CEU eTD Collection In partial fulfillment of the requirements forIn of Ar Master the degree the fulfillment of of partial : From Dispositionalism to Central European University Department of Budapest, Hungary Michael V. Griffin Michael V. Griffin Karmen Marguč Submitted to Submitted Supervisor: Student Student 2010

ts ts CEU eTD Collection of is our brains, color perception depends on each i each on depends perception color brains, our is color of perception obtain easily can I So, facts. empirical newest the on based show results the As subjectivisms. and between pr historical the solve to is concern main The color. of perception aet icvre md i nuooy Sne h sgiiat orga significant the Since neurology. in made discoveries latest fa to seems perception of philosophy in apparatus visual the of pl to tendency fascinating against His Matthen. Mohan arguments by developed recently subjectivist present and dispositionalism ofcolors. view philosophy in of ontological the from are colors what of question general the to add that color of perception the on view subjective new of development significan The stimuli. distal by caused still but subjective, speci thesis makes What dispositionalism. or way possible third consequent and color the of the about is Thesis MA present The eeoe b Jh Lce ses o rsn te ouin Bt a te a the as But, solution. the present to seems reveal significantly investigation the in approaches comparative Locke, John by developed prop physical or it of cause the with an as Abstract i i

erties of the bodies. Dispositionalism, Dispositionalism, bodies. the of erties some physical arguments against arguments physical some ce of this MA Thesis lies in the in lies Thesis MA this of ce Locke only tries to show the the show to tries only Locke de away in comparison to the to comparison in away de , Locke even deepens the gap the deepens even Locke , al for philosophy is that it is is it that is philosophy for al oblem of how to relate color relate to how of oblem uralistic that was was that realism uralistic and epistemological point point epistemological and ndividual. Therefore it is it Therefore ndividual. is broader, which would would which broader, is involve the significance the involve rsosbe o the for responsible n ly the theory of the of theory the ly nalytical and and nalytical CEU eTD Collection as the for University Maribor directions the course in writing of the thesis. advice and of University, pieces European numerous and Central support for sp Miščević, A . Nenad my Professor enlarge to all me to helped gratitude who deep University, feel European I work. this of accomplishment the on superinte a as support and encouragement endless and Griffin’s view. perspectives truthful different study, from my throughout the enthusiast approach and lecturer a as guidance, and Griffi V. Michael Professor to goes appreciation supreme My Acknowledgements Acknowledgements ii ii

no eeomn o m own my of development into corrections, comments, His n. ndent significantly influent influent significantly ndent rfsos t h Central the at professors itne n gvn me giving and sistance ecial thanks goes to to goes thanks ecial olaus t the at colleagues ly engage me to to me engage ly CEU eTD Collection SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 4.3 4.2.1 4.2 4.1 4 THE FINAL VERDICT: COLOR AS SUBJECTIVE 25 3.4.2 3.4.1 3.4 3.3 3.2.4 3.2.3 3.2.2 3.2.1 3.2 3.1 3 MATTHEN - FROM REALISM SUBJECTIVISM TO 15 2.4.3 2.4.2 2.4.1 2.4 2.3.1 2.3 2.2 2.1 2 LOCKE - FROM DISPOSITIONALISM TO SUBJECTIVISM 1.3.4 1.3.3 1.3.2 1.3.1 1.3 1.2 1.1.5 1.1.4 1.1.3 1.1.2 1.1.1 1.1 PERCEPTION COLOROF 1 THE PHILOSOPHICALTHEORIES AND EMPIRICAL FACTS ABOUT THE

P P C R A A R A A Q I E E T DEAS INOURDEAS

HILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF THEOFPERCEPTIONHILOSOPHICAL COLOROF THEORIES LURALISM MPIRICAL FACTS AS AS FORSUBJECTIVISM FACTS THE ARGUMENTS MPIRICAL ABOUT FACTS THENATURE COLOROFMPIRICAL HENATURE COLOR OF OLORS AS QUALIAOLORS AS ANDPHYSICALISM EJECTION DISPOSITIONALISM OF AGAINST RGUMENTS PLURALISTREALISM AGAINST RGUMENTS REALISM EALISM FOR RGUMENTS AGAINST RGUMENTS T T T T T P P D S Q A M D C D D S M C P UALITYANDTHEPOWER OFBODY YNAESTHESIA DIFFERENTERCEPTION OF SPECIES RIMITIVISTS HYSICALISM UBJECTIVISM HE CASESYNAESTHESIA HE OF BRAIN HE ADAPTATION THEORYERROR HE COMPONENT HE INCOMPATIBILITY ECOLOGICAL HE VIEW OLORANDPAIN OLORCONSTANCY UALIAINTRODUCED RGUMENTSACTIONAGAINSTREALISM RELATIVE ENOMINATION THESIS EPENDENCY THESIS EPENDENCY ISPOSITIONALISM ETAMERISM ETAMERISM

S

UBJECTIVIST

– –

D THE STAGESECOND THE STAGEFIRST

- ISPOSITIONALISM QUALE

R EADING OF EADING

Table of content of Table

iii

L OCKE

20 38 12 6

46 37 12 43 41 32 31 30 30 29 23 21 20 19 17 16 14 13 13 33 41 34 33 26 19 29 5 8 6 8 7 6 7

CEU eTD Collection Figure responses Afterimage 7: andFigure synaesthetes of non-synaesthetes Perception 6: Figureas the part spectrum Visible of 5: electromagnetic Figureflower The certain species by 4: perceived human vision Figure normal Model for 3: ofFigure the eye 2: Figureelectro spectrum The 1: magnetic

List of Figures, or of Illustrations List Tables iv iv

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is attracted to to attracted is form fruit. Even Even fruit. form l experience ill psychological CEU eTD Collection between physics and psychology. betweenand psychology. physics concerns subjectivism and between gap the Nowadays the that presume thereforeand objects physical ofproperty came Valberg that to regard With present. to seems not does book perceiver in standard circumstances. 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Matthen’s major analyze I three subjectivism. between of favor distinction in the dispositionalism us si color, offers of perception terminology the about view Lockean analyze and describe the perception of color should hold. At the end the brief conclusion is is conclusion brief the end the At hold. should color of perception the 4 he world, that are often, but to my to but often, are that world, he port for my thesis. Further I will will I Further thesis. my for port al state that is caused by neural neural by caused is that state al ristics. That is why color should should color why is That ristics. istence of qualia and the nature nature the and qualia of istence ted by the empirical facts. 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The The intervened. es thod. thod. ee reject I Here made and the the and made CEU eTD Collection ecpin f oo oe a t gv te nwr o o cn t e tha be it can mind-indep of how a as to perceived be to seems answer property the give to has one color of perception physical object. What theory of color perception one chooses most chooses one perception color of theory What object. physical hscl at, aey aeegh o cran ot, ih qua with sorts, certain of wavelengths namely facts, physical Imag them. experience we way same the in colors the possess physical colored are not objects by(2009) Cohen and Aboites (2009), forbasic the p according to which colors are physical properties physical are colors which to according perception of theories conflicting two of development to lead physical whether - color of nature the about question basic the So, f iulsae tesle o ter cle sbetvs, t subjectivism, called theory or themselves states visual of a color takes one if example, For for. settles one color of theory 3 The 3 classification of theories ofperceptio color The 2 offather this view J. J. C. Smart. is moreover it posses the question of why color seems to be perceive be to seems color why of question the posses it moreover h hois fpreto el wt tepolm fhw o re to how of problem the with deals perception of theories the nat constituting the investigate color of nature the of theories The c measuredproperties, mass, oras size shape, physical such the way in since subjective, something and like more argue, shall I is, it experience would who individual, an without facts, physical of full p the that physicalism to responded some psychology of development property the were it if as looks color that and throughthe propertie as colors that is physicalists for argument main a we since objects, the of properties as considered are Ac colors ideology. corpuscular or realism the to response a as developed of nature constituting the concerns color of theories of concern main The perceptionof color The1 philosophical theories and empirical facts ab

3 . n was n primarilybymade HilbertByrne and (1997).I roblemof subjectivism objectivism and see Ross(20 5 2 , and eliminativism, with regard to which to regard with eliminativism, and , s of the objects look nearly the same same the nearly look objects the of s hen according to the problem of of problem the to according hen endent objects (Eliasmith, 2008). (Eliasmith, objects endent ttribute them to the object. The object. the to them ttribute of the physical object. With the With object. physical the of ine an uninhabited, bare world bare uninhabited, an ine of colors, that is, physicalism, physicalism, is, that colors, of s a mental qualitative property qualitative mental a s ae xlntr quantitative explanatory late ure of the color, meanwhile meanwhile color, the of ure ly depends on the proposed proposed the on depends ly litative color experience; experience; color litative n the samen vein wasit developed also it cannot be explained or or explained be cannot it objects are colored - has has - colored are objects in a colorful way. Color Color way. colorful a in a tepoet f the of property the as d 01). outthe an be. an be. odn t te realism the to cording hysical world does not does world hysical it. Subjectivism has Subjectivism it. mna qualitative mental t CEU eTD Collection mental color concerns what is like for the perceiver to be consci be to perceiver the for like is what concerns color mental 7 See 7 also Boyle Descartes (1979), and (1970).A pr For 6 Hardin, instance Clark, McGilvray,Lewis. and Block. 5 Mental color according to this view is typically is view this to according color Mental 5 As 4 oppose objectiveto colors heldby physicalism o ecie etl colors mental describe to proces neural to reduced be can experiences color or qualia addition object that denies he is, That 112). p. 1988, (Hardin, experiences” color objec of property a as color to respect with eliminativists Hardi 1997). Hilbert, and (Byrne colored as objects represent denie simply and property sensational the of existence the for C agree. I which with experiences color of existence the admit col is that nothing is there words other in ‘red’; of referent the scienc modern eliminati to According general. that in subjectivism and eliminativism aware be to has one Galilean However opinion. same the of are colore scientists followed not are readings, objects physical that some shows straightforwardly on Locke, and P void. the in atoms colorless of consists ultimately it if world place a find can color how of question the put who , atomist rea which color, about subjectivism of type the is Eliminativism Subjectivism 1.1.1 ofperceptionthe theories Philosophical ofcol 1.1 t Locke that Following violet. the in anything ‘resemble’ not does clai Locke 13). viii, II, E. 1975, (Locke, ” our in produced be to I the causes Motions, their of modifications and degrees different in matter of particles insensible such of byimpulse theViolet, of terms in described befunctionally systems visual of our described processes to are colors mental which to according disposition to look . Locke as one of the first dispositionalists first the of one per as Locke blue. certain look to disposition a produce to disposition a is color dispositionalism phy as color takes dispositionalism eliminativism to contrast In Dispositionalism 1.1.2 4 rs mil bcue f h dsicin ewe te iw that view the between distinction the of because mainly arise

called quale (sing.) or qualia (plural); for insta for (plural); qualia or (sing.) quale called . . ecursoris Galileo (1957).

6

6 . or or ts, but reductivists with respect to to respect with reductivists but ts, of peculiar figures, and bulks, and bulks, andfigures,peculiar of . L. Hardin for example, argues argues example, for L.Hardin . hilosophers, such as Descartes as such hilosophers, d. Many contemporary color color contemporary Many d. s that experiences veridically veridically experiences that s or in the world. Subjectivists world. the in or ches back to the early Greek early the to back ches sical property. According to to According property. sical ous of colorof ous nce Peacocke, McGinn, Shoemaker, and Shoemaker, McGinn, Peacocke, nce vism there is nothing to be be to nothing is there vism hinks that violets, although although violets, that hinks ceptual state, roughly the the roughly state, ceptual of the distinction between distinction the of 7 deas of the blue Colour… Colour… blue the of deas ses. The difficulty of how how of difficulty The ses. argued the following: “a following: the argued cam “e r t be to are “we claims n asl eain; e.g., ; causal ms that an idea of blue blue of idea an that ms s are colored and in in and colored are s within the physical the within 5 and the view the and e e CEU eTD Collection between color and what happens in the perceivers of color”of perceivers the in happens what and color between properties whose natures (a) are specifiable in ways t ways in specifiable are (a) natures whose properties y cec a apyia rpry f oe id Bre a (Byrne kind some of property physical a as by epne s eonzd n at y h aprts f oo perce color of apparatus the by part in recognized is response perce normal in response certain a produce to dispositions is color light, the to influence specific a has that disposition a with 9 See, 9 HilbertByrne and (1997), chapter p. 13, 259 See, 8 HilbertByrne and (1997), chapter obj(the 3 betv vrin f hscls ad anan ta “physical that maintains and physicalism of classifie version objective is it mig (a), this but ‘subjective’; as classified to is dispositionalism according reductive is st physicalism psychological the to relations by constituted not are (b) and t rather but properties, physical are colors that much so not le The possess. to objects perceive veridically sometimes we color that view the speaking broadly is color about Physicalism Physicalism 1.1.3 Locke’s terminology. his in can ambiguity to be mistaken due hi thesis this in see will we As 15). II,viii, (E. us” in sensation secondar a is have objects physical that properties the of one treatedas Locke is hand other the On 1997). Hilbert, and(Byrne way i Locke why is That size. and mass, shape, as such qualities, of s the in blue, actually not are blue, be to represented arethey Jackson and Pargetter identify color as categorical base of the of base categorical as color identify Pargetter and Jackson Hilbert, 1997). properti physical on supervene even not do colors that hold also may ‘pr called typical is what to up line closely be to seems stat perceptual certain produce to disposition is color that that col are objects that argue physicalists like Primitivists Primitivists 1.1.4 seems be to some close quite version dispositionalism ofto physicalism

ectiveversion of physicalism is alsohold by Harma . 7 hat do not employ our color , color our employ not do hat imary ’, i.e., shape. Primitivists shape. i.e., quality’, imary rd ad o gis dispositionalism against go and ored, ht be misleading. Armstrong holds holds Armstrong misleading. be ht nd Hilbert, 1997). As one can see see can one As 1997). Hilbert, nd hat colors are to be identified with with identified be to are colors hat 8 meanwhile Harman proposes that that proposes Harman meanwhile . Byrne and Hilbert identify color identify Hilbert and Byrne . ense that violet is primarilymade is violet that ense ading idea behind physicalism is is physicalism behind idea ading e. Color, according to this view, this to according Color, e. y quality or “power to produce to “power or quality y s view on colors as dispositions dispositions as colors on views s treated as eliminativist in one in eliminativist as treated s disposition that is recognized is that disposition a ‘betv’ meanwhile ‘objective’ as d s are physical properties that that properties physical are s ates of perceivers. Because Because perceivers. of ates ption” s ct al oia links logical all cuts ism iver, where the appropriate the where iver, n, Byrnen, Hilbert). and dispositionalist, because dispositionalist, es of objects (Byrne and and (Byrne objects of es . 9 O te te hand other the On . CEU eTD Collection ecpin f oos t s motn t caiy h functioni the clarify to important is it colors of perception identifying dispositionalism, of version a as seen best perhaps 10 Thompson was 10 inspiredby J. J. Gibson (1987). Following 387). 1999, (Maloney, scene three-dimensional a in illuminants arrangem possible any to correspond light of the that here emphasize should We perceived. is that color of spectrum the fl electromagnetic the by defined be can that rays light ther hand one On retina. the in incoming is that light of allocation of broadly is perception color of study The experience. certain a ne the and thebrains,eye to the from the of transmission conce Further itself. experience the of nature the about facts the of properties physical as such facts, empirical the phi incorporate to attempt should one color of nature the revealing In factsEmpirical about of color nature the 1.2 and Hilbert, 2000). observe the by "codetermined" are colours cont that claim the i.e., the see t view seems theory the of components crucial the of one that is which ecological the ob palpable mention of They shallow. fairly as dispositionalism proponents the that stress However 751). 1995, (Thompson perceivers affect to dispositions’ level Thompson by developed recently been has view ecological The The view ecological 1.1.5 the world which the perceiving animal must simply 21).animal (ibid. must Th recover” the perceiving world which the alread not are and particular… in codetermination animal-environment partl the of be properties are to “colours Thompson supposed to According observation. are environment the of properties words (Thomp systems" separate "fundamentally as treated be not should " the ecological that persists The and action, and language. perception between ecological correlation in explained be should that c out carry to vision color developed have species different view of point evolutionary the from species diverse in perception color physical of property a as perceived is color how answers the

