UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI
Date:______
I, ______, hereby submit this work as part of the requirements for the degree of: in:
It is entitled:
This work and its defense approved by:
Chair: ______
RETHINKING THE AXIS:
APPROACHES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNIST
INITIATED/UNCOMPLETED ARCHITECTURE IN BUCHAREST AFTER
1989.
A Thesis submitted to the Division of Research and Advanced Studies at the University of Cincinnati
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN ARCHITECTURE
In the School of Architecture and Interior Design at the College of Design, Architecture, Art and Planning
2006
by
Mihai Ivan
Master of Architecture, Institute of Architecture and Urban Planning, Bucharest, 2003.
Committee Chair: Nnamdi Elleh Committee Members: John E. Hancock Menelaos Triantafillou
i ABSTRACT
Romanian contemporary history was marked by a turning point in 1989. Following more than 42 years of successive totalitarian regimes, the nation shifted to an incipient and fragile democracy. While new social and political orders have been established, other areas like the built environment still retain rather ambiguous features. The best example is the barely touched gaping wound produced by the vast communist urban and architectural interventions in the capital city of Bucharest. Envisioning the long overdue elaboration of an official master plan for the central area of the city, this thesis seeks to explore the possibilities for the evolution of the development, focusing on the main element: the uncompleted communist- initiated two-mile long esplanade which cuts through the center of Bucharest. The local history, the local attempts to bring change and similar case studies are to be analyzed in order to define the actual grounds on which change can occur.
KEYWORDS
Demolition, reconstruction, communist architecture, Bucharest, Romania.
ii
iii DEDICATION
To my parents and Andra.
iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am greatly indebted to my advisor Nnamdi Elleh who has supervised this thesis from the
very beginning with amazing and inspiring insights and comments. I would like to express
my special thanks to John E. Hancock and Menelaos Triantafillou, who were always motivated readers and critics. I am indebted to the care and stylistic grace that my committee at the University of Cincinnati has brought to this writing over the past two years. My special thanks goes to Professor Augustin Ioan at the Institute of Architecture and Urban Planning of
Bucharest, who has been a great example to follow in exploring my thesis topic.
For many gestures of kindness and words of encouragement offered during the passage of
this text completion, I would like to express a strong sense of gratitude to my always
supportive professors: Jim Bradford, David Saile and Elizabeth Riorden, as well as to my
colleagues and peers: Silvia Gugu, Siddharth Puri, Ferenc Traser, Laura Vas, Ruchi Mehta,
and Banu Bedel.
This thesis could not have been finished without the encouragement and fortitude of my girlfriend Andra and my parents, who endured this long process with me, always offering support hand and love.
v TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ...... ii KEYWORDS ...... ii DEDICATION ...... iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... v TABLE OF CONTENTS...... 1 ILLUSTRATIONS...... 3 INTRODUCTION ...... 7
CHAPTER ONE – BUCHAREST, A HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE...... 14
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES ...... 14 HISTORY LESSONS ...... 17 THE PRE-COMMUNIST PERIOD ...... 22 THE BIRTH OF NATIONAL STYLES...... 22 THE MODERN MOVEMENT ...... 25 THE COMMUNIST REGIMES. 1947-1989...... 30 THE COMMUNIST RECONSTRUCTION. BUCHAREST 1980 – 1989...... 37 PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION ...... 37 NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION ...... 45 REASONING – STATED INTENTIONS VERSUS REAL INTENTIONS...... 46 ECONOMY ...... 48 STYLE ...... 49 SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS ...... 50 THE POST-1989 CONDITION OF THE UNCOMPLETED PROJECT...... 52 THE UNCOMPLETED PROJECT IN THE POST- COMMUNIST SOCIO-POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT…………………………………………………………………...... 55 THE ROMANIAN CIVIL SOCIETY...... 58 THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE EMERGING FINANCIAL GROUPS...... 62
CHAPTER TWO – LOCAL APPROACHES...... 65
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES ...... 65 THE “BUCHAREST 2000” COMPETITION ...... 67 THE THEME – MOTIVATIONS AND GOALS ...... 69 THE IDEALISTIC CHARACTER OF THE COMPETITION...... 71 THE WINNING PROJECT...... 74 CONCLUSION...... 77 THE COMPETITIONS FOR THE PATRIARCHAL ORTHODOX CATHEDRAL, 1999-2002...... 79 THEME ...... 80 REASONING...... 82 THE SITES ...... 82
1 CONCLUSION...... 86 THE “ESPLANADA” DEVELOPMENT ...... 87 WRITINGS, ARTICLES, CONFERENCES ...... 90 NEIL LEACH – “ARCHITECTURE AND REVOLUTION” ...... 92 DANA HARHOIU...... 94 AUGUSTIN IOAN...... 95 PERIODICALS AND NEWSPAPERS...... 98 ALTERNATIVE PROJECTS...... 100 “HABITAT AND ART IN ROMANIA” FOUNDATION – HAR ...... 100 THE GROUPS OF URBAN ACTION ...... 101 WORKSHOPPING BUCHAREST ...... 102 CHAPTER CONCLUSION...... 103
CHAPTER THREE – ALTERNATIVE VISIONS ...... 106
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES ...... 106 BERLIN...... 108 DANIEL LIBESKIND ...... 114 LEBBEUS WOODS...... 117 REM KOOLHAAS – THE GENERIC CITY ...... 121 CHAPTER CONCLUSION...... 126
CONCLUSION ...... 128
REFRENCES...... 134
2 ILLUSTRATIONS
1. The Plan of Bucharest, 1846. Harhoiu, Dana. Bucuresti, un Oras intre Orient si
Occident. (Rom. Bucharest, a City Between Occident and Orient). Bucuresti:
Editura Simetria, Uniunea Arhitectilor din Romania si Arcub, 1997, p 27.
2. The Manuc Inn, inner court. Ibid., p 99.
3. The Patria Inn, Ibid., p 100.
4. The Romanian Post Office Headquarters, today The Museum of National History
Ibid., p 106.
5. The Adriatica and Agricola Insurance Companies, Ibid., p 106.
6. The Magheru Boulevard around 1940. Ibid., p 126.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Horia Creanga: villa Elisabeta Cantacuzino, 1934. Machedon, Luminita and Ernie
Scoffham. Romanian Modernism. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999. p 123.
11. Marcel Janco: Paul Wexler villa, 1931. Ibid., p 135.
12. The major grid of the modern city overlapping the medieval city tissue. Harhoiu,
Dana. Bucuresti, un Oras intre Orient si Occident. (Rom. Bucharest, a City
Between Occident and Orient). Bucuresti: Editura Simetria, Uniunea Arhitectilor
din Romania si Arcub, 1997, p 62.
3 13. The Publishing House, Bucharest, 1950-1951. Leach, Neil. Architecture and
revolution. London: Routledge, 1999. p 62.
14. Open-Air Theater, Bucuresti, 1953. Ionescu, Grigore. Arhitectura pe teritoriul
Romaniei de-a lungul veacurilor. (Rom: The Architecture on Romanian Territory
along the centuries). Bucuresti: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania,
1982.
15. Suceava Hospital. Ibid., p 640.
16. Apartment units. Ibid., p 647.
17. The “Brancovenesc” Hospital during demolition in 1985. Harhoiu, Dana.
Bucuresti, un Oras intre Orient si Occident. (Rom. Bucharest, a City Between
Occident and Orient). Bucuresti: Editura Simetria, Uniunea Arhitectilor din
Romania si Arcub, 1997, p 18.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p 14.
20. Ibid., p 15.
21. Satellite view of the central area of Bucharest. Image from Google Earth.
22. Aerial view of the uncompleted project.
http://www.vterrain.org/Locations/ro/zep_aerial.html
23. Author.
24. http://www.geocities.co.jp/SilkRoad/9268/2003.romania.htm
25. http://hem.passagen.se/finels/fotosajt/casa.htm
26. http://oasis.halfmoon.jp/extphoto/romania_main.html
27-32. Author.
4 33. Historical timeline. Author.
34. Cristea, Doina. Urban planning competition "Bucharest 2000”. Bucharest:
SIMETRIA, 1995. p 39.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p 38.
37. Ibid., p 78.
38. Ibid., p 80.
39. Satellite view of the central area of Bucharest. Google Earth.
40. Concursuri pentru catedrala patriarhala ortodoxa : 1999-2002, Bucuresti : NOI
Media Print, p 39.
41. Ibid., p 25.
42. Ibid., p 62-63.
43. The Esplanada project. Buletin Informativ al Filialei Teritoriale Bucuresti a
Ordinului Arhitectilor din Romania. Decembrie-Ianuarie (2005-2006). Bucuresti,
p 30.
44. The Esplanada project. http://www.oar-bucuresti.ro/evenimente/simpozion-
2005/index.html.
45. Author.
46. Author.
47. Woods, Lebbeus. Radical Reconstruction. New York: Princeton Architectural
Press, 1998, p 81.
48. Ibid., p 76.
49. Ibid., p 77.
5 50. Koolhaas, Rem and Bruce Mau. Small, Medium, Large and Extra-Large: Office
for Metropolitan Architecture. New York: Monacelli Press, 1995. p 1060.
51. Ibid., p 1216-1217.
6 INTRODUCTION
1989 represented for Eastern Europe a major turning point in many aspects of life. It was when the Soviet Union and its international agenda that was predicated on total isolation of its spheres of political influences—Eastern Europe, also known as the Warsaw Pact— fell and instantaneously began the gradual march towards reintegration to the rest of the world, especially Western Europe. With the decline of the threat of an all-out nuclear war that could take place between the United States-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), and the Soviet-led Eastern Block that characterized the Cold War, the re- emergence of Eastern Europe as part of the global community that had the potential to be culturally, economically, and politically connected to Western Europe was marked by substantial enthusiasm by the people who reside in the various countries of the former
Eastern Block. However, the radical transition from one political system to another proved to be much more difficult and challenging than the leaders of the countries and their respective populations had envisaged. All efforts to transform the newly decolonized former Eastern Block countries from communist rule to democratic rule were met with resistance. Here, the spheres of architecture and urban design were not exempt from the controversies that embroiled the countries from communist to democratic rule.
After 42 years of oppressive regimes, in the domains of architectural and urban design practices, the Romanian transition experiences from communist to democratic rule were marked by problems related to the absence of private property, the forced urbanization of
7 a large number of human settlements without adequate infrastructure to support the new
settlements, and the large scale instantaneous capitalist investments from around the
world that poured into the newly decolonized country. The transition was marked by
large scale poverty and disillusionment, as well as individual and social isolations among
different emergent social groups, isolations which can be described as economic and
political winners and losers during the national transition programs from communist to democratic rule. In addition, while some areas such as the press found it easy to make
the transition to the democratic rule through active reporting of events within the new
political practices shortly after 1989, the scars left by the uncompleted socialist initiated
urban and architectural design projects were far more difficult to manage and repair by
the newly emergent leaderships in Romanian cities.
This thesis will focus on one major uncompleted communist initiated urban and
architectural design project in the center of the capital city Bucharest. It was the largest
and the most radical urban and architectural development project in the history of
Romania and it has been identified as the ‘uncompleted’ communist project as it was
“still unfinished at the time of Ceausescu’s overthrow and execution in 1989.”1
Originally a historical residential and commercial district which developed organically
through several hundred years, the area was partially demolished in order to
accommodate a vast urban reconstruction development initiated by the communist regime
in the 1980’s during the reign of Ceausescu. More than one sixth of the historical core of
Bucharest was demolished. The purpose of the boulevard was the celebration of the
communist inspired political order: “a gigantic, ideological scheme grounded in the
1 Neil Leach, Architecture and revolution (London: Routledge, 1999), 9.
8 glorification of power.”2 The demolition of a valuable, traditional urban heritage that was once built around religious edifices and important works of architecture, as well as the gigantic scale of the communist intervention inflicted a gaping wound both upon the urban tissue and upon the population’s urban memory. In addition, demolitions of existing urban fabrics in order to make way for the vast boulevard irreversibly isolated neighborhoods that were once connected to become urban islands of their own, and interrupted important circulation patterns that had connected different nodes of the city.
Presently, after fifteen years of incipient democracy, the center of Bucharest is characterized by two major aspects: fragmentary interventions on the uncompleted communist government urban design and monumental architectural projects that were designed to constitute the fronts of the boulevard; numerous debates, architectural and urban design competitions, and proposals aim to articulate the meaning(s) of the monumental projects. The dual complexity is made worse by the fact that the Romanian government could not just erase the project from the slate and make it go away. In addition, given the lack of expertise or official regulations concerning the evolution of the uncompleted communist initiated project, the center of Bucharest began to evolve in a chaotic manner after the fall of communism in 1989. Worse, the current image of the development reveals rough concrete block architecture that has become heavily politicized as a symbol of communist failures. Moreover, the slowness and the small scale of the interventions that have been implemented have not helped to put a much more received image on the structures that line the boulevard. Evolutionary in its
2 Dana Harhoiu, Bucharest, a city between Orient and Occident (Bucuresti : Editura Simetria, Uniunea Arhitectilor din Romania si Arcub, 1997), 18.
9 essence, the present process of remaking the communist initiated project can be seen as
summarizing the way an already disturbed environment composed of totalitarian structures is attacked by fragmentary and uncoordinated alterations, and it expands the scars left by the past interventions, eventually decreasing the chances of authorities being able to come up with a coherent holistic urban and architectural design answer to the
project. In addition to the economic and political constraints that negatively impact the project, the question of an overall approach to this problem still remains largely unexplored.
This study proposes the investigation of the development possibilities of the wounded
city focusing on one of its most symptomatic objects: its spinal cord, the two-mile long
axis that stretches along the central area of the city. It is the emblematic structure of
communism that still lives and evolves today. Designed as a large boulevard bordered by
buildings in order to accommodate military parades, this urban element represents the ultimate gesture of the regime’s oppressive dominance over the city. While The People’s
House represents an accent in the urban tissue, the broad dimensions of the axis render it influential over several areas of the city. The elements that dominate the axis currently are the new offices for banks, retail spaces, and upscale apartments. Given the context, it was the natural way of development considering the lack of any expansion plan or of any major financial resources. Most of the newly emerged structures can be characterized by terms like small scale and fragmentary.
10 While anticipating the promulgation of urban planning regulations which are overdue for the control of development along the boulevard, as well as the continued emergence of large-scale financial investments, this paper will attempt to make an inventory of all the developments that have been proposed for the reconstruction of the unfinished communist initiated monumental urban design in Bucharest, and define a framework for future interventions. While the local proposals seem to be the most coherent and realistic for the development of the boulevard, the incentive to analyze a series of related contemporary debates about how to rebuild the monumental parts of a city is increased by the need to learn from similar projects from around the world, especially from Europe where Berlin was rebuilt as a capital city following unification of East and West
Germany.
The first chapter will give an overview of the local context in which the project was initiated and implemented. Historical data about the city emphasizing its urban and architectural evolution is provided. The chapter will focus on the description of the communist architecture, especially on the evolution of the ‘uncompleted project’ between
1980 and 1989. Arguing that the built environment can be closely related to the political structures and functioning of the Romanian nation, especially during the totalitarian communist years of government, providing facts about the national politics are crucially important for this thesis. An analysis which closely examines how the structures and functions of national government (as well as ideological orientation) are reflected in the architectural practices of the state will be helpful in our understanding of how the post-
11 communist society is evolving, and particularly why the project that reminds the people
of the communist eras is highly contentious.
The core of the thesis will be the second chapter. The most influential competitions that
have impacted the development of the boulevard, research, and writing outcomes about
the development of the area will also be analyzed. For example, this study will explain
how and why “Bucharest 2000” and “The Competition for the Orthodox Patriarchal
Cathedral” are the most significant national and international events that focused on
proposals to deal with the axis. Moreover, the thesis will argue that recent large-scale
developments that are proposed for the area—which are sensitive to the anticipated urban
development regulations for the boulevard —are more realistic and economically
achievable than the results that were proposed by the competitions. The “Esplanada”
development is the most recent proposal in that direction. The writings of the most
influential critics like Augustin Ioan and Dana Harhoiu provide useful insights for
theorizing about the present Romanian urban development in Bucharest. Even though the
voice of civil society lacks coherence and agreement and is often characterized by
isolationism and provincialism along interest groups, articles from cultural periodicals like “Dilema” and “22”, or by urban attitude groups will also be investigated.
The third chapter will emphasize the relevance of contemporary theories about the city,
focusing on the particular ones which deal with the specific situation of reconstructing
cities and the common issues that affect the capital cities of former East European
countries. In order to support the analysis major voices in current city planning theory
12 will be considered. Similar reconstruction processes like Berlin, utopian projects
(Lebbeus Woods for Sarajevo), and radical theories (Rem Koolhaas and Daniel
Libeskind) will also be discussed. The purpose of these approaches is to find
contemporary understandings of how other nations and theorists are looking at similar
problems such as the unfinished monumental Bucharest boulevard.
Through the analysis provided, the study attempts to define the actual grounds on which a
new architecture has the chance to emerge during the completion of the unfinished projects of the communist regimes. The conclusion of the thesis will try to narrow down
the subject to a few main topics such as history versus tabula rasa, preservation versus
radical reconstruction, predictions about the future society, and how to deal with the
multiplicity of ideas and concepts. Although a difficult task, and also one “long
overdue”3 (as Augustin Ioan has put it) the study proposes a reassessment of the diseased
‘heritage’, while making certain aspects of the communist remnants from which the
society of Romania have benefited operational, rather than constantly eliminating the past
from any contemporary responses to the problems of the nation.
3 Augustin Ioan, “Bucharest - Lately,” article to be published, 2005.
13
CHAPTER ONE
BUCHAREST: A HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE
The years of communist power have marked the city with urban projects that are important for their true significance, and what is this but a genuine cultural tragedy in two senses: one, the destruction of the traditionally established values, belonging to the memory of the town; the other, at the same time, the implantation of a gigantic group of buildings in the most critical part of the city, whose only achievement is the celebration of the power of having done so.4
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
By studying general facts about the urban and architectural context of Bucharest, the first
chapter proposes to familiarize the reader with the object of research and provide a series
of historical insights that are relevant to the project from several standpoints. The
architectural and urban evolution of the city will be emphasized along its main stages of evolution in the last hundred years. As architecture does not materialize independently of political, economic, and technological cultures, the political and social aspects which characterize each stage of the development of the city up to the period of the evolution of the grandiose totalitarian boulevard project will be highlighted.
In order to better understand why the issue of communist architectural and urban design
remnants needs special attention in contemporary Romania, the remaining features of
4 Harhoiu, 13.
14 urban structure of Bucharest after the massive demolitions, the unfinished communist planned urban and architectural designs and constructions for the ceremonial boulevard, as well as the newly emerged urban patterns following the fall of the communist regime are going to be considered. In this regard the three main evolutionary steps of the
Romanian architectural history will be described. They are:
1) The pre-communist period with a special focus on the first decades from the beginning of the 20th century until 1947. 2) The communist period with the different successive regimes between 1947 and 1989. 3) 1989 to the present characterized by the emergence of a democratic regime.
