Lessons from the 2010 Floods on the Atlantic Coast (Xynthia) and in the Var

Home , 2010 Var floods, Var (department)

COUR DES COMPTES

Summary of the Public Thematic Report

July 2012

Lessons from the 2010 floods on the Atlantic coast (Xynthia) and in the Var

 Disclaimer his summary is intended to help the reader under- Tstand and make use of the Cour des Comptes report. The Cour des Comptes is responsible only for the content of the report. Responses by government departments, councils and other organisations are appended to the report. Contents

Overview ...... 5

1 Increased and forgotten risks ...... 7

2 Early warning and emergency response systems: further progress needed ...... 9

3 Prevention: persistent deficiencies in urban planning ...... 13

4 Protecting built-up areas: a lack of consistency . .17

5 Compensation: very comprehensive, but with some

inconsistencies ...... 23 Cour des Comptes

Conclusion ...... 27

Recommendations ...... 29 of the Public Thematic Report by the Summary

3 Overview

wo natural disasters that occurred in 2010 are etched into our memories because of their Tdramatic consequences. Storm Xynthia reached the French coast during the night of 27-28 February 2010, causing sudden and extensive marine flooding. The human toll was very heavy: 29 deaths con- centrated in La Faute-sur-Mer in the Vendée and 12 deaths in Charente-Maritime. On 15 June 2010, the Var was hit by extraordinary floods triggered by overflowing rivers and run-off, in turn caused by exceptional rainfall. The Draguignan area and the Nartuby and Argens valleys were particularly hard hit. The death toll was 23, with nine people losing their lives in Draguignan; another two people were reported missing. Hundreds of people also suffered both physical and psychological trauma, losing their homes and all their belongings. As well as their tragic human cost, both these disasters resulted in considerable financial costs to local authorities. Total public expenditure (by central government, local authorities and Europe) amounted to €467 million for Xynthia and €201 million for the Var floods. Insurance payouts came to €690 million for the Xynthia floods and €615 million for the Var floods, making a total of more than €1.3 billion, €640 million of which was covered by the

“natural disaster” government guarantee scheme. Public expenditure is funded by taxes paid Cour des Comptes by all taxpayers, while the cost of insurance claims is funded by insurance premiums and the natural disaster contribution paid by virtually everyone in the country. These consequences have raised questions over the government’s response, in terms of its ability to prevent and manage these kinds of disasters. It is for this reason that the Cour des Comptes and three Chambres Régionales des Comptes covering the Pays de Loire, Poitou-Charentes and Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur regions carried out a series of audits in 2011, through an interjurisdictional structure, to learn lessons from these terrible floods.  of the Public Thematic Report by the Summary

5 Cour des Comptes

Increased and 1 forgotten risks

Increased risks ures almost double in the summer, with the population of Charente-Maritime ris- The disasters affected vulnerable ing to almost one million and that of the areas in which urban development Var exceeding two million. increased the level of risk to the population. Forgotten risks, in Until the mid-20th century, these spite of warnings areas mainly consisted of farmland where the principal threat was the risk There were other disasters before of marine flooding along the Atlantic 2010, but they were forgotten. And yet, coast and overflowing rivers in the Var. some of them left clearly visible traces: Since then, urban development has for example, a marble plaque on the wall changed the nature of the risks. As a of the chemist’s shop opposite the town result of demographic pressure, which hall in Trans-en-Provence is a reminder

is particularly high in coastal areas and of the high water line reached by the Cour des Comptes in the southernmost part of the country, 1827 flood and the damage it caused. as well as the considerable inflow of Above all, warnings had been given. people during the tourist season, and in For example, a 2008 report emphasised spite of limited capacity, there is a real a serious risk in La Faute-sur-Mer and “thirst” to build in these areas, fuelled L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer posed by “the com- by owners and developers and support- bination of two phenomena: rising ed by local elected officials. water levels in the Lay estuary and The southern Vendée area includes marine flooding”, and pointed out that the towns of La Faute-sur-Mer, “ the Lay estuary region is the most dan- L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer and La Tranche- gerous part of the coast…”. While this sur-Mer. Its population, which is boost-

report undoubtedly failed to arouse of the Public Thematic Report by the ed by 150,000 summer holidaymakers, enough interest, a brochure on the Lay has grown by 22% in little more than a estuary flood prevention plan, circulated quarter of a century. more widely in July 2007, continued to Summary Since 1982, the population of describe this alarming state in similar Charente-Maritime has grown by 21% terms. and that of the Var by 43%. These fig- 7 Increased and forgotten risks