8 uctuation and on the other hand there is is there hand other the on and uctuation objects, neural facts and psychological and facts neural objects, explained by the spectral power power spectral the by explained ng of the visual apparatus, the the apparatus, visual the of ng scurity of the ecological view, ecological the of scurity objects Thompson considered Thompson objects r and its surroundings (Byrne (Byrne surroundings its and r the colours with ‘ecological- with colours the n o srae, bet and objects surfaces, of ent et al.et o be difficult to make clear; clear; make to difficult be o that there is no assumption no is there that ertain biological functions functions biological ertain rning theories about the the about theories rning nml n environment" and animal y ‘composed’ by visual visual by ‘composed’ y ural activity that produce produce activityural that e is the scale of different of scale the is e losophical concerns with with concerns losophical o, 92 2) i other in 21); 1992, son, iw Acrig o that to According view. (1992) world that result from from result that world y labeled properties in in properties labeled y view strives for the the for strives view , Byrne and Hilbert Hilbert and Byrne , rast to traditional traditional to rast e ecological view is ecological is e view that the old quarrel old the that 10 . In search for search In . CEU eTD Collection perception that serve as important arguments for subjectivism. perception arguments for as serve that subjectivism. important brightness 2005). (Kuehni, re still is subjectivism colour and physicalism colour between The science shows that the visual apparatus perceives the visibl the perceives apparatus visual the that shows science The ecpin f oo ad fewrs oe f h lts discov latest the of some afterwards and color of perception 15 Amplitude 15 oflight the waves presents the altitu The frequencies 14 of the waves longer -the wave a Nanometer 13 (nm) a ofunitis spatial measurement; Subsequent 12 subjectivismto and projectivism. Following 11 theories the as such physicalism, prim Figureelectro spectrum The 1: magnetic oo preto, n te mltds f h lgt waves light the of amplitudes the and perception, color l the of frequencies the between distinction a is There etc. UV, ar there that clear is it 1 figure the From apparatus. visual specte electro-magnetic the of part small the only is which brainour of product a is somewhe located is it e.g. internal; something is it or light) hte clr s oehn etra o idpnet f h oe h p who one the of independent or external something is color whether Source: http://www.lcse.umn.edu/specs/labs/glossary_items/em_s 12 . I will introduce some physical and psychological facts about facts psychological and physical some introduce will I .

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controlsthe amount of light enteringthe eye. s lights onto retina. the tion travelto on. light to passto light theinto eye. information about light using rods and cones. The cones. and rods using light about information 16 . Following that cornea that Following . 20 . Species, those are able to perceive color, have color, perceive to able are those Species, . 10 19 is located (see figure 2). There the There 2). figure (see located is posed of photoreceptors (rods and (rods photoreceptors of posed of light-sensitive cells, which cells, light-sensitive of 17 and lensand esearch/topics/biomedical- pectrum (Pines, 2008, see see 2008, (Pines, pectrum functioning of the retina is similar tosimilar is retina the of functioning a dim light, meanwhile light, dim a 18 invert the signal the invert ht each that

CEU eTD Collection binocular (Molavi and vision Essen, 1997). can perceive only all of the possible mixtures of blue ofmixtures possible the of all only perceive beingscan only respond respond (e.g., red) R R, to only color to G receptor photoreceptor and B, one

cortex, V1 in the brain the in V1 cortex, the carries nerve optic the via travels signal electrical cell bipolar the agitate photoreceptors the after However, defend. Iwill 22 go not detailsinto of how electrical the Aswe will21 seethe IIIchapter in somespecies c Figure 3: Model for normal human vision human vision Figure normal Model for 3: andnm, red 575 nm. at cc. c at is pick absorption the blue 3 figure the In 1967). Riggs, also green, blue-, and black- (see Byrne, and Hilbert, 2000) Hilbert, and Byrne, (see white black- and blue-yellow, green, the stage neural the f At red). (e.g., color opponent the blocks it the from seen be can it As 1957). Jameson, and Hurvich (see, develo Jameson was perception color of theory opponent-process the Further, Source: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/bookshelf/br.fcgi?book=webvision&part=ch28k

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gr 3 each 3 igure allcolor allcolor and and he 21 . CEU eTD Collection produced by this wavelength? Further questions that might rise are: rise might that questions Further wavelength? this by produced scohscl at peetd ie h slto t te philosop the to solution the give presented facts psychophysical Figureflower The certain species by 4: perceived pigm visual green, waves. and red, ultraviolet four have that reptiles and fish birds, some also are figur (see color as spectrum ultraviolet perceive hand other the on absor not do bee, honey like sorts, some in cells Photosensitive cones. of firs the in absorption light the of picks three are there shows 4 light-abso of types three only are there because trichromat, differentl objects external the perceive species Different ofdifferent Perception species 1.3.1 is What then their ours? really color different from a is color? vis the of function and structure different have species different sp electromagnetic the of wavelength specific the like thing, what red, color the sees one when words, Inother color? the of nature h eprcl at se t cery rsn te iul pe visual the present clearly to seem facts empirical The factsEmpiricalfor as arguments subjectivi 1.3 the Sources: see of Contents Table 12 rbing photoreceptors. As the figure figure the As photoreceptors. rbing sm sm y. For instance, human being is is being human instance, For y. t row, since we have three types types three have we since row, t crm r t s h sensation the is it or ectrum ual organs, is it possible that possible it is organs, ual cpin f oo. u, do But, color. of rception e 4, the second row). There row). second the 4, e ia polm ht s the is what problem hical ns n cn eet blue, detect can and ents according to the fact that that fact the to according is red, is it the physical the it is red, is b the red color, but but color, red the b

Trichromatic or (UV+B+G+R) Visible lightVisible Tetrachromats (UV+B+G) (B+G+R) ‘bee vision’ CEU eTD Collection rpris f bet, r oe xc, hi reflectances, their exact, more or objects, of properties they since physicalism, forarguments famous the of onepresent between black and white. So, different species perceive ‘bare perceive species different So, white. and betweenblack ujciit acut Fr ntne n h journal the that in experiments instance of For plenty account. subjectivists are There 2009). Nathans, and (Jacobs, extor that system a as vision colour treating Some by this conditions. explain different in illumination in alteration to insensitive perce which, to regard with vision, colour animal) (and human of feature is this that show researches latest But, possess. objects the different circumstances, such s candle light, sun light, electric light, sun light, candle s such circumstances, different the although colored stay objects that phenomenon the is constancy Color constancyColor 1.3.2 ugse ta or ecpin f oo i cnrle mc mr b or b eyes our by more much controlled is color of perception our that suggested 25 See 25 alsoDavid Rosenthal, M.(2001). scientistsa direct evidence for internal,an autom perc color the in shift the contacts use to obliged we were participants experiment the to According 24 See IIIchapter23 the Beyond dispositionalism –Ma elcac o seta pwr ucin i kon s as known is functions power spectral or reflectance cause be can perception color given a that phenomenon empirical The Metamerism 1.3.3 otra mmas wih ae ny n pget el n cn perceiv can and cell pigment one only have which mammals, nocturnal that dog, as such mammals, non-primate some also exist There clea is “it claims: Kuehni 2000). Hilbert, and (Byrne, cone-types ap visual our by obtainable information the all that fact the reflecti unlike with surface the of results the are colors that c identical perceives one that case the be might it example, seems to be different with regard apparatusseems visual be to different our with to specie unlike for different is constancy color since subjectivism, us be can it and 2000) Hilbert, ab and (Byrne theory view new ecological a namely of development the to lead has prescribed This are way. different colors unique the of experience the consequently and 24 .

atic atic calibratorof color (Williams, perception 2005 eption occurred although they were not wearing the the wearing not were they although occurred eption tthen’spluralistic realism aring colored contacts 4 hours per day. But, after But, day. per hours 4 contacts colored aring 13 Neuroscience 23 . olors, call it blue, despite the fact fact the despite blue, it call olors, rm h lgt ecig h eye the reaching light the from ng character. This is the result of result the is This character. ng physical world’ in different way way different in world’ physical ts information about the surface the about information ts aau oiiae ny n three in only originate paratus not so. is the the is constancy Color so. not lamp or other. This seemed to seemed This other. or lamp argue that this is the propertythe is this that argue s and the object outside of us of outside object the and s r that there is no simple 1:1 simple no is there that r ). are dichromats, and a few few a and dichromats, are Wlim i strappingly is Williams , Ken, 2001) (Kuehni, several weeks, when they were not were they when weeks, several ed as the argument for for argument the as ed ooe cnat. hs s c. to acc. is This contacts. colored u clr perception, color out d by widely varying varying widely by d cognitive scientists scientists cognitive o h ojcs n a in objects the to pa i fvr of favor in speak ived color is rather is color ived dfeet shades different e rains than by our our by than rains ae xoe to exposed are y 25 For . CEU eTD Collection physics. The answer is indeed no. physics. indeed answer is no. The ihr yashts h d nt eur te xenl hscl sti physical external the experience require synaesthetic not do who s synaesthetes of groups higher distinctive two are there (2001) Hubbard and Ramachandran e are phenomena sensory Acc 2001). Hubbard, and some (Ramachandran, off or on turned be stimuli cannot and automatic certain to response In 7). 1995, mos for difficult seems qualitywhose sensorystartling blendings s taste colors, hear to capacity rare “the is Synaesthesia Synaesthesia 1.3.4 hs nwr te hlspia qeto wehr oo eprec c experience color whether question philosophical the answers This 26 It seems that Kuehni here refers to the Hume’s p Hume’s the to refershereKuehni that seemsIt 26 the treat the for representationalism, see Alter (2006) servesSynaesthesia fun against arguments28 the as They 27 only needthinkto of the synaesthetic stim (fromI,Book III Part IofBook A Treatiseofof H therea one-to-oneis correspondence orbijection a the area of neurologyof area the of vast a is there although debate, philosophical in synaesthesia exper se an there surprise as my In color brain? the that by strictly mean generated that Would sensat 2001). different Hubbard, integrates and and (Ramachandran, segregates brain the how understand synaesthet synaesthesia “studying claim Hubbard and Ramachandran, lower As 21). 1995, and the se and a to response 2007) in only triggered Macpherson, is experience synaesthetic from taken Dixon, by (tested relationship objects. identical physical not to is and it of properties the 26 ewe sc sgaue ad h rslig xeine” (Kuehni experiences” resulting the and signatures such between 28 that supports Valberg’s idea that color is strictly somet strictly is color that idea Valberg’s supports that 27 ti i uuly h cs wt te rpeeclu synaesthete grapheme-colour the with case the usually is this ;

, Wager, and (1999). betweenFs the the and Gs.Hume's appear uman Nature), uman see also Rayo (2007). ulusorderin for synaesthetic the effect occur.to ctionalism,see (2007).MacphersonThere also is di rinciple according to which the number of Fs is equ is Fs of number the which to according rinciple 14 m t b vr ltl witn about written little very be to ems ae o eprec ohr equally other experience or hapes sr siuu (yoi, 1993 (Cytowic, stimulus nsory reports and new researches in in researches new and reports t of us to imagine”(Cytowic, to us of t

s Frege'sin Foundations of Arithmetic scussion goingwhetherscussion on presents it al to the number of Gs if and onlyif and if Gs ofnumber the to al an be explained by the the by explained be an uu t idc the induce to mulus ions and ” thoughts” and ions netee: the ynaesthetes: iie ta are that licited hing subjective subjective hing may help us to to us help may 20, 25). 2001, , es whose whose es ording to to ording ience is is ience

CEU eTD Collection properties structure chemical the is it asleep; falls person which by rednes the example For circumstances. standard under perceiver Human Understanding Understanding Human poisonous and take care of the things that have a disposition to be fr be to disposition a have that things the of care take and poisonous property of the object that changes under the certain conditions; certain the under changes that object the of property statement is always its manifestations (Crane, ed. 1995, alwaysstatement manifestations is (Crane, ed. its 30 The expression 30 'categorical property' is broadly 29 See Pargetter29 Jackson, and Prior ‘Three theses a ic dsoiin uuly r uosral, n ae n sne ‘ sense a in are and , are usually dispositions Since another by realized be “might, disposition Therefore it. observes wi perceiver the when red, of experience the produces object the b exposed when has, object disposition a is wavelengths certain (Cran properties second-order both are they perception, color and p to have bodies that power a specifically more or disposition a A color. about dispositionalist a as regarded general in is Locke Locke2 -from dispositionalism subjectivismto still many of them call the attention for the inconsistencies i inconsistencies the for attention the call them of many still have philosophers most that account the is dispositionalism Although sle being of property the example For occurrence. actual not and objec the to applied are predicates dispositional those claims contemporar in properties 2006, Pitson, (see etc. and elasticity fragility, solubility, dispositional of examples stock The 2006). under perceiver normal the to red look to object the of disposition (C famous” so is work Locke’s which for inconsistencies unfortunate Since dispositions are not causes areSince not dispositions 1995). significantly used to describe the world. We avoid things that have have D that things disposition. avoid the We world. of the describe manifestation to the used significantly is dissolving and breaking the fragi the Meanwhile circumstances. suitable in breaks glass 30 r aiettos Amtog ipts ht h tuhmkr for -maker the that disputes Armstrong manifestations, or and the contemporary definition. Curley even claims that “those “those that claims even Curley definition. contemporary the and

