Ethnos and Politics DIDACTICAL GUIDELINES

Home , Ardhendu Bhushan Bardhan, Ethnosymbolism, Lithuanian calendar, Moldovan language

VYTAUTAS MAGNUS UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND DIPLOMACY DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Bernaras Ivanovas • Algimantas Prazauskas

Kaunas, 2013 Reviewed by. Assoc. Prof. Dr. Saulius Pivoras

Approved by the Department of Political Science of the Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy at Vytautas Magnus University on 12 December 2012 (Protocol No. 7a)

Recommended for printing by the Council of the Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy of Vytautas Magnus University on 7 January 2013 (Protocol No. 54)

Translated and edited by UAB “Lingvobalt”

Publication of the didactical guidelines is supported by the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. Project title: “Renewal and Internationalization of Bachelor Degree Programmes in History, Ethnology, Philosophy and Political Science” (project No.: VP1-2.2-ŠMM-07-K-02-048)

1. The Concept of Ethnic Politics. Ethnos, Ethnic Identity and its Structure ...... 7 2. Nation ...... 17 3. Nationalism 28 4. Multi-ethnic society: structure, dynamics and the issue of integration ...... 42 5. Ethnic conflicts 51 6. National integration in multi-ethnic communities 72 7. National movements and their types 85 8. Political regime and stability of the multi-ethnic society 106 9. Federalism ...... 115 10. Influence of ethno-political factors on international relations (Palestine and Israel) ...... 142 Literature ...... 148

The topics of ethnic politics have retained their relevance for already thirty years. Despite being a relatively new field of political science, ethnic politics have become firmly entrenched in this area. Solid foundation for this was laid by the world’s prominent political scientists K. Deutsch, R. Brubaker and others. New challenges continuously bring forth the importance of ethnic politics; therefore, the study process has to be continuously updated and modified in order to reflect, as far as possible, the status of relevant issues in the context of ethnic politics. Nationalism gaining new forms, ethnic conflicts and political processes in multi-ethnic countries are the constant focus of researchers’ attention. New theoretical approaches emerge, new concepts are introduced or the older ones, such as “ethnosymbolism”, are given new meanings. It is crucial to follow and analyse these processes; therefore, inclusion and introduction of new materials and views on a variety of issues of ethnic politics is of paramount importance. In this regard, the present collection of methodological articles attempts to make its humble contribution by introducing the students of the Ethnos and Politics course to the most important topics and questions of ethnic politics that also require individual work. The latter is very important; therefore, every article will present the essential questions, terms and concepts to be analysed and understood by the student. This would be the central task of the publication, i. e. to encourage the readers to work indepen- dently, motivate them to engage in a further quest for knowledge and acquire an understanding of the way ethnic politics is related to the other topics and issues of political science. If we succeed in reaching this goal together, then this study of ethnic politics will have accomplished its core mission.

1. The Concept of Ethnic Politics. Ethnos, Ethnic Identity and its Structure

Key concepts: Nationalism; ethnicity; national identity; national state. After reading the article, the student: a. will understand the characteristics of ethnic nationalism and the diversity of the actual concepts of nationalism; b. will be able to evaluate the importance of ethnicity in politics; c. will understand the structure of national identity and the contents of its parts.

Relevance of the issue: disintegration of the USSR, Yugoslavia, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, secession of Eritrea, East Timor, de facto secession of Northern Cyprus, national movements in other countries, separatism attempts, opposing tendencies of ethnic particularism and globalisation. Stability of the system, and often the type of regime and vitality of the state depends on the nature of ethnic relations (cf. Robert Dahl) that also inluence the international system.

A. Level of international interaction What makes up the contemporary world? States (192 members of the United Nations) or nations? Social, gender, religious, national groups, citizens of specific states, classes, races, information societies? Differ- ent approaches are possible: an orthodox muslim is convinced that all of humanity is divided into muslims and non-muslims, feminists, in the first place, see gender differences, marxists see class divisions (Healey, Joseph F. Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class. Pine Forge Press. 2010, p 17). But the most obvious division is division into states: 1) they occupy all of the land; 2) except for relatively few apatrids, almost all of the world’s population are citizens of some country; 3) states are the most important international players. However, an important role on the international arena, and especially in the community paradigm, is played by nations. The majority

7 Ethnos and Politics of the world’s population are members of some nation. The Radio of Armenia: the Soviet Union is inhabited by three nations: Armenians, Russians and non-Russians. It is difficult to determine the number of nations and ethnic groups in the world, but there are a few thousands of them at any rate. A more exact calculation is, perhaps, only possible by equating state and nation. This view is held by most politicians and even liberal thinkers. Both revolutionaries and liberals are certain that with the increasing economic integration, growing social mobility within the states and closer contact between different ethnic groups, a civic community with a common language and culture will inevitably be formed within the limits of national borders. This was also inspired by the USA’s example ofmelting pot. There was almost no doubt that a Soviet, Yugoslavian, Indian, Indonesian, etc., nation was taking shape. 1) State number dynamics. Since the second half of the 19th century, another trend had also been developing: regaining of independence by Greece (1831), separation of Belgium (1831), Romania, Serbia and Montenegro (1878), Norway (1905), Bulgaria (1908), Albania (1913), emergence of Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, the Baltic countries in the wake of the World War II and of Ireland in 1922. After the World War II, minority integration and assimilation tendencies prevailed in the European states for a time; however, the sixties already saw the so-called ethnic paradox – a boost in minority (Basque, Flemish, Corsican, Catalan) nationalism. A particularly powerful wave of ethnic nationalism hit with the beginning of political liberalisation after the Cold War. Conclusion: one of the most significant factors that shaped the current map of Europe are national movements. In Asian and Afri- can countries, the matters are a bit more complicated. 2) Relationships between nations lead to many international conflicts. The issue of borders and territorial disputes (e. g., “Lietuvio kalen- dorius” (Lithuanian Calendar) and the claims to the Kaliningrad enclave, the attitudes of Belarusian nationalists towards Vilnius). This is irredentism and separatism. The latter are related to the fact that in many cases, ethnic and international borders do not match, or that certain groups believe that they were illegally annexed to a multi- ethnic state, or to both.

8 The Concept of Ethnic Politics

Defending the interests of “compatriots”: this is related to diasporas living outside the borders of their historic homeland. The defence policy is rather selective: it does not apply to all countries where fellow-countrymen live. Support to separatists as a means of fulfilment of national interests. Military support.

B. State level Minority demands: cultural autonomy, territorial autonomy, secession. The issue of integration. Homogeneity or pluralism. Normative culture and language. The issue of identity and the need for loyalty. Political culture.

Theoretical questions. A large part of scientific literature is about specific conflicts: Ethnic politics conflictology

Research References to tribes can already be found in the oldest texts (Herodo- tus, Xenophon, Caesar, Tacitus, Strabo), the Old Testament contains descriptions of their customs and way of life. Relations between individual groups is one of the most important ancient and medieval history lines. Therefore, history is the first science to explore interethnic issues. Later: ethnology (cultural anthropology, sociology (as a narrower field, sociology of prejudice (Healey, Joseph F. Race, Eth- nicity, Gender, and Class. Pine Forge Press. 2010, p. 147)), psychology, political and legal science). (Parenti M. Ethnic Politics and Persistence of Ethnic Identifi- cation. – APScReview, 1967, vol. 61, No. 3, p. 717–726). J.Rothschild (1981) introduced the term “ethnopolitics”. Research object: ethnos as an object and subject of politics, political relations between ethnic groups (i. e. purely political sphere and overlapping fields). Relativity: not axioms but inherent characteristics and consistent patterns. 9 Ethnos and Politics

Central concept: ethnos. Derived from the Greek word ethnos – “the people”. Main features: self-awareness (“us” and “them”) and a name. Un- certainties arise in both cases. “Who are you?” Answers to this question are components of the identity structure. Component dynamics happen in the course of a lifetime. Differ- ent degree of constancy, also depends on a situation. Importance of intensity. Ethnicity is constant, almost universal. Historically different age of various groups: a) the Chinese, Persians, Assyrians, Jews; b) the European nations; c) new nations (Americans, Brazilians, Austra- lians, etc.). Many extinct nations: Phoenicians, Hittites, Etruscans, Dacians, Prussians, Yotvingians, Curonians, Livonians, etc. Either way, ethnoses and nations are communities that exist for many cen- turies. The basis of the common component is a collective identity. It dif- fers from its other forms because it is inherited and constant. Ethnic- ity is difficult to change. Attributes of an ethnos: a name, the concept of homeland, historical memory, culture, language, mentality and character traits. The simplest definition of ethnos: the people that have a name. However, there is a lot of confusion with the names: Deutschen – al- lemands, Germans, niemcy, vokiečiai, tedesco, saks, etc.; russkije – krievi, vene; chan – kinai, Chinese, Chinesen, chinois (derived from the Qin (Ch’in) dynasty); Roma – čigonai, Gypsies (Egyptians), bohe- miens (French), heidens (Dutch), mustalainen (Finnish for “blacks”). Therefore, there is a distinction between endonyms and exonyms. Both types of names originated in different ways: 1) from one of the groups comprising the nation (the Franks, Kartvelians, Angles); 2) from the dominant group (the Romanians, Russians) 3) from the assimilated group (the Prussians, Franks); 4) from the name of a dynasty or a ruler (Khan Uzbek); 5) from the name of a location (the Prussians, Germans). The endonym often means “people” (the Apatani and the Zhuang in India, many Indian peoples of North America)

10 The Concept of Ethnic Politics

Smaller groups are often called by their exonyms. Often these have a negative meaning: niemcy, the Iroquois (“real snakes” in Al- gonquin), the Sioux (“adders” in Ojibwe language), the Eskimo (“eat- ers of raw meat” in Algonquin), the Apache and the Comanche of Oklahoma (“enemies” in the languages of their neighbours). Exonyms usually cover several closely related groups: the Sioux (Omaha, Iowa, Dakota, etc.), the Chinese Di (barbarians), the Naga and the Kuki in India (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, nationalism and imagination. London: Seagull Books, 2010, p. 19.), the Polynesians, Chinese, Indians, Russians, Sudanese, Pakistani, Nigerians, etc. There are quite a lot of cases of exonyms becoming endonyms: the Polynesians, Hawaiians, Naga, American Indians. However, not all groups with their own language and culture have names. Firstly, names like “people”, “ i ioni kiai” or “tuteishi” can hardly be considered ethnonyms. In some places, e. g. in Papua New Guinea or individual African countries “we” are the residents of one village only. In their exploration of languages and culture, ethnologists distinguish specific groups; however, if these groups do not have endonyms, it shows that they do not perceive themselves as a group and only form a community from the outside point of view, as perceived by the neighbouring groups or ethnology experts. Therefore, self-awareness and identity are the key features of an ethnic group. Self-awareness of a group, as well as the identity of an individual, is characterised by a complicated structure. The importance of individual components and their hierarchy are different, but almost in all cases ethnic identity can be characterised by several key components: Homeland defined as a territory where (as a rule) an ethnic group had been formed and currently resides. Common territory is a necessary condition for the formation of an ethnos; however, there have been cases when a fully-formed ethnos has had to exist without a common territory for a long time (e. g. Jews: only a quarter of them live in Israel, the Roma, the Kurds, the Chinese diaspora in South- East Asia). Often the imagined borders of the homeland do not match the current national or administrative borders. E. g. it is impossible to define the borders of Kurdistan; there was no State of Israel up until 1948 and its borders remain a matter of dispute. The current

11 Ethnos and Politics borders of Germany and Poland are the result of the World War II. The ethnographic borders of Russia are unclear: Kiev, “the Mother of all Russian Cities”, is the capital of Ukraine; it is not clear whether Karelia, Udmurtia, Tatarstan, Yakutia and, in particular, the Kalin- ingrad enclave may be considered Russian lands. Not everything is clear regarding Lithuanian borders either. Therefore, the image of homeland is, first of all, associated with distinct geographical objects. Since ancient times, people have settled near water, thus for many nations rivers are among the most important symbols of the homeland: the Rhine, the Thames, the Vistula, the Danube, the Volga (although historically, its basin was the territory of the Turkic people and its name is of Turkic origin), the Daugava, the Nemunas, the Nile, the Ganges, the Yangtze, the Huang He, the Amazon, the Mississippi. For mountain peoples, the symbolic significance is held by mountains: the Alps, the Cauca- sus, the Himalayas. Not all locations have large rivers or mountains, which means that often the representatives of flora (a birch, a cypress, a cedar, tulips, orchids, a cherry tree) and fauna (a kangaroo) or special features of the landscape (snow, monsoon rains, oases) become symbols of the country. Historical memory: myths, symbols. Ethnic identity is linked to a community that has its imaginary roots in ancient times, i. e. a myth of common of origins. Important, mythologized events: the Arme- nian Genocide of 1915, the Mongol invasion, the Dacian-Romanian continuity, Aristotle as a Bulgarian, Jesus Christ as a Hungarian, Croatian, Ukrainian, Al-Farabi (870–950) Academy in Kazakhstan (1997), the cult of Timur in Uzbekistan. Culture. Ethnos is primarily a socio-cultural community, thus the differentiating role is played by specific elements of spiritual and material culture. Folk culture: traditional housing (houses on poles of some of the Melanesians and Micronesians, tree houses of Indian Garo tribes, the floating houses of the Orang Laut and some other minor nations of the South-East Asia; mobile homes of nomads: yurts, tents, wig- wams, Eskimo igloos, snow houses, etc.). Food. It is different in composition (plant food, meat, fish), manner of preparation, eating time. There is a variety of nutritional ta-

12 The Concept of Ethnic Politics boos: Indians do not eat beef, Jews and Muslims do not eat pork, Europeans do not eat snakes, bugs, maggots and dog meat, which are all part of the Chinese diet, Mon-Khmers do not consume milk. However, it is important to keep in mind that food is dependent, by a large part, on climatic conditions. One of the main cultural functions in general is adaptation in a given environment. As a result of urbanisation and technological progress, a lot of adaptive features lose their significance and the sphere of ethnic specifics gets considerably narrower. Traditional folk culture is preserved mostly in rural areas, and even then on condition that the country does not have a well-developed communications network. In the contemporary post-industrial society, ethnic culture is often deliberately maintained, involving creation of folk ensembles, establishment of museums, teaching subjects of ethno- logical nature in universities. Therefore, cultural differences between nations may be very mild, almost unnoticeable to an outside observer (e. g. between the Czechs and Slovaks, Croatians and Slovenians, Austrians and Germans). The issues of hybrid identity then arise.

Without more prominent differences of traditional culture and other distinguishing factors (national borders, different histories, etc.), ethnic identity is poorly expressed or non-existent (the Hindi belt in India). Language is the most visible element of identity. Language is simultaneously a cultural element, its means of transmission and the symbol of identity. In most cases, it is language (or at least its specific characteristics) that is one of the most important elements of ethnos distinguishing one ethnos from another. Exceptions: Anglophone, Hispanophone nations, the Punjabi, Bengali, also the Swiss. Religion. Its importance is very different. It is particularly important for those groups that have their own specific religion or a cult, like the Jews or Japanese, also in case it divides nations, which are linguistically related (Catholic Poles and Orthodox Ukrainians). National character and mentality. The differences are obvious, but it is very difficult to define or evaluate them. The middle of theth 19 century saw the development of a separate branch of science, ethnopsychology, which was of particular interest for the Germans (Herder, Steintal, Paul); a magazine called “Zeitschrift fuer Voelkerpsycholo-

13 Ethnos and Politics gie und Sprachwissenschaft” was published in 1859–1889. The central concept of ethnopsychology was Volksgeist. The racism of Nazi Ger- many compromised the studies of national identity. However, the Cold War and the process of decolonisation revived the interest in the features of national character. Ethnic autostereotype, or the image and stereotypes of one’s own group. It emerges by self-comparison to other groups, thereby forming ethnic stereotypes, i. e. the images of other groups or nations. Both are very subjective evaluative generalisations. An autostereotype expresses the internal solidarity of the group; for many people, stereotypes are one of the guiding tools, a kind of instruction advising how to behave in their interactions with the members of a particular group. Political factors exert a complex influence. Economic factors characterise the state, not the ethnos. Endogamy refers to marriages primarily within the confines of the ethnos. In the absence of universal cultural criteria distinguishing between ethnic groups, some researchers think that culture is not an actual characteristic of ethnos. Ethnos is a community that was formed under the influence of other factors. Starting with F. Barth’s 1969 book (Barth F., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. 1969. Boston: Little,. Brown and Co.), many Western ethnologists feel that self- awareness is the only universal characteristic of ethnos. Ethnicity is becoming an artificial construct, an artifact that came into existence for some external reasons or through the effort of the “elites”. Pur- portedly, the construction of ethnoses is deliberate, and people accept this construct because it gives them certain psychological and/ or material advantages, i. e. fulfils instrumental functions. The marginal status, however, is not always clear (especially the status assigned in the process of assimilation, group hierarchy). Functions of ethnicity: normative, integrating, instrumental and cognitive.

Ethnocentrism Ethnocentrism represents group solidarity, loyalty, worship (of sa- cred objects, the way of life, customs), a hostile or at least negative view of other groups. It is possible to distinguish two forms of eth- 14 The Concept of Ethnic Politics nocentrism: the aggressive form which is characterised by the component of ethnic superiority (“the chosen nation”) and the relatively peaceful, isolationist form. Classification of groups into positive and negative categories may have a psychological basis: the aspiration to develop affiliative and differential relationships. Experiments have confirmed that aggression towards individuals who are not part of the group strengthens internal relations within the group. This is characteristic of all groups. The concept was known to ethnologists since the 19th century, similar thoughts were also expressed by Darwin who wrote that cooperation within the group and competition between groups are part of natural selection mechanism (1871). The term itself, however, was introduced by W. G. Sumner (1906, 1911). He associated internal group solidarity with inter-group conflicts: fragmentation of the group may lead to defeat in a conflict with another group (the functional theory of social conflict was formulated approximately at the same time, i. e. in 1908). From this, two codes of morals logically followed: one for comrades inside and the other for strangers outside. In Sumner’s opinion, ethnocentrism is identical to patriotism. Ethnocentrism is particularly common in traditional societies. In the early modern period, it transforms into nationalism.

Questions 1. What is ethnic nationalism? 2. What determines the spread of the concepts of ethnic nationalism? 3. What is the difference between the ethnic and civic nationalism? 4. What does the structure of national identity consist of?

Online research project: Perform a search for the concepts of “ethnicity” and “nationalism” in Lithuanian information portals (www.delfi.lt, www.balsas.lt, www.lrytas.lt, etc.) and evaluate the perception of these concepts. Compare the usage of these concepts with similar information in Western information portals (http://www.nypost.com, http:// www.washingtonpost.com/). 15 Ethnos and Politics

Optional chapter task: Use the following internet information resource containing different media materials: http://www.sagepub.com/healeystudy5/ archives.htm#ch1 and answer the questions of the first quiz: http://www.sagepub.com/healeystudy5/.

Literature: 1. Anderson B. Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Rev. edition. – London; New York: Verso, 1991 (1st ed. – 1983). (Arba lietuvi kas vertimas); 2. Brubaker R. Pilietybė ir tautiškumas Prancūzijoje ir Vokietijoje. Vilnius: Pradai, 1998; 3. Brubaker R. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the Na- tional Question in the New Europe. Cambridge University Press. 1996; 4. Deutsch K.W., Nationalism and social communication. – Cam- bridge, 1969; 5. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, nationalism and imagination. London:Seagull Books, 2010; 6. Kuzmickas B. ir Astra L. Šiuolaikinė lietuvių tautinė savimonė. Vilnius: Rosma, 1996; 7. Ozkirimli, Umut, Theories of nationalism. Palgrave Macmillan. 2010. 8. Smith A.D. The Ethnic Origins of Nations.- Oxford; N. Y.: Black- well, 1986. 9. Sumner, William Graham. On Liberty, Society, and Politics: The Essential Essays of William Graham Sumner, ed. Robert C. Ban- nister (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1992. 2. Nation

Key concepts: Nation; nationhood; people; ethnic group; national self-awareness. After reading the article, the student: a. will be able to evaluate the spread of the concepts of nation; b. will understand the differences leading to different interpretations of national origins; c. will be able to distinguish the most important factors behind the formation and transformation of nations.

“Nation” is one the most arguable concepts. 1) Nation in English: UNO, NHL, multinationals, “national team”; 2) people; 3) a large ethnic group inhabiting a compact territory; 4) Indian tribes in North America. In Latin, natio means birth. Four “nations” were convened at the Council of Constance (1414–1417): German (including Hungary and Poland), English, French and Italian; there was a similar situation in medieval universities. Enc.Br.: “In medieval universities, a group of students from a particular region or country who banded together for mutual protection and cooperation in a strange land. In some universities nations were responsible for educating and examining students. Each one was gov- erned by its own proctor, who was elected for terms varying from one month (at the University of Paris) to a year (University of Bolo- gna). Through participation in elections and meetings, the students – many of whom in later life were to serve on committees and councils of kings and princes – were exposed to the practical workings of constitutional government. At Bologna, the original site of the division into nations and the model for this development in other universities, there were four nations – Lombard, Tuscan, Roman, and Ultramon- tane (including French, German, and English). Students who were Bolognese citizens were not admitted to a nation: they did not need the protection afforded foreign students. Also, for a citizen of Bolo- gna there would have been the question of divided loyalties, since

17 Ethnos and Politics members owed their first allegiance to their nation (Encyclopedia Britannica. 2011, vol. 4, p. 446)”. The most essential component is the foundation, i. e. the group united by: J. S. Mill: common feelings and preferences; J. Fichte: language; Renan (1882): will, spiritual principle and soul; F. I. Neiman (1888): unique essence based on culture; Kirchhof (1905): economy, “seriousness of life”; O. Bauer: common destiny as a consequence of natural heritage and cultural values; F. Oppenheimer (1923): national self-awareness; A. Vierkandt (1923): culture; E. Lemberg (1964): ideology in general; K. Deutsch (Deutsch K. W., Nationalism and social communication. – Cambridge, 1969): social communications; nation as “a people who have a state”, “a people who achieved the possibility of control over some of the social enforcement institutions and in the prospect can form a sovereign nation-state”; B. Anderson (1983): “an imagined political community”; E. Renan in his lecture “Qu’est-ce’qu’une na’ion?” (What is a nation?) (1882) emphasised common aspirations and characteristics (race, religion, common interests, geography), but insisted that none of them ensured the unity of the nation and, apologising for the met- aphor, stated that the nation was a daily plebiscite. It is clear enough that a fully-formed nation is, as a rule, a territorial socio-cultural community with its own self-awareness and a full social structure. The latter distinguishes a nation from an ethnic group which does not have the most important social layers due to a small number of members or they are integrated into the structure of another nation. Therefore, 230,000 Icelanders form a nation, but Nivkhs (4000), Andamanese (1000) and hundreds of other small groups cannot become a nation. In the first half of the 19th century, Lithuanians were not a nation due to significant regional socio-cultural differences, the absence of a common identity, and also because their own professional culture was almost non-existent, while its sparse intelligentsia was in the orbit of the Polish culture.

18 Nation

One of the most debated questions are the reasons for the formation of nations. Why some of the groups, sometimes small, form their own nations, while in many other cases, quite large groups (often comprised of over ten or even a few tens of millions people) with their own dialects and quite distinct cultural traits merge with other nations? Why, for example, in Europe, the current nations, and not some other nations were formed? The origin of nations is explained in a variety of ways. There are three main viewpoints: primordial, constructionist and historical. For many countries and nations, this is a very poignant political issue. Given that nations are a logical result of the evolution of ethnic groups, this means that… From the primordial point of view, the ancestors of modern nations have existed since ancient times, and in the process of modernisation close, related ethnic groups were inevitably destined to merge. There is no essential difference between the current nation and its predecessors; therefore, there is no theoretical issue of the origin of nations. Only two topics merit attention: survival of the ethnos (in many cases, in very unfavourable conditions) and the history of “national rebirth”. This viewpoint is especially typical of patriotic (or nationalistic) journalism, school history textbooks and political discourse in many countries. One of the possible logical conclusions is that larger, currently existing groups become nations, therefore, they have a legitimate claim to their own statehood. This means that fragmentation of multi-ethnic states is not over yet. Umut Ozkirimli sees several essential, closely related weak spots in the theory of primordialism: 1. Nature of ethnicity and ethnic relations; 2. Origin of ethnicity and ethnic bonds; 3. Date of origin of nations; 4. The issue of national feeling and attachment (Ozkirimli, Umut, Theories of nationalism. Palgrave Macmillan. 2010, p. 60–67). Constructionist or modernist view, which is currently dominant in the Western countries, especially in the USA’s social sciences, virtually denies the connection between ethnicity and nation. In the opinion of constructionists, nations are the result of social engineer- ing and construction. This may be done by the state which, by uniting

19 Ethnos and Politics different ethnic groups, erodes their cultural differences and intro- duces a common language and self-awareness through a variety of means (school, state apparatus, military service, etc.). France, where at the end of the 18th century one third of inhabitants did not understand French, is given as an example. The same may be done by the elites of ethnic groups, who in this way seek to create a social niche reserved for themselves. In both cases, the ideology of nationalism is the driving force. This postulate was quite flatly formulated by Ernest Gellner in 1964: “Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self- consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist” (Gellner E., Thought and Change. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; Chicago: University of Chicago 1964, p. 169). Granted, in his later writings, he acknowledged that such socialisation may only be accomplished by the state. Paul Brass (1991): “ethnicity and nationalism are not ‘giv- ens’. They are social and political constructions, creations of elites, who draw upon, distort, and sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures of the groups they wish to represent in order to protect their well-being or existence or to gain political and economic advantage for their groups as well as for themselves” (Brass P. Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison. New Delhi; Newbury Park (Cal.): Sage Publications, 1991, p. 18.). The views of historical determinism and ethnosymbolism do not constitute one school of thought, but they are united in the belief that nations are the consistent result of historical developments and social evolution, as well as in their ambition to identify common and specific factors that determined the formation of nations. Ethno- symbolists (e. g. A. D. Smith, J. A. Armstrong) are united by their critique of the modernist view based on the understanding of the importance of ethnic symbols, myths, historical memory, values and traditions for the transformations of nationalism and the formation process of ethnicity starting with the 18th century (Ozkirimli, Umut, Theories of nationalism. Palgrave Macmillan. 2010, p. 143–157). Many writings of numerous researchers from Soviet countries, as well as Eastern and Central Europe that should be attributed to historical determinism, are formally, but often without much reason, attributed to the Marxist school of thought. Among the Western au- thors: Karl Deutsch, Anthony Smith.

20 Nation

According to K. Deutsch, “a nation is a transformation of several ethnic segments into a people in the process of social mobilisation”. Except for short periods, ancient and medieval times can be characterised by localism, decentralisation of production, settlements, military and legal authority. Common culture of a state, region or continent did not have much influence on rural population. In K. Deutch’s opinion, the changes were determined by: 1. The shift from subsistence farming to barter economy; 2. Social mobilisation of rural population from the core, more densely populated areas more actively involved in barter trade; 3. Urban and social mobility growth; 4. Development of basic communication networks. K. Deutsch: “In no way do I claim that a communication network can by itself create a nation. Cultural compatibility and, in many cases, sufficient similarity of colloquial dialects necessary for the formation of a common language understandable to large population groups are at least no less important”. 5. Uneven, differential concentration of capital and professional skills. This was the driving force behind migration to more developed areas, contacts between core inhabitants and migrants, and finally, assimilation; however, if the flow of migrants was too high, they developed their own form of nationalism. 6. In the competitive political and economic battle, there is an inception of national interests. Social coalition is more solid if backed by social communications and cultural style. In the game of competition, forming groups on ethnic or national grounds is by far not the only way to unity, but of all possible combinations, ethnic and national units, in many cases, ensure the optimum power and stability ratio and the maximum ability to adapt in a competitive world. 7. The rise of national self-awareness and development or introduction of national symbols: the church, the saints (Stephen in Hungary, Wenceslas in Bohemia and the Czech Republic, Patrick in Ireland, Matka Boska Czestochowska in Poland). The beginning of crystallisation of group self-awareness gives birth to inspirators and supporters of “national rebirth”: compilers of grammar books and dictionaries, who give the language its literary form, collectors

21 Ethnos and Politics of folklore, first poets and writers, historians, modellers of national symbols. Almost at the same time, an appearance is made by the first national organisers: heads of literary and cultural clubs, associations, singing collectives, sports clubs, politicians. Cooperatives, mutual support funds, insurance societies are created, i. e. an entire body of organisations serving cultural, physical and technological progress, which characterises every fully-fledged nation, is formed. 8. Doubling ethnic self-awareness and political pressure. Often this is done with a purpose to turn one’s own nation into a privileged class (Deutsch K. W., Tides among Nations. New York: Free Press 1979, p. 27–37). In K. Deutsch’s opinion, after the nation has been formed, there are four types of changes: 1) There is an emergence of a relatively large community of people who can communicate effectively and have sufficient economic resources to pass these communication abilities to their children. 2) Economic and social resources are acculumated ensuring the division of labour necessary for the continuation of this process. 3) There is an accumulation and integration of symbols, individual and societal methods of their preservation, transfer and creation of new combinations that are in line with the current and future level of mobilisation and integration of material and human resources. 4) An ability is developed to change the intended purpose of economic and social resources, their combinations. The community acquires an ability to learn in the broad sense of the word: create new knowledge, re-formulate its goals. According to all of these criteria, a nation is a more effective organisation than a multi‑ethnic or local community (Deutsch K.W., Tides among Nations. New York: Free Press 1979, p. 48.). Anthony Smith emphasises the ethnic origins of the nation and his most important work in this field is called “The Ethnic Origins of Nations”. The starting point were the early states that united the territories of closely related ethnic groups. But the crucial factor was the triple revolution or, more precisely, three revolutions: (1) Revolution in the area of division of labour. Economic centres within national borders became interested in the development of communications (e. g. between the centres for the extraction of raw ma-

22 Nation terials and ports). This laid the grounds for the common interests of regional and city elites, and later, for the unified occupational system. (2) Revolution in the area of government. Together with economic change, the military and administrative control methods were also changing and developing and the military‑administrative state apparatus made up of educated intellectuals was being formed. The bureaucratic state encouraged the growth of the bourgeois class, and with the collapse of monarchies, this class inherited the state government skills and the government apparatus. (3) Revolution in the area of cultural coordination. The place of the church was taken by the sovereign secular state striving to create a community of equal and loyal citizens. There was a gradual process of identification between the state, territory and cultural community. At first, such identification gained a foothold among the - bu reaucracy that spread it further among the other layers of society. In the West, territorial centralisation and cultural standardisation were happening in parallel. Administrative (formal) language was very important. Cultural standardisation was undertaken by the state on a particularly wide scale in the second half of the 19th century, when primary education became a mass phenomenon and the universal military draft began. The result of the three revolutions were centralised, culturally homogeneous states (Smith A. D. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. – Ox- ford; N. Y.: Blackwell, 1986, p. 42). Benedict Anderson noted the factor of the spread of national languages: 77% of books published before 1500 were in Latin, while at the end of the century the majority of books published in France were already written in French. The print run of published books was also growing: ~ 20 million in the 15th century, 150–200 million in the 16th century. “It can be said that the book was the first modern-style mass-produced industrial commodity”. Book publishing business was constantly searching for new markets and became a large business, whereas capitalism unified related folk languages. In the 16th century, the pace of change in the French language had significantly slowed down, and in the 17th century national languages gained their current form almost everywhere (Anderson B., Įsivaizduojamos bendruomenės. Vilnius: Baltos lankos, 1999, p. 12).