Each epoch retains a unique characteristic that transformed the city in different ways. A gradual understanding of these three main periods of time will give insight into the main features of the local and national background, the relevant influences over the city regarding different types of architectural styles, and the actual configuration of the place.
The specific features of the place are relevant when one begins to analyze the context where the communist reconstruction became a major part of it.
Before taking into consideration the results of the attempts to restructure the area affected by the communist architecture in Bucharest, it is necessary to understand the reasoning behind the initiation of such post-communist developments. By concentrating on the developments in the city, it will be argued that the intervention was harmful for the city.
Unlike many other similar urban interventions which were questioned at the time of their planning and implementation—for example, the Baron Haussmann’s boulevards in
Paris— Nicolae Ceausescu’s project in Bucharest was probably inspired by the need to
15 construct the kind of monumental boulevard that was reminiscent of the twentieth century
urban design where military parades and show of national forces were displayed for the
banal purposes of elevating the powers of the leaders. This was particularly important for
a totalitarian state that was closely tied to the Soviet Union, but which also wanted to
impress the authorities in Moscow. The contrast is clarified by Thomas Hall (1997/1999,
64) who writes that the expansion of the boulevards of Paris was:
A question of encouraging progressive investments in development and infrastructure, of creating jobs and improving conditions for the masses. But it was certainly just as important to Louis [XIIth] to demonstrate his own forcefulness and to complete his famous uncle’s great urban development project which had been lying fallow during the allegedly feeble regime of the interim period.5
The current post-communist era redevelopment proposals along the boulevard maintain a series of complex issues that obliges this study to look at the political regimes that played
a crucial role in the evolution of the city during the latter part of the twentieth century. It
is a feature specific to the communist decades, when the urban and architectural developments were among the most influential ways to express the regime’s absolute authority. The styles of the architectural scheme, the grandiose size of the development, and the materials used in the urban and architectural developments were also tightly connected to the agenda of the totalitarian regime. However, since 1989, the new
‘democratic’ political culture has left its own marks over the recent architectural developments along the boulevard, but unlike the powers wielded by the Ceausescu regime, the post-communist developments reflect a new power: the powers of the emergent Romanian financial elite.
5 See Thomas Hall, Planning Aspects of Europe’s Century Capital Cities, Aspects of Nineteenth Century Urban Development (London: E & FN SPON, 1997/1999), 64.
16 Considering the current approaches towards the interventions, one will notice the lack of
interest of the civil society in the development of the boulevard, while contrastingly,
there is a constant and influential pressure from the members of the political classes. As a
result, the majority of voices which are able to articulate the significance of developing
the boulevard for the purposes of common good are mostly from the academic (and thus
a very closed and isolated) circle whose views on the redevelopment of the boulevard do
not reach the larger Romanian society. Finally, the lack of adequate regulations and the
corrupted condition of the architectural profession in the country cannot be overlooked in
any discussion that focuses on the reconstruction of the boulevard.
HISTORY LESSONS
Bucharest does not have a very long history or at least it does not leave that impression
on a passer-by through the city. A simple walk through the city’s central area will reveal
a mixture of buildings and architectural styles, interrupted textures, mixed or disappeared
layers, and contradictions. The striking disorder indicates a disturbed evolution both in
historical and urban terms. There are few critical texts on the urban evolution of
Bucharest. However, Luminita Machedon6 and Dana Harhoiu7, as well as the historians
Grigore Ionescu and Gheorghe Curinschi-Vorona, have made significant contributions by analyzing various stages of the city’s history.
6 Luminita Machedon has thoroughly analyzed the modernist productions and their present status. 7 Dana Harhoiu focused on the local and external cultural influences over the city.
17 Although initially inhabited by occupying Romans, the first recorded settlement of
Bucharest dates back to the 13th century. Founded as “a line of defense against the
Ottomans, for Christianity”8 the main activities in the city were mainly related to
commerce thanks to its central position in the Wallachian Field, as well as its relatively
short distance from the Danube. The geographical position of Bucharest has both positive
and negative influences on the city and on the whole country. Culturally, it acted as a
catalyst for the meeting of Western and Oriental cultures, allowing both to contribute to
the national identity of the country. On the other hand, politically and socially, Bucharest
has always been a place dominated by wars and civil disturbances until very recently.
The war of independence took place in 1877, despite the fact that the formation of the
Romanian states can be dated to 1600. Struggling to face the pressures on the country by
competing Eastern and Western powers is a major theme in the national history of
Romania. The prolonged defensive position that was maintained by the country is reflected in the poor development of the cities throughout the country. The long periods of fighting and civil disturbances favored the development of defensive and religious architecture. Until the nineteenth century Bucharest developed slowly, experiencing constant periods of Ottoman occupation, which facilitated the economic and commercial growth of the city but also limited the evolution of the traditional styles of architecture in favor of the Oriental cultural influences and mentality.
A major break happened in 1821 when the long Ottoman Oriental domination ceased and
independence was proclaimed. The moment marked the beginning of the configuration of
8 Harhoiu, 21.
18 a national identity, a rupture with the Eastern culture and an adoption of a lifestyle
“reaching European standards.”9 The French culture and lifestyle became so influential
that towards the beginning of the twentieth century Bucharest was called the “Little-
Paris” thanks to the multitude of French-Romanticist style buildings and a frenetic
embracing of the French language and lifestyle by the Romanian people. Even today the
most representative administrative or cultural edifices date from that eclectic period.
Another major influence was determined by almost a hundred years of German
monarchy. The idea of a foreign ruler, and especially a monarchy, was considered in
order to settle the tumultuous political scene. The decades under the rule of the monarchy
marked a flourishing development and a constant modernization of the nation. The
monarchy decades marked the introduction of Germanic styles buildings, especially in
the official architecture, of palaces and administrative buildings. The local culture
however, remained prevalent.
The event that decisively influenced the fate of the country but also the reaffirmation of
Bucharest as a major city in the Eastern European area was the 1918 union of all
Romanian provinces under one single state. An immense enthusiasm and optimism
marked the event that materialized in an unpredicted general development as well as
openness towards the international scene. Bucharest became “the capital of a country
whose area had doubled.”10 It was the period that produced the most famous musicians
9 Dinu C. Giurescu and Stephen Fischer-Galati, ed., Romania – A Historic Perspective (New York : Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1998), 208. 10 Luminita Machedon and Ernie Scoffham, Romanian Modernism – The Architecture of Bucharest 1920- 1940 (Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press, 1999), 53.
19 and philosophers, and also left a rich and valuable built environment modeled by the
modernist ideas of the time. Unfortunately, the process was violently slowed by the
beginning of World War II and completely stopped in 1947 once the first communist
regime took over the political arena.
The next 45 years meant a total rupture from the freshly achieved relations with the
Western World and marked a total obedience towards the Russian communist regimes.
“The radical transformation of the country was most apparent in the socioeconomic
area”.11 All the previously accepted values and accomplishments in all fields were to be
replaced by a new scale of values imposed by the new socialist order. In terms of political events, the king was exiled and Romania became a republic, and the formerly known idea of liberty or liberty of speech acquired new connotations. The long period of total isolation materialized in an absolute deterioration of cultural life – poverty, obedience and constraints being the words for the five decades that can be described as a period of
“dark history.”
1989 marked the latest shift in Romanian history. The fall of the communist regime
marked the hesitant and enthusiastic beginning of a new order. The events that followed
in the city of Bucharest in the fields of architecture and urban planning—whether they
disturbed the whole context of the reconstruction and completion of the communist
11 Stephen Fischer-Galati, “Romania Under Communism” in Romania – A Historic Perspective, ed. Dinu
C. Giurescu and Stephen Fischer-Galati, 441 (New York : Distributed by Columbia University Press,
1998).
20 initiated projects or they facilitated their development—are still debatable subjects.
However, this thesis will try to approach the subject of architecture and its relation to the
city of Bucharest and the Romanian society as a whole with caution.
In Romania, there was always a major shift of ideology with every new regime that came
to power; often such shifts in government ideology were also reflected in the national
architectural practices around the country. In addition, there is no doubt that the moments
of economic prosperity left the most visible marks over the architectural heritage of the
city of Bucharest; for example, one can mention the modernist times between the World
Wars and the prolonged periods of the communist regime between 1947 and 1989. Each period produced its own unique building styles based on its ideological orientation.
1. The Borroczyn Plan, 1846. The map suggests that the city still retains an organic structure until the nineteenth century, with no visible major intervention.
21 12 THE PRE-COMMUNIST PERIOD
THE BIRTH OF NATIONALIST STYLES
In terms of city development, few radical changes happened in Bucharest before the second half of the nineteenth century. Views of the city always resembled a vernacular commercial small-town center rather than a European capital city. In his book about
Romanian Architecture, Grigore Ionescu calls this state of affairs “architecture without architects.” This was due in part to the territorial division prior to the unification of all
Romanian regions and thus the weakness of the political and administrative centers.
“Bucharest developed during the Middle Ages as an idiosyncratic maze of narrow lanes and low buildings, then remade itself again in the late nineteenth century in the image of
Paris”.13 1848 marked one of the periods for the creation of a number of modern nation states in Europe, and it ushered into the Romanian nation the founding of the first
architecture school. The school facilitated the creation of new architectural styles in an attempt to create semi-vernacular nationalist architecture for the country while also adopting some of the international trends in order for the country not to be left behind.
With the consolidation of the Romanian nation state and its capital in Bucharest, and
falling behind many European countries in the industrialization process (around thirty
12 Augustin Ioan claims in Power, play and national identity (Bucharest: The Romanian Cultural Foundation – Publishing House, 1999) that only the latest hundred years of Romanian architecture can be considered as participating to the creation of urban qualities of Bucharest. 13 Robert Neuwirth, “City, interrupted,” Metropolis 16, no.8 (1997): 35.
22 years after the Western world), authorities of Romania realized that the city of Bucharest needed modern infrastructure. The response to that came through the Neo-Romanian movement, a name designating a filtered academic style of the traditional shapes and proportions, driven by modern construction techniques and Western European influences.
In his book Power, Play and National Identity, Augustin Ioan (2002) reveals and makes an inventory of the main features of the eclectic architectural style, analyzing it as predecessor of the modernist movement. The movement involved all programs of architecture—the development of small scale projects such as dwellings and the neighborhoods to larger scale projects such as administrative and political establishments—and the task of the program also included giving a certain identity to the city of Bucharest, and ultimately to the Romanian nation.
2-3. The historical core retains the character of an old commercial city.
23
4. Nineteenth century architecture was strongly influenced by the French culture: The Romanian Post Office Headquarters, today The Museum of National History. 5. The Adriatica and Agricola Insurance Companies, today apartment buildings in the central area of Bucharest.
Concerning urban planning, it was the first time when certain regulations of the existing
street grids were put in place. The urban development program consisted of paving and
adjusting the existing urban pattern. However, “[none] of these changes significantly
altered the configuration of the affected towns”14 in Romania. Being a predominantly agricultural society, the modernization efforts did not change the structure of Bucharest.
The emphasis on architecture was on projects of small scale, a characteristic that even provided design examples for the later modernist periods in the twentieth century. The end of the nineteenth century marked the first time when elaborated plans of the city were put together in an anticipation of an upcoming development.
The Neo-Romanian period made an important contribution because it was the first time
that architecture and the profession of architect were introduced locally by taking them
14 Machedon and Scoffham, 75.
24 from the academic environment and bringing them to the service of the people through urban and architectural designs. Different groups and trends were established, allowing further development of the discipline. Although marked by arguable eclectic features, combining different styles (local, oriental, or newly acquired western influences) the moment marked the introduction of the institutionalized architectural discipline, which in turn also set the framework for the following trends.
THE MODERN MOVEMENT
The modern movement impacted Romanian local architectural and urban developments between the two World Wars. In Romania the modern movement was received as a part of a larger cultural movement with international connections and openness towards the occidental world. The moment marked the first time in the national cultural history of the country when a worldwide phenomenon was penetrating the multitude of traditional architectural styles. The particular characteristic of Romanian modern work, however, was the movement’s constant association with tradition; many of the architectural historians criticized its relatively impure or what they perceived as its hybrid character.
While architects like Marcel Janco were more connected to the European artistic and architectural avant-garde movements, others like Horia Creanga and Octav Doicescu preferred “the formal simplicity of vernacular architecture and translated it to a new level of interpretation,”15 within the country.
15 Machedon and Scoffham, 53.
25 From an architectural standpoint, the movement gained considerable popularity due to the fact that industrialization of the country was at its peak: there was an enormous need for construction ranging from housing to administrative and factory buildings. Bucharest gained a major boost in terms of construction between 1920 and 1940. Thanks to the scale of the projects, the achievements of that era in Romanian architectural experience are still visible among the different fabrics of the city. The achievements ranged from large boulevards to entire neighborhoods, and the areas retain a unified modernist character. The masterpieces of the modern movement are to be found especially among the small scale of single family homes and in fragmentary clusters as large-scale housing developments.
By 1947, when the modern movement abruptly ended, “Ninety percent of the city was
new, but the street network was unchanged, the property holdings were unchanged, and
the one family house was still the basis of the urban development.”16 The modernist
epoch had indeed only a small effect upon the built environment in Bucharest: Arguably,
its success was mostly due to its respect for the existing major axes of the city which
contributed to the overall quality of the built environment, but the large-scale urban
design projects remained pure utopias on paper. An example of urban development is the
reconstruction of the existing North-South axis – the Balcescu-Magheru Boulevard, a
unique example for the unity and constant display of the modernist principles.
16 Giurescu and Fischer-Galati, 123.
26 In 1934 the first modernist Master Plan for the city and urban policies emerged however
they remained mostly on paper. The driving principles for the authors of the Master Plan
insisted on the implementation of ideas like “Everything that is acceptable must be
preserved” and more radical concepts “Life in the middle of nature.”17 The idea of
creating a garden city where the peripheral greenery penetrated towards the central areas
came from the rural character of the marginal neighborhoods but also from the utopian projects of the time like the German ‘Siedlungen’18 and Tony Garnier’s projects for
industrial cities.19 The north part of Bucharest was the only one that evolved in such a
way, and presently is considered the upscale neighborhood of the city. However, this kind
of successful development was not carried out all over the city, partly because of
economic reasons and partly because of its difficult applicability over undeveloped areas
of the city. Thus, the city still provided the perception of a small rural trade center
remained. The eventual flaws—like the lack of focal points (civic or cultural center) or its
fragmentary character—were to be highlighted by the communist regimes in order to
justify the large scale urban interventions.
17 Machedon and Scoffham, 87. 18 See Udo Kultermann, Architecture in the 20th century (New York : Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1993), 47. 19 See Tony Garnier, Une cité industrielle : Etude Pour la Construction des Villes (New York : Princeton Architectural Press, 1989).
27
6-9. Between 1920 and 1940 Bucharest acquired a regularization of the major existing urban axes. Views of Magheru Boulevard, the North-South redeveloped axis.
10-11. During the inter-war period a special accent was put on residential architecture and small scale structures. Single family homes by Horia Creanga and Marcel Janco.
28 Strangely enough and opposed to the mainstream, Marcel Janco20 was describing in an
article titled “Toward an Architecture for Bucharest.” In his writings, Janco states that
the urban status of Bucharest was in crisis and he pleades for “a complete remaking” of
the city. It should be noted that Janco was largely influenced by Le Corbusier’s discourse
La Ville Radieuse.21 Janco’s proposals were motivated by the need to accommodate the
fast industrial development which was complicated by a non-linear, traditional,
meandering city street system. Janco’s claims were based on the poor infrastructure and
the unhygienic environment that were not able to cope with the Romanian industrial
revolution.
The modern movement in Romania emerged later than the development of the
movements in other parts of Western Europe, and it also ended sooner in 1947 when the
first communist regime was enthroned. After 1947, the era of the emerging socialist
doctrines, the Modern Movement in Romania was considered “the epitome of the
bourgeois mentality”22 and decadence and it was instantly sentenced to a list of
unacceptable ideas with its promoters. The elimination of the Modern Movement from
the Romanian architectural scene and discourses meant that more than twenty years of
continuous and evolving movement was again interrupted not by a major change in cultural life but by a shift in political ideology which favored the communist regime.
20 Machedon and Scoffham, 79. 21 See Kenneth Frampton, Modern Architecture, a Critical History (New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1980) 178. 22 Robert Neuwirth, “Modernist Bucharest Ages,” Metropolis 16, no.8 (1997): 37.
29
12. The major modernist revised axes overlapped over the organic city. To be noted are the major North- South axis and the less developed East-West one. The orange diagonal line represents the Dambovita River.
THE COMMUNIST REGIMES. 1947-1989
In 1947 Romania’s monarchic regime was replaced with the rise of communist power.
The following 42 years meant the abandonment of the modernist current that emerged
during the inter war years; fragments of the modernist concepts were precariously
reassessed for short periods of time during the 1960’s. Henceforth, the whole communist
30 era was marked by several different so-called “styles” in response to the political
orientations of the successive totalitarian regimes. A common characteristic of all
communist decades was the clear subordination of the architectural program and of the
profession of architecture to the totalitarian political aims. The communist doctrine had the ultimate goal of creating a revolutionary new society, and as a medium architecture
“represented one of the most efficient” modes for transmitting the ideals of the socialist regime because it is “as an art with a public visibility.”23 The most important aspect when
studying the evolution of the national architectural and urban developments is the high
political dependence of Romania on the USSR. Subordination to a totalitarian regime
meant following the same ideological guidelines of the supreme country, the USSR,
despite certain local peculiarities of Romania. For a better understanding of the influence of the era upon the development of Romanian architecture and society one has to divide the 42 years of totalitarian domination into three periods:
1) The period immediately after 1947 marked by the Stalinist discourse, violently rejecting any external-Western influence and constantly grounding the discourse in humanist principles. 2) The 1954 era, represented by Nikita Krushchev’s24 speech, which in terms of architecture meant a return of certain modernist concepts, and the abandonment of classical collection of styles promoted by Stalin. 3) 1977 – 1989, the period of rupture from the USSR’s influence and the beginning of an isolationist discourse, marked by the Ceausescu regime. Here it is important to mention that the last period provides the central topic for this thesis – the communist reconstruction of Bucharest.
23 Carmen Popescu, “Deconstructing Formalism: Socialist Realism versus Modernist Architecture”. Paper presented at the DoCoMoMo conference, New York, 2004. 24 President of USSR between 1953-1964
31
13-14. The Stalinist period was dominated by a monumentalization of the public architecture. The classical orders were used here for the Press House and an open air theater.
