Elizabeth Millän-Zaibert (Chicago) Frederick Beiser. German Idealism. The Struggle against Sub jectivism, 1781-1801. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 2002. XVI + 726 S. ISBN 0-674-00769-7.
A recent surge of Anglophone inte cerning Lessing's alleged Spinozism rest in German Idealism and early (1780-85); the profound effects German Romanticism has resulted in which the publication of Kant's Cri nothing less than a publishing boom tique of Pure Reason (1781, 1787) of studies in this area. Frederick Bei had upon the philosophical climate ser's work was crucial in preparing of the period; K.L. Reinhold's at the ground for this development of tempts to establish a foundation for English language studies of German Kant's Critique, which found their Idealism and early German Romanti fullest expression in his Über das cism. In The Fate of Reason: Ger Fundament des philosophischen Wis man Philosophy Between Kant and sens (1791); and the effects of Fich- Fichte (1987) and Enlightenment, te's Wissenschaftslehre (1794) on the Revolution, and Romanticism: The German philosophical mood of the Genesis of Modern German Political period. Thought (1992), Beiser made a com Beiser's work imbued the philoso pelling case that many German phi phical drama that unfolded on the losophers of the immediate post- German philosophical scene of the Kantian period and the issues that late 1700s and early 1800s with new they raised were worthy of much life. This reawakening of the key more attention than they had hitherto controversies and the figures who received in the English-speaking were crucial players in this drama world. has opened exciting new paths of The Fate of Reason not only wove study As a result of Beiser's innova a story of the themes that characteri tive work, the contributions of the zed the immediate post-Kantian peri early German Romantics (figures od (all centered around what Beiser such as Friedrich Schlegel, Friedrich calls the „authority of reason"), but it von Hardenberg (Novalis), and Höl also provided a much needed context derlin), too long considered to be of which enabled the contributions of merely literary significance, are be the immediate post-Kantian philoso ginning to receive attention from phi phers to be appreciated. In The Fate losophers in the United States. of Reason, Beiser carefully analyzed: There has been a tendency to give the effects of the controversy bet Hegel all the credit for the great stri ween Mendelssohn and Jacobi con des in post-Kantian German philoso- German Idealism 245 phy, and Beiser's earlier work helped is, Beiser steers a middle path bet to correct this limited reading of the ween the two basic and „utterly irre history of German philosophy. His concilable" interpretations of Fichte: most recent study continues in a si the reading of him as a subjective milar vein: giving a voice to thinkers idealist and the reading of him as an who have been sorely neglected in absolute idealist. In the four chapters the English-speaking world and pre of Part III of the study, Beiser moves senting a well grounded alternative to an analysis of the absolute idea to the tradition of reading German lism that he argues characterized the Idealism as a movement shaped pri work of three important early Ger marily by Hegel. Beiser is an impres man Romantics, Friedrich Schlegel, sively astute philosophical historian Novalis, and Hölderlin. The book of philosophy who consistently of concludes with a treatment of idea fers a rich, historical framework with lism in the most protean figure of the which to come to a deeper, fuller ap period, Friedrich Schelling, a thinker preciation of key figures who are of who moved in and out of the Roman ten overlooked, and his most recent tic circle, and whose philosophical book is no exception. positions on thinkers such as Kant Beiser's study of German Idealism and Fichte were ever changing. Bei from 1781-1801 is divided into four ser connects each of these parts to parts; each part is so comprehensive tell his enlightening story of German and far-reaching that one can almost Idealism's struggle against subjecti speak of four books in one. Beiser vism. begins with ten detailed chapters on Beiser rejects the „seductively Kant's critique of idealism. In the fi simple" account of the history of nal chapter of this section on Kant, German Idealism, according to he carefully dispels the „stubborn which it is one long move towards an myth" that „Kant dropped off the inflated self-contained subjectivism, philosophical stage in the 1790s" (p. arguing that the „development of 180) and presents the Opus postu- German Idealism is not the culmina mum as an important contribution to tion but the nemesis of the Cartesian