In the final analysis, a serious lack of deliver a more effective response to risk awareness led populations and pub- marine flooding, flash floods and lic authorities not to take full measure of breached flood defences. the threats hanging over some areas in It points forward to the national the three départements in question. flood risk management plan, the framework for which was laid down in the Steps taken since 12 July 2010 Act on the national com- these events mitment to the environment, known as “Grenelle 2” , transposing the Euro- As well as generating a large amount pean Directive of 23 October 2007, of feedback, the two disasters have been known as the “Floods Directive”. The the subject of parliamentary reports and purpose of the Directive is to establish inspections. a strategic view of flood risks by 2015. As a result, the government has Certain systems put in place, partic- adopted various initiatives grouped ularly in connection with forecasting together into a “rapid submersion plan” and warning, proved their effectiveness (sometimes known as the “plan digues” when the Var once again experienced or “flood defence plan”), published on exceptional rainfall in November 2011. 17 February 2011. The plan aims to Cour des Comptes of the Public Thematic Report by the Summary

8 Cour des Comptes

Early warning and 2 emergency response systems: further progress needed

Early warning and emergency L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer. These shortcom- response systems can save human lives. ings, which affected virtually all coastal They also have a limited cost relative to areas subject to a high risk of significant their impact in the event of a crisis. To flooding, are regrettable, even if cor- achieve their purpose, however, they recting them would only have had an must be comprehensive, consistent and impact if substantial progress had also rational. been made on coastal oceanographic models. Early warning Since Xynthia, work has begun to systems improve tools designed to incorporate coastal developments into forecasting. However, this work will take time and in Significant improvements the meantime gaps still remain. Further -

more, the number of parties involved Cour des Comptes in weather and flood fore- suggests a need to formally coordinate casting the forecasting of marine flooding. In the Var, rain devastated a relative- While Météo France correctly fore- ly small area of 40-50 km² around cast rising water levels, they underesti- Draguignan – something Météo France’s mated the extent of this phenomenon operational forecasting tools were not in the La Rochelle area, with forecasts able to forecast with a sufficient degree putting the flood surge at between of precision. Moreover, monitoring of 0.80 metres and 1 metre, compared with the Argens and Nartuby rivers – both of an actual high water line of 1.5 metres. which are classed as high risk – by the There were known deficiencies in the flood prevention service (SPC) was forecasting system, such as a lack of of the Public Thematic Report by the woefully inadequate. The SPC comes automated tide gauges and observation under the ministry with responsibility stations belonging to the Naval Hydro- for the environment, which had cut its graphical and Oceanographic Depart- Summary investment expenditure. ment (SHOM) around the edge of the After the disaster, a substantial bay of Bourgneuf and the cove of effort was made to improve equipment. 9 Early warning and emergency response systems: further progress needed

This effort needs to be strengthened In the Var, the impact of warning mes- and continued. sages sent to mayors was reduced by the fact that no red alert was issued and by Further room for communication difficulties experienced improvement in during the crisis. Alerts to local populations fell far early warning short of what was needed. While may- mechanisms ors in Charente-Maritime visited the most vulnerable individuals to warn In interpreting early warning mes- them personally, there was no real oper- sages in connection with Xynthia, wind- ational warning system in place in either related danger outweighed the risk of of the two Atlantic départements or the flooding, with the 1999 storm acting as Var. Steps have since been taken: for the benchmark in collective memory. example, the three affected towns in the There were, however, deficiencies that Vendée are developing warning systems need to be highlighted: for example, using sirens, telephone alerts and vehi- Météo France’s failure to include its very cles equipped with loudspeakers. This high wave warning procedure (ATFV) action would nonetheless be more effec- in its weather vigilance procedures, thus tive if it was coordinated. reducing the visibility of these warnings. At the national level, Météo France This defect has since been corrected. and the central service for hydrometeo-

