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Home , Japan, South Korea, Spiral (Suzuki novel)

NO. 35 AUGUST 2019 Introduction

Japan-South Relations – A Downward Spiral More than “Just” Historical Issues Alexandra Sakaki

The latest dispute between and over compensation for former Korean forced labourers appears to be following a familiar pattern. Historical spats between two most important in Northeast – especially over the phase of Japanese colonial rule – are nothing new. But the tensions run deeper this time, and mutual mistrust has hit unseen heights. Japanese frustration has grown markedly, with feeling duped by . While there have been tussles over diverging interpretations of history, current domestic and regional develop- ments are an exacerbating factor. Now leaders in both capitals are publicly ques- tioning whether the other side still shares similar core values and strategic goals. The growing rift could easily affect the regional balance of power, weakening America’ position as ally of both Japan and South Korea.

Japanese-South Korean relations are at their that South Korea had inadequately man- worst since normalisation in 1965. The aged sensitive supplied items used in arms relationship is so tense that Japanese Prime production. Also, Tokyo said, there had Minister Abe Shinzō refused bilateral talks been no bilateral talks export controls with South Korean President Jae-in since 2016. at the summit in at the end of The true reason for the tightening of . Tokyo’s 1 announcement of export controls, however, is likely to be restrictions on exports of three chemicals the Japanese government’s ire over South to South Korea caused further consterna- Korea’s actions in the dispute over com- tion. Japan dominates the global market pensation for former Korean forced labour- for these materials, which are required for ers. Tokyo wants to persuade Seoul to make displays and concessions. In a declaration on the tight- semiconductors. Tokyo also decided on ening of export controls, Prime Minister 2 August to drop South Korea from the Abe himself mentioned the issue of forced “whitelist” of countries it largely exempts labourers: Because, he said, South Korea from catch-all export controls for sensitive was failing to abide by international agree- goods. Japan argues that it has evidence ments in its handling of this issue, Tokyo

had to assume that it was also breaking its The conflict runs especially deep in promises concerning in sensitive relation to the question of compensation. goods. In response, Seoul announced that it The escalation was triggered by rulings by would challenge Tokyo’s export controls the Korean Supreme Court in and before the WTO and remove Japan from its 2018, requiring the Japanese list of preferred trading partners. firms & Sumitomo Metal and The bilateral relationship had already Heavy Industries to make per- been characterised by tensions under the sonal compensation payments to former previous two South Korean governments forced labourers. Further cases against other ( Geun-hye and Myun-bak). For Japanese firms are under way, affecting example the Park government held no in all about one thousand former forced summit with Tokyo for almost three years. labourers. Tokyo asserts that an agreement Japanese and Korean experts and research- on compensation was signed along with ers are at a loss about how to stop the the 1965 Treaty on Relations, under downward spiral. which Japan provided $300 million in eco- Disagreements between Japan and South nomic and $200 million in reconstruc- Korea over their shared history are nothing tion loans. In return South Korea regarded new. The identities of both - claims from the colonial period as settled. ries are coloured by explicit grievances, As far as the Japanese were concerned, the which hinder reconciliation. Japan is the agreement covered both state and private central negative point of reference in claims. The issue of forced labourers had modern South Korea’s self-image, and anti- been explicitly discussed in the talks and Japanese attitudes form an integral com- until the 2018 court rulings Seoul had ponent of South Korean . On shared the line that the claims had been the other side, Japanese right-wing - settled by the 1965 agreement. alists in particular feel that their proud Now, in 2018, the South Korean supreme nation receives excessive criticism for its court argued that the 1965 Treaty on Basic past, especially from Korea. Relations had only regulated state claims, The two countries have often argued not individual ones. This interpretation about their history in the past. But in recent tallies with a trend in international in years the level of mistrust has reached pre- recent decades to enhance individual legal viously unknown dimensions. Although protections and place greater weight on these are the most important democracies human rights. The Korean claimants are in and central allies of the currently seeking to have assets of the re- , government officials and spective Japanese companies in South Korea independent observers on both sides are seized to fund compensation payments. increasingly voicing doubts that the respec- Japan has protested against this of tive other side is guided by similar values action and called on South Korea to agree and strategic objectives. Current domestic to arbitration under the rules agreed in and regional developments further burden 1965. But the Moon government has nei- the relationship. ther agreed to this proposal nor made any moves to stop the seizure of assets. From Tokyo’s perspective Seoul has Escalating strife and mistrust broken with the 1965 treaty and is under- mining the legal foundation of the bilateral The dispute between Japan and South Korea relationship. Seoul responds that the rul- has been dominated by two issues in recent ings affect the scope of the 1965 treaty, but months: the question of compensation do not fundamentally challenge its appli- for former Korean forced labourers under cability. South Korea appeals to Japan, as a Japanese colonial rule, and a military inci- , to show respect for the inde- dent in December 2018. pendence of its . Tokyo is consider-