23 Ethnos and Politics

Controversial role of the state. Lord Acton (1862): “A State may in course of time produce a nationality; but that a nationality should constitute a State is contrary to the nature of modern civilisation” (Lord Acton. Nationality 1862. http://www.panarchy.org/acton/nationality.html). Ernesto Baker: “From the beginning of the 19th century, nations create states, not vice versa”. Johann K. Bluntschli, ex- pert on the theory of the state: “Every nation has a calling and the right to create its own state... Every state is a nation (Jede Nation ist berufen und berechtigt, einen Staat zu bilden... Jeder Staat ist eine Nation)” (Allgemeine Staatslehre. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart. 6. Aufl., 1866, S. 107). History shows that different alternatives may be possible. In West- ern Europe, nations and states consolidated in parallel, although in general states within the current borders existed back before the Peace of Westphalia. In Eastern, Southern and partially in Central Europe, nations formed either within the boundaries of multi-ethnic empires (i. e. regardless of the state’s attempts to thwart this process) or within a politically fragmented ethnic area (Germany, Italy). Depending on historical circumstances, several ways to form a nation may be distinguished: 1) dynastic: within the boundaries of formerly existing king- doms; 2) ethnic: on the basis of ethnoses in multi-ethnic states (Hab- sburg, Ottoman, Russian empires); 3) immigrant nations (the New World); 4) on the basis of political or territorial statehood: in the former colonies. The process is not yet over, nation-building remains one of the most important functions of the state. France: the principle of jus soli. Revolution changed the concept of the nation: equal rights and duties, privileges were replaced by the concept of citizenship (citoy- enneté). It was modelled after the city-state, but citizenship began to mean territorial belonging, not a privileged status. Revolution created the national state; the Constitution of 1793 even recognised equal rights for foreigners (the Convent later revoked them). Cul- tural cosmopolitanism of the upper classes that was characteristic of Europe of that time was also forgone. “By inventing the citizen

24 Nation of a national state and a legally homogeneous group of members of the nation, revolution simultaneously invented the foreigner… A person had to be either a citizen or a foreigner… By abolishing legal and moral boundaries within the national state, it /revolution/ formed legal and moral boundaries and differences between national states” (Encyclopedia Britannica. 2011, vol. 4, p. 80–82). Nationalité and citoyenneté (nationality and citizenship) became synonyms. Ethnicization of nationhood. After 1830, there was an increased usage of the word “nationalité”, which has an ethno-cultural meaning (it firmly stuck in 1848). It became the preferable and “natural” understanding of legal and ethno-cultural nationality. A weakened France needed particularism, not cosmopolitanism; therefore, Fran- cocentrism gained ground. Racists (Arthur de Gobineau, Ernest Re- nan) associated race with class, contrasting German aristocracy with the Gaulish masses. However, owing to the war with Germany, race was separated from class and matched with nation, France’s “Latin civilisation” was contrasted with “German barbarism” (Encyclope- dia Britannica. 2011, vol. 4, p. 157–158). Free compulsory primary education in the 19th century. Secular education meant national education, also including history and geography. Patriotism was fostered, especially after the defeat in 1870. Schools became powerful vehicles of assimilation. The army became another “national school”. French identity became an acquired, not inherited, quality. Germany: the rule of jus sanguinis. In the absence of a united national state, Staatsangehorigkeit and Staatsburgerschaft did not match with Nationalitat and Volk- szugehorigkeit. Even after unification, the nation and the state were different, ethno-national undertones remained even in the Nation- ality Law of 1913 (Encyclopedia Britannica. 2011, vol. 4, p. 88). Until the end of the 18th century, universal rights did not exist: special rights were held only by the members of certain status groups. The first important step was Prussia’s Allgemeines Landrecht (the Code of 1794) where classes were transformed into nationally defined and nationally regulated corporations (Encyclopedia Britannica. 2011, vol. 4, p. 99).

25 Ethnos and Politics

The German Confederation of 1815 (Deutsches Bund): settlement for permanent living depended on membership, not the other way around. The German Nationality Law of 1913 allowed Germans living abroad to keep their citizenship for an indefinite amount of time and pass it on to their descendants, i. e. it separated citizenship from territory and defined citizenry as a community of individuals sharing common origins. In 1910, Germany had approximately 1.25 million foreigners and 3.5 million emigrants. Citizenship was not granted even to third generation immigrants. Out of 1.5 million Turks (including 400,000 Turks born in Ger- many), only about 1000 receive German citizenship every year. In the eighties, citizenship in Germany was granted to about 5000 immigrants every year (half of them Yugoslavians); in France, out of a smaller number of individuals, over 50,000 were granted citizenship.

Questions: 1. How is the concept of nation most frequently understood? 2. What are the theories on the origins of nations? 3. What are the theoretical approaches to the origins of nations? 4. How is primordialism different from ethnosymbolism? 5 What are the essential differences between the principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis?

Online research project: Look how the concept of nation is understood in the materials of Lithuanian political parties made available online (programmes, other documents). Which concept of nation is dominant? Anal- yse the underlying reasons and the influence in terms of ethnic nationalism.

26 Nation

Recommended literature: 1. Anderson B., Įsivaizduojamos bendruomenės. Vilnius: Baltos lankos, 1999; 2. Brass P. Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison.New Delhi; Newbury Park (Cal.): Sage Publications, 1991; 3. Brubaker R. Pilietybė ir tautiškumas Prancūzijoje ir Vokietijoje. Vilnius: Pradai, 1998; 4. Deutsch K.W., Tides among Nations. New York: Free Press, 1979; 5. Encyclopedia Britannica. 2011. vol. 4; 6. Healey, Joseph F. Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class. Pine Forge Press. 2010; 4. Ozkirimli, Umut, Theories of nationalism. Palgrave Macmillan. 2010; 8. Smith A.D. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. – Oxford; N. Y.: Black- well, 1986; 9. Smith, A. D. Nationalism. Keyconcepts. Polity press. 2010; 10. Stephen, Cornell, Ethnicity and Race. Making identities in a Changing World. Pine Forge Press. 2007. 3. Nationalism

Key concepts: Ethnic nationalism; state nationalism; nationalising nationalism; nationalism of an ethnic group; national socialism; national identity. After reading the article, the student: a. will be able to evaluate the nature of nationalism; b. will understand the most important types of nationalism; c. will know the structural and priority differences determining the types of nationalism; d. will be able to apply R. Brubaker’s triadic nexus of nationalism.

“In too many studies, nat’lism and ethnicity become interchangeable and undistinguishable: nat’list problems have become ethnic problems and vice versa. This conceptual jumble is both unavoidable and understandable in a study of ‘ethnic nat’lisms...” (Griffiths S. I., 1993, 295.) “Its very vagueness and lack of pragmatic content gives it a potentially universal support within its own community... ethnicity can mobilize the vast majority of its community – provided its ap- peal remains sufficiently vague or irrelevant” (Hobsbawm E. J., 1991, p. 169).

Definitions of nationalism: Loyalty and devotion to one’s nation or country, such that national interests are placed above either individual or other group interests (Enc Br.) “The Penguin Dictionary of Politics” (David Robertson (1993)): “N. is the political belief that some group of people represents a natural community which should live under one political system, be independent of others and, often, has the right to demand an equal standing in the world order with others. Although sometimes a genuine and widespread belief, especially under conditions of foreign rule, it is equally often a symbolic tool used by political leaders to control their citizens… At its simplest nationalism contrasts with in- ternationalist movements or creeds, and means a stress on local, at

28 Nationalism

times almost tribal, identities and loyalties… In fact the doctrine of nationalism, although widely acknowledged, cannot be very clearly defined” (p. 333–334). “The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics” (2009): “Nationalism turns devotion to the nation into principles or programmes. It thus contains a different dimension to mere patriotism, which can be a devotion to one’s country or nation devoid of any project for political action. It is important to distinguish between particular nationalisms, which do not imply a general approach to politics, and a universal principle of nationalism. Most nationalists have a programme for their own particular nation; but do not necessarily hold views about the significance of nationality elsewhere. It is in this sense that nationalism has been described as an ideologically empty bottle with strength and shape, but no particular content. Thus the nationalism of the Congress Party in India before independence was able to in- corporate such varied figures as J. Nehru, a modernizer and believer in rational planning, Krishna Menon, a Marxist, and M. K. Gandhi, an anti-industrial Hindu ascetic. The general feature of universal principles of nationalism is an assertion of the primacy of national identity over the claims of class, religion, or humanity in general…” (p. 334) Gellner E. (1983, p. 1): “primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.” Enc. Brit.: ideology based on the premise that the individual’s loyalty and devotion to the nation-state surpass other individual or group interests. Smith A. D. (1976, p. 1): “ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, cohesion and individuality for a social group deemed by some of its members to constitute actual or potential nation” 1991 (Smith A. D., National Identity. Penguin: London, p. 72–82): “an ideology, including a cultural doctrine of nations and the national will and prescriptions for the realization of nat’l aspirations and the national will”, based on ethnic and geneological grounds, and “a social and political movement to achieve the goals of the nation and realize its will”.

29 Ethnos and Politics

Kellas J. G., (Kellas J. G., The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnic- ity. 1991. Palgrave Macmillan, p. 2–3): nationalism seeks to defend and promote the interests of the nation. Seton-Watson H. (Seton-Watson H. Nations and States: an En- quiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism. Westview Press. 1986, p. 19): “Nationalism, as I understand it, is a doctrine and a movement designed to promote and safeguard the existence of a nation”. Other main interpretations of nationalism: 1) Nationalism is a Romantic movement that emerged in Ger- many and Italy as a response to universalism and rationalism of the Enlightenment. From this point of view, it is easier to understand people in a linguistic, cultural and historical context connecting them to a specific territory, and not on the basis of abstract human nature. Values and concepts uniting a community are local, not universal. The leading theorist of romantic nationalism was J. G. Herder (1744–1803) who wrote about the importance of Volksgeist: “...that the only rational form of government was a national state based on a Volk, and detested imperial forms of government. Herder’s contribution was to emphasize the cultural unity of a community and the role played by folklore and popular traditions in its identity. It was apparently he who coined the word nationalism. Development of mankind had lead to nothing, and a new mankind has to be created through educations and instilling reine Sittlichkeit” (Hamilton A. Herder’s Theory of the Volksgeisthttp://www.counter-currents.com/2011/05/ herders-theory-of-the-volksgeist/). Later it spread in Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. Ideas of this kind of nationalism were developed by Rousseau, Fichte, ideologists of national movements: Kossuth, Palacky, Mazzini; they are prominent in the USA’s Declaration of Independence. 2) Nationalism is a reaction against colonialism in the countries whose traditional social organisation collapsed under the pressure of colonialism. Since most of the colonies were multi-ethnic, nationalism acquired a supra-ethnic character (the nationalism of Indians, Indonesians and Filipinos). 3) Nationalism is a reaction of the periphery due to uneven development of capitalism. Scottish nationalism is given as an example.

30 Nationalism

Often, however, it is typical of the more advanced regions (the Bal- tic governorates in the Russian Empire, Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain, Punjab in India). Several types of nationalism: aggressive (with a characteristic superiority, the complex of the “chosen nation”), peaceful, isolationist. There are also more detailed classifications. Ernst Haas: – liberal; – jacobinic (aggressive); – traditional; – syncretic (a combination of tradition and innovation); – integral, enforcing strict subjection of individuals to the interests of the group.

Anthony Smith (1971: 228): Colonial Heterogeneous Ivory Coast, Tanzania, Chad Cross-cultural US, Ireland, Argentine, Chile Mixed Indonesia, Kenya, Burma, India, Malaysia Ethnic Secession Norway, Serbia, Tunisia, Egypt, Basque Diaspora Armenia, Greece, Zionism Irredentism Italy, Bulgaria, Somalia, Poland, Mongolia Pan. Turkism, Slavism, German, Hellenic, Arab Post-Independence Recent Integration Yugoslavia, Tanzania, Mali, Senegal, Ghana Protection Brazil, Peru, Paraguay, Bolivia Expansion Germany, Greece, France, Poland, Bulg., Romania, Japan, USSR Sovereign Renewal 17th cent. England, Rev. France, Turkey, Russia, Switz., Mexico, China, Cuba Preservation Ethiopia, Afgh., Siam, 16th cent. England and Spain

31 Ethnos and Politics

In the opinion of many experts, nationalism is a new phenomenon which started taking shape at the end of the 18th century, and is particularly associated with the American and French Revolutions. It originates from the assumption that nations are the primary and natural focus of allegiance – an assumption that has by no means always been widely accepted. Until the 18th century the focus of such allegiance was more likely to be a smaller unit, such as the fiefdom, religious group, city, or immediate locality. In the religious context, for example, the focus of allegiance would be a supranational group, such as the Christian community as a whole, called Christendom. The nation was therefore one among many objects of allegiance. Only in the 18th century did the nation first begin to become the focal point of political activity. Unlike most other political doctrines, nationalism lacks a founding father whose ideas have served as in- spiration and model for his successors (Encyclopedia Britannica. 2011, vol. 4, p. 362). The formation of nationalism was stimulated by the creation of centralised states, as well as the processes of modernisation and social modernisation: secularisation of education, which promoted the use of native languages, ideas of national sovereignty. In Eu- rope, nationalism was first formed in Britain, in the course of the Puritan Revolution in the 17th century, by combining the ethics of calvinism (Mornay du Plessis, Johannes Althusius, Theodore Beza) and the principles of liberalism characteristic of the newly emerging commercial class. A similar type of nationalism with a characteristic understanding of its country’s mission also formed in America. The Americans justified their struggle for it in universalistic rather than nationalistic terms. But the Americans contributed significantly by their propagation of the principle of self-determination and the stress that people should be free to govern themselves and foreign rule is always illegitimate, American nationalism was a typical product of the 18th century. British settlers in North America were influenced partly by the traditions of the Puritan revolution and the ideas of Locke and partly by the new rational interpretation given to Eng- lish liberty by contemporary French philosophers. American settlers became a nation engaged in a fight for liberty and individual rights. They based that fight on current political thought, especially as -ex

32 Nationalism pressed by Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine. It was a liberal and humanitarian nationalism that regarded America as in the vanguard of mankind on its march to greater liberty, equality, and happiness for all. The ideas of the 18th century found their first political realization in the Declaration of Independence and in the birth of the American nation. Their deep influence was felt in the French Revo- lution (Birch A., Nationalism and national integration. http://www. google.lt/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=3&v ed=0CEkQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tolerance.cz%2Fcourse s%2Fmonnet%2Fwinter2004%2FAQCI%2FAQCI_irena_birch.doc& ei=zk4vUPqCC6rf4QSO3YCQDg&usg=AFQjCNFMWcfiK66b59oE RzGOjkABCLd01). Napoleon’s armies spread the ideas of nationalism across Europe; they also found resonance in Latin America (Mexico). However, his conquests caused a wave of resistance nationalism. The Revolutions of 1848 were followed by the unifications of Italy, Romania, Germany in 1859–1871, elements of liberalism reached Spain and Russia. Bismarck’s Germany, however, saw the coming into force of conservative, authoritarian nationalism; Alsace-Lorraine was annexed against the will of its people. Similar nationalism also gained ground in Russia (at the expense of Westernizers). Ethnic nationalism was bringing the Ottoman and Habsburg empires to ruin. After World War II nationalist fervour died down in many Euro- pean nations, in part owing to their awareness of an increasing inter- dependence, fostered by such organizations as NATO, the European Economic Community, and others. In Asia and Africa, however, nationalism grew rapidly, chiefly as a reaction against colonialism; in later stages neutralism and nonalignment were also employed as bul- warks against domination by large political and economic powers. With the downfall of the communist system in eastern Europe, nationalism again reasserted itself among many Soviet satellite countries. Nationalism based on linguistic, ethnic, and religious affilia- tions resurfaced in a striking fashion in the former republics of the Soviet Union and in the remnants of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s (Encyclopedia Britannica. 2011, vol. 4, p. 442). To conclude, it can be said that the following is the most comprehensive concept of nationalism:

33 Ethnos and Politics

Nationalism is an ideology and movement with the aim to ensure survival of the community that calls itself a nation and to create optimum conditions for its existence. Two components may be observed in the ideology of every nationalism: the one presenting a particular image of the community and the deciding (or appealing) one. The first component is related to identity: group symbols, myths, autostereotypes. This component, in particular, encompasses creative work of cultural educators during the period of national consolidation: collection of folklore, interest in ethnic culture, re‑interpretation of history (particular emphasis is placed on the glorious past, the Golden Age), often even the creation of an epos (the Finnish Kalevala, the Estonian Kalevipoeg), publishing activities. All these activities with the characteristic attributes of the initial stage of the movement are well-documented and used by constructionist researchers. However, they tend to ignore two important circumstances: 1) the “founding fathers” cannot, on their own initiative, decide which groups will be part of the forming nation. Should the provincial elites have competed to pursue their interests, the Bavarian, Pro- vençal, Prussian-German and other nations could have been formed. Socio-cultural boundaries are not contingent on national ideologists, their role is limited to the creation of an ideology and its spread within the boundaries of the group whose formation is determined by other factors. 2) By far not all “inventions” of national ideologists are adopted as symbols, or they can be rejected after some time (e. g. descent from the groups mentioned in the Old Testament). The symbols that go hand in hand with the collective historical memory, ethnic stereotypes and autostereotypes take root. In other words, self-awareness may only be influenced within certain limits. The particularly important elements of the first building block are the ones that express the national identity, the attitude towards other nations, and also, in multi-ethnic countries, the view on incorporation (voluntary accession, dynastic union, annexation, etc.). The second building block of nationalist ideology expresses the interests and goals of the nation. These may include the preservation of identity, the right to use one’s native language in public settings,

34 Nationalism autonomy, independence, unification of the ethnic territory. From the political point of view, this building block is much more important. Although both blocks are related, the first one is, nonetheless, limited to identity, image and, in a certain sense, is an internal, intra- group phenomenon, whereas the second one presents immediate demands with regard to other groups and/or the state. Interests and demands are formulated by the smaller segments of the nation: different social groups. Therefore, they may differ. Groups that are better integrated into the multi-ethnic society are usually more moderate. Marginal groups, if they are politically mo- bilised, part of the young population (especially educated young people) more often have extreme demands, e. g. Basque nationalism, which can be characterised by the moderate nationalism of the wealthy bourgeoisie integrated into the political and economic system of Spain, and the armed organisation ETA, which is mainly an organisation of young people seeking independence by means of terrorism. As a rule, every nationalism can be characterised by a variety of movements, starting with moderate liberal and ending with extremist movements. This variety, however, can be very diverse. In most cases, all movements are united by fundamental common goals, such as pursuit of independence or autonomy, and their differences lie primarily in tactics. In the event of a strong polarisation and fragmentation of the society, cases are possible when different groups are also unable to agree on strategic goals. In that case, it is very difficult to speak about a collective nationalism of the nation during a given period. Such a situation may arise during a civil war, also at important turning points of history (e. g. in Russia after the collapse of the USSR). Supra-ethnic nationalism developed in many overseas colonies: India, Indonesia, the Philippines, etc. The uniting factor was racial discrimination, identical status of the new educated classes, the common fight against colonialism. Thus a new supra-ethnic nationalism, often with racist undertones, was developed. Cheikh Anta Diop (Cheikh Anta Diop, Nations negres et cultures, 1955): “The Negroes were the first to invent mathematics, astronomy, calendar, sciences generally, religion, agriculture, social organization, medicine, writ- ing, technology and architecture” (http://www.diop-ahmadou.com/

35 Ethnos and Politics article-nations-negres-et-culture-de-cheikh-anta-diop-66890960. html). However, it was not uniformly adopted by different ethnic and religious groups. In some cases, the battle for liberation, while integrating and uniting some of the groups, became a disintegrating factor for other groups, i. e. fomented their separatism (Muslims, Tamils, etc., in British India). The difference between nationalism as an ideology and nationalism as a movement: the loud and aggressive nationalist ideology is often typical of those countries where nationalism does not have a mass foundation, or the nations are still in the early stage of development.

Ethnic and civic nationalism Ethnic nationalism develops if the developing nation and the state do not match: in a multi-ethnic state (Habsburg, Ottoman, Russian empires) or in the context of political fragmentation (Germany, Italy). In multi-ethnic or dependent countries, minority nationalism can always be characterised by a negative attitude towards the dominant majority or the state. For example, Polish (also Latvian) nationalism was anti-Russian and anti-German (pro-Russian nationalism was unimaginable), Lithuanian nationalism is primarily anti-Polish and slightly less anti-Russian, Serbian, Romanian and Bulgarian nationalism is anti-Muslim. Often it can be characterised by a positive attitude towards some other nations, e. g. historically, Armenian nationalism was anti-Turkish and pro‑Russian. Civic nationalism Its components: 1. State nationalism; 2. Patriotic education; 3. Symbolism: flags, coats of arms, names of institutions (schools, universities, military units), streets.

Ethnocentrism The concept was introduced by W. G. Sumner (1906, 1911) (ETH- NOCENTRISM – A KEY DETERMINANT IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE STRATEGY FORMULATION? http://epub.wu.ac. at/544/1/document.pdf). It expresses solidarity and loyalty for the group, hostility towards other groups. Striving to divide reality into 36 Nationalism positive and negative categories may have a psychological cause: a wish to create a system of affiliative, positive and differentiated ties. Experiments have confirmed that hostility towards other groups and strangers strengthens internal relations within the group. According to Sumner, a stranger is either a guest or an enemy; therefore, ethnocentrism has two codes of morals: one for comrades inside and the other for strangers outside. Sumner maintained that ethnocentrism was identical to patriotism. Ch. Darwin (Darwin Ch. Origin of man. London, 1871, p. 182) wrote that groups are characterised by “the spirit of patriotism, fidelity and sympathy” that are useful in competition, which in turn is a mechanism of natural selection. Ethnocentrism is typical of a traditional society with a mythologised world view. In the early modern period, it transforms into ideology.

Religious nationalism, often identified as fundamentalism A Muslim leader in Palestine: “a secular state is anti-Islamic”, “no such thing exists in Islam”. One of the reasons secular ideas and institutions are so firmly rejected by some religious leaders is that they hold these ideas and institutions accountable for the moral decline within their own countries”. Often, the govenment, founded on secular principles, is regarded as responsible. Secular nat-lists within the Third World countries are thought to be enemies in part because they are in league with a more global enemy, the secular West. To some religious nationalists’ way of thinking, there is a global conspiracy against religion, orchestrated by the United States. For this reason virtually anything the United States does that involves non-Western societies, even when its stated intentions are positive, is viewed as a part of a global plot to control or destroy them... The process od stanization indicates that secular nat-m is seen as religious entity, albeit a sinister one, and this view can be explained, in part, by the “fallen-angel” syndrome: the more vaunted the expectations, the more severe the recrimination. Many members of formerly colonized countries had had such high expectations of – such great faith in – secular nat-m that their disappointment in its failure was also extreme... 37 Ethnos and Politics

For that reason the loss of faith in secular nat-m is linked to another phenomenon: the perception that secular institutions have failed to perform. In many parts of the world the secular state has not lived up to its own promises of political freedom, economic prosperity, and social justice. Some of the most poignant cases of disenchantement with secularism are to be found among educated members of the middle class who were raised with the high expectations propagated by secular-nationalist political leaders. Some of them have now been propelled toward religious nat-m after trying to live as secular nat- lists and feeling betrayed, or at least unfulfilled... both democracy and socialism less appealing as role models than they have been in those more innocent decades, the 1940s and 1950s. Pluss the message of mass media (Brubaker R. Nationalism Reframed, 1996, p. 232).

Black nationalism A political and social movement prominent in the 1960s and early ‘70s in the United States among some African Americans. The movement, which can be traced back to Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association of the 1920s, sought to acquire economic power and to infuse among blacks a sense of community and group feeling. Many adherents to black nationalism assumed the eventu- al creation of a separate black nation by African Americans. As an alternative to being assimilated by the American nation, which is predominantly white, black nationalists sought to maintain and promote their separate identity as a people of black ancestry. With such slogans as “black power” and “black is beautiful” they also sought to inculcate a sense of pride among blacks (Brubaker R. Nationalism Reframed. 1996, p. 234).

R. Brubaker’s triadic nexus of nationalism R. Brubaker’s concept: “nationalising nationalism” of the new states, homeland nationalism and minority nationalism interlocked together in a triadic nexus. The corners of the triangle (“fields” in Brubaker’s terminology) represent mutually antagonistic nationalisms emerging as a result of various internal forces. “Nationalising nationalism” of the new states is the same state nationalism. “Nationalising nationalism can be characterised by 38 demands on behalf of the titular nation or nationality perceived in terms of ethno-cultural categories and strictly distinguished from the community of citizens”. The core nation is understood as a legitimate “owner” of the state which is conceived as the state of and for the core nation. Despite having its own state, however, the core nation is conceived as being in a weak cultural, economic, or demographic position. This weak position – seen as a legacy of discrimination against the nation before it attained independence – is held to justify the “remedial” or “compensatory” project of using state power to promote the specific (and previously inadequately served) interest of the core nation (Brubaker R., Nationalism Reframed. 1996, p. 5).

“nationalising nationalism”

“minority nationalism” “homeland nationalism”

R. Brubaker’s triadic nexus

This nationalism is challenged by the “nationalism of the external homeland (or compatriots)”, i. e. the nationalism of those countries whose citizens or diasporas make up the national minorities in the “nationalising” new state. R. Brubaker writes: “Homeland nationalisms assert states’ right – indeed their obligation – to monitor the condition, promote the welfare, support the activities and institutions, and protect the rights and interests of their ethnic kin (…). In response to the characteristic statements of nationalising states that the status of minorities is a purely internal matter, “homeland states” assure that their rights and responsibility in respect of their ethnonational kin does not depend on state borders and citizenship. In this sense, “homeland” is a political, not an ethnographic category. A state becomes an external homeland, when cultural or political elites begin to define certain residents of other states as members of a single nation divided by borders and when they begin to claim that a common nationality makes the state, in a certain sense, responsible, not only for for its citizens, but also for the ethnic kin who reside in

39 Ethnos and Politics

other countries and have a different citizenship (Brubaker R. Nation- alism Reframed. 1996, p. 5). Between these two antagonistic fields, there is minority nationalism. R. Brubaker emphasises that such a nationalism is a political stance, not an ethno-demographic fact. The relationship between “minority nationalism” and “homeland nationalism” is not necessarily harmonious because, in pursuit of its own national interests, the ethnic homeland does not always support its ethnic kin. The position and stance of every field are determined by the interaction with other fields and internal struggles. An important feature of the triangle is a continuous mutual mon- itoring. It is not a passive recording of events, but a selective observa- tion, interpretation and representation.

Questions: 1. What are the reasons for the vitality of ethnic nationalism? 2. What determines the flexibility of nationalist ideology? 3. When does ethnic nationalism play a positive role? 4. What political factors foment the nationalism of national minorities?

Online research project: Evaluate the perception of nationalism in Lithuanian electronic mass media. Which concepts of nationalism are dominant? Com- pare the views on nationalism and its assessments in the portals www.delfi.lt and www.respublika.lt.

40 Nationalism

Recommended literature: 1. Brass P. Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison. New Delhi; Newbury Park (Cal.): Sage Publications, 1991; 2. Brubaker R. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the Na- tional Question in the New Europe. Cambridge University Press. 1996; 3. Brubaker R. Pilietybė ir tautiškumas Prancūzijoje ir Vokietijoje. Vilnius: Pradai, 1998; 4. Darwin Ch. Origin of man. London, 1871; 5. Griffiths, M.D. (1993). Pathological gambling: Possible treatment using an audio playback technique. Journal of Gambling Studies, 9, 295-297; 6. Healey, Joseph F. Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class. Pine Forge Press. 2010; 7. Hobsbawm E. J., Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Conto, 1992. 8. Kellas J. G., The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity. Macmillan: L., 1991; 9. Ozkirimli, Umut, Theories of nationalism. Palgrave Macmillan. 2010; 10. The Penguin Dictionary of Politics. David Robertson. Penguin Books Ltd. 2011; 11. Smith A. D., The Ethnic Origins of Nations. – Oxford; N. Y.: Blackwell, 1986; 12. Smith A. D., National Identity. Penguin: London, 1991; 13. Smith, A. D., Nationalism. Keyconcepts. Polity press. 2010; 14. Stephen, Cornell, Ethnicity and Race. Making identities in a Changing World. Pine Forge Press. 2007. 4. Multi-ethnic society: structure, dynamics and the issue of integration

Key concepts: Multi-ethnicity; ethno-demography; ethnic structure of the society. After reading the article, the student: a. will be able to evaluate the challenges posed by multi-ethnicity; b. will understand the specifics of domestic and foreign politics of multi‑ethnic countries; c. will assess the fundamental factors connecting multi-ethnicity and the political system.