29 used for used color experience (see, Crane, 1995, and a bout dispositions’bout American Philosophical Quarterly , they are not necessarily manifested. That is why Goodman is That manifested. necessarilyare not , they 15 see view chapter 1 Armstrong’s and Crane, 1995). Disposition is such is Disposition 1995). Crane, and of the pill. In the case of soporificity of case the In pill. the of lity and solubility are dispositions; dispositions; are solubility and lity n his work his n t with regard to their possibility possibility their to regard with t roduce certain idea in normal normal in idea certain roduce y light. Further disposition of disposition Further light. y ccording to that view color is is color view that to ccording sugar dissolves in the water; the in dissolves sugar th normal visual apparatus is is apparatus visual normal th ep-inducing is not the cause the not is ep-inducing disposition” (Crane, 1995). (Crane, disposition” s of an object consists in a in consists object an of s lsoMatthen, 2007). , 95. elcin f a of Reflection 1995). e, (1982). directed on’ categorical categorical on’ directed urley, 1972, 440). Lowe Lowe 440). 1972, urley, concluded about Locke, about concluded agile and so on (Crane, on so and agile An Essay Concerning Essay An al conditions (Pitson, conditions al dsoiin o be to disposition a y philosophy, are are philosophy, y dispositional a soiin are ispositions

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ambiguous, being employed either for representative foremployed b either being ambiguous, distinction Lockean the Descartes to According 32 Stuart and (2003). For 31 ambiguity the between terms the and‘idea’ ‘ the psychological distinction between sensation and perception and sensation between distinction psychological the not does that object present can it besides thought, that of content i and thought or of state of kind any in involved be must represent is idea propositional; is perception the Meanwhile differentinto II.ii.1). (E. ” dist not is and mind, the in Conception or Appearance uniform one but nothing “s Locke to According 8). xvii. IV. (E. Ideas” particular our those they as only is Things, other about Reasoning and Knowledge our and Mind: Ide the about only is Knowledge, and Reasoning Man’s Every 8). xvii. expe of objects immediate the are “ideas that say would Locke thesis to According 38). 1991, (Ayer, altogether occurrence their for a belong, they which to something of idea obscure the with together experi of of the the ideas consist a form substance of can we that The idea only Ideasmindour in 2.1 andI forqualities powers;arguments subjectivis introduce further will intr first me Let such. as color of thesis subjectivist the to me gives it quarrel, philosophical old the solve not did Locke Although I go not detailsbut will even into say.would read him Some as physicalist, disp not and relationalism, of sort a and subjectivism of conclusion the te Locke’sambiguous how shows Analysisexperience. the as color, to relate to and perception of problem the solve to tries Locke the allegations carelessness of inconsistency or Lock of reader cautious and truthful no that obviously be to seems about subjectivist speaking strictly is Locke that argues hand Ja 52). 1995, (Lowe, confused” little a even perhaps and matters these “ambiva him founds he yet but dispositionalist, a as Locke understands 33 See chapterSubjectivism.33 the 4 ‘in the understanding’.But I will not go the into

detailsof this problemhere. quality’E. II.viii.8 in seeAyer Curley (1991), (1 modes of thought or for their objects as they are they as objects their foror thought of modes ten ecpin n snain ses o e proble be to seems sensations and perception etween 16 31 . oduce the distinction between ideas, between distinction the oduce color, as the feature of the object, object, the of feature the as color, ation of content to the mindthe to content of ation colors (see, Jacovides, 2007). It 2007). Jacovides, (see, colors rience and knowledge” (E, IV, IV, (E, knowledge” and rience 33 . Idea in the Lockean sense Lockean the in Idea . 972), Jacovides 972), (2007),Lowe, (1995), e’s work is safe against all all against safe is work e’s exist. That corresponds to to corresponds That exist. imple idea ‘contains in it it in ‘contains idea imple conceived of, as they exist objectivelythey exist as of, conceived nd which is responsible is which nd m. m. rminology leads him to to him leads rminology of representationalism, of as existing in his own his in existing as ositionalism as many as ositionalism covides on the other the on covides the source that leads that source the t can determines the the determines can t et bu sm of some about lent about this account. account. about this ai. h tr ‘da is ‘idea’ term The matic. correspond with with correspond enced ‘powers’ inguishable 32 . It . CEU eTD Collection produce a certain idea in us and we as the perceivers are only only are perceivers the as we and us in idea certain a produce follow it sight, by distance a at or touch by us to close bodies particles; small of out made is everything that presupposes produce ideas in us, and therefore we define them as qualities of t of qualities as them define we therefore and us, in ideas produce and secondary qualities. distinc the consideration into take to have we Further 22). viii. II. (E. po the have objects other wax, the Sun, the object, the of qualities II.viii (E Qualities” primary insensible its of Reason “by defe Locke that perception of theory corpuscularian the with hand has a passive power to be melted by the Sun. In the same way o way same the In Sun. the by melted be to power passive a has t melt to power active an has sun the example For qualities. b can which powers, passive and active between distinguishes Locke are 1994, 62). (McCann, inconceivable alternati since particles insensible small of impulse trough Theref imperceptible. probably are they intermediate that c we If bodies. perceived the and us between intermediates that oos ad o n r n mr ta mr nms o fa consciousness.Hence if the living creature so were re names mere than more no are on so and colors, 43 p. 1965, (Guthrie, void the and atoms simply are , and Anaxagoras, claimed that color like color that claimed Anaxagoras, and Parmenides, qu secondary and primary between distinction The 34 nesbe atce o or ess ( I.ii81) Scnay qua Secondary II.viii.8,13). (E senses” our on particles insensible mind our in ideas produce powers…to the as ‘quality’ defines Locke Quality power body of the and 2.2 51).imagination (Ayer, 1991, wel as sense-perception, in involved comprehensively are mechanisms see he and identical, be might they that possibility the out ruled wasLocke brain the in events and ideas between relation the of t by brain the to brought data the understanding and systematizing, acti the indicates perception hand other the On sensation. shortly or the world exterior bo into from of the data means representation the passive

moved, allmoved, these qualities would wipedbe away and sweet and bitter, and hot and cold, is color only color is cold, and hot and bitter, and sweet 9). Locke actually followed more modern Galileo Gal Galileo modern more followed actually Locke 9). a te bet i wih e oae hm r concer are them locate we which in objects the as r lte rahs ak n h tm o Dmciu, who Democritus, of time the in back reaches alities 17 .23). Because we are able to perceive perceive to able are we Because .23). ore, our sense organs are affected affected are organs sense our ore, i.e., the body produces sensations sensations produces body the i.e., e om o croel interaction corporeal of forms ve he wax. Wax on the other hand hand other the on Wax wax. he s that there must be something something be must there that s officially agnostic. He did not not did He agnostic. officially a passive observers. All these these All observers. passive a bject has the active power to to power active the has bject annot perceive the particles particles the perceive annot he object. This goes hand in in hand goes This object. he ms to believe that physical that believe to ms wer to produce ideas in us us in ideas produce to wer he senses. On the question the On senses. he nds in E II.viii.11-14. He II.viii.11-14. E in nds lities annihilated”(Galilei, 1623). by convention, because in truth there truth in because convention, by e explained by tertiary tertiary by explained e ve process of picking, picking, of process ve b te prto of operation the …by tion between primary primary between tion ilei: “I think that tastes, odors, tastes, that think “I ilei: l as in memory and and memory in as l 34 e, n ta te rsd in reside they that and ned, js lk primary like just , dy and to the brain dyand the to brain a aog o Heraclides, to along had CEU eTD Collection produce various Sensations in us us in Sensations various produce rdc vros estos n s y hi piay ulte o thei of qualities primary their by us in sensations various produce qualities secondary and primary between pow merely represent qualities secondary of ideas the hand other indepe mind intrinsic, represent qualities primary of ideas that II (E. all at them of Idea resemblance no have Qualities, Secondary the but themselves; Bodies the in exist really do Patterns are Bodies, of Qualities primary of Ideas “the states Locke cor the of explanation a give not do powers ‘bare’ which to regard t by supported is powers bare and robust between distinction The 23). viii. t of differentmodifications the from result powerswhich things: t power a “only is quality secondary precisely More II.viii.10). “… are qualities secondary But, odor. ideas simple us in produces violet the example, For us. in ideas bec powers, sense robust a in are object the of qualities All way different two in explained be can Locke to according Powers prima the on depend they 14,23).II.viii.10, because ‘secondary’ them named and minds power as qualities secondary defined basically Locke II.viii.10). qualities are bare powers produced in a certain conditionscertain a in produced powers bare are qualities 36 Incase the of36 the color perception the light is For 35 distinction the between barepowers robu and light and tangible qualities are explained as “nothing in the obje the in “nothing as explained are qualities tangible and light s colour, like: qualities secondary hand other the On corpuscularism. of viii. II. also see II.viii.9, (E. mobility” and figure extension, c part two Locke into wheat of grain body. a divide we a “if example: following from pa divided constituent be never minute can the They of texture. sometimes motion number, shape, size, solidity, as of viii Chapter II, Book In An Essay Concerning Human UnderstandingHuman Concerning Essay An

neededfor secondary quality produceto idea usin st st powersLocke by see also Bolton 2001, 111. y hi piay Qualities primary their by are 35 . Primary qualities are elementary properties, such properties, elementary are qualities Primary . ohn i te bet themselves Objects the in nothing 18 36 and exist by primary qualities (E qualities primary by exist and Resemblances of them, and their and them, of Resemblances applicable the produce they ause 22), which follows from the idea idea the from follows which 22), ndent, real qualities and on the on and qualities real ndent, .viii.15). The main idea here is is here idea main The .viii.15). like specific shape, color, and color, shape, specific like hose primary qualities” (E. II. (E. qualities” primary hose cts themselves, but powers to powers but themselves, cts s, each part has still solidity, still has part each s, at ifrnl uo other upon differently act o ( I.ii1) Secondary II.viii.10). (E ” s, produced in us by these these by us in produced s, . s (Jacovides 2003, 332-33). 2003, (Jacovides s

he resemblance thesis with thesis resemblance he ers to produce ideas in us. us. in ideas produce to ers s to produce ideas in our our in ideas produce to s responding actuality. As actuality. responding r insensible parts” (E. (E. parts” insensible r , Locke distinguishes distinguishes Locke , larifies that by the the by that larifies el tse sound, taste, mell, rts of body, and and body, of rts ry qualities (E. (E. qualities ry , but Powers to to Powers but , CEU eTD Collection u te ifrn Arneet n Rfato o ter iue n i and minute their of Refraction and Arrangement different the but porphyry example is also one of the most cited in philosophy also ofporphyry one is color cited of example in the perc most uh da i us in ideas such porphyry in the light, when it is plain plain is it when a light, whiteness the in of porphyry ideas those that and light; of absence or presence partial argument subjectivism. for Size and Figure’ (E. II.xxiii.11) (E. Figure’ and Size Te admirable ‘an with replaced be and ‘disappear’ would see we s could one “if that us tells eyes microscopic of example The modern i.e., light. in from visible language produce thecolor; prism arrangem different that claims Locke that seems It IV.xvi.12). p is color Bodies “the pellucid of way refraction fashionable quite in mentions Locke As light. depends disposition or quality secondary as Color dispositionalism. of ‘color’.Here Lockeexpression uses precise,when be to have We qualit primary circumstances are changed. that means This intrinsically. body the in are qualities 41 Porphyry 41 igneousan is rock containing the large The same 40 example was given alsoMaier by (1968) According 39 Jacovidesto Locke must havemind in p See,II.viii.23 38 and II.xxiii.9. II.viii.23, 'original and qualities atII. 12viii. 17, viii. II. at qualities' 'real mentions Locke 37 The reason for that can be find also in the thesis of inseparabi of thesis the in also find be can that for reason The “

codn t Lce rmr qaiis r ra qualities real are qualities primary Locke to According first the Dependencystage– 2.3.1 thesis Arguments Dispositionalismagainst 2.3 Hinder light from striking on porphyryon striking from light Hinder 38 . Locke describes ‘real qualities’ as the one that are r are that one the as qualities’ ‘real describes Locke . Cn n oe hn ay el leain ae ae n h porphyr the in made are alterations real any think one any …Can 39 ; II. ; x.6.

’” and “the Colour and shining of Bodies, is in them nothing them in is Bodies, of shining and Colour “the and ’” 40 'primary and real qualities at II. viii. 22, 'real 22, viii. II. at qualities real and 'primary . This shows Locke’s commitment to corpuscularism. The corpuscularism. to commitment Locke’s shows This . crystals known as phenocrystsembedded in fine-g a rismsand like the (see 2007).Jacovides, 66-67. t a n clu i te dark the in colour no has it 41 , and its colours vanish; it no longer produces any produces longer no it vanish; colours its and , 19 37 smtms ald lo original also called sometimes ; lity that will be presented as the as presented be will that lity ee much better, the colors that colors the better, much ee eally in the body, because they because body, the in eally ent and refraction of the light light the of refraction and ent e d nt hne hn the when change not do ies original qualities’ or ‘primary qualities’ at qualities’ ‘primary or qualities’ original I will describe his first stagefirst describehis I will tr o at o a certain a of parts of xture nd redness are really in in really are redness nd rainedmatrix. I hs ide, uh a such indeed, has, It ? oue b ‘different by roduced on the presence of of presence the on nsensible parts” (E (E parts” nsensible eption: eption:

