Religious Authority and Political Instability In
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27 introduction of religious radio stations, more newspapers, and the internet. In turn, public exposure to the numerous sources of media, RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY AND POLITICAL online information, and opinions fragment INSTABILITY IN ISRAEL support for religious authorities.116 By Michael Freedman Observers note a similar pattern in Israel where greater exposure to mass media and the internet, Jewish religious political parties have historically among other important sociological changes such 117 played an important role in Israeli politics. as upward social mobility, has had an impact on Religious political parties receive on average the nature of religious authority (link). Religious about 20 percent of the vote. Israel’s Proportional leadership was centralized in the past, and Representation (PR) electoral system gives religious parties, especially the ultra-orthodox strength to the religious political parties and ones, relied on religious authorities to espouse enabled them a large, often disproportionate, their politics. For instance, Shas was able to rely impact on national politics, frequently, on Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef and the Ultra-Orthodox determining whether the Israeli coalition tilts to Ashkenazi parties relied on one, agreed-upon the left or right. Three main political parties “great rabbi of the generation” (Gadol Hador), represent the diverse religious Jewish such as Rabbi Shach. But, with increased communities in Israel: the Jewish Home information comes increased choice; today there (Religious Zionism, or “modern Orthodox”), Shas is no clear religious leader in either of the ultra- (Sephardic Ultra-Orthodox), and United Torah orthodox camps. There are many leading rabbis – Judaism (Ashkenazi Ultra-Orthodox). but no one, centralized figure. Religious communities are more fragmented, have greater competition between religious leaders, and are However, recent sociological changes such as less united in their choice of a leader. greater exposure to the internet have led to a decentralization of religious authority in Israel. The decentralization of religious authority in This decentralization of religious authority has Israel interacts with two major factors, which impacted the religious political parties in cause the political fragmentation of the different ways. Israel’s main religious Zionist mainstream religious Zionist party and causes the political party split into the Jewish Home and the radicalization of the Ultra-Orthodox parties. New Right in the run-up to the April 2019 These factors are voter demand for religiously elections. Further splits followed with six political sanctioned parties and the institutional structure parties competing for votes from the religious of the religious political party. Notably, the Zionist community. After the April 2019 elections, changing fortunes of Israel’s religious political several smaller parties did not run again, and parties have serious implications for Israeli pragmatic alliances were formed between the democracy. different political parties (Yamina). This alliance was unstable, and the party split after the September 2019 elections. Only after several Religious parties in the Middle East, including months of contentious negotiations did the parties Israel, rely heavily on clerics for legitimacy and agree to run together for the March 2020 elections popular support. Religious leaders tell their (link). They won only 6 seats, with many potential followers to vote en-masse for specific parties – voters moving to other parties such as and people do so with the expectation that they Netanyahu’s Likud party. are fulfilling a religious commandment.115 Thus, capable religious leadership translates into political power. However, recent developments in Historically, the Ultra-Orthodox parties were mass communications have weakened the comfortable serving in right-wing and left-wing authority of religious leaders, with the coalitions (including Shas support for Oslo, without which the Oslo Peace Accords would never ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ____ APSA MENA Politics Section: MENA Politics Newsletter | Volume 3, Issue 1, Spring 2020 28 have been signed). However, during the 2019 Religious Zionist voters historically placed less elections, Shas identified strongly with the right- importance on religious authority than do typical wing parties. In addition, the leadership has made religious parties in the Middle East. Political more policy demands in the religion and state leadership would occasionally consult with realm. These demands alienate potential right- specific religious leaders, but did not treat their wing partners (such as Avigdor Lieberman’s Yirael decisions as binding. However, disagreements Beitenu party popular with extreme right wing but over several religious issues, including the secular voters) and are seen as disconnected from religious nature of the state, religious gender the average supporter of the party (link). equality (especially support for female prayer at the Western Wall), support for illegal settlements, and female political leadership, have polarized the Two main factors explain how decentralization of community. power within religious leadership shapes the contemporary political fortunes and positions of Israel’s Jewish religious political parties. These divisions became especially prominent during the 2005 disengagement from Gaza, which was seen by many members of the religious Religious voters’ demand for religiously Zionist community as a betrayal by the state to sanctioned parties: Voters for whom a religiously settle the land of Israel.118 While most community sanctioned party is critical are less likely to move leaders ruled that it was illegal for religious to a secular party, while voters for whom religious soldiers to disobey orders to evacuate settlements, sanction is less important are relatively more other leaders called for mass refusal and promised likely to do so. that the expulsion would never happen since it went against the divine will (link). The institutional structure of the political party: Some religious political parties include formal Reflecting the divisions within the community, institutions run by religious leaders who make religious Zionist political parties then split decisions for the party (including, for example, between a more liberal group that believes their the composition of the list or how the party should political influence is hampered by the involvement vote on important decisions), while other parties of religious leaders in politics and a more may affiliate with a religious stream (such as conservative group that believes that political religious Zionism) and defer to religious advisors, parties need to submit to the authority of religious but the decision of the latter are informal and leaders. The Ultra-Orthodox parties have even non-binding. campaigned for these religious Zionist voters, with messages such as “Judaism without The table below maps Israeli political parties compromises” (link). In turn, different religious leaders from these two sub-communities endorse different parties. This spread of religious Zionist voters over several parties, including larger parties such as the Likud, lowers the overall electoral strength of the community. Radicalization of the Ultra-Orthodox Parties Despite high religious fragmentation, formal based on these factors. religious bodies allow Ultra-Orthodox parties to largely maintain their electoral power, despite Weakening of the Religious Zionist Parties divisions within religious streams (e.g.: Lithuanian versus Chasidic). This is due to the ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ____ APSA MENA Politics Section: MENA Politics Newsletter | Volume 3, Issue 1, Spring 2020 29 fact that the Ultra-Orthodox parties set up a Rabbinic body which is composed of key leaders Michael Freedman, Massachusetts Institute of from the different streams who settles divisive Technology, [email protected] issues such as the order of the candidate list. Furthermore, the party does not allow for THE DECLINE OF DEMOCRACY IN ISRAEL’S primaries or women to run for political leadership. SOVEREIGNTY DISCOURSE In contrast, in local city elections where there is By Meirav Jones and Lihi Ben Shitrit no formal religious body to bridge the gaps, religious disagreements have political One week before Israel’s second round of general consequences. For example, in the most recent elections in September 2019, Prime Minister municipal elections in Jerusalem, the Ultra- Benjamin Netanyahu announced that should he be Orthodox parties ran competing lists and publicly re-elected, he would act immediately to “apply backed different candidates for mayor (link). For sovereignty” over the Jordan Valley in the West example, secular Mayor Nir Barkat lost the Bank.120 The talk of “sovereignty” only intensified Jerusalem elections in 2003 and was only with the Trump Administration’s “Peace to successful in 2008 because one ultra-Orthodox Prosperity” plan, which was celebrated by the Hasidic sect refrained from voting for Barkat’s Israeli right (and center) for its endorsement of religious competitor. Israel applying sovereignty over at least 30% of the occupied West Bank, including the Jordan Yet, this consensus comes at a cost. Rabbinic Valley and all Israeli settlements.121 While the consensus generally adopts the most extreme term