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ing taking the dispute to the International mutual mistrust. Instead of discussing the Court of Justice; that, however, would events at working level and – regardless of however require Seoul’s consent – which the question of fault – seeking means to Japanese and Korean researchers agree prevent such incidents in future, Japanese would be unlikely. Korean researchers and and South Korean representatives accused journalists point out that a lengthy inter- each other of lying. Each side speculated national process would be unfair to the about reasons why the other might have an victims, who are already extremely old. interest in such an incident. South Korean Independent Japanese experts assert that journalists and researchers argued that the South Korea would oppose involving the Abe government had provoked the incident International Court of Justice because of in to step pressure on Seoul in the the precedent that would create for Seoul’s forced labourers dispute and to improve its with Tokyo over the public approval ratings. Japanese research- (Dokdo/). ers in turn alleged that the South Korean Lacking alternative options, Japan has vessel had not actually been conducting a now chosen to tighten export controls. As rescue operation, but had in fact been in- such it has taken – like the United States, volved in illegal activities that it wished and other countries – the inter- to keep concealed from the Japanese. For nationally criticised route of using trade example, they asserted, Moon might have instruments to pursue diplomatic objec- been seeking to supply funds to North tives. While the criticisms be justified, Korea with the aim of improving relations. Tokyo’s actions also reveal how powerless it feels in the face of current South Korean policy. The move has been received Social and domestic developments by the Japanese public, which certainly suited the Abe government in advance of Current social and domestic tensions make the elections to the of Councillors on it even more difficult for both sides to seek 21 July. It is however doubtful whether compromise in historical disputes. Recent economic pressure will persuade Seoul to years have witnessed a fundamental gener- step back. It is more likely that South ational changeover in the political elites of Korean public opinion will turn further both countries. Politicians born after the against Japan and that the fronts will hard- Second War now define the agenda en on both sides. in Japan. Their attitude to the past is The two countries have also been em- shaped much less by actual experience of broiled in a second bitter dispute over a the war and the immediate post-war era or maritime incident that occurred on 20 De- by personal feelings of guilt. They expect cember 2018 within Japan’s exclusive eco- South Korea to pursue a pragmatic line nomic zone. According to the Japanese, looking to the future rather than the past. a South Korean warship undertaking a Nationalist tendencies have also grown rescue operation for a North Korean vessel among Japanese politicians. Abe himself is directed its fire-control radar at a Japanese a very controversial figure in South Korea, patrol aircraft observing the manoeuvre. where he is seen as a revisionist who rela- Seoul rejected the accusation and asserted tivises Japanese colonial atrocities and that the Japanese plane had approached the wants to restore Japan’s former military South Korean vessel on a dangerous low- strength. altitude course. The defence ministries of South Korean politics is increasingly both countries issued footage to influenced by the so-called “386 genera- back their claims. tion”, those who were born in the While the question of blame cannot be and participated in the student democracy clarified on the basis of public sources, the movement in the . They have a very incident certainly underlines the extent of critical take on South Korea’s post-war

