2015-7-9 Iran North Korea Timeline.Numbers

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2015-7-9 Iran North Korea Timeline.Numbers Iran & North Korea Economic Sanctions Timeline Dear Policymaker/ Iran and North Korea Observer: Since the announcement that China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (known under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as the E3/EU+3) had reach an agreement with the Iranian regime over its nuclear activities, expert comparisons have been made between this approach to Iran and the Six-Party Agreement on North Korea. These parallels are not unfounded. On October 18, 1994 when President Bill Clinton announced the agreement with North Korea, he argued it represented “the first step on the road to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula” and that the agreement would “make the United States, the Korean Peninsula, and the world safer.” President Clinton emphasized that the agreement did “not rely on trust. Compliance will be certified by the International Atomic Energy Agency.” Similarly on Iran, President Barack Obama said on July 14, 2015: the “comprehensive long-term deal” would “prevent [Iran] from obtaining a nuclear weapon.” It marks a “change that makes our country and the world safer and more secure,” he added. “This deal is not built on trust. It is built on verification.” Two years ago, it appeared the Obama Administration was focused on avoiding mistakes made by its predecessors. In February 2013, Secretary of State Kerry underscored the need for a “swift, clear, strong and credible response" to Pyongyang's third nuclear test and the authoritarian regime's "continued flaunting of its obligations” or risk emboldening Iran. He added: "Just as it's impermissible for North Korea to pursue this kind of reckless effort, so we have said it's impermissible with respect to Iran. What our response is with respect to this will have an impact on all other nonproliferation efforts." It would appear the response to North Korean aggression was prologue to the JCPOA with Iran. To provide context for, and to assist policymakers in their oversight responsibilities and in developing a response to, the multiparty agreement with Iran that avoids repeating the mistakes that led to a nuclear North Korea as well as a weakened global nonproliferation structure, the independent analysts at Poblete Analysis Group have developed the following timeline. It summarizes and juxtaposes developments on Iran and North Korea’s nuclear paths for quick reference. Also included, is a December 26, 2014 summary document on the U.S. approach to Pyongyang. We hope you find this useful. ©2015 Poblete Analysis Group LLC Alexandria, Virginia www.pobleteanalysisgroup.com This product is for informational purposes only. It was not petitioned or funded by any third parties. North Korea Iran 2015 Technical - Nuclear April 29 - A report from David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini at Washington's Institute for Science and International Security analyzed satellite imagry taken from January through the beginning of April 2015. The imagry suggests that a centrifuge plant at the Yongbyon nuclear complex is operational, and a plutonium-fueled reactor at the site may be operating again at low power or intermittently. April 22 -In a closed-door meeting with U.S. nuclear specialists, the Wall Street Journal reports that China's top nuclear experts have increased their estimates of North Korea's nuclear arsenal, revising their estimate to 20 warheads, with the capability of producing enough weapons-grade uranium to double that number by 2016. April 16 - Before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Army General Curtis "Mike" Scaparotti, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, said he believes that North Korea has the ability to arm a KN-08 ICBM with a miniaturized nuclear device. April 14 - A Wall Street Journal editorial notes that Behrouz Kamalvandi, deputy head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, said, "we have inked an agreement with the Russians to construct two new nuclear power plants for the generation of electricity, while the Chinese will also enter this arena soon," in remarks published in Iranian state media. April 13 - South Korean Vice Defense Minister Baek Seung-joo dismissed U.S. Admiral Bill Gortney's assessment of North Korea's ability to mount a nuclear warhead on a KN-08 ICBM, saying that Adm. Gortney's remarks were "not made with a thorough assessment of North Korea's capabilities." April 8 - The head of NORAD and the U.S. Northern Command, Admiral Bill Gortney, told reporters that "our assessment is that they [North Korean leadership] have the ability to put a nuclear weapon on a KN-08 and shoot it at the homeland." March 20 - In an interview with Sky News, North Korea's ambassador to the UK, Hyuan Hak-bong, when asked "So can I just be clear: you are telling me that the North Korea [sic] has the ability now to fire a nuclear missile?", Ambassador Hyun responded: "Any time, any time, yes." March 19 - The commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, Admiral Cecil Haney, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in a hearing that "we think [North Korea] already miniaturized some of this capability," referring to the DPRK's nuclear weapons program. March 18 - Citing growing missile threats from North Korea and Iran, U.S. Missile Defense Agency Director Navy Vice March 18 - Bloomberg News reports that U.S. officials claim Iran did not technically violate the Joint Plan of Action Admiral James Syring said that the U.S. was carrying out increasingly realistic tests of missile defenses and (JPOA) in feeding UF6 into an IR-5 centrifuge because some research and development related to centrifuges is improving cyber security. Vice Admiral Syring also stated that North Korea has fielded hundreds of missiles capable permitted (see Nov. 8, 2014 entry under Technical-Nuclear). Additionally, the U.S. officials claim that the person who of reaching U.S. forces based in South Korea and Japan, according to Reuters. fed the UF6 into the centrifuge was likely a low- or mid-level employee who was not acting on orders from above. February 25 - Joel Wit of the 38 North blog says that Pyongyang is currently believed to have 10 to 16 nuclear weapons, has achieved miniaturization for the plutonium-based weapons, and projects to have as many as 100 nuclear weapons by 2020. February 11 - The Institute for Science and International Security analyzes activity at Parchin, where Iran is alleged to have conducted work related to nuclear weapons development. Satellite imagery from October showed construction material and debris visible at the site. Imagery from January 2015 show the absence of these materials, while showing gravel or recycled asphalt consistent with resurfacing prior to laying new asphalt. January 28 - Satellite images suggest North Korea may be about to restart the nuclear reactor seen as its main source of weapons grade plutonium, according to the US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University. January 7 - A 2014 South Korean Defense White Paper claims that North Korea has "reached a significant level of technology to miniaturize nuclear weapons." Technical - Missile April 15 - The Washington Free Beacon reports that, since September 2014, more than two shipments of missile April 15 - The Washington Free Beacon reports that, since September 2014, more than two shipments of missile parts have been monitored by U.S. intelligence agencies as they transited from North Korea to Iran. Unnamed parts have been monitored by U.S. intelligence agencies as they transited from North Korea to Iran. Unnamed sources said the transfers included goods covered by the Missile Technology Control Regime, including large sources said the transfers included goods covered by the Missile Technology Control Regime, including large diameter engines that could be used for a future Iranian long-range missile system. diameter engines that could be used for a future Iranian long-range missile system. April 13 - Russia announces that it has lifted its ban on the sale of the sophisticated S-300 anti-aircraft missile system to Iran. Iranian state media reports that the Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council stated that his country will receive delivery of the air-defense system by the end of the year. April 11 - Speaking with reporters in Seoul, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter condemns recent North Korean missile launches, saying the launches "puts the security of the Korean peninsula and the entire region in danger." April 8 - North Korea fired two surface-to-air missiles off its west coast before U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter was to visit Seoul. April 7 - The head of NORAD and U.S. Northern Command, Admiral Bill Gortney, confirmed to reporters that the road-mobile KN-08 ICBM, first paraded in North Korea in 2012, is operational. April 4 - North Korea test-fired 4 short-range missiles into the West (Yellow) Sea to protest the ongonig Seoul- Washington military exercises, according to South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff. March 25 - At a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, Admiral Cecil D. Haney, confirmed that North Korea is in the process of developing a submarine-launched ballistic missile. March 18 - The Director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency testifies in a Senate hearing that both Iran and North March 18 - The Director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency testifies in a Senate hearing that both Iran and North Korea could achieve the ability to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile as early as this year. Korea could achieve the ability to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile as early as this year. March 13 - North Korea fires seven surface-to-air missiles off its east coast, including the first test of a SA-5 system, again in response to the ongoing U.S.-South Korea military drills.
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