The Reconversion of Ottoman Bureaucratic Families in Turkey (1909-1939) Olivier Bouquet
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Old Elites in a New Republic: The Reconversion of Ottoman Bureaucratic Families in Turkey (1909-1939) Olivier Bouquet To cite this version: Olivier Bouquet. Old Elites in a New Republic: The Reconversion of Ottoman Bureaucratic Families in Turkey (1909-1939). Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Duke University Press, 2011, 31 (3), pp.588 - 600. halshs-02136105 HAL Id: halshs-02136105 https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02136105 Submitted on 30 Apr 2021 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. 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Old Elites in a New Republic: The Reconversion of Ottoman Bureaucratic Families in Turkey (1909–1939) Olivier Bouquet Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Volume 31, Number 3, 2011, pp. 588-600 (Article) Published by Duke University Press For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/cst/summary/v031/31.3.bouquet.html Access Provided by CNRS BiblioSHS at 06/28/12 1:33PM GMT Old Elites in a New Republic: The Reconversion of Ottoman Bureaucratic Families in Turkey (1909 – 1939) Olivier Bouquet ustafa Kemal Atatürk, together with the other early Kemalist leaders, as well as their supporters, promoted a radically republican ideology that has increasingly come under scholarly scrutiny in the past decades. One new way of looking at this revo- lutionary era emphasizes the importance of social evolutions from the final Ottoman period and the beginning of the republican era, processes of change that took place at a slower pace and are less easy to perceive than the violent and spectacular events surrounding the Turkish national struggle for independence. True, the new order in Turkey eectively propa- gated equality and social mobility, organizing the transition from an ancien régime order to a meritocratic society based on a new national bourgeoisie. Moreover, the Kemalist ocers who set up the new regime in the aftermath of the independence war ( – ) were openly hostile to the prominent senior dignitaries who had served the sultan. As a result, they forced them to retire and to give up their administrative positions. However, the clear disruption of the bureaucratic apparatus did not necessarily imply the complete eradication of the previ- ous ocial state nobility, since none had really existed under Ottoman rule. This had been imperial policy, which depended on the sultans for both dynastical continuity and territorial integrity. Practically, the Sublime Porte had tolerated, maintained, or even promoted pre- Studies of Ottoman nobilities into the eighteenth century, before launching their integration into the new Tanzimat administration ( – ). Benefiting from this Ottomanization policy, promi- nent notables navigated the reforms in such a way that they could secure ocial positions in Istanbul for their sons and grandsons. Moreover, insofar as the imperial state was unchal- South Asia, Africa and lenged in supervising the ongoing changes aecting the organization of socioprofessional Comparative the Middle East activities, that is, the emergence of journalists, lawyers, or academics as elements of the new elite, old established families used their positions to organize their reconversion at the mar- x-1426755 gins of the classical administrative sphere. As a result, when the republican regime was set up, they were seen as traditional political elites (keepers of the adab, culture nurtured through Vol. 31, No. 3, 2011 doi 10.1215/1089201 informal education and training) as well as specialists in strategic branches connected with scientific and technical evolutions. Some of them had organized excellent educational oppor- © 2011 by Duke University Press tunities in European universities for their heirs. In libraries and clubs, Ottoman gentlemen were oered profitable knowledge, in particular proficiency in French, English, or German. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Edhem Eldem and Sinan Kuneralp for their useful suggestions and comments. I also owe a debt of thanks to Amy Singer for her corrections and 588 decisive editorial engagement. When they eventually returned to Istanbul, eighteenth century had progressively emerged they had excellent credentials, beyond those all over the empire, benefiting from the decreas- 589 of most of the new bureaucrats. Consequently, ing financial and political control of the central far from being rejected for civil service as ostra- state over its territories. Suce it to mention cized dignitaries had been initially, they were here that the Baban ruled a large frontier area promoted through the new ocial apparatus as in Iraq, the Bedirhan ensured their supremacy diplomats, professors, or even politicians. Even over a great part of eastern Anatolia, and the if the Kemalists never admitted it ocially, the Çapanzâde had extended their influence over new system was in fact based partly on the co- a large territory from central Anatolia to the 1939) optation of existing elites, who maintained their Mediterranean coast. – Bouquet Republic: social privileges. Some decades later, with the Even if the Tanzimat centralization policy (1909 beginning of the multiparty era, some members put an end to dynastic powers, some families New Olivier of old Ottoman families became deputies in the maintained their local influence and their so- a in Turkey regions their ancestors had ruled in the previ- cial prestige. The same was true in Istanbul, in ous centuries. Interestingly enough, the republi- where the state practically encouraged nepo- Elites can regime sustained two opposing tendencies: tism, albeit ocial decisions were put forward Old Families a declared antipathy toward Ottoman bureau- to restrain it. At least percent of the grand cratic elites and the eective use of their heirs muftis originated from ulema families; most of to organize the state. the civil servants had a father who served the state; and more than one- quarter of the pashas Bureaucratic The Ottomans: were pashas’ sons. Ocially, the title “pasha” Dynasty, Aristocracies, Nobilities was considered a personal reward and was given The Ottoman state was embedded in dynastic to career ocials as much as it was oered as Ottoman continuity to such an extent that it ocially op- a testimony of gratitude to notables who had of posed transferring ocial ranks and state privi- proved their loyalty to the imperial dynasty. In leges from father to son. The highest ranks and part, it had become a family honor character- titles (such as vizier and pasha) were considered ized by high levels of intermarriage: if a state Reconversion inalienable, since they were conferred intuitu ocial married a pasha’s daughter, it was likely personae by the sultan. True, some old nobilities that he himself would be honored with the title. The persisted: Sharifian families and their represen- However, such outstanding sociopolitical re- tatives (the nakibüleşraf ); traditional Romanian production rates did not pave the way for the lords (boyars), who had been maintained after emergence of any kind of state nobility: not the conquest of Rumelia; and Phanariot fami- only could most families hardly count pashas lies, who claimed prestigious Byzantine origins. beyond two or three successive generations, None of them could legitimately claim any sort but a grand vizier of humble or even unknown of territorial control within Ottoman domains. origins (such as Mehmed Emin Âli Pasha in Indeed, the Ottoman Empire was indivisible. the first case and İbrahim Edhem Pasha in the From this perspective, the official institution second) was far more likely to be honored with of the Khedivial dynasty in Egypt marked a a prestigious rank than the son of a vizier who watershed, when the Sublime Porte acknowl- had just reached the position of governor was. edged the hereditary control of Mehmet Ali’s Within the Ottoman state, there were no privi- family over the province of Egypt in . This leges or long- consolidated familial prestige that was partly the result of a process in which some the sultan could not put to a resolute end if he prominent, albeit unofficial, dynasties in the deemed it necessary. Conversely, if an English 1. The figure for the grand muftis is from Norman Itz- On the fathers of civil servants, see Joseph S. Szyliow- kowitz and Joel Shinder, “The Office of Şeyh ül- Islam icz, “Changes in the Recruitment Patterns and Career- and the Tanzimat: A Prosopographic Enquiry,” Middle Lines of Ottoman Provincial Administrators during the Eastern Studies 7 (1972): 98. See also Madeleine Zilfi, Nineteenth Century,” in Studies on Palestine during the “Elite Circulation in the Ottoman Empire: Great Mol- Ottoman Period, ed. Moshe Ma’oz (Jerusalem: Magnes, las of the Eighteenth Century,” Journal of the Economy 1975), 279. and Social History of the Orient 26 (1983): 320, 326 – 27. family, as depicted by Somerset Maugham, had submitted as criteria of merit and loyalty to the 590 to wait at least three generations before its new sultan. As a matter of fact, the central adminis- status was acknowledged, high social considera-