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history and the dictatorship. Reassessing Park was also publicly criticised for the the events of that era – including the agreement her government reached with Treaty on Basic Relations with Japan – is Japan in 2015 over the so-called “comfort one of their central concerns. This applies women”, the women forced into prostitu- in particular to representatives of the pro- tion in Japanese military camps during the gressive camp like President Moon, who War. Tokyo had promised was himself imprisoned in the 1980s for to contribute one billion yen (at the time participating in a protest. So while South equivalent to about €7.6 million) to a South Korea has seen a growing desire to learn Korean foundation for the victims, and the about and discuss the past, the new gener- Japanese foreign minister had made an ation of Japanese elites tend to exhibit more official apology for their suffering. Both strongly nationalist attitudes than their sides had also agreed to end the dispute predecessors and focus more on the future. with “a final and irreversible resolution”. Domestically, South Korea continues to Although most of the surviving victims struggle with the aftermath of the scandal accepted payments from the foundation over the previous government under Park (namely 34 of the 46 women who were still Geun-hye. Park, who was removed from alive), public dissatisfaction over the out- office in 2017 amidst corruption alle- come grew. A conducted in July gation, was criticised for her lack of trans- 2017 for the think- Genron NPO and parency in governing. She tended to ignore Institute found that about 56 per- advisers and ministers, and paid cent of South “disapprove” of the little heed to public opinion. Between agreement. 75 percent also felt that the com- October 2016 and March 2017 more than fort women issue “has not been resolved”. one million Koreans took to the in Moon, who had called during his elec- Seoul alone, in the so-called “Candle Light tion campaign for negotiations over the Protests”. Transparency in government was forced issue to be reopened, therefore a central promise of President appointed a panel of experts to investigate Moon Jae-in, when he was elected in May the process by which the agreement had 2017. As the Five-Year Plan of the Moon Jae- come into being. It reported its conclusions in Administration of August 2017 states, the in December 2017: the Park government new leadership intends to pursue “politics had conducted the negotiations in secret driven by the people, not a government and without consulting the victims. Al- for vested interests and elites”, rooting out though Moon decided to formally respect “unfair privileges and foul play”. Broad the “” agreement (for ex- public support is therefore vital, as Moon ample avoiding criticising Tokyo over the seeks to restore public confidence in issue in multilateral forums), he dissolved politics. the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation Park’s handling of history disputes with which was central to implementing the Japan also came in for criticism. Park had 2015 agreement. In July 2018 the Moon apparently influenced the judiciary and government approved funds to replace persuaded the then Chief Justice Yang the Japanese contributions with its own – Seung-tae to delay pronouncement of judge- although it remains unclear what is to ment in the forced labourers cases in order happen with the Japanese money, as Tokyo to avoid diplomatic difficulties with Tokyo. does not wish to take it back. By pointing to the independence of the There are also other reasons for Moon’s courts and refusing to prevent the immi- tough line towards Japan. NGOs exert nent confiscation of Japanese assets, Presi- strong political influence in South Korea, dent Moon is taking a public stance against first and foremost the so-called Korean political influence on the judiciary. Over- Council (in full, the Korean Council for ruling the verdicts could trigger a constitu- Justice and Remembrance for the Issues of tional crisis. Military Sexual by Japan). Founded