Understanding of the ethnic situation The starting point is the ethno-demographic data. It is logical because (1) other circumstances being equal, relations between ethnic groups are strongly dependent on the population ratio; (2) this indicator is statistically relatively easy to identify (at least in the majority of cases). However, neither of these postulates is an axiom. There are a lot of cases when ethnic identity is poorly expressed, and it is not clear which ethnos should be assigned this or that group. Dilemmas of hybrid identity then arise. In some countries, certain groups and minorities are not recorded in the population census altogether (this was typical of the interwar Poland; the USSR statistics did not record Talyshi, Svans, Kipchaks; Kurds were not recognised as a separate group in Turkey); in Yugoslavia, 5% of the population were recorded as Yugoslavians, meanwhile in the USSR, every citizen could only indicate a nationality that was included in a pre-defined list.

Mono- and multi-ethnic societies Homogeneous: Over 98%: Korea (99.8), Portugal (99.5), Japan (99.3), Western Sa- hara, Cuba. 95–98%: Poland, Hungary, Italy, Greece, Norway, Finland, Den- mark, Iceland, Ireland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Armenia

42 Multi-ethnic societ

(since 1988), Egypt, Yemen, Bangladesh, Somalia, Columbia, Brazil, Jamaica. Reservation – religious differences: Germany (38% Protestant, 34% Catholic).

Multi-ethnic societies Bipolar structure: Cyprus (77% and 19%), Belgium (Flemish 51.2% and Walloon 40.6%), Malaysia (Malay 44% and Chinese 43%), Su- dan, Peru (Hispanic 50%, Quechua 43%), Ecuador (48% and 50% respectively), Canada (Anglophone 44% and Francophone 27%), Latvia (Latvian 52%, Russian 30%), Estonia (60% and 30%), Kazakhstan. Close to bipolar: Sri Lanka (Sinhalese 73.3% and Tamil 19%), Ukraine. 1+n (the dominant majority, “the core”): Germany (German 91.5%, Turkish 2.4%, other 6.1% (made up largely of Serbo-Croatian, Ital- ian, Russian, Greek, Polish, Spanish), UK, France, Spain, Lithuania, Ukraine, Israel, Iraq, Singapore, Mexico, Argentina, USA. Dominant relative majority: Iran (45%), Kuwait, Indonesia (46%). Polycentric: India (Indo-Aryan 72%, Dravidian 25%, Mongol- oid and other 3%; Hindi 200 million, Marathi 70 million, Bengali 60 million, Telugu and Tamil – 50 million each, Gujarati, Malay- alam – 40 million each), Indonesia (Javanese 45%, Sundanese 14%, Madurese 7.5%, coastal Malays 7.5%, other 26%), the Philippines (Visayan 43.4%, Tagalog 22.3%, Ilocano 11.4%), Zambia (Bemba 34.3%, Tonga 16.3%, Malawian 13.7%), Chad (Sudanese Arab 30.3%, Sara and Baguirmi 25.8%), Liberia (Bakwe 26.7%, Kpelle 20.8%, Gere and Barsa 14.4%), Kenya (Kikuyu 27.4%, Luhya 15.7%, Luo 14.3%, Kamba 10.7%), Uganda, Nigeria (Hausa 21.5%, Yoruba 21.2%, Igbo 18.4%, Fulbe 11.2%), Tanzania, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, CAR (Zulu 19.8%, Khosa 19.3%, Afrikaner 9.3%, Mestizo 9%, Tswana 8%), Zaire/Congo (Britannica. 2011. vol. 4, p. 446).

Diasporas and autochtonic groups Largest diasporas: Russians, Chinese, Jews, Indians (Hindi-phone – about 200 million in India, 1 million in South Africa, 700,000 in Mauritius; Tamil – 50 million in India, 3.5 million in Sri Lanka). Of 132 countries in 1992 43 Ethnos and Politics

~12 homogeneous pop. 25 single group 90% plus 25 majority of 75% 31 single group 50-75% 39 no single group over 50% What is the norm: mono- or multi-ethnic states? At first sight, it would logically seem that homogeneous states are more stable and thus had more opportunity to survive over a longer period of time. However, multi-ethnic states have already existed since ancient times (India, China, the Roman Empire), in the middle ages: the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (as well as the Polish-Lithuanian Common- wealth, Russia, Switzerland), in the early modern period: Russian, Habsburg and Ottoman empires, colonial domains in Asia, Africa and America. At present, an absolute majority of states are multi- ethnic (Western countries mostly due to immigration).

Compact and dispersive distribution Swiss cantons: German 99% in Thurgau, St. Gallen, Nidwalden, Ap- penzell A. R., Schwyz, Obwald (6 total), 98% in Zug, Aargau, Schaff- hausen, Glarus, Lucerne, Uri (6 total), 97% in Basel (country), So- lothurn (9 total). 97–99% in 14 cantons.

Boundaries of ethnic areas, national borders and the issue of divided nations Azerbaijani, Mongols, Koreans, (24 million in North Korea and 45 million in South Korea), Punjabi, Bengali (130 million in Bangla- desh, 60 million in India), Baloch, Germans during the interwar period and after the World War II before the unification of Germany, Tajiks (in Tajikistan and Afghanistan), many African groups.

Dynamics of ethnic situation Let’s start with the concept of minorities. At first sight, the question seems to be simple: “minority” is the antonym of “majority”. Definition of the United Nations (1977): “a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State whose members – being nationals of the State – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from the rest of the population and who, if only 44 Multi-ethnic societ implicitly, maintain a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language”. It is often emphasised that a minority is discriminated against, has exclusive, visible social attributes and an identity, its membership is obtained from birth. Many specialists tend to think that a minority is a social construct. In Germany, there are the following officially recognized minorities: citizens of Danish, Sorbian, Frisian and Romani origins. Gender minority (women) are a statistical majority. In Estonia, the following groups are recognised as minorities: a) that have stable and firm ties with Estonia; b) whose culture, languag`e or religion is different from those of Estonians; c) that seek to preserve their cultural traditions, religion or culture that form the core of their identity.

Ethnic differences Socio-cultural differences: religion, language, culture, customs, characteristics of identity, political cultures and subcultures. The quality of difference is important. It is determined by “cultural distance”.

External orientation The difference is between autochthons and diasporas. The latter are oriented either towards the “external homeland” or towards the dominant majority. Diasporas of the same nations in different countries are differently oriented: 1. Difference between coastal and hinterland ethnoses; 2. Difference between lowland and highland ethnoses (Burma, Laos, Thailand, partly India, China); 3. Ethno-regional social economic differences and ethno-social differentiation Differences of ethnic groups lie not only in language and cultural characteristics. From the geographical point of view, economic development is not and cannot be evenly spread (see K. Deutsch). In multi-ethnic states, regional differences often correspond to the boundaries of ethnic areas, regardless of administrative division 45 Ethnos and Politics

(diffusion within the boundaries of an ethnic area). This is determined by many factors, above all, “territorial luck”: (A. R. Wal- lace’s theory of race: “territorial luck” produced different rates of technological development, economic growth, and civilization, which then determined power relations between groups, or, as he takes pains to point out, any innate genetic characteristics) (1) terrain (communications opportunities); (2) climate; (3) fertil- ity; (4) natural resources; (5) population density; (6) technological capacity of the population; (7) distance from potential markets; (8) possible advantages of the local industry; (9) long‑term effect of earlier decisions on infrastructure development (Connor, Walker, “Eco- or Ethno-Nationalism?”. – Ethnic and Racial Studies, 7 (July 1984), p. 342–359). Importance of transit (Riga, Calcutta, Mumbai, Singapore, Hong Kong).

Ethnic stratification Let’s start with the unequal status of ethnic groups in different areas: a. political inequality (East Slavs in the USSR, Alawites in Syria, Latvians in Latvia, Estonians in Estonia, etc.); b. social inequality – in extreme cases – ethnic classes (Germans in Central Europe, Chinese in South-East Asia, Russians in the post- Soviet space outside the Russian Federation, colonists and aborigines, Jews in many Western and Eastern European countries). Diasporas, as a rule, are more urbanised. Lithuania’s case: Lithuanians – the entire structure, Poles, Russians, Jews). The USSR – non-urbanised nations (Moldavians, nations of Central Asia). Diasporas are traditionally specialised (the situation changes in the industrial and information society); c. socio-cultural inequality. In this case, normative culture and language guarantees higher status and opportunities (Indian “tribes” often have to learn 2–3 additional languages); it is a matter of status and prestige.

Folk culture vs high culture Often autochthonic groups adopt urban culture or its individual elements from diasporas (in the Soviet Union, primarily from Rus- sians). 46 Multi-ethnic societ

Multi-ethnic society models Centre/periphery (internal colonialism) model Colonial development creates division of labour on a cultural basis, or ethno-social stratification. The most prestigious jobs are reserved for the representatives of the “core”, or metropolis. Economic development of the colony is subjected to the interests of the metropolis, cities grow primarily on the coast as centres of transit trade, directly connected to the metropolis. In the internal colony, new- comers from the core, for the most part, monopolise trade, banking and management. Economic dependence is reinforced through legal, political and military means. The internal colony has a lower standard of living, less services. The state becomes an important in- strument of re-distribution of resources. Periphery is economically integrated; however, such conditions of integration cause dissatisfaction among the population of the periphery because they don’t benefit much from it. Unlike the core, periphery can be characterised by a low division of labour and urbanisation level, low level technology, big families, traditional norms and values. In other words, the level of group’s integration into the society remains low. Exceptions: Baltic governorates in Tsarist Russia, Catalonia and the Basque country in Spain, Bengal in the colonial and Punjab in the present-day India. Pluralistic society model J. S. Furnivall presents this model very precisely in the context of an example that is well-known to him: “In Burma, as in Java, probably the first thing that strikes the visitor is the medley of peoples – Euro- pean, Chinese, Indian and native. It is in the strictest sense a medley, for they mix but do not combine. Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market-place, in buying and selling. There is a plural society, with different sections of the community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit. Even in the economic sphere there is a division of labour along racial lines. (...) Natives, Chinese, Indians and Europeans all have different functions, and within each major group subsections have particular 47 Ethnos and Politics

occupations. There is, as it were, a caste system, but without the religious basis that incorporates caste in social life in India...” (Furnivall, J. S. Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Society and History. New York: New York University Press, 1948, p. 304) The author also sets apart the situation outside the tropical region: “Outside the tropics society may have plural features, notably in South Africa, Canada and the United States, and also in lands where the Jews has not been fully assimilated into social life; in other countries also there are mixed populations with particularist tendencies. But in general these mixed populations have at least a common tradition of western culture, and, despite a different racial origin, they meet on equal terms and their relations are not confined solely to the economic sphere. There is a society with plural features, but not a plural society...( Furnivall, J. S. Colonial Policy and Practice: A Compara- tive Study of Society and History. New York: New York University Press, 1948, p. 305)”. There is an emphasis on the economic and social aspects of the matter, as well as the issue of disintegration: “Like a confederation, a plural society is a business partnership rather than a family concern, and the social will linking the sections does not extend beyond their common business interests. It might seem that common interest should tie them closely, for a dissolution would involve the bank- rutpcy of all the partners. But the tie is strong only so far as this common interest is recognized. Perhaps the only plural society in- herently stable is the Hindu society in India. Here there are separate groups or classes, partly racial, with distinct economic functions. But in India caste has a religious sanction, and in plural society the only common deity is Mammon. In general, the plural society is built on caste without the cement of a religious sanction. In each section the sectional common social will is feeble, and in the society as a whole there is no common social will. There may be apathy even on such a vital point as defence against aggression. Few recognize that, in fact, all the members of all sections have material interest in common, but most see that on many points their material interests are opposed. The typical plural society is a business partnership in which, to many partners, bankruptcy signifies release raher than disaster (...) A plural society is broken up into groups of isolated individuals, and the

48 Multi-ethnic societ disintegration of social will is reflected in a corresponding disorga- nization of social demand. Even in a matter so vital to the whole community as defence against aggression, the people are reluctant to pay the necessary price. In religion and arts, in the graces and orna- ments of social life, there are no standards common to all sections of the community, and standards deteriorate to such a level as all have in common... Civilization is the process of learning to live a common social life, but in plural society men are decivilized. All wants that all men want in common are those which they share in common with the animal creation (Furnivall, J. S. Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Society and History. New York: New York University Press, 1948, p. 310). M. G. Smith’s types of pluralism and the corresponding societies: – structural: matching social and cultural differences, groups have unequal standing; – social: matching social and cultural differences, corporate groups; – cultural: institutional characteristics unrelated to social differences. M. G. Smith’s modes of incorporation: – differential: one group dominates by employing various methods (up and including coercion); it may also be a minority. This would already be an extreme case of structural pluralism: East and South Africa, the Far East during the colonial period, Latin America. It is also possible in ethnically homogeneous societies; – equivalent: consociational groups are incorporated as corporate units (Switzerland, Lebanon), privileges, opportunities and rights are dispensed equally; – universalistic: (UK, France, the Netherlands, Denmark) individuals are directly incorporated in the public domain with formally identical civic and political status, irrespective of their membership in intermediate corporate groups. A few more less known multi-ethnic society models: Multicultural state model: Switzerland, Belgium, USA, Canada, India, Australia. Hegemonic model: Russia. Domination of the majority, ethnic paternalism.

49 Ethnos and Politics

Questions: 1. What is the difference between multi-ethnic and mono-ethnic states? 2. How is multi-ethnicity related to nationalism? 3. What are the connections between multi-ethnicity and peculiarities of a political system? 4. What are the types of multi-ethnic states?

Online research project: What is the perception of multi-ethnicity in the Lithuanian electronic mass media? Compare the dominant views with those found in the electronic mass media portals of other European Union countries (in particular, Great Britain (http://www.telegraph.co.uk, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news) and France (http:// www.lefigaro.fr) ). What are the crucial differences?

Recommended literature: 1. Brass P. Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison. New Delhi; Newbury Park (Cal.): Sage Publications, 1991; 2. Brubaker R. Pilietybė ir tautiškumas Prancūzijoje ir Vokietijoje. Vilnius: Pradai, 1998; 3. Furnivall, J.S. Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Society and History. New York: New York University Press, 1948; 4. Healey, Joseph F. Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class. Pine Forge Press. 2010; 5. Ozkirimli, Umut, Theories of nationalism. Palgrave Macmillan. 2010; 6. Smith A.D. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. – Oxford; N. Y.: Black- well, 1986; 7. Smith, A. D. Nationalism. Keyconcepts. Polity press. 2010; 8. Stephen, Cornell, Ethnicity and Race. Making identities in a Changing World. Pine Forge Press. 2007. 50 5. Ethnic conflicts

Key concepts: Ethnic conflict; “barrel of gunpowder”; ethnic stereotypes. After reading the article, the student: a. will be able to evaluate the causes and concequences of ethnic conflicts; b. will understand the significance of negative ethnic stereotypes in the context of ethnic conflicts; c. will be able to analyse ethnic situations in the regions gripped by ethnic conflict.

Major Genocides since World War II (Table made by author):

1. USSR 1943–47 Repatriated nationals and ethnic minorities 500–1,100 000 2. China 1950–51 Landlords 800–3,000 000 3. Sudan 1955–72 Southern nationalists 100–500 000 4. Indonesia 1965–66 Communists and ethnic Chinese 80–1,000 000 5. China 1966–75 Cultural revolution victims 400–850 000 6. Uganda 1971–79 Opponents of Idi Amin 100–500 000 7. Pakistan 1971 Bengali nationalists 1,250–3,000 000 8. Cambodia 1975–79 Urbanites 800–3,000 000 9. Afghanistan 1978–89 Opponents of the regime 1,000 000 10. Sudan 1983–98 Southern nationalists 100–1,500 000 11. Iraq 1984–91 Kurds 100–282 000 12. Bosnia 1991–95 Bosnian Muslims and Croats 25–200 000 13. Burundi 1993–98 Hutu, Tutsi 150 000+ 14. Rwanda 1994 Tutsi 500–1,000 000

Y. Sadowski: “Ethnic conflict seems to have supplanted nuclear war as the most pressing issue on the minds of policymakers”. The majority of ongoing armed conflicts are ethnic conflicts. (Sadowski Y. Ethnic Conflict. Foreign Policy, No. 111 ( Summer, 1998), pp. 12-23. Published by: Washingtonpost. http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.230 7/1149375?uid=3738480&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21101142828747). Ethnic conflicts are a new, mainly th 20 century phenomenon (Bosnia, Serbia, Caucasus, Kurds, Jews and Arabs, Sri Lanka, Kash-

51 Ethnos and Politics mir and the North-East of India, Burma, the Moro in the Philippines, East Timor, Hutu and Tutsi, Southern Sudan). Fred Riggs defined them as the “third tsunami”: “When ethnic differences lead to ethnic conflict the result is often more disruptive to the social order than in the case of class conflicts. On a global basis more people have been killed in this century because of ethnic group to which they belonged than because of their class. Forceful expulsions of populations, genocide, civil wars, and a variety of internal upheavals linked to ethnic conflicts have marked social and political life in the advanced industrial countries no less than in the newly-indept states of Asia and Africa. Ties of blood (whether real or a social invention), have driven mankind to commit acts that exceed the brutalities committed on behalf of class” (Weiner M., Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India. 1989. Oxford University Press, p. 155). S. I. Griffiths defined ethnic conflict as “the problem of insufficient communication”: “As such, ethnic conflict is often dismissed as something that is either easy to deal with, or is an intractable problem, wherever it occurs. After all, some of these problems can be, and have been, dealt with as relatively simple issues if civil order and domestic criminal law in some more enlightened new democracies – this has been particularly the case in relation to a number of inci- dents in most of the Central European countries and other problems, as in Georgia or Tajikistan, have been dismissed as probably too difficult to contemplate” (Griffiths S. I. Nationalism and ethnic conflict: threats to European security. 1993, Oxford University Press, p. 125). Theoretical approaches in the analysis of ethnic conflict: 1. the pessimistic concept of the barrel of gunpowder; 2. the instrumental theory of elite manipulation; 3. the theory of group realism: ethnic groups act as clearly defined, culturally homogeneous groups; 4. the manichean view: bad (civic) and good (ethnic) nationalism. Why do ethnic conflicts occur? The most general cause of a conflict is the clash of opposing -in terests for material, social or symbolic resources. To explain them, scientists employ several models that require a more comprehensive introduction.

52 Ethnic conflicts

The model of diffusion The main presumption of the diffusion, or acculturation model (A. Kroeber), or rather concepts, states that as a result of the contact between groups, the more backward groups and minorities inevitably take on the elements of the dominant group’s culture. The more in- tensive and broader the contact, the more elements of that culture are taken on by the peripheral group. This process is particularly sped up by industrialisation which erodes social structure, education, mass media. Finally, acculturation occurs – there is a change in the core value system. However, often the reaction of minorities is that of resistance. Many researchers, especially modernising politicians, treat this resistance as an irrational reaction of the groups striving to preserve a backward, but familiar, convenient and safe way of life. Often the fact that the “natives” are unable to take advantage of the new job opportunities is presented as an argument. However, it is worth not- ing that in many cases, the resisting minority boosts the efficiency of resistance by adopting modern technology (the press, radio, TV, weapons) and forms of organisation (parties, movements, appeals, etc.), i. e. social and political mobilisation, which is undoubtedly an expression of modernisation, is employed to resist other aspects of modernisation, in particular, to reject the core culture.

The model of security dilemma: As stated by H. J. Herz: “The very essence of the security dilemma is that it describes a situation in which uncertainty can lead to the pursuit of actions which are paradoxical because they make matters worse – it is a tragedy” (Herz H. J. Political realism and political idealism. Chicago. University of Chicago press. 1951.http://www.jstor. org/discover/10.2307/2194289?uid=3738480&uid=2129&uid=2&uid= 70&uid=4&sid=21100947117613); Barry Posen “The Security Dilem- ma and Ethnic Conflict”, Survival 35, No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 27-47.). Here, the critical factor is the uncertainty with regard to the intentions or possible actions of the “other” or “alien”, which gives rise to suspicion, and the relationship starts deteriorating, although neither side sought to harm the other. The dilemma arises because there is no guarantee of security. H. J. Herz: “It is one of the tragic implica- tions of the security dilemma that mutual fear of what initially may 53 Ethnos and Politics never have existed may subsequently bring about exactly that which is feared most” (Herz H. J. ... 1951, p. 24). The security dilemma arises because the participants of a conflict operate in a closed, self-help environment, i. e. there is no guarantee of security. This kind of situation is also typical of weak (according to Buzan) states. In a critical situation, at least one side, often a state, cannot rely on the political regulation mechanism (e. g. the worry among Muslims at the approaching independence of India). The case of Malaysia and the issue of the Chinese minority is of particular importance here. In this sense, H. J. Herz presents a comprehensive and significant explanation: “It is necessary to note that the security issue over which the dilemma operates in ethnic tension is different from the traditional state security issue. Traditionally, the issue has been one of territory, and the dynamics of the dilemma have begun to operate when states have acquired the military ca- pability to alter the status quo. In ethnic tension, the security issue is the group’s identity, and the dynamics of the dilemma begins to operate when the continuation of this identity from one generation to another is threatened. In Malaysia, UMNO pursued a policy of positive discrimination, the constitution explicitly grants special status to the Malays, with positive discrimination operating in higher education, government employment and economic opportunities. English was replaced by Malay as the national language while the symbols of the state are Malay, with Islam the state religion. The consequence of this long-term policy has been the perception among the ethnic minorities that they are second-class citizens. This has been particularly evident for the Chinese in higher education. In order to increase Malay enrolment in universities the regime has favoured Malay applications at the expense of other ethnic groups. This re- striction on Chinese students enrolling in university education has been bitterly resented by the Chinese community. By 1977, it has been suggested that 75 percent of new students were Malays and many Chinese families were sending their children abroad because of the discriminatory policies (Herz H. J. 1951, p. 24). This also led to a call for a privately-funded Chinese university – Merdeka University – but this was rejected by UMNO in 1978 on the grounds that by teaching through the medium of Chinese it would conflict with the goals of

54 Ethnic conflicts a unified national system of education. There exists in Malaysia, -al though its intensity has declined, ethnic tension among the Malays and non-Malays. The Malays perceive that they are economically inferior to the Chinese and consequently have a feeling of insecurity which can become quite intense. The Chinese, likewise, are insecure, but in their case it is because they fear that rather than being content with equality, the Malays will maintain their special position to the detriment of the Chinese. The Malay fear that they were about to lose their special privileges enshrined in the constitution and lose political control of their country to the Chinese, and the Chinese grievance that they were second- class citizens, became so intense in the late 1960s that it ignited the race riots of 13 May 1969. Throughout the 1960s, communal polarization was on the increase as the Malays became aggrieved at not sharing in the modest economic growth Malaysia enjoyed, while the Chinese blamed Malay political obstacles for preventing them from achieving greater gains. With Chinese youths shouting “Malays out! The Malays are fin- ished! The Chinese are going to run the country!”, Malay fear became exacerbated until it manifested itself in violence, with the Malays turning on the Chinese and Indian communities. The Malays had lost faith in the regime safeguarding their “special position” while the Chinese did not believe the authorities were either able or willing to protect them in the face of Malay violence. The Malays perceived a direct threat to their identity and retaliated with the fanaticism of the religiously possessed in a holy war.The security dilemma can be seen in operation. Both communities began to conceive of one another as a threat and, with the Malay and Chinese losing faith in the regime to provide for their security, began to take measures to defend themselves. A spiral of insecurity developed as each perceived their ethnicity to be under threat and took measures to defend themselves (supporting communally based parties) that had the paradoxical effect of generating fear in the other. This fear reached such a crescendo that it erupted in ethnic violence. Eighteen years later, similar dynamics could be seen at work again. The school issue “reflected the extent to which ethnic relations [had] deteriorated ... Each race appears to think that every small con-

55 Ethnos and Politics cession will be seen by the other as a sign of weakness, and worse, will trigger more demands, leading to further concessions”. Fear can cloud accurate threat perception and can lead to the belief that resolve is required since compromise can be seen as a sign of weakness. Tensions reached a peak at an UMNO Youth rally calling for the resignation of Lee Kim Sai, the Labour Minister and deputy president of the MCA. It appeared as though Malaysia would again be wracked by ethnic violence, and once again the dynamics of the security dilemma could be seen at work – in particular, the misperception of threat, since despite the primacy of Malay culture, the regime has sought not to undermine Chinese culture but rather to maintain a diversity of cultures in Malaysia. For example, prior to the 1990 elections Mahathir had lifted restrictions on cultural events such as the Chinese lion dance, provided additional grants to Chinese primary schools, and promised that his government was committed to multiculturalism. Although these measures were clearly designed to woo Chinese voters, “they were significant concessions in a symbolic sense that made Chinese feel that their cultural identity was not being ignored”. When these communities have felt their identity threatened, both the MIC (Malaysian Indian Congress) and the MCA have at times proven successful in modifying UMNO’s policies. In 1979, the MCA was able to persuade UMNO to increase non-Malay university admission until Malay and non-Malay recruitment was proportionate to the ethnic diversity of the population. In 1997, the DAP released a statement “saying it was shocked that the MCA ... was not consulted” over the decision to make Islamic studies a compulsory subject at university. However, in this instance it appears that the decision had been taken in the 1980s, and the 1997 discussions centred on implementation and thus consultation was not considered necessary. What is interesting about the Malaysian case is that the security dilemma has lessened since its heyday in the late 1960s, and now operates only in a mild form. It is not sufficiently active for the tensions to continually erupt into violence. Indeed, there has been no repeat of the 1969 race riots. Malaysia thus offers the opportunity to examine methods of mitigating and perhaps escaping the ethnic security dilemma. A tragedy can occur as insecurities create hostilities along ethnic lines even though neither’s ethnic identity is under threat. It is because at the heart of the eth-

56 Ethnic conflicts nic tension lies a fear which can be lessened by reducing uncertainty, which makes power-sharing a means of mitigating the ethnic tension. It was declared “that UMNO would continue to protect the interests of the Malays”, but that “UMNO was mindful of the reality that Ma- laysia was a multiracial country and hence would continue to provide economic opportunities to all races” (Herz H. J. 1951, p. 56). Malaysia has thus mitigated its ethnic security dilemma and, while tensions exist, they have not erupted into violence since 1969. Whether the ethnic communities of Malaysia will reconstruct their identities and adopt a Malaysian identity that removes the ethnic security dilemma is the challenge Malaysia faces in the 21st century.

The factors determining ethnic conflict:

Identity, nationalism (ethnocentrism, tribalism) The efforts to preserve identity as a pursuit of psychological security and homeostasis. It is especially pronounced among the migrants ex- periencing a cultural shock. For this reason, migrants are clustered in colonies, e. g. Lithuanians in Chicago, Macedonians in Detroit, even Jews (in New York). Preferences. Wildawsky A.: “Cultural theory, by contrast [to eco- nomicic theory. – AP], is based on the premise that preferences are en- dogenous – internal to organizations – so that they emerge from social interaction in defending or opposing different ways of life. When individuals make important decisions, these choices are simultaneously choices of culture – shared values legitimating different patterns of social practices. Always, in cultural theory, shared values and social relations go together: there are no disembodied values apart from the social relations they rationalize, and there are no social rel-s in which people do not give reasons for or otherwise attempt to justify their be- havior. When choices are not completely controlled by conditions (cult. theory holds) people discover their preferences by evaluating how their past choices have strengthened or weakened (and their future choices might strengthen or weaken) their way of life. Put plainly, people decide for or against existing authority. They construct their cultyre in the process of decision making. Their continuing rein-forcement, 57 Ethnos and Politics modification, and rejection of existing power rel-ships teaches them what to prefer. (...) How does the social filter enable people who possess only inches of facts to generate miles of preferences? What is it about cultures that makes them the kind of theories that ordinary folk can use to figure out their preferences? The ability of people to know what they prefer without knowing much else lies at the crux of understanding preference formation. Culture codes can be unlocked, I maintain, because its keys are social. By figuring out their master preferences, as it were – who they are and are not, to what groups they do and do not belong – they can readily figure out the rest. A basic reason people are able to develop so many preferences is that they actually do not have to work all that hard. A few positive and negative associations go a long way. (...) It is no more necessary for a person to verbalize about culture than it is necessary to know the rules of grammar in order to speak. (...) Overall, it cannot be too difficult to arrive at preferences on most matters, because everyone does it. Just as we consider our connections with (p. 38) those who advocate petitions as a quick way of determining whether we would feel comfortable in signing, so do people in general learn how to know what they ought to prefer without knowing much about it. People who do do not pay much attention to politics or public policy can nevertheless develop preferences by getting them from... two-step flow of communications from activiststo less atten- tive citizens...” (Wildavsky A., The deficit and the public interest: The search for responsible budgeting in the 1980s. University of California Press. Berkeley and New York, 1989, p. 39.) Taip pat žr.: Wildavsky A., Theories of risk perception: Who fears what and why? (1989), p. 169. (http://geography.ssc.uwo.ca/faculty/baxter/readings/wildavsky_and_ dake_Ch13_in_cutter_theories_of_risk_perception.pdf).