the history of German Idealism. Sec tradition (i.e., the doctrine that the tion II of the study is dedicated to an subject has an immediate knowledge examination of Fichte's critique of only of its own ideas, so that it has subjectivism, an examination that at no knowledge beyond its circle of tempts to clear the waters that have consciousness)" (p. 2). In Beiser's muddied a clear reception of Fichte's history of German Idealism, it is not thought and of German Idealism. In subjectivism that triumphs, but rather the eight chapters that constitute this the struggle against subjectivism that part of the study, Beiser takes on the emerges triumphantly, a struggle that difficult tasks of showing, „how Beiser characterizes in terms of an Fichte evades both solipsism and a „intense effort to break out of the cir transcendent metaphysics" and of ex cle of consciousness" or „egocentric plaining „[Fichte's] idealist princi predicament". ples and his teaching about the limits The egocentric predicament is the of human knowledge" (p. 218). That problem created by the transcenden- 246 Elizabeth Millän-Zaibert ce of our ability to know whether our confines of the subjectivist interpre ideas of the world and the world ac tation to which it has all too often be tually correspond, a problem that en doomed. might leave us trapped in an utterly In Beiser's version, „the story of subjective world with no real con German Idealism becomes a story nection to external reality. According about the progressive de-subjectivi- to Beiser, German Idealism is com zation of the Kantian legacy, the gro pelling not because it leads us to the wing recognition that the ideal realm subject, trapping us there, but becau consists not in personality and sub se it leads, surprisingly perhaps, to jectivity, but in the normative, the ar the development of a robust realism chetypical, and the intelligible" (p. and naturalism. German Idealism has 6). Beiser's story of German Idea suffered because of the general mi- lism is told in terms of the unfolding sperception that all forms of idealism of neo-Platonism, with its „ultimate amount to anti-realism. The connec heirs" identified as the Marburg Neo- tion that Beiser makes between rea Kantians, Hermann Cohen, Paul Na- lism and idealism, seemingly odd torp, and Emst Cassirer. bedfellows, at least for those bred on Throughout the four parts of the the Anglo-American philosophical study, Beiser maintains a focus on tradition, can only be made because the meaning of idealism itself and Beiser vehemently rejects any sub- the reaction against subjectivism car jectivist interpretation of German ried out by the idealists of the period Idealism. under consideration. Beiser's sustai He claims that the general tenden ned attention to the very meaning of cy to read German Idealism as a idealism does indeed reveal that Ger form of vulgar subjectivism is rooted man Idealism from 1781-1801 was in a failure to distinguish between not a „grandiose form of subjecti two very different forms of idealism: vism", but rather a reaction against „the two versions of idealism corre any sort of subjectivism, a reaction spond to two senses of the term „ide whose final goal was to break out of al", the ideal can be the mental in the egocentric predicament and do contrast to the physical, the spiritual nothing less than prove the reality of rather than the material, or it can by the external world. In short, the batt the archetypical in contrast to the ec- le against subjectivism, leads Ger typical, the normative rather than the man Idealism towards a robust rea substantive. Idealism in the former lism. sense is the doctrine that all reality Beiser's study is also dedicated to depends upon some self-conscious correcting the widespread misper- subject; idealism in the latter sense is ception that the young Romantics the doctrine that everything is a ma played merely a transitional role in nifestation of the ideal, an appearan the post-Kantian period. Beiser con ce of reason" (p. 6). Featured in Bei- vincingly argues that the young Ro ser's story is idealism in the second mantics were crucial players in the sense mentioned above, and so a development of German Idealism: fresh, new story of German Idealism indeed, „the early romantics [not He emerges, one which frees it from the gel, as commonly believed] were the German Idealism 247 true founders of absolute idealism4' to do with sweeping claims regar (viii). The absolute idealism that Bei- ding the dependency of reality upon ser imputes to the Romantics is a the self-conscious subject. Their kind of objective idealism, one that idealism was far less subjective, and attempts to explain the reality of the while it did commit them to the external