Truth in Economic Subjectivism

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Truth in Economic Subjectivism Munich Personal RePEc Archive Truth in Economic Subjectivism Zuniga, Gloria L. October 1998 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5568/ MPRA Paper No. 5568, posted 04 Nov 2007 UTC Journal of Markets & Morality 1, no. 2(October 1998), 158-168 Markets & Morality 159 Copyright © 1998 Center for Economic Personalism The first is an epistemic sense of ‘subjective’ that provides an acco unt of choice given the constraint of limited resources despite unlimited wants. The second is an ontological sense of subjective that describes the eco- nomic character of things as dependent on human acts of valuing. Truth in Economic Subjectivism Carl Menger advanced this account of the subjective theory of value in his Principles of Economics, first published in 1871. The significance of his co ntributio n lies in the transcatego rical description of social phenomena. Gloria L. Zúñiga While most accounts reduce value either to the mind or to some intrinsic Doctoral Candidate in Philosophy pro perty o f things, Menger demo nstrated that all so cial phenomena was State University of New York at Buffalo composed of varying combinations of beliefs and entities, judgments and facts, mind and matter. In order to achieve such a transcatego rial acco unt of value, Menger first provided an epistemic account of economic valua- tion by grounding his analysis on the experience of the valuing individual. Second, he provided a description of exact laws of economic phenomena, The Problem of Subjectivism thus advancing an ontology of economic objects. The achievement of such The notion of ‘subjectivism’ has a significant place in the body of eco- a theoretical account of value could not have been reached without the nomic theory, most notably in the theory of subjective value.1 There is, reco gnitio n that, barring exact laws, there co uld not be any science of eco- however, one concern that some philosophers have raised about truth in nomics, and without any sort of empirical realism, economics could not normative judgments that puts economic subjectivism seriously into ques- rightfully be called a social science. What will be useful, then, in the task of tion.2 This concern can be articulated as the following questio n: Is there tackling the question of truth in economic valuatio n is to explore how truth regarding economic value judgments? The answer to this questio n is Menger employs the notion of subjectivism both epistemically and pertinent not only for an improved understanding of economic value ontologically.3 theo ry but to such philo so phical investigatio ns as realism, epistemology, ontology, and ethics. Nonetheless, the answer is no t readily available in Epistemic Sense of Subjective the body of economic theory. The ensuing discussion will explore the is- When considering the epistemic sense of subjective economic value, sue of whether the truth of economic judgments can be settled objectively we must keep in mind two features of the economic species o f value. First, and, if so, how truth is made known. the economic judgments that individuals make indicate the extent to which they believe an object may satisfy their needs. According to Menger, an What Is Subjective Economic Value? individual makes an economic judgment on the basis of the causal con- Subjectivism is commonly predicated on normative expressio ns o f nection he perceives between a thing and the satisfaction of a mediate or beliefs, attitudes, and emotions by a judging subject. In economics, how- immediate end. Accordingly, an individual’s judgment directed at a thing ever, the meaning of subjectivism is more complex. When economists has an interested nature since his evaluatio n o f the thing involves an ex- speak of the value of economic goods as subjective, they not only refer to pectation of what the thing will fulfill for him. a judgment by an economic agent but also to the status of the object to Second, the judgment is called ‘economic’ because it invo lves an evalu- which the judgment is directed. There are, then, two senses of subjective: ation directed at making a choice among known alternatives. Every cho ice 1. The evaluation of an object perceived by an individual as having a invo lves impo rtant elements o f scarcity, such as limited time, income, pro- causal connection with the satisfaction of an end. ductive resources, physical and intellectual limitatio ns, levels o f satiety, 2. The subject-dependent status of objects in their role as economic and so on. Coping with scarcity is a fundamental feature of the human go o ds. condition that involves the allocation of means to meet