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Home , Albert Camus, Benjamin Tucker, Subjectivism, Trace (deconstruction)

CHAPTER 19 and

Shane Wahl

Introduction

One way to approach the relationship between anarchist and exis- tentialist philosophy would be to the historical connections between the two and provide an account of how certain thinkers in both “schools” share philosophical and pragmatic concerns, questions, and maybe even answers. Such an approach has the merits of comprehensiveness and perhaps exhaus- tiveness on its side. This method would give ample breadth to the relationship and its philosophical underpinning, providing a full account of historical and theoretical connections. While this chapter is meant to give a solid overview along these lines, I am also mostly concerned with developing a “philosophy of the future” for anarchist-existentialists (or existentialist-anarchists). A key part of this, in my view, is to grapple with a major problem that confronts both the existentialist and the anarchist at the theoretical and practical level. This is the problem of the supposed (or maybe assumed) distinction—sometimes held to be hard and fast—between the “” and the “social.” Focusing on this particular issue provide some depth to the discussion. Anarchism has varying degrees of “” built-in theoretically, that is, there are different kinds of anarchists seeking different understandings of how anarchism is to operate in terms of individual versus social cohe- sion, often with some strong skepticism for the possibility of the latter in an- archist theory and practice.1 The practical issue regarding the individual and social cannot be overlooked. A “common sense” understanding of anarchism as somewhat synonymous with “chaos” breeds an outlook of dismissal of any claims of it “working” in any kind of truly social setting. Furthermore, anyone who has actually spent as an activist and member of anarchist groups and collectives will understand that there are issues of social cohesion “on the ground” even amidst consensus-based formations. On the hand, existentialism has been seen quite often as fundamental- ly individualistic mainly as a result of its purported claim to subjectivism—the

1 This range may be represented in and Max Stirner on the one end, and the various anarcho-communists, collectivists, and syndicalists on the other end.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi ��.��63/9789004356894_021 560 Wahl view, here, that what is true, good, and beautiful is merely a of individu- al taste or perspective due to certain constraints on and even mean- ing altogether. are then claimed to be in primary conflict with one another in some way, and this makes any kind of social existentialism dubious, or even absurd.2 This chapter, then, proceeds as follows. Keeping with the merits of the “breadth” approach, the first section provides some definitions and then de- velops a brief historical context for the nineteenth-century developments (“origins” is too strong a word) of both anarchism and existentialism, with a dis- cussion of many of the prominent figures involved. The second section traces the philosophical connections between anarchism and existentialism, and centers on the collapse of ushered in by the “death of God.” An argu- ment I will put forward here is that existentialism and “classical” anarchism may both be seen as operating in the tension between and post- modernism, as both the break with the past and the hopeful embrace of the absurd into the future. With the death of God there is a vacuum of meaning, , explanation, and order, and both the existentialists and the anarchists were deeply skeptical of attempts by humans to put human institutions in the place of this dead God. The third section is an extended look at the of two —Jean-Paul Sartre and (with a short dis- cussion of as well). That section advances the individual/social problem as a real one for both anarchists and existentialists, yet as a problem which can be overcome within the resources of both philosophical traditions. Sartre and Goldman are the main vehicles to elucidate that argument.

A Brief History of Two

Without getting too carried away with quibbling over definitions, I will claim that existentialism, or existential philosophy, refers to an orientation of cre- ativity in the face of a nihilistic world. The existentialist holds that human be- ings are responsible for creating meaning in this nihilistic world. One could, here, get mired in the “nihilistic world” half of this definition, and there is good reason given how important such as anxiety, dread, despair, and for- lornness are in the history of existentialism. The other half, though, is often overlooked in its radical openness. This call to creativity should be thought of, at least with all things equal, as liberating. There is no authority with a

2 Even Robert Solomon refers to the “extreme individualism” of existentialism. See Robert C. Solomon, Introducing the Existentialists (Indianapolis, In.: Hackett, 1981), vii.