world on the basis of idealist claim that „everything is a manifest principles, but which does not attach ation of the ideal, an appearance of the forms of experience to a subject, reason", they did not conceive of this but rather to the realm of pure being manifestation of the ideal as a sub as such. The ideal, on Beiser's rea jective, mental or spiritual appearan ding of the Romantics' breed of idea ce of reason, but rather its normative lism, is the archetypical, intelligible, or archetypical manifestation. Abso and structural, not the subjective, lute idealism is not subjective idea mental, or spiritual. lism with a subject inflated to com Beiser's privileging of the early prehend the whole of reality, but a German Romantics in his tale of form of realism. Moreover, as abso German Idealism will put Hegelians lute idealism derives „the transcen on guard. Indeed, Beiser openly as dental subject from its place within serts that his study „is a reaction nature" (p. 4), this kind of idealism is against the Hegelian legacy" and fur also connected to a certain kind of ther that Hegel was a „tortoise naturalism that is rooted in the Ro among hares" (p. 11), the hares being mantics' view that the absolute is his predecessors in Jena, who never „nothing less than the whole of natu created grand systems, and who we re" (p. 356), with nature understood re treated with contempt in Hegel's as some sort of organic whole. Bei rewriting of the history of philoso ser stresses that the naturalism of ab phy. As Beiser puts it: „There is not a solute idealism is not simply empiri single Hegelian theme that cannot be cal naturalism „which explains traced to his predecessors in Jena, to everything in the phenomenal world many earlier thinkers whom Hegel according to natural laws, but which and the Hegelian school either belitt leaves the noumenal world untou led or ignored" (p. 10). Beiser rejects ched. Rather, it maintains that we the teleological reading of history can explain not only empirical con that followed in Hegel's wake. One sciousness but transcendental self- consequence of this rejection is that consciousness according to its place in his daring and original study, Bei in nature" (p. 355). So, far from trap ser does not read German Idealism ping us in an isolated subject cut off as a progression toward Hegel or a from the world, absolute idealism is decline from Kant, but rather pre shown to throw us into the world, sents German Idealism as a much with no clear-cut divisions between more nuanced movement and looks subjects and objects, with everything carefully at the contributions of indi conceived as a part of a living, brea vidual thinkers on their own terms. thing whole of nature. Beiser argues that the German Ro Beiser also corrects the picture of mantics were absolute idealists, but the absolute idealism of the Roman stresses that their idealism had little tics as a breed of neo-foundationa- 248 Elizabeth Millän-Zaibert
lism-on this point, he is in the good early German Romantics, namely, company of the leading German that self-being owes its existence to a scholars of Romanticism, Dieter transcendent foundation which can Henrich and Manfred Frank, who ha not be dissolved by consciousness. ve each done work on the early stu Frank links this view of the primacy dents of K.L. Reinhold (LB. Erhard, of Being to the romantic position that CI. Diez, F. Weißhuhn, C.C.E. the true foundation of self-being is a Schmid, F.C. Forberg, J.RA. Feuer- puzzle that cannot be handled by re bach, and F.I. Niethammer, among flection alone: to solve the puzzle we others) and have carefully traced the need to turn to art. development of romantic skepticism Beiser makes reference to the ten regarding the feasibility of establis sions between his idealist reading of hing first principles for philosophy. the Romantics and Frank and Hen- Yet, there is, despite agreement on rich's anti-idealist reading, telling us the point of anti-foundationalism as a that Frank and Henrich's sharp di formative element in the philosophi stinction between German Idealism cal thought of the early German Ro and early German Romanticism is mantics, a strident point of contenti the result of a „much too narrow44 (p. on between Frank and Henrich's 354) interpretation derived from fo characterization of the early German cusing too much attention of a few Romantics, on the one hand, and early manuscripts. A serious limitati Beiser's, on the other. on of such a focus, Beiser claims, is Frank, for example, argues that that „it completely underrates the the anti-foundationalism that deve Platonic heritage of Hölderlin, Nova lops in the post-Kantian period of lis, and Schlegel44 (p. 355). Given German philosophy is