ends. Menger was 158158158 160 Truth in Economic Subjectivism Markets & Morality 161 the first to ground the analysis of economic value on the notion of scar- people in the same way that subjective values help the individual to coor- city.4 If there is no perceived scarcity, the judgment is not an economic dinate the parts of his plan.”7 judgment.5 Yet, suppose that there is counterfeit money in an economy. Economic Since an economic judgment of value is subjective, its truth o r falsity agents might be fooled by the token objects they believe to be genuine cannot be settled by an objective appeal to facts o bserved by a third party. members of the type-category “money.” One way to analyze this problem This does not imply, however, that we may never be wrong in our eco- is to attribute the cause to subjectivism. In o ther words, the criticism would nomic judgments. Menger acknowledged error as the mo st fundamental be that any token object is arbitrarily designated to be a member of a type- epistemological problem.6 If we can err, there must be judgments that are category such as “money” by simply believing it to be so. This criticism, false. Parenthetically, it is also wo rth mentio ning that the discovery o f er- however, is mistaken since it misconstrues the notion of subjectivism in ro r in o ur judgments suggests that the fulfillment of expectations corre- economic judgments. A better way to view this problem is to consider that sponds to putative features of the object toward which our judgment is an error in a judgment directed at an object does not modify the object directed. It may be the case, then, that the truth of an economic judgment such that the object becomes what we believe it to be. As we shall see in can be settled objectively by facts about the object that co rrespo nd to the the ensuing discussion of the ontological sense of subjective economic individual’s expectations. Clearly, no one but the acting subject could make value, universal catego ries such as “mo ney” are objectively describable by this determination. exact laws such that a counterfeit dollar bill is not a genuine instance of The problem with erroneous judgments, to return to the issue of error, the catego ry “mo ney.” What is impo rtant to this epistemic analysis is that is that we o nly discover o ur mistakes ex post, sometimes immediately after instances of error in our knowledge of objects do not alter the object by and sometimes long after a choice has been made. However, we must also shaping it according to our mistaken beliefs any mo re than a false to ken co nsider the case that the agent remains fo rever fo oled by an apparent o f a type-catego ry alters the catego ry itself. We have thus come to the thresh- fulfillment of his expectations. Suppose, for example, that Oedipus dies old of the second sense of subjective in Menger’s theoretical account of before finding out that Jocasta, the woman he loved and married, was his economic value. mother. In this case, Oedipus never learns of his error, so he dies convinced that his expectations of love have been fulfilled. Objectively speaking, how- The Ontological Sense of Subjective ever, there are facts in the wo rld, such as the identity o f Jocasta as his mo ther, Menger developed a complex ontology of social objects that have a that are no t in agreement with his expectatio ns. unique nature. According to Menger, economic objects are not merely de- The question that immediately comes to mind is this: If agents are no t scribable by their physical properties since, for example, money is not re- likely to find out whether their economic judgments are true, at least in ducible to the paper, metal, plastic, or electronic components that comprise time to make corrections, can any kind of individual economic planning the various kinds of currency we acknowledge as money.8 In fact, there is ever be po ssible? This questio n addresses a central problem in economics no single physical property that is common to all the members of the regarding the dispersed nature of knowledge. The problem is not that class of objects we call money. But what makes a do llar bill money or, knowledge is dispersed but, rather, that there might be systemic o bstacles more generally, what makes any one thing an economic good, is a combi- to acquiring knowledge of the facts relevant to the economic activity of nation of two things. First, the views we hold about things as economic individuals. Such systemic o bstacles are always the result o f the co nstraints objects.9 Seco nd, the exact laws governing the catego ries o f economic ob- imposed by economic systems that do not allow for unfettered exchange. jects. Each of these requires some careful elaboration.