Cour des Comptes In the Var, Météo France discussed rology and flood warning support whether or not to increase the alert level (SCHAPI) are developing new informa- to red; in the end, no red alert was tion systems covering rainfall and river issued, since it was deemed to be too flooding. The 2008 White Paper on long after the event. This policy has defence and national security provided since been revised. for a new system to warn and inform For Xynthia, a red alert was issued local populations. Its implementation, to local mayors via automatic telephone however, is falling behind, with no con- calls and fax messages sent by prefec- crete plans in place at present other than tures. In Charente-Maritime, representa- the cataloguing of sirens and other local tives of the State administration con- warning mechanisms. Furthermore, tacted local mayors personally. ambiguities over the sharing of respon- of the Public Thematic Report by the Conversely, mayors in the southern sibility between central government and Vendée, where towns were being flood- local authorities need to be clarified. ed, did not ensure that an emergency Summary warning was issued to the prefect, as laid down in the French General Local Authorities Code. 10 Early warning and emergency response systems: further progress needed

Organising the Emergency services: room emergency for improvement in both response their use and their coordi- nation

Plans need to be Feedback has underscored the effi- ciency and dedication of emergency supplemented and services, and steps have been taken to updated further improve their capability. However, some questions still remain There were shortfalls in emergency unanswered. plans prior to the crisis. Air assets – which are especially Central government’s “ORSEC” important during crises of this kind – plans organising the civil security were used inconsistently from départe- response had not been updated, and ment to département. For example, signifi- flood response exercises were non-exis- cant use was made of helicopters as tent. While the Var risk analysis and pro- soon as emergency operations began in tection plan (SDACR) considered flood the Var and in Charente-Maritime, while risk, the plans covering the two départe- they were used less and later in the ments on the Atlantic coast did not really Vendée. Similarly, the degree of coordi- address the risk of flooding. This defi- nation was variable; in the Var, the abil- ciency has since been only partly cor- ity to coordinate air assets was simpli- Cour des Comptes rected. fied by the fact that the département is Meanwhile, very few towns had met home to military schools. Finally, there the requirement to draw up a local were gaps in air-to-ground communica- emergency action plan. Efforts made tions. since the crisis remain to be completed: A national air asset plan, to be at the end of 2011, of the 55 towns in implemented locally through defence Charente-Maritime that were required to and security zones, has yet to be drawn have such a plan, only 25 did; the equiv- up. alent figures were 33 out of 69 towns in the Vendée and 27 out of 47 in the Var. Unsuitable facilities

Furthermore, these plans do not con- of the Public Thematic Report by the tain a sufficient level of operational detail, Several fire stations were flooded while intermunicipal plans are too scarce when the disasters struck: three emer- or even non-existent, as is the case in gency services centres in Charente- Summary La Faute-sur-Mer and L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer, Maritime; the L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer fire where there is every reason to justify the station in the southern Vendée; and in need for such plans. the Var, as well as the emergency servic- 11 Early warning and emergency response systems: further progress needed

es centre in Les Arcs-sur-Argens, the cles were lost out of a total of 160 that local fire and emergency services were damaged by the disaster in the Var. department (DDSIS), the main emer- Emergency services facilities located gency services centre and the départe- in flood-prone areas need to be closed ment’s storage facility in Draguignan. or relocated. The local operational fire and emergency response centre (CODIS) was thus taken out of service, and 87 vehi- Cour des Comptes of the Public Thematic Report by the Summary