precisely what Beiser's claim that: „the idealist di distinguishes figures like Feuerbach, mension of absolute idealism comes Niethammer, and the early Roman from its rationalism" (p. 353), a ra tics, from the group of German Idea tionalism unpacked in Platonic lists, such as Fichte and Schilling. terms, we begin to see one aspect of Frank draws a sharp line between the Platonic heritage that we would early German Romanticism and Ger do well to take into account. Beiser man Idealism (see especially my also points to the Platonic renais translation of his lectures, The Philo sance that held sway in the late sophical Foundations of Early Ger 1790s and early 1800s in German man Romanticism, forthcoming with speaking lands, a renaissance that SUNY Press). Frank traces idealism did indeed influence the early Ro to its articulation by Hegel that con mantics. Not surprisingly, when Bei sciousness is a self-sufficient pheno ser discusses the early German Ro menon, one which is able to make mantics in Part III of his study, one the presuppositions of its existence of his central themes is the Platonic comprehensible by its own means. legacy that guided these thinkers (p. Frank contrasts this kind of idealism 355 ff.). and the accompanying view of the Beiser's account of romantic phi self-sufficiency of consciousness to losophy as a breed of absolute idea the conviction that characterizes the lism does pay serious attention to its German Idealism 249 roots in Spinoza and to the strong connection with this point concer strands of naturalism present within ning the intimate relation between it. As Beiser also claims that „abso truth, beauty, and the world, Beiser lute idealism involves a greater de refers us to Friedrich Schlegel's des gree of realism than critical idealism cription of the general standpoint of [does]14 (p. 355), one begins to see a idealism: „Idealism considers nature strongly realist reading of the Ro as a work of art, as a poem" (p. 374). mantics' idealism. On Beiser's stron Beiser's reading of the early German gly realist reading of idealism, when Romantics as absolute idealists, whi does idealism cease to be idealism le at odds with Frank's views does and become a strange hybrid of rea not, for the most part, mislead him in lism and idealism that is uniquely ro his interpretation of the major mantic? Which is to ask, can we so strands of early German romantic easily reject Frank's view that early thought. Yet there is a strand of his German Romanticism is not really a argument which does seem to entail form of German Idealism at all? a somewhat distorted view of the Beiser loads the absolute idealism early Romantics. which he claims characterizes the One reason why the early German young Romantics with a heavy dose Romantics have so long been neglec of Spinozism, Platonism, and vital ted is that their work is read as part materialism. The connection to vital of the tradition of classical German materialism, whose supporters held Idealism, and in the company of such that the essence of matter was force grand system builders as Fichte, rather than extension, proves critical Schelling, and Hegel, their work, in coming to a full understanding of which was not designed with any the romantic conception of nature, a grand-theory goals in mind, is often crucial aspect of their philosophical dismissed as incomplete and unim project. portant. Frank's strong and compel Beiser's story nicely accommoda ling case against the move to read the tes central themes attended to by the Romantics as idealists at all is part of early German Romantics, especially, an effort to free them from the dark, the role of aesthetic experience in heavy shadows cast upon them by their general framework for under the grand system builders of classical standing reality and the coherence German Idealism. Beiser, in sharp theory of truth that they endorsed. contrast, argues that we can under Beiser indicates that for the early stand the historical significance of German Romantics, the metaphysi the early German Romantics only if cal claims of absolute idealism are we come to an understanding of their such that to regard nature as an orga absolute idealism and hence read nism and as a work of art are one and them as German Idealists. Beiser's the same: „The universe is nothing solution to the problems of neglect less than a natural work of art, a that have beset a proper reception of work of art is nothing less than an ar the early German Romantics is to tificial organism. Hence, the realms present them as part of the constella of truth and beauty, the natural and tion of classical German Idealism (it the aesthetic, coincide" (p. 374). In is important to keep in mind, howe- 250 Elizabeth Millän-Zaibert