Recommended publications
  • A Sociological Study of Nihilism: a Case Study
    International Journal of Liberal Arts and Social Science ISSN: 2307-924X www.ijlass.org A Sociological Study of Nihilism: A Case Study Jahangir Jahangiri, PhD Assistant Professor of Sociology, Department of Sociology and Social Planning, Faculty of Social Sciences, Shiraz University, Eram Place, Shiraz, Fars, Iran Code Postal: 7194685115 Email: [email protected] Rayehe Ghareh M.A in Sociology, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran Email: [email protected] Abstract The present research aims at studying nihilistic thoughts among students of Shiraz University. The framework of the research is Crosby’s theory about nihilism. The study is based on a quantitative approach and employs a survey method so as to collect the required data. Statistical population of the study is the whole Students of Shiraz University that according to the formal statistics consists of 20000 students. 400 students are selected by multistage sampling method. The results show that there is a significant relationship between the independent variables of gender, adherences to religious practices, fatalism, fear of failure, need for achievement and the dependent variable nihilism. Stepwise regression method used to predict the dependent variable. Ordinarily, five variables of fatalism, fear of failure, Adherences to religious practices, gender and need for achievement could predict 33% of dependent variable (R2=0.338) Key Words: Nihilism, Sociology, University Students, Shiraz University, Iran Introduction Undoubtedly, the most fundamental question that every human being faces with, is about the purpose of life. Not only modern human, but also pre-modern human beings have been encountered with this question. The intolerable journey from birth to death, and relentless onslaughts of hopelessness and despair, persuade every human to answer the question, as possible.
    [Show full text]
  • Agency: Moral Identity and Free Will
    D Agency AVID Moral Identity and Free Will W DAVID WEISSMAN EISSMAN There is agency in all we do: thinking, doing, or making. We invent a tune, play, or use it to celebrate an occasion. Or we make a conceptual leap and ask more ab- stract ques� ons about the condi� ons for agency. They include autonomy and self- appraisal, each contested by arguments immersing us in circumstances we don’t control. But can it be true we that have no personal responsibility for all we think Agency and do? Agency: Moral Ident ty and Free Will proposes that delibera� on, choice, and free will emerged within the evolu� onary history of animals with a physical advantage: Moral Identity organisms having cell walls or exoskeletons had an internal space within which to protect themselves from external threats or encounters. This defense was both and Free Will structural and ac� ve: such organisms could ignore intrusions or inhibit risky behav- ior. Their capaci� es evolved with � me: inhibi� on became the power to deliberate and choose the manner of one’s responses. Hence the ability of humans and some other animals to determine their reac� ons to problema� c situa� ons or to informa- � on that alters values and choices. This is free will as a material power, not as the DAVID WEISSMAN conclusion to a conceptual argument. Having it makes us morally responsible for much we do. It prefi gures moral iden� ty. A GENCY Closely argued but plainly wri� en, Agency: Moral Ident ty and Free Will speaks for autonomy and responsibility when both are eclipsed by ideas that embed us in his- tory or tradi� on.
    [Show full text]
  • Objectivism/Subjectivism in Scientific Articles of Different Areas: the Heterogeneity of Academic Writing
    OBJETIVISMO/SUBJETIVISMO EM ARTIGOS CIENTÍFICOS DAS DIFERENTES ÁREAS: A HETEROGENEIDADE DA ESCRITA ACADÊMICA Ângela Francine FUZA* ▪ RESUMO: A existência do discurso que postula a homogeneização da escrita acadêmico- científica no processo de constituição do texto é a problemática que desencadeou esta pesquisa. Nesse sentido, o objetivo deste estudo é analisar artigos científicos brasileiros de periódicos A1 das diferentes áreas do conhecimento a partir dos elementos que constituem os gêneros, forma composicional, estilo e temática, delimitando aspectos que tendem ao objetivismo e ao subjetivismo nos textos. O trabalho se pauta nos pressupostos dialógicos do Círculo de Bakhtin, no tocante aos gêneros, ao objetivismo e subjetivismo, e nas pesquisas desenvolvidas segundo os princípios dos Novos Estudos do Letramento. Os resultados apontam que: a) todo enunciado é constituído de elementos subjetivos e objetivos; b) os aspectos que evidenciam objetividade e subjetividade marcam-se predominantemente na forma composicional (e arquitetônica) e no estilo dos textos, em diálogo com a temática; c) os artigos das diferentes áreas se assemelham, ao tratar de elementos que tendem à objetividade, como forma composicional e recursos linguísticos; d) os artigos diferem quando apresentam aspectos que, embora estejam na materialidade verbal, encontram significação no contexto extraverbal, perpassando a subjetividade, como escolha temática; variação no número de autores no texto etc.; e) a existência de nuances de objetividade e de subjetividade permite caracterizar a escrita nas áreas de forma heterogênea. ▪ PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Objetivismo. Subjetivismo. Escrita acadêmica. Artigo científico. Introdução A escrita acadêmico-científica tem sido um tema amplamente discutido no meio acadêmico por pesquisadores do campo dos estudos da linguagem em seus vários âmbitos e perspectivas metodológicas.