12 Cour des Comptes

Prevention: 3 persistent deficiencies in urban planning

Building Failure in authorisations communicating risk with serious information consequences The French Environmental Code Of particular note in this regard is affirms citizens’ right to be informed the “Les Voiliers” housing development about major risks. Before the crises, in La Faute-sur-Mer. Conversely, after however, there were numerous short- much hesitation by the State’s represen- comings in this type of information, not tative, the planned property develop- all of which have been remedied. ment in the Valescure area of Fréjus was Risk information

refused planning permission. These Cour des Comptes examples illustrate promoters’ and local documents authorities’ desire to develop sites, The departement’s major risk docu- ignoring natural risks, as well as the ment (DDRM) is drawn up by the pre- weakness of the State’s representative in fect. The documents for the three the face of this desire. Neither verifica- départements in question were too general tions of legality nor the Water Act in nature and had not been updated appear to have been applied sufficiently within the maximum time allowed by rigorously in such cases. regulations (five years). Actions initiated Beyond having tragic consequences since 2010 to update these documents for human life, the granting of planning and ensure that they address more spe- permission in high-risk areas can end up cific risks have yet to be completed. of the Public Thematic Report by the costing central government dearly, as The municipal major risk informa- shown by the example of the “solidarity tion document (DICRIM) is drawn up zone” in Aytré, Charente-Maritime.

by the mayor. Before the disasters, only Summary a tiny minority of towns had such documents, and those that did exist were 13 Prevention: persistent deficiencies in urban planning

barely operational. Since the crises, pre- Directive” of 2007, risk mapping activi- fectures have made help available to ties will have to be stepped up. Such towns to draw up these documents. activities will need to be carefully coor- However, efforts have been hampered dinated by government ministries. by staff shortages on the ground. In the Var, two years on from the disaster, only Information for buyers 32 municipal major risk information and tenants documents have been submitted to the prefecture; virtually all of the départe- Information for buyers and tenants ment’s 153 towns should have submitted (IAL) on the risks affecting a property, such a document. required under the 30 July 2003 Act and Flood hazard atlases (AZI), pro- applicable since June 2006, is subject to duced by the State administration, map serious shortcomings: not all at-risk out the risks. In the absence of other areas are covered; information is gener- more specific or binding documents, ally incomplete and does not take into they can also be used to prevent con- account the full extent of risks; prefec- struction in dangerous areas. However, toral orders and information on govern- they first have to be known about and ment websites dedicated to informing distributed. While they had been satis- buyers and tenants is not updated; and factorily distributed in the two Atlantic there is a lack of precision in the “state- départements, the same was not true of ment of risks”, which is required by

Cour des Comptes the Var, where the prefect failed to send ministerial order and is appended by out the new generation atlases to mayors notaries to agreements to sell and deeds before the disaster struck. It turns out of sale. that these atlases could have been used While information for buyers and to predict the impact of the disaster tenants in the Var was updated by the quite effectively. central authorities in 2011 following the Conversely, the risks mapped out in audit by the Cour des Comptes, the atlases distributed on the Atlantic coast same is far from true for the country as fell well short of the marine flooding a whole. A specific review of the exist- that took place in February 2010. In any ing situation should be drawn up and event, local councils had received the the information scheme should be atlases without enthusiasm and they had relaunched. of the Public Thematic Report by the hardly been used in reviewing applica- tions for building permits. Flood risk Since 2010, the relevant ministers Summary prevention plans have asked prefects to ensure that risk mapping documents are fully distrib- The flood risk prevention plan uted. Under the European “Floods (PPRI) is ordered and adopted by the 14 Prevention: persistent deficiencies in urban planning

prefect following a public inquiry and, in - the State administration – through particular, opinions from the relevant its representatives, the prefects – did not local councils. In particular, the plan always stand up to pressure from local defines at-risk areas and is binding in elected officials and often acquiesced to nature, thus serving to control urban an excessive lengthening of procedures. development. In the meantime, the content of Some situations, however, raise such plans was subject to consultation, questions: the way in which the Saint- and even negotiation, to ensure that it Hermentaire area, where the town’s would not place too many restrictions main emergency services centre was upon the potential for urban develop- flooded without warning, was covered ment, at the expense of the safety of in the Draguignan flood risk prevention people and property. Local elected offi- plan; the excessively long and arduous cials sought to reduce restrictions as far progress of the Lay estuary flood risk as possible, and State representatives prevention plan in the Vendée, which often agreed to compromise solutions. only entered into the pre-implementa- Steps taken since 2010 point to a tion phase some six years after it had renewed desire on the part of central been ordered and, in the end, had not government to improve the coverage of been adopted by the time storm Xynthia at-risk areas – some of which have been struck; and the content of the provi- designated as high priority – within a sions in this plan, which raises questions short timescale. However, local opposi-