b the by y CEU eTD Collection perceive color. With regard to contemporary dispositionalist’ view dispositionalist’ contemporary to regard With color. perceive power power rsne f ih; eod prhr de nt ely hne hn t when change really not does porphyry second, light; of presence ecie. u, hs s nosset ih h scn sae depend stage second the with inconsistent is this But, perceiver. becaus or constitution in change a on depend must change that F, being whiteness; and redness, of idea the us in produce to stone, hard that of parts some day, and night both particles, of configuration feel thereto be it if were Pain would no sensible Creature be yet would there Sun, the or Fire, the from Hea and Light of Ideas the receive to Organs those to joined Mind a “ For the human apparatus. instance: visual color that objects might some although animal, an is organism this colors First, things. two states Locke paragraph this In the appropriate visual apparatus. Normal in this sense the that organis this means in the appropriate apparatus. visual Normal pres the on depends color of existence the that claims Locke stagesecond the Dependency– 2.4.1 thesis ofArguments forSubjectivistReading Locke2.4 which depends the existence of color of onthe presence the perceiver. s hscl rpry f h ojc ta eit i certa in exists that object the of property physical is i.e qualities; intrinsic of alterations as modifications genuine m Pestle por to according that I suggest it?” of Texture the of Alteration the of beating the can Alteration real What one... dirty will Colour clearwhite the and Almond, an “Pound phenomenon: describesa in that Following 2007). (Jacovides, qualities explanatory fundamental r a undergoes body a if states: thesis dependency Therefore Were there no fit Organs fit no there Were to produce such a sensation in us (E. II. (E. us sensation in 19). produceto a viii. such but whiteness or redness are not in it at any time, but such a texture a such but time, any at it in not are redness or whiteness but to receive the impressions Fire makes on the Sight and Touch; nor Touch; and Sight the on makes Fire impressions the receive to 20 no more Light, or Heat in the World, than there there than World, the in Heat or Light, more no as are apt, by the rays of light rebounding from from rebounding light of rays the by apt, are as in circumstances independently of the the of independently circumstances in ” (E. II.xxxi.2) II.xxxi.2) ” (E. are in the porphyry only in the the in only porphyry the in are ence of the normal perceiver with with perceiver normal the of ence ., primary qualities. Color as such as Color qualities. primary ., eal change from being F to not to F being from change eal phyry example Locke thinks of of Locke thinks example phyry it does not matter whether matter not does it in such sense is limited to to limited is sense such in k i ay oy bt an but Body, any in ake ency thesis according to to according thesis ency e ih i bokd off. blocked is light he t, by those impressions impressions those by t, from others the idea of idea the others from e it acquired different different acquired it e E II.viii.20 Locke Locke II.viii.20 E m is being is m to able be altered into a alteredinto be that hath the hath that CEU eTD Collection an iut te ae eain o h etra ojcs Lce s Locke objects. external the to relation same the situate pain rdcd n i te ae a, s o i te ie (. II.viii. (E. Fire” the in not is way, same the him in produced his and Fire; the in actually is Fire, the by him in produced s a be to seems dispositionalism’ stage ‘two the that only Not reduced to secondary quality, when it is not observed, but further t further but observed, not is it when quality, secondary to reduced dependency stage second the into further even Going perceiver. normal t disposition is color two, stage following disposition, a is quality 43 For 43 example the caseofsee the changed color of For see42 instance example of II.porphyry (E. vi 44 See, E. II.viii.17,See, E. 44 II.xxxi.2, and viii. 19. independentlyinconsistently,and onthe obse depends color the observer exists of lightas such conditions, ar and object, the on powers merely are qualities secondary that Loc light. visible the by expose when wavelengths specific a is color thesis dependency of stage first the to According 19).and viii. (s qualities secondary the see to order in organs fit or apparatus per the on depends color of existence the that shows paragraph This i take us let But object. following reasoning: the in anything resemble not do warmth thesi resemblance for support a only is that dispositionalism “… following: the consider i the that to regard With does. pain e of idea the the as resemble way similar warmth of idea the that show to tries Locke 66). 49, cl walking of experiment thought Descartes’s follows Locke 66) a (color) qualities secondary of ideas between comparison the For pain and Color 2.4.2 aboutvery the naturecolors. interesting conclusions of ab account subjectivist into fit to appears that makes Locke further me let But, colors. of nature the about account appropriate dispositionalism that seems also it dispositionalist, as Locke 42 or that primary quality are changedare quality primary that or what Reason one has to say, That his Idea of Warmth, which was was which Warmth, of Idea his That say, to has one Reason what

ii. 19).ii. almond (E II.viii.20),(E almond when their primary qualitie 21 Idea of Pain, which the same Fire same the which Pain, of Idea disposition of the object to reflect to object the of disposition ke would explain that by the fact fact the by that explain would ke out colors. This brings also some also brings This colors. out s; i.e., the pain and the color like like color the and pain the i.e., s; dea of warmth and the idea of idea the and warmth of dea 43 should not be taken as the the as taken be not should ee also E. II.viii.17, II.xxxi.2, II.viii.17, E. also ee ignificant problem for taking taking for problem ignificant . Though color as secondary as color Though . oser to the fire (Maier 1968, (Maier fire the to oser o produce a certain idea in a in idea certain a produce o nd pain (McCann 1994, 65- 1994, (McCann pain nd introduce some arguments some introduce ae ta smoe might someone that tates e changed by the specific specific the by changed e s arechanged. o primary qualitiesprimary o ceiver appropriate visual visual appropriate ceiver t cnieain the consideration nto tra ojcs n the in objects xternal color as an idea is not not is idea an as color 16). According to to According 16). rver. rver. 44 . So . CEU eTD Collection believe that colors are like pain only the ideas. For instance Ay instance For ideas. the only pain like are colors that believe as qualities secondary are colors then so, is this If perceiver. ht da s n h qaiy f h ojc. n te wrs ok does Locke words other In object. the of quality the in is idea that Locke explains This individual ‘red’. called be the to is object an in whether produced idea relevant the that conclude might one addition relat is color that claim the for support a gives That real. is them of each color, different perceives organism each T although II.xxxii.15). (E time” same the at Ideas different Minds Men’s Obje same the i That ordered, so Ideas, were it Organs, simple our of our Structure to Falsehood of “Imputation no be would there that f that draws Ayer 207-09). 1991, (Ayers, others” of heads the inside s can’t this and head, speaker’s the in idea particular a only on obje an whether determines that idea are relevant “the that concludes exist that things “all that states theory corpuscular Does that means that the existence of secondary qualities fully qualities secondary of existence the that means that Does M II.xxi.73). Parts” (E and Texture, Number, Figure, Bulk, different the but us, in Ideas whe Object, sensible any in be to else, thing any conceive cannot the into enquire would and Minds, our in Ideas bare the beyond go we “When Locke 20andII. made 24. The that that: viii. interesting is notion as taken is ‘color’ hand other the on but 24, 19, 10, 8, viii. II. at ideas as t shows Locke of reading Careful quality? secondary be to taken ta is color whether question the answer to is here concern main The II, nomore the is in Whiteness xxx.2) (E, object, is. than Pain s the as not and us in is which pain, like is color the Therefore A: Q1: Why is Whiteness in Snow, and Pain not? (E, II, Why and Snow, not? viii.16) in Pain Whiteness is Q1: Q2: why is whiteness in Snow when “the Pain as an Ideaas when why Snow an the in effects “the is that of whiteness Pain is Q2: object, is not, when it is not felt? (E, II, (E, felt? not when is object, not, is it viii.18) 22 oa rte ta dsoiinl In dispositional. than rather ional ’s ambiguity, stated at E. II.viii.8 E. at stated ambiguity, ’s teer us wrong, not matter what’s matter not wrong, us teer ly particulars” (E III.iii.6), and and III.iii.6), (E particulars” ly relational. But still one might one still But relational. econdary quality outside of us. us. of outside quality econdary depend on the presence of the of presence the on depend er with regard to the Lockean the to regard with er hat he uses expression ‘color’ expression uses he hat ct is to be called ‘red’ is thus thus is ‘red’ called be to is ct ct should produce in several several in produce should ct reby it produces different produces it reby his fits into account that that account into fits his ken to be the idea or it is is it or idea the be to ken for an individual equally individual an for rom the Locke’s claim Locke’s the rom to o is insensible its of otion o ma ta ie is idea that mean not secondary quality at quality secondary f by the different different the by f ir Causes, we we Causes, ir determines that CEU eTD Collection be called so in a derivative sense because they produce ideas tha ideas produce they because sense derivative a in so called be ut rmrl sgiis utc ad eodrl te ut per just the secondarily and signifies primarily just i sgiiac fr y iw s ht h triooia prob terminological the that is view my for significance His more is he dispositionalist as Locke read many although up, sum To in us” (E. II. viii.16)II. (E. us” in from sweet, and white manna, and cold; and white snow, light; and hot Fo 2). ii. III. (E, them” uses that him of mind the in ideas the signi immediate or primary their in “words Locke to According Denomination 2.4.3 concerned,and that theyreside the only conscio in Similarly Galileo47 “tastes,that, noted odors,co See II.viii.15-16,46 also E, 22, and Ayer (1991), See 45 Jacovides, 2007. actually in the object, but it denominates the object, which is is which object, the denominates it subjectivism but object, the in actually other words only ideas are red in the primary sense of ‘red’ m ‘red’ of sense primary the in red are ideas only words other deri and primary between distinction a makes Jacovides vein same e of sort a as objects the of qualities to applies it and idea, its in is ‘blue’ word the example For us. in produce they ideas (Quine, 1980,10) particular either rednesses, any that believing without red are phil reasonable “the that claims Quine Similarly us. in ideas exi still qualities Secondary us. in ideas the only but qualities, are Locke to according Colors us. in produced idea the by names since quality, secondary a sense derivative or secondary in and idea an in healthy organisms c sense same Inthe b1). IV.2 1003a34- , 2008, , making of feature its by sense ‘heal derivative called is Apple apples. and organisms about speaks he where Aristotle in in Aristotle (Stuart, 2003,63). eoiae fo utc. aoie i hs ok pel t Aristoteli to appeals work his in Jacovides justice. from denominated e For p.390). 1998, (Craig, denomination or paronymy of notion the introduces and Categories 45 . 47 . 46 developed the distinction between primary and secondarysignific and betweenprimary developeddistinction the . Following that the qualities of the bodies are denominated from denominated are bodies the of qualities the that Following .

lors,so onand are moreno mere than sonames far 63-64. usness”(Galileo, 1957, 274). 23 xtension (Ayer, 1991, 63). In the the In 63). 1991, (Ayer, xtension o. h js pro i therefore is person just The son. r example “flame is denominated denominated is “flame example r osopher may believe that barns barns that believe may osopher primary sense the name for the the for name the sense primary es n te rbe o dual of problem the and lems st, but only as the cause of the the of cause the as only but st, eanwhile physical objects may objects physical eanwhile or , inhere in them” in inhere universal, or fication stand for nothing but nothing for stand fication t are red in the primary sense sense primary the in red are t as as object the in which we place them is vative sense of color. In color. of sense vative olor is in primarily sense primarilysense in is olor the primary sense (see, (see, sense primary the therefore not secondary secondary not therefore secondary qualities are qualities secondary thy’ in a secondary or or secondary a in thy’ plausibly subjectivist. subjectivist. plausibly a clear argument for for argument clear a the ideas they produce they ideas the an work an Metaphysics xample xample ation ation the , CEU eTD Collection apparatusvisual activity? or neural role primary the plays what is; it what external, something t answer and perception of chain causal the further investigate 48 For 48 againstarguments contemporaraydispositiona ant e ht oo i peetd s da disposition dual a as presented is color that be dispos cannot terminology that showed I when clear. is solved idea) as be color and quality might secondary ambiguity external. the something that as shows color denomination interpreting of difficulty the shows hesit The internal. something is that pain; like not is color why He such. as dispositionalism in doubt the present dispositionalism

lismsee chapter 24 4.1Arguments against dispositionalism 48 Teeoe I ugs ta we that suggest I Therefore, . in causing the color experience, experience, color the causing in he following: if color is not not is color if following: he ation of the great empiricist great the of ation has a reason to ask himself himself ask to reason a has toaim al, ic it since fails, itionalism Further the idea of of idea the Further

(color as as (color CEU eTD Collection produce experiences of a particular sort in perceivers. The e The perceivers. in sort particular a of experiences produce a dispositionalism, to view similar have to seems he perception, hscls tee xs ojc wt cran aeegh a wavelength certain with object exist there physicalism e xlie i te hscl em? oa Mthns n i work his in Matthen’s Knowing. Mohan terms? physical the in explained be codn t dsoiinls clr s dsoiin f h obj the of disposition the a of is disposition color a dispositionalism to as According color of specification the about is version dispositionali of definition contemporary between distinction main The arguments againstof apparatus subjectivism. visual and his to try will I complex so is color bout theory his Since color. of difficult is it that of because and realism relative action account compound quite Matthen’s regard perception. color With of view organisms. ecological different in apparatus visual of function func a in color explain to tries he further and dispositionalist not distal stimuli; i.e., external sense objects, to classes” (ib classes” to objects, sense external i.e., stimuli; distal c and classify systems “Sensory states Matthen As blue’. looks similarly properties'; 'appearance are featuressensed s distal classify apparatus visual the that is idea core The act (Matthen,classification” of sensory 2007,14). sti distal a property a is “color that is view Matthen that particulars a of actions produce to tendencya has object, the of the as color, that argues Matthen ‘looks-blue’. e.g., ‘looks-colored’; of for argues he because complex, is approach His apparatus. visual 50 This made is 50 byempirical the factof threephot Distal stimulus 49 means a surfacespectral reflect classification the of basis the on property a have to appears spe a needs perceive being of independently exist that object a color taking problematic, be to seems dispositionalism Although 3 -Matthenfrom realismto subjectivism certain shade. But, how are related physical entities and expe and entities physical related are how But, shade. certain objects or distal stimulus distal or objects ate, ie ipstoait, ae a la dvso between division clear a makes dispositionalists, like Matthen, 49 , which produce the perception in the observer with the appropri the with observer the in perception the produce which ,

ance of ance the object that conveyinformation the t to oreceptorsG, R, B, see the chapterThe 1 empirical 25 to dispositionalism ‘the object appears or appears‘the object dispositionalism to to classify him into the specific theory theory specific the into him classify to mulus appears to have by of an an of virtue by have to appears mulus id. 2007, 13)2007, id. d t s sal eprecd n a in experienced usually is it nd timuli in specific categories. The The categories. specific in timuli xperience of the object is the state the is object the of xperience that is made by visual apparatus, visual by made is that riences of them? Can experience Can them? of riences cial investigation. According to to According investigation. cial ategorize: they sort and assign assign and sort they ategorize: ort in the perceiver. Following Following perceiver. the in ort analyze the functional process process functional the analyze lthough he persist that he is is he that persist he lthough ect that has a tendency to to tendency a has that ect the realist version of color color of version realist the he visualhe apparatus that classify it. factabout thenature of color. tional way, that is by the the by is that way, tional s physical property of the the of property physical s 50 property or disposition disposition or property to this he is close to to close is he this to bet Ea, 2008). (Egan, object . Therefore, the object the Therefore, . eig Dig and Doing, Seeing, sm and Matthen’s Matthen’s and sm is therefore called called therefore is xenl physical external ate CEU eTD Collection perceivers suchby 2007,167). processing” (ibid. ecie i. oo a sc cno b dfnd s oe widesprea some as defined be cannot such as Color it. perceives perceive the persisting color as the property of the obje the of property the as color persisting the perceive perception, he rejects subjectivism about color and puts sever puts and color about subjectivism rejects he perception, ki different of Organisms sense-features. certain of presence be recognized as the feature of the distal stimuli that arethat stimuli distal the of feature the as recognized be re pluralistic called thesis the develops Matthen thing. same 51 As one51 ofmajor the proponentof subjectivism. or symbol of a feature that is being attributed to an object an to attributed being is that feature a of symbol or automatic the of tr Matthen perception. color in account improvement great a is apparatus The species. different of apparatus visual analyses deep his in seen be can work Matthen’s of contribution The h rcsig f ifrne f aeegh ecig h ee a eye, the reaching wavelength of of processing the described so is vision Color classificati clearly “color that comparative states way. perception. Matthen the of product final the Exper stimuli. external the of independent is and apparatus visual Classif 14). 2007, (ibid. way certain a in it classifies it when olwn Mthn oo i te rpry f oehn ta i e is that something of property the is color Matthen Following Realism 3.1 of account my in role of neuronscertain sort. already can causestimulation experience of the significant the play not does stimuli distal bet relation The subjective. totally usually is experience the diffe are there species the within Since significant. more is color of perception the in role major plays apparatus visual that Furthe realism. against arguments the on focus manly will I why words, although diverse species with different structure and function function and structure different with species diverse although words, color why is That systems. visual various of plethora by gained Although according to Matthen color cannot be captured by the objecti the by captured be cannot color Matthen to according Although with systems sensory evolved have they 327). 2007, informational functions (ibid. consequently, and world the about