    [Show full text]
  • Frederick Beiser: German Idealism. the Struggle Against Subjectivism
    Elizabeth Millän-Zaibert (Chicago) Frederick Beiser. German Idealism. The Struggle against Sub­ jectivism, 1781-1801. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 2002. XVI + 726 S. ISBN 0-674-00769-7. A recent surge of Anglophone inte­ cerning Lessing's alleged Spinozism rest in German Idealism and early (1780-85); the profound effects German Romanticism has resulted in which the publication of Kant's Cri­ nothing less than a publishing boom tique of Pure Reason (1781, 1787) of studies in this area. Frederick Bei­ had upon the philosophical climate ser's work was crucial in preparing of the period; K.L. Reinhold's at­ the ground for this development of tempts to establish a foundation for English language studies of German Kant's Critique, which found their Idealism and early German Romanti­ fullest expression in his Über das cism. In The Fate of Reason: Ger­ Fundament des philosophischen Wis­ man Philosophy Between Kant and sens (1791); and the effects of Fich- Fichte (1987) and Enlightenment, te's Wissenschaftslehre (1794) on the Revolution, and Romanticism: The German philosophical mood of the Genesis of Modern German Political period. Thought (1992), Beiser made a com­ Beiser's work imbued the philoso­ pelling case that many German phi­ phical drama that unfolded on the losophers of the immediate post- German philosophical scene of the Kantian period and the issues that late 1700s and early 1800s with new they raised were worthy of much life. This reawakening of the key more attention than they had hitherto controversies and the figures who received in the English-speaking were crucial players in this drama world.
    [Show full text]
  • German Idealism: the Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781-1801
    Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Theology Faculty Research and Publications Theology, Department of 1-1-2004 Review of "German Idealism: The trS uggle Against Subjectivism, 1781-1801" by Frederick C. Beiser Philip J. Rossi Marquette University, [email protected] Published version. Theological Studies, Vol. 65, No. 1 (2004): 217-218. Permalinkf. © 2004 Theological Studies, Inc. Used with permission. BOOK REVIEWS 217 Catholic leaders to give us the married as well as the celibate diocesan priests we need. Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles JOHN A. COLEMAN, S.J. GERMAN IDEALISM:THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SUBJECTIVISM, 1781–1801. By Frederick C. Beiser. Cambridge: Harvard University, 2002. Pp. xvi + 726. $61.50. Beiser’s important earlier studies—The Fate of Reason (1987) and En- lightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism (1992)—placed the trajectory of ideas, issues, and arguments of late 18th- and early 19th-century German philosophy and political thought within an illuminating account of their cultural and political contexts. In this work, B. shifts attention from that larger background and presents, in contrast, a closely focused analysis of the texts of six thinkers—Kant, Fichte, Ho¨ lderlin, Novalis, Schlegel, and Schelling—that bear upon “one specific theme: the meaning of idealism itself, and more specifically the reaction against subjectivism” (viii). The analysis is in service of a larger thesis that goes counter to a commonly accepted interpretation of German idealism as “essentially the culmination of the Cartesian tradition,” which is usually accompanied by “a seductively simple narrative” that makes it “the gradual and inevitable completion of Kant’s ‘Copernican Revolution’”(1–2). B.