Even if building is “the soundest evidence of a how strong and stable a given regime
was”25, the specifics of the communist approach towards architecture were represented
by a step back from the real needs of the society, while focusing on praising the ideological symbols through constructions. For example, a feature of the first period, the
Stalinist Socialist Realism was to monumentalize the image of the city by rebuilding some of the major axes of Bucharest and adding a series of representative buildings. In order to acquire the desired monumentality, accents were built along and at the end of the largest boulevard. The most suggestive structures are the Press House and extensive apartment neighborhoods on the outskirts of the city. The new style consistently affected all programs in order to render omnipresent the Marxist concept of equality between individuals. Since the celebration of the new communist ideology was above any other reasoning, the costs of the projects became unlimited. The reaffirmation of a new identity was thought to be interpreted in architecture by going back to the classicist roots, to the idea of the perennial, by trying to recreate what the ancient civilizations managed to leave behind thousands of years ago.
25 Ioan, Power, Play and National Identity, 195.
32
The birth of a style by using the large classical vocabulary was associated with the eternal
values represented by Greek or Roman architecture, but it was also the opportunity to
make a radical shift from the sleek modernist guidelines. The idea “to give to the people columns”26 was part of the plan to create a “welcoming, human architecture, founded on
the tradition of the people, conscious of the values of the present and building a luminous
future.”27 The ideology was even more subtle: the politics of collage and pastiche
searched for “reviving a popular adherence to certain systems of values and power.”28 At
the same time the extensive use of a uniform aspect for all built environments provided
the idea of equality.
The approach was automatically adopted in 1947 and lasted during the first decades of
communist regimes, influencing all the states in the Eastern European region. It
ultimately faded when a certain rationalization of the concepts and of the financial
resources invested in the movement was considered. Probably the most important causes
of its failures were the death of its strongest promoter—Stalin—and the poor economic
conditions of the nations concerned.
The major shift in the approach towards the relation between buildings and ideology
happened in 1954, with Nikita Khrushchev’s discourse. Although the new president of
the USSR presented a politically focused discourse, “this speech was meant to be a
26 Ibid., 59. 27 Popescu, 7. 28 Ioan, Power, Play and National Identity, 74.
33 manifesto against Socialist Realism as the most representative expression of Stalinism.”29
The message radically affected the following decades of communist architecture. By criticizing the previous approaches towards ways of building (over-decorated, monumental, out of scale, waste of materials), Khrushchev advocated more rational building techniques, prefabrication and mass production. In other words, although the base reasoning was totally different, the discourse can be seen as a return to the modernist concepts. However, this time it was for a different purpose. In opposition to the Stalinist style, where the leading doctrine was the creation of a monumental, timeless style, the new guidelines favored a more rational, functional, and economically expedient approach. Similar to Adolf Loos’ principles (“ornament is a crime”) the focus on adornments had to be replaced by a more realistic social agenda. With immediate effect, the architectural productions in the Khrushchev years were a consequence of the “form follows function” approach, eliminating any redundant decoration or articulation of architectural spaces. Although the vast majority of the built environments became scarce and lacked architectural quality, the trend allowed a whole generation of modernists to subtly revive certain elements that can be traced to the once abandoned Modern
Movement. As a result, the Romanian seaside resorts for example, or to some extent, some residential neighborhoods, were created in purest modernist spirit. In terms of city planning, the rational principles were the generators of a systematization of national territory, a process that was initiated in the rural area of Romania and culminated with the re-urbanization of big cities.
29 Ibid., 65.
34
15. The 1960’s brought a total rationalization of all architectural programs. A hospital in Suceava pictures the prefabrication process as being one of the driving forces of the communist ideology. 16. The moment also marked the emergence of the prefabricated apartment units, which were to become the main housing form throughout the country. The Grivitei Boulevard, Bucharest.
1965 ushered in another change in the political structure of the nation. The emergence of
Nicolae Ceausescu as president introduced the concept of a “Golden Epoch”30. Until this
point the architecture and city planning were a relapse in terms of quality and identity,
shifting in different directions that were imposed by the Russian dominated government
in Moscow. The first years of the new regime followed the general tendency of the whole
East European Block: scarce functionalist developments, with minimal concerns about
quality or artistic expression. At a certain point, however, there was a shift in
Ceausescu’s ideology concerning both internal and external politics. Romania was thus the only nation in the Eastern European region “to have shunned the shockwaves of
Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin’s cult.”31 Trying to escape from the Russian
authority and also to demonstrate the influence Romania had in the Eastern Block, a new
policy of isolation and self-sufficiency was adopted. In order to prove the viability of this
30 Name given to the revolutionary decade while Nicolae Ceausescu was the president of the country. It lasted approximately between 1980- 1989. See Neil Leach, ed. , Architecture and Revolution (London: Routledge, 1999), 178. 31 Vladimir Tismaneanu, “Understanding National Stalinism, Legacies of Ceausescu’s Socialism,” in Romania since 1989, ed. Henry F. Carey, 33 (Oxford, UK: Lexington Books, 2004).
35 radical position, the Romanian Communist Party came up with a set of measures to emphasize the new discourse. For example, any financial and commercial connections were cut with most of the other European countries. The moment marked a shift in ideology, promoting on one hand a deliberate rupture from the mainstream communist regimes of the Eastern communist block, while reconsidering concepts specific to the earlier Stalinist period: an ideal society created by an everlasting regime. The buildings were conceived accordingly, architecture being a major part of the program. The new way of designing structures as well as the “style” they inaugurated aimed to show the world the vast potential of the country. The grandiose and classic structures were again back on the agenda. In the early years of the Ceausescu regime, the idea of reconstruction dealt with new areas of the city as forms of expansion. This is how many residential neighborhoods were built as part of the expanding big cities of Romania. The old was kept unaltered and even if it was signifying the history or past ideologies, carefully considered as objects that did not interfere with the ongoing projects. The real problematic process started when the pre-existing built environment started to be seen as a bearer of conflicting ideas and as an unwanted example of historical values or religious references. This newly emerged hatred towards the past meant the beginning of an erasure process.
Ceausescu’s wish to make his dominance known to the Romanian population meant another rupture from the Krushchev architectural styles he inherited. The economic and simplistic attributes of functionalism were not sufficient with directions he envisioned to take the Romanian state. This meant a partial return to the Socialist Realist concepts
36 about humanism and local values in order to make a place in history for the new type of individual he hoped to produce in the Romanian state, and to construct timeless and everlasting structures that would be inherited by that individual.
THE COMMUNIST RECONSTRUCTION OF BUCHAREST 1980 – 1989.
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
In 1983, the dictator Ceausescu laid the foundation stone of the biggest construction site in Romania– “The People’s House” and the surrounding architectural complex, including the two mile long “Victory of Socialism” Boulevard. Both projects can be seen as representing “the ultimate moment of delirium … this moment constitutes a victory over space.”32 However, for good or for bad, one has to situate President Ceausescu’s construction ambitions within the twentieth century where such monumental projects are common. Here one can cite the construction of Chandigarh during the Nehuru regime in
India; the construction of Braśilia in Brazil; the expansions of the Tiananmen Square and the Red Square in Moscow during the early part of the twentieth century, and above all the construction of Abuja, Nigeria, a city for Three Million Inhabitants, during the latter parts of the twentieth century. In addition, Lawrence Vale would argue that such monumental projects originate from the examples and precedents provided by Versailles and Washington, D.C. There are ample texts to support this line of argument, and it is plausible to see Ceausescu’s projects as the outcome of the experimental modernist
32 Constantin Petcu, “Totalitarian City, Bucharest 1980-, semio-clinical files,” in Architecture and Revolution, ed. Neil Leach, 183-184 (London : Routledge, 1999).
37 projects that were proposed in the early part of the twentieth century by architects such as
Ebenizer Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright, and Le Corbusier.33 The physical data about
Ceausescu’s reconstruction project is impressive even when it is compared to some of the biggest urban interventions in the world: one-sixth of the core of Bucharest was demolished including fourteen churches and two monasteries, numerous “fin-de-siecle” residences, modernist masterpieces, and neighborhood centers. A series of impressive numbers apply to the structures that replaced the old tissue as well: the People’s House is even today rated as second largest structure in the world in terms of volume, becoming an omnipresent view from all over the city.34
17-18. More than one-sixth of the central area of Bucharest was demolished to make room for the communist developments.
33 See Robert Fishman in Urban Utopias in the Twentieth Century: Ebenezer Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright, Le Corbusier (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1982/1999); Norma Evenson, Planning and Cities: Le Corbusier: The Machine and the Grand Design (New York: George Braziller, 1969); James Holston, The Modernist City: An Anthropological Critique of Braśilia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Lawrence Vale, Architecture, Power, and National Identity (New Haven, Ct: Yale University Press, 1992); and The Mall in Washington, ed. Richard Longstreth with an introduction by Therese O’Malley (Washington, D.C. and New Haven, CT: National Gallery of Art and Yale University Press, date?). 34 See Doina Petrescu’s article in: Neil Leach, ed. , Architecture and Revolution, (London: Routledge, 1999) 188.
38 The grand boulevard that replaced parts of the city’s core reveals a series of impressive
physical data as well. The axis—two mile long and over 300 feet wide—crosses several
neighborhoods of the central area of the city. It was originally designed to accommodate
military parades, but also to emphasize the dominance of the People’s House as the focal
point of the city in the manner of baroque designs such as Washington, D.C. The grand
boulevard starts at its western extremity with the People’s House, crosses The Union
Square, and ends in a circular plaza at its eastern end. Bordered mainly by ten-story
buildings, housing, and administrative headquarters for the communist regime, the axis is
marked by a sequence of public edifices as well: The National Library and The National
Opera House (uncompleted) are the important accents along the axis. The colossal
boulevard brutally overlapped the existing urban grid, interrupting streets, cutting into
neighborhoods, isolating areas behind the concrete blocks. In addition, the course of the
Dambovita River had to be swerved through an underground system of canals in order to
keep the axis uninterrupted.
The typical functions of the old historical area (like minor commerce, manufacturing and artistic communities) were replaced by major public functions, political and administrative. There was also a massive change in terms of scale: from small, single story houses arrayed arbitrarily along narrow streets, the landscape became dominated by
large boulevards bordered by concrete block buildings of ten stories or more. Augustin
Ioan summarizes the process as “The story of the ‘making-by-demolition’ and ‘the
unmaking-by-building’35” of Bucharest. However, one thing that cannot be ignored is
35 Augustin Ioan, “Bucharest - Lately,” article to be published, 2005.
39 that the architects of Ceausescu’s project were definitely looking at the urban plans and the malls of Abuja, Nigerian; Braśília, Brazil; Canberra, Australia; Islamabad, Pakistan;
Beijing, China; Moscow, in the Russian Republic; Paris, France; and Washington, D.C.,
United States, when they were planning the colossal boulevards. The monumental scale of the malls in these cities influenced the Romanian authorities under Ceausescu who followed the trends of monumental twentieth century mall designs.36
36 See Lawrence Vale (1992); Richard Longsreth, 1991 and 2002; and James Holston, 1989.
40
19. The demolished area marked in red overlapped over the central area of Bucharest. 1. The location of People’s House 2. The Unirii Square marking the intersection with the North-South axis. 3. The two mile long axis. 4. Circular square at the eastern end of the axis. 5. Areas cleared for continuing the project in the adjacent areas with mostly housing projects
41
20. The evolution of stages of the city: - orange: the original core. - black line: modern evolution - red: the communist project.
21. The axis and the People’s House planned development versus the historical surroundings.
42
22. Aerial view of the development looking from east to West. In the background, the People’s House.
43
23. The axis from west to east, ending in a circular square. 24. The axis from east to west, ending with the People’s House.
25. The monumental scale of the People’s House. 26. View of the axis from the People’s House hilltop.
27. The architectural style of the development imitates the manifold of classical orders.
44 NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION
The Ceausescu project was the apotheosis of a larger process of urbanization for the
whole country initiated by the communist regime. It was a large scale development that
involved the transformation of even the smallest settlements in the nation: villages in the
heartland have been invaded by concrete structures, unsuitable and atypical to such areas.
All major cities had their downtown remodeled. Bucharest finally became the ultimate setting for the communist architectural interventions. The initial goal was to transform
Bucharest into an exemplary European capital city able to face both the western
“imperialism” (a preferred term utilized to designate the Western civilization), but also
the competition inside the communist block. The nationwide urban renewal project was
unsound from the very beginning, in financial terms, and even so the project got started
and almost finished in nine years of continuous erasure and reconstruction. The renewal negatively changed lifestyles: it destroyed property and local culture, and left the national financial reserves almost empty.
On the ideological level, the intervention continued some of the primary goals of
communism: the destruction of private property (such as a modernist residence in one of
the central neighborhoods or even a small shop in the historic district). The regime also
had a social goal of destroying private property in order to laminate the role of
neighborhoods as social places: plazas, churches, markets. Another reason for attacking
the central area of the city so violently was because of its rich spiritual content. Churches
45 were physically undesirable and also represented one of the most cohesive force among the masses – a strong competition for the forced communist ideology.
REASONING – STATED INTENTIONS VERSUS REAL INTENTIONS
In the case of Bucharest, the stated intentions behind such a grandiose project were found in the urge for reconstruction after the 1977 damaging earthquake that affected mostly the older areas of the city. The stated intention was to replace the large number of affected structures with new ones. The necessity of a mass reconstruction instead of renovations of the affected structures was, however, chosen only as a pretext for the gigantic rebuilding of the city. As the central area of the historical city was the most affected, that was considered to be a starting point for the new development. Another official explanation for placing the development over existing historical areas was the multitude of disorganized layers that were sprouting around the central area of the city. The intervention was supposed to bring unity by eliminating the deplorable structural and functional incompatibilities. The reasons were partly true, as Bucharest never benefited from a large-scale urban project. Even if one were to look back at the architectural and urban development history of the city, one could identify strong and valuable architectural productions where the image of the city was always disrupted in terms of its urban form because it always resembled an ad-hoc collection of buildings. However, in similar cases in many parts of European historical cities, the obvious choice lies in preservation and rehabilitation. In the case of Romania, the solution was an abrupt erasure and replacement of the old urban tissue of Bucharest.
46 The project was in fact so ambitious that it was proposing the recreation of almost all of existing political, administrative and cultural buildings in Bucharest. This explains the large area of land needed to accomplish such a project. Thus, not only the old part of the historical center was affected, but also more recent structures, entire residential neighborhoods and religious settlements. On the other hand, all the political and administrative headquarters were scattered all over the city. Bucharest had no political or cultural focal point, and the idea for a Civic Center emerged. The central position of the future development also encouraged the decision for a large Civic Center. It is absolutely
true that an old urban structure such as Bucharest with a historical city core could not
absorb large-scale new functions without showing signs of disruption. However,
cohabitation with the old tissue was not considered.
Another important factor the dictatorial regime considered in order to justify its urban
design ambitions was the interrupted development of the city’s infrastructure. Despite an
obvious denial of the past, Ceausescu wanted the people of Romania to believe that his
project had a connection with the history of the city. For example, the axis was
considered to be a continuation of the plan for rehabilitation of Bucharest that was prepared when Carol the Ist was King of Romania. The king’s plan was interrupted by the
Second World War. The “Haussmannization” of Bucharest carried-on at the beginning of
the century was a necessary intervention in order to face the urban growth and
industrialization. In this more recent case, the evolution of the city was above all a
conversion from the familiar image of the one family house to the collective dwellings,
and from the religious symbols to the political ones which advocated the stances of the
47 communist regime. There is no doubt that a certain level of intervention was necessary to
upgrade the city’s infrastructure to the contemporary development needs, and also to
bring the city to the level of other European capital cities. This realization caused the
Ceausescu intervention to be a project of introspection by the Romanian people. Was that
the best way to develop the city? Did the intervention attain its aim of upgrading the city to be on par with other twentieth century modernist cities? These are some of the few questions that began to plague the Ceausescu urban projects.
The site chosen for the development was not random. In order to emphasize the grandeur
of the project, the highest point in Bucharest was chosen as the site for The People’s
House. The top of the hill on which The People’s House is located was close to the historical core of the city; it was also a residential neighborhood formed mostly by
private houses. The orientation of the axis was dictated by connecting the People’s House site with the historical center of the city. Its east-west orientation was to counterbalance the already existing major north-south axis.
ECONOMY
As the majority of projects initiated and built on public funds, the expenses were astronomical. And if for example in France, building a new national library (command initiated by the Mitterrand regime, architect Dominique Perrault) was necessary and also
the investment was backed up by a relatively prosperous economy, in Romania the
expenses of the urban intervention were too high for the country to finance. Regardless,
48 the project was still carried on between 1980 and 1989, with enormous sacrifices to the
whole country both in terms of human resources and financial expenses.
STYLE
The stylistic roots of the Ceausescu projects resemble socialist-realism. In the 1930’s, the
new monumental developments were intended to celebrate the newly established
communist regimes, supervised by the Russian superpower. In order to mark the total
opposition from capitalism, “an architecture with antique references, centered,
symmetrical, experienced frontally, solemn, heroic and orderly”37 was the chosen
discourse. These aims, as well as the major importance of architecture in the public
display of power were revived for Ceausescu’s initiatives of modernizing the urban landscape and also the whole cultural scene. However, the process that lasted for a little
more than ten years from 1977 to 1989 was not the apotheosis of socialist-realism.
Instead it was a revisited version modified and distorted by decades of promotion of a
politicized version of modernism.
A second aspect tightly relates the reconstruction decision to the inauguration of a
particular style which aims to erase the styles of architecture that have accumulated in the
city over hundreds of years. The project has been associated with utopian projects of
postmodernist creators such as Ricardo Bofill. “The buildings lining the Boulevard are
37 Ioan, Power, Play and National Identity, 37.
49 consciously Post-Modern,”38 wrote Gavin Stamp in ‘The Architectural Review.’ On the
other hand, he also deplored the intentions related to the project: “In the West, Post-
Modernism affects to be a democratic reaction to the totalitarian character of the Modern
Movement. In Romania, it is just a cynical veneer to the worst and most vandalistic
tyranny in Europe.”39 The renowned French periodical ‘L’Architecture d’Aujourd’hui’
had published several reports on the area before 1989. Similarly, while the political aspect was criticized, the urban and architectural accomplishments were regarded as
being groundbreaking through its size and uniformity. Augustin Ioan presents the
development as the “intrusion of the slum, a maneuver to occupy the very center of the city”40 that throws the object into the larger revealing context of contemporary theories of
the city.
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS
Paradoxically, one of the tasks of the communist regime was its unsuccessful intrusion
into the areas of the sacred connections between the masses and their religion(s). No
matter how many churches they demolished during the process of the Ceausescu
construction, the religious collective mentality of the people never changed. One missing
aspect of the Ceausescu developments was the leaders’ inability to pay attention to the
social and economical needs of the people, but instead they focused on the totalitarian
apparatus, and the display of power. The project became a political decision born out of
38 Gavin Stamp, “ Romania’s New Dehli,” Architectural Review 184, no. 1098 (1988): 6 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid.