in connection with the area located tion from both inhabitants and elected Cour des Comptes behind the eastern flood defences in officials has not disappeared altogether. La Faute-sur-Mer, where the level of If the objectives are to be achieved, pre- risk appears to have been reduced. fects must adopt a firmer stance in sup- The examples analysed show that port of government. before the crises: A new policy taking into account cli- - flood risk prevention plans had not mate change has been laid down for been ordered for all at-risk areas; coastal risk prevention plans. Further- - where such plans had been more, the European “Floods Directive” ordered, the procedure was often inter- is set to introduce substantial changes to rupted, as in the Var, or became bogged France’s preventive arrangements. This down in interminable discussions; transitional phase must not be allowed of the Public Thematic Report by the - the vast majority of mayors to result in a slowdown in the efforts opposed the adoption of such plans or made to map risks and put in place risk delayed it as long as possible, feeling prevention plans. Summary that it would hinder their desire to con- tinue urban development in their towns; 15 Prevention: persistent deficiencies in urban planning

Urban planning level, however, checks conducted on urban planning activities proved very documents lax. Many of the areas affected by the Prefectures often blame this state of 2010 floods were covered by obsolete affairs on administrative jurisprudence urban planning documents that did little or staff shortages. While these argu- to constrain extended urban developments partly reflect reality, an examina- ment. For example, 12 of the 13 affect- tion of sensitive cases reveals that laxity ed towns in the Var had land use plans in checking documents is mainly that dated back to before 1995, and explained by a lack of determination at seven of these were drawn up earlier prefectoral level. than 1990. Following the disaster, the prefects Since the disasters struck, local of the affected départements showed ini- authorities have not made any real effort tiative in working towards more rigor- to replace these plans with new genera- ous verifications, and were issued with tion documents aimed at ensuring bal- guidelines containing a greater level of anced and sustainable land develop- operational detail. However, if there is ment. to be a lasting improvement in the effec- Meanwhile, the relevant ministries tiveness of verifications of legality, the have not taken action to require local necessary qualified staff will be needed, authorities to begin drawing up “territo- as will, in particular, a clear willingness Cour des Comptes rial consistency plans” or produce local at prefectoral level. Prefectoral authority urban development plans to replace in this area will be reinforced by backing obsolete land use plans. It would be from central government. advisable for central government to enact legislation or regulations requiring local councils to update their urban planning documents. Verification of legality

of the Public Thematic Report by the Prior to 2010, national guidelines issued to prefects clearly pointed out the need to ensure that the verification of Summary legality included, as a priority, checking urban planning documents and decisions in at-risk areas. At an operational 16 Cour des Comptes

Protecting built-up areas: 4 a lack of consistency

Unsuitable public High-risk areas: facilities located on buying up built the sea front or property riverside In areas exposed to a particularly Various examples point to the cost high risk, decisions to carry out amica- to taxpayers of establishing public facil- ble purchases of homes by the govern- ities in areas subject to flood risk – a risk ment, as practised in “solidarity zones”, which, though well known, was not could have formed part of a policy of taken into account. “strategic withdrawal” – i.e. a policy of In all three départements, numerous not trying to protect areas where it was camp sites were affected by the disas- not realistically possible to provide ade- Cour des Comptes ters; some were in grave danger, like the quate protection. However, a lack of “Côte de Lumière” municipal camp site consistency in the application of this at La Faute-sur-Mer in the Vendée, approach limited its effectiveness. which was also in contravention of the Different methods law, and the three camps sites at Aytré in Charente-Maritime. In this département, followed post-Xynthia and 32 camp sites were flooded, with ten of in the Var these submerged to a depth of at least one metre. In the Var, nine camp sites After Xynthia, it is reasonable to say had to be closed in summer 2010. that central government rushed to Although the crises forced the define “solidarity zones” without ade- of the Public Thematic Report by the authorities to face up to the need to quate consultation, leading to large strictly apply camping regulations, the numbers of protests. results to date still leave room for Following further work by expert Summary improvement. assessors and a more in-depth consultation, it subsequently defined compulsory 17 Protecting built-up areas: a lack of consistency