    [Show full text]
  • G. E. MOORE on CONCEPTS and JUDGMENT* G. E. Moore Sobre Conceptos Y Juicio
    DOI: 10.36446/af.2021.357 G. E. MOORE ON CONCEPTS AND JUDGMENT* G. E. Moore sobre conceptos y juicio SEBASTIÁN BRICEÑO a https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3040-4869 [email protected] a Universidad de Santiago de Chile, Santiago, Chile Abstract In “The Nature of Judgment” (1899), G. E. Moore defends the strange thesis according to which “[i]t seems necessary… to regard the world as formed of concepts”. Philosophers have offered distinct understandings of this proposal, in particular of what Moorean concepts really are. In this article I discuss and reject three of them: one, according to which Moorean concepts are universals within the framework of a bundle theory of concrete particulars (Nelson, 1962; Baldwin, 1990); a second one, according to which Moorean concepts are particulars within a mereological framework of analysis (Bell, 1999); and a third one, according to which Moorean concepts are a sui generis category, resulting from his alleged rejection of the substance (particular)/attribute (universal) distinction (MacBride, 2018). I end by defending my own understanding, which highlights the openly Platonic stance of the young G. E. Moore. Key words: Concepts; Judgment; Proposition; Abstract; Particular; Universal; Substance. Resumen En “The Nature of Judgment” (1899), G. E. Moore defiende la extraña tesis según la cual “[p]arece necesario… entender al mundo como formado de conceptos”. Los filósofos han ofrecido distintas comprensiones de esta propuesta, en particular de lo que los conceptos mooreanos realmente son. En este artículo discuto y rechazo tres de ellas: una, según la cual los conceptos mooreanos son universales dentro del marco de una teoría del cúmulo sobre particulares concretos (Nelson, 1962; Baldwin, 1990); una segunda, según la cual los conceptos mooreanos son particulares dentro de un marco de análisis mereológico (Bell, 1999); y una tercera, según la cual los conceptos mooreanos son una categoría sui generis, resultante del supuesto rechazo de la distinción substancia (particular)/atributo (universal) (MacBride 2018).
    [Show full text]
  • German Idealism: the Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781-1801 Pdf, Epub, Ebook
    GERMAN IDEALISM: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SUBJECTIVISM, 1781-1801 PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Frederick C. Beiser | 752 pages | 04 May 2011 | HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS | 9780674027176 | English | Cambridge, Mass, United States German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781-1801 PDF Book The Meaning of Absolute Idealism 3. Friend Reviews. The Blinding Light of 2. Thanks for telling us about the problem. More filters. View all 3 comments. Professor Philosophy Hall of Languages The Problematic Status of the Categories 2. Regulative or Constitutive? The Transcendental versus the Subjective 4. Beiser, Harvard University Press June 10, , pp. The Elements of Magical Idealism 5. Self-Knowledge and Freedom 7. Objective Idealism 3. In this book, Beiser sought to reconstruct the background of German Idealism through the narration of the story of the Spinoza or Pantheism controversy. Just a moment while we sign you in to your Goodreads account. A very interesting and thorough examination of thinkers who get very little attention, especially in the English speaking world. In the current volume Zammito carries over and amplifies this sentiment. The Aenesidemus Review 3. The Origins of Intellectual Intuition 4. It is impossible to not only read Kant and the Jean school but the whole of the post-Husserlian phenomenologists except in the light the history of post-Kantian thought and its development as well as misinterpretation. Namely the problematic relationship of subjectivity to objectivity in the works of Kant, Fichte, Jena romantics and Schelling. Models of Knowledge 4. If the boundary between apes and humans was subject to equivocations it would not be surprising that there would also be debate about the unity of humans as a species, resulting in discourses about race and the origins of what has been referred to as "scientific racism.