50 fear; it was also a desperate attempt to control the masses, also born out of the competition inside the communist block – a way to show that Romania’s economical
power was able to afford a total reconstruction of the country. But above all, the
architecture and planning of the cities was not conceived according to society’s needs.
People became victims of an artificially created environment. While basic functions like
commercial, public space or individual housing were completely missing, useless
invented public functions created gigantic shelters that hardly can find any use currently.
Attempting to provide a neutral and objective description of the Civic Center (People’s
House and the adjacent structures aligned along a two mile long axis) may seem in the
beginning a difficult task. The opinions on the project vary from total hatred to total
acceptance of the project as an achievement of unquestionable beauty. A simple tourist
guide, or various voices of the street, would immediately refer to it as an impressive
structure, both in terms of size and in terms of financial resources that were invested in
the project. Mentioning that the structure was part of an oppressive apparatus comes
second in the description of the esplanade. Despite the collective denial (reference to the
dictatorial system), the dominant popular opinion holds a certain trace of restrained
esteem towards the project. For inhabitants of Bucharest, it has become part of the daily
landscape and even if hated or admired it continues to dominate the central area of the
city. The mixed feelings and receptions of the Ceausescu projects come into opposition
with the intellectual voices: books, studies, international publications. While for the masses the project embodies the idea of beauty, amazing through size but also style
(accomplished maybe by the resemblance with classical buildings), the more in-depth
51 studies reveal the underlying implications and the enormous waste of energy and
resources that were invested on the project seem to have been forgotten. Following an
article form Neil Leach’s “Architecture and revolution” written by Doina Petrescu41, the
conclusion is that the general perception about the communist remains, on one hand,
negative when being associated with the late regime, but on the other, optimistic—
supplemented by admiration from most of the members of society because of its large scale and style which somehow identifies itself with an idyllic image—a collage of decorations which makes reference to the Greek and Roman ruins, but also to Baroque
urban planning.
THE POST-1989 CONDITION OF THE UNCOMPLETED PROJECT.
The current state of affairs finds the uncompleted project characterized by slow evolution
and uncertainty. Most of the buildings have found a new function: the People’s House
became the new headquarters of the Romanian Parliament and it additionally houses the
Museum of Modern Art. The apartment buildings were transformed into either offices or
upscale residences thanks to their downtown location. The commercial spaces were
mostly acquired by banks and corporate showrooms. The area still contains a series of
large empty lots – the foundations for the National Opera House and uncompleted
buildings, the Palace of Justice and the National Library. In terms of real estate the area is
still a very desirable location, as it is located close to all the major centers in the city.
41 Romanian architect currently teaching at the University of Sheffield, UK
52
27. In the first years of post-communist condition the development was characterized by large abandoned construction sites. 28. Today, there still are large unfinished areas. The image presents the foundation for the National Opera.
The real problem of development is the lack of any official position concerning its overall
development. There has not been any framework created for a controlled growth of the
area. Consequently the unity of the place has been distorted. Many critics have argued
that the post-1989 interventions expanded the gaping wound in the city center, making an
eventual renovation more difficult. In addition, the adverse reaction towards the
disappeared regime was immediately reflected and projected onto its architectural
symbols. Concrete buildings that were once the sign of modernization are altered by
their new owners: “For these reasons, we ‘wrap’ whatever someone else has produced,”42
stated Dorin Stefan one of the most influential local architects.
The process of “reinterpretation” of the communist buildings is on one hand an
expression of democracy – a controlled environment acquires the touch of pluralism from the multitude of choices. It is a battle that people win against the oppressive symbols; it is
a triumph of democracy and individuality against coerced social uniformity. On the other
42 Dorin Stefan, “X-raying of a spatial blink”, Architecture Design, Jan.-Feb (1996): 32.
53 hand, the process reflects confusion, lack of organization, arbitrary decisions, and uncertainty. Thus, the doubtful quality of the intervention is not the only issue. The fact that the post-1989 changes are described as “wrapping,” “dressing-up old structures” does not bring back or increase the urban quality of the place. Most of the changes were uneven because the spatial features of the large voids remained untouched. The grand boulevard still keeps its monumental axis character, and since lacking any military parade it is just a simple transportation route, and not even a very efficient one: it leads nowhere—other than to ordinary peripheral neighborhoods.
The ideas related to the future development of the area are dealing with a broader urbanistic perspective expose the capitalist process of re-branding an old communist architectural production that suffers of a bad image. The second chapter will analyze the most representative of these attempts, emphasizing the current process of wrapping and dressing-up the grey concrete structures of the communist regime.
29. The totalitarian structures attacked by symbols of consumerism. A state owned department store transformed into a mall. 30. Most of the buildings received alterations in terms of functions and aspect. The image portrays a curtain wall attached to the old buildings.
54
31- 32. Then and now. The repetitive white concrete blocks have been arbitrary altered by the new owners.
THE UNCOMPLETED PROJECT IN THE POST-COMMUNIST SOCIO-POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT.
Given the absolute connection between architecture and the political orientation of a nation such as communist Romania, the fall of one political system, could automatically determine the collapse of the other and its architectural practices. In the case of
Bucharest, where every single piece of communist architecture was crafted to the smallest detail following an explicit ideological agenda, the process of integration into the post-communist cultural practices still represents a major challenge for Romanian society. The unfinished status of Ceausescu’s project fuels the debate and the controversy regarding its future.
The aims of the actors who contributed to the post-1989 evolution of the uncompleted architectural project are to be analyzed. Even if the civil society started to feel its presence (or at least was supposed to) the major changes that the uncompleted project
55 acquired were solely connected to the intentions of the members of the political classes.
The process by which the uncompleted project has been rehabilitated seems like a repetition of the past when all decisions connected to urban life or public interests were consistently taken by the totalitarian communist regime. Consequently, despite the democratization of Romanian society, the fate of the uncompleted architecture left by the totalitarian regime is controlled by politics and financial interests.
The present status of the architectural project was not determined only by the December
1989 events, but also by what followed afterwards. There are a number of influential factors typical for the post-communist period. These elements will be analyzed in order to provide further information and justification supporting the idea that the uncompleted communist projects need more attention than the unsystematic opinions that have emerged so far.
The first impact of events of 1989 on the uncompleted project was the minimization of its social and cultural values. Even if the demolition of entire neighborhoods for the construction of the mega-scale project was initially intended to stroke the ego of
Ceausescu, the scale of the project and its nationalist symbol expired once Ceausescu was out of power because the project had outlived him and his regime. This latter insight was minimized in order to make way for the capitalist exploitation of the boulevard. The main actors in the reconstruction of the uncompleted project are on one hand the political class in conjunction with the financial powers, and on the other hand the civil society.
56 The relatively slow and sometimes faulty changes that occurred in the past fifteen years
were mainly determined by the following factors:
1) The attitude of society – or better said an in-depth description of the main features, weaknesses and limitations of present Romanian society, which surprisingly played a minor role in the assimilation process of ex-communist symbols and in the decisional process regarding the uncompleted project initiated by the totalitarian regime. 2) When talking about the new political class, a major distinction can be observed when comparing general perceptions of the unfinished project. Started as one of the idiosyncrasies of the post-communist era, the political and the economic groups seem to be merging in order to monopolize the decisional powers at all levels. The process is summarized by a shift from a centralized communist power towards a new political elite, and its emerging financial allies—local and foreign. 3) The emergence of capitalist values led to the transformation of a regimented society into a consumer oriented one, an appealing alternative when compared to the obedient status of the communist citizens. This also brought a certain degree of ignorance towards cultural and ideological issues, as the monumental boulevard project was automatically associated with the totalitarian regime.
Like all activities that were connected to the communist regime, the reconstruction process of the capital city of Bucharest stopped immediately after the fall of the
communist government. The attempt to come to terms with the past was only considered
years later. The break in decisions and opinions was determined in part by the constant denial attitude of the masses, which was not able to properly manage the challenges of a democratic environment, while being largely influenced by the mentality acquired during the communist decades. This was doubled by the capitalist mirage, which brought new elements like consumption and commerce that obviously attracted the masses more than the need to participate in the post-communist national reconstruction debates.
57 The wish of the newly emerged political and financial elite was to preserve the
symbolism of the remains and reuse them later. There are a series of collateral elements
that favored this approach. One of them is the poor economic condition of the nation,
reflected by the poverty of the individuals. Doubled by the emergence of the capitalist market, this led to the superficial attitude that pretentiously feigns a lack of interest and understanding towards other national and public problems. Consequently, official management of the communist heritage was almost absent: in the case of the architectural remains no commission was initiated to regulate the disturbed character of the affected areas of Bucharest and other Romanian cities.
THE ROMANIAN CIVIL SOCIETY
Tom Gallagher43 may be among the biggest foreign experts in the Romanian society’s
contemporary issues. His claim that “Romanians have been viewed as subjects rather
than citizens by successive regimes…Elites have been able to stay in charge by
promoting social fragmentation and relations of dependence,”44 best summarizes the
condition of a society that was forced to be part of a totalitarian experience.
Probably “massive change” would be appropriate for describing the consequences of the
1989 events. However, the deeper one goes into studying the development of the
43 Professor of Ethnic Conflict and Peace at the University of Bradford, UK, specialized in the East European political and social issues, with a special focus on Romania. 44 Tom Gallagher, Modern Romania, The End of Communism, the Failure of Democratic Reform, and the theft of a Nation (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2005), 53.
58 Romanian society, the more it seems clear that the term “massive change” is a result of a
rather superficial judgment. Most of the studies45 carried out for the Romanian society
reveal a certain slowness and inertia concerning the mentality and behavior when facing
the challenges posed by a democratic society.
Many analysts suggest that Romanian society supports the lingering effects of a typical
“mass society.” This means that in periods of transformations it is difficult to make
adjustments, this being one of the main reasons of socio- economic failure or reluctance
to adhere to any form of organized, formal groups. Focusing on the uncompleted project,
Romanians can be seen as citizens lacking a minimal amount of civic engagement. This
can be extended to the attitudes of the elite. For example, Richard Andrew Hall46 in his
studies about Romanian society describe the typical individual as “continuing to exhibit a
preference for informal personal networks over formal institutions” reinforcing “ the
tendency towards fragmentation already present …”obviously, the lack of belief and even
more, the persuasive tendency of denial of any kind of identification with official
institutions is reflected in the total disinterest for any symbol belonging to any past or
present type of power. Without attempting to formulate a justification or an excuse, the
reason lies in the way Romanians have been viewed by the various regimes that ruled the
nation: always as subjects, rather than individuals. The Romanian masses have become
the most regimented societies of the Eastern Block.
45 See the collection of texts “Romania since 1989” by Henry F. Carey, an extensive collection of articles by sociologists, journalists and economists who attempt to cover and explain all the aspects of the massive post-communist change. 46 Richard Andrew Hall – Ph.D. in Political Science, Indiana University, author of many political studies about Eastern-Europe with special focus on Romania
59
Romanian culture is also marked by the unconditional acceptance of capitalist values. It was a new phenomenon that invaded everyday life, transforming each person into a potential customer, a consumer, and bringing a new and attractive alternative as opposed to the previous conditions of individual existence. This seems to be the main determinant of the present attitude of denial of post-communist issues that are affecting Romanian society. Besides, this attractive aspect of everyday life did not exist before 1989. The sense of individual property became the main behavioral aspect that developed in the last fifteen years. It is a huge contrast from the lifestyle that was deprived of access of certain basic needs of life during the communist regime.
Going back to the “uncompleted project”, the same attitude applies. For example, the
People’s House (considering the given name) was rejected by a majority of the citizens.
When decisions were finally made by the political class about the fate of the mega- structure, some members of the political class were among the voices that opposed the decision. The members of the fragmented intellectual class were the only ones who raised a series of issues in an attempt to break the barriers imposed by the lifeless masses. The opinions of the intellectuals were not radical, but rather utopian. Even if the intellectuals were among the few categories that adopted a critical position, they did it somehow from an elevated and distant position, and they were not able to put their ideas into action. One of the underpinning assumptions was that the post-communist era is a mere continuation of the past regime and therefore it was hopeless for any public voice to be heard. This is how key positions in organizations and associations as well as governmental agencies
60 were abandoned by the notable among the intellectual movement who preferred smaller groups.
Generally nations with older, well-established democracies show great gratification and respect towards national symbols. A flag or a place can be a site of cohesion among people who belong to the same nation. On the contrary, a typical feature of Romanian society is the tendency to reject any kind of collective symbol. Similarly the rejection of the communist values was also a rejection of the architecture created to celebrate the regime. Fortunately architecture is not a book or a flag that can be thrown out of the window and set on fire on a big pile of propaganda material. It is not a symbol that can disappear in a day. Regardless, the absence of any type of education concerning the preservation of the architectural edifices of the past, especially of the communist years, resulted in treatments that can be compared to the burning of the propaganda materials.
In conclusion, it can be said that the collective reaction is not spontaneous reflection on the major changes of the last few years, but also an accumulation of behaviors from decades of oppressive rule. Choosing to radically change a mentality is not a decision that can be made overnight, but momentarily taking the easy way may be part of the process.
Once the material needs have been fulfilled, the cultural needs can henceforth be addressed. But again, critical theorists argue that the “commodity fetish” is one major aspect of every capitalist society—the main reason that can slow down intellectual emancipation. For that reason capitalist rules should not be accepted unconditionally.
61
THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE EMERGING FINANCIAL GROUPS.
The emerging political groups became the major players in almost all public issues and disputes, including on the city’s architecture. The newly emerged political organizations do not meet the sympathy of any political analysis, whether it is local or foreign. For example, Tom Gallagher considers the shift made in 1989 nothing but a process by which
“the old comrades discard the ideology, but kept the power” constantly “manufacturing conflicts” in order to preserve the obedient condition of the society.47 One can talk about the minimization of the architectural project as a deliberate wish. No changes or interventions were made in the first five years when the debates where going on. Once the debates vanished, forceful interventions started to show up (probably the most significant event is conversion of the People’s House into the new House of Parliament).
Another feature of the political class is its openness towards the occidental world.
Isolation is no longer preferred and the invasion of capitalism is seen as the only way of life. In addition, the financial powers were closely connected to the political ones. The allegation that a new totalitarian regime might have emerged in the guise of democracy is not farfetched because it explains how a group of “old comrades”—this time it includes powerful politicians and members of the new financial sectors—continue to make decisions that concern the whole society. Here one can see the transformation of the
People’s House into the House of Parliament as part of the claim of old official symbols
47 Gallagher, 70.
62 by the newly emerged elite. Subsequently, the People’s House became synonymous with democratic politics while the surrounding structures became centers of financial power.
The principal actors are the same and the interdependence between political and financial powers is made stronger at the expense of the weakening voices of the Romanian masses.
The old communist relics became not only centers of political command but also the new signs of local prosperity. Combined with society’s crisis in search of a symbol and its unconditional embrace of capitalist values, the meaning of the uncompleted project was changed. From the supreme symbol of a political regime, it became the symbol of a new combined financial and political power. Although it may seems strange, the two domains can hardly be separated in the present Romania.
63
33. Historical timeline showing the most important features of the last hundred years of Romanian politics, economics, social life and architecture.
64
CHAPTER TWO
LOCAL APPROACHES
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
The core of the research constitutes an analysis of the most important actions initiated along more than fifteen years of post-communist climate regarding the possibilities of development of the uncompleted communist project. Given the complex nature of the object of study, there is a large range of approaches: from international competitions with official character to academic research, conferences or public debates. The following examples emerge as a result of the general concern of Romanian society about the uncompleted project. Although the approach and the outcomes are different (the competitions envision a clearer result, while the texts tend to criticize certain issues related to the area), they are grounded in the same purposes. The possibilities of evolution of the communist structures have been undertaken so far by different professions. All proposals retain two common features: all of them point towards the necessity to act concerning the urban evolution but without ever being materialized. In addition, the majority of the ideas are grounded in the belief that the communist experience was a harmful one and consequently acquired a nostalgic attitude by invoking the pre-communist history of the place.
This thesis proposes to investigate the strengths and weaknesses of each proposal, as well as the context out of which they emerged. The causes of failure and singularity of the approaches
65 are complex, from the usual lack of financial resources and ending with issues related to the political and social climate. The lack of a coherent theoretical and architectural research framework backed up by almost nonexistent urban development regulations constitute additional factors.
The “Bucharest 2000” (1996) competition and “The competition for the Patriarchal Orthodox
Cathedral” (1999-present) are going to be analyzed as the largest competitions that proposed an urban intervention in the area. Although never built, the winning projects remain the best reference in terms of practical approaches towards the site. The conference “Beyond the Wall” held in 1995 produced a rich written material, emerging as a valuable theoretical basis. Neil
Leach and Fredric Jameson are among the renowned international architectural theorists that dealt with the subject. Augustin Ioan’s groundbreaking work concerning the communist structures is to be analyzed by studying a series of books dedicated exclusively to this matter, as well as numerous articles in cultural or architectural periodicals. Dana Harhoiu and Mariana
Celac are just a few of the architectural historians and critics that had an influential role in defining a theoretical framework related to the communist project. A different perspective came from small civic groups initiated by artists, architects, or simply persons who share the same interest. Generally the results are actions displayed in the public places of the city and through unconventional types of media. Even if their influence does not appear to be major, they offer an alternative vision when looking at the problem.
Along with the rather tentative character of the proposals specific to the last fifteen years, the more recent projects came out of real intentions. The inevitable development driven by
66 economic growth and foreign companies’ investments attracted large-scale real estate waiting
to be materialized. The present moment marks an evolution in terms of approach, both from
local planning commissions and the investors interested in the area. The “Esplanada” project
will be considered for this latest stage of the evolution.
The relevance of each approach will also be emphasized: while the official competitions (even
if oriented towards specific classes of professionals like architects and planners) received
enormous support form local and governmental agencies, the researches and writings were rather born out of personal enthusiasm of the authors or of smaller cultural organizations
concerned with the subject. The minimal influence of an important part of the society along
with its groups–the civil society–is another important feature when studying the diverse origins
of related subjects.
THE “BUCHAREST 2000” COMPETITION
The Romanian local authorities initiated in 1995 an international competition of ideas for
restructuring the zone situated to the south of Bucharest city centre, synonymous with the
uncompleted project. The reason why it was called “a competition of ideas” was the general
state of indeterminate goals (stated even in the theme) when approaching issues related to the
city’s evolution. The situation directly relates to the absence of concern about the moral and
psychological scars left by the totalitarian regimes. As Augustin Ioan puts it, “We are
searching for models of reconstruction. Analogies, allegories, utopias. Bucharest continues to
wallow, vandalized, in a state of severe waste, which the city itself cannot overpass. Just as it
67 cannot expect real help from those who caused it to implode.”48 Thus, the uncompleted project fell under the category of undesirable subjects, despite its overwhelming presence in the everyday life of the large capital city.