purchase areas (involving expropriation gerous structures; the second phase will of property owners). These compulsory include a survey of the most exposed purchase areas were often smaller than areas, with properties to be purchased the previously defined solidarity zones. only in these areas, in consultation with Central government’s decision to local elected officials. More than a year purchase homes on an amicable basis after the events in question, no reliable was based on twin objectives of protec- estimate of the number of homes con- tion and national solidarity, giving rise to cerned was available, though an initial a high degree of ambiguity. The high diagnosis had identified a further 18 cost of buying homes located outside homes. Although this procedure avoids compulsory purchase areas (totalling unnecessary purchases, it leads to long almost €50 million in the Vendée and delays to allow for rulings on dangerous €34 million in Charente-Maritime) illus- structures, and can make it more diffi- trates the hurried nature of the deci- cult for owners to agree to a sale when sions that were made. the time comes. If the aim was to protect the popu- While a slower process has disad- lation living in high-risk areas, amicable vantages, the legitimate need for speedy purchases should have been completed action does not justify hasty govern- in the more tightly defined compulsory ment action in the immediate aftermath purchase areas. If, on the other hand, of Xynthia. the principle to be applied was that of

Cour des Comptes showing national solidarity for victims, Funding of property including in cases where compulsory purchases purchase was not justified in the absence of a very high level of risk or where less Expenditure on buying homes, expensive protection solutions were which totalled €316 million at end June available, other methods would have 2012 in the two Atlantic départements, is been more economical. funded by the major natural risk preven- The example of the Boucholeurs tion fund, commonly referred to as the district (Châtelaillon, Yves) is revealing “Barnier fund”. This amount accounts of a chaotic process and contradictory for almost all fund expenditure in the decisions that were unnecessarily costly four-year period from 2006 to 2009 for the public purse. (€331 million). To ensure that the fund of the Public Thematic Report by the A radically different method was was adequately financed in 2011, the followed in the Var – rather than imme- government had to allocate in advance diately defining amicable purchase areas, the dividend from the Caisse Centrale Summary the problem was approached in two de Réassurance (the French state-owned phases: the first phase covered 20 reinsurance company), as well as agree- homes that had been designated as dan- ing another advance to bolster the 18 Protecting built-up areas: a lack of consistency

fund’s cash reserves, which had been risks associated with rivers. However, more or less used up by the end of the 2010 disasters highlighted the inade- 2010. quacy of existing arrangements. The need to define a Difficulties in identifying policy for properties responsible parties exposed to serious danger Before the disaster, central govern- There is a risk that the need to pro- ment took action to identify and classify hibit future construction in all or part of sea flood defences in the two Atlantic the affected areas might be gradually departments. This work encountered forgotten; to avoid this risk, the ultimate serious limitations. status of properties purchased by gov- Identifying the parties responsible ernment remains to be determined. It is for flood defences turned out to be a also essential that dangerous areas else- very complicated task. In many cases, it where on the coast be identified and is not known who owns each flood that appropriate action be taken, either defence. Where this information is by purchasing relevant properties or by known, the owners are often found to making them less vulnerable. be incapable of maintaining flood Finally, it would be advisable that defences due to a lack of resources and local authorities, who share some willingness. It is also difficult to identify

responsibility for existing urban devel- who is responsible for managing flood Cour des Comptes opment, contribute to the cost of pur- defences. For example, it has not been chasing properties at extreme risk, as possible to identify the parties responsi- this would give them an incentive to take ble for 95% of the total length of sea more care when issuing building per- flood defences in Charente-Maritime. mits. Finally, the large number of poten- Ultimately, a consistent, overarching tial operators linked to a given stretch of policy covering all at-risk situations still flood defences creates confusion, mak- remains to be defined. ing it difficult if not impossible to properly maintain defences. Flood defences In the Var, all four of the rivers that gave rise to the floods are non-govern- and protection ment owned; this means that the of the Public Thematic Report by the works riverbed belongs to the owners of the riverbanks, who are, in principle, People rely on sea flood defences to responsible for regular maintenance of Summary be effective and on their local elected the river. Local authorities and groups representatives to effectively manage the of local authorities have the option, but 19 Protecting built-up areas: a lack of consistency