    [Show full text]
  • 12-Ethical Subjectivism.Pdf
    Metaethics Ethics and Metaethics Normative ethics: the study of goodness, virtue, and right action. • What is intrinsically good? • What is the best distribution of benefits and burdens in the world? • What traits of character do we value in people? • What rules or principles should we follow? Metaethics: the study of these moral concepts and their grounding. • What is the scope and status of moral values? • What does it mean to say that “X is good”? • Do moral claims like “X is good” have a truth-value? • Do moral values exist in the world independently of human beings? Subjectivism and Objectivism Ethical Subjectivism: the truth of moral judgments is grounded in an arbitrary will. • Simple Ethical Subjectivism (SES): the individual’s feelings. • Divine Command Theory (DCT): the will of God. • Ethical Relativism (ER): the beliefs of the group. EthicalArbitrary Objectivism =df. based: theon truthrandom of moral choice judgments or is groundedpersonal in some whim, non-arbitrary rather than reality any .reason or • Aristotle’ssystem: virtue his theory: mealtimes human flourishing were. entirely • John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism: pleasure. • Immanuelarbitrary. Kant’s deontologism: reason. Subjectivism and Objectivism Ethical Subjectivism: the truth of moral judgments is grounded in an arbitrary will. • Simple Ethical Subjectivism (SES): the individual’s feelings. • Divine Command Theory (DCT): the will of God. • Ethical Relativism (ER): the beliefs of the group. Ethical Objectivism: the truth of moral judgments is grounded in some non-arbitrary reality. • Aristotle’s virtue theory: human flourishing. • John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism: pleasure. • Immanuel Kant’s deontologism: reason. Simple Ethical Subjectivism (1/4) “Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance.
    [Show full text]
  • Mackie's Argument from Queerness for Nihilism I. Introduction to Moral
    Phil. 173: Metaethics Jan. 24, 2018 Lecture 2: Mackie’s Argument from Queerness for Nihilism I. Introduction to Moral Nihilism moral nihilism: Just as there is no such thing as phlogiston, there is no such thing as moral goodness, rightness, wrongness, duty, obligation, or any other moral notion. It is commonly claimed that according to nihilism, all moral sentences are false. This is a mistake. • first problem: Even if nihilism is correct, some moral sentences should come out as true. “Failing one’s students for fun is wrong.” “It is not the case that failing one’s students for fun is wrong.” “Your professor believes that failing one’s students for fun is wrong.” • second problem: On some semantic theories, if there is no such thing as wrongness, then “Failing one’s students for fun is wrong” is neither true nor false. (For example, according to P. F. Strawson’s theory of definite descriptions, “The present king of France is bald” is neither true nor false. For similar reasons, we might think that “Phlogiston is lighter than air” and “Failing one’s students for fun is wrong” are neither true nor false, if nihilism is correct.) Nihilists can avoid these problems by taking whatever semantic theory is used to determine the truth-value of phlogiston sentences and also use it to determine the truth-value of moral sentences. It is also commonly claimed that according to nihilism, everything is permitted. This is also a mistake. According to nihilism, there is no such thing as permissibility. II. The Standard Interpretation of Mackie Mackie’s main thesis: there are no objective values (values are not “part of the fabric of the world”).