ver, that Beiser explicitly states that [Hegel] summarized and integrated his work „does not pretend to be a into one system all the themes his contribution to what the Germans less scholastic and organized con call „Konstellationsarbeit" (ix)). Reitemporaries had left in fragments or ser's portrait of the early German notebooks" (p. 10). With claims like Romantics clearly shows that they this, Beiser underestimates the philo were not subjective idealists, and he sophical significance of the fragment convincingly highlights the strong and the very theme of incomplete doses of realism and naturalism pre ness that the Romantics develop in sent in their thought. In his reassess their work. ment of the role that the grand sy Though Beiser frees the historical stem builders played in German sky of the dark shadow cast over Idealism, Beiser urges us to keep in German Idealism by Hegel and the mind that, „Hegel exaggerated his rewith casts much needed light on own originality and individuality" (p. the early German Romantics, his re 10), and that many of his ideas can ading seems, at points, nevertheless be traced back to his predecessors in guided by the lens of the classical Jena, whose work has far too long German idealist system builders, lea been ignored. This move clears spa ding him to reduce some of the Ro ce for the contributions of the early mantics' achievements, including German Romantics to come into their rejection of closed systems for view. the presentation of their ideas, to me Yet, for all of his careful excavat re imperfect forms that awaited com ing work, there is something unsett pletion by system builders like ling about Beiser's suggestion that Schelling and Hegel. As Beiser cor the early German Romantics' use of rectly indicates, Novalis did „nurture the fragment was part of a disorgani systematic ambitions" (p. 410), yet zed way to present their ideas; the he fails to give sufficient attention to fragments lacked systematicity and the fact that Novalis' conception of a completeness which would be provi system was quite unlike that of ded by the likes of Schelling or He Schelling or Hegel. Novalis' aspirati gel: „What was merely fragmentary, on to fuse realism and idealism, an inchoate, and suggestive in Hölder aspiration discussed by Beiser (see lin, Novalis, and Schlegel became pp. 433 ff.) presents us with difficult systematic, organized, and explicit in philosophical problems. The first Schelling" (p. 467) and „[w]hat Höl question that needs to be addressed derlin, Schlegel, [and] Novalis ... is: what did Novalis' fusion of rea had left in fragrnents-what they re lism and idealism amount to? Bei garded as a mystical insight tran ser's answer is that it amounted to scending conceptual articulation- absolute idealism. I offer a tentative Schelling would now try to word of caution that perhaps we rationalize and systematize" (p. 553). would be in a better position to ap Although the study seeks to clear preciate the early German Romantics space on the map of ideas for thin on their own terms, if we would un kers squeezed out by Hegel, Beiser pack the uniquely romantic fusion of claims that „in unsurpassed fashion the realism and idealism in a way German Idealism 251 that did not reduce their contributi 1801) concludes with a detailed ac ons to pieces of unfinished work that count of Schelling's pivotal role in found its culmination in Schelling the development of absolute idea and Hegel's systems, that is, if the lism, in particular his break with net we cast to catch their thoughts Fichte and his important contributi were not crowded with system buil ons to Naturphilosophie. ders. The romantic aspiration to fuse Beiser's study uncovers the Plato idealism and realism was related to nic moorings of German Idealism, their rejection of understanding rea clearing space for a realist reading of lity in terms of categories of being idealism. Moreover, with Beiser's and their turn towards processes of reading of the Romantics as absolute becoming, and to the ontological and idealists, a new debate is opened epistemological problems that ac concerning the early German Ro company such a shift in focus. mantics' relation to classical German Beiser's reading of the early Ger Idealism, just the sort of debate that man Romantics as absolute idealists keeps philosophical interest in past battling against subjectivism does historical periods alive and well. shed new light on the Romantics' Anyone interested in the period of connections to and critiques of Kant German philosophy from 1781-1801 and Fichte's idealism. Beiser's im will benefit tremendously from a ca pressive study of German Idealism's reful study of Beiser's work. struggle against subjectivism (1781-