Negative stereotypes Negative stereotypes are worth a separate discussion. Their significance to ethnic conflicts was aptly described by K. Deutsch: “A nation is a group of persons united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbors” (Karl Deutsch, National- ism and Its Alternatives, 1969). The relationship between Transylvanian Hungarians and Ro- manians may serve as the best example: “The relationship between 58 Ethnic conflicts

Hungary and Romania has been burdened by reciprocally negative stereotypes virtually from the outset of the reception of nat’lism in the 19th century. From the Hungarian standpoint, the Romanians were untrustworthy and had inflicted deep humiliation on the Hun- garian auto stereotype by their successful seizure of Transylvania, not to mention adding insult to injury by their occupation of Budapest in 1919. For the Romanians, the Hungarians were a constant threat, an impenetrable barrier towards the West and a security problem, in the form of the sizeable minority that now had Romanian citizenship. In- deed, the Romanian nat’l ideology, having been developed in the 19th century in an ethnically almost uniform state, found the distinction between citizenship and culture difficult to define and resented -hav ing to share the territory of the state with ‘alien’ elements. The ground of a deep-seated conflict was, in this way, more or less unconsciously laid during a century and a half” (Mihaly Fülöp. Transylvania and the Great Powers: 1945–1946, – Gerrits A. & N. Adler, 1995, p. 99).

Group boundaries and the issue of importance of identity It is important because it determines behaviour and the propensity (not) to escalate conflict: 1. Strong boundaries and many prescriptions – hierarchical system; 2. Few prescriptions – egalitarian system; 3. Weak boundaries and many prescriptions – apathy, fatalism; 4. Few prescriptions – competition and individualism. Models of Four Cultures (adapted from Douglas M. Natural simbols. Barrie and Rockliff. London. 1970; 1982, p. 26. (http://www.google.lt/books?hl=lt&lr=&id=UqtQBkJzZZAC&oi= fnd&pg=PP1&dq=M.+Douglas,+1970+&ots=KRshhu2G_r&sig=qe0R ajrBbPUaYUjBmQB62TZybpM&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=M.%20 Douglas%2C%201970&f=false))

Number and Variety Strength of Group Boundaries of Prescriptions Weak Strong Numerous and varied Apathy (Fatalism) Hierarchy (Collectivism) Few and Similar Competition (Individualism) Equality (Egalitarianism)

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“But none of these modes of organizing social life is viable on its own. A competitive culture needs something – the laws of contract – to be above negotiating; hierarchies need something – anarchistic in- dividualists, authority-less egalitarians, apathetic fatalists – to sit on top... Hence, cultural theory may be distinguished by a necessity the- orem: conflict among cultures is a precondition of cultural identity. It is the differences and distances from others that define one’s own cultural identity” (Douglas M. Natural simbols. Barrie and Rockliff. London. 1970; 1982, p. 26). The question of boundaries may become a political problem during population census (clashes in India), election, in addressing certain issues (new passports and a personal identity card in Lithuania: indication according to preference – the last boundary for a nationalist).

Cultural distance This is an ambivalent parameter. The perception of closeness/es- trangement between one’s own and other groups in the collective/ individual consciousness. It becomes an inportant factor in the pres- ence of other factors, especially the fear of survival. The problem is particularly relevant if the distance between the normative culture and minority culture is great. Cultural distance is related to external orientation, also to the degree of tolerance which in traditional societies is rather low. It is particularly evident in the case of civilisational differences, in traditional societies – also in the case of religious differences: Kash- miri, Naga and Mizo in India, Nilot tribes in Sudan, Croats, Slove- nians, Albanians in Yugoslavia. In Uzbekistan, 33% of Russians indicated Uzbeks among the distant nations. There is a similar view on Jews and Roma in European countries. The Chinese emperor to Macartney, head of the British (George III) mission to China in 1793: “Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely, to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfill the duties of the State: strange and costly objects do not interest me. If I have commanded that the tribute offerings sent by you, O King, are to be accepted, this was solely in consideration for the spirit which prompted you to dis- patch them from afar. Our dynasty’s majestic virtue has penetrated 60 Ethnic conflicts unto every country under Heaven, and Kings of all nations have of- fered their costly tribute by land and sea. As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or ingenious, and have no use for your country’s manufactures… If you assert that your reverence for Our Celestial dynasty fills you with desire to acquire our civilization, our ceremonies and code of laws differ so completely from your own that, even if your Envoy were able to acquire the rudiment of our civilization, you could not possibly transplant our manners and customs to your alien soil...” (Edward H. Buehrig. The Perversity of Politics. London, etc.: Croom Helm, 1986, p. 116) In this and many other cases, cultural distance determines the aim to disassociate completely from another culture and, more spe- cifically, the policy of isolationism, thereby avoiding ethnic conflict. China sought to maintain such policy up until the fall of the empire; Japan took a similar course until the Meiji Revolution.

Negative past experience The historical “anti-” component in Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian, Russian (Germans, Tatar Mongols), Armenian, Hindu, Chinese nationalism.

The survival syndrome and the fear of becoming a minority Usually develops with rapid changes in the demographic situation. Assam, Latvia, Estonia, Fiji Sikhs, Assamese, Basques, French Ca- nadians. In 1931, Malays made up 44% of the population in Malaya, while the number of Chinese born in Malaya increased from 8 (1911) to 29%. Thus, prior to independence, ethnic divisions in Malaya were being demarcated by the indigenous Malays who feared that they would be left behind in “rural stagnation” by the active and vibrant Chinese community.

Ethnic division of labour or ethnic specialisation In the view of the autochthones, trade and crafts are non-prestigious activities. In Assam, Bengali Muslims were successfully engaged in vegetable-growing, but the Assamese did not do it as they deemed it unacceptable to carry baskets of vegetables on their heads. Ethnic division of labour eliminated competition. 61 Ethnos and Politics

Classic situation: ethnic classes, minorities as mediators (mostly trade, for example, the Chinese in South-East Asia, Asians in East Africa, Jews in Europe until the World War II). The appearance of mediators does not cause hostility. Conflict occurs either for political reasons (anti-Chinese pogroms in Indonesia after 1965, in Malaysia), or when autochthonous groups engage in the same activities, which signals the beginning of competition (Jews in Lithuania after 1929). Diasporas have the advantage of being more concentrated, having their own credit organisations, limiting mutual competition, using cheaper (especially family) labour. The drawback of the social (class) theory of ethnic conflict: conflict is presupposed in all instances of competing interests.

Status (the progressive and the backward) Opposition of the backward and the progressive and humiliating comparison: the issue of status (D. Horowitz). Often the backward groups are the ones to initiate the conflict. Various criteria of pro- gressiveness/backwardness: education, civil service, free professions, level of urbanisation, relationship with modern economic sectors. Links to the normative culture.

Contact theory Gordon Allport’s hypothesis: contact undermines negative attitudes and stereotypes if the contacting sides have equal status, cooperate to achieve common goals and their positive relationship is based on norm. D. Forbes argues that the consequences of increased contact are mixed: the relationships are getting better on a personal level, yet there is a rise in the lack of tolerance between groups (because it poses a threat to identity, creates a risk of assimilation). This is confirmed by the consequences (Forbes D. Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture, and the Contact Hypothesis. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997, p. 291) of the decision on school desegregation (Brown vs Board of Education, 1954). What Forbes calls the layperson’s contact hypothesis is “[t]he idea ... that more contact between individuals belonging to antagonistic social groups (defined by customs, language, beliefs, nationality, or 62 Ethnic conflicts identity) tends to undermine negative stereotypes and reduce prejudice” (ix). In actuality, this hypothesis is vastly more complicated. The first chapter, “Defining Terms”, explains the various permuta- tions of contact theory, which derive from the work of Harvard psy- chologist Gordon Allport. The second chapter, “A Social Experiment”, details research on racial attitudes following the Brown decision of 1954, a ruling predi- cated on the contact theory. But looking back “one cannot help but be impressed by the steady accumulation of evidence that clashes with the dominant opinions among social scientists at the time of Brown v. Board of Education” (60), so much so that “the great social experiment of desegregation has been a failure” (61) in terms of the contact hypothesis. The paradox unearthed by Forbes is that more individual contacts reduce intolerance, but more group contacts increase intolerance. D. Forbes “assumes that ethnic [language] conflict, like nationalism, is ultimately about control of a state” (Forbes D. Ethnic .... 1997, p. 142). Thus group conflicts erupt from “cultural differences” (Forbes D. ...1997, p. 148); so his thesis is that “[a]n increase of contact gives rise to various manifestations of an increasing conflict of interest as each group tries to vindicate and defend its own customs and values” (Forbes D. ..., 1997, p. 148).

Reaction to nation-building policy: Raises suspicion, the situation is interpreted in one’s own way, seeing threats everywhere.

Political mobilisation on the basis of nationalism See R. Brubaker’s triadic nexus.

Change of the system, especially liberalisation and democratisation There is a resurfacing of interests that were previously suppressed, appearance of political niches, sphere of activity for the opponents of the old regime. The spread of democratic values seems a slightly more plausible candidate as a trigger for ethnic violence: The recent progress of democracy in Albania, Armenia, Croatia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, 63 Serbia, and South Africa has been attended by ethnic feuding in each country. But this is an inconsistent trend. Some of the most savage internal conflicts of the post-Cold War period have occurred in societies that were growing less free, such as Egypt, India (which faced major secessionist challenges by Kashmiris, Sikhs, Tamils, etc.), Iran, and Peru. Many of the worst recent ethnic conflicts occurred in countries where the regime type was unstable and vacillated back and forth between more and less free forms, as in Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Leba- non, Liberia, Nigeria, and Tajikistan. Conversely, in numerous cases, such as the so-called third wave of democratization that swept Lat- in America and East Asia during the 1980s, political liberalization seems to have actually reduced most forms of political violence. In the case of liberalisation, of particular importance are differences in political culture, historical memory. Without knowledge of the specifics of these components, the conflicts may seem to be -ir rational to the outside observer. Particular resistance may be exhib- ited by those groups whose political culture is incompatible with the democratic political system in the making.

Types of ethnic conflicts Depending on their place in the social, cultural, regional structure, level of awareness, relationships with other internal and external groups, and other parameters and circumstances, individual blocs of the ethnos have a different interpretation of ethnic and group interests and priorities. For example, even such a natural thing as the use of native language in public settings may be perceived differently: the most interested group is the creative intelligentsia (if it exists), the educated part of society, meanwhile, this is less important for illiterate rural masses and the upper levels integrated in the normative culture and using the official language. The more differentiated the society, the more disagreements there are on the matter of ethnic interests. Accordingly, there may be a difference in the extent of and the reasons for demands, which may incite a conflict. It may be maintained that socially differentiated ethnoses are divided into two parts: on one end of the scale, there are groups for whom ethnic interests are of no importance whatsoever, on the other 64 Ethnic conflicts end, there are groups for whom this matter is of primary importance. Socially homogeneous ethnoses, for example, the so-called tribes show a considerably higher level of solidarity in this respect. Absolute confrontation between ethnoses uniting all members on each side is quite rare and usually occurs only in two cases: (a) in the case of a rather minor structural or social differentiation; (b) in exceptional circumstances, when the existence of the ethnos comes under threat, thus making possible stringent sanctions against those members of the group who do not show proper solidarity.

Ethno-territorial conflicts They are driven by claims to territories, often inhabited by different ethnoses but with a complex historical legacy (e. g. Kosovo). Eth- no-territorial conflicts are often accompanied by ethnic cleansings, genocide directed against a specific ethnic group.

Ethno-social conflicts. Interpretation of ethnic interests Ethno-social conflicts have a prominent aspect – a clash of interests of different ethnic groups. In this case, a conflict arises due to different interpretations of these interests in the context of social relations.

Ethno-political conflicts History knows quite a few conflicts of this type. The object of the conflict is power. One of the most vivid examples are the claims of Hungarians, Czechs and Slovaks to power in the Habsburg Empire. This situation was unfolding on a wide scale throughout Central Eu- rope during the Spring of Nations in 1848.

Ethno-linguistic conflicts Nevertheless, much more attention is required by ethno-linguistic conflicts. Language is incorporated into the political value system, it acquires symbolic value, and a certain language policy is implemented in order to accelerate national integration. The situation may differ subject to the type of ethno-demographic situation. Countries with a dominant core usually experience linguistic assimilation processes and the spread of bilingualism among minorities. In the case of polycentric systems, analogous processes occur in the regions. In 65 Ethnos and Politics

most states, one language is declared official in the entire country – it is used in more areas while others, at best, only have this status in minority regions. Official status grants obvious privileges to the dominant group, thus reflecting political inequality between the ethnoses. In Pakistan, this was the cause of discontent among the Bengali of East Pakistan, which grew into a movement for independence. The wave of discontent may be provoked by legal changes, even though the actual situation remains unchanged, for instance, the introduction of Hindi language in 1965 prescribed in the Indian Con- stitution ignited protests in Tamil Nadu and Bengal, declaration of Assamese language as state language in Assam in 1960, Sri Lanka’s Language Act of 1956. Ethno-linguistic conflicts occurred almost in all Eastern countries. In Algiers, the Berbers took a stand against the Arabisation policy announced in 1980. This is associated with the fact that national policies are more often directed against minority languages, rather than their religion. This is done in cases when a secular concept of nation is adopted. Often the following formula is adhered to: “One state, one nation, one language”. In Turkey, Kurds are called mountain Turks, Malays in Thailand – Thai Muslims, minorities in Cambodia – Highland Khmers. In many countries, minority languages are banned in all public spheres including primary schools. In Iraq in 1970, Kurdish language was recognised as official language in Iraqi Kurdistan and the second official language of Iraq. Ethno-linguistic conflicts are quickly politicised. The number of speakers is very changeable: for example, the number of Rajasthani speakers in 1961–1971 dropped in half, the number of Maithili speakers in 1951–1961 soared 56 times. The likelihood of ethno‑political conflict becomes much higher when groups start making demands in order to preserve their identity and, as a necessary condition, their language and culture. The state, and often the dominant majority, perceives these demands as an actual refusal to acknowledge the normative status of the majority’s language and culture, as well as the foundation of the national state. Conflicts do not occur if a language is considered prestigious.

66 Ethnic conflicts

Ethno-confessional conflicts Religion may be an ethno-differentiating factor: Javanese and Mus- lims, Tenggerese and Hindus. In many cases, however, religious differences have no influence: besides Hindus, there are Christians and Muslims among Tamils; there are both Muslims and Christians among Lebanese and Albanians. The best examples: Lebanon, Muslims and Hindus in British In- dia, Punjab, the Moro population of the Philippines. In some cases, religion is equated to language: Swahili and Urdu are considered Muslim languages in Africa.

Dynamics of ethnic conflicts Recent years have seen a clear trend to switch from confrontation to accomodation. About 300 politically active ethnic movements were recorded in the 20th century.Their numbers had been growing since the fifties and reached their peak right after the end of the Cold War when the fragmentation of the USSR and Yugoslavia raised a new wave of demands. 1988–1992 saw the beginning of about a dozen new conflicts in the former Soviet Empire, and twice as much in the Southern hemisphere. Two thirds of all new campaigns started after 1985 fall into the 1989–1993 period. In the middle of the decade, the trend changed: there was a slight decline in the number of armed movements (from 115 to 95) but, more importantly, out of 59 armed conflicts that were going on in the beginning of 1999, 33 de-escalated, 29 were caused by obvious short-term tendencies, and only 7 (including the conflict in Kosovo) escalated. The search for a political solution clearly became the dominant strategy. From 1993 to the beginning of 2000, the number of self‑determination movements decreased twice. In the course of the decade, peace agreements were reached in 16 cases of separatism, 10 more were put on hold by truce and ongoing negotiations. Currently, there are 18 ongoing separatist wars: less than ever during the last 30 years (Gurr T. Ethnic Warfare on the Wane. May/Jun 2000, vol. 79 Issue 3, p. 52). In parallel, accomodation of ethnic demands that did not grow into an armed conflict was taking place. In 1990–1998, there was a

67 Ethnos and Politics decrease in discrimination against more than one third of the groups monitored after the governments had acknowledged their interests. A new regime to regulate the relations between the majority and minorities is in development. It has the following characteristic principles: (1) minority rights, democracy, negotiation and mutual accomodation. The main and most important principle: in the beginning of the decade, emphasis was put on the collective, rather than individual, rights of minorities; (2) as a related aspect, a right to a certain autonomy in the framework of the state – self-government in those areas where the minorities make up the majority; many countries, however, fear that autonomy is a step towards secession, although it is very rare in the contemporary world for an autonomy achieved by agreement to be the stepping stone to independence. Newly-emerged ethnic mini-states: Somaliland, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Iraqi Kurdistan appeared precisely because of the lack of negotiation. Currently, there is a variety of agreement models ending self-determination wars: the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Northern Ireland Peace Agree- ment, less was written about the foundation of the state of Mizoram in 1986, the Gagauz autonomy in Moldova (1994) and the Chakma autonomy in the Chittagong Hills of Bangladesh (1997). In the middle of the decade, the autotitarian regime of Burma made some concessions and signed a truce with the Kachins and Mons (this failed with the larger populations of Shans and Karens), the governments of Mali and Niger did this with the Tuareg rebels. In the majority of the newest self-determination wars, armed actions started with the demands for absolute sovereignty and ended with the negotiated de facto autonomy in the framework of the state. Nationalists who are determined to fight for absolute sovereignty (Chechen and East Timor leaders) are a rarity. On the other hand, central governments are increasingly inclined to think that it is cheaper to negotiate for regional and cultural autonomy and to redistribute part of the funds than to fight against the endless insurgency, especially when other states and international organisations encourage negotiation. (Tur- key’s position became a real anachronism, even Saddam Hussein was more inclined to cooperate with some of the Kurdish groups).

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Democracy guarantees institutional measures in most societies ensuring minority rights and interests. The United Nations Organisation, other organisations (OSCE, the Council of Europe, OAU, OIC) and the major countries are particularly supportive of resolving conflicts by means of negotiation and more than once served as mediators in the resolution of minority conflicts. The lesson of Kosovo was learned even in Beijing where the leaders of the communist party started planning alternative policies towards Tibetans and Uighurs. Conflicts are presently given more attention precisely because they are a challenge to the currently established norms. The new regime has not yet become entrenched, a long list of countries has rejected its principles: not many Muslim countries agree to guarantee political and cultural rights for religious minorities, some of the old conflicts (in Afghanistan, Sudan) have not been reached by regional and international influence or it is insufficient (the Kurdish problem, the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda), in some places, the truce and agreements are unstable (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Iraqi Kurdistan, Bougainville, Northern Ireland). Repression without accomodation, however, causes new resistance. The greatest challenges for the new international policy for the resolution of ethnic conflicts can be found in Africa, in the zone stretching from Ethiopia and Sudan towards the Angolan highlands and Congo, and in West Africa, especially in Nigeria, somewhat less so in Sierra Leone, Chad. The international ethnic conflict regulation practice is one of the greatest accomplishments of the decade following the Cold War. There is, however, an unforeseen consequence: accomodation has a demonstrative effect and encourages other groups and political businessmen to put forward similar demands (the Cornish in Britain, Reangs in India, Mongols in China have all created organisations demanding autonomy). The list of pretenders, however, is not infinite and all of them are already heard of. Compromises end in disappointment; therefore, other forms of mass opposition may arise, such as related to religion (Islam, Bud- dhism, Falun Gong in China). For now, social class, ethnicity and faith are the three alternative foundations of mass movements.

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Much work is being done in the field of conflict resolution, diag- nostic, mediation, resolution and prevention methodologies are being developed. Results are more often short-term and unclear with the law of “unforeseen consequences” often coming in effect. J. Fearon ir D. Laitin write: “...peaceful and cooperative relations between ethnic groups are far more common than is large-scale violence” and thus seek to “account for ethnic violence without overpredicting its occurrence” (Fearon, James, and David Laitin. 1996. Explaining interethnic cooperation. American Political Science Review 90(4): p. 715). In their opinion, this results in “the decentralized, nonstate institutions [that] often arise to mitigate problems of opportunism in interactions between individuals of different ethnic groups” (Fearon, James, and David Laitin. 1996. ....p. 715). By the courtesy of these institutions, tacit cooperation and the fear of conflict escalation become common. The second factor is “in-group policing equilibria, which rely on common expectations that transgressions by members of other ethnic groups will be observed and punished by their compatriots. Both equilibria implicitly moderate the frequency and scale of episodes of ethnic conflict” (Fearon, James, and David Laitin. 1996. ... p. 715). However, they recognise that “self-policing could have brutal consequences: a group might employ sanctions to induce its members to participate in attacks against its rivals rather than punish them for doing so. In-group policing equilibria could thereby be associated with high levels of violence, potentially well in excess of those observed under spiral equilibria” (Fearon, James, and David Laitin. 1996. ... p. 715–35).

Questions: 1. What are the causes for the emergence of ethnic conflicts? 2. Why do many global conflicts have ethnic reasons? 3. What are the most efficient measures for reducing the emergence of ethnic conflicts? 4. Which regions of the world are most affected by the issue of ethnc conflicts?

Online research project: Which global ethnic conflicts are most frequently mentioned in Lithuanian online mass media? What views do they present? 70 Ethnic conflicts

Compare them with the stance taken by electronic mass media in other European Union countries (e. g. Britain).

Recommended literature: 1. Brass P. Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison. New Delhi; Newbury Park (Cal.): Sage Publications, 1991; 2. Brubaker R. Pilietybė ir tautiškumas Prancūzijoje ir Vokietijoje. Vilnius: Pradai, 1998; 3. Fearon, James, and David Laitin. 1996. Explaining interethnic cooperation. American Political Science Review 90 (4): 715–35; 4. Forbes D. Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture, and the Contact Hypothesis. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997; 5. Gurr T. Ethnic Warfare on the Wane. May/Jun2000, vol. 79 Issue 3; 6. Healey, Joseph F. Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class. Pine Forge Press. 2010; 7. Herz H. J. Political realism and political idealism. Chicago. Uni- versity of Chicago press. 1951. (http://www.jstor.org/discover/10. 2307/2194289?uid=3738480&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&s id=21100947117613); 8. Ozkirimli, Umut, Theories of nationalism. Palgrave Macmillan. 2010; 9. Smith A.D. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. – Oxford; N. Y.: Black- well, 1986; 10. Smith, A. D. Nationalism. Keyconcepts. Polity press. 2010; 11. Stephen, Cornell, Ethnicity and Race. Making identities in a Changing World. Pine Forge Press. 2007. 12. Wildavsky A., The deficit and the public interest: The search for responsible budgeting in the 1980s. University of California Press. Berkeley and New York, 1989.

71 6. National integration in multi-ethnic communities

Key concepts: National integration; loyalty; acculturation; assimilation; political integration; social integration; economic integration. After reading the article, the student: a. will understand the concept of national integration; b. will be able to analyse the methods and instruments of national integration; c. will evaluate the measures ensuring the loyalty of national minorities; d. will be able to evaluate the importance of national integration in multi‑ethnic countries. Many philosophers, political scientists and politicians have viewed integration in a positive light, placing particular emphasis on the problems of prejudice and ethnic superstition. In this sense, significance lies in the development of a certain branch of sociology – the sociology of prejudice and determination of its persistence allowing to address this issue more broadly. (Healey, Joseph F. Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class. Pine Forge Press. 2010, p. 147). In the opinion of Hegel, Marx and Engels, this is a historical necessity. “Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without a fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary for the working of repre-ve gov-t cannot exist” (Mill J. S. Considerations on Representative Government. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946, p. 292). Myrdal’s vicious cicle:

Contact situation (1) Interior status

(2) Prejudice/Racism

(3) Discrimination

(Healey, Joseph F. Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class. Pine Forge Press: 2010, p. 118).

72 National integration in multi-ethnic communities

Theoretically, however, this issue is not well-explored. The contrast is especially pronounced in comparison with a vast array of ethnic conflict studies. The reason for this is that in the th20 century integration was not very important for North America, and even in 1992 some experts predicted that the role of nationalism will be limited, nations and ethnic groups will be forced to “retreat before, resist, adapt to, be absorbed or dislocated by the new supranational restructuring of the globe” (Hobsbawm E. J. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge University Press. 1992, p. 191). The term “national integration” was restricted to such versions as democratic, i. e. voluntary assimilation (America’s melting pot) and democratic pluralism (the concept of the multicultural political nation-community). But even in this regard some researchers reject the concept of integration because, in their opinion, only a small group can be integrated (face-to-face associations): “The only integrated societies that do exist comprise face-to-face associations and groups of persons who have some shared interests and values along with many that are not so shared. These shared values may be incompatible with what are described as the shared values of society. Such societies may or may not have any connection with national boundaries...” (Ben- ton R. 1979. Who speaks Māori in New Zealand? Wellington: New Zealand Council for Educational Research: p. 52–53). Others equate integration with assimilation. J. S. Mill: “Experience proves that it is possible for one nationality to merge and be absorbed in another: and when it was originally an inferior and more backward portion of the human race the absorption is greatly to its advantage“ (Mill J. S. Considerations on Representative Government. Oxford: Basil Black- well, 1946, p. 294). Conventional ideas about nations and nation-states reflect “thinking that could have been regarded as relevant in times in which populations were organized around elites, largely separate from other such societies, each concerned with its own preservation from external attack and from internal revolution. The notion of integrated social systems is not one that can readily be applied to a modern industrial society comprising very many different interest groups, cultural groups, ideological groups, class groups and others that have their own values and attitudes to society. In practice, any grouping, be it the nation, the state or the world society, comprises an infinite

73 Ethnos and Politics number of societies... Integration is a meaningless notion when applied to a population living within a particular geographical area, except in so far as interests can be identified that are shared by all. This would be an unusual circumstance. The nearest approximation would be survival in times of foreign threat and even there would not be full consensus. Integration is a sociological concept: the boundaries of societies that are relevant are social, not geographical, boundaries. The attempt to impose integration, in a given territory, either by coercion or by socialization processes that are designed to promote values, is likely to be counter-productive. Part of the counter-productivity may be dissident behaviour in one form or another” (J. S. Mill, ... p. 53). From the point of view of economic determinism, integration means division of labour in the country’s economy. From the political point of view, integration is the prevalence of supra‑ethnic institutions, cultural integration is perceived as acculturation of minorities. Karl Deutsch (Deutsch K. W., Nationalism and social communication. – Cambridge, 1969, p. 2) defined integration as “the attainment, within a territory, of a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for ‘long’ time, dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its population”. Later more emphasis was placed on the acknowledgment of the state’s legitimacy by all groups and loyalty to the existing political unit. According to S. Neuman (National Political Integration in a Global Environment, ed. Stephanie Neuman (New York: Praeger, 1976: xi), the measure of integration is “not a degree of social homogeneity, but the ability of a political unit to conduct its important and necessary business without disaffecting its major components” (so that they remain willing for the system to handle their business and continue to participate in it). This thought was more clearly expressed by R. Khan who described integration as “elimination of fragmented groups harbouring particularistic loyalty and its replacement with loyalty to a broader aggregate community – a nation” (Khan R. Composite culture of India as New National Identity, In: R. Khan ed. Composite Culture and national Integration; Shimla: Indian institute of advanced studies. 1987: p. 63). A question then arises: which societies may be considered integrated and which not? This is related to one of the fundamental questions of sociology about forces, measures and mechanisms sup-

74 National integration in multi-ethnic communities porting the society. Two approaches to this question – coercion and consensus theories – emphasise different aspects of society. Approaches: (a) The coercion theory is associated with the name of Hobbes who said that society is a form of social order imposed by some on others by threat or coercion. The basis for this approach is an empiri- cal conclusion that societies are basically conflictual and not based on voluntary cooperation (R. Dahrendorf). (b) Value theory (Weber, Durkheim, Parsons): societies hold together because of common values that are sufficiently strong for their influence to enable the acceptance of a certain inequality and social injustice. The social contract theory, however, is only suitable for small groups, but in a broader sense, it is a myth. These two theories do not exclude each other completely, and syn- thesis is possible (e. g.: Chalmers Johnson. Revolutionary Change. Stanford. Stanford University Press: 1966. http://books.google.lt/boo ks?id=LYmfmDa6MUEC&printsec=frontcover&hl=lt#v=onepage& q&f=false), or alternative view (like functional conflict theory). (c) Economic determinism is characteristic not only of (neo) marxism. Walter L. Wallace (The Future of Ethnicity, Race, and Na- tionality. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997) postulates that the melting pot will eliminate ethnic and racial differences. In his opinion, multiculturalism is not a long-term solution as it does not erase differences that are the reason for conflicts. Accordingly, in so far as concerns multi-ethnic societies, two dia- metrically opposed answers regarding integration are possible: different groups are either (1) forced to obey and, having no other choice, accept the common norms, or (2) they do this because it is more beneficial. According to J. Rothschild, there are three spheres of integration (Rothschield J. Ethnopolitics: a Conceptual Framework. New York: Columbia University Press. 1981: p. 108-109). (http://books.google.lt/books?id=gMez9WNrpmcC&pg=PA2 46&lpg=PA246&dq=J.+Rothschild+1981+national+integration&s ource=bl&ots=kyTwBIsjy0&sig=q_OKktfx3EeDh0bwFwNxfxI12 Hc&hl=lt&sa=X&ei=n8QoUJvoIovssgaJ_YC4BQ&ved=0CDAQ6 AEwAA#v=onepage&q=J.%20Rothschild%201981%20national%20 integration&f=false):

75 Ethnos and Politics

1) “Life opportunities” integration – achievement of a similar mortality rate, literacy and income level. This corresponds to An- thony Birch’s (Birch A. Nationalism and National Integration. 1989. London, Academic dividion: p. 51. http://books.google.lt/books?id= gMez9WNrpmcC&printsec=frontcover&hl=lt#v=onepage&q&f=fal se) economic integration: full or partial segregation; 2) Functional integration is, first and foremost, a division of labour, procedural rules regulating functional relations. From the economic and technocratic point of view, which is characteristic of (neo)marxist and liberal concepts of multi-ethnic societies, functional integration is considered basic, stating that it is “objective” and “rational” and, most importantly, the driving force behind homogenisation surpass- ing “peripheral”, “primordial” and other “irrational” loyalties.