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in 1990 to represent the interests of former Korean opinions find significant public “comfort women”, the Korean Council is resonance – going as far as to call for a regarded as a veto player on this issue. It is “severance of relations” (dankō). also reported to have mobilised the public Certain observers have expressed their protests against the 2015 agreement. In hope that the Japanese-South Korean rela- December 2011 the Korean Council erected tionship will recover after Abe and Moon a statue to “comfort women” in front of the leave office. But it is unclear to what extent Japanese embassy in Seoul. Tokyo regarded their successors will be willing to change this as a violation of the Vienna Convention tack. It is likely that the next South Korean on Consular Relations, under which host president will again come from the pro- countries are required to protect the dignity gressive camp. The conservative parties, of diplomatic representations. In the inter- which traditionally place more importance , the Korean Council has erected further on security cooperation with Japan, have statues, including some abroad. Since 2017 been weakened by the scandal over Park other NGOs have also created similar monu- Geun-hye. And anyway, they can hardly ments to the forced labourers. In May 2018 oppose the court rulings in the forced activists tried to erect a statue to the forced labour cases. On the Japanese side Prime labourers in front of the Japanese consulate Minister Abe has already taken a great in , but were prevented from doing domestic political risk with the “comfort so by a heavy police presence. women” agreement. After its failure, Japa- Domestic calculations may also play a nese researchers agree, no politician can role in Moon’s anti-Japanese stance. South afford to make any further concessions to Korea’s traditional political division be- South Korea. So the fronts have hardened tween liberal and conservative parties on both sides. (known as the South-South divide, nam-nam kalteung) has deepened in recent years. De- clining public support leaves Moon reliant Strategic mistrust on cooperation with the opposition for progress on important projects such as re- Diverging regional strategic perspectives forming the electoral system, and his North further burden the bilateral relationship. Korea agenda. A confrontational line to- In the past the shared interest in deterring wards Japan helps the South Korean parties was always an important and to close ranks and bridge their political sufficient reason for security cooperation. differences. After meeting with five party But now Moon and Abe view each other’s leaders on 18 July, Moon announced that dealings with North Korea with great mis- Seoul’s response to Japan’s tightening of trust. Improving relations with export controls would be formulated in is a foreign policy priority for Moon, who cross-party consultation. met with North Korean ruler Jong-un From Tokyo’s perspective, by dissolving three times in 2018 alone. Abe on the other the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation hand insists on a policy of strict sanctions Moon has suspended the “comfort against North Korea and observes South women” arrangement – and violated an Korea’s overtures with great concern. Tokyo inter-governmental agreement. In recent fears that Seoul could make concessions to years Japan had already seen growing criti- Pyongyang that subvert Japanese security cisms that South Korea had become a “bot- interests. Conversely, Seoul regards Tokyo’s tomless pit” for reconciliation that hard line towards Pyongyang as a hindrance would never be enough. That side of the to its policy of rapprochement. The two debate felt vindicated by Moon’s policies. countries’ papers underscore just This also changes Japan’s domestic discourse how widely their assessments diverge. on South Korea. Whereas right-wing nation- While the Japanese white paper of August alist views were once marginal, today anti- 2018 describes the North Korean nuclear

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and missile programme as an “unprece- countries. Now it is the twelfth-largest dentedly serious and imminent threat”, economy. As a developed economy with Seoul’s own white paper of 2019 diversified trade relations, South Korea is dropped the designation of North Korea as nowhere near as dependent on Japanese an “enemy”. investment and technology as it still was The two countries have also pursued just two decades ago. Japan’s share of South diverging approaches in their dealings with Korea’s trade has been in steady decline China. Tensions in this culminated since the mid-. Between 1993 and during the Park Geun-hye administration, 2018 alone it fell from about 18 to 8 per- which sought to drive a wedge between cent. Since 2009 China’s share has in fact North Korea and China by working to im- been larger than that of Japan and the prove its own relations with . Tokyo United States together – reaching almost perceives the expansion of Chinese influ- 24 percent in 2018. And almost one quarter ence in the region as a threat and inter- of South Korea’s foreign direct investment preted Seoul’s course as a turn towards goes to China, against just 2 percent to Beijing. Japanese researchers and govern- Japan. So Japan’s relative importance ment officials feared that Seoul might to South Korea has fallen, while China has accept China as the leading become the most important economic in place of the United States. Park in turn partner. rejected Tokyo’s hard line as counter- Nevertheless, there are still areas where productive. China’s importance to Seoul South Korea remains highly dependent on extends well beyond its influence on North Japan – one case in point being the three Korea, in particular as an economic partner. chemical products mentioned above, which Bilateral trade with China offers South are now subject to stricter export controls. Korea enormous opportunities – but also South Korea also imports crucial techno- creates dependencies and vulnerabilities. logical components from Japan, as well as Japanese and South Korean perceptions plant and machinery. concerning China have converged some- In view of its impressive economic rise what since 2017. Seoul has adopted a more and growing confidence, it is unsurprising critical stance towards Beijing since the if Seoul pursues its historical demands on Sino-Korean dispute over the deployment Tokyo more determinedly than in the past. of missile defence systems (Ter- On the other hand, South Korea’s economic minal High Altitude Area Defence, THAAD) success engenders different expectations in South Korea in 2016/17. The Japanese among the Japanese political elites: Japan perspective on China has improved a little, and South Korea, they argue, can now treat with both sides working to stabilise the each other as equals and Tokyo no longer relationship over the past three years. needs to make continuous concessions to Nevertheless, Tokyo still worries that Seoul Seoul’s demands. In South Korea this stance might accept Chinese regional dominance. is regarded as confirmation that revisionist So tensions could easily reignite over differ- tendencies are proliferating in Japan. ent approaches to Beijing in Seoul and Tokyo. Outlook: An Ill Wind …