26 ct in its own way, they all perceive the the perceive all they way, own its in ct grasped by the visual organs. Inother organs. visual the graspedby . Sensory qualia merely signal the signal merely qualia Sensory . rences in the perception of color, of perception the in rences ween the experience of color and color of experience the ween alism, according to which plenty plenty which to according alism, al objections to Hardin to objections al nds need different information information different need nds on is one that is generated is from one on is that ication is made strictly by the the by strictly made is ication . In my opinion neural activity activity neural opinion my In . d vial t nra color normal to available nd , according to Matthen, must must Matthen, to according , eats each sensation as a sign sign a as sensation each eats r I will try to object the idea idea the object to try will I r tra t te pce that species the to xternal epreta sae ht is that state experiential d ience of a certain shade is shade certain a of ience perception, since the the since perception, of the visual apparatus visual the of and comparison of the of comparison and

in a functional and and functional a in vist’s theories of color color of theories vist’s function of visual visual of function 51 different . That is That . CEU eTD Collection proposition corresponds to reality’ (Armstrong, 1989). Matthen clai Matthen 1989). (Armstrong, reality’ to corresponds proposition product seem to be reduced to the unique quality or distal stimuli, th stimuli, distal or quality unique the to reduced be to seem product and yellow between perceive we that split the instance, For 199). the in described be can class that of extension the that means specified. physically be can experience perceptual The 203). way? (Matthen, this know” 2007, in donot We for world be real it to a unmixed is color the in blue with unmixed be to has green “unique that is response Matthen one. b is, wavelength other some or is, nm 525 or green, unique colors is nm 520 about either wrong or right unconditional an is there that advocate who A by made t proposal realist robustly order the to refers in answer be to have color a does what question: the asks Lewis act Matthen brain's calls the with he parallel what are colors of which to basis according the on theory his developed Matthen (Matthen, 2007,203). in property a such is there different look they when and share is there color, same the be to appear stimuli distal “when that perception the to corresponds stimulus distal a in Something colors. olw Amtogs orsodne els. T sy ht is P that say “To realism. correspondence Armstrong’s follows Matthen’s world. physical exterior the by explained be can 52 Sensory 52 category as defined the is experience, a h aporae iul paaue i dfeet as Sne col Since ways. different in apparatuses visual appropriate the vari by sensed are frequencies, and length different with waves com light visible i.e., features; physical varied apparently of chapter Matthen endeavors to demonstrate that even peculiar individua peculiar even that demonstrate re to endeavors Matthen chapter wavelength, i.e., counterparts; physical that their by he specified because subjectivism, against argues Matthen 2007, 209). ob therefore are mistake, of chance the and accuracy of standards w associated light, visible of Characteristics . of

nd it nd is the productof the classification made by 27 By "physically specifiable" Matthen specifiable" "physically By (2003), Hilbert David and Byrne lex posed of various electromagnetic various of posed some independent property they they propertyindependent some vt (e, ei, 99. When 1969). Lewis, (see, ivity argumentation for color realism color for argumentation language of physics (ibid. 2007, (ibid. physics of language ith functional, species-specific, species-specific, functional, ith them that distinguishes them” distinguishes that them flectance, etc. In his eighth eighth his In etc. flectance, ety of species that developed that species of ety visual apparatus,visual see Matthen, 2007. r xeine a te end the as experiences or green happens somewhere somewhere happens green true is to say that this this that say to is true ms that the same goes for for goes same the that ms jectively verifiable (ibid, (ibid, verifiable jectively is might be seen as a sort sort a as seen be might is perceived color can be be can color perceived of them. Matthen claims Matthen them. of o be unique green, his his green, unique be o l sensory categoriessensory l or yellow. But what what But yellow. or s iiaiy space, similarity ’s . They claim that that claim They . ut not more than more not ut 52

CEU eTD Collection rcsig ytm opts h ptny f h cne o the of center the of potency the computes system processing wavelengthonly groundto differential learned (con visu the functionally defined as is vision Color 54 See 53 also 2007,Matthen, 213.204, and violet, appear to have when visual organ co-classifies the co-classifies organ visual when have to appear violet, and physica ofproperty the is blue as such color, of shadeCertain relative the ends. to 199)2007, (ibid. states” specify to physically possible always is it i.e. terms; sens a what describe to possible always is “it that concludes simila real the have you there and differentiate to difficult and colours these that and receptor, one only affects light spectrum, f the gathe of account take categoricity, of boundaries black-white, sharp the introduce and blue-yellow, Take red-green, Lewis. of by space made Brightness example thought simple a presents Matthen 2007,142). ‘physically (ibid. specifiable’ stimulati follows that system process opponent the that argues exac agitates which light, gives visible the He of ray the classifies. of composition system visual that color of t categories sets Matthen Instead physics. of laws the to only restricted kinds these that argues He realism. correspondence maintain to order is Matthen the to according is (a), Condition 206). F 2007, (ibid. (a) N)” (or E if of condition S species of member a for sense relative observer’ the re of N) state neural (or consist E experience “sense specifically world' 'the where world, physical the the specifiable, physically is experience perceptual the computa a with interface an as objective as is light visible inter The specified. physically be can it and reality the in act classificatory color the about notions distinct of two between distinction the product Remember final a only is experience it realism Matthen’s to According so? this is why is a follow experienced both are they since so is this that answer would 53 . For example if one asks why are red and violet similar Mat similar violet and red are why asks one if example For .

al discriminative capacity that relies on sensorst on relies that discriminativecapacity al ditioned)responses (Matthen, 2007,166). 28 h rsos cniin o is various its of conditions response the n (acc. to Byrne), it conveys data about data conveys it Byrne), to (acc. n presents distal feature F in the action- the in F feature distal presents action between cone cells and the the and cells cone between action ble device. If the reaction state of state reaction the If device. ble physically specifiable response response specifiable physically l objects, such as blueberry, sky, as such objects, l ory system detects in physical physical in detects system ory rity space of colours. Matthen Matthen colours. of space rity m in such a waya such in m he limitations to the specific specific the to limitations he on of the visual apparatus is is apparatus visual the of on pcrm f h vsbe light visible the of spectrum an example of the specific specific the of example an ivity of the visual system. system. visual the of ivity t receptors in the retina and and retina the in receptors t are consequently very dark dark very consequently are s reddish, the question that that question the reddish, s hat react differentially to light differingin light differentially react to hat s eas te opponent- the because is s sensory system. More More system. sensory s act that at the ends of the of ends the at that act . Following that Matthen that Following . of specifications are not not are specifications of r metamers together, together, metamers r h -Saturation- the 54 required in in required . The color The . then CEU eTD Collection hscl at aot h pyia sae f t Subjectivis it. of state physical the about facts physical processing which cannot be adjust to the physical properties physical the to adjust be cannot which processing ecie, uh s poec, codn t wih e ecie h w the perceive we which to according opponency, as such described, Figureas the part light spectrum. Visible of 5: electromagnetic reflected.green violet. to is case that closer in Green is than to s opposite the on is red 5, figure the from seen clearly be can that prism the at look we when case the not is this But green. m as experienced therefore is such as Red us. in produces system e are colours that or subjectivism, narrow the for argues Hardin The component 3.2.1 incompatibility Arguments realismagainst 3.2 I of account reasonable colordefend put try to will subjectivist objections ac first the difficulties some introduce me let Now, organ. visual observer the when and light by exposed are they when i.e., conditions; simulate cause is it and experience like internal, something is appar visual appropriate the with species on effect certain something is color which to regard with a) position the for argues real. In the same vein one might say that the taste of the chocola the of taste the that say might one vein same the In real. a Color world. physical hum the that to is correspond inadequately for experiences arguing is Hardin What 188-190). 2007, Matthen, also see 2003, is color Therefore, color. of experiences the to similar arenot words other in or violet, and green, red, with identical not are violet ex occasion that properties physical the that concludes Hardin Source: http://www.bio.miami.edu/ecosummer/lectures/lec_foodweb.htm 29 atus, as oppose to b) by which color color which by b) to oppose as atus, msl rl o te hss already thesis the on rely mostly t not a physical property (Hardin, (Hardin, property physical a not ide of the spectrum where violet violet where spectrum the of ide , which exists independently of independently exists which ,

reflects the wavelengths. As it it As wavelengths. the reflects b dsa siui n certain in stimuli distal by d eine o rd gen and green, red, of periences te does not equip us with the with us equip not does te xperiences that color-vision that xperiences ore similar to violet than to than violet to similar ore count is facing. In order to to order In facing. is count n h ojc ta hs a has that object the in colors in physical sense sense physical in colors s physical entity is not not is entity physical s l l a te appropriate the has Matthen’s realism. Matthen’s realism. orld by opponent opponent by orld n color an

CEU eTD Collection propertiesexternal objects. Althoughcome we that argues of the t might he p that wavelengths the of mixtures possible the of all between st clearly Dedrick As experience. color identical the produce 55 See 55 chapter 46) correlatefails The to the (Matthen, structure in anything content...” with 1992, of spacecontainIn t structure states “phenomenal that might194). Matthen addition system-independentclasses message This correspondproperty. some i to the to perceiver sensation conveys Color objects certainclasses. to the Matthen’stheory view the the error color that: like visi something becomes objectreflectance, perceive the can in nospecies of properties the of apparatus visual spec of experience on the ofexplanation and basis the function us show would that machinery such produce to able be might we that p physical of terms in experience color of type- property physical is color that states about they that objectivism therefore and Matthen for difficulty The formations. causal type-ide are experiences Color 1996). (Dedrick, states” sensory distinc token for responsible causally be may patterns response metamerism supports fact empirical The Metamerism 3.2.2 world (Matthen, 2007,188-190). a with identical not are green and red colour way, this in of incompatible counterparts physical no are there since then, component, r if argues Hardin As systems. perceptual opponent-processing Matthen explains the errorerrors theoryMatthen explains distal onthe ofbasis detecting in theoryThe error 3.2.3 one-to-one. latest to according Relation experience. color each to corresponds ea since typ that, with not agree not do are I 1996). (Dedrick, states are experiences neural that claims He problem. same the furt Dedrick species. different between differences the all appar visual between differences insignificant also consideration implausible quite be to seems this experience, color same the 1.3.3Metamerism .

55 acrig o hc dfeet aeegh can wavelengths different which to according , 30 roperties. Although Matthen suggests suggests Matthen Although roperties. , but how can you then explain the explain then you can how but , her argues that subjectivism faces subjectivism that argues her ates: “an indefinite number of of number indefinite “an ates: t, but type-identical, chromatic type-identical, but t, ed and green are incompatible are green and ed roduces in us sometimes even sometimes us in roduces -dnia; enhl color meanwhile e-identical; sne e ae o ae into take to have we since , ny properties in the physical the in properties ny correct way. According to According to way. correct tcl n cn ae diverse have can and ntical atus within one species and species one within atus discoveries in neurology is is neurology in discoveries ch path of neural activity activity neural of path ch message that these that message ht r component- are that s false 2007, (ibid, s stimulus or stimulus the correspondence correspondence the color in general is is general in color on assigns distal o the clear hat totally tral refore CEU eTD Collection principle of color attribution, with regard to which “’x is colore is “’x which to regard with attribution, color of principle ecpul ro, ept hri ifrnil ciiis w activities inferential her/is despite error, perceptual properties leads opposed that Matthen) the to conclusi to (as us and of the objects individual to classify something as blue is only a particular visual exparticular classifya to only visual is individual as something blue w to according principle, transparency the col for for argues argues Matthen he when inconsistent is Matthen (2008), Egan Following Arguments relative action against realism 3.2.4 somethingis and external. phenomenal not instances presentedin the thesis. col ‘canary-yellow’example the for uses Matthen 56 impor the for activity the in brain. arguments my on later and apparatus visual of function f argumentation Matthen’s between distinction the introduce me Let mer caused clearly be can it if object, physical external experie color that be it can how is expose to like would I question the experience consequently individual and stimulation electrical to w individual the account, Matthen’s Following blue. of experience the b the which, to regard with principle; transparency of thesis a get to unable clearly is this But colors. about dispositionalism Thi exportation. look thesis this named Matthen 256). 2007, (ibid. colored” appears visually something property the “is Color 257). 2007, (ibid. presents it when be to appears visually something color the is esta Matthen Secondly, attribution. color of principle fundamental the extr greater into goes Matthen But, 250). 2007, (ibid. stimuli distal generate to brain the of stimulation electrical an only even or onthe of basis explained becomponent cannot incompatibility experiences world. the and According to Therefore mistaken about the external are mislead we such we the that that follows external things cannot possess the properties the external world.in world, The image although would be conclusi as it they present something the ext Hardin subjective. states correspond the As donot to experiences on the we phenomenal color that focuscoloropinion should is character and of conclude InDedrick, onewould colorBut, might of ask outside be then us? why 1996). something my apparatus visual perform to repre the biological of fails their function

or, but, for the sake of simplicity, I try to stay to try I simplicity, of sake the for but, or, 31 ere not disrupted (Egan, 2008). The The 2008). (Egan, disrupted not ere ely by neural activation in the brain? the in activation neural by ely rain manipulation is sufficient for for sufficient is manipulation rain a flash of blue, when there is no no is there when blue, of flash a d' is true if and only if x really x if only and if true is d' the look of the specific color” color” specific the of look the ih ht s edd o an for needed is what hich long with Matthen’s early early Matthen’s with long faithful to the color ‘blue’ in nearly all nearly in ‘blue’ color the to faithful perience of aperience blue of nce is attributed to some to attributed is nce eme when he establishes he when eme or the significance of the the of significance the or sentative tasks (seesentative blishes the fundamental the blishes hose brain are exposed exposed are brain hose to have when it looks looks it when have to blue color makes a a makes color blue actually perceive. tance of the neural neural the of tance physical s sounds more like more sounds s r els. First, realism. or on that coloron that thesis of thesis ernal on 56 thing,