Means of national integration

1. Social integration Reducing socio-economic differences: a) between groups (affirma- tive action, positive discrimination); b) between ethnic regions. SSRS the persistence of traditional patterns was also reflected in the lack of change in the relative economic and social standing of Soviet national groups. As tsarism collapsed, indicators of relative development were highest in the northwest and lowest in the south- east. This pattern has not changed. The exceptions on both sides were Moldova in the west, among the lowest on the scale, and Kazakhstan in the east, with relatively high levels of development. The perception of scoring badly in comparison with fellow citizens of a different nationality, or in comparison with neighbors across international borders, has been important in the formation of national attitudes. In contrast to Malaysia’s Malay – dominated government, which openly discriminates in favor of the Bumiputera, Singapore’s Chi- nese-dominated government follows an opposite course. Recogniz- ing that most of Singapore’s Malay citizens have not yet attained the educational levels or developed the business skills of the Chinese majority, the government has adopted a variety of measures designed to favor Malays: Malay students are exempted from paying fees at the 76 National University, and Malays appear to have easier access to certain types of government jobs. In practice, this has meant that, while private business continues to be dominated by ethnic Chinese and multinational corporations, a large proportion of post office clerks and similar lower and middle- level government employees are Malays or Indians. At Singapore’s National University, the cleaning women are Malays, but Malay pro- fessors and students are relatively few in number. Malay students tend to eat at separate tables, perhaps for Muslim dietary reasons. Thus, despite the government’s admirable intent, the leisure time of most Singaporeans is spent largely in the company of members of their own communities. Finally, the bottom rung of the employment ladder, notably construction work, is left to temporary workers from abroad. The mainly South Asian male construction workers live in temporary plywood barracks on their construction sites. The women, mostly Filipina and Indonesian house maids, live in the homes of their employers. But neither construction workers nor house maids can expect to become Singaporeans.

2. Socio-cultural integration This is a total assimilation and acculturation, acknowledgment of the dominant norms that are considered rational in the most important areas of life, allowing ethno-cultural pluralism in marginal or private spheres; or a complete assimilation. This corresponds to Anthony Birch’s (Birch A...... 1989: p. 51) social integration (variants include assimilation, melting pot, cultural pluralism). Specifics in the optional ethnic sphere, mandatory common normative culture (language, social norms). Extreme integration models: plural society and national state.

3. Assimilation Even as far back as 1861, J. S. Mill (Mill J. S. Considerations on Rep- resentative Government. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946, p.294) wrote that assimilation is beneficial for minorities because it is a way for them to raise their status and close the development gap. Further- more, this is a prerequisite for democracy: “Free institutions are next 77 Ethnos and Politics to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist” (Mill J. S..., p. 292). This was considered to be an axiom up until the 1960s. The most important feature of institutionalised pluralism: no ethnic culture performs normative functions on a national scale (Switzerland, Belgium, India). However, “only a few States formally recognise their multinational or poly-ethnic nature; most of them maintain the ﬁction of appearing to be mono-ethnic or uni-national states, or at best they give only lip service to to the ethnic pluralism within their borders (Stavenhagen R. The ethnic question: Conflicts, development, and human rights. Tokyo. United Nations University Press. 1990: p. 1). Different situation on various levels (Indian tribes are assimilated or gain territorial autonomy – Jharkhand’s example).

4. Cultural autonomy Cultural autonomy means the legitimacy of the culture of ethnic minorities: the right to have schools and mass media using their native language, to use it in state institutions, to foster and develop their culture. This is a natural thing in current democratic countries; however, such rights are nowhere near a given in most Asian, African and Latin American states despite being required by international conventions. International instruments contain two provisions: (a) prohibition of discrimination and (b) declaration of equality of all citizens before the law. Interwar documents: with Poland, 1919 – MT 49–50; Lithuania 1922 – MT 52–55. UN instruments: Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) – Articles 2 and 7; acknowledgment of the cultural rights of minorities; UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960): “depending on the educational policy of each State, the use or the teaching of their own language, provided however…” 64–65/; Article 27 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1960): “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not 78 National integration in multi-ethnic communities be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language” /73/. Article 5 of the UN General Assembly’s Declaration on the Hu- man Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live (1985) provides for the right to freedom of thought, opinion, conscience and religion, the right to retain one’s own language, culture and tradition, the right to freedom of expression; the right to peaceful assembly; UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992), in particular, Articles 1–5; 92–95; the more comprehensive recommendations (1993) – 102–104. The principles of cultural autonomy in European countries are stated in the instruments of the OSCE and the Council of Europe. – Instruments of the Council of Europe: The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992) provides for the regime of protection for such languages, 121–139. Not signed by Lithuania; Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995), /145–155/. – Instruments of the OSCE and CSCE: The Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (1990), /184–186/; The Helsinki Mandate of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (1992), /207–213/. The Helsinki Final Act (1975).

5. Psychological and ideological integration. Indoctrination in order to change identity The goal is to form a new element in the structure of identity. This is done by reinterpretation of history, usage of symbols, socialisation. Media has made a significant contribution to the formation of a nation, its consolidation, not only from the political, but also from the economic, social and cultural point of view. Radio and later TV, a single TV channel is particularly effective: common space, a symbolic gathering (it is more real than B. Ander-

79 Ethnos and Politics son’s “reading of a newspaper”). With the expansion of the range of choice, there is segmentation, decreased interest in the news and politics in general and, at the same time, there is a decline in the number of readers. For example, in Israel, which had only one channel for twenty years since 1969, 65% (including Arabs) of the population on average watched the news, and the 9 pm evening news was almost like a daily ritual, whereas after the launch of the second channel, they are only watched by 20% and 15% (35% in total) of the population, respectively (http://www.imw.org.il/english/). There is a need for a common space that would attract the greater part of citizens on a regular basis and provide everyone with an opportunity to have a say. A single TV channel would be ideal. Alter- native channels mean the disappearance of this centre of attraction. While there was only one channel, an Italian viewer hurried off to the pizzeria to discuss the news he had just seen. A similar situation was in Britain that only had the BBC channel for ten years, and in Israel for twenty years. Presently, with hundreds of channels, TV is dead in terms of participatory democracy, it has become an average video shop. In America, news on any channel are watched by less than 30%, and this indicator is dropping. Except for exclusive events (landing on the Moon, the Olympic Games, Watergate, collapse of the communist Europe, war in the Gulf, the WTC drama), TV no longer provides citizens with the common viewing experience (http://honestreporting.com/). Currently, neither TV (and media) segmentation, nor globalisation meets the needs of a participatory national state. Media diversity also stimulates ethnic diversity. Lithuanian Russians watch Russian TV, Poles watch Polish TV at their district TV centres. French integration model is becoming impossible. Identity is also influenced by globalisation.

6. Political integration Political integration: a total recognition of legitimacy of the existing state (also loyalty and patriotism, accordingly) of one’s own free will or due to indirect pressure. Includes co‑optation of the elites, mass participation, presupposes common characteristics and elements of a civic society. 80 National integration in multi-ethnic communities

Sublevels noted by the aforementioned Anthony Birch: “political assimilation”, accomodation, ethnic conflict and majority control. Incorporation into the political system and common institutions (three branches of government, governmental, party and professional organisations). Mechanisms: (1) Territorial autonomy and federalism Autonomous units in Finland, Denmark, Italy, China, the Philip- pines, Iraq. Federal states: Belgium, Russia, Yugoslavia, Georgia, India, Can- ada, Nigeria. Main issue: the ratio of diversity and unity, centralisation and decentralisation. Federalism limits the possibility of integration in other spheres, e. g. in the cultural sphere, because it recognises the national and minority culture and language as legitimate. (2) Co-optation of the elites and its demonstrative effect a) informal (Turkey, Israel); b) reservation of seats (India, Singapore) and power-sharing; c) indigenisation (the USSR practice: коренизация, from Russian: коренное население, meaning indigenous population): a characteristic of the USSR national policy in the first decade, strengthening the sense of nationality among the USSR nations (for more information, see: Stalin J. V. Marxism and the national question http://www. marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03.htm). (3) Ethno-demographic sphere Migration of the majority to the minority territories (the USSR, Tiber and Xinxiang in China, Mindanao in the Philippines, Vilnius, Chisinau). (4) Mixed families

National integration issues after the Cold War The issue of political integration has become more difficult to solve. After the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR, the decline in patriotism among the majorities has become very notice- able, ethnic majority is becoming more differentiated (especially in post-communist countries, a vivid example of that is Lithuania). 81 Ethnos and Politics

Regional integration trends weaken the importance of national integration while strengthening the attempts of minorities to retain their specificity (e. g. South East Lithuania). International standards greatly complicate state national integration policies. Multicultural society model. The views on ethnic specificity and uniformity are changing (partially under the influence of the USA and other countries that aban- doned the melting pot model or switched to multiculturalism). Integration of minorities is complicated by homeland nationalism, their connections to the homeland. An indication that Singapore’s Malays are not wholly convinced of their equal status appeared a few years ago at a soccer match held in the city-state between Singaporean and Indonesian teams. As the “Straights Times” noted, the Malays in the audience reserved their cheers for the Indonesian team. The journalists who reported the incident were reprimanded privately by a habitually hyper-sensitive government. Singapore’s leaders are determined to prevent unauthorized assertions of ethnicity. During a recent election campaign, when a Chinese opposition candidate complained that the government was dominated by “Christian Chinese”, he was attacked as a “Chinese chauvinist” and later sued for calling his critics “liars”. Like the United States, Singapore remains less than a multiethnic utopia. But the government’s determination to instill in its citizens a shared sense of Singaporean nationality, while also celebrating the city state’s cultural pluralism, combined with its effort to enable all Sin- gaporeans the benefit from the country’s dramatic economic growth, have been impressive. That places Singapore in happy contrast to several neighboring states (http://www.straitstimes.com/searchpage/city- state%20between%20Singaporean%20and%20Indonesian%20teams).

Questions: 1. What is the purpose of the national integration policy? 2. What are the most important instruments of national integration? 3. What is the difference between national integration and acculturation? 4. What determines the efficiency of national integration? 82 National integration in multi-ethnic communities

Online research project: Compare the extent of coverage on the issue of national integration in Lithuanian (e. g. www.lrytas.lt) and Polish (e. g. http:// www.wprost.pl) electronic media. How are the instruments of national integration perceived in each country?

Recommended literature: 1. Birch A. Nationalism and National Integration. 1989. London, Academic dividion: p. 51. http://books.google.lt/books?id=gM ez9WNrpmcC&printsec=frontcover&hl=lt#v=onepage&q&f= false; 2. Brass P. Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison. New Delhi; Newbury Park (Cal.): Sage Publications, 1991; 3. Brubaker R. Pilietybė ir tautiškumas Prancūzijoje ir Vokietijoje. Vilnius: Pradai, 1998; 4. Chalmers Johnson. Revolutionary Change. Stanford. Stanford University Press: 1966. http://books.google.lt/books?id=LYmfmD a6MUEC&printsec=frontcover&hl=lt#v=onepage&q&f=false; 5. Healey, Joseph F. Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class. Pine Forge Press. 2010; 6. Hobsbawm E. J. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge University Press. 1992; 7. Khan ed. Composite Culture and national Integration; Shimla : Indian institute of advancet studies. 1987; 8. Mill J. S. Considerations on Representative Government. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946; 9. Ozkirimli, Umut, Theories of nationalism. Palgrave Macmillan. 2010; 10. Smith A.D. The Ethnic Origins of Nations.- Oxford; N. Y.: Black- well, 1986;

83 Ethnos and Politics

11. Smith, A. D. Nationalism. Keyconcepts. Polity press. 2010; 12. Stavenhagen R. The ethnic question: Conflicts, development, and human rights. Tokyo. United Nations University Press. 1990; 13. Stephen, Cornell, Ethnicity and Race. Making identities in a Changing World. Pine Forge Press. 2007. 7. National movements and their types

Key concepts: National movement; “spring of nations”. After reading the article, the student: a. will be able to evaluate the causes of the emergence of national movements; b. will understand the factors underlying the vitality of national movements; c. will be able to understand the synergies between nationalism and national movements; d. will be able to understand the fluidity of multi-ethnic states and its dependence on the type of political regime.

Social movements are alliances of people with common, often precisely stated goals. By forming their own structures, they become organisations. Unlike parties, movements are particularly characterised by collective membership: along with individual members, they are comprised of various organisations and political parties. Another specific feature of movements is that they do not necessarily participate in the fight for political power (including state rule): for example, green movements did not participate in politics for a long time, and only later, after forming parties, did they join the electoral battle, and now have their representatives in the parliament. In Ger- many, after the election in 1998, the Greens became the group that was invited by the Social Democrats to form the coalition government. Very often, being part of a movement paves the way to power for political leaders. Several stages or phases can be distinguished in the evolution of a movement. In the first stage, ideas and views are being developed and discussed, activists emerge. The second stage includes the propagation of ideas, efforts to attract as many followers and supporters as possible. The third stage, when the movement has acquired a broader social base, includes the articulation of demands and stepping up of activities (often including political activities). The fourth stage is a kind of crossroads: having achieved its goal (the demands have been

85 Ethnos and Politics satisfied), the movement is either destined to fade, or, on the contrary, transforms into a socio-political organisation or a party and strives for participation in government. Under normal stable conditions, a movement passes these stages within several decades. However, with the occurrence of radical political changes, for instance, the collapse of an authoritarian regime and democratisation of public life, a very fast evolution of the movement is possible. Owing to the accumulated dissatisfaction of the masses, movements are presented with an occasion to become an influential political force within a few months. This is how the Velvet and Singing Revolutions occurred in some of the Eastern and Cen- tral European countries (in particular, in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Armenia), when movements became the ruling blocs within one or two months after the founding congress. The following are the main criteria of the classification of movements: the sphere of activity (culture, politics, economics, social sphere), the aim; it is also possible to classify them by the measures they undertake (terrorist, peaceful, constitutional). Ethnicity is characteristic of the whole society; therefore, ethnic movements are possible in almost all spheres; for example, there are literary ethnic movements, environmentally-friendly ethnic movements, let alone political as politics is a universal means for achieving any goal. Movements can be classified by spheres and goals. In any case, this is a fight for a certain distribution of material resources.

National movements The following is important for national movements: Firstly, the ideological platform of nationalism (different interpretations of interests, priorities and, accordingly, different currents and groups, but all of this is typical of many movements). Secondly, different competing currents in nationalism and the gender component have already been referred to (the role of women in the national movement in the context of defence of the rights of this gender group): • from the moderate liberal to extremist currents; • importance of the following issues: the interests of groups consensus and priorities. 86 National movements and their types

Practically all groupings (with the possible exception of non-differentiated tribes; more exactly, the examples of Naga and Mizo) have different political groups and leaders, raise different demands. For -ex ample, there are many well-adapted people among the Turkish Kurds who make no demands at all. Others are pursuing cultural autonomy, albeit their opinions on its contents are very different. The majority wants territorial autonomy – the creation of the Kurdistan province. Fringe groups want an independent Kurdistan that in the best scenario would unite Kurdish lands that are currently part of Turkey, Iran and Iraq. Even in the context of such a confrontation that describes the Palestinian-Israeli relationship many Palestinians have adapted quite well, and there are even more of those who are completely satisfied with the possibility of working in Israel and getting a relatively good remuneration. They have created a political party and participate in the activities of the Israeli parliament. Up until recent years, Kosovo experienced an opposition between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the moderate nationalists (Ibrahim Rugova) who wanted the status of a republic within Yugoslavia. In Birma, the Karens have been fighting for independence for already half a century, others participate in the fight against separatists. A wide range of demands is characteristic of many ethnic groups, and it is not always possible to determine clearly which of them is the most supported and reflects the “will of the nation”, even if a referendum is organised (the Québécois in 1995, almost 50:50). Therefore, national movements in the broad sense are often different from other types of social movements. The issue of women’s rights is also often raised because the situation of national movements is important in terms of the rights of gender groups and the change in their status. The extent to which feminism is capable of presenting its demands is often determined by the structure of ethnic identity and historical tradition of the groups themselves. Religion may also become the determining factor. This is followed by the third rule. Subject to a specific situation, the goals and priorities may change. In Russia, in the beginning of the First World War, the demands of most non-Russian nations were limited to cultural autonomy (a response to the policy of russification started by Alexander III), later – territorial autonomy, and in 1917–1918, the pursuit of independence became the main goal on the

87 Ethnos and Politics fringes of the empire. National demands were changing even faster in 1987–1990: demonstrations on the anniversary of the Ribben- trop‑Molotov Pact in the summer of 1987, the Estonian Declaration of Sovereignty in the autumn of 1988 (natural resources, ratification of the laws of the Union), declaration of languages of the titular nations as state languages, demands for economic autonomy in the first half and for independence in the second half of 1989. One of the most important aims of ethno-political studies is to find out why the broadest support is gained by certain goals and not others, for example, by the pursuit of autonomy and not independence. There is no formal limit between the political and non-political demands. The wish to speak one’s native language and preserve one’s own culture reflects cultural needs, but if the regime pursues the policy of assimilation, such demands are treated as political because under the authoritarian regimes any group demands are treated as political.

Types of ethnic/national movements: (1) Ethno-cultural: linguistic (Tamils, Bengali); religious (cf. Christians, Muslims, Sikhs in India, Moro in the Philippines); ethnic “rebirth”. (2) Ethno-social; (3) Ethno-political: xenophobic/antiforeign. (4) Egalitarian: equality/citizenship (Indians in North America, Indians in Africa); (5) Autonomist: self-government, territorial autonomy; (6) Separatist (secessionist): independence; (7) Irredentist.

Xenophobic/antiforeign: ethnic rule, deportations. Assam, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Bosnia. In April 1994, about 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed in Rwanda. The testimony in the UN War Crimes Commission reports sug- gests that what is called „cleansing“ is actually genocide; that is (according to Webster’s Ninth) „the deliberate and systematic destruc- 88 National movements and their types tion of a racial, political, or cultural group“. While it is true that there have been abuses on all sides (as in most conflicts), the vast majority of victims have been unarmed Bosnian Muslim civilians. An estimated 200,000 Bosnian Muslims have been killed (out of a pre-war Bos- nian total population of some 4 million). The „ethnic cleansing“ consists of: 1) Attacks on lightly defended settlements by heavily armed forces; 2) Savage shelling of settlements that resist; 3) Daily mass- killings, torture, and deliberate starvation; 4) Systematic use of rape; 5) Deliberate annihilation of cultural heritage (mosques, libraries, schools, museums, cemeteries, manuscript collections); 6) An economy of pillage with regular “caravans” of Muslim loot taken across the Drina river into Serbia proper; ekspropriacija 7) Final, ritualized dehumanization in which survivors are stripped of every personal possession (Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, http://www. merriam-webster.com/medical/ninth%20cranial%20nerve).

Egalitarian Egalitarian or civil rights movements. Generally taken up by diasporas that do not live in compact groups, mostly in cities, also by some autochthonous groups (Indians in both Americas, Aborigines in Australia and New Zealand; citizenship rights of Australian Aborigi- nes were only recognised in 1967). Jews in Tsarist Russia had no right to acquire land, they were usually forbidden to settle beyond the boundaries of the sedentary belt. Just recently (until 1994), the South African Republic had an apartheid system in place that limited the political rights of black people. The situation of Afro-Americans was analogous in the USA. Civic equality does not automatically mean recognition of group rights. It is particularly characteristic of the new Asian and African states whose national unity is still very shaky and national integration remains one of the most important functions of the state. Instruments: Sweden, 1975: the principles of equality, freedom of choice and partnership of ethnic groups; Canada: Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), Multicultural- ism Act (1988)); Australia, 1989: National Agenda for Multicultural Australia. 89 Ethnos and Politics

Autonomistic movements Canada In 1 April 1999, a new autonomous unit, Nunavut (capital: Iqalu- it, population: 4,200), was established on the Northwest Territories (NWT); it occupies 770,000 square miles – the eastern part of the NWT (about 60% of its territory), population: 25,000, of them 85% are Inuits. Very high rate of unemployment, birth and suicide among youth. For now, civil servants are from the NWT, but the Inuits should make up 50%, later – 85%. The beginning of the process was marked by the demands to return the lands, the study prepared by the Inuit organisation Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC) in 1973, and the Nunavut Territory Project in 1976. At its Annual General Meet- ing in October 1980, the ITC unanimously passed a resolution calling for the creation of Nunavut. In 1990, the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (TFN) and the territorial and federal governments signed a land claims agreement on the return of lands and the division of the NWT. 137,000 square miles of land was returned, the rest remains the federal property; moreover, $1 billion in compensation has to be paid over 14 years. In 1992, the agreement on self-government and division was approved in the NWT May plebiscite; in October, a political accord providing for the establishment of Nunavut in 1 April 1999 was signed between the TFN and the government. In June 1993, the Parliament approved the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement and the Nunavut Act. In 1997, an Interim Commissioner was appointed for Nunavut. There will be three official languages: English, French and Inuktitut. On 15 February, 19 legislators were elected. The government is decentralised: 10 executive departments are spread across various communities (Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, http:// www.merriam-webster.com/medical/ninth%20cranial%20nerve).

Dynamics: from language to autonomy The best example: reorganisation in India (for more information, see: Thorpe S., Thorpe E. (2009). The Pearson General Studies Manual (1 ed.). Pearson Education India.) Reasons for the need for reorganisation: not matching ethnic and administrative borders (large minority groups in almost every state),

90 National movements and their types

the governance problem (three types of main territorial units), higher expectations in the course of political mobilisation, political commit- ments of the Indian National Congress (INC). Particularly intensi- fied in the absence of a uniting factor – the anti-colonial movement. 1948: the Linguistic Provinces Commission. In its report, the Commission recognized the need to solve what it called administrative problems of such provinces as Bombay, Madras, Central Prov- inces, nevertheless it did not support the idea of homogeneous linguistic states which it believed would lead to the growth of regional subnationalism. The report caused indignation in several provinces, particularly in Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra regions of the Ma- dras and Orissa provinces. Both these regions were inhabited by the Telugus (or Andhras), while the administration both at province and district level was dominated by the Tamils in Rayalaseema, and the Oriyas, regarded generally as conservative in relatively more advanced Coastal Andhra. Another special committee presided prime minister Nehru himself, also adopted negative attitude towards the reorganisation, stressing that the creation of new provinces would be detrimental to administrative, economic and financial structures and would release “subversive and disintegrating forces”. The Committee was prepared to conced an exception in the case of Andora (Thorpe S., Thorpe E. (2009). The Pearson General Studies Manual (1 ed.). Pearson Educa- tion India: p. 14). The reluctance to undertake a far-reaching reorganisation of states immediately after independence can be easily understood. Hydera- bad issue was still hanging, Kashmir problem already had lead to hostilities between India and Pakistan, Naga tribals on the Burmese border had started a seccessionist movement. No wonder, it was feared that new changes could completely destabilise the situation in the country. However, the new attitude of the government to the reorganisation issue was a clear departure from the pre-independence stand of the Congress, yet it remained ambivalent, as the government and the INC high command regarded the reform non-desirable and inevitable simultaneously (Arora B. Adapting Federalism to India: Multi -level and Asym- metrical Innovations”. Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., Mukarji 1972, p. 158–159). One more reason of postponing ter-

91 Ethnos and Politics ritorial changes was the circumstance that political leaders even of the same ethnic community in many cases raised incompatible demands. For instance, S. K. Dhar commission during its visit to Ma- dras was presented a memorandum by Andhra Mahasabha, insisting on the formation of the Vishal Andhra (Greater Andhra) province, another memorandum from some twenty members of the Legislative Assembly rejecting this proposal, while the Rayalaseema Mahasabha insisted on a separate Rayalaseema state with the city of Madras as its capital (Rao G. „Fiscal Overlapping, Concurrency and Competi- tion in Indian Federalism”, Working Paper. 1978, p. 100). Similarly, the Kannada leaders of the Bombay and Madras provinces raised the slogan of a united Karnataka, while this claim was rejected by the Congress leaders of Mysore, where the Kannadas were the dominat- ing majority. In most cases the absence of ethnic solidarity can be explained by the collision of subregional and/or caste interests, e. g. of kammas in Coastal Andhra and reddys in Rayalaseema (Mathew G. History and developmentof federalism. P. 168 http://www.forumfed. org/libdocs/FedCountries/FC-India.pdf). All the preceding decisions concerning the territorial changes in the process of the integration of the dormer princely states were undertaken by the government, paricularly by sardar Patel. In early 50s, it was the electoral process which made the crucial impact on the decisions concerning the reorganisation of states. The negative attitude of the Congress high command towards the reorganisation and the ambivalent position of the Madras provincial organisation were among the principal reasons why the elections to the Legislative Assembly were almost a disaster for the INC: it secured only 152 out of 375 seats, and its share was even less (43 out of 143) in Andhra area of the province. On the other hand the Communists, staunch supporters of the ethnoregional autonomy principle, won 46 seats, and their nominee defeated the president of the Andhra provincial committee Sanjeeva Reddy. The opposition parties made a block which disposed of 164 seats in the Legislative Assembly, however the governor proposed to form the government to a nominated Congress- man, who did not care for the problems of Andhra. These manouvres and the fast-onto-death of a venerable Gandhian Poti Shriramulu in support of the Andhra case lead to widespread disturbances in the

92 National movements and their types state and caused the federal government to agree to the formation of an ethnically homogeneous, or ‘linguistic’, state of Andhra. The announcement to the effect was made by the prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru on December 19, 1952, the borders of the new state were defined in February next year, and the state was formally inaugurated on Oc- tober 1, 1953 (Thorpe S., Thorpe E. (2009).The Pearson General Studies Manual (1 ed.). Pearson Education India, p. 26.). The success of the campaign for the formation of Andhra set an important precedent in several ways. Andhra was the first linguistic state to appear in India after independence was proclaimed. The movement applied combined parliamentary tactics – formation of a multi-party block in the legislature, pressure by diverse organisations outside the assembly and individual acts of self-sacrifice, which had become, after the famous fasts of Mahatma Gandhi, part of the Indian political culture. It was the last method which often caused the rise of mass emotions and actions. After the concession in the Andhra case the Union government could not postpone further the reorganisation issue. In December 1953 States Reorgansation Commission (SRC) was set up in order to examine the overall situation and particular claims and to prepare its recommendations. The Commission was proscribed a general principle that besides language and culture such criteria as the interests of promoting unity and security of India, financial, economic and administrative considerations should be applied in the process of carving out new states. It took the Commission two years to study the situation in different parts of the country, to analyse thousands of memoranda and resolutions and prepare its report. The result was a probably the best official analysis of the ethnopolitical situation ever prepared in any country. Following the basic directives the SRC proposed to reorganise 29 existing units of different types into 16 states and three Union territories (Delhi, Manipur and the Andaman and Nicobar islands). Among the proposed states, Vidarbha, comprising Marathi areas of Madhya Bharat, and Jammu and Kashmir were to be the smallest (7.6 million and 4.4 million inhabitants respectively), and all the states, except Bombay and Punjab, were unilingual. The parliament did not

93 Ethnos and Politics approve the idea of a separate state of Vidarbha and was in favour of dividing Hyderabad, with its larger part going to Andhra and smaller portions to other contiguous states. As the result, 14 states and 6 Union territories emerged after the reorganisation of 1956. Al- though the principle ‘one language, one state’ was not consistently applied (and there was no such intention) and later bifurcation of several more states followed, the reorganization of states was probably the greatest territorial reform undertaken in any country in the 20th century. The remnants of feudal princely states disappeared in less than a decade after independence, but more importantly, the new territorial pattern introduced for the first time the principle of ethnoregional units of federation in a democratic political system. In this sense the reform of 1956 was a bold experiment in the history of federal polities (Schmidt K. J. (1995). An atlas and survey of South Asian history. M.E. Sharpe: p. 88.). In 1960, bifurcation of Bombay state into Maharashtra and Guja- rat followed. The problem of carving out separate states of Marathas and Gujaratis was complicated because in the city of Bombay, the largest industrial and financial centre of India, surrounded by Mar- athi-speaking countryside, the Gujarati, Marwari and Parsi settlers dominated in business and other areas, while the Marathas constituted a minority. The upper strata, especially the big business of Bom- bay, did not favour the idea of ceding the city to Maharashtra, being aware that in such case the Marathas would do everything in order to raise their own status and assure their dominance. Despite all the efforts of the Marathi intellectuals, the Committee of the citizens of Bombay and the Platform of National Unity persuaded the States Re- organisation Commission to recommend status quo. As the agitation for a separate Marathe state continued, the Congress high command put proposed a compromise solution of creating three states, viz., Maharashtra, Gujarat and Bombay. The big business of Bombay welcomed the idea, but both the Gujaratis and Marathas found it totally unacceptable. Similarly, Nehru’s idea of making Bombay the second capital of India was rejected. To press their demands, the Marathas set up a Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti (United Maharashtra Com- mittee), comprising the Communist Party, Workers’ and Peasants party on the left and the Jan Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha on the

94 National movements and their types extreme right. The intention of the Union government in January 1956 to proclaim Bombay a Union territory caused mass strikes of the textile workers, railwaymen and dockers followed by mass violence and casualties. The attempt of the ruling party to preserve tha status quo cost it heavy losses during assembly elections of 1957. In Maratha regions the Samiti collected over 3 million votes, while the INC support was only 2.2 million, and even in the city of Bombay the Samiti had an edge over the Congress. Allthough INC managed to form a minority government in the state, the Working Committee of the Congress finally resolved in August 1959 in favour of bifurcation and the next year the parliament adopted an act on the formation of Maharashtra (including the city of Bombay) and Gujarat. During the 1962 elections INC received the award as nearly 53 per cent of the voters on Maharashtra supported its candidates and the number of Congressmen in the legislative assembly increased from 135 to 215 (Encyclopaedia Britannica. 2011, vol. 4, p. 356).