    [Show full text]
  • Anarchism and Existentialism
    CHAPTER 19 Anarchism and Existentialism Shane Wahl Introduction One way to approach the relationship between anarchist philosophy and exis- tentialist philosophy would be to trace the historical connections between the two and provide an account of how certain thinkers in both “schools” share philosophical and pragmatic concerns, questions, and maybe even answers. Such an approach has the merits of comprehensiveness and perhaps exhaus- tiveness on its side. This method would give ample breadth to the relationship and its philosophical underpinning, providing a full account of historical and theoretical connections. While this chapter is meant to give a solid overview along these lines, I am also mostly concerned with developing a “philosophy of the future” for anarchist-existentialists (or existentialist-anarchists). A key part of this, in my view, is to grapple with a major problem that confronts both the existentialist and the anarchist at the theoretical and practical level. This is the problem of the supposed (or maybe assumed) distinction—sometimes held to be hard and fast—between the “individual” and the “social.” Focusing on this particular issue will provide some depth to the discussion. Anarchism has varying degrees of “individualism” built-in theoretically, that is, there are different kinds of anarchists seeking different understandings of how anarchism is to operate in terms of individual liberty versus social cohe- sion, often with some strong skepticism for the possibility of the latter in an- archist theory and practice.1 The practical issue regarding the individual and social cannot be overlooked. A “common sense” understanding of anarchism as somewhat synonymous with “chaos” breeds an outlook of dismissal of any claims of it “working” in any kind of truly social setting.
    [Show full text]
  • The Welfare-Nihilist Arguments Against Judgment Subjectivism
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v19i3.886 Vol. 19, No. 3 · March 2021 © 2021 Author THE WELFARE-NIHILIST ARGUMENTS AGAINST JUDGMENT SUBJECTIVISM Anthony Kelley ne way to construe subjectivism about well-being is as the view that x is basically good for S if and only if, because, and to the extent that x is Ovalued, under the proper conditions, by S.1 Dale Dorsey argues for an idealized, judgment-based theory of valuing, one according to which a person values a thing if and only if, because, and to the extent that she would believe, under the proper conditions, that it is basically good for herself.2 Call subjectiv- ism about well-being coupled with a judgment-based theory of valuing judgment subjectivism.3 Judgment subjectivism is a remarkable theory, and Dorsey’s case for it is compelling. If the theory is true, then what is good for you is wholly determined by what you believe is good for you. It is somewhat surprising that it has not been the subject of much scrutiny.4 In this paper, I offer three related arguments against the theory. The arguments are about what judgment subjectivism im- plies about the well-being of welfare nihilists, people who believe that there are no welfare properties or at least that none are instantiated. I maintain that wel- 1 This construal is Dale Dorsey’s; see Dorsey, “Subjectivism without Desire,” 407. One con- troversial feature of Dorsey’s statement of subjectivism is that it requires that a theory link a person’s good to her values in order for it to count as subjectivist.
    [Show full text]
  • Reason and Intuitive Knowledge in Spinoza's Ethics
    Reason and Intuitive Knowledge in Spinoza’s Ethics : Two Ways of Knowing, Two Ways of Living by Sanem Soyarslan Department of Philosophy Duke University Date: _____________________ Approved: ___________________________ Tad Schmaltz, Co-Supervisor __________________________ David Wong, Co-Supervisor __________________________ Michael Ferejohn __________________________ Andrew Janiak __________________________ Alan Nelson Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Duke University 2011 ABSTRACT Reason and Intuitive Knowledge in Spinoza’s Ethics : Two Ways of Knowing, Two Ways of Living by Sanem Soyarslan Department of Philosophy Duke University Date: _____________________ Approved: ___________________________ Tad Schmaltz, Co-Supervisor __________________________ David Wong, Co-Supervisor __________________________ Michael Ferejohn __________________________ Andrew Janiak __________________________ Alan Nelson An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Duke University 2011 ii Copyright by Sanem Soyarslan 2011 iii ABSTRACT While both intuitive knowledge ( scientia intuitiva ) and reason ( ratio) are adequate ways of knowing for Spinoza, they are not equal. “The greatest virtue of the mind” and “the greatest human perfection” consist in understanding things by intuitive knowledge, which
    [Show full text]