CEU eTD Collection physically specifiable properties--are infinitely nume infinitely properties--are specifiable physically by wavelength-sensitive receptors, they are all bind to colour to properby receptors, they are all bind wavelength-sensitive species all Since object. distal the of colour the perceive is relativized are the about colour, which exist only by vir by only exist which colour, about truths the are relativized is be t not to relativized have,as blue,The should objects such that properties ' as taken be not should defends Matthen sense the in Pluralism color. not is there that be would color, of nature real the is what question, b Mat that Following 91). 2007, least (Matthen,world” the about truths objective “at or right are both being, human than way different a appar visual honeybee’s purposes.the Althoughown its of basis the on di classifies species each that is answer His 202). 2005, (Matthen, l violate not need This experience. humans that colors the to ceded same the exactly colors pigeon to accord must “we instance For beings different if different way? color the about right is who question: the ask flower the separate not does he since perceive, apparatus visual diffe is see bees the What figures. compact have hand, other the on blossoms since pollen, collect they when bees, for important is s and circles as such forms, 'compact have that one and crosses' f 'broken have which those, to flowers segregates which bee, honey the H 90). w 2007, (ibid. not” is what out leave and on activities, own organism's focus systems perceptual actions… specialized their guide animals of kinds all to common image sensory no is “there which to Ca the to refers he that doing In beings. human the to compare as species for color of perception the describes insufficiently dispositional against argues Matthen philosophers, other many As Pluralism 3.3 Does a color-blind person perceive the world in the right way? M way? right the in world the perceive person color-blind a Does might species certain a why explains also it because that A important? so apparatus visual the of activity the is why But, colorvarious of experiences. observes kinds unlike veridical have all experienc color the from distinct is colors of experience Pigeon 32 rous... why then can both not be correct” be not both can then why rous... use the same information collected collected information same the use that perceive color in different way way different in color perceive that perceive colors in the wrong way. way. wrong the in colors perceive e of human being, but anyway anyway but being, human of e s. With regard to that Matthen that to regard With s. quares' (ibid., 2007, 40). This This 40). 2007, (ibid., quares' tual of how particular species species particular how of tual have broken forms and buds, buds, and forms broken have ccording to Matthen it seems it Matthen to ccording atthen claims that “an act of act “an that claims atthen rtesian paradigm, according paradigm, rtesian oth of us can be capturing capturing be can us of oth ism, because it seem that it it that seem it because ism, stal stimuli in its own way, own its in stimuli stal authority as we have just just have we as authority rent from what the human the what from rent ties (ibid, 2007, 188-190). 2007,188-190). (ibid, ties , which all of them use to to use them of all which , a i iprat o the for important is hat perceive the color in a a in color the perceive relativistic' application. relativistic' atus classifies things inthings classifies atus orms, such as stars and stars as such orms, just one real nature of nature real one just ogic. Properties--even Properties--even ogic. e puts the example of example the puts e then’s answer to the the to answer then’s he observers. What he observers. What CEU eTD Collection hscls i as clr osac, codn t wih objects which to according constancy, color also is physicalism the on occurs that phenomenon psychological a only is constancy Color even or objects distal the by than brain our by more tha much controlled suggest neuroscience in researches latest the this Despite the change heat to colorexposed some types when the textile the of is texture when changed, is color condition special In time. through waveleng emit they because changed, are conditions light although of One bodies. the of properties physical the by caused are color that does, Matthen as perce species different many because conclude, only external something to mistaken is it opinion my In brain adaptationThe 3.4.1 Arguments realism pluralist against 3.4 58 For 58 empirical the research see Houston and Fletc species-specificThis 57 outset of normality de and individual is deficient just in case that individual is not able to to inherent for species able individual's actions are that typical not is individual that case in just deficient is individual inher specific s some trichromatic disrupts to it since according incorrect, i.e., as do; considered humans way the in stimuli distal pige of malfunction The navigation. aerial for vision color use hand other fo of edibility the about inductions maintain to vision color use humans spe developmentally or ‘genetically either are they that evolution’ by ‘associated name functions’.guided T activities’, ‘species activities’, or ‘specialized Matthen actions what constitute of These set capacity. that a of development have Species 206). 2007, (ibid. s innate and capacities sensory between mismatch no is there now theref that argues and 206), 2007, (ibid. time” the of most equilibrium c the of apparatus visual “most that assumes Matthen color. of shade certain a detect cannot the when or conditions light unusual or weak the class The objects. of features unobservable different concerning for used is classification color words, other In 206). 2007, (Matthen, aid” functispecialized adisrupts it wrongif is classification

ficiency is accordancein with Neander's, conc1983 her, 1940 andher,1940 McGilvray,J.A. (1994). 33 57 on that the classification is supposed to supposed isclassification the that on cified’ (ibid. 2007, 205). For instance, For 205). 2007, (ibid. cified’ . ive the same thing. Experiences thing. same the ive nl atos f ien. An pigeons. of actions ently t our perception of color is is color of perception our t ification can be disrupted in in disrupted be can ification hey are ‘innate’ hey the sense are in h fmu agmns for arguments famous the species are in evolutionary evolutionary arein species 58 ensorily guided activities” activities” guided ensorily prpitl prom the perform appropriately are colored as constant constant as colored are eption. . th of certain proportion proportion certain of th changed. For instance instance For changed. by our sensory organs. sensory our by s as ‘innate sensorily sensorily ‘innate as s ore “for most species species most “for ore od, pigeons on the the on pigeons od, ons that categorize categorize that ons making inductions inductions making cheme, would be be would cheme, ai o photo- of basis s betv and objective is ertain species species ertain ih the with CEU eTD Collection the the of blurring starlight caused by the atmosphere ada as known is technique mapping system laser A 59 always red looks 6). figure (see paper the on written 5 number the example For colored. as numbers people which to according synaesthesia, color-grapheme is common generall is C# instance For color. red of experience the and F# sound in sensations experience they it to response in F#, note musical s are they although is, that idiosyncrasies; certain a with made first (1880) Galton Francis color. of nature i the about the realism presents synaesthesia opinion my In case. the always not terms physical in detects system sensory a what describe ‘physicallyspeci experienceis color Matthen Accordingto ofsynaesthesiaThe case 3.4.2 at arrive we world, 2005). colors” (Williams, same the share all we since and world, the in color that show experiments These perception. color calibratorof evi direct is “this that states Williams contacts. by caused color lens, normal the in change the experienced They them. using longer contact the wearing of affect the reported volunteers' ended i Prize Bressler’sa Williams brings that part amazing w people, way same right the ‘in colors see the to tend color specific the of Insunglasses contacts. colored the without or normally, like felt later or sooner they lens, contact colored wearing were t Volunteers specified. time the at day a people hours four for contacts several experiment latest William’s to According the with published Wisconsin of College Medical the at Science Visual a optics medical of professor (2005), Williams David receptors. detail topogra the out maps that system laser a of basis the On de color of experience the that functioning the apparatus. visual brain than of the suggests made he that experiment 59 Williams and Hofer (2005) had a direct access to the photoreceptive cells i the to photoreceptive cells access and Hofer a (2005) direct had Williams il Clr ecpin s o i te y o te eodr It's Beholder: the of Eye the in Not Is Perception Color title

(Williams, 2005). ptive optics, and was originally used by astronomer by used originally was and optics, ptive

34 n vision science is that when experiment when that is science vision n timulated by one modality, such as as such modality, one by timulated ” (Matthen, 2007, 199). But this is this But 199). 2007, (Matthen, ” fiable’, i.e. “it is always possible to to always possible is “it i.e. fiable’, h o te ne ee n exquisite in eye inner the of phy ec fr n nenl automatic internal, an for dence were obliged to wear colored colored wear to obliged were way’ after some time. But, the But, time. some after way’ ended to report that while they while that report to ended nd director of the Center for for Center the of director nd the article in Science Daily Daily Science in article the is defined by our experience bydefined our is prat ruet against argument mportant multiple modalities, that is is that modalities, multiple they perceived the world world the perceived they vision that was primarily was that vision ‘looks’ green, whereas 2 whereas green, ‘looks’ a description of people, of description a y reported as blue. More blue. as reported y the same definition of of definition same the although they were no no were they although experience letters and and letters experience s in telescopes to compensate forcompensate to telescopes in s pends more on the the on more pends n h Brain the In hen wearing the the wearing hen n the retina. The . CEU eTD Collection be for green. redwill the that letter, instance than ti through stable remains associations color the of perception brain are not autonomous, but evidently they have overlapping functions. functions. overlapping have they evidently but autonomous, not are brain brain. the of locations different the at concurrently processed t travel which impulses, nerve into translated are Stimuli brain.

61 The cross-activation is the result of the cross the of result the is cross-activation The 61 In philosophy 60 of mind athis strongis argument occurs as the consequence of ‘cross-wiring’ in the brain the in ‘cross-wiring’ of consequence the as occurs r pluralistic Matthen’s against argument the as Synaesthesia etr s e, u te te a gen Dy 20) I adto repo addition In 2001). (Day, green as other the but red, as letter one that so synaesthetes, between inconsistency are there although Hubbard, and (Ramachandran, association” memory high-level a not and is “synaesthesia that show to supposed is experiment simple (Ramachandra 2 numbers the from design shape the see to more ta it meanwhile picture, the on triangle of shape the perceive recognize normal by numbers perceive synaesthetes numbers Since right. of the on perception synaesthetes the shows 6 Figure The Source: http://www.lurj.org/article.php/vol2n1/synesthesia.xml right). lef the (on non-synaesthetes of numbers the of Perception 6: Figure erlgcl netgtos hw ht nomto ta i sn fo thal from send is that information that show investigations neurological fr information of transformation linear old the to opposite view the that that is alsothein fusiform. The method used fM is

wiring between the ‘number grapheme area’ in the fu the in area’ grapheme ‘number the between wiring R R brainimaging (Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2003). againstfunctionalism. 35 60 . The ‘cross-activation theory’ ‘cross-activation The . a genuine sensory phenomenon phenomenon sensory genuine a me (Baron-Cohen et al., 1993), al., et (Baron-Cohen me Moreover these locations in the the in locations these Moreover ealism is important because it it because important is ealism kes several seconds or even even or seconds several kes n eti clr hy easily they color certain in n & Hubbard, 2001). This This 2001). Hubbard, & n t) and synaesthetes (on the the (on synaesthetes and t) te hlms Te new The thalamus. the o rts show that it is higher higher is it that show rts might perceive a certain a perceive might siform gyrus and the ‘color area V4’ area ‘color the and gyrus siform om visual organ to the the to organ visual om 2001). Synaesthetes Synaesthetes 2001). o te et and left the on r hs significant This ms s rather is amus

61 is CEU eTD Collection particularcharacter that hasit(Ramachandran, and and a qualeand ofshape,which the is responsible for the the blueberry,her/hisconsciousness experience has bystimulated does matter sensory not it which organs. importantly ones. Most neural certain by produced qualia are such as colors Therefore a systems visual F the of properties. function between neural correlation systematic certain by explained and with correlated experi Color activity. neural of total the on depend qualia 62 Qualia are the 62 ‘raw feels’ of experienconscious ie rs t te ‘qualia’ the to rise gives othe (and sensory the in neurons of activity the that shows consequence 62 Acrig o erlgss aahnrn n Hrti (1997) Hirstein and Ramachandran neurologists to According .

the square the appearance of the blueberry.Qualia give ce; i.e.,ce; the redness of red, thepainfulness of pa Hirstein, 1997). atleast two qualia, a qualeof(sing.) color that 36 in,and etc. For instance when one imagine responsible is for sensation the of redness, nd paths of neural activity. activity. neural of paths nd ences or qualia is therefore is qualia or ences ciiy we nuos are neurons when activity, loig ht hr i no is there that ollowing human consciousexperience the r areas) in the brain the in areas) r CEU eTD Collection believe that it is caused by neural activity in the brain tha brain the in activity neural by caused is it that believe surfac or light as such features, physical external of basis ex color that mentalism with agree I quale. a as treated be problem of metamerism, we should not count the visible part of th of part visible the count not should we metamerism, of problem color real,following: is as seems o be what to work the been this in us with exte by explained be cannot and correspond not does too this but brain, According to mentalism color is subjective, internal or individual e individual or internal subjective, is color mentalism to According if at only all, activity neural to the in brain. s color shows neurology in experiments different and synaesthesia of instea apparatus, visual cranial) (extra the in processes the eliminativis of type the with particular in disagree I on. so wavelengths having as instance for language, quantitative own its different of consists it saythat should we Rather colored. as incompati of thesis the to regard With apparatus. visual our within easi be can color of experience addition, In achromatic. merely that states subjectivism, of species being Eliminativism, independently of the perceiver. as color and colored not are objects physical answer: sketchy f my be will which of later the mentalism, and eliminativism subjectiv major two explain me let so color, about subjectivist relati the be there can how and is distinction the what subjective, the by explained be might experiences te Perhaps disappearing. is perception, color of basis the as proposed traditionally the particular, In facts. physical quantitative ‘ by explained completely are that experiences psychological of terms other the on Subjectivism light. visible of fluctuation about facts explai to tries hand one the on Physicalism it. describe to try term in worlds two between divided be to seems color of nature The The4 final verdict: ascolor subjective nenl qatttv-ulttv; n explanatory-non-explanatory. pair and following quantitative-qualitative; the internal; to according classified be can distinction The 37 e structure of the object. However, I However, object. the of structure e bet d nt ae oo, .. are i.e. color, have not do objects perience cannot be explained on the the on explained be cannot perience d of the neural activity. As the case the As activity. neural the of d m that reduces color experience to to experience color reduces that m sa uhpyia ett. am I entity. physical such as is t values, which can be described in in described be can which values, anthropocentric’ and cannot be be cannot and anthropocentric’ such does not exist externally orexternally exist not does such correlation with external facts, facts, external with correlation n color on the basis of physical physical of basis the on color n physical neural activity in the in activity neural physical e positions of color perception: perception: color of positions e uu t te on o almost of point the to nuous nl ufruaey somewhat unfortunately inal, ly reduced to the processes processes the to reduced ly e spectrum electromagnetic e of 650 nm, or 735 nm, and nm, 735 or nm, 650 of tries to describe color in in color describe to tries on between them? I am a a am I them? between on xperience. As such it can can it such As xperience. ensation can be reduced, be can ensation l cmoet ad the and components ble o cnrs: external- contrast: of s s of which theoreticians which of s h qeto ta has that question The rnal physical facts. facts. physical rnal bjective or color as bjective as or color CEU eTD Collection perceivers experience a given secondary quality in different in quality secondary given a experience perceivers

words when it is manifested in our mind as red. It does not matter matter not does It red. as mind our in manifested is it when words t produces it if only and if red is object an Locke, to According Lockean of dispositionalism. version f me let Therefore, chapter. next the in rejected completely thes dependency of depe perceiver is color which to according version, dispositionalist stage second the while object, the of disposition quali secondary as color that indicates thesis dependency perce of stage a on depends not does and depends the simultaneously be quality secondary cannot It inconsistent. is dispositionalism dual terminologic that Locke’s conclusion chapter, second the in explained is it As ofRejectiondispositionalism physicalism and 4.1 thatintroduce seems againstbe the to dispositionalism argument relate yel and green, red, as described be can that color the experience Alt world. external the of independent experience color of example be could hallucination of case the lead, his following So, 237). 1994, (Robinson, ext the of independently exist obviously They hallucinations. as non-v such for his within account no has “realist the that asserts vi in manifested is it whenever exists, it there; actually is worl this in something possible or potential merely not is color that Iclaim Moreover, exists, ontologically is, there that means irr perhaps and mind-dependent are they although real, are numbers Fo entities. neural i.e. physical, some to reducible and dependent objectivecolor. color of experience the between distinction The 63 As opposed to objectivism I do not think that subjective color subjective that think not do I objectivism to opposed As denotes or some mental entity a quale. more be to seems it opinion my in world, the in entities mental t argues re can ‘color’ word the eliminativism to which according Whereas mental. subjectivism, of strand mentalist to inclined more

and color as the feature on the object can be best best be can object the on feature the as color and 38 te f erl ciiy Robinson activity. neural of rtue ways, since each of them is right right is them of each since ways, cs n h agmns against arguments the on ocus disposition of the object, but it but object, the of disposition 63 is unreal because it is mind- is it because unreal is r instance, one might say that that say might one instance, r he idea of red in us; in other in us; in red of idea he plausible to believe that it that believe to plausible al problems suggested the the suggested problems al ty is a physical property or or property physical a is ty ndent. The first one will be will one first The ndent. o ad t. e m now me Let etc. and low hough I hallucinate, I still still I hallucinate, I hough fer neither to physical nor physical to neither fer educible. The term ‘real’ ‘real’ term The educible. hat color is something something is color hat d to hallucination. d to 2002). (Boghossian, d ecie a sbetv clr and color subjective as described rdcl phenomena”, eridical ra pyia world physical ernal s ons o strict a to points is ae ht oo as color that case whether different different whether vr Te first The iver. taken as an an as taken CEU eTD Collection photoreceptors. For an example, please look at the figure 7, first 7, figure the at look please example, an For photoreceptors. , dispositionalism does not tell us what us does tell the actual not perceptions, color-propert dispositionalism projection of one’s eyes” (Boghossian and Velleman, 1989, 87). projectioneyes” (Boghossian of 1989,87). one’sVelleman, and Figure responses Afterimage 7: and on the then right. the white object the first the one,since isit perfectly explainedby s Boghossian 64 and Velleman (1989) do not distinguis bu wa h prevs Hwvr ee i te ae ih aot ( about right are they if even However, perceives. he what about mgs o o se t b dsoiin o smtig xenl bt mor but external, something or dispositions be to seem not do images for problem The afterwards. object white the at look we when greenafter-ima a produce object colored red the atStaring Source: http://www.wellesley.edu/Neuroscience/Faculty_page/Conway

ipstoaim s facing is dispositionalism interesting the present (1989) Velleman and Boghossian Further, problems. its without view not is such causes that wavelength specific a has it that but red, a be (or to has a need object disposition donot thanare. We experiences say to the descri are wavelengths Different explanatory. not are qualities se or such as empirical opinion my In is. experience whereas explanatory, disposition that argue might dispositionalists The 64 Te eaie fe-mg i cue b oesiuain of overstimulation by caused is after-image negative The .