Separatist movements Dissatisfaction with the existing situation, historical memory, political culture, external orientation. If the standard of living in Lithu- ania during the Soviet period was like in Finland, and the Russian language wasn’t compulsory (like now), there would have been no secessionist movement.

Pseudo-separatism It unfolds in very different situations: in backward tribes and in the most developed ethnic regions (previously even in the colonies where the situation was better and which had more elements of a constitutional state). Dynamics (1): restoration of independence (illegal incorporation); Dynamics (2): from the issue of language to separatism in Moldova. Moldova was among the backward Soviet republics, close to the republics of Central Asia. In 1989, its population was 4,359,100: Moldovans 65%, Ukrainians 13.8% (601,000), Russians 13% (567,000). Among Moldovans, urban citizens made up only 38%. Russian was the main language spoken in cities, companies and higher education institutions. With the beginning of perestroika in 1987, the students 95 Ethnos and Politics

of the Institute of Agriculture started demanding to teach Moldo- van language. The second secretary of the Moldovan Communist Party, V. Smirnov, called them “the sons of kulaks and nationalists”. In the spring of the next year, the club of the Moldovan intelligentsia named after Matvejevich demanded to declare Moldovan the state language. This demand was supported by many Moldovans. Every Sunday, there were mass protests in Chisinau. At the end of May in 1989, the Popular Front of Moldova was founded. Under the society’s pressure, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Moldova prepared and announced the draft law on languages. The Russian-speaking population perceived it as a challenge. In response, they started their mobilisation on the national platform creating an organisation called “Jedinstvo” and the Labour Party of Moldova (LPM). Russian speakers are mainly concentrated in Transnistria which is home to about 40% of Moldova’s industrial potential. A spiral evolution followed. Moldovan protests in Chisinau started flashing slogans like “Mol- dova for Moldovans”, “No to Russian Language”, “Russians Out!”, “Suitcase‑Station-Russia”. At the end of the summer, a total polarisation between Moldovans and Russians was already obvious. The latter organised strikes in 15 cities, mainly along the River Dniester. The LPM announced: “On the basis of party committees that adhere to the position of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), a temporary revolutionary committee will be set up to take all legislative and executive power in the Repub- lic into its hands”. As a response, in Chisinau, manifestations were organised that gathered hundreds of thousands Moldovans. On 1 September 1989, the Supreme Council (SC) passed the law on languages. Moldovan language (and Latin characters) became the state language, and Moldovan (Cyrillic) and Russian became languages of inter-ethnic communication. In response, this garnered a new wave of strikes in Tiraspol, Bender and Ribnita. The elections to the SC were held in the spring of 1990. During its first session, a fight broke out between the Moldovan and Tiraspolean delegates. The latter left the SC, and in their absence the Council easily adopted the Declaration of Sovereignty. In June, the Congress of the the Popular Front of Moldova (PFM) announced a new goal: to achieve independence and to remove the

96 National movements and their types communist party from power. In response to this, on 2 September 1990, the leaders of Transnistria announced the foundation of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian SSR (PMSSR). The November referendum confirmed this decision. The decision on the foundation of the PMSSR was repeatedly adopted after the failure of the coup d’état on 25 August 1991. Conversely, it became very popular to seek unity with Romania in Chisinau at that time. In June 1992, the Moldovan army attempted to take over Bender. After a week of fighting, there was an interference by the th14 Russian army deployed on the left bank of the Dniester. Since then, it has been controlling a 225 km long and 4–15 km wide security zone together with the Moldovan and Transnistrian units. Military conflict only had exacerbated the split. There is no precise data on the death toll; it is assumed that there were about 1000 casualties, and 100,000 more became refugees. The Moldovan government started negotiations with the Gagauz separatists, and in 1994, the autonomy of Gagauz-Yeri (capital: Com- rat) was recognised. In the same year, with the mediation of the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine, negotiations were also started with the government of Tiraspol. On 5 August 1997, Chisinau and Tiraspol signed the Memorandum on the Principles of Normalization of the Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria defining the status of Transnistria within Moldova. After a week, the Transn- istrian government refused to recognise this provision only agreeing with confederate relations. The PMR currently has all the attributes of a state and three state languages: Russian, Moldovan and Ukrainian. Moldova implemented a zero-variant citizenship law and ratified the European Framework Convention for the Protection of Nation- al Minorities in 1996. For the time being, there are more Russian schools in Chisinau than there are Moldovan schools (out of 13 universities, 10 are private). Gagauzia’s autonomy was recognised by the law of 23 12 1994. Population: 182,500, Gagauzians 78.7%, Bulgarians 5.5%. Gagauzia has three official languages, and for now, there is no purely Gagauz- ian school. A university has been opened in Comrat, 2000 students.

97 Ethnos and Politics

Transnistria has a population of 546,000: Moldovans 40%, Ukrai- nians 28%, Russians 25%. Its predecessor, the Moldovan Autonomous SSR, was founded in 1924 (for more information, see: http://www. johnsmithmemorialtrust.org/web/site/Articles&News/FellowsAr- ticles/Mocan.asp).

Chain reaction In October 1998, the leader of the Conservative opposition, William Hague, proposed to establish a separate Parliament of England. This is not only a reflection of tactical political interests, but also of a growing English nationalism inspired by processes in other regions of the Great Britain (Northern Ireland, Scotland).

Ethno-confessional movement: Punjab from autonomy to separatism After the merger of PEPSU and the Punjab province in 1956, the population of the states was 70 per cent Hindu and 30 per cent Sikh. The Hindus were prevalent in urban areas and in the western part of the new state while the Sikhs were concentrated mostly in rural areas. Al- though Punjabis spoke the same language, the Sikhs used Gurmukhi script and the Hindus preferred Devanagari and used Hindi as their literary language. In politics, too, the Hindus supported the Jan Sangh, the Sikhs had their Akali Dal, while the secularly oriented sections of both communities favoured the Congress and the Communist Party. The Akali Dal and a significant section of Sikhs traditionally held that the aim of politics was to safeguard the interests of their religious community, and insisted on its autonomy. From this viewpoint it was only a step to the demand of creating a Sikh state as a unit of the federation. Being a minority, and politically divided at that, the militant Sikh elites could hardly hope to achieve this aim, especially as secular leadership of the nation, particularly Nehru, was averse to religion becoming as an institutionalised political force. Therefore, during early 50s the Akalis used to their adavantage the competition between the Congress and the Jan Sangh to wrest concessions for the Sikh community: the increase of share of the government jobs, recognition of Punjab as bilingual state, etc. It took more than a decade of various political manouvres, mass campaigns and several fasts-unto-deathe (never completed) by the Sikh leaders, and 98 National movements and their types the countermobilisation by the Hindus to prove that the situation in the state could be seriously destabilised. It was the armed conflict between India and Pakistan in 1965 when hostilities ocured mostly along the Punjab section of the international borfer, that caused the Congress high command to make concessions to the Sikh demand of a Punjabi linguistic state as for the security of the nation was more important to have a stable state along the border with Pakistan than to fight communalism of the Akalis. In 1966 the Hindi-speaking area of Haryana was separated, and the truncated Punjab became a unilingual Punjabi state with a 60 per cent Sikh majority. Reorganisation of Punjab completed the process of creating states for the large linguistic groups. It has to be noted that the reasons that caused the reorganization of states were evident to Indian intellectuals, and the differences of opinion among them were not significant. According to a sociological research, most respondents indicated language as the principal reason, the only major exception being the Hindi-speakers who considered cultural differences more important (Siddiqi K. U., Libera- tion War of Bangladesh. Hasina:1971, p. 104).

Separatist movements For the analysis of separatist movements, we will use specific cases that will allow to expose the issue in question more fully. Aborigines Independence aspirations of Hawaii Colonial heritage Multi-ethnic conglomerates: East Timor Indonesia had steadily ignored the demands of the Assembly (1975, 1976, 1977, 1981) to pull its army out of East Timor. In 1996, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to two East Timorese men: the bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and to the specialist in international law and international relations Jose Ramos-Horta. It was, however, of much greater importance to the Suharto regime that on the eve of the intervention, President Jimmy Carter promised Jacarta millions of dollars in military and economic aid, and that Australia officially recognised East Timor as part of Indonesia in the beginning of 1978. 99 Ethnos and Politics

The non-existent nation The inhabitants of East Timor cannot be called a nation in any sense. Even the name of their country is a toponymic misunderstanding. “Timor” in Malay means east. The territory was named “the east of the east” in 1859, when Portugal and the Netherlands divided the island roughly in half. The population of East Timor consists of a number of tribes speaking very different languages: Tetum, Galoli, Mambai, Tokodede, Bunak, Kemak, Makasai and a dozen others. Unlike in Indonesia, the Philippines or India, the language of colonialists has not been widely adopted here: although Portuguese was exclusively used in churches and public institutions, it was only known by about one percent of inhabitants – obviously too small a number to form a common East Timorese identity. These factors were the cause of the chaos in the course of colonisa- tion. In 1974, the Governor of East Timor set up the Committee for the Self-Determination of East Timor. However, it was not so easy to find out the “will of the people”. There was no such thing as East Timorese nationalism or patriotism. There was also no consensus among the first parties to have emerged. The association of urban youth, ASDT/Fretilin, spoke in favour of independence, democracy and socialism, the UDT (Timorese Democratic Union) of plantation owners and administrative officials was in favour of association with Portugal, and the third one, the small Apodeti party created by In- donesian intelligence that had barely a few hundred members, supported integration with Indonesia. Following the departure of the colonial administration, a small- scale civil war broke out in the country with the participation of the Indonesian military. On 28 November 1974, Fretilin made a unilater- al declaration of independence of East Timor, but Indonesia moved in its troops a few weeks later on 7 December. In the following year, Jacarta declared East Timor an Indonesian province “by the will of the Timorese people”. (Dr. Udai Bhanu Singh, Research Fellow, IDSA Indonesia: From Economic Crisis to Political Turmoilhttp:// www.idsa-india.org/an-nov-00-9.html). The fight was the impetus for unification. With the beginning of armed East Timorese resistance, Indonesian troops bombed villages, herded the villagers into guarded camps. Resistance sources have

100 National movements and their types alleged that over 23 years, military operations and the outbreak of famine were responsible for the death of about one third of the population of East Timor. A combination of colonial-type modernisation and repressive policies is not an effective method of integration. On the contrary, such a policy promotes solidarity among the oppressed groups. Only a small part of the East Timorese made a fortune from the participation in economic development schemes or built an administrative career. The majority of the population feared the Indo- nesian government. The other part engaged in active resistance. The most significant change was that a common threat helped the East Timorese forget their ethnic, linguistic and religious differencies and encouraged their perception of themselves as a community. Indonesian politics was the main cause for the emergence and quick spread of East Timorese nationalism, it also determined the anti-Indonesian slant of this nationalism. However, it would be too soon to say that the East Timorese constitute a community that would be able to exist in peaceful conditions. (Dr. Udai Bhanu Singh, Research Fellow, IDSA Indonesia: From Economic Crisis to Political Turmoilhttp://www.idsa-india.org/an-nov-00-9.html).

Religion and separatism: The best example is the foundation of Pakistan. The difference between the Hindus and the Muslims was the most important cleavage within the Indian society. Between 1881-1941 the share of the Muslims among the total population rose from 19.7 to 24.7 per cent, while that of the Hindus declined from 74.3 to 65.7 per cent. Among many groups that had settled permanently in India, the Greeks, Sakas, Parthians, Huns, very few managed to maintain their separate identity for a longer period. Leaving aside such small communities, like Parsees, Jews or Armenians, the major exception were Muslims. From the founding of the Indian National Congress in 1885 the Muslims followed the advice of their spiritual leader and kept themselves generally away from its activities. Except the annual session of 1899 in Lucknow, when many Muslims took part, during the first decade Muslims constituted 10 per cent of the delegates, in the second decade 4.8 per cent and in the third (1906-150 dropped to 2.4 per 101 Ethnos and Politics cent (Majumdar R.C., Chopra P.N. Main currents of Indian history. Sterling Publishers, New Delhi: 1979, p. 244) Numerous factors were in force to make the cultural differences between the Hindus and the Muslims a political cleavage. As early as 18... the Muslim leaders, particularly Sayeed Ahmad Khan, were worried that the introduction of representative government in India would mean the majority, i. e. Hindu rule. The Muslims press and leaders enthusiastically welcomed the partition of Bengal and kept themselves aloof from the Swadeshi movement, which was one of the causes for the foundation of their separate party, the Muslim League in 1906. Introduction of separate electorates also contributed to the polarisation along the confessional lines. A major cause of the Muslim alienation was the fact that Indian nationalism as the ideology of the anticolonial movement acquired increasingly religious slant at the cost of the secular nationalism (as represnted by Jawaharlal Nehru and the socialists). M.K.Gandhi and his followers, instead of stressing Indian unity, preached Hindu-Mus- lim unity, and in their effort to win the trust of the Muslims occasion- ally supported their religious demands, e. g. for the restoration of the caliphate („Khilafat movement“), which strengthened separate Mus- lim identity. Similarly, the “Lucknow pact” between the Congress and the League, although much publicised as an example of sincere effort to harmonise political iinterests of the two communities actually meant recignition of the „two-nation“ theory, which by that time had become popular among a significant section of Muslim leaders. „The period 1924-1928 in many ways marks the watershed in communal relations in India and, during this period, the communal organizations sought to strengthen Hindu society against the Muslims and the Congress moderates... Muslim attempts to conduct widespread proselytization among the Hindus made the organization of the Hindu community more imperative. The Hindu Mahasabha, although founded the same year as the Muslim League, only emerged as a party of all-India importance in these years. The Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh was formed in Nagpur to fight for Hindu interests in the riots that swept the city in 1924: (Lambert E. The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan 1960. Yale University press: p. 214).

102 National movements and their types

Religion, history, separatism: The Kashmir problem The most complicated case in the accession story was the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Oncce a dependence of the Great Moghuls, in 1752 it was captures by the Pathans of Afghanistan, and in 1819- 39 formed part of the Sikh state under Ranjit Singh. In the chaos that followed the death of the powerful Sikh ruler, the rajah Gulab Singh of Jammu signed a treaty with the British in 1846, recognizing their supremacy and agreeing to pay a token tribute, reduced later to two Kashmir shawls and three handkerchiefs. The British were not interested in the hill territory and agreed to recognize Kashmir, Ladakh and Gilgit as parts of the new state. The British appointed their resident in the state, and no troops were stationed, unlike in other larger states. Jammu and Kashmir held a special position among other Indian states. Territorially it was the largest among them and occupied a strategic position, bordering with Tibet, Sinkiang province of China and Afghanistan, besides being very close to the Soviet Central Asia (separated by a long and narrow strip of the Afghan territory). While in many princely states Muslim dynasties ruled over predominantly Hindu population, the situation was reversed in Jammu and Kashmir, where the maharaja was Hindu and the majority of the population was Muslim // and in Ladakh it was of Tibetan stock and professed Lamaist version of Buddhism. The religious majority had established their organisation, the Muslim Conference, to fight for their rights as far back as 1932, under Sheikh Abdulla, who later played a prominent part in Indian politics. As the partition of the British India became eminent in 1947, the maharajah thought in terms of an independent state, despite the attempts of Lord Mountbatten to persuade him to join either India or Pakistan. By August 15, when the two dominions came into being, the ruler kept aloof and signed a Standstill Agreement with Paki- stan. However, it did not work smoothly and, as most of the state’s communication lines were with Pakistan, Kashmir had difficulties with supplies of petrol, food and other commodities (Lambert E. The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan 1960. Yale Uni- versity press: p. 222). 103 Ethnos and Politics

On October 22, 1947 Pathan tribesmen, estimated at some 5,000, invaded Kashmir and moved swiftly, while all the Muslim soldiers of the Kashmiri forces deserted. After two days, the invaders cap- tured the power hpuse which suplied electricity to Sringar, the capital of the state. At this moment the maharajah Hari Singh appealed to India for help and, as Lord Mountbatten considered Indian forces could not enter the territory of and independent country, immediately agreed to accede to India. Sheikh Abdullah, then in Delhi, was also in favour of accession to India, and was shortly invited by the maharajah to form an interim emregency government. On October 27, over one hundred civilian and air force planes started the airlift of Indian troops to Sringar – without any previous planning. The Sikh battalion managed to stop the raiders at the entry into the Kashmir Valley.The government of Pakistan declared on October 30 that the accession of Kashmir was based on fraud and violence an as such could not be resognized. At the suggestion of talks by Jinnah, the Governor-General of Pakistan, Lord Mountbatten went to Lahore on November 1. During the discussions there the idea of holding a plebiscite in Kashmir was mooted for the first time, but was dropped as no agreement could be reached concerning the parties who would supervise it. After the inconclusive discussions, the prime minister of Pakistan Liaqat Ali Khan declared in a broadcast that that rhe rebellion of the enslaved people was being suppressed by the Indi- an forces. Later Nehru and Jinnah met several times to discuss the Kashmir problem, but failed to reach understanding. Finally the In- dian government appealed to the Security Council of the United Na- tions. As the UN Commission for India and Pakistan team arrived in Delhi and proposed a plebisctie to be held after normal conditions had been restored, a cease-fire was declared from January 1, 1948. In the meanwhile Indian troops ousted the tribesmen, who retreated, leaving behind them plundered towns and villages (Lambert E. The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan 1960. Yale Uni- versity press: p. 223).

104 National movements and their types

Questions: 1. How are national movements different from political movements? 2. What are the reasons for the emergence of national movements? 3. Why are some national movements very active in expressing themselves, but not others? 4. What are the reasons for the success of national movements? 5. What determines the nature of ideology of national movements?

Online research project: Review 3 US information portals (http://www.nypost.com, http:// www.washingtonpost.com/, www.cnn.com) and evaluate how the events of 2011 in North Africa are assessed. Are there any differences in opinions and what are the possible reasons for them?

Recommended literature: 1. Brass P. Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison. New Delhi; Newbury Park (Cal.): Sage Publications, 1991; 2. Brubaker R. Pilietybė ir tautiškumas Prancūzijoje ir Vokietijoje. Vilnius: Pradai, 1998; 3. Healey, Joseph F. Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class. Pine Forge Press. 2010; 4. Ozkirimli, Umut, Theories of nationalism. Palgrave Macmillan. 2010; 5. Smith A. D. The Ethnic Origins of Nations.- Oxford; N. Y.: Black- well, 1986; 6. Smith, A. D. Nationalism. Keyconcepts. Polity press. 2010; 7. Stephen, Cornell, Ethnicity and Race. Making identities in a Changing World. Pine Forge Press. 2007.

105 8. Political regime and stability of the multi-ethnic society

Key concepts: Political regime; multi-ethnic state; political stability; global culture. After reading the article, the student: a. will be able to evaluate the influence of democracy and authoritarianism on the stability of a multi-ethnic state; b. will understand what challenges are encountered by multi- ethnic states trying to ensure their political stability; c. will be able to analyse the issues of global culture through the prism of the issues of hybrid identity and postmodernism.

The stability of a political regime in a multi-ethnic state is a matter of the effectiveness of national integration. Ethno-political issues are inherent to both democracies and autocracies. The main difference are the ways of integration. Analogous institutional variants: equal rights of citizens, recognition of minority rights, territorial autonomy (the USSR, Yugoslavia before the breakup), cultural autonomy. The main objective of integration is also common – a loyal citizenry. Democratic regimes, however, pursue it in the framework of pluralism, whereas the goal of authoritarian regimes is a homogeneous society, at best, tolerating inessential cultural differences, or, in exclusive cases, a segregated society recognising virtually no civil rights for minorities. Thus the regime shapes the ethno-political situation, however, at the same time, the ethno-political situation has an impact on the regime: institutionalised, recognised ethnic pluralism is an important pillar of the democratic system (e. g. in Switzerland, India), whereas the policy of national oppression without responding to the needs and aspirations of ethnic groups produces tension and renders authoritarianism obligatory. To put it differently, unresolved ethnic issues become a justification for authoritarianism. Formula: political system with an inward orientation: support, demands are often contrary, especially those coming from the ma- 106 Political regime and stability of the multi-ethnic society jority and minorities; political system with an outward orientation: actions, decisions benefit one or another group. The nature of the regime is reflected in every component of the bloc. The nature of demands is determined by the quality of ethnic homogeneity, historical memory (incorporation, its results: national politics, status, possibility of the preservation of identity), ethno-demographic situation, external orientation, compatibility of political cultures. Democratic and authoritarian regimes respond to demands differently. For a democratic regime, sensitivity to demands is a necessary quality ensuring the regime’s ability of timely response to and resolution of issues. An authoritarian regime usually seeks to limit the articulation of demands in the initial stage or voluntaristically formulates demands of its own. A demand for the conditions necessary for the preservation of identity and cultural autonomy. In the second half of the 20th century, the issues of cultural preservation in democratic systems are resolved almost automatically because cultural matters are associated with natural human rights. This is not related to segregation, this is about the possibility of having their own schools, newspapers, RTV broadcasts in their native language, at least for the larger groups. Au- thoritarian regimes usually do not recognise cultural autonomy. By not recognising cultural autonomy, authoritarian regimes thereby complicate the formulation of demands and political mobilisation: in the absence of press in the language of minorities, they have no opportunity to discuss their issues, form a common position and demands. That is exactly why some regimes deny the very existence of minorities. In Communist countries, it was strictly regulated, for example, different opportunities in the Soviet Union were meant for the nations of the titular union and autonomous republics; outside their republics, the minorities were usually deprived of even the most basic symbols of cultural autonomy (schools, newspapers), for some groups, their situation was different in individual republics (there were Polish schools, a newspaper, radio broadcasts in Lithuania, but there were none in Ukraine and Belarus). It was expected by the So- viet government that such a policy would at first gradually form a hybrid identity of separate ethnic groups (usually it had an aspect of

107 Ethnos and Politics russification), and later shift to the reinforcement of an ephemeral Soviet identity (homo sovieticus). Nevertheless, the issues of hybrid identity were most relevant on the fringe ethnic territories where communication was strongest and mutual influence had a clear historical context (political state boundaries that had changed in the aftermath of both World Wars and rarely coincided with the ethnic boundaries also contributed to this). The reactions of minorities are different depending on various -pa rameters (let’s compare the reactions of Lithuanians and Ukrainians to the press ban or a complete lack of recognition of the languages of minor nations in the Tsarist Russia), and the level of support for the regime changes accordingly. The issue of language is of particular relevance. There is Arabisation in North African countries, Ma- layisation in Malaysia, Thaisation in Thailand and many other cases when the decisions taken expand the privileges and increase the support and loyalty of the majority but decrease those of the minorities. Often authoritarian regimes make such decisions on purpose in order to increase their support (Sinhalisation in Sri Lanka). Another way to suppress the demands is an increased “background noise” on other issues that are more important to the dominant majority. Cultural demands may at least formally be treated as non-political. But in the context of authoritarian regimes they are quickly politicised (as a threat to unity, for example, in 1988, the reaction in Moldova to the demand to teach Moldovan in the Institute of Ag- riculture), if they are not satisfied. The next level of demands – the territorial autonomy – is purely of political nature and thus causes far greater controversy. In democratic Western countries, territorial autonomous ethnic regions are a fairly common thing, but this is completely uncharacteristic of the absolute majority of Asian, Afri- can and Latin American states, most of which can be labelled as soft or weak types of state. Territorial autonomy means the delegation of part of the powers to ethnic regions, whereas the authoritarian regime is characterised by a centralised government system.

Escalation to separatism Separatist movements seldom have mass support. Governments may seek to neutralise them by political, police or military means. 108 Political regime and stability of the multi-ethnic society

Reaction to separatism by purely political means: provision of broader autonomy (Canada), also military and police means in Asia. India: fight against the Naga, a political decision taken in 1963 – the foundation of the State of Nagaland, the first small state. It was the first notable departure from the previously laid down principles and a precedent for further federalism reforms. In the case of Czechoslo- vakia and the Soviet Union, there was a peaceful breakup (no armed conflicts between republics, flash-points of conflict were of local- na ture only: Transnistria, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh). Authoritar- ian regimes pursue integration policy in order to assimilate or eliminate minorities, or at least shut off their opportunities for political mobilisation and expression of interests.

Separatism and authoritarian regimes: The best-known examples: the Philippines (Marcos 1965–1986); Burma (since 1989 – Myanmar, capital – Yangon; Ne Win – Prime Minister in 1958–1960, dictator in 1962–1974, president in 1974–1981, Chairman of the Burma Socialist Programme Party until 1988).

Inter-connection between an ethnic conflict and authoritarianism: 1) genocide: Armenians, Gypsies, Jews, partially South and Cen- tral American Indians; 2) forced repatriation (ethnic cleansing): Armenians from Tur- key, Turks from the former fringes of the Ottoman Empire, Chinese from Burma, French from Algiers, Hindus and Mus- lims in South Asia; 49,000 of Asians from Uganda in 1971; 3) deportation: North Caucasian nations, Kalmuks, Germans in the Volga region, Kurds; 4) forced assimilation: France, Hungary in Habsburg times; 5) military means; a) military operations; b) guarded camps; c) isolation from the external sources of support; 5) co-optation; 6) federalisation: the USSR after the World War II, India and other former British colonies, Indonesia, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSR) in 1968, Belgium in 1993; 109 Ethnos and Politics

7) the policy of territorial fragmentation: Central Asia, Nigeria; 8) official neglect of the issue: Turkey; 9) segregation and apartheid: CAR.

The inter-connection between authoritarianism and ethnic conflict that we have introduced is best revealed in the case of Sudan, which deserves a more detailed discussion. (THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN http:// www.sudanembassy.ca/Docs/THE%20CONSTITUTION%20OF%20 THE%20REPUBLIC%20OF%20THE%20SUDAN%201998.pdf) Sudan: 2.5 million square kilometers, 36 million inhabitants. Ethnic divisions: black 52%, Arab 39%, Beja 6%, foreigners 2%, other 1% . Dinka – 10% of the population, over 40% of the Southern population; divided into 25 tribes. About 400 languages and dialects. Lingua franca: Arab, English. In the South, in the 1st and 2nd primary grades pupils are taught in their native language, later – Arab or English. Religions: Sunni Muslim 70% (in north), indigenous beliefs 25%, Christian 5% (mostly in south and Khartoum). Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899–1955). Independent since 1 January 1956. The first multi-party election to the Constitutional Assembly was held in 1948. The temporary constitution provided for the Westminster model. Elections in 1953 and 1958. A coup occurred after a few months following the second election; the parliamentary government was briefly restored in 1964–1969. After the coup in May 1969, a restricted election was held in 1974 (candidates approved by the government only). The dictator Nimeiri was deposed in April 1985, a democratic election was held in April 1986. Instability: six coalition governments in three years. A coup on 30 June 1989. Even the British administrators in the South claimed that a re- volt was imminent in the South due to the domination of the North. With the approach of independence, the British were started to be replaced by the Northerners everywhere.

110 Political regime and stability of the multi-ethnic society

The first civil war in 1955–1972. It started in August 1955, before the declaration of indepedence, with the rebellion of the Southern Equatorial Corps and the police in Torit and other cities. The rebellion was suppressed. Later, the remnants of the rebels and students made up the Anya Nya partisan army whose activities in 1963–1969 encompassed all three Southern provinces. By the end of the sixties, the death toll reached about 500,000 people. The Sudan African National Union (SANU, the name since 1963) founded by refugee intellectuals in 1962 has also issued demands for independence. In 1971, an ex‑lieutenant Joseph Lagu united the Southern Sudan Liber- ation Movement (SSLM). In March 1972, Lagu and Nimeiri signed an agreement in Addis Ababa that allowed a democratic election (1973, 1978) of the Southern Regional Assembly (an autonomous regional government) in the South. All matters except for defence, foreign politics, finance, socio-economic planning and interregional relations were handed over to the region. Anya Nya fighters joined the national army, some, however, left for the woods or Ethiopia (that supported the separatists because the Sudanese government supported Eritrean separatists). It is thought that the rebels were also provided with clothing and weapons by Is- rael. The rebels gathered more recruits among the Dinka and Nuer and founded Anya Nya II. The second war, 1983. At first, the former fighters of Anya Nya I fought against the par- tisans but their loyalty faded when Nimeiri disbanded the Regional Assembly in 1981, and started the territorial reform and islamisation in the South in 1983 (the Sharia Law was introduced). Nimeiri decided to bring in the Northern army units and move the Southerners to the North. In February 1983, the Southern units mutinied, and in a few months formed the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and its political wing, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), together with Anya Nya II. They were both led by John Garang, a Dinka military officer who was sent to quell the mutiny (a Christian who studied at Grinnel College, Iowa, and at a military base in Fort Benning, Georgia, received a degree in economics at Iowa State Uni- versity). However, he did not succeed in uniting everyone, dissidents from Anya Nya II began collaborating with the government’s army.

