Peking Move a Setback to By Anatole Shub Washington Post Foreign Service PARIS, July 16 — China's vitation to the President of the to visit Peking — unthinkable in 1961, 1964 or even early 1968 —represents a major politi- cal setback for the present post-Khrushchev leadership of the , Soviet Soviet Leadership experts here believe. It is, moreover, a setback for which Leonid Brezhnev's leadership team has, in about German reunification. large measure, its own rigid- ilthrushchev's bid to Bonn ity to blame. For, in nearly the Vietnam war, expand its (assailed publicly by Brezh- military presence in the seven years in power, Brezh- : , nev and Kremlin ideologist nev has failed to make the Middle East and reject „Mikhail Suslov), combined Western overtures toward a concessions needed to con- with successful Chinese de- ciliate either Washington or more. realistic German pol- ,, velopment of their own at- icy, the Brezhnev group Peking—and, by the inva- omic device, led to Khrush- sion of Czechoslovakia on shocked both Washington 'chev's overthrow, an- and Peking with the inva- Aug. 20, 1968, helped bring mounced Oct. 15, 1964. the two together. sion of Czechoslovakia. New The new leadership, with possibilities for U.S.-Chinese 's dilemma—which its y,oungest member, ,Alex-, Brezhnev and his associates entente were apparent the ander Shelepin reportedly day after calling the Rus- have tried to evade—dates playing a key role, immedi- back nearly a dozen years, sians "modern revisionists" ately set out to attempt a —instead of again calling to the autumn of 1959. Dur- reconciliation with__ Peking. ing tht fateful season, furl' the Russians "Modern revi- But even the .U.S. bombing, sionists"—branded the Bre- mer Soviet leader Nikita S. of North Vietnam failed to Khrushchev toured first the zhnevites "fascists" and "the drive Mao into Brezhnev's new tsars," definitions with United States and then arms, to respond to the So- China. which many Americans viet leader's ambiguous ap- could agree. He praised the late Presi- peals for "unity of action." dent Dwight D. Eisenhower The Sino-Soviet clashes on However, the Vietnam the Ussuri River in March, as a "man of peace," while war did give Brezhnev and in Peking he formally re- 1969, frightened the Brezh- fused to honor a previous his colleagues the opportu- nev team, which had fewer nity to shelve, most of troops on the Chinese fron- promise to give China a Khrushchev's theses on "sample" atomic bomb and tier than Khrushchev had "coexistence", and harden emplaced there in 1964. the technical data for the their line both toward the manufacture of others. United States and toward Turned to U.S. West . Despite numerous efforts The Middle , East War in„, by other Soviet leaders to ' 'lithe, 1967, -Iedlci'itharp'in- arrange a compromise be- creases in the Soviet mili- tween Moscow and Peking. tary budget, a more repres- News Analysis Khrushchev increasingly in- sive regime internally, and dicated—particularly after continued reluctance to cede the Cuban missile crisis of anything of substance either The death of Ho Chi Minh 1962—that his' personal West of East. in September, 1969, pro- choice was for a deal with Anti-Maoist Figures vided an opportunity for a the United States. According to some osberv- meeting between Chou and Realizing by the summer ers, Moscow may have coun- Soviet Premier Alexei Kosy- of 1964 that more than at- ted too heavily between 1965 gin, which led ultimately to mospherics were required, and 1969 on such anti-Mao the restoration of ambassa- Khrushchev sent his son-in- Chinese leaders as Liu dorial relations and some law, Alexei Adzheubei, to Shao-chi, Teng • Hsiao-ping (not much) trade but little West Germany with the and Peng Chen to defeat else. The Chinese have been , message that Moscow was Mao's Cultural revolution aware that, whatever the So- ready to discuss dumping viet "comrades" have been East German boss Walter or, at the very least, plunge Ulbricht and talk seriously China into semipermanent chaos. While continuing to fuel East Germans, the Soviet massive - spring of 1969, but Ulrbicht Brandt to sign the West saying, a m ve S o e marshals or other hardliners itary buildup has been con- came to Moscow and the German-Soviet nonaggres- deal was quashed. At the sion treaty, he had clearly — Brezhnev could not de- tinuing on their frontiers. liver the goods. More than Meanwhile, the Brezhnev same time, Brezhnev was promised West German ne- team has approved incapa- pursuing the will-o-the wisp gotiators a new and satisfac- 15 months of Big Four nego- ble of following through on of a "world" Communist tory settlement for West tiations of Berlin have yet its initial overtures to West conference, which he origi- Berlin as quid tiro quo for to produce a settlement sat- Germany's Willy Brandt, nally intended to serve as such Bonn concessions as isfactory to Bonn and the al- which were actually an anti-Chinese platform recognition of the disputed lies, while Soviet conduct in launched s horny atter the but in fact saw Romanian, Oder-Neisse Polish-German the Middle East has further invasion of Czechoslovakia Italian and other Commu- frontier.- Brandt's associates eroded U.S. confidence in when Brandt was foreign nist defiance of the Soviet expected a Berlin settlement Kremlin credibility and last ministers ,and not yet chan- line. to be reached within a few winter's Polish , uprising , cellor. A package deal with By the • summer of 1970, months. demonstrated continuing Bonn appeared to be on the when Brezhnev at last took But again whether instability in Eastern Eu- verge of conclusion in the the plunge and pemritted through the pressure of the rope.,

THE WASHINGTON POST Sasurday, July 17,1971 A Et

United Press International Soviet Communist Party Leader Leonid Breshnenr.