cience. hbetween negative and positiveafter-image.In the 39 ge or the opposite color experience, color opposite the or ge and such experience. But this later later this But experience. such and facts do not show that secondary that show not do facts dispositionalism is that after- that is dispositionalism ptive in a different language language different a in ptive at the red object on the left left the on object red the at problem of after-images after-images of problem discussion Iwill merelyfocus on condary quality is not not is quality condary hi rsetv) color respective) their /science.htm /science.htm e like “a figment or or figment “a like e y of the object is.

ppear to be) be) ppear to CEU eTD Collection by our Figure 7) that the object on the left has a disposition to produce to exp the object a onthe disposition left has by Figure 7) the that our processes in our eyes. Magenta cannot be found in the beam of white l white of beam the in found be cannot Magenta eyes. our in processes rdc a eti eprec i u, u as o te tutr o our of structure the on also but us, in experience certain a produce perc normal that a not is being human true, is this say if But, perceiver. would Dispositionalist not? or perceiver in color emit produce that objects the Do way. different a in color perceive is true more precise definition should be given. It should include the include should It given. be should definition precise more true is criticism Velleman’s and Boghossian from independent rejoinder, own pe same the in colors different produce can object same the that dis The brain. his/her of product the all, after is, after-image ob having person the without produced be cannot after-image Although ht s aet clr Ta i de o h fc ta after-imag that fact the to due is That color. magenta is that gre of perception the Moreover observer. the in experience green therefore and Acc wavelengths of proportion certain a well. emits usually as physicalism for situation unpleasant an is This B?experience experienceA, the the object color of of objec the that case the be it can how Besides it. perceive we perce primarily we color the of saturation the on depends image not is This afterwards. object white perceive we when green of ide the produces it if onlyand if red is object an way: following of definition official the change would This right. the on object the in oo eprec truh ie n h sm prevr n hw t i it how and perceiver same the in time through experience color e dispositionalists the how of question the raise might one addition In i theall Therefore colorscolor it the the spectrum. in product is and of the brain that is getting older. So, the does not depend only on the dispo the on only depend not does vision color the So, older. getting is that appa visual in change the of because but object, the in change some of produce to disposition exp color case this In a perceiver? the in shade has color different object same the that be it can how slightly a in world the perceive people older The time. col through that fact scientific is it Moreover color. as light UV the can be the case that is independent of the external physical external the of independent is that case the be can ap visual the of structure the on depends experience color that shows 40 object. Since I refuse that visual visual that refuse I Since object. erience does not change because because change not does erience positionalist can go on to claim to on go can positionalist or vision changes in perceiver perceiver in changes vision or t A produces besides the color the besides produces A t UV light have dispositions to to dispositions have light UV eiver, since he cannot perceive cannot he since eiver, more yellow color shade. So, So, shade. color yellow more e is created by the opponent opponent the by created is e idea the produces and red of a rig o hscls object physicalism to ording rceiver. Let me here offer my my offer here me Let rceiver. ive, light conditions and time and conditions light ive, should produce a red and not not and red a produce should always the case, since after- since case, the always n ass h after-image the causes en possibility (made vivid vivid (made possibility in the same conditions conditions same the in paratus and moreover it it moreover and paratus s that different species species different that s it does in the normal normal the in does it xplain the variability of variability the xplain iul paau. That apparatus. visual dispositionalism in the in dispositionalism . In my opinion, if this if opinion, my In . ight that is made up of up made is that ight ratus of the perceiver the of ratus served some object, object, some served sition object has to has object sition erience of greenerience of s subjective.s CEU eTD Collection ro ta te ipe da ae o awy drvd rm h corr the from derived always not are ideas simple the that proof ecie hm Te pcrm f h ojcie ocle color so-called objective the of spectrum The them. perceive wavelengths does not corresponds to the structure of the spectrum of of spectrum the of structure the to corresponds not does wavelengths str the since su false is objectivism that for concludes who (1988), Hardin argumentation My objects. of surfaces of properties than the are they that suggests This incompatibilityshows). component objective the moreove about fact physical the resemble other; not do and constant each to relations complex in stand colors Subjective (Hume, 1965,4). that opinion of be will but few are there believe I senses? never had it tho’ shade, particular that of idea the himself to up suppl to imagination, own his from him, for possible plac’d ‘tis whether be one, single that except colour, that of shades different particular one excepting kinds, all of colours with acquainted well years thirty for sight his enjoyed have to person a ... “Suppose light. the by observed be might it than way different a in other each prese it because interesting is example His shade. missing subjective as color for speaking example quoted often and clear A Colors asqualia 4.2 Har with agree I subjective intrinsic, them. for that perceive each individual addition, In mental. such as is it and activity color color, of perception the for role primary the has apparatus appeal to qualia in their work work their in qualia to appeal Rama sensations color different among distinguishing of purpose the psyc and philosophy in used widely nowadays is “qualia” term The introduced4.2.1 Qualia categorizat their colors, our RGBimplement system. or trichromatic subjective of spectrum the to correspond of measurements our of basis the on made we that classifications

Three laws of qualia: what neurology tells us about the the about us tells neurology what qualia: of laws Three 41 nts subjective colors as related to to related as colors subjective nts he can; and this may serve as a a as serve may this and can; he , and to have become perfectly perfectly become have to and , color spectrum of the beam of beam the of spectrum color been conveyed to him by his his by him to conveyed been is the final product of neural of product final the is product of our brain, rather brain, our of product y this deficiency, and raise raise and deficiency, this y colors (as the thesis of the of thesis the (as colors i (98 ta clr are colors that (1988) din shade of blue ... Let all the all Let ... blue of shade jciim olw Larry follows bjectivism ucture of the spectrum of of spectrum the of ucture the wavelengths do not not do wavelengths the eoe i .. o ask, Now ... him before hology. For instance, for for instance, For hology. is Hume’s example of a of example Hume’s is sodn impressions” espondent s, their relations and and relations their s, o ad eain that relations and ion hnrn n Hirstein and chandran tee eain are relations these r the colors as we we as colors the CEU eTD Collection people say ‘color’. people say ‘color’. gree blue, as them describes s/he objects, at looks perceiver philosophical one. Despite this their work is significant for phi for significant is work their this Despite one. philosophical 65 Jackson’s 65 ingenious‘Mary’ scenario (seeJackson vn ute. ee s pzl I id neetn. e oie t noticed We interesting. find I puzzle a is Here further. even c never can c example thought wetheir opinion my In seems 1997). Hirstein, and (Ramachandran, it which color the of experience actual “that conclude: (1997) Hirstein and Ramachandran ‘red’. feel to is how color about results complete has he Although vision. color of laws completely now he that concludes He produced. is experience way the photo eye, the study of the makes super-scientist Finally,the hd o clr Sil sprsinit a n ie t wa the what to idea no has super-scientist Still, color. of shade pre would individual wavelength, certain a reflects object the and a points he when that, realizes super-scientist research his nam and object an perceives one when brain humans’ the examine to is that gray; of shades different in looks everything scientist w that observes and color, call people n phenomenon his the about by curious is and planet another from came who super-scientist ab investigation empirical an offer they quoted work the In 1997). (Ramach synaesthesia and syndrome, Bonnet Charles scotomas, visual l experiences the qualia of example an as put (1997) Hirstein Ram malfunction. to seems consciousness which in syndromes neurological consciousness of functions biological xeiet xml; eidn oe f h cascl ay thought Mary classical the of one reminding example; experiment Ramachandran by presented is qualia of existence possible The the traditional philosophicalare approach private qualia ineffable, In 1997). Hirstein, and (Ramachandran memory short-term in endure regulation the in involved states brain non-conscious to contrast in and decision a make merely cannot we that means which experienced, that they possess possess they that differ are “qualia that argue Hirstein and Ramachandran qualia. specific functional characteristics” (ibid. 1997) Qualia are irreversibl are Qualia 1997) (ibid. characteristics” functional

,1986). (1997). The term is often used in the cases of of cases the in used often is term The (1997). 42 t the objects in the presence of light light of presence the in objects the t -pigment cells, neural events, and events,neural cells, -pigment from black to white. He decides decides He white. to black from inked to temporal lobe epilepsy, lobe temporal to inked wavelength correspond when when correspond wavelength , r e, t. u, o super- for But, etc. red, or n, and Hirstein’s (1997) thought (1997) Hirstein’s and ent from other brain states in in states brain other from ent losophical discussions about discussions losophical , and intrinsic. and intrinsic. , scribe to the object specific specific object the to scribe ature monochromic. He is is He monochromic. ature ne t super-scientist” to onvey hat the contrast between between contrast the hat experiment out ‘qualia’ rather than a a than rather ‘qualia’ out of seeing apples as blue, blue, as apples seeing of es it in a certain color. In color. certain a in it es vision, he cannot know know cannot he vision, addition, according to to according addition, andran, and Hirstein, and andran, nesad al the all understands hen a normal color color normal a hen of behavior, qualia qualia behavior, of s h pr o the of part the is an be developed developed be an achandran and and achandran 65 Iaie a Imagine . e once once e CEU eTD Collection product of something physical. I do not support the idea of causal c causal of idea the support not do I physical. something of product stat clearly Silby up. set not is brain the within pattern representational, and posses’ only contents such as ‘red’, ‘blue’ ‘red’, as such contents only posses’ and representational, c and intrinsic are qualia or experiences color that believe I ofThecolor nature 4.3 -quale Ilove as love. long in am not it how know cannot I instance for to, how knowledge possess to like more such, as color of experience the have to like is it what know neura of terms in characterized indirectly and partly be might b I dualism. for argue I activity, neural to connection causal a have structure processing neural appropriate an missing is he since is it how know cannot super-scientist So, 1998). (Silby, brain” the input sensory the of weight synaptic the perceiver, normal a in ic h de nt ae htrcpos eeoe fr oo vso, n the and vision, color for developed photoreceptors have not does he since i what know cannot scientist above presented example thought the In specifica qualitative character experienceas such. color of such that seems it time) through change even and other obse different of apparatus visual (since color of shade certain or in emit object wavelength what specification a make can exam shade Hume’s missing explain cannot super-scientist our negative, then answer an await should we Here “between”? of sense what in And But, does the correlate of the 14the of correlate the does But, stands that one the as it imagine can I missing. be always has tutr sfiinl fn gand o ti ts? ups, si Suppose, and blue, of task? shades recognizable 18 are there this that caricature, for grained fine sufficiently structure question interesting givenmissing shadea of at the of leastbasis scientist neural locate an Here experience. visual our of i structure roughly structure neural a spectrum, visible the of structure exist, might there So, channel. neural (red-green)same the in ext the to correspond green and red instance, for seen, colors the in r correspond do channel neural the in oppositions the But, seen. colors the co not do range) visible in shortest the vs. longest (the wavelengths th stand exactly ‘between’ the correlate of the 13the of correlate the ‘between’ exactly stand 43 es that “whenever color is experienced is color “whenever that es der to produce in the perceiver a a perceiver the in produce to der ategorical, not dispositional nor dispositional not ategorical, to brain, perceiver’s in activity l that in my experiences the 14the experiences my in that after all a neural correlate of the the of correlate neural a all after one has to possess qualia. It is is It qualia. possess to has one between the 13the between , ‘yellow’, etc. Although color color Although etc. ‘yellow’, , Dsie h fc ta qualia that fact the Despite . oopi t te qualitative the to somorphic reactivates the color label in label color the reactivates rver might differ from each each from differ might rver piyn t te on of point the to mplifying a given color? Iscolor? neural given the a for someone to see colors, colors, see to someone for rrespond to the contrast in in contrast the to rrespond reme values of excitation of values reme rss cud u super- our could arises: elieve that qualia are the the are qualia that elieve tion cannot describe the the describe cannot tion from neurologist. If it is it If neurologist. from s like to experience red, experience to like s losure. Although qualia qualia Although losure. oughly to the ones the to oughly is to feel to be in in be to feel to is ple. Although he specific neural neural specific th and the 15the and th and 15and th th th ? ? .