Changing economic dependencies The downward spiral in Japanese-South Korean relations will be hard to reverse. Changing economic dependencies are The fronts have hardened. Domestic pres- another reason why historical disputes be- sures compel politicians on both sides to tween Tokyo and Seoul escalate more respond forcefully to actions by the respec- intensely today. Half a century ago South tive other that are perceived as offensive, Korea was still one of the world’s poorest which further exacerbates tensions. There

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is scant willingness to negotiate compro- Tokyo and Seoul to cooperate in mending mises, for fear of public criticism. their ties. The relationship is so tense and mistrust- In order to prevent China exploiting the ful that the two sides have ceased to recog- bilateral dispute to weaken US influence nise each other as partners with shared in Asia, Tokyo and Seoul should now resist values. In 2015 Japan’s Diplomatic Blue- nationalist urges and work to calm the book dropped its reference to sharing “fun- situation. Japan must accept that recon- damental values such as freedom, democ- ciliation is always an ongoing process, espe- racy, and respect for basic human rights” cially in relation to a young democracy like with South Korea. South Korea’s 2018 white South Korea which has a heightened need paper likewise dropped the passage refer- to come to terms with its own history. © Stiftung Wissenschaft to the shared values with Japan. For its part, South Korea must realise that und Politik, 2019 The dispute between Japan and South reconciliation requires the victims’ side to All rights reserved Korea also gives grounds for European con- accept positive gestures, and that relitigat- This Comment reflects cern. Such a gulf of mistrust between East ing these after they have been accepted will the author’s views. Asia’s two most important democracies can only strengthen the nationalist forces on easily be exploited – especially by China, the other side. The online version of to expand its own power in the region and this publication contains weaken US influence. Unlike in the past, functioning links to other Washington has largely watched the dete- Further reading SWP texts and other relevant sources. rioration of relations between its two most important allies in Asia without under- Alexandra Sakaki and Gudrun Wacker SWP Comments are subject taking efforts at mediation. That may be China – Japan – South Korea: to internal peer review, fact- changing: during his visit to Tokyo and A Tense Ménage à Trois checking and copy-editing. Seoul in the first half of August US Defence SWP Research Paper 4/2017, 2017, For further information on our quality control pro- Secretary Mark Esper urged both sides to 34 pages cedures, please visit the SWP cooperate on the North Korean threat. website: https://www.swp- Even changes in political leadership are Alexandra Sakaki and Junya Nishino berlin.org/en/about-swp/ initially unlikely to bring about lasting Japan’s South Korea Predicament quality-management-for- improvements in relations. While International Affairs 94, no. 4 (July 2018), swp-publications/ possesses little in the way of real influence, pp. 735–54 SWP it should make it clear that a better Japa- Stiftung Wissenschaft und nese-South Korean relationship is also in Politik its interest. The idea of allowing the joint German Institute for agreement on exchange of military intel- International and ligence on North Korea to expire is current- Security Affairs ly under discussion in South Korea. But Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 both sides have a real interest in security 10719 Berlin cooperation in relation to North Korea, +49 30 880 07-0 which should not be allowed to become a Fax +49 30 880 07-100 political football. www.swp-berlin.org President Moon’s speech on [email protected] the 74th anniversary of Japan’s surrender ISSN 1861-1761 in the Second World War offered a glimmer doi: 10.18449/2019C35 of hope for bilateral relations. Striking a conciliatory note, he stated his hope for Translation by Meredith Dale

(English version of Dr. Alexandra Sakaki is Senior Associate in the Asia Research Division at SWP. From January to April 2019 she was SWP-Aktuell 42/2019) a visiting researcher at the Japanese National Defence Academy and , conducting research on bilateral relations in Japan and South Korea. The visit was funded through a Feodor Lynen Research Fellowship from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.

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