not the obligation, of acting in place of In the Var, while the Nartuby was riverside landowners where a declara- covered by a river contract, the intermu- tion of public interest (DIG) is issued nicipal union for the development of following a public inquiry. the Nartuby (SIAN), which was respon- In reality, the rivers were not main- sible for implementing the contract, had tained by riverside landowners, and completed very few of the planned intervention by local authorities proved flood protection actions. greatly lacking. Action undertaken since Poorly maintained flood the disasters defences and rivers Government-instigated flood In spite of a limited effort following defence works undertaken post-Xynthia the 1999 storm, funding for the mainte- – including both phase 1 emergency nance of flood defences on the Atlantic works and phase 2 upgrading and rein- coast was far from sufficient before the forcement works – bore no relation in disaster. financial terms to what had gone before. Between 2001 and 2009, average Under the “rapid submersion plan”, this annual expenditure on flood defences in financial effort is set to increase sub- the three affected towns in the southern stantially over the next few years. Vendée was €0.54 million; in reality, Furthermore, a draft “flood

Cour des Comptes three to four times this amount was defences” decree is being drawn up. In needed. Between 2000 and 2009, central particular, this decree will be accompa- government allocated €8.7 million to sea nied by an order defining key principles flood defence works in Charente- for the design, construction, mainte- Maritime; after Xynthia, it committed nance and monitoring of flood €19.5 million – 2.2 times more in one defences. The process of defining these year than the total for the previous ten technical standards appears to be some- years. what belated, and should be completed Over and above the issue of fund- without delay. ing, the examples of the flood defences Under the “rapid submersion plan”, in La Faute-sur-Mer (Vendée) and prefects are tasked with identifying pri- Charron (Charente-Maritime) highlight ority high-risk diked areas and seeking of the Public Thematic Report by the the difficulty of successfully investing in out project owners for the relevant flood defences when no one is really flood defences. responsible for them. They illustrate the The prefects of the two départements Summary “vagueness of collective irresponsibili- on the Atlantic coast have been actively ty”, which government failed to remedy. involved, alongside local authorities, in drawing up flood prevention action pro- 20 Protecting built-up areas: a lack of consistency

grammes (PAPI). However, this process, stakeholders to take on the management while seeking to be rigorous in identify- of flood defences not owned by them. ing those responsible for managing While this approach is pragmatic, it is flood defences, is taking time, while uncertain whether the funding available there is a high level of demand for under the plan will be sufficient to con- effective protective measures in exposed vince local authorities to assume a areas. Government authorities must responsibility that will prove very signif- work with their partners to manage this icant. difficulty, avoiding protective measures A review of action taken by prefects that would only serve to encourage fur- should therefore be drawn up, within a ther dangerous urban development. reasonable time frame, so that this In the Var, a new desire to ensure action can be taken into account when that rivers are properly managed is making the (probably legislative) deci- reflected in the production of a flood sions needed to settle the issue of gov- prevention action programme. Here ernance. The current legal framework is again, this process, while positive, will still governed by the provisions of the require time, and interim solutions will 16 September 1807 Act on “drying out need to be found. Moreover, govern- marshland”. The Act, under which resi- ment should initiate discussions on the dents are asked to protect themselves subject of legislation and regulations against flooding, bears little resem- governing non-government owned blance to the current environment,

rivers to identify which authority can which is characterised by increased Cour des Comptes genuinely take responsibility for their urban development. The focus is no maintenance. longer on individuals protecting their property; it has shifted to the need for a The unresolved issue of genuine public service at local or inter- flood defence governance municipal level. The fundamental issue of gover- In their feedback, government nance thus remains to be resolved. inspectors considered “three scenarios Furthermore, the role played by the to meet the challenge of managing natural disaster insurance scheme in flood defences”: adjustments to the sta- encouraging protective and preventive tus quo; the transfer of responsibility to action should be affirmed. local authorities, intermunicipal bodies of the Public Thematic Report by the or départements; and the creation of a national managing body. The “rapid submersion plan” relies Summary on prefects taking action to identify a responsible authority, encouraging local 21 Cour des Comptes