The competition was, however, the first major step towards a certain attitude, regarding not only the communist architecture, but also a statement of intentions: the remains of the past were still there, and sooner or later they had to be faced. The initial idea was more than admirable, receiving great attention from both the local and international architectural scene: while the theme was elaborated locally, the competition was supervised by the International
Union of Architects (UIA) and UNESCO. The jury abounded in international personalities like
Kenneth Frampton, Barry Bergdoll, Vittorio Gregotti, and as a result it received over two hundred entries from all over the world. Richard Rogers, Foreign Office Architects and Greg
Lynn were among the famous participants.
The ambitious effort to organize such a large-scale competition in a region deprived of such events in the past was also part of the effort of the Union of Romanian Architects to rehabilitate the image and the position of the architectural (also planners, photographers, artists) profession. After decades as mere servants for different communist regimes, the competition emerged as an opportunity “to reinvent a place for architects in the decision making process about the future” of the city. A relevant discussion about the common East
European issue of reconstruction is Michael Wise’s reference to the profession of architect
48 Augustin Ioan ,“Bucharest: The Not-Yet-Istanbul and the Would-Be-Sarajevo (Radical Reconstruction as Anti- Nostalgia),” ArtMargins, www.artmargins.com (11/15/05).
68 before and after the fall of communism. The debate is generalized in fact to the extent that
Wise argues that every totalitarian system has subjugated and used architecture for its own
ideological and propagandistic purposes. This relates also to the present difficulty of the
architectural movement in Romania to overcome the crisis of authority and style that it is going
through. Despite the large number of existing practices (most of them located in the capital
city) there has been hardly any cohesion in terms of approach and dialogue, and even if some results can be considered encouraging they have a minimal and scattered character compared
to the scale of the city. In terms of architectural criticism, things seem to have evolved
differently, as this area of research managed to penetrate by making an alliance with the other
cultural movements which seem more tuned to contemporary tendencies.
THE THEME – MOTIVATIONS AND GOALS
Despite the earlier described conditions, the short but very concise theme of the competition is
extremely relevant for the thesis goal. As no action was taken since the competition took place,
the issues enunciated more than ten years ago remain intensely problematic. The state of facts that determined such an action was described as:
Strongly marked by its historical evolution and by the different urban planning actions over the last forty years, this zone calls for reconsideration, both on the architectural and urban levels. The unfinished planning program carried out between 1980 and 1989, resulted in the break-down of the urban fabric, the degradation of certain areas and the defacement of the main historical buildings, the opening of vast non-assigned areas and the emergence of numerous marginal zones.49
49 Doina Cristea, Urban Planning Competition "Bucharest 2000” (Bucharest: SIMETRIA, 1995), 26.
69 The competition had from the very beginning two goals: to be able to define a “scheme”, a
framework for development in the first place, and more importantly following the guidelines to
get to action. Not only has physical intervention failed to appear, but also Bucharest did not
have a general plan nor any possibility of professional intervention over the existing built
territories. The object of the competition was an attempt to define a coherent reconsideration of
Bucharest’s city centre through the remodeling of the Unirea50 sector, by reducing the fractures
produced by previous operations and by restoring the architectural heritage and the vestiges of
the urban culture of the past. Proposals were to allow the creation of an urban framework
capable of receiving specific activities for the city centre of a contemporary European capital,
and in the perspective of the year 2000. The dramatic cut of functional and formal diversity
that happened between 1980 and 1989 was to be reconsidered as well.
The lack of urban strategy was one of the main stirring forces for the project. Even if the wish
for development was considered as soon as the communist regime ceased, there was absolutely
no direction, nor people with the required expertise capable to provide a strategic plan for development. There were very few constraints on thematic concerns, thus allowing the competitors a broad variety of approaches. The main requirements for the competition were:
• To create a flexible, open and sustainable environment that would favor sustainable and dynamic urban development. • To identify the necessary changes to create a genuine central area containing the significance and the value of a European capital city. • To reconstruct the urban coherence in the centre. • To enhance the specificity of the site, of its cultural heritage and traces of its former urban culture.
50 Area of the city which includes the People’s House building and the monumental axis in front of it.
70 In terms of restrictions, the wish was to minimize the demolition of Ceausescu’s buildings
despite the eventual negative emotional and ideological significance embedded. Integration was preferred, despite the obvious antagonism between the two overlapping layers of the city.
Anticipating a future evolution, the project took into consideration the current status of the
place: Bucharest found itself in a contradictory state of things, an undeveloped city from all
points of view had to take in a manifold of functions and activities very difficult to integrate.
This was the primary concern of the organizers. Here must be noted the visionary approach:
even if the competition focused on the uncompleted project, the final goal was in fact to be
able to develop a more general framework for the city. It is obvious that there are other areas in
the central part of the city other than the concrete structures. And even if these may not be so
badly damaged in physical and functional terms they needed development as well. The
communist reconstruction not only erased certain areas, but also isolated and stopped the
normal evolution of others that continued to exist. These were also to be included on the
agenda as being part of the competitors’ consideration.
THE IDEALISTIC CHARACTER OF THE COMPETITION
The enthusiasm and excellent publicity the competition received had also a downside: a more realistic analysis revealed the extreme discrepancy between such a high professional approach and the actual condition and limited possibilities the context was offering. Major architectural publications and critics questioned Romania’s financial ability at that time to perform till the end or even start such a long and costly intervention. Barry Bergdoll51 summarizes the two
51 Member of the jury writing a competition report in Architectural Record, November 1996.
71 possibilities: either a realistic reconstruction project married with a powerful administrative
agency, or only a valuable chapter in the competition’s catalogue. Unfortunately, but not
unexpectedly, the competition proved to be a good exercise for the cultural and professional community, though without visible results.
The economic factor was not the only obstacle: while the architectural scene, as initiator of the
idea, was more than excited about the event, voices of the civil society started to argue the
idea. It was not about the event itself, but rather about its outcomes. The questioned issues
were about how the population would deal with another decade of reconstruction after a similar
process that was barely over. Why would such a project be of maximum priority after more
that 15 years of continuous reconstruction? Is the mental trauma going to be effaced? The
public opinion was that the enormous amounts of state resources should be invested in other
areas which could eventually contribute to the growth of life standards. The participation of
world renowned architects and critics did not bring the expected popularity among the masses,
the only supporters being intellectual groups and potential investors for the area. This can be
categorized as a mentality issue, where the act of building was mistakenly associated with a
certain type of political dominance over the masses. It is in a way a natural reaction
considering the past events and the way they shaped everyday life through architecture.
Augustin Ioan is taking the ideological aspects, a step further, revealing a connection between
the inexistent implementation of the project and the leading political figures. Thanks to the
“cheap, arbitrary acts of momentary despotism”52 displayed by the “democratic” power, the
outcome of the competition consisted in a nicely printed catalogue and a series of large scale
52 Augustin Ioan, Power, Play and National Identity (Bucharest, The Romanian Cultural Foundation – Publishing House, 1999), 192.
72 models of the winning projects exhibited in the City Hall. In the meantime, the People’s House became the new house for the Romanian Parliament, transforming a symbol of the exterminated power into one of the new political power. The winning project, as any other
participating one, opted for a total de-politicization of the area, especially as centralized power
was the main generator of the initial destruction of the place. In fact the decision of the
government was in total contradiction with the ideas enunciated in the theme of the
competition. Not only would the occupation of the remains with new administrative and
political functions have meant a total or at least partial preservation of such, but also would
have meant a symbolic transfer of image from one regime to another. Unfortunately, it
happened mainly because of the lack of resources to accomplish such a large scale urban
intervention, and also because of the total lack of opposition to the government’s decision-
making process. “Freezing” the actual context did not allow the accomplishment of any of the
points stated in the competition theme, especially the ones referring to a certain physical
intervention over the existing buildings.
Even if far from respecting the winning competition or any other proposal, the only part of the
development that went through planned interventions was the People’s House. A small part of
it became the place for parliamentary debates. More recently in 2003, in order to get rid of the
burdensome characterization of “isolated object behind high fences”53, one aisle of the
building was remodeled for housing the National Museum of Modern Art. The axis did not
follow any kind of urban renovation, nor was it included in any professional study about future
opportunities of development.
53 Mariana Celac, “Zidul Parlamentului,” Revista 22, no.8 (2002). http://www.revista22.ro.
73 THE WINNING PROJECT
The first prize winner in the Bucharest 2000 Competition was Meinhard von Gerkan from
Germany. His scheme was appreciated mostly for creating a clear and pragmatic urban strategy, and a dynamic tension between the restored modernity and the vestiges of the past.
The design had several prevailing features:
- The east-west monumental axis was kept, respecting the original requirements to
demolish as little as possible. However, the axis not only had a strong physical and
visual impact, but was also cutting into the whole area. Decisions to minimize the
power and authority of the grand boulevard and also to reconnect the north-south
regions of the central area were made. In order to further bring back unity to the area,
developments were considered along the auxiliary axes like the river course or the
remaining historical arteries. The north-south grand boulevard and the road leading to
the Patriarchal Church as well as the Dambovita River were to become again an
important component of the city, after they were buried underground to leave room
for the project to develop.
- The revival of the old street grid was proposed consequently, in order to stand as a
reminder of the old city, but also to recreate proper circulation and transportation in
the area. The main axis was in fact the only large public street in a very busy area of
the city, rarely being able to face the increasing traffic. The street grid was mainly
developed around the People’s House managing to fill or at least reduce the existing
74 voids that were creating a gap between the monumental structure and the rest of the
city – the building becomes part of the city, it is not a solitary statement anymore.
The new street structure was to acquire new developments mainly destined for
business or administrative purposes. The broken connections constitute the streets of
demolished neighborhoods developed in the 1920’s and are part of the modernist
urban- planning process.
- Gradual growth. In terms of urban strategy, the project was proposing a gradual
development meant to avoid an abrupt change similar to the communist procedure.
As none of the existing structure was to be demolished, and the project could have
been realized in parts, it responded well to the economic climate of the place.
Attempting to “hide” the past developments might have meant an even bigger
investment that was not realistically accomplishable in only a few years. On the other
hand, since the project was meant to be finished across one decade or more, the
question of a continuous construction site made the population reluctant to such a
major change, as many have been traumatized by the similar communist experiment.
The jury appreciated the general strategy of the project, the treatment of the liaison between the main axis and the urban fabric, that of the secondary axis – the river and that of the planning of the new axis situated close to the House of Parliament. The sensitive balance created between the two axes was praised: the subtlety of the transition between the Unirii Boulevard and the
House of Parliament, the quality of the urban structure recreated through a series of blocks, the
75 scale and flexibility of which permit a wide variety of architectural approaches and cityscapes and its potential stage implementation.
34- 35. Van Gerkan opted for a revival of the old urban tissue, focusing mainly on the area around the People’s House. The monumental boulevard was interrupted by redesigning the stream of Dambovita River and by inserting buildings inside the void left by the axis.
76
36. The monumental image of the development was thought to be minimized by inserting a series of high-rise buildings and by densifying the built areas.
37. The proposals to demolish and change the original totalitarian configuration were not accepted. Richard Rogers tied the project to older axes and the eliminated communist fragments.
77
38. The radical configuration proposed by Richard Rogers. The axis is interrupted in several points.
CONCLUSION
The initiative was more than admirable, although from the very beginning stated as only a competition of ideas, basically a utopian action meant to reveal the eventual potential for development of the city. The outcome would have been an agency which could guide the future investors according to the final results of the competition. The lack of resources for initiating and developing a large scale project was obvious since the project was organized only five years from the 1989 events.
Today, after more than 10 years since the competition was organized, no major interventions happened in the area, scattered and fragmentary renovations being characteristic for the place.
The lack of major interventions was thus replaced by a series of small scale interventions –
78 façade renovations, new buildings inserted in the empty spaces, making the monumental area more colorful and more animated but altering the unity of the initial plan. The remaining old buildings that escaped the demolition process are in an advanced state of damage and seem to be forgotten for good behind the also degraded grey concrete blocks. The western part of the
Unirii Boulevard is furnished with luxury shops, while the eastern end shelters major banking facilities and enterprise headquarters. Most of them show an eager concern towards individualizing their image and thus breaking the predominant monotonous grey concrete shells. In the southern residential area the infrastructure was completed, but most of the residual lots remain untouched.
THE COMPETITIONS FOR THE PATRIARCHAL ORTHODOX CATHEDRAL (1999-2002)
In terms of local competitions, the second most important official contest was for building the
Patriarchal Orthodox Cathedral in Bucharest. Organized by the Romanian Patriarchy, The City
Hall and the Romanian Architects’ Union, the event was presented as a competition of architecture and urban planning. The main challenge of the contest was to erect a new national cathedral for the Romanian Orthodox Church. The competition constituted a negative example of poorly managed attempts at urban rehabilitation as the process was slowed down by factors like general public questioning, by the site that changed its location no less than five times (so far) and also flawed by a strong political involvement.
79 THEME
In 1999, the Romanian Orthodox Church (the supreme Christian religious institution) asked for
help from the local and government institutions in order to organize a competition for building
a large cathedral, a representative structure for the Romanian Orthodox spirituality. As the
church was providing the majority of funds (over 200 million dollars), the project was
considered realistic, since typically the financial aspect was the major constraint. The idea
appeared in a very favorable moment: the Church needed a new symbol in order to reaffirm its
power after decades of communist prosecution and demolished places of worship and also the
idea of a large cathedral for the Romanian spirituality dated from the beginning of the
twentieth century. The highly politicized character of the competition emerged as soon as the
political class realized the immense electoral power of such an investment: whoever was to
accomplish the project was to receive the adhesion of a large number of religious adherents.
The initial idea of the competition - to create a public building and rehabilitate parts of the city-
was to become a long term political debate. It should be noted that even though the
competition started in 1999, due to the ever-changing political regimes the large structure
never got built—although the intention still exists.
For the city, a new competition was a sign of possible development, both physical and also in
terms of regulations or guidelines, as in 1999 there were still no established guidelines or frameworks for future urban development. As far as the requirements were concerned, the original data provided for the competitors was rather evasive. From the very beginning, one thing was stated clearly (similar to the Bucharest 2000 competition): “As the urban planning
80 guidelines for the area are still being prepared, the competition has also the role of selecting the
best ideas in regard to the urban rehabilitation of the area.”54 It is interesting to note that the
urban development of the area was considered to be as important as the main object: the
cathedral was supposed to be a “synthesis between the traditional religious architecture and the
context where the object is going to be inserted”55 and its surroundings were to answer to the
area’s functional and physical problems. The church was not intended to emerge as a single
function in the area. The urban development asked for adjacent public spaces and functions
typical to the central area of the city: retail, parks, and underground parking. The complexity of
the theme was not backed up, however, by a very coherent discourse. Even if the church had
only a minor role in the elaboration of the theme, the City Hall and the Architect’s Union
offered to the contestants a very vague theme.
1.
2.
39. The locations for the competition’s sites. 1. The first site proposed in 1999, in Unirii Square and 2. The site proposed in 2002 along the axis. The site has since changed three more times in other locations not connected to this area.
54 Translation form the original “Regulations and theme of the competition”, see Concursuri pentru Catedrala Patriarhala Ortodoxa: 1999-2002 (Bucuresti: NOI Media Print, 2003), 7. 55 Ibid.
81 REASONING
The reasoning behind laying the foundation for this competition was stated very clearly in the
competition guidelines: to provide a large spiritual place for the Orthodox residents (the main
religious group of the country, over 85% of the population). By its central location, and also its
position in the core of the communist development, the new cathedral was to answer not only
to the needs dictated by the architectural program, but also to redefine the urban environment
for the area. The initial site proposed by the competition program was the Unirii Square – the
largest central square in Bucharest and situated along the axis.
The eventual creation of such a place had different connotations: from the point of view of the
Romanian Orthodox Church, it is simply a celebration of spirituality, while for planners and
architects it emerged as a rare opportunity to intervene in the area and attempt to change the
place. If the “Bucharest 2000” competition was utopian form the very beginning, this time the
competition was stated as a realistic enterprise. The Patriarchy owned the necessary funds to
build such a major structure and although the location changed several times due to numerous
debates, the cathedral will probably be built in the near future.
THE SITES
Since the expected urban rehabilitation projects (both private and state initiated) weren’t likely to reshape the capital city anytime soon, the local authorities also encouraged the project almost unconditionally, as it seemed to be among the few, (if not the only one) opportunities to
82 actually come up with an intervention in the deserted urban structure. The investments in
construction in the first years of post- communism were scarce, focusing more on the
residential districts or commercial centers on the outskirts of city. The cathedral, on the
contrary, was aiming for a very central location inside Bucharest’s territory. Since
“[s]eemingly, the wind of change has barely touched the Romanian capital,”56 the proposal
was accepted immediately, and a site was assigned. The combination between a realistic
scheme and the total lack of perspective concerning a change inside the void left by the
communist reconstructions determined the placement of the cathedral along the two mile long
axis—in the center of the Unirii Square.
As unbelievable as it may seem, the proposed location has changed five times since 1999.
Compared to the relatively unanimous opinion about “Bucharest 2000”, this time controversies never ceased to appear from all areas. The impossibility to take decisions to a higher level without consulting smaller groups reflects on one hand the attributes of a democratic approach: it is the case of the cultural and architectural periodicals that came with solid arguments (both ideological and site-related) against the proposal. On the other hand, the opposing voices began to shape up in the political scene as well: the project was not seen any more as a generator of public space or a celebration of Christianity, but a race for winning the national adherence to one political doctrine or another.
56 Augustin Ioan, “Bucharest - Lately,” article to be published, 2005.
83
40-41. In addition to the main object – the cathedral, the proposals for the 1999 phase came up with changes for the urban configuration of the Unirii Square.
The first two locations were both interfering with the uncompleted project. The original site proposed in 1999 in the Unirii Square (the main square along the axis of the communist project) marked the place for the first phase of the competition. The phase had its winners, the proposals were plenty, but still the site was abandoned. The reasons lie in the interminable controversies that appeared from every level of the society, local press and the specialists’ opinion: while the newspapers and cultural periodicals contested the opportunity of another large structure, both physically and economically, there were problems in terms of infrastructure, the whole square being crossed by a major subway junction point.