CEU eTD Collection possess two types of red-green and Mary is a is Mary and blindness color red-green of types two possess perceives color in the opposite wayperceives than color normal the observer opposite in pro without not is view this But, representatively. and phenomenally chara phenomenological the reduce impossible is it that follows but different, is such as quale The red. as not and green as object differe have they since case, the not is this But, quale. similar should that they Therefore, thing. same the seems about therefore are and content, it and way, same the in colors seems of It shades object. different the of color red the perceive they that claim invert has Fred object. red a observe Fred and Mary instance, For 66 The example 66 of color inverted perceiver wasalre netoaim vis hs rbe b dsrbn qai i two in qualia describing by problem this avoids but intentionalism awareness, our to object physical Sinc red the experience. of perceptual experience of explanation the provides it that of consequence positive The 2007). (Nickel, content” their in differ they diffe perceiver this of experiences two if perception, visual a for “necessarily, is: intentionalism of definition strict The intentionalism. representative character is qualia describe to seems that view One objects? the on somewhere ex like something simultaneously are pain and color that be it can headache,thew to location the I wayprescribe sameas the in in or object the on is it as metaphor) you this prefer if it, loca the prescribe I Moreover, headache. the as way same the in rather but aft or red world, of experience the instance, For external internal. something the in located not is pain, like Color, i objects external classify more is likely Color individual. pain.like to and categories to only serves world external the of features the about information the convey propertie physical to connection causal some have experiences xeiet gis itninls cnen te osblt o a of possibility the concerns intentionalism against experiment

ady presented Locke. by 44 66 front of my eyes, when I close them, them, Iclose when eyes, my of front . single perceiver, and restricted to to restricted and perceiver, single r in their phenomenal character, phenomenal their in r er-image of green is in our mind mind our in is green of er-image hich is at the forehead. But, how But,forehead. the at is hich to the object outside of me, me, of outside object the to te pcfc a fr each for way specific the n tion to color (or projection of of projection (or color to tion . Qualia or color experiences experiences color or Qualia . normal perceiver. They both both They perceiver. normal that they both discriminate discriminate both they that experiences have the same same the have experiences t ula Fe osre the observes Fred qualia. nt s of the object, they do not not do they object, the of s color-inverted person, who who person, color-inverted ed color spectrum, since he since spectrum, color ed as having phenomenal and and phenomenal having as w d nt srb the ascribe not do we e the content is the same. It same. the is content the periences and are located located are and periences cter of experience to its its to experience of cter it is a mental entity or or entity mental a is it different ways that is is that ways different blems. Famous thought thought Famous blems. also have the same or or same the have also the intentionalism is intentionalism the CEU eTD Collection between what is significant and what is beside the point, and is and point, the beside is what and significant is what between m something into it translates and information the organizes brain being consciously collaborate in a process. Sensation occurs when when occurs Sensation process. a in collaborate consciously being e sd necagal i eeya lnug, hy r dist are they language, psychophysics to processes.According everyday in interchangeable used be background Kuehni, 2005,30). p. genetic and society, (know-how), experiences w the of perception the expectancy perceptual to regard With youmight begin seeto things thein painting that reall not and painting a at look might one E.g., 69 For example68 -students the in class should focus Psychophysics 67 is the study of how stimuphysical that by the selective attention and perceptual expectancy. Acc expectancy. perceptual and attention selective the by that terminology. my clarify me Let are Colors causeda sensation or certain qualia by Characterization: following: characterization the precisely More something. turn in cause ep nearly are qualia whether open it leave I activity. neural qualia are they specifically more subjective, are Colors it so color, of shades p historical the to solution following the propose I subjectivism. certain being of properties have obje of objects thesis the to similar is That ‘being red’. of ‘is that property something the then sense, qualitative in real is ‘red’ wi been has that philosophy in problem old an to pass me Let be which indicateargument going.to my the direction would in and long the of beginning the just is this that aware am I content. into neural impulses and send them to the brain. From here on follows t follows on here From brain. the to them send and impulses neural into recep sensory and environment the in stimulus distal a from energy process active and passive between distinction The senses. the da the understanding and systematizing, picking, of perce process active meanwhile brain; the to and body the into world exterior the distinguished from perception. Although sensation and perception seem t seem perception and sensation Although perception. from distinguished

Sensation youwere unablesee to before. y understand the message the artist is trying to co to trying is artist the message the understand y on whaton teachers the are saying. li areli translated intopsychological experience. 67 a sensation is the passive route of bringing data fromofdata bringingroute passive the is sensation a as such should be, and in philosophy routinely is, is, routinely philosophy in and be, should such as 45

or sensation and are caused by the the by caused are and sensation or iphenomenal or whether they do do they whether or iphenomenal 69 tvs, ih ead o which to regard with ctivism, th us since Aristotle’s time. If time. Aristotle’s since us th f ecpin f oo i the is color of perception of ording to that one distinguish one that to ording orld is a function of our past our of function a is orld

Glsen 20, e also see 2002, (Goldstein, roblem of the nature of color. of nature the of roblem e’ a t b acie to ascribed be to has red’ influenced by motivationby influenced is made by the necessity of of necessity the by made is complex debate, but I hope hope I but debate, complex nvey. But, if someone tells you about it, about you tellssomeone if But, nvey. inct, but complementary complementary but inct, ta brought to the brain by by brain the to brought ta eaningful. The brain does does brain The eaningful. em a het o my to threat a seams tors convert this energy this convert tors to i dfnd s the as defined is ption esr ogn absorb organs sensory he perception; i.e., the i.e., perception; he neural activity. neural activity. o be terms that can can that terms be o 68 . CEU eTD Collection physiology and neurology. The empirical research illustrates illustrates research empirical The neurology. and physiology since color and pain are individual-bound, subjective, and as such, indepe such, as and subjective, individual-bound, are pain and color since beginning very the presents pain and color between distinction The description his of is colorargument as analogous for pain. to subjectivism to order in perceiver the in manifested be to has color of idea thesi dependency of stage second his in found be can that for argument f in is he that shows reading careful the but dispositionalist, in is instance, for Locke, chapter. second the to me brings This overall interpreted. mistakenly na the about question the answer to try that theories the from miia fcs icvrd n ifrn fed aot h color the about fields different in discovered facts empirical fir the In approach. scientific the of use make to tried have I what the relation explain betweensensation of and color, acti neural should qualia definit addition, In given. be should definition strict more that think I stat different the with cope to us helps language different philosophy the in question hard the to solution the also present might worthissubjectivism of versionbroad this In opinion, mysensation. physical the include that versions broader not subjectivism, narrow ar subjectivism against arguments the Furthermore background. in kept s that and neurology of field the in done investigations latest the use phil that are study my during noticed I that things basic Two Summaryconclusionand hasexperienceare a has qualitati perceiver the since that real, the ow o my In perception. of specialty and her/his activity neural apparatus, on depend qualia since ‘solipsisti way, own idiosyncratic) her/his dramatically, in world the perceives individual An qualia. pr in role basic the plays activity Neural activity. neural of stimulations the of products bare are They all. at external not do see we which by qualia, view my w to According claims. which nicely by but see, we what not are experiences opinion my In 46 es, such as physical and mental. But, But, mental. and physical as such es, oducing phenomenal experiences or or experiences phenomenal oducing act subjectivist about color. The The color. about subjectivist act osophers of mind mainly do not not do mainly mind of osophers our visual apparatus that cause that apparatus visual our the problem of color perception perception color of problem the pinion phenomenal experiences experiences phenomenal pinion ture of the color and might be be might and color the of ture t hpe I rsn te latest the present I chapter st general taken to have been a a been have to taken general exist. Further, the important important the Further, exist. ve character of red. ve character of red. of treating color as qualia, as color treating of vision, such as physics, physics, as such vision, e see, as Hatfield (2007) (2007) Hatfield as see, e y of deeper study, since it it ysincestudy, deeper of ubjectivism seems to be to seems ubjectivism correspond to anything anything to correspond facts as the causes of of causes the as facts s, according to which, to according s, ’ o, o u i less it put to (or, c’ n structure of visual visual of structure n ion I propose for the for propose I ion of mind. The idea of idea The mind. of e mainly against the against mainly e

ndent of physical of ndent vity is. vity is. CEU eTD Collection . In my opinion, neural activity in the in activity neural opinion, my In perception. of philosophy arefaste weSo, one-to-onerelation. reality in physical brute the error the in believe to reason good a provides This presented. nhooeti dfnto o clr mc mr srosy anthropocent seriously more (much color of definition anthropocentric Therefore, color. of shade specific the senses that individual each acti neural the of path the since individual; each for unique sense Neur subjective. is it individual-bound, is color of sensation the Since bodies.) and classification external of the sense this in qualia (Also, qualia. of existence the for arguments t moreover and color of sensation and activity neural of explanation cons a suggest arguments Both general. in philosophy the in discussed synaesthes of case the and adaptation, brain the is activity the for arguments known well the of One role. primary the plays us s other thesis the In green. not and violet to opposite is red which to different of spectrum physical the for hold not does this but green, ma not do the sensations is red of sensation instance, For wavelengths. among distance color between hold that similarity and contrast r by I introduced was that physicalism incompatibility, component against the i.e., argument; argument the As realism. of thesis subjec nature its by is color whether question the answer to order functioning of importance the and realism of idea Matthen’s refute a properties of kind what show to try I chapter, third my In Lockeas subjectivist. be can read of quality the as sense derivative in merely and idea as denoted Locke C subjectivist. is that support argument the for The the is denomination objec physical the of properties the as or world external ap colors that only is pain and color between distinction The world. to classificatory model of visual apparatus, since it does not ha not does it since apparatus, visual of model classificatory to objec I subjective as colors of explanation the provide to order In misl the have, physical need to like would world often we that but or positively us equip not to fails only not it although real, is that something as 47 ts, while pain is located in the body. body. the in located is pain while ts, ning to our sensation of the world the of sensation our to ning re colors as subjective and try to to try and subjective as colors re a ht em nt o ae been have to not seems that ia brain that causes sensations in in sensations causes that brain fruae h wl known well the eformulate ve such significance for the the for significance such ve play the role of recognition recognition of role the play ory. We cannot perceive the the perceive cannot We ory. opposite to the sensation of sensation the to opposite vation might be different in different be might vation tive I investigate Matthen’s Matthen’s investigate I tive t to Matthen’s commitment Matthen’s to t with all the information in information the all with the object. I conclude that that conclude I object. the of the visual apparatus. In apparatus. visual the of wavelengths, with regard regard with wavelengths, hey provide the empirical the provide hey significant role of neural neural of role significant age o te strongly the for argue I pear to be placed in the the in placed be to pear al activity is in the same same the in is activity al adn Rltos of Relations Hardin. iderable role for the for role iderable mlr xmls are examples imilar c poiiy and proximity tch i ta te one the than ric olor is primarily olor is eads us. CEU eTD Collection perceiver). I conclude that that conclude I perceiver). par physical relates merely who Hilbert, David by proposed philosophical landscape” (Hatfield, landscape” philosophical 2007). the into philosophers, astute observationally of or psychologists,

n staig h dmi o te hnmnl ihn lre ntrl c natural, larger a within phenomenal the of domain the situating and integrating fact, natural a as phenomenal the acknowledge should Ha As activity. brain of terms in phenomenal of explanation future term in either real, something as phenomenal the accept should we phenom the of existence the subsume might science in development stay to and investigating on keep to is way right The gravitation. to us lead not should attraction gravitational in research further of of rejection a demand not should properties phenomenal of understanding t I day. one succeed will it hope I and problem mind-body the to philosoph in problem hard the to answer the give to has activity qual as treated is color which to according view, subjectivist The the brain. phenomena of kinds all for argues subjectivism such as and sensation pl brain Our organs. sensory different by caused be might wi sensation agrees it and hallucinations, of existence the for allows view oo i te esto cue b a eti nua activity. neural certain a by caused sensation the is color 48 ameters to the human subject, the subject, human the to ameters y of mind that is the solution the is that mind of y ir descriptions of the mental, mental, the of descriptions ir open-minded, since further since open-minded, tfield puts it, “philosophers it, puts tfield ia or the product of neural neural of product the or ia th the idea that the color color the that idea the th hink that the gaps in our our in gaps the that hink enal. That is why I think think I why is That enal. s of dualism or of some of or dualism of s reject (the existence of) of) existence (the reject ays the primary role in in role primary the ays that are connected to to connected are that the descriptions of of descriptions the them, like the need need the like them, lua, and ultural, This This CEU eTD Collection brain. acc perception of philosophy the in view - subjectivism Narrow by property stimuli. caused external or is and physical it i.e.,Visual apparatus human, –the animal. eye; the sensory organs. f or objects external the Matthen, to acc. - stimuli Distal produce to object the quality conditions. the standard normal in under perceiver of power Lockean - quality secondary as Color as Color produced an is Lockean idea experience color - secondary by that of Sensation - the passive route of bringing data from the exte the from data bringing of route passive the - Sensation the brainto by senses. the a systematizing, picking, of process active the - Perception caused bysubjective not is and stimuli. it distal accordin perception of philosophy in view - subjectivism Broad Glossary Glossary 49 eatures of the objects that stimulate that objects the of eatures rior world into the body and to the to and body the into world rior nd understanding the data brought brought data the understanding nd g to which color is subjective subjective is color which to g ording to which color is is color which to ording da f secondary of idea qualities. qualities. 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55 PD israin L Toe University, Trobe La dissertation, PhD , The Western Ontarion Series in Philosophy in Series Ontarion Western The ora o Cncoses Studies Consciousness of Journal Philosophia Philosophical StudiesPhilosophical . Volume 25, Numbers 1-4. 1-4. . Volume 25, Numbers , 979-983. , 979-983. , 3rd 1-19. edition, ositions, ositions, Consciousness and Consciousness neurology tells us us tells neurology tos n o the to in ations . lnvestigatioe lnvestigatioe American Vl 4, Vol. , thesia. CEU eTD Collection Philosophical PsychologyPhilosophical the Problem Mind-Body Aspects of Philosophical 110, 267–284. areas of monkey visual cortex. areas monkey cortex. visual of selective orientation and wavelength of distribution The (1983). S. Zeki, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2005/10/051026082313.htm ScienceDaily Be The Of Eye The In Not Is Perception Color (2005). D. Williams, Synaesthesia Problem: Qualia Extra "The (1999) A. Wager, (1992). J. Valberg, J. as cognitive avision case science. for study Com coloring: of Ways (1992). J. F. Varela, and A. Palacios, E., Thompson, E. (1995).Thompson, 112. Volume Review. January. Philosophical The colors. Locke’s (2003). M. Stuart, Physicalist of Hawaii. a of Criticisms Some “On (1975). C. J. J. Smart, Russell, B.Russell, of (1914).Relation Sense-Data Physics, to The Subjectivism. Color for Cognition Problem Location The (2001). W. P. Ross, Sinnoti-Armstrong, W. and Sparrow, D. (D.Sparrow, and W. Sinnoti-Armstrong, 10, 42-58.p. Milwaukee, Wisconsin. (Oct. 26, 2005), (Oct. 26,2005), The Puzzle of ExperienceThe Puzzle of Colour VisionColour , Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 263-281. , Vol. 12, No. 3,263-281. pp. Proceedings onthe Royal Society. . New York: Routledge. 2002). A Light Theory of of Light TheoryA 2002). Behavioral and Brain Sciences and Brain Behavioral 56 . New York. Oxford University Press Inc. York.. New University Press Oxford , ed. C.-y. Cheng Honolulu: University Press Honolulu: ed. Cheng C.-y. , Scientia London 217: 449-470.217: London Color. Color. 16, 1-27. 16,1-27. n Representationism", and holder: It's In The Brain Brain The In It's holder: Theory of Colors,” in in Colors,” of Theory Philosophical StudiesPhilosophical osiuns and Consciousness 15: 1-74.15: el i different in cells parative color color parative ubr 1. Number