111 Ethnos and Politics

The goal of the SPLM was a secular, democratic, federal system. Ambushes, attacks on police outposts; in 1986, the SPLA had sufficiently gained in strength: 12,500 members made up 12 battalions, military training was received in Ethiopia. For a few months, the SPLA had taken over an important city of Rumbek, and more cities along the Ethiopian border and elsewhere in 1987–1988, laid siege to Juba (a garrison of 100,000 men). In the South (1/3 of Sudan’s territory), 90% of the territory in 1991 was controlled by the SPLA. It continued to swell in numbers: about 20,000–30,000 in 1989, 50,000– 60,000 in 1991. The majority of military commanders were Dinka, lower-rank ones were also Nuer and Shilluk. In 1991, almost one-half of the SPLA forces were non-Dinka. Their arms were trophy weapons, also (until 1985) from Libya, because Libya was hostile towards Nimeiri. The SPLA denied having received any weapons from Ethiopia, although observers thought that those accounted for the major part of their weaponry. The SPLA had mortars, anti-aircraft guns, Russian SAM (bazookas), about 20 armoured vehicles, BM-21 truckmounted rocket launchers. Captives were usually shot. The government started assembling militia forces in the areas where the SPLA was disliked by Dinka and Nuer. Arming the tribes revived old conflicts. As a result of the militia, SPLA and Anya Nya II rampage in 1986–1987, millions of villagers fled their homes: in 1989, about a million reached Khartoum, 3,500,000 were registered in Ethiopia, 28,000 in Uganda. The SPLM is also primarily a Dinka organisation. However, due to the terror of the army and Arab militias, it was also joined by other groups, especially the Azande. The coup d’état by Colonel Omar al-Bashir in June 1989. In the aftermath, 28 generals and 500 other military officers were removed, 28 of them were shot to death in April 1990. Because of the violence and incompetence, Bashir’s government became isolated. Military junta: the Revolutionary Command Council for Na- tional Salvation established after the coup d’état in 1989 was the supreme authority made up of 15 military officers, and ‑ al Bashir became its chairman. The Council also has some of the functions of executive authority, five members (1991) are ministers. There is

112 Political regime and stability of the multi-ethnic society no set term of office or rotation procedures. The Chairman of the Council is President of the country (currently – Bashir who was a colonel at the time of the coup and gave himself the title of Lieuten- ant General after the coup). Announcement of a federal system in 1991. A civilian regime was introduced on 16 October 1993, dominated by the representatives of the Sudanese National Islamic Front (a fun- damentalist organisation formed out of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1986). Bashir is the Head of state and Government. Political parties are banned. 26 states instead of 9 on 14 February 1994. Previously, military service was popular for economic reasons (10:1) because the wages were higher that those of the civilians of comparable status ($150 monthly for a colonel in 1990; however, they are also provided with flats, free medical care for the officers’ family members, can get limited goods (bread, tea, coffee, sugar, soap) for a lower price – these goods are often resold by lower ranks. Field officers can buy imported cars without customs duty). At the end of the eighties, there was a decrease in the numbers of those willing to serve in the South, southerners often transferred to the SPLA. Because of the connections to the SPLA, cruelty is rampant in the South. Prisoners and the wounded are often shot without trial. After 1989, two generals were forced to resign. The army had overthrown the civilian regime four times. In No- vember 1958, it had a fairly wide support since it was thought that it was a counterbalance to the domination of one social, political or religious group. The military, however, always lacked the ability to deal with economic problems and consequences of the civil war. The military often control the civilian government (after Nimeiri’s coup, the Revolutionary Command Council in 1969–1971 was made up of 9 military officers and 1 civilian), are appointed ministers, ambas- sadors. This is particularly characteristic of Nimeiri’s period (1969– 1985, was overthrown upon his return from Washington; it was done by the Minister of Defence) (Sudan: Application for summonses for two war crimes suspects a small but significant step towards justice in Darfur. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/IOR10/002/2007/ en. Also: Sudan: Application for summonses for two war crimes sus-

113 Ethnos and Politics pects a small but significant step towards justice in Darfur http:// www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR10/002/2007/en/8fb74bd1- d3ad-11dd-a329-2f46302a8cc6/ior100022007en.pdf0).

Questions: 1. What factors determine the political instability of multi-ethnic states? 2. Why do authoritarian countries experience greater difficulties in ensuring their political stability? 3. What factors encourage conflicts between national groups and political regimes? 4. In the case of the situation in Sudan, how does the connection between the escalation of ethnic conflict and the nature of the political regime unfold?

Online research project: Find two EU electronic media portals (e. g. www.bbs.com) that would present different opinions on the division of Sudan. Try to name the reasons for the difference in opinions.

Recommended literature: 1. Brass P. Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison. New Delhi; Newbury Park (Cal.): Sage Publications, 1991; 2. Healey, Joseph F. Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class. Pine Forge Press. 2010; 3. Ozkirimli, Umut, Theories of nationalism. Palgrave Macmillan. 2010; 4. Smith, A. D. Nationalism. Keyconcepts. Polity press. 2010; 5. Stephen, Cornell, Ethnicity and Race. Making identities in a Changing World. Pine Forge Press. 2007.

114 9. Federalism

Key concepts: Federation; confederation; decentralisation; unity. After reading the article, the student: a. will be able to evaluate the differences between the federation and the confederation; b. will understand the reasons for the vitality of federations; c. will evaluate the peculiarities of development and existence of federations; d. will evaluate the fluidity of multi-ethnic states and its dependence on the political regime and the principle of administrative division of the state.

No. Country Units Fed. Dis. Pop. 2011 (mil.) 1 India 28 7 1, 210 2 USA 50 1 314 3 Brazil 26 1 170 4 Russia 88 138 5 Pakistan 4 2 190 6 Nigeria 30 1 101 7 Mexico 31 1 114 8 Germany 16 81 9 Ethiopia 9 70 10 Argentina 23 42 11 Canada 10 34 12 Malaysia 13 2 29 13 Australia 6 2 22 14 Switzerland 23 8 15 U.Arab Emirates 7 3

Largest federations of the world (table compiled by the author)

Let’s begin with confederation. It is quite rare in history: Austria-Hun- gary before 1918, Sweden and Norway before 1905, the USA in 1781– 1789, Switzerland in 1815–1848. A confederation possesses characteristics of both an international and state organisation, and in every case, confederations either crumbled or transformed into a federation. 115 Ethnos and Politics

Confederations are created by an agreement (Articles of Con- federation of the 1781 Constitution of the United States), its members retain the right to leave. Sovereignty belongs to units, and the government of the alliance cannot make any decisions without their agreement. International law does not practically recognize confederations because they don’t hold sovereign power over their own territory and population. Agreements with confederations used to be limited, mainly only on the matters of war and peace. A confederation does not have a wide scope of mandate: war and peace, foreign politics, common communications, resolution of disputes between its members. The number of executive bodies is also limited. A confederation’s legislative power is formed by the legislative powers of its subjects that oblige their representatives to follow the orders and instructions given. Decisions taken by the government of the confederation are not direct effect decisions, they are addressed to the government authorities of its subjects; the latter may annul them. A confederation’s budget is made up of voluntary contributions, it cannot introduce or collect direct taxes. Subjects may introduce customs duties, have their own armies, there is no common citizenship. A federal system is a way to consolidate (unite) several political units while preserving the integrity and autonomy of each of them. This is attained by way of negotiation between the centres of the government. Federations are very different, but they all have a few main common characteristics: (1) Written constitution. A federal relationship is formed on the basis of a permanent alliance. Usually, this is a constitution. An exclusive feature of federal constitutions is that the relations regulated within said confederations are not only those between the government and the society, but also between the central government and territorial units (states, provinces, lands). The latter are often reserved the right to create their own constitutions. (2) Decentralisation. The political system must ensure a factual distribution of power among the mainly autonomous centres. The power of the states and the central government may not be limited unilaterally. (3) Territorial distribution of power is often called a territorial democracy in the United States. Territorial distribution of power has

116 Federalism two aspects: (a) ensuring the equality of representation of different groups and interests in the political system and (b) using these units to ensure local autonomy and representation of different groups in the civil society. With the changes taking place, territorial autonomy has really paid off because it is easier to ensure representation of new interests in smaller units. Territorial autonomy of fundamentally different groups increases the system’s integration capabilities, as well as preserving democratic government. Example: Quebec. Powers of the federation in most states: – foreign relations; – defence, armed forces; – setting borders, customs duties; – monopoly over money and emission of money; – common measuring units; – post, telegraph and telephone services; – passports, immigration, emigration; – federal transport and transport links; – provision of security; – federal law enforcement agencies; – national statistics; – manufacture, acquisition and sales of weapons, ammuni- tion and explosives; – legislation in these fields. (4) Elements of maintaining unity. Current federal systems ensure a direct relationship between the citizens and all equal governments. They are usually elected directly and carry out the functions immediately affecting every citizen. This direct relationship is the distinguishing feature of federations as compared to alliances or confederations. They are based on the common nationality of units and their population, which could be inherited (Germany), at least partially invented (the USA, Argentina, Australia), or developed (Canada, Switzerland). The lack of common national sense is dangerous to such new federations as India, Malaysia and Nigeria. The emergence and survival of federations was influenced by geographic factors, for example, the Mississippi Valley, the insular nature of Australia, mountains and jungles around Brazil, the USA’s neigh- bourhood with Canada, neighbour pressure on German duchies.

117 Ethnos and Politics

Elements of maintaining decentralisation. Federation members must be sufficiently close in population numbers and resources, or the balance could be maintained by geographic factors or numbers. There are big and small states in each geographic region of the USA. In Canada, the two largest and wealthiest provinces cannot unite against the remaining ones due to ethnic differences. In Switzer- land, canton groups are comprised of cantons of different size and confessions. The lack of balance was one of the reasons for the failure of federations: Prussia in Germany at the end of the 19th century, Russia: 3/4 of the area and 3/5 of the Soviet Union population (Encyclopedia Britannica. 2011, vol. 3, p. 444.). Successful federations can be characterised by stable internal borders. Changing borders is avoided and only done in extreme cases, with the agreement of all involved. Decentralisation is maintained by different legal systems. Legal systems of the US states are based on English law (French, in one case), while federal laws only serve for uniting the systems of the fifty states. The variety of laws helps preserve the decentralised legal system. Federal systems often allow local governments to modify national laws (Switzerland). In true federal systems, members have a lot of influence on the adoption of constitutional amendments. This requires the approval of dispersed majorities. Decentralisation is reinforced by guaranteed representation in national legislature and often in the political process (guaranteed in the American and Swiss constitutions). In Canada and Latin Ameri- ca, the participation of subjects is an unwritten norm. Perhaps the most important individual element of maintaining decentralisation is a non‑centralised party system. In the two-party system of the USA, parties are really coalitions of state parties and only function as national parties in the presidential elections and in holding a national congress. Party funding and the decision-making procedure are divided either among the state organisations, or the different national groups. In the Canadian parliamentary system, a greater cohesion of parties is required at the national level. Party fragmentation is taking place along the regional or provincial lines.

118 Federalism

A victory in the national elections is won by the party that for a short time managed to expand its provincial base to a national scale. In Latin American countries whose party systems are less developed decentralisation is determined by caudillismo – the split of power between strong local leaders. Caudillistic decentralisation is apparently typical of Nigeria and Malaysia. Two instruments are particularly important for maintaining the federal principle: Firstly, the nation and the units must possess their own sufficiently developed government authorities with the right to change them unilaterally within the limits set by the agreement [the constitution]. Legislative and administrative authorities are needed. Secondly, the agreement-based division of responsibility between all branches of government is the central feature of federalism. Divi- sion means common participation in policy planning, funding and administration. In most cases, division is officially legalised but in any case, there is a possibility to work together while retaining independence. Although federal or decentralised systems turned out to be very durable, their success is determined by a specific political environment that is conducive to democratic governance and has traditions of political cooperation and self-restraint. Furthermore, federal systems function best in societies that are characterised by the community of fundamental interests because it is then possible to allow a lot of local initiative and rely on voluntary cooperation. Use of force to maintain federations is even more harmful than in other democratic systems. Federal systems are particularly successful where there is enough of competent human (for occupying positions) and material resources, part of which is sacrificed as a price for freedom.

Federalism and ethnic relations Federalism and ethnic relations are inseparable from each other because federations, as a rule, are multi-ethnic states with a whole array of political, social, economic and cultural issues. This subject is best explained on the basis of specific examples. Below, we will present the cases of India and Pakistan, as well as Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates, Spain, Switzerland and Belgium. 119 Ethnos and Politics India (Constitution of India. http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/welcome. html) Area: total: 3,287,590 sq km Population: 1,029,991,145 (July 2001 est.) Ethnic groups: Indo-Aryan 72%, Dravidian 25%, Mongoloid and other 3% (2000) 24 languages each spoken by a million or more persons Administrative divisions: 28 states and 7 union territories*; Andaman and Nicobar Islands*, Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chandigarh*, Chhattisgarh, Dadra and Nagar Haveli*, Daman and Diu*, Delhi*, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana,Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Lakshadweep*, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland,Orissa, Pondicherry*, Punjab, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, Ut- taranchal, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal. Bicameral Parliament or Sansad consists of the Council of States or Rajya Sabha (a body consisting of not more than 250 members, up to 12 of which are appointed by the president, the remainder are chosen by the elected members of the state and territorial assemblies; members serve six-year terms) and the People’s Assembly or Lok Sabha (545 seats; 543 elected by popular vote, 2 appointed by the president; members serve five-year terms). Elections: People’s Assembly – last held 5 September through 3 October 1999 (next to be held NA 2004) . Election results: People’s Assembly – percent of vote by party – BJP alliance 40.8%, Congress alliance 33.8%, other 25.4%; seats by party – BJP alliance 304, Con- gress alliance 134, other 107. Political parties and leaders: All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam or AIADMK All India Forward Bloc or AIFB Asom Gana Parishad [Prafulla Kumar MAHANTA]; Bahujan Samaj Party or BSP [Kanshi RAM]; Bharatiya Janata Party or BJP [Bangaru LAXMAN, president]; Biju Janata Dal or BJD [Naveen PATNAIK]; 120 Federalism

Communist Party of India or CPI [Ardhendu Bhushan BARDHAN]; Communist Party of India/Marxist-Leninist or CPI/ML [Vinod MISHRA]; Congress (I) Party [Sonia GANDHI, president]; Dravida Munnetra Kazagham or DMK [M. KARUNANIDHI]; Indian National League [Suliaman SAIT]; Janata Dal (Secular) [H. D. Deve GOWDA]; Janata Dal (United) or JDU [Sharad YADAV, president, I. K. GU- JRAL]; Kerala Congress (Mani faction) [K. M. MANI]; Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam or MDMK [VAIKO]; Muslim League [G. M. BANATWALA]; Nationalist Congress Party or NCP [Sharad PAWAR]; National Democratic Alliance, a 16-party alliance including BJP, DMK, Janata Dal (U), SHS, Shiromani Akali Dal, Telugu Desam, BJD, Rinamool Congress]; Rashtriya Janata Dal or RJD [Laloo Prasad YADAV]; Revolutionary Socialist Party or RSP [Tridip CHOWDHURY]; Samajwadi Party or SP [Mulayam Singh YADAV, president]; Shiromani Akali Dal [Prakash Singh BADAL]; Shiv Sena [Bal THACKERAY]; Tamil Maanila Congress [G. K. MOOPANAR]; Telugu Desam Party or TDP [Chandrababu NAIDU]; Trinamool Congress [Mamata BANERJEE] Political pressure groups and leaders: numerous religious or militant/chauvinistic organizations, including Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Bajrang Dal, and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh; various separatist groups seeking greater communal and/or regional autonomy, including the All Parties Hurriyat Conference. GDP – per capita purchasing power parity – $2,200 (2000 est.)

Pakistan (Constitution of Pakistan. http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/) Area: total: 803,940 sq km. Population: 144,600,000 (July 2001 est.). 121 Ethnos and Politics

Ethnic groups: Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun (Pathan), Baloch, Mu- hajir. Religions: Muslim 97% (Sunni 77%, Shi’a 20%), Christian, Hindu, and other 3% Languages: Punjabi 48%, Sindhi 12%, Siraiki (a Punjabi variant) 10%, Pashtu 8%, Urdu (official) 8%, Balochi 3%, Hindko 2%, Brahui 1%, English (official and lingua franca of Pakistani elite and most government ministries), Burushaski, and other 8%. Literacy (age 15 and over can read and write): total population: 42.7%, male: 55.3%, female: 29% (1998). Administrative divisions: 4 provinces, 1 territory*, and 1 capital territory**: Balochistan, Federally Administered Tribal Areas*, Islamabad Capital Territory**, North-West Frontier Province, Punjab, Sindh. note: the Pakistani-administered portion of the disputed Jammu and Kashmir region includes Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas. Constitution: 10 April 1973, suspended 5 July 1977, restored with amendments 30 December 1985; suspended 15 October 1999 Had of government: Chief Executive Gen. Pervez MUSHARRAF (since 12 October 1999). Cabinet appointed by the chief executive Elections: president elected by Parliament for a five-year term; election last held 31 December 1997 (next to be held 2002). Eection last held 3 February 1997 (next to be held NA); note – Gen. Pervez MUSHARRAF overthrew the government of Prime Minister Mham- mad Nawaz SHARIF in the military takeover of 12 October 1999; in May 2000, the Supreme Court validated the October 1999 coup and set a three-year limit in office for Chief Executive MUSHARRAF. Legislative branch: note – Gen. Pervez MUSHARRAF dissolved Parliament following the military takeover of 12 October 1999; bicameral Parliament or Majlis-e-Shoora consists of the Senate (87 seats; members indirectly elected by provincial assemblies to serve six-year terms; one-third of the members up for election every two years) and the National Assembly (217 seats – 10 represent non-Muslims; members elected by popular vote to serve five-year terms). No timetable has yet been given for elections following the military takeove. National Assembly – percent of vote by party – NA%; seats by party –

122 Federalism

Pakistan Muslim League, Nawaz Sharif faction or PML/N [Nawaz SHARIF] – 137 Pakistan People’s Party or PPP [Benazir BHUTTO] – 18 Mutahida` Qaumi Movement, Altaf faction or MQM/A [Altaf HUSSAIN] – 12 Awami National Party or ANP [Wali KHAN] – 10 Baluch National Party or BNP – 3, JWP 2, JUI/F 2, PPP/SB 1, NPP 1, independents 21, minorities 10; note – Gen. Pervez MUSHARRAF dismissed Parliament 15 October 1999. Judicial branch: Supreme Court (justices appointed by the president); Federal Islamic or Shari’a Court. Political parties have been allowed to operate after the dissolution of Parliament: Awami National Party or ANP [Wali KHAN]; Balochistan National Movement/Hayee Group or BNM/H [Dr. HAYEE Baluch]; Baluch National Party or BNP [Sardar Akhtar MENGAL]; Jamhoori Watan Party or JWP [Akbar Khan BUGTI]; Jamiat-al-Hadith or JAH [Sajid MIR]; Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, Fazlur Rehman faction or JUI/F [Fazlur REHMAN]; Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan, Niazi faction or JUP/NI [Abdul Sattar Khan NIAZI]; Millat Party [Farooq LEGHARI]; Milli Yakjheti Council or MYC is an umbrella organization which includes Jamaat-i-Islami or JI [Qazi Hussain AHMED], Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, Sami-ul-Haq faction or JUI/S [Sami ul-HAQ], Tehrik-I-Jafria Pakistan or TJP [Allama Sajid NAQVI], and Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan, Noorani faction or JUP/NO [Shah Ahmad NOORANI]; Mutahida` Qaumi Movement, Altaf faction or MQM/A [Altaf HUSSAIN]; National People’s Party or NPP [Ghulam Mustapha JATOI]; Pakhtun Khwa Milli Awami Party or PKMAP [Mahmood Khan ACHAKZAI]; Pakhtun Quami Party or PQP; Pakistan Awami Tehrik or PAT [Tahir ul QADRI];

123 Ethnos and Politics

Pakistan Muslim League, Functional Group or PML/F Pakistan Muslim League, Junejo faction or PML/J Pakistan Muslim League, Nawaz Sharif faction or PML/N [Nawaz SHARIF]; Pakistan National Party or PNP [Hasil BIZENJO]; Pakistan People’s Party or PPP [Benazir BHUTTO]; Pakistan People’s Party/Shaheed Bhutto or PPP/SB [Ghinva BHUTTO]; 1 Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf or PTI [Imran KHAN] Political pressure groups: military remains important political force; ulema (clergy), landowners, industrialists, and small mer- chants and also influential leaders:

Ethiopia Constitution Of The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (http://www.africanlegislaturesproject.org/sites/africanlegislaturesproject.org/files/Constitution%20Ethiopia.pdf) Independence: oldest independent country in Africa and one of the oldest in the world – at least 2,000 years Unique among African countries, the ancient Ethiopian monarchy maintained its freedom from colonial rule, one exception being the Italian occupation of 1936-41. In 1974 a military junta, the Derg, deposed Emperor Haile SELASSIE (who had ruled since 1930) and established a socialist state. Torn by bloody coups, uprisings, wide- scale drought, and massive refugee problems, the regime was finally toppled by a coalition of rebel forces, the Ethiopian People’s Revolu- tionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), in 1991. A constitution was adopted in 1994 and Ethiopia’s first multiparty elections were held in 1995. A two and a half year border war with Eritrea that ended with a peace treaty on 12 December 2000 has strengthened the ruling coalition, but has hurt the nation’s economy. Area: total: 1,127,127 sq km.; Population: 65,891,874; HIV/AIDS – 10.63% (1999 est.) 3 million (1999 est.) HIV/AIDS – deaths: 280,000 (1999 est.);

1. Political alliances in Pakistan can shift frequently 124 Federalism

Ethnic groups: Oromo 40%, Amhara and Tigre 32%, Sidamo 9%, Shankella 6%, Somali 6%, Afar 4%, Gurage 2%, other 1%. Languages: Amharic, Tigrinya, Oromigna, Guaragigna, Soma- li, Arabic, other local languages, English (major foreign language taught in schools); Religions: Muslim 45%–50%, Ethiopian Orthodox 35%-40%, ani- mist 12%, other 3%–8%; Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write: total population: 35.5% male: 45.5% female: 25.3% (1995 est.) Country name: conventional long form: Federal Democratic Re- public of Ethiopia. Local long form: Ityop’iya Federalawi Demokrasi- yawi Ripeblik According to current estimates, coffee contributes 10% of Ethi- opia’s GDP. More than 15 million people (25% of the population) derive their livelihood from the coffee sector.) In December 1999, Ethiopia signed a $1.4 billion joint venture deal to develop a huge natural gas field in the Somali. Regional State. The war with Eri- trea forced the government to spend scarce resources on the military and to scale back ambitious development plans. Foreign in- vestment has declined significantly. Government taxes imposed in late 1999 to raise money for the war depressed an already weak economy. The war forced the government to improve roads and other parts of the previously neglected infrastructure, but only certain regions of the nation benefited. Recovery from the war is mostly contingent on natural factors. A drought has continued into the end of 2000 and food relief is expected to be needed through mid-2001 at least. Ethiopia may receive Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief by the end of the year. (Debt external:- $10 billion (1999 est.). GDP – per capita purchasing power parity – $600 (2000 est.). Administrative divisions: 9 ethnically-based states (kililoch, singular – kilil) and 2 self-governing administrations* (astedaderoch, singular – astedader): Adis Abeba* (Addis Ababa); Afar; Amara, Binshangul Gumuz; Dire Dawa*; Gambela Hizboch; Hareri Hizb; Oromiya; Sumale; Tigray; YeDebub Biheroch Bihereseboch na Hiz-

125 Ethnos and Politics

boch (Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region) (http:// www.apapeth.org/Documents/EthiopianLaws.html). Constitution: ratified December 1994; effective 22 August 1995. Legislative: bicameral Parliament consists of the House of Federa- tion or upper chamber (108 seats; members are chosen by state assemblies to serve five-year terms) and the House of People’s Representa- tives or lower chamber (548 seats; members are directly elected by popular vote from single-member districts to serve five-year terms): elections: last held 14 May 2000 (next to be held NA May 2005) election results: percent of vote – NA%; seats – OPDO 177, ANDM 134, TPLF 38, WGGPDO 27, EPRDF 19, SPDO 18, GNDM 15, KSPDO 10, ANDP 8, GPRDF 7, SOPDM 7, BGPDUF 6, BMPDO 5, KAT 4, other regional political groupings 22, independents 8; note – 43 seats unconfirmed. Political parties: Amhara National Democratic Movement or ANDM – 134 Oromo People’s Democratic Organization or OPDO – 177 Tigrai People’s Liberation Front or TPLF – 38 Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front or EPRDF – 19 Walayta, Gamo, Gofa, Dawro, Konta People’s Democratic Orga- nization or WGGPDO – 27 Sidama People’s Democratic Organization or SPDO – 18 South Omo People’s Democratic Movement or SOPDM – 7 and dozens ot others. Note: irregularities and violence at a number of polling stations necessitated the rescheduling of voting in certain constituencies; voting postponed in Somali regional state because of severe drought.

JAE (former: Trucial Oman, Trucial States) “The White Book. The Basic Law of the Sultanate of Oman” } { ICL Document Status: 6 Nov 1996 (http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/mu00000_.html) Background: The Trucial States of the Persian Gulf coast granted the UK control of their defense and foreign affairs in 19th century treaties. In 1971, six of these states – Abu Zaby, ‘Ajman, Al Fujayrah, Ash Shariqah, Dubayy, and Umm al Qaywayn – merged to form the UAE. They were joined in 1972 by Ra’s al Khaymah. The UAE’s per 126 Federalism capita GDP is not far below those of the leading West European nations. Its generosity with oil revenues and its moderate foreign policy stance have allowed it to play a vital role in the affairs of the region.

Area: total: 82,880 sq km Land use: arable land: 0% permanent crops: 0% permanent pastures: 2% forests and woodland: 0% other: 98% (1993 est.) Natural hazards: frequent sand and dust storms GDP – per purchasing power parity – $22,800 (2000 est.) capita: Population: 2,407,460 note: includes 1,576,472 non-nationals (July 2001 est.) 75% of the population in the 15-64 age group is non-national (July 1998 est.) Ethnic groups: Emirati 19%, other Arab and Iranian 23%, South Asian 50%, other expatriates (includes Westerners and East Asians) 8% (1982) note: less than 20% are UAE citizens (1982) Religions: Muslim 96% (Shi’a 16%), Christian, Hindu, and other 4% Languages: Arabic (official), Persian, English, Hindi, Urdu Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 79.2% male: 78.9% female: 79.8% (1995 est.) Capital: Abu Dhabi Administrative 7 emirates (imarat, singular – imarah); Abu Zaby (Abu divisions: Dhabi), ‘Ajman, Al Fujayrah, Ash Shariqah (Sharjah), Dubayy (Dubai), Ra’s al Khaymah, Umm al Qaywayn Independence: 2 December 1971 (from UK) Constitution: 2 December 1971 (made permanent in 1996) Legal system: federal court system introduced in 1971; all emirates except Dubayy (Dubai) and Ra’s al Khaymah have joined the federal system; all emirates have secular and Islamic law

127 Ethnos and Politics

for civil, criminal, and high courts Suffrage: none Executive chief of state: President ZAYID bin Sultan Al Nuhayyan branch: (since 2 December 1971), ruler of Abu Zaby (Abu Dhabi) (since 6 August 1966) and Vice President MAKTUM bin Rashid al-Maktum (since 8 October 1990), ruler of Dubayy (Dubai) head of government: Prime Minister MAKTUM bin Rashid al-Maktum (since 8 October 1990), ruler of Dubayy (Dubai); Deputy Prime Minister SULTAN bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan (since 20 November 1990)

cabinet: Council of Ministers appointed by the president

note: there is also a Federal Supreme Council (FSC) which is composed of the seven emirate rulers; the council is the highest constitutional authority in the UAE; establishes general policies and sanctions federal legislation, Abu Zaby (Abu Dhabi) and Dubayy (Dubai) rulers have effective veto power; meets four times a year

elections: president and vice president elected by the FSC (a group of seven electors) for five-year terms; election last held NA October 1996 (next to be held NA October 2001); prime minister and deputy prime minister appointed by the president

election results: ZAYID bin Sultan Al Nuhayyan reelected president; percent of FSC vote – NA, but believed to be unanimous; MAKTUM bin Rashid al-Maktum elected vice president; percent of FSC vote – NA%, but believed to be unanimous

Legislative unicameral Federal National Council or Majlis al-Ittihad branch: al-Watani (40 seats; members appointed by the rulers of the constituent states to serve two-year terms)

elections: none note: reviews legislation, but cannot change or veto

128 Federalism

Judicial Union Supreme Court (judges are appointed by the branch: president)

Political parties and leaders: none Political pressure groups and leaders: NA (Oman observer. http://main.omanobserver.om/)

Spain Parliamentary monarchy Cortes Generales (General Courts) Congress: 300–400 deputies – at least two from each province + proportionate to the number of electors. In the Senate: four from each province, elected directly. Formally unitary, but close to a federation. There are 17 comunidades autonomas (CA), of them Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia are national units. 7 CA have two or more provinces. Each CA has its own statute. Under the Constitu- tion, their competence may cover 22 areas (agriculture, environment, tourism, museums, libraries, teaching, languages, health care). More can be delegated. Four communities (the aforementioned ones and Andalusia) are fully autonomous. The central government has 32 areas of responsibility, but they can be delegated to the communities. Communities have financial autonomy (tax collection, from their own assets, etc.). Communities have their own Legislative Assemblies elected directly under the proportional system, which form the Councils of Government that are headed by Presidents nominated by the King. The Basque Country has a parliament, a government and a Consti- tutional Court, Castile and Leon has the Cortes and the Junta. The central government appoints a delegate to each of the autonomous communities (AB) who becomes the head of the state administration on the territory of the AB and coordinates its activities with the activities of the AB administration. (More information can be found here: http://www.ine.es/en/nor- mativa/leyes/rd1036see_en.htm)

129 Ethnos and Politics

Switzerland Constitution of Switzerland, 29 May 1874. (Constitution of Switzerland: http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ sz00000_.html). 7.1 million inhabitants: German 65%, French 18%, Italian 10%, Ro- mansh 1%, others 6%. Religions: Catholic 47.6%, Protestant 44.3%, others 8.1% (1980). Occupation: in the service sector 50%, industry and trades 34%, administration 10%, agriculture and forestry 6% (1992). Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, Confederation Suisse, Con- federazione Svizzera. The beginning of the confederation was the Rütli oath (Uri, Schw- yz, Unterwalden 01 08 1291). Ended the expansion policy in 1515, pro- ceeded to reinforce its defences only. The army is militia-based, except for a small number of regular soldiers. Service: four months and annual training. Defence budget: $4.1 billion (1.4% GDP). 1874–1994: 130 constitutional amendments. 23 cantons, among them three cantons made up of two half-cantons: Unterwalden (Obwalden and Nydwalden), Basel (urban and rural), Appenzell (Innerroden and Ausserroden). The City of Basel is the smallest (36 sq km) and Graubünden is the largest canton (7106 sq km). Cantons according to languages: 14 German, 4 French, 1 Ital- ian, 3 bilingual and 1 trilingual. Article 1 of the Constitution: Together, the peoples of the 23 sovereign Cantons of Switzerland united by the present alliance <…> form the Swiss Confederation. Article 2 [Goals] The aim of the Confederation is to preserve the outward independence of the fatherland, to maintain internal peace and order, to protect the freedom and the rights of the confederates and to promote their common prosperity. Article 3 [Cantonal Sovereignty] The Cantons are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the Federal Constitution and, as such, exercise all rights which are not entrusted to the federal power. Article 5 [Guarantees] The Confederation shall guarantee the Cantons their territory, their sovereignty within the limits set forth in Article 3, their consti- 130 Federalism tutions, the freedom and the rights of the people, the constitutional rights of the citizens as well as the rights and prerogatives conferred upon the authorities by the people. Article 6 [Cantonal Constitutions] (1) The Cantons are bound to request the Confederation to guarantee their constitutions. (2) This guarantee shall be afforded provided a) these constitutions contain nothing inconsistent with the Fed- eral Constitution; b) they ensure the exercise of political rights according to republican (representative or democratic) forms. Article 7 [Treaties between Cantons] (1) All separate alliances and all treaties of a political nature between Cantons are prohibited. (2) The Cantons may, however, conclude agreements among themselves concerning matters of legislation, justice and administration, provided they bring such agreements to the notice of the federal authority, which is entitled to prevent the execution of the agreements if they contain anything contrary to the Confederation or to the rights of other Cantons. Article 8 [War and Foreign Affairs] The Confederation alone has the right to declare war and to make peace, as well as to conclude alliances and treaties, especially customs and commercial treaties, with foreign states. Article 9 [Cantonal Treaties] Exceptionally, the Cantons retain the right to conclude treaties with foreign states concerning matters of public economy, neighborly relations and police provided such treaties contain nothing contrary to the Confederation or to the rights of other Cantons. Article 10 [Cantonal Foreign Affairs] (1) All official intercourse between the Cantons and foreign governments or their representatives shall take place through the agency of the Federal Council. (2) The Cantons may, however, correspond directly with subor- dinate authorities and officials of a foreign state with respect to the matters mentioned in Article 9. Article 13 [Standing Army]

131 Ethnos and Politics

(1) The Confederation may not maintain a standing army. (2) Without the consent of the federal authorities, no Canton or Half-Canton may maintain a standing armed force of more than 300 men, not including Police forces. Article 19 [Federal Army] (1) The federal army consists of: a) the troops of the Cantons; b) all Swiss who, though not belonging to those troops, are nevertheless subject to military service. (2) The right to dispose of the army as well as of the war materials provided for it by law rests with the Confederation. Article 20 [Military Affairs] (1) Legislation on military organization is a federal concern. The execution of such legislation within the Cantons shall be ensured by the cantonal authorities within the limits to be laid down by federal legislation and under the supervision of the Confederation. Article 22quater [Zoning Plans] (1) The Confederation shall decree by legislation principles applicable to zoning plans to be drawn up by the Cantons for the purpose of ensuring the judicious use of ground and rational land occupation. Article 24 [Rivers and Forests] (1) The Confederation has the right of high supervision over the control of river embankments and forests. Article 24bis [Water]. The Confederation shall by legislation establish principles in the general interest concerning the conservation and exploitation of water and the supply of drinking water. The Confederation is empowered to issue legal provisions concerning navigation, transmission and distribution of electrical energy, atomic energy, construction and operation of railways and pipelines, post and telegraphs. Environmental protection is a cantonal concern; however, the Confederation shall, in carrying out its obligations, preserve the characteristic aspects of landscapes and localities, of historical sites as well as of natural and cultural monuments, support environmental protection projects, counter air pollution and noise, legislate on the protection of animal and vegetable life (Article 24). Article 27 [Educational System] (1) The Confederation is entitled to set up, in addition to the existing polytechnic, a federal university and other establishments for higher education or to subsidize such institutions.