84 The reason for choosing a spot right in the middle of the communist development had been
primarily a location principle. Intended to fill the large empty spaces located between the
buildings that form the axis, the cathedral was to become a new focal point that would
eventually attenuate the visual force of the dictatorial structures. In terms of function, building
such a large church would provide a qualitative public space, thus solving one of the major
problems in the area. The place where the cathedral was meant to be built had also spiritual and
historical significance. Historically speaking, the place was the place of birth of the city, and
also represents the intersecting point of the major north-south and east-west axes. The most
relevant site for this thesis object of study is the location proposed in 2002, a spot along the
axis. After the failed attempt initiated three years earlier, the competition occurred again. Both
the site proposed and the physical requirements for the cathedral were the two main elements
that transformed the whole competition into a long and still ongoing controversial debate. Peter
Derer, architect at the Institute of Architecture and Planning Bucharest, was wondering in an
article which appeared in 22 magazine if a singular object inserted in an already controversial area is going to be able to solve at least partially the problems of Bucharest’s central area57.
The article also makes reference to the huge dimensions of the structure, similar to the already
existing communist concrete blocks. This is only one skeptical position from a series of many articles suggesting that the cathedral seems to continue the uncompleted project in the same
manner it started and does not constitute an adaptation to the present times.
57 Peter Derer, “Catdrala Neamului”, Revista 22, no. 737 (Apr.2004). http://www.revista22.ro/html/index.php?art=881&nr=2004-05-05.
85
42. The second phase of the competition – 2002, requested only the interruption of the axis with a singular object – the cathedral. The images present Dorin Stefan’s proposal. Given the limited number of options, the main focus was on the architectural object.
CONCLUSION
The competition took place in a general state of uncertainty. Since no regulations or large scale development plans were functioning at that date, a paradox emerges: basically each project had
86 to come with its own urban principles and regulations. The initiative was received with skepticism by the majority of public voices, being doubled by a political involvement.
The faulty approach of this competition, with five different site locations in less than five
years, occurs from the inability to develop and materialize local urban policies, doubled by
electoral reasoning and personal and religious passions. The poor quality of the projects, both
in terms of architectural and planning proposals, and the lack of decision- making experience within the Romanian Orthodox Church superiors are additional impediments to a competition that could have changed the face of the ill-fated central neighborhoods left in despair.
THE “ESPLANADA” DEVELOPMENT
Under the slogan “A new center for Bucharest” and backed up by impressive numbers like
over one billion dollar investment and a two million square foot building area, a new project
for the central area of the city was presented in 2005. The location: over several empty lots along the axis. Planned for construction in 2007, the project was surprisingly unveiled at a business fair held in November 2005 by a group of foreign investors. The idea had not been debated publicly nor was it shown to the local architectural board in advance.
The city hall presented, however, the initiative as salutary in terms of development, and also
favorable for the city, which could finally become an important center for the business
community. The way the project was presented worried the local community of practitioners
87 who considered the investment not responsive to the local conditions, and not based on any type of regulations, totally ignores the sensitive aspects of the area.
43. Esplanada project proposes the development of a modern financial center.
44. The project does not relate to the communist structures or the old urban tissue whatsoever.
88 Dan Marin, member of the OAR (the national organization of professional architects)
considers that: “Bucharest deserves more than this,”58 especially when the project is
considered being ‘the’ business center of the city. The question of simple juxtaposing of
architectural objects eliminates the concerns previously formulated about the surroundings.
Even if the project reflects an inherent wish for development, most of architectural critics
argued against the unconditional acceptance of any kind of investment. “The public debate
and the competitions are maybe the best way to take correct decisions”, summarized Dan
Marin as opposed to the unconditional acceptation of a project provided by investors. Serban
Sturdza the president of OAR, believes that the project is an insulting “proposal for a third
world country” in terms of architectural quality. On the opposite side, the local administration
cannot ignore such a huge scale proposal, the biggest in the whole East European region. The
advantages of such a project are unquestionable, but the events are taking place while the city
hall’s only requirements for the area were the presence of underground parking lots and a
decent amount of greenery. Thinking the “Esplanada” project as a part of the “Bucharest 2000”
results might have brought up a more fruitful result.
With this “ex abrupto” proposal, the influence of the public, democratic debate lost ground
once again against the implemented overnight, ready-made proposal. Without questioning the
issues related to the design of the project, the event shows a typical case where the “tabula
rasa” imposed by externally funded groups wins the battle against the local “genius loci”
approach. In the condition where all the proposals connected to the area are going to be driven
58 See Buletin Informativ al Filialei Teritoriale Bucuresti a Ordinului Arhitectilor din Romania. Decembrie- Ianuarie (2005-2006), Bucuresti, 29.
89 by exclusively financial and marketing factors, the local voices concerned with the sensitive
issues of the place will have no chance to emerge as winners.
WRITINGS, ARTICLES, CONFERENCES
As opposed to the practical considerations represented by the competitions’ outcomes, the
theoretical approaches seem to have the capacity to explore the uncompleted project from a
larger perspective, a rather usual attitude considering the variety of disciplines involved in
researching the post- communist issue: architecture theoreticians, historians, sociologists,
journalists, individually or reunited in groups. If the competitions’ themes are largely
characterized by a preservationist attitude but also find building next to the existing structures
as the only solution, the following examples ponder over the subject from different points of
view. However, despite the large number of texts gathered around the subject, looking for a
solution concerning the evolution of the axis, or the uncompleted project in general, will not
reveal much. Most of the writings only address the problem and critique its generator forces
and the incapacity of the present decisional factors to materialize any kind of intervention, but
fail to offer concrete solutions. Others, on the contrary, come from different disciplines the
case in which architecture is considered only a secondary element.
The mass-distributed press acquired unprecedented freedom of speech and evolution after
1989. Cultural periodicals like 22 or Dilema constantly focused on the urban evolution of
Romanian cities. New architecture periodicals like Octogon and Arhitectura appeared. Even
90 the daily papers were often involved with the topic. The consequences of the written word
remained, however, secluded despite its large availability to the public. Since a strong
dissolution of the civil society’s public influence happened for a prolonged period of time, the
present written ideas (even if coherent and numerous) take further the same minimal degree of
importance as the society they emerge from. Strangely enough, the disregarded messages from
the press seem to project over the specialty publications as well: the scarce numbers of
architectural books focused on the subject did not have any effect whatsoever. Even if
popularized, they stirred up debates only in the hermetic intellectual circles from which they originally emerged.
Without trying to minimize the overall qualities of the texts and researches regarding the
uncompleted project, Augustin Ioan – one of the most fervent supporters of the subject—
repeatedly criticized both the lack of expertise and elementary amateurism of those interested
to write about the subject. To be clearer, Ioan refers to a certain immaturity of the theoretical
discourse, especially the architectural one, blaming the situation on the prolonged communist
isolationism. The lack of expertise and information combined with claims based on punctual
and arbitrary conclusions, not based on solid studies, make in his opinion many of the written
works risky in terms of presumptions or final conclusions.
91 NEIL LEACH – “ARCHITECTURE AND REVOLUTION”
Architecture and Revolution59 is a collection of essays edited by Neil Leach about the specific
problems of Eastern Europe. The authors – politicians, architects, urban planners or philosophers – gathered in 1995 for the “Beyond the wall” conference in Bucharest not to solve the problems of the Romanian society, but to try to better define them, as apparently there was little concern at that time about architecture or the inevitable urban development.
The attempt went even further by trying to define the specific problems of the post- communist
societies in relation to their built heritage: lack of theoretical framework, lack of local and
national architectural identity, lack of communication with the civil society. By being able to
define and explain these issues, the participants hoped to reveal the tools necessary for an
eventual intervention over the diseased environment. The book is a fascinating synthesis of the
most acknowledged thoughts and ideas about Romanian society and its recent evolution.
The compilation of texts can be compared with a competition, where each chapter reveals a
captivating article starting with the same outline, but pointing towards different specific issues.
A philosopher’s perception is obviously very different from that of an architect’s, but
considering that the main focus is on the whole society, it becomes an advantage as it covers
most of the questionable issues that might influence a built environment. There are twenty-one
essays categorized following a logical timeline: historical perspectives – what it was and the remains, the climax – moment of change, and the future – strategies for a change.
59 Neil Leach, Architecture and revolution, (London: Routledge, 1999), 8.
92 The major advantage of the book is that it is maybe the only one which deals with the subject of the East European reconstruction, being at the same time internationally acknowledged.
There have been several similar local attempts, but looking locally, from only one side of the barricade when the so-much-adored outcome is in fact on the other side, would be at least loaded with subjectivism. In addition, most attempts have been made only by architects or urban planners, which again limits the field of expertise and consequently of finding a proper solution. The book is maybe the only one where Romanian architecture is analyzed, and also it is an early work prior to the Bucharest 2000 competition.
People like Vaclav Havel, Daniel Libeskind, and Neil Leach present their own theories about the urban environment of Eastern Europe, about the omnipresent iconic dark grey concrete blocks and about the humble chances of quick answers for these issues. The general optimistic attitude of that time can hardly find its place in the pages of the book, and thanks to the reserved attitude the ideas are still valuable after ten years of slow and faulty development. The reserved attitude seems to be just the right approach when starting an analysis on virgin ground, with no theoretical or research basis. Since it was an early work after the fall of communism the question of memory was still strong (or at least stronger than it is), the articles published have more awareness about the fate of the cities then any other later work about this subject.
93 DANA HARHOIU
The book Bucharest, a City Between Orient and Occident (Bucharest, 1997) presents a series of unprecedented and largely questioned theories about the urban evolution of Bucharest. The author, an architectural historian by profession, reveals a different view of the major events that shaped Bucharest’s evolution. Although the development of the axis and the People’s
House are not the main subject of the book, Harhoiu praises a better understanding of history in order to be able to decide the future of the place: “The legitimacy of any creative enterprise is endangered by a certain confusion regarding the local values that still persists after fifty years of totalitarianism.”60
Harhoiu characterizes the communist physical destruction of the city as a major event characterized by “the mediocre quality of the urban and architectural project”61, but she places
it along a series of happenings in the history of Bucharest. Consequently, the author re-
evaluates the tumultuous history of the place by describing the effects of other events like
earthquakes, fires, and especially the Ottoman domination. Although the most obvious and
significant, the communist intervention is not necessarily the most destructive process for the
local or national identity. In addition to the physical wound, Harhoiu also emphasizes a general
cultural tragedy caused by the communist regime, pointing toward other catastrophes than this
omnipresent architectural debate: the people’s mentality, the cultural and artistic life, the
destruction of the temporal continuity of everyday life.
60 Harhoiu, 13. 61 Ibid.
94 This way of addressing the problem leads the author to claim that in fact the generally believed
idea that the pre-modern city was organically developed is not entirely true. By making a
comparison with the city of Constantinople, Harhoiu reveals certain planned oriental
organizational schemes present in Bucharest. Following this idea, the modernist evolutionary
period and the communist intervention were moments when the city was marked by a shift
from an oriental-type planning towards a western urban influence: The Haussmannian
influence “applies to an urban texture… intervening over the irregular Medieval-Ottoman
texture.”62 The uncompleted project becomes consequently one of the several major shifts in the urban development of the city that contributed to the current disorganized structure.
AUGUSTIN IOAN
Augustin Ioan researched and published extensively over the major themes of the architecture
and politics of the East and Central European regions. His focus on political influence over the
built environment, on the conflicting attitudes of decisional factors, and the societal needs
render him an expert in the theory and history of modern and contemporary Romanian
architecture. Although a practicing architect, Ioan preferred to concentrate on the methods of
researching the urban and architectural issues as the approach was believed to be more fruitful
and also more in need of a coherent framework.
Ioan pioneered and dominated the architectural critique that emerged after 1989. The nostalgic
and omnipresent historical perspectives have always been targeted and criticized over the city’s
present and acute controversies. By approaching the problem from both sides of the barricade,
62 Ibid., 59.
95 theoretically and practically, Ioan attempted to find a coherent discourse in tackling an
eventual action over the diseased environment. Many of his books—for example Power, Play
and National Identity—emerged from a critique of the Romanian researchers' own weak
interest in promoting their patrimony in writing the histories of their own artistic past. Similar to Dana Harhoiu’s study, Ioan follows the same path by reinterpreting the city’s history, this time from an architectural perspective. As a representative of the new generation of architectural theoreticians, the author considered imperative the “duty to revisit the perennial
obsessive themes”63 enunciated decades ago. As new universal theories appear constantly,
thinking of the city from the perspective of a series of venerable foregoers might lead to
erroneous results. Ioan proposed a re-interpretation of the last hundred years of architectural
history in order to justify any present action.
From the position of co-editor of several Romanian and international art and architecture
journals like Octogon and Arhitectura, or as a contributor to the major cultural periodicals like
22 and Dilema, Augustin Ioan infused with contemporary research methods an area largely
characterized by “the wear of traditional modes of interrogating the object”64. Developed over a period of over fifteen years, the almost monthly reports over the city came up with weighty reaction to the numerous faulty political and administrative decisions taken against the city.
Ioan’s attraction in relation to the city and its architecture is further described in Arhitectura si
Puterea – Architecture and power (Bucharest, 1992) and Khora – teme si dificultati ale relatiei
dintre filosofie si arhitectura – Khora – in between architecture and philosophy (Bucharest,
63 Ioan claims in Power, play and national identity, 7. 64 Ibid.
96 1999). The introduction of philosophical concepts in an environment dominated by the newly-
risen ignorant materialism and consumerism comes forth as a major feature of Augustin Ioan’s
books.
When gathering the manifold of Ioan’s texts, it seems difficult to foresee the author’s definite
position towards the communist development. As the texts stretch over a period of fifteen years
(during which societal and political change happened on a daily basis, bringing new rules,
visions and decisions) his attitude can be define a rather as a constant and ever-changing reaction to the troubled and hazardous ground on which his theories are occurring. However, the lack of action over the last years is considered the most problematic. The uncompleted project still looks like a wasteland waiting to be altered, modeled, modified, and integrated.
The article “Bucharest, lately”65 makes a summary of his vision over the last fifteen years of
stagnation. From the theoretician’s point of view, “Researching Communist architecture is a
tricky endeavor in contemporary Romania, where some major actors of that era are still alive,
some even still in charge, and are not exactly interested in opening up archives for investigation and interpretation.”66 However this side of the process proved to be much more
successful than the physical attempts which are practically nonexistent.
A specialist of the relation between power and architecture, Ioan establishes a radiography of
how political regimes that perpetuated after 1989 contributed to the failure of the physical
manifestation of any type of discourse: through the weak implementation of capitalist laws,
through the permanent manifestation of totalitarian decisions and through appropriation of the
communist symbols for the new power.
65 Augustin Ioan, “Bucharest - Lately,” article to be published, 2005. 66 Ibid.
97 Other aspects related to Ioan’s influence over the uncompleted project reside in his dominant
role in the competition for the orthodox cathedral, as one of his main research topics is the
national religious architecture. His participation was, though, largely contested as it destroyed
some of his very own previously dictated principles concerning the area, like the de-
monumentalization of the place or concepts related to the public space.
As a conclusion for the current state of affairs, after fifteen years of passive attitude, Augustin
Ioan believes that “The real (re)working of Bucharest is yet to come. And it better be preceded
by a serious (re)thinking of it as a contemporary European city, in a moment when the very
meaning of what a contemporary city is, or will be in times of public violence, shifts rapidly.
Not an easy task, but, nevertheless, one long overdue.”67
PERIODICALS AND NEWSPAPERS
As presented earlier, Augustin Ioan was a major contributor to a series of periodicals like
Arhitecturam, Arhitext design, Octogon, Dilema and 22. This was not, however a solitary
enterprise. He belonged to a larger group of historians, sociologists, and philosophers who
reunited and expressed their points of view. Probably the most influential and penetrating
among the large public are the publications dedicated to political and social analysis like
Dilema- Dilemma, 22 and Observatorul Cultural – The Cultural Observer.
The mission of these periodicals is not the fate of the urban tissue, but rather focused on the
city as a component of everyday life, as one of the many (harmful) aspects that influence the
67 Ibid.
98 contemporary societal change. The Dilema’s “raison d’etre” for example, lies in the wish to educate the individual, to make one aware of “the individual without dilemmas.”68
All these manifestations are happening far from any political force or decision: a reason for them to survive, but also a reason to insignificantly manipulate any form of decision. The closed circle that eased their growth impedes their proper relation to the exterior world. No written protest has been able to change or stop a major decision concerning construction or demolition in the city before and after 1989. The targeted public is also a distinct category of society stopping the spread of ideas beyond their intellectual circle.
The architectural magazines’ like Arhitectura, Arhitext Design, Octogon mainly focused on emergent new design and are less preoccupied with the social, political implications of the communist project. After a few years of constant debate, the editors gave up realizing it is impossible to attract readers by debating a subject that will not happen anyway in the near future. The positivist attitude is obviously the way to go, since Romanian architecture does not evolve around one major subject.
Many times, the periodicals are just extensions of larger civic groups that are in responsible for organizing conferences, exhibitions, or publishing books. For example, 22 is part of “GDS”—
“The group for social dialogue”. The chief-editor Dilema, Andrei Plesu, is also the president of the New Europe College Institute, an establishment for advanced studies in the humanities and social sciences. Under these foundations, various conferences over the vibrant subject of
68 Andrei Plesu, “The person with no dilemmas,” Dilema, no.8 (March 4-10): 1993.
99 communist remains have been organized, many of these focused on architecture. Mariana
Celac, Augustin Ioan, and Ana- Maria Zahariade are only a few of the contributors.
ALTERNATIVE PROJECTS
Perhaps the greatest advantage of the alternative projects is that they happen far from the
influence of the central powers, political or administrative. Founded from external or local
private funds, or simply resulting from the unconditional enthusiasm of a handful of dedicated
professionals, these actions give alternative options to a rather institutionalized approach for
the previously discussed attempts. The stagnant situation tended to encourage this type of action, even if its limited range of action or scale of outcomes is not meant to revolutionize the state of affairs.
69 “HABITAT AND ART IN ROMANIA” FOUNDATION – HAR
The HAR program (Habitat and Art in Romania) is an artistic and social experiment involving
artists, architects, journalists, and art critics concerned with the depersonalized places as a
consequence of the communist regime, with the rehabilitation of human settlement. The goal is
to enhance simultaneously artistic movements as a real way of communication between the
majority (the general public) and the minority of the visual arts trade as well as an improvement of the public space.
69 See: www.ong.ro/ong/har/index.htm.
100
One example is the way of dealing with the residual public spaces. By placing a series of
sculptures in the leftover empty lots of high-rise, high- density residential areas (typical for the
communist regime), the places acquire the function of open-air exhibitions, also helping with
the cleaning of the place from the usual trash-can character of the empty lots.
This action of salvaging unused public spaces has focused on the empty lots and the residual
areas belonging to the uncompleted project. Unfortunately, successful attempts were made
only in the smaller cities of the country like Ramnicu Valcea and Calarasi, where the organization found support in the local administration. Another concrete result is the authors’ wish to contribute to the elaboration of new urban policies, an action that normally should have been initiated by authorities.
THE GROUPS OF URBAN ACTION
Appearing recently as a counter-reaction to the weak interest of public authorities to promote
modern art, groups of artists have been seeking alternative ways to convey their refusal to
comply with the current state of affairs. Often, these manifestations are connected to the
discontent in a city’s evolution. The uncommon ways, which do not follow the academic
approach, often include the urban landscape as place of manifestation for these ideas.
Photographers, painters, sculptors, or actors occupy, convert and put a mark on fragments of
the city.
101 In terms of urban attitude, the main claims are to fight against consumerism, and consequently
against the “attacked” urban image. Artists fight against banners, against the oversaturated commercial character of places once emblematic for the city, against the depersonalization of the urban landmarks. By the underground exhibitions and reunions, by public manifestoes like stencil graffiti and internet blogs the wish is to find a more penetrating way to question the quotidian reality using the artistic performance. Vlad Nanca, Stefan Tiron, and Vali Chincisan are only a few artists reunited under the covers of the Omagiu70 magazine, under numerous
blogs and urban attitude websites71.
WORKSHOPPING BUCHAREST
Twenty Dutch designers and architects who believe that fieldwork is a significant method to
conceive new definitions of public space initiated earlier this year the “Workshopping
Bucharest”72 action. This is a typical externally funded event, part of a larger process that looks to analyze a series of European cities in the perspective of the future European Union development.
The participants seek to contribute to progress within the area of spatial design and to new
definitions of public space. As opposed to the usual process where Western cities were a model
for Bucharest, this time a reverse exchange of ideas with Romanian students and experts is
70 See www.omagiu.com. 71 See www.2020.ro, www. Altenativ.ro and http://bukresh.blogspot.com. 72 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/incepem/message/3796
102 preferred. The goal is to create awareness in the West-European design world about the
inevitable European developments. The researchers believe that Bucharest has a lot of positive
details that can contribute to the development of Western cities: the overlapping historical and
cultural layers, the condition of the no-man’s land territories, the unplanned manifestations of
public space and buildings. The benefit for the local community is consequently minimal,
being reduced to an exchange of information between foreign and local participants, mostly
students.
CHAPTER CONCLUSION
The local approaches concerning the uncompleted project are characterized by certain common
themes like the permanent filtering of the present through a historical perspective, as well as
the constant rage against the physical remains of the communist regime. As described by
Wolfgang Kil focusing on Berlin, the author invokes “the confusion between the hatred against
the communist regime as ideology and its physical remains” 73. Similarly, Dana Harhoiu’s
claims that before starting to think about a reconstruction or even deciding if such a
reconstruction is necessary, the process needs to be backed up by a study regarding the place (a
very particular situation, where ready-made solutions cannot be applied). The groups of
specialists or individuals, who generated ideas and projects assuming exclusivist approach
apparently missed that “clash” of ideas between different levels of social or professional
73 Kil Wolfgang, “Post-Communist or anti-modern?” http://lrc.cornell.edu:8088/IRC/Plone/Members/Esther/Abschlussprojekt/plonearticle.2005-04- 29.9341823804/Attachment00004951/Alexanderplatz%20paper.pdf, (02/15/06).
103 categories. There has rarely been any cohesion between research and theoretical studies over
the area and the concrete results that appeared lately.
To conclude, several definitive features tie together over fifteen years of sporadic attempts to
do something in connection with the affected central area of Bucharest:
- The nostalgic tendency to invoke memory. Due to the lack of local research, theoretical approaches have been limited and not groundbreaking. Most of them were anchored in
preservationist approaches related to the pre-communist urban tissue, with no reference to the
contemporary approaches in the field. No effect over the built environment.
- The minimization of the architectural profession, as well as its isolation from the
international scene led to a practice limited to a few concepts initiated by the communist party.
Therefore, a broad view over the post-communist issues was impossible to handle with a
limited fund of experience and knowledge.
- The anti-democratic tool of decision making. In addition, the role of different actors was
also minimized, making the act of decision a tool only for restricted groups and factors of
decision. Any attempt to develop the city does not take into consideration the manifold of
needs and wishes displayed by public opinion.
- The idea of radical change. A repercussion of the already mentioned conservative
approaches is the fear of proposal and implementation of radical ideas. The call upon the past can be attributed as well to the lack of knowledge and expertise in any other direction.
104 - Separate groups with different concepts did not materialize any research in a common manifesto. The isolation of the concepts persisted even in the case of multi- participant competitions.
A longer description of the process would inevitably tend to dramatize and personalize too much the final purpose of the research. It is more important to analyze the remains of the
process, the immense mass of constructions that remained and still mark an important chapter
in the national history. The future directions that the area will follow should consider a
manifold of aspects and examples, as opposed to the concepts presented earlier. Unconditional
acceptance of western values—ignoring the local aspects, accompanied by a constant denial of the past—does not seem to produce any results. Accepting and understanding the national constraints and legacy, making the communist experience operational, are issues that can lead to some departure points for the urgent and long overdue decisions about the object of study.
105
CHAPTER THREE
ALTERNATIVE VISIONS.
CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
Since 1989, the local critical approaches and practices were unable to give a single coherent
answer to the problem of communist architecture. The results of these studies actively
contributed to the formation of a broad range of proposals and critiques. However, most of
them approach the problem from a similar historical perspective and display a certain
nostalgic, preservationist attitude by praising the older disappeared layers of the city. The
question is whether 21st century Bucharest is to successfully develop according to the limited
local set of responses, or if it needs more than that. After addressing the qualities and
weaknesses of the local approaches, the third chapter will explore alternative ways related to
the evolution of the axis and the surrounding area.
As described in the second chapter, another common feature of the local proposals for
development has been guided by the constant minimization of the communist development.
Similar to Romania, most of the Eastern European region was dominated by despotic regimes
with subsequent traumas in the present. The outcomes may not have been as tragic in all countries, but most of them dealt with issues of reconstruction of the city and of the cultural and artistic life. Concerning the burdensome heritage of built remains, Berlin stands as a major
106 example. Having to deal with both Nazi and communist tyrannical regimes, the city was
subject to similar debates in recent years. Daniel Libeskind’s concepts about the
reconsideration of the past and about the ideologically infested environments can be found
relevant for Bucharest as well. Although an architect, Libeskind ties the problem of
reconstruction to collective memory and social issues. In addition, Lebbeus Woods’ theories
proposing radical reconstructions of diseased places are to be seen in connection with Sarajevo,
a city struck by years of civil war, a place where reconstruction is vital.
The wish to explore the modern ways cities are going to develop in the next decades forces the
study to look at the contemporary concepts related to urban evolution. Demographics, the
ongoing economic globalization and the inherent political union with the rest of Europe are
only a few factors that have been totally ignored by the local studies. The first signs toward an
anti-nostalgic treatment were given by the architectural theoreticians who questioned the
dominant opinion of re-building the once existing structures. The contemporary international
concepts related to the cities’ evolution are currently addressing more and more the exploration
of radical ways for approaching urban development. Rem Koolhaas is among the theoreticians who radically reconsidered the fate of cities in the perspective of concepts like globalization, placelessness, permanent versus temporary.
This chapter will reveal that the physical constraints and the political pressure over the area
should not be the only determinants of its evolution: the idea of (re)building a future city
should be based upon a general openness to external sources, following the same path as
societal change. Since the local lifestyles and economics are changing according to the newly
107 emerged western values of consumerism and communication, these ideas need to penetrate the
concepts related to urban renewal.
BERLIN
Capital Dilemma74 is one of the books that discusses the rebuilding over the representative
architectural remains of past regimes, and the way the burdensome legacy is ideologically
considered in the new interventions. Briefly, the book analyses the process of remaking Berlin,
the apex of the German political power. The place itself is intriguing as it deals with the key
moments that Germany was subject to through its rather tumultuous history. According to
Michael Wise, the author of the book, “architecture assumes importance as a maneuverable political tool”75. The classical buildings stand over time-accumulated layers of significance as
they play host to various disparate and historically significant events of the different political
eras of Germany.
Wise proposes an interesting analysis of the present condition of the city of Berlin. The book
appeared in 1999, the moment when almost all of the structures designated for the new capital
were finished and thus a turning point in terms of power and architecture in the already
burdensome legacy the city holds. The process of becoming the new capital of the most
powerful nation in Europe was a significant step loaded with political, economical, and
74 Michael Wise, Capital Dilemma (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1998). 75 Ibid., 120.
108 ideological issues. Wise discusses the strengths and weakness of the ongoing rebuilding
process.
45. The Stalin Allee – the monumental axis of East Berlin was preserved perfectly, no alterations being made.
46. All totalitarian buildings have been renovated and preserved in their original configuration.
The resemblance with Bucharest deals mostly with the situation of the communist relics and
the way they are to be integrated (or not) into the new urban plans. Consequently, there is also
the symbolic power of the remains, but also of the new structures that appeared. Although the wish to eradicate the communist remains is comparable (in Berlin’s situation, the Nazi structures were an additional issue), the big difference was scale. While in Germany the western part instantly flooded the east with enormous amounts of capital and occidental know- how, the similar process in Bucharest happened at a slower pace and at a much smaller scale.
109 The Bucharest experience seems like a very far echo of the Berlin reconstruction. The debates
concerning the legacy, nonetheless, are similar despite the present different results. While in
Bucharest the battle was carried out between the communist super-structures and the
unanimously accepted pre-communist manifestations in art and architecture, Berlin faced four
different and opposed elements: the past monarchies, the regime of the 3rd Reich, the communist period, and finally the current capitalist power. The more the layers are inter- woven, the more intricate the situation becomes. Thus, the response had to suit the critical situation keeping in mind the country’s “[acute] awareness of the ideological implications of architecture and urban planning”76
Both issues concern a certain amount of reconstruction. Still, the big issue resides in the fact that in the case of Berlin such an intervention was justified by the practical purpose of moving the capital’s administrative and political command centers from Bonn to Berlin, while in
Bucharest the issues were strictly related to the integration of the communist remains with their physical and mental presence. Even if the results of the present Berlin are debatable in terms of scale and style, the purpose was attained and the financial support allowed them to mark a radical reconstruction throughout the city. There were two major aspects concerning the Berlin intervention:
1) The Berlin project proposed ways to deal with the communist and Nazi structures by minimizing their influence. This was accomplished by taking the reconstruction to such high scale that the past relics become almost unperceivable and less influent. Covering the past by minimizing it or moving the vital points of the city was the procedure by which most of the burdensome legacy was solved. The solution happened mostly because of the different ideological groups which pleaded for preserving various manifestations in architecture of the past regimes: communist, Nazi or even monarchy. The prevailing opinion was that obviously the past cannot be
76 Ibid.,57.
110 erased and replaced with all new. Michael Wise infers also the idea that the preservation of some key structures belonging to the tumultuous past “could help promote an understanding of a common past among Germans”77 2) The situation of the residential architecture (entire neighborhoods of high-rise flats) was different: a total conservation took place, the only alteration happening in terms of new but similar material applied to the facades. Contrary, while Bucharest follows the general tendency to totally deny the past, accompanied by lack of financial resources and preferring to find simple and inexpensive ways to make place for new needs and functions while leaving the relics in total dereliction.
The chapter called “Designing new images of power”78 tells the story of how moving the capital city to Berlin was considered. First, the decision was made in order to enhance the unification statement made by the unification of the two countries. The symbolic reason was invoked and linked to the Berlin Wall collapse: one structure goes down and needs to be replaced with something new. The solution of monopolizing symbols of former regimes would have meant an unconscious transfer of ideology. Therefore, the Romanian situation where the
People’s House acquires the new location for The House of Parliament did not apply in Berlin.
In exchange, the solution of rebuilding the whole modern city from zero was chosen. Although this was accomplished with the help of signature-architects, Wise displays a certain disappointment over what has arisen so far: “the official architecture of the capital emerging thus far is neither triumphant nor encoded with assertions of postwar moral absolution” despite the abundance of famous structures. The reasons reside on one hand in the “tabula rasa” attitude of the outsider architects, but also the lack of a very well defined local plan. Wise cites
Aldo Rossi in this regard: “I fear that Berlin has lost awareness of its destiny as a capital and in history.”79
77 Ibid., 120. 78 Ibid., 57. 79 Ibid., 157.
111 A relevant discussion related to the issue of reconstruction is Michael Wise’s reference to the architectural profession before and after the fall of communism. The discussion is generalized to the extent that Wise argues that every totalitarian system has subjugated and used architecture for its own ideological and propagandistic purposes. The current transformation of
Berlin revealed a less exuberant and avant-garde Berlin than many have expected. The local architects followed the general tendency to minimize the past: “The architectural solutions they proposed… [expresses] a wish by at least some members of a new generation for fewer constraints in the design of a national image.”80
This is partly because of the general tendency towards precaution in stating national values for fear of a resemblance to the previous historical precedents, but also because the lack of a real movement in German architecture, especially in Eastern Germany. As a result most of the projects have been commissioned to Western German architects or international offices. The communist period managed to diminish the profession of architecture to such an extent that the architect became a mere slave of the system, accentuating the idea of mere builder and minimizing areas like criticism or theoretical approach. Freedom of expression was replaced by clear and strict guidelines concerning certain image and economical efficiency. The rebirth of a movement out of a practically extinct profession has not happened yet, proving that few local practices managed to state their doctrine among the master re-builders of the New Berlin.
This relates to the present difficulty of the architectural movement in Romania to overcome the crisis of authority and style. Despite the large number of existing practices (most of them located in the capital city) there has been hardly any cohesion in terms of approach and
80 Ibid., 158.
112 dialogue, and even if some results can be considered encouraging they have a minimal and scattered character compared to the scale of the city.
Michael Wise’s final argument questions the idea of reconstructing over such a significant number of layers, each loaded with collective connotation. He introduces the theme of caution:
“The new Berlin is less exuberant, experimental, and expansive than the unified German capital of which some had dreamed” as the new buildings, even if they display a statement through their number and spread on a large area of the city, fail to make an ideological statement. Thus, the new democratic symbols dissolve themselves into the contemporary architecture of the city, making the process of reconstructing the new capital only a way of showing financial wealth. Moreover, not only do the new structures lack ideological force, the supposed unity and identity of large-scale development is missing as well. Thus, the dilemma faced by contemporary Germany in its search for a new identity reflects strongly on the indecisive and wavering nature of contemporary planning and development control.
The lesson Bucharest needs to learn from the Berlin example is that the issues in dealing with
the past cannot be solved by immense financial resources, not even by commissioning a large
number of signature architects. Backed up by a gigantic reconstruction Master Plan, the current status of Berlin did not satisfy all opinions, especially the ones concerned with the integration of history.
113 DANIEL LIBESKIND
Influenced by his Jewish-Polish origins and by his large interest in one of the emblematic places of totalitarian repression—Berlin—Daniel Libeskind displays a particular attitude towards the current living conditions within the ex-communist environments. Common negative descriptions like “wrong,” “ugly” or “inhuman” have always guided the majority of research related to the communist experience and favored a return to the previous state’s old, classicist values represented by the historical areas of the city. Similarly, the “harmful” axis along with the People’s House were always sought to be integrated into a process of urban reconsideration of the old tissue, and minimized in favor of a correction of the urban matrix.
Opposed to these principles Libeskind sees destruction, both mental and physical, as an opportunity to formulate a set of answers totally independent of the usual forms of contextualism and utopianism, and transform the traumatizing experience into a departure point.
The major theme Libeskind builds his arguments upon is related to the questionable rational tendency to encourage “the erasure of history”81. The supreme arguments to support his claim are the immediate demolition of the Berlin Wall and the sudden execution of the Romanian dictator days after the 1989 events. He establishes a set of ideas according to which the dreadful fragments of the past need to be reconsidered and seen as part of the future. Libeskind considers this a difficult task, as most of these crucial moments in history are followed by unconditional hatred and rejection of the past. The masses need thus to be educated in this regard. The reasoning behind this approach lies mainly in the need to preserve society’s icons,
81 Neil Leach, Architecture and revolution, (London: Routledge, 1999), 130.
114 not only physically, but also mentally—both positive and negative. The lived experience
around these icons is important for keeping the collective memory observant in order to
prevent similar episodes.
The solution proposed by Libeskind deals with the physical remains as well, encouraging a preservationist approach towards the environments flawed by concrete and injected with
ideology. He advocates again the idea of maintaining the accident. Addressing the question of
Berlin, a city ravaged by political decisions, Daniel Libeskind advocates the presence of the
omnipresent traumatizing experiences as an irrefutable fact. “No one can afford to
ideologically just wipe… out of their minds and say, we don’t like it, we like the old streets of
the medieval Berlin, because this is just wishful thinking.”82 It is an ethical vision, “an
opportunity loaded with new relations and urban experiences”83 in the sense of keeping the
memory alive, keeping the masses sensitive to the harmful past by its constant display in
everyday life. Reciprocally, since the trauma provides an opportunity for development, it does
not have to be minimized, but rather included in the most common present experiences. The
concepts behind this approach are mainly related to a subtle recollection of the past, to the need
in every society to identify icons, both praiseworthy and fearful. Libeskind, especially at the
present time, after decades of mass belief in false symbols, considers it necessary to educate
the masses not to erase, but operate on these totalitarian remains, enhancing the idea of
democracy furthermore – the symbols belong to the people.
82 Ibid., 130. 83 Ibid., 127.
115 Another important claim of Libeskind’s theory invokes Paul Valery’s84 axiom according to
which “humanity is permanently threatened by two dangers: order and disorder”85. Bucharest,
by nature has always developed organically, evolving in an unpredictable manner, especially at
the urban planning level. These features have been considered the generators of its charm and
flavor, but presently they don’t seem to correspond to the envisioned 21st century Bucharest.
On the other hand, the restrictive wish to impose a regulated city grid has been disastrous and
did not resolve the issues started by the chaotic texture. A further similar procedure would do
nothing but enhance the existing fracture.
As a result, Libeskind declares himself against the idea of a Master Plan, invoking its eventual
totalitarian connotations. The city must be seen as a collective work, and thus another form to
revive and enhance the public contribution in such decisions. In Libeskind’s opinion, another
controlled layer built according to a Master Plan would determine in physical terms a repetition
in the evolution process and another form of collective brainwashing from the mental point of
view. Libeskind strongly opposes “the eternal recurrence of the same through replication”86 especially where this would mean deletion of history chapters and an unconscious and dangerous rehabilitation of totalitarian ideas (backed up by the idea of latent existence of totalitarian aspects, as many of the East European countries have governments formed by ex- communists wearing a different name).