132 Federalism

(2) The Cantons shall provide for adequate primary education which shall be placed wholly under state control. Such education shall be compulsory and, in public schools, free of charge. (3bis) For the period of compulsory schooling the school year shall begin between mid August and mid September. All matters relating to customs are a federal concern; the Confed- eration is entitled to levy customs duties. The Confederation is entitled to legislate on banking and take into consideration the specific tasks of the cantonal banks (Article 31quater), take measures to ensure balanced economic development and to prevent unemployment and price inflation, collaborate with the Cantons and private enter- prise, take into consideration the varying economic development of the individual regions of the country (Article 31quinquies). The Confederation shall control the manufacture, import and sale of alcohol by legislation and prohibit the import and sale of ab- sinthe (Article 32). Gambling houses are prohibited (Article 35). The Confederation shall have the monopoly of issuing banknotes in order to regulate the circulation of money. Two thirds of the net profits of the bank shall accrue to the Cantons (Articles 38–39). Switzerland is not a real parliamentary republic because it has a lot of elements of direct democracy. In reality, however, the number of voters that reached 70–80% during the interwar period is now usually much lower – 40%, which is the lowest in Europe. Reasons: increased welfare, lower significance of parties, excessively technical nature of issues raised in referendums. According to surveys, 20% are not interested in politics, another 20% perceive themselves as incompetent and 20 more percent believe that their vote won’t make a difference. Women gained the right to vote after the 07 February 1971 referendum, and in cantons after the 1991 decision by the Federal Court. Article 71. The Federal Assembly (Bundesversammlung, Assem- blee Federale) consists of two chambers: – the National Council (Nationalrat, Conseil National): 200 deputies elected in direct proportion to the number of residents using the proportional election system (a canton or a half-canton constitutes one constituency). A president and a vice-president shall be elected for each session and may not be elected during two successive sessions.

133 Ethnos and Politics

– the Council of States (Standerat, Conseil des Etats): 46 representatives (two from each canton, one from each half-canton). The deputy’s position is not a main job, and is remunerated with an honorarium. The National Council consists of about 30 lawyers, 25 farmers and civil servants, 20 businessmen, 10 representatives of mass media, many scientific workers, members of cantonal governments. Average age: about 50 years. Three-week sessions four times a year. Article 85 [Federal Assembly Competences: 14 positions]. Federal laws must be approved by both Councils, also in a referendum if 50,000 Swiss citizens entitled to vote or eight Cantons so demand. The supreme executive authority is the Federal Council (Bundes- rat, Conseil Federal) composed of seven members (Article 95). They shall be elected by the Federal Assembly from among all the citizens who are eligible for the National Council, but not more than one member may be elected from the same Canton (Article 96). The chairman (President), who is also the President of the Confedera- tion, and the Vice-President shall be elected by the Federal Assembly from among the members of the Council. They can only be elected for one term (Article 98). According to Article 102, the Federal Council shall conduct federal affairs, ensure the compliance of the laws with the constitution, guarantee that the cantonal constitutions are not infringed, submit to the Federal Assembly drafts of laws, approve or reject the agreements of the Cantons among themselves and with foreign states, be in charge of foreign policy, ensure the external and internal security, be in charge of military affairs, draft and implement the budget and, at each session, render an account of its activities to the Federal Assembly. Departments: foreign affairs, internal affairs (health care, education, culture, science, environment, statistics), justice and police, finance, economy, transport and energy. A new Federal Council can only be appointed by a newly elected Federal Assembly, i. e. it is not dependent on the parliament during the period of legislature. There is no mechanism of government re- moval or effective control. Furthermore, Council members are usually elected (individually) for the next term. On average, Council members work for 10–12 years; K. Schenk had worked for 32 years (1864–1895), K. Motta for 28 years (1912–1940), F. Etter for 26 years (1934–1959).

134 Federalism

It is formed proportionally: the Free Democratic Party, the Chris- tian Democratic People’s Party and the Social Democratic Party each have two representatives, the Swiss People’s party has one. The Federal Court, which is elected by the Federal Assembly, han- dles cases between the Confederation and the Cantons, between the Cantons, between the Confederation (the Cantons) and citizens (or corporations) (Articles 106–107). Article 116 [Languages] (1) German, French, Italian and Romansh are the national languages of Switzerland. (2) German, French and Italian are declared to be the official languages of the Confederation. Cantons and half-cantons are formally considered sovereign units, have their own constitutions, collect direct taxes. They are responsible for hospitals, public order, municipal services. In practice, they are increasingly becoming executive bodies of the federation. 15 cantonal parliaments are called Kantonsrat, four Landsrat, and in Canton Jura, it is called Parliament. Each parliament has 60–200 members, all of them elected under the proportional system. The government is called Regierungsrat or Conseil d’Etat in most cantons. Government members almost everywhere are elected directly under the majority system. In Glarus, as well as in Unterwalden and Appenzell half-cantons, the supreme authority is Landsgemeinde, a general assembly of voters (up to 10,000 in Glarus at the beginning of May, 1,100–2,500 in half-cantons at the end of April). It is established in the Constitu- tion of Obwalden (1968) that the passage of the cortege through the streets should be accompanied by music, and the appearance of the administration on the dais by drums. The lowest level is comprised of communes (Gemeinde) which are different in each canton. There are 3021 communes. Since 1850, their number in Switzerland has dropped by only 2%, whereas in Europe, from 78–89% (Sweden, Denmark, Belgium) to 40–68% (UK, Austria, Norway) of communes were abolished throughout 1950–1980. There is a big difference in their area (from 28 ha to 28,000 ha) and population numbers (from 2,000–3,000 to 300,000–400,000). The communes are responsible for their own finances, taxes, schools, sanitary

135 Ethnos and Politics services, maintenance of order, also for water and power supply in the cities. The communes conclude inter-communal agreements or form associations. Self‑government bodies (except the three French- speaking cantons) are the General Assembly in Geneva, councils (parliaments) in Neuchâtel and Vaud.

Belgium The Constitution of Belgium (Belgium – Constitution. http://www. servat.unibe.ch/icl/be00000_.html): Article 1: “Belgium is a Federal State made up of Communities and Regions”. Article 2: “Belgium is made up of three Communities: the French Community, the Flemish Community, and the German-speaking Community”. Article 3: “Belgium is made up of three Regions: the Walloon Re- gion, the Flemish Region, and the Brussels Region”. Article 4: “Belgium has four linguistic regions: the French-speaking Region, the Dutch-speaking Region, the bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital, and the German-speaking Region”. Article 35 provides for the distribution of powers between the federal authority, communities and regions. Article 38 [Local Autonomy] Each Community has assignments which are recognized by the Constitution or by the laws carried in pursuance of it. Article 39 [Regional Autonomy] Regional bodies that are elected in the regions and whose powers are set out in the Constitution. Article 41 [Decentralization, Adjournment] Interests which are exclusively of a communal or provincial nature are ruled on by communal or provincial councils, according to the principles established by the Constitution. Article 43 [Linguistic Groups] For cases determined by the Constitution, the elected members of each House are divided into a French linguistic group and a Dutch linguistic group. Article 54 [Group Veto, Alarm-Bell Procedure] 136 Federalism

A motion signed by three-quarters of the members of one of the linguistic groups can declare that a bill is of a nature to gravely dam- age relations between the Communities and thus veto any law with the exception of budgets and laws requiring a special majority. In this case, the draft bill is referred to the Council of Ministers which, within thirty days, gives its recommendations on the bill to the House. A linguistic group can only use its right of veto once with regard to the same bill. Article 63 [Seats] (1) The House of Representatives is made up of one hundred and fifty members; according to Article 66, each of them benefits from an annual indemnity of twelve thousand francs. Section II. The Senate The Senate (Article 67) is made up of seventy-one senators, of whom twenty-five senators are elected by the Dutch electoral college, fifteen by the French electoral college, ten senators are appointed by and within each of the Councils of the Flemish and French‑speaking Communities, one by the German Council, ten more are appointed in accordance with other procedures, also (Article 72) the King’s children older than 18 years of age. Chapter II Federal Legislation Article 74 [Competencies] Notwithstanding Article 36, federal legislative power is jointly exercised by the King and by the House of Representatives for: 1) the granting of naturalization; 2) laws relative to the civil and penal responsibilities of the King’s ministers; 3) State budgets and accounts, without prejudice to Article 174 (1), second sentence; 4) the establishment of the army quotas. Article 77 [Competencies of Both Houses] (1) The House of Representatives and the Senate are equally competent with respect to: 1) the declaration of constitutional revision and for constitutional revision; 2) matters requiring settlement by both legislative Houses by virtue of the Constitution; 3) laws described in Articles…

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The Council of Ministers (Article 99) includes fifteen members, an equally number from both linguistic communities. Chapter IV Communities, Regions Subsection I Community and Regional Councils The French Community Council, the Flemish Community Coun- cil, the German-speaking Community Council and regional councils are formed under Article 115. Each Community Government and regional governments are formed in accordance with Article 121. In accordance with Articles 127 and 129, the French and Dutch Community Councils rule by decree on the use of language for administrative matters, education, service, also on schools and education, with the exception of common standards and cultural matters. Their decrees have force of law in relevant regions, except as concerns the border communities, services and institutions, the activities of which are common to more than one Community. Article 136 [Linguistic Groups in Brussels-Capital] (1) There are linguistic groups within the Brussels-Capital Re- gional Council, and among the governing bodies, qualified with respect to Community issues; (2) The governing bodies together form the United Governing Bodies, acting as an inter-Community consultation and coordination organ. Article 137 [French and Flemish Community Council] In view of the application of Article 39, the French and Flemish Community Councils, in addition to their respective Governments, may exercise the responsibilities, respectively, of the Walloon and of the Flemish Regional Governments, along the terms and according to those conditions established by law. This law must be adopted by a majority vote as described in Article 4, last paragraph. Article 138 [French Community Responsibilities] (1) The French Community Council, and the Walloon Regional Council and the French linguistic group of the Brussels-Capital Re- gional Council, may decide of common accord that the Walloon Re- gional Council and Government in the French-language Region, and the Brussels-Capital Regional Council and its governing bodies in the bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital may exercise, in full or in part, the responsibilities of the French Community. Article 139 [German- and Walloon Council]

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(1) Upon request by their respective Governments, the German- speaking Community Council and the Walloon Regional Council may, by decree, decide of common accord that Walloon Regional responsibilities may be exercised in whole or in part by the German- speaking Community Council and Government in the German-language Region. (2) These responsibilities may be exercised, according to the case, either by decree, by order, or Article 165 [Urban Entities, Federations of Communes] (1.1) The law creates urban entities and federations of communes. It determines their organization and their responsibilities through application of those principles described in Article 162. (1.2) For each urban area and for each federation there exists a Council and an executive committee. (1.3) The president of the executive committee is elected by and within the Council; his election is ratified by the King; the law establishes his statute. (1.4) Articles 159 and 190 apply to the rulings and regulations of urban entities and federations of communes. (1.5) The geographical limits of urban entities and of federations of communes may only be changed or rectified on the sole basis of a law. (2) The law creates the body within which each urban entity and nearby federations of communes may meet, according to the conditions and manner which the law establishes, for the examination of common problems of a technical nature within their respective areas of competence. (3) Several federations of communes may cooperate or associate themselves with one or more urban entities in accordance with the conditions and in the manner prescribed by law, to jointly manage and regulate those issues within their respective areas of competence. Their Councils may not engage in joint deliberation. Autonomy in unitary states This is a very old phenomenon. Throughout all known history, conquered and annexed regions were often granted absolute autonomy in their internal affairs. The Ottoman Empire had a millet system which allowed autonomy for religious groups.

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Italy is divided into 103 provinces which make up 20 regions, and the status of each of them is regulated by a separate law. Five of them that were formed in 1945–1953 have a special (different) status: Trentino-Alto Adige (South Tyrolean ethnic minority and Ladins), Val d’Aosta (French minority), Friuli-Venezia Giulia (Friulians and Slovenians), Sicily and Sardinia. The first three have ethnic minorities. Trentino-Alto Adige is divided into two autonomous provinces that have a regional status. The Constitution vests the regions with the power over 17 subject matters: local police, medical care, city building, regional transport, agriculture, etc. Regions have financial autonomy, they levy their own taxes and share in state tax revenues; they can also be granted special funding. Taking into consideration the opinion of the regional councils and on the basis of a referendum, regional borders may be changed or new regions may be formed (this requires at least 1 million citizen votes). Under the Constitution, provinces and communes (about 8,000) are autonomous units (enti) whose status is regulated by the general law. Denmark: Greenland and the Faroe Islands (separate CIA Fact- books) have autonomy. In Great Britain, the 1997 referendums were followed by the creation of regional assemblies of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales (the May 1999 elections). That was also when the issue of the self- government of England was raised. In 1999, regional development agencies (RDAs) for eight regions were established, and T. Blair’s government committed to moving towards the direct election of regional authorities where it was required. Currently, British government system is very centralised, even such matters as opening a hotel or closing a hospital are decided by the ministries. In 1990, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao was created in the Philippines. Decentralisation may be expensive as there is an increase in the number of politicians and civil servants. The most important thing in federalism is a concession to ethno- territorial demands. It institutionalises the differences of the latter.

140 Federalism

Questions: 1. What is the difference between the federation and the confederation? 2. What determines the vitality of the federation? 3. What is the connection between multi-ethnicity and federalism? 4. In case of which country, out of those presented, the interests of ethno-territorial units are balanced best and why?

Online research project: Review the online portals of the public authorities of the federations in the European Union (e. g. Germany) and evaluate crucial ethnic issues referred to in those portals.

Recommended literature: 1. Brass P. Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison. New Delhi; Newbury Park (Cal.): Sage Publications, 1991; 2. Brubaker R. Pilietybė ir tautiškumas Prancūzijoje ir Vokietijoje. Vilnius: Pradai, 1998; 3. Belgium – Constitution. http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/be00 000_.html); 4. Healey, Joseph F. Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class. Pine Forge Press. 2010; 5. Ozkirimli, Umut, Theories of nationalism. Palgrave Macmillan. 2010; 6. Smith A.D. The Ethnic Origins of Nations.- Oxford; N. Y.: Black- well, 1986; 7. Smith, A. D. Nationalism. Keyconcepts. Polity press. 2010; 8. Stephen, Cornell, Ethnicity and Race. Making identities in a Changing World. Pine Forge Press. 2007.

141 10. Influence of ethno-political factors on international relations (Palestine and Israel)

Key concepts: International system; ethnic conflict, threats to international stability. After reading the article, the student: a. will be able to evaluate the connections between the stability of the system of international relations and the issues of ethnicity; b. will understand the importance of ethno-political factors in the relations between the countries; c. will be able to analyse the significance of international relations and international organisations in the context of transformations of nationalist ideology; d. will evaluate the significance of international organisations in resolving ethnic conflicts.

Theories analysing the significance of ethno-political relations to -in ternational stability are realistic, liberal and communitarian theories: 1. The three-bloc neo-mercantilist geoeconomics model. 2. The multipolar balance of power model – traditional “realist” and/or neo-realist frameworks. 3. The “clash of civilizations” thesis. 4. The unipolar dominance model (geopolitical “long cycle” and “hegemonic stability” theories). 5. The “zones of peace” versus “zones of turmoil” model. 6. The “global village” model (shift of power and sovereignty -IN GOs, regimes). 7. The bipolar model. International community and the threats it faces: a) danger of military conflict (especially civil wars, also Armenia- Azerbaijan, East Bengal, Kashmir, Cyprus);

142 Influence of ethno-political factors on international relations

b) refugees (Kosovo, Myanmar, South Sudan); c) migration issues (events of the Arab Spring in North Africa); d) danger to the integrity of the state: separatism and irredentism (Germans, Cypriots and Greeks); e) interest in the stability of the system (closed-door club): non- recognition of secessionist movements, principles of territorial integrity and non-interference into internal affairs, declarative nature of the right to self-determination; f) attempts to avoid/eliminate tension in order to preserve integrity at any cost (Bosnia, Iraq after Desert Storm): Questions raised by the international community: – failure to recognise national and secessionist movements as subjects of the international system (Chechnya, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Socialist Republic of North Korea); – support to central government (Nigeria vs Biafra); – pressure regarding the resolution of the issue by democratic means, autonomy; – human rights issues; – migration issues; Possible actions of the international community: – verbal response (resolutions, e. g. with regard to Palestine, Geor- gia, Cyprus); – mediation (OSCE, UN missions, forces) – limited effectiveness; – intervention (Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Libya); – protection of minorities (conventions; regime for the protection of national minority rights in Europe); At the level of international relations: – support to the state (India to Sri Lanka, the USSR to Ethiopia); – secret intervention (Nazi in Czechoslovakia); – support to rebels (Pakistan to Kashmir, China to Naga and Mizo in 1960–70s, Libya, Malaysia to Moro in the Philippines); – unofficial support (Arab countries to Chechnya, Libya to the -Su danese separatists); – use for propaganda (USA towards the USSR, China towards the India, Albania towards the Yugoslavia); – neutrality; – defence of “compatriots”:

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a) official: Russia, Lithuania and Poland; b) at the non-national level: Israel. – cultural support; – preservation of citizenship for “compatriots”: Israel, Germany, Baltic countries (with reservations).

The role of international organisations International NGOs have a vast influence on the expression of the ethnic factor in the field of international relations. This issue has not been broadly examined, and thus merits attention. International NGOs: Amnesty International, UNPO; Solidarity of the Unrepre- sented Nations: UNPO, transnational indigenous movements. United Nations Working Group on indigenous populations (the 1985 Declaration of Basic Principles). Survival International, Nation- al Congress of American Indians. It is worth introducing the activities of a certain organisation on a broader scale since it provides a fairly good reflection of the issues that are of relevance to us.

The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), based in the Hague, Netherlands, has been identified by key figures in the “ethnicity” movement as an international command center for separatist and secessionist movements. The group was founded in 1991, on the basis of an initiative by Lodi Gyari, foreign minister of the Dalai Lama’s Tibetan exile government. Gyari visited the Russia in 1989, and looked up a fellow Buddhist, Far Eastern history profes- sor Linnart Maell, himself from Estonia. They resolved to form an organization that, in Maell’s words, would “work for small peoples”( http://www.unpo.org/). The UNPO is Sometimes referred to as “the alternative United Nations”. The secretary general of UNPO is Michael Van Walt, the son of Dutch diplomats, who had previously been a Washington law- yer and general councel to the Dalai Lama, and had represented Ti- bet’s case before the U.N. Human Rights Commission.

144 Influence of ethno-political factors on international relations

UNPO receives funds from Scandinavian churches and other organizations, as well as from the Dutch Foreign Ministry and the Canada-based International Center for Human Rights and Demo- cratic Development. It works with Britain’s Lord Avebury, chairman of Britain’s Parliamentary Human Rights Group; theInternational Working Group in Indigenous Affairs, based in Copenhagen; and the Pan-European Union of the von Hapsburg clan. In March 1996, UNPO will coordinate a conference on self-determination in Tibet, East Timor, and the Western Sahara, at the U.N. in Ženeva (Plačiau: (http://www.unpo.org/)).

Transnational indigenous movements Roughly 100 million people in 37 countries are “stateless nations”. Indigenous peoples are ethnic groups that are defined as “indigenous” according to one of the various definitions of the term, though there is no universally accepted definition United Nations Working Group on indigenous populations The Center for World Indigenous Studies is an independent, non- profit research and education organization founded by indigenous individuals in North America, Northern Europe, South Pacific and Africa. Controlled by indigenous people, the Center is dedicated to the advancement of indigenous peoples’ knowledge through research, education, people exchanges and communications. CWIS works to provide thoughtful analyses, from the indigenous perspective on social, economic and political issues, trends and currents events which affect indigenous nations and their neighbors. Survival International is a human rights organization, with con- sultative status as a NGO at the United Nations, which defends the rights of threatened tribal peoples to survival, self-determination and the use and ownership of their traditional lands. At the 1985 session of the Working Group, a draft Declaration of Principles was submitted by the indigenous NGO’s and more than seventeen other indigenous organizations. That Declaration includes principles relating to self-determination. It may be noted by the Working Group that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) has in its most recent Annual Report announced its intention to withhold loans to 145 Ethnos and Politics states which fail to consult indigenous peoples who will be directly affected by the developments flowing from such loans. About 2% of the world’s population live outside their countries of birth. These approximately 100 million people include refugees, asylees, legal immigrants, and unauthorized or illegal migrants. About one-quarter of the world’s immigrants are in North America – more than 22 million in the United States and 3 million in Canada. Another one-quarter live in the industrialized countries of western Europe and Asia. Immigration has become a major issue around the world. The large numbers of immigrants obviously affect the receiving countries; immigrants provide needed labor, but are perceived as exacerbating social and economic divisions. The departure of emigrants may somewhat alleviate the population pressures in sending countries, and the funds remitted from these migrants often represent a major source of foreign exchange for the developing nations. On the negative side, those leaving are often “the best and the brightest” these developing nations have to offer. Finally, the failure of policies to control immigration and the inherent unpredictability of refugee flows are likely to keep the issue on the political agenda in most western countries. Under current German law, ethnic Germans are eligible for citizenship, regardless of their place of birth. According to German officials, up to 4 million ethnic Germans lived in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. Around 2 million have emigrated to Germany since 1989. Last year (1995), 218,000 arrived in Germany, compared with 223,000 in 1994 (plačiau: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/ indigenous/groups/groups-01.htm).

Questions: 1. What ethnic factors drive international conflicts? 2. What is the reaction of the international community to ethnic conflicts? 3. What is the dynamics of ethnic conflicts in the 21st century? 4. What is the contribution of international NGO’s to the resolution of ethnic issues at the level of international relations? 5. What problems do indigenous groups usually face and what causes them? 146 Influence of ethno-political factors on international relations

Online research project: Review the information portals of the United Nations (http:// www.un.org/en/) and evaluate what measures are employed by this international organisation to resolve global ethnic conflicts.

Recommended literature: 1. Brass P. Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison. New Delhi; Newbury Park 2. Brubaker R. Pilietybė ir tautiškumas Prancūzijoje ir Vokietijoje. Vilnius: Pradai, 1998; 3. Chalmers Johnson. Revolutionary Change. Stanford. Stanford University Press: 1966. http://books.google.lt/books?id=LYmf mDa6MUEC&printsec=frontcover&hl=lt#v=onepage&q&f= false; 4. Deutsch K.W., Nationalism and social communication. Cam- bridge; MIT Press, 1969; 5. Deutsch K.W., Tides among Nations. New York: Free Press 1979; 6. Fearon, James, and David Laitin. 1996. Explaining interethnic cooperation. American Political Science Review 90 (4): 715– 35; 7. Smith A.D. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. – Oxford; N. Y.: Blackwell, 1986; 8. Smith, A. D. Nationalism. Keyconcepts. Polity press. 2010; 9. Stephen, Cornell, Ethnicity and Race. Making identities in a Changing World. Pine Forge Press. 2007.

147 Literature

1. Anderson B., Įsivaizduojamos bendruomenės. Vilnius: Baltos lankos, 1999; 2. Brass P. Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison. New Delhi; Newbury Park (Cal.): Sage Publications, 1991; 3. Brubaker R. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the Na- tional Question in the New Europe. Cambridge University Press. 1996; 4. Brubaker R. Pilietybė ir tautiškumas Prancūzijoje ir Vokietijoje. Vilnius: Pradai, 1998; 5. Chalmers Johnson. Revolutionary Change. Stanford. Stanford University Press: 1966. http://books.google.lt/books?id=LYmfmD a6MUEC&printsec=frontcover&hl=lt#v=onepage&q&f=false; 6. Deutsch K.W., Nationalism and social communication. Cam- bridge; MIT Press, 1969; 7. Deutsch K.W., Tides among Nations. New York: Free Press 1979; 8. Fearon, James, and David Laitin. 1996. Explaining interethnic cooperation. American Political Science Review 90 (4): 715–35; 9. Forbes D. Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture, and the Contact Hypothesis. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997; 10. Furnivall, J. S. Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Society and History. New York: New York University Press, 1948; 11. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, nationalism and imagination. London:Seagull Books, 2010; 12. Griffiths, M.D. (1993). Pathological gambling: Possible treatment using an audio playback technique. Journal of Gambling Studies, 9, 295-297; 13. Gurr T. Ethnic Warfare on the Wane. May/Jun2000, vol. 79 Issue 3; 14. Healey, Joseph F. Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class. Pine Forge Press. 2010; 15. Herz H. J. Political realism and political idealism. Chicago. Uni- versity of Chicago press. 1951 (http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2 307/2194289?uid=3738480&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&si d=21100947117613);

148 Literature

16. Hobsbawm E. J. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge University Press. 1992; 17. Healey, Joseph F. Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class. Pine Forge Press. 2010; 18. Hobsbawm E. J., Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Conto, 1992. 19. Kellas J. G., The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity. Macmillan: L., 1991; 20. Khan ed. Composite Culture and national Integration; Shimla: Indian institute of advancet studies. 1987; 21. Ozkirimli, Umut, Theories of nationalism. Palgrave Macmillan. 2010; 22. The Penguin Dictionary of Politics. David Robertson. Penguin Books Ltd. 2011; 23. Smith A. D., The Ethnic Origins of Nations.- Oxford; N. Y.: Black- well, 1986; 24. Smith A. D., National Identity. Penguin: London, 1991; 25. Smith, A. D., Nationalism. Keyconcepts. Polity press. 2010; 26. Stephen, Cornell, Ethnicity and Race. Making identities in a Changing World. Pine Forge Press. 2007. 27. Stavenhagen R. The ethnic question: Conflicts, development, and human rights. Tokyo. United Nations University Press. 1990; 28. Wildavsky A., The deficit and the public interest: The search for responsible budgeting in the 1980s. University of California Press. Berkeley and New York, 1989.