84 French author and Symbolist poet, (1871-1945). 85 Libeskind, Traces of the unborn, 128. 86 Ibid., 128.
116 Similarly, the idea of fertile delay emerged at a forum at the Architecture Salon in Zagreb,
Croatia87 where one comes to the conclusion that the communist experience was not
necessarily a time of delay or non-existence. Looking at the exhibited projects, the Western influence was considered predominant, while completely ignoring the past. All the participants finally saw the weakness of the approach – the constant denial of the burdensome past. As a solution, a reassessment of the history was considered.
LEBBEUS WOODS
“Now there is no choice but invent something new, which nevertheless must begin with
damaged old, a new way that neither mimics what has been lost nor forgets the losing, a new
that begins today, in the moment of loss’s most acute self-reflection.”88
Woods’ theories are particularly relevant as he focuses on the reconstruction of residual spaces
born out of unpredictable violent effects of war, political regimes, or natural calamities. As
opposed to Daniel Libeskind, Woods proposes a dramatic method to make people think about
the city, to reflect upon the wounded places of their everyday life. The violent change
occurring in the contemporary city cannot be handled by a fanciful restoration of the past, as
Woods considers it a mere denial of the history and further surrender in face of the negative
forces. The opposite solution, “tabula rasa”, would give an erroneous response to these
particular present situations. In addition, the relations of the individuals with the city, the
87 Matteo Ghidoni, Ivana Katuric, Mimica Vedran, “Croatia. A fertile delay?,” DOMUS 873 (Sept. 2004): 36-55. 88 Lebbeus Woods, Radical reconstruction (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1997), 27.
117 whole humanity changed and so did the role of the architect: the practice as a discipline needs
to review its position and take into consideration the multitude of events that affected the
contemporary era.
Woods proposes a different type of radical approach which does not include complete erasure
or a Master Plan imposed by force. The radicalism of his reconstruction operates on a mental level. The built results follow. One of the most important aspects is to teach people how to deal
with this issue, even if it is terribly painful. The masses need to understand that the
burdensome experience will never fade completely, and that scars will always be there. People
need to accept with pride the sufferance and the losses, but also what has been gained.
47. A structure affected by bombing gives birth to a visible scar that ultimately will become the same with the building.
118
In his projects, Woods treats the city as a living organism, when wounded it becomes almost a corpse. The war and the destructive political ideologies are seen as the virus that initially started the wound. But instead of appealing to traditional procedures that attempt to cover, restore, or erase the past in a cowardly manner, Woods insists on leaving the wound to heal by itself, even if this means that the scar might take over the whole affected structure. Thus, the virus persists and gets a permanent place in the collective memory. Even after a long time, after the wound has healed, there will be a scar that cannot be deleted. Woods makes the wound the pivotal point of his projects. He would let the virus expand and claim its own presence over the attacked building, flowing over its facade and into the interior. The spatially resultant mutations come to reiterate the fact that “Healing is not an illusory, cosmetic process”89. For the masses the adoption of such procedure would mean an acceptance of an everlasting painful presence and forever a reminder of inexcusable guilt.
The process of healing is also seen by Woods extremely radically. There is evidently a buffer area, a period when the wound acquires a scab that grows indeterminately before it stops and becomes a scar. Although cruel, when compared to Bucharest’s newly acquired façade transformations over the communist structures, the process seems strikingly similar. Would this be a sign that the uncompleted project is still undergoing the “scab” phase?
Probably the most relevant examples in connection to the object of study are the Woods’ projects for Sarajevo and Havana. While employing the wounded organism metaphor, Woods
89 Ibid., 16.
119 manages to build an impressive response to the actual diseased societies. By the power and cruelty of the proposal, the message really has the chance to penetrate and change popular thought. The problematic issue arises when these theories are related to the concrete proposals.
Possessing an extraordinary mastery of drawing, Lebbeus Woods makes a series of picturesque proposals. The questioning starts as to when these would be able to become reality. Totally opposite to a programmatic architecture, the proposals tend to take the shape of a series of symbols arrayed on various wounded structures. The functional or sometimes even the structural sense is challenged. The question of reconstruction becomes even more convoluted with this type of proposal. On the one hand, the ideas are salutary considering the mental challenges they bring into question. They become amazing intellectual manifestoes, but their implementation is illusory. Following Lebbeus Woods’ projects, the places become rather huge memorials, inhabited temples that fail ultimately to respond to another set of unavoidable issues like program, financial resources, and general acceptance.
48. Lebbeus Woods’ theory exemplified on a building in Sarajevo. Before….
120
49. … and after the process.
REM KOOLHAAS – THE GENERIC CITY
"Urbanism doesn't exist. It is only an ideology in Marx's sense of the word. Architecture really exists, like Coca-Cola: Though coated with ideology, it is a real production, falsely satisfying a falsified need. Urbanism is comparable to the advertising propagated around Coca-Cola - pure spectacular ideology. Modern capitalism which organized the reduction of all social life to a spectacle is incapable of presenting any spectacle other than that of our own alienation. Its urbanistic dream is its masterpiece" (Koolhaas and Mau: S,M,L,XL, 1995).
In his attempts to formulate modern visions about the city, Koolhaas’ ideas become extremely
significant as they undermine most of the already traditionally established views about
urbanism and urbanity. Koolhaas envisions the arbitrary condition of the future human establishments. His studies become relevant for the purpose of this thesis, as they approach a
121 similar problem – how to build a place for the future. This time, the issue is approached from a totally opposite direction, rendering irrelevant all the local debates.
Gathered under the concept of Generic City,90 Koolhaas imagines the typical city of the future, a condition that all the places in the world will acquire being shaped by globalization, high density, cyber age, and mass culture. In opposition, terms like history, public space and pedestrian walkways will disappear. By definition, the word generic describes a “relating to or characteristic of a whole group or class”91 and “having no particularly distinctive quality or application.”92 It is a loaded concept that portrays the current condition of certain already existing cities (especially the Asian high density metropolitan areas), but also reveals
Koolhaas’ vision about the future of all human settlements. The generic city does not yet give insight as to how to build the cities of the future – it is rather a term that describes the manifold of changes typical of the contemporary world, and reveals a vision of how the inhabited places are going to be altered. It is more like a warning, an argument for Koolhaas’ affirmation that urbanism came to extinction. Bucharest is also a candidate for becoming a generic city, especially in its current condition, when it confronts a local identity crisis and is also simultaneously injected with external “globalized” influence.
90 The article about the Generic City was initially published in 1994 and later in 1995 as part of “S, M, L, XL”. 91 Merriam-Webster OnLine. http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/generic (accessed April 10, 2006). 92 Ibid.
122
50-51. The generic city envisioned by Koolhaas: ultra-high density, standardized image, the triumph of private space.
The main themes in Koolhaas’ discourse also reject the idea of permanence, of tight relations to the historical layers: “Regret about history’s absence is a tiresome reflex”93. For Bucharest this would mean a rupture from the recent history – as bad memory and also from the glorifying history – as nostalgia and a model for reconstruction. The reason for which Koolhaas’ generic city is not tied to history is because first it limits evolution, and second because one of its main principles is “to abandon what does not work.”94 The past becomes immaterial as every part of the world will be flooded with universal mass culture and pragmatic developments. Trying to fight against a rapidly globalizing world that displays only material economy, machine scale, and random meaning employing the traditional weapons is
93 Rem Koolhaas, Bruce Mau, S,M,L,XL (New York: Monacelli Press, 1995), 1263. 94 Ibid., 1252
123 seen by Koolhaas as a lost battle. The generic city seems the only way to be in the future, a place without character, without virtues.
The predicted non-identity of the future cities, their ephemeral structure and image induces the
concept of “tabula rasa”. Since in the near future Koolhaas sees the emergence of “the same”
everywhere, the attempts to preserve notions and symbols belonging to the history or tied to an
identity seems an obsolete and inevitably extinct concept. Koolhaas further states this concept
by rephrasing that “with globalization, we all have more or less the same future.”95 The concept applies to all the places in the world. Bucharest will also ultimately become a spot in the global network, acquiring the same featureless character as any other place in the world.
The theory rejects any connection to the past, to the history, nostalgia, the classical center – periphery relations. Thinking about the development of the axis as an important part of the city center becomes thus irrelevant in a place where the center does not exist anymore. The qualities of the very center can be out taken by other spots, part of the same ever-growing settlement. Once the historical qualities are also erased, the place becomes similar with every other part of the city. The solution instead is to shift to another level and attempt to search the values of identity-less places, to anticipate what the city will be like and build it accordingly.
Koolhaas does not formulate a recipe on how such a place will be shaped. One of the
predominant features, however, is the lack of any center and the appearance of several interconnected, equally influent points. Consequently, Bucharest’s central area will become marginal both physically and as influence, making all the concern about reinforcing it futile.
The pragmatic vision Koolhaas proposes is strictly connected to gathering massive amounts of
95 Ibid., 366.
124 data followed by a strict response to a set of needs. The pragmatic vision challenges concepts
like “urban planning” and “urban design”, terms that become unnecessary at the moment of
“general urbanization.”96 Architecture is seen as a product while the architect is in charge with
creating fashionable ephemeral products. Since retail and office space are predominantly
needed, that is why it should happen. Considering that most of the ex-communist buildings
currently host bank branches and shopping centers, and that by the nature of these
transformations the past was completely ignored, one can compare the arbitrariness of the
current evolution with Koolhaas’ generic city. Although violently criticized locally, the
ignorance and strictly consumerist approach of the ongoing process matches the image of
generic city.
But does this mean that Bucharest is already becoming a generic city? Is the data driven recipe
going to work for the whole development until radical transformation? What if it will expand
all over the city? The overall vision is already questioned by some of the experts in the globalization phenomenon. For example Paul Virilio97 agrees with the emergence of the
“meta-city”98 citing even Pascal: “the center is everywhere and the circumference is
nowhere”99. However, the disappearance of the public in favor of the total intimacy and
isolation is argued. While the ultimate city imagined by Koolhaas is empty streets and no
96 Bo Gronlund, “Rem Koolhaas’ Generic City,” http://hjem.get2net.dk/gronlund/Koolhaas.html (accesseed, February 14, 2006). 97 French cultural theorist. 98 Paul Virilio, «Fin de l’histoire, ou fin de la geographie ? Un monde surexposé». http://www.monde- diplomatique.fr/1997/08/VIRILIO/8948.html (accessed February 15, 2006) 99 Ibid.
125 public space, where everything becomes extensively private and isolated, Virilio is concerned with the disappearance of any form of intimacy or hidden spot.
In addition, the development pace Bucharest has experienced seems ridiculously slow when compared to cities like Singapore or Kuala Lumpur. If it is thought to follow the idea that any city will become in the future a bigger or a smaller spot as part of a worldwide economical and cultural network, then the concept needs to be further detailed. Koolhaas lacks any concern about the social issues raised by the city. A programmatic, data-driven solution would hardly be accepted by Romanian society. Questions related to the memory of the place, history, tradition, and even traditional inter-human relations are still strong local characteristics.
Perhaps the most relevant example is the strong existence of religion and the subsequent institution of the church which is gaining increasing popularity after forty-five years of repression.
CHAPTER CONCLUSION
Ever since 1989, there was always an attempt to “correct” the urban matrix by further developing it and adding a new layer of construction. The belief was that the communist traces will be erased or at least minimized. Perceiving this interventionist attitude as necessary looked at the problem from a relatively narrow perspective. Evidently, every city needs to develop further, but could this be the solution for Bucharest? Can a new layer of concrete fill the scar left by a pervious similar intervention?
126
The theories presented earlier demonstrate that the palette of possibilities is much broader than expected. Ranging from Rem Koolhaas’ visions free of intellectual prejudice to Libeskind’s circumspect attitude towards the past, the affected areas of Bucharest certainly have models to follow. The multitude of ideas comes to show one more time the complexity of the world we live in presently. Few realized that adopting a democracy shifted the complexity of daily situations to a much higher level than in the past. The same path is followed by the city’s evolution as well. Multiple functions, increasing traffic and population, and various social groups are factors that cannot be controlled with traditional approaches. In addition, as the society’s tendency is to adopt the multitude of characteristics of Western lifestyles, the broader theoretical views should follow the same trend.
On the other hand, the timid evolutions in what concerns political and economical stability make most of the theories irrelevant. Most of the concepts analyzed took the Western World as their model – an ever-expanding territory that is constantly developing economically without any constraints. Such theories are difficult to be applied to an environment characterized by uncertainty and slow evolution. The disoriented and ambiguous developments of the post- communist years are the best proof. In addition, the shift in the population’s mentalities seems to take longer than expected, making such theories relevant and praiseworthy only for a limited number of individuals.
127
CONCLUSION
This thesis has explored the main local and international approaches related to the
reconstruction of the uncompleted communist initiated-projects. It has demonstrated that the
vast and uncompleted urban design and architectural interventions that were initiated by the
communist regimes are some of the most contentious topics in contemporary Romanian
national debates. Rejected by a large segment of the population and hailed as a welcome
development by others who see the projects as the beginnings of contemporary urbanization,
modernization and monumentalization of the cities of the country, both sides have equally
failed to provide any elaborate strategy for the redevelopment and completion of the
communist initiated projects. The debates surrounding the projects are compounded by
questions of collective national memory (or memories).
In order to emphasize alternative approaches towards interventions along the uncompleted
communist-initiated boulevard project, the study was contextualized within the cultural,
economic, and political climate of East-European post-communist regimes following the fall of
the Soviet Union and its allies. In addition, the study explored the larger global case studies of
contemporary monumental, nationalist-inspired, urban design as well as architectural and
urban design theories that have been utilized for the analysis of such projects. Although a success recipe cannot be formulated, a set of key principles and recommendations can be enunciated for a better reevaluation of the eventual development processes of the uncompleted
128 project. They do not have to be considered altogether, but rather as small steps towards a
clearer approach.
TABULA RASA VERSUS GENIUS LOCI
The question addresses generally the perspective of the recent openness towards exterior
Romania has gained recently. It is the issue that most of the developed countries have already
been facing: a struggle between the local qualities of the place against the constant
uniformization of the urban landscape. The same process could be observed happening in
Bucharest from the early years of the post-communist condition. Marked by a certain diversity,
the new structures follow a pattern that can be met everywhere in the world: a mall resembles
any other mall, an office building looks like it was transferred from any financial center in the
world. This happens at a time when society is still not educated enough to value the historic
qualities of the city, a justified reaction given the fact that the genius loci is in this case
predominantly flawed and repulsive.
However, a nation where history has been distorted and misinterpreted for almost half of the
20th century probably deserves more than a sudden erasure of the local values. This does not
mean, however, a new process of isolation from the outside world or an unconditional
embracement of anything related to the past. It is simply probably not the moment for
Bucharest to accept the condition of generic city and struggle to preserve the remaining values
129 as much as it is possible. The simple purpose of remains as living memory might be a good
enough reason to do that.
THE NOTION OF FERTILE DELAY
The communist experience has justly been regarded as a burdensome experience of the past.
The trauma it left in the people’s memory and through its physical remains gives the right to
the present generation to undoubtedly condemn it. However, if a political regime can change
overnight, the condition of a place cannot acquire fundamental instantaneous transformations.
Many times, in many discourses, the hatred against the dictatorial regime was transferred automatically towards its creations as well. Doubled by the isolationist decades that determine nowadays the critics and decisional factors to look only towards the past, the uncompleted project has no chance in displaying any eventual qualities or opportunities that might arise from its exploration. Stated in a conference about Slovenian architecture100, the notion of
fertile delay proposes a reassessment of the communist remains. The ongoing evolution
process of the Eastern European countries much resembles what the Western nations experienced after World War II: massive amounts of capital invested and blazing fast development. However, many cities now confront the negative effects of this rapid industrialization and urbanization. As Romania is experiencing a similar process, looking back
at the similar already-consumed process can give insights about how to handle an eventual
reconstruction, mostly what to avoid. As an example, the axis area is currently developing into
100 Ghidoni, Katuric, and Vedran, “Croatia. A fertile delay?,” DOMUS 873 (Sept. 2004): 36-55.
130 a financial district (beside the existing banks and office space, the “Esplanada” project has
many chances to be built). A look at the collapse of such centers in American cities can give
insight on how to avoid the transformation of the uncompleted project in an abandoned
downtown.
A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE PAST
The long periods of isolationist politics imposed by the totalitarian regimes imposed a rupture
from external influences or sources. Architecture and urban development made no exception.
While modernism was being replaced by post-modernism, and the latter was becoming extinct too, the local community of professionals had no choice but to look to the past – the only alternative available. This gave birth to an inertia in thinking: most of the local historians, sociologists, researchers and architects acquired a certain attraction for everything that was
opposed to communism, but secluded inside the internal boundaries, more precisely the periods
before 1947 and mostly the modern movement.
However, things have changed and the post-communist complex state of affairs cannot be
thought of from a conservative and limited perspective. Dana Harhoiu’s Bucharest a city
between Orient and Occident or Augustin Ioan’s questions like “What is Really National?”101
emerged as a counteraction to this type of approach, the authors advocating a better
understanding of the past before thinking about rebuilding the future. Since the very question
of local and national character is still stirring up debates, building the future interventions on
such disputes is a risky enterprise.
101 Ioan, Power, Play and National Identity, 221.
131 ARE IDEAS ENOUGH?
Romanian society is still in a stage of becoming. The transfer from a despotic hierarchy to a democratic one where the social classes start to become distinct is still developing. That reflects the dominant influence of certain decisional factors (the political forces) and the lack of power of the civil society. An increase in the influence of the public debate and a more moderate acceptance of any investment in the area would probably shape differently the eventual actions about the place. The poor management of local administrative decisions doubled by the lack of any official framework during fifteen years led to the failure of several interesting projects that had at least the merit to become starting points for the development of the area.
In addition to that, the aspect of an unstable economic and political environment is still a major obstacle against the materialization of any form of larger development dictated by rational and ethical requirements. Here must be noted the failure of the “Bucharest 2000” competition – an event officially managed, and the very probable occurrence of the externally funded
“Esplanada” development. The issue with the success of these financially outsourced projects is their little-to-no connection to the issues debated in this study. The process would ultimately tend to transform the area into a generic city, with its’ consequential qualities and flaws.
132
THE POWER TO ANTICIPATE THE FUTURE
The current population still remembers or was in one way or another affected by the communist regime. However, for the next generations there will hardly be any remembrance of the tyrannical decades and the oppression the population had to suffer. The same will happen to the built remains: in years they will simply be degraded ruins of a vanished era. That is why the concerns about how to handle the current situation need to look into the future. No matter what way the urban tissue will take in the future, this reconstruction does not have to be perceived as the final point of the process, but rather a transitional step in a longer evolutionary path. Many projects and concepts are not flexible enough, constantly tending to put a strong mark on an already existing forceful intervention. We are in the era of the transient, of the ephemeral. This part of the city needs to be revised consequently. As the regime that created it did not even have time to finish it: the same way the current interventions are not forever. A cautious strategy would probably give better results than a constant search for everlasting creations.
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