Compensation: very 5 comprehensive, but with some inconsistencies

Aid and the speed with which aid payments were made, were highly variable, with signifi- compensation cant differences even between neigh- bouring towns like La Faute-sur-Mer and L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer. While not Insurance payouts unusual, differences in the methods Although insurers worked hard to used to redistribute donations can give quickly pay compensation to private rise to misunderstandings, and even individuals, they made little in the way of feelings of unfair treatment. It would be specific effort for businesses, while cen- worthwhile for central government to tral government made aid available to put together a guide recommending help businesses get through this difficult rules for local authorities to follow period. when channelling aid directly to the victims of these types of disasters. While the average cost per claim in Cour des Comptes the Var was slightly lower than that aris- Furthermore, donations were not ing from the Xynthia floods (€16,788 managed in a consistent way. The prob- versus €20,909), the cost of compensa- lems that occurred – potential for the tion paid to businesses and local author- duplication of aid, insufficient coordi- ities was higher in the Var (€266.3 mil- nation, failure to allocate amounts for lion versus €208.9 million). their intended purpose and the scatter- ing of aid – need to be corrected. Donations and aid for Tax deductions and private individuals exemptions Total donations received amounted of the Public Thematic Report by the to €5.65 million for Xynthia and The cost of tax deductions granted €1.14 million for the Var. Taking into to private individuals was four and a half account 66% tax relief, this represented times higher in the Var than in the a cost to government of €4.4 million. Vendée, while the cost of compensation Summary Local authority procedures for for homes under the natural disasters channelling aid directly to victims, and scheme was only slightly higher in the 23 Compensation: very comprehensive, but with some inconsistencies

Var than in the Vendée. Furthermore, it Problems encountered is surprising that the number of requests was so high, and that all such Two different procedures were used requests were accepted. The total direct for amicable purchases, each of which cost of tax measures was €1.73 million had similar aims and terms, thus compli- for Xynthia and €4.09 million for the cating the task of managers for no gen- Var. uinely convincing reason. Tax exemption was granted for cap- Property purchase ital gains on secondary residences in the two Atlantic départements, leading to expenditure questions being raised in some cases. For example, a property situated in Properties affected La Faute-sur-Mer was bought for €602,776 after deducting insurance pay- “Solidarity zones” covered 840 prop- outs of €173,224, while it had been erties in the Vendée (including 11 business- bought in December 2007 at a reported es) and 788 properties in Charente- price of €300,000. Work had since been Maritime (including 70 businesses). completed on the property costing In the Vendée, 701 homes, situated around €90,000. In contrast to what in La Faute-sur-Mer and L’Aiguillon- would have happened in a normal sale, sur-Mer, were covered by sale agree- the purchase of the property by govern-

Cour des Comptes ments; at end 2011, 699 purchases had ment enabled the owner to secure a been completed for a total value of completely tax-free capital gain of more €151.5 million. Thirty-three homes, situ- than €300,000. ated in La Faute-sur-Mer, 17 of which Most amicable purchases by govern- were secondary residences, had an ment were based on an article in the assessed market value in excess French Environmental Code, which of €500,000, representing a total cost to authorises such transactions provided central government of €19.3 million. that the price “proves less expensive The highest single purchase cost was than the cost of safeguarding and pro- €831,000 for a secondary residence. tecting the population”. While a com- In Charente-Maritime, 458 proper- parison with the cost of other safeguarding measures was carried out in

of the Public Thematic Report by the ties in 13 towns were covered by sale agreements at end 2011, for a total value the Var, no such comparison was made of €141.8 million. Eleven homes, eight for the Xynthia disaster. No analysis was of which were main residences, had an undertaken of the situation of each Summary assessed market value in excess individual home and, in particular, no of €1 million, representing a total pur- case-by-case checks were carried out to chase cost of €16.65 million. 24 Compensation: very comprehensive, but with some inconsistencies

establish whether other safeguarding Aid for economic measures would have been less costly. For those properties that were pur- agents chased, checks were not systematically This type of aid related to farms and carried out to establish whether a build- businesses. It is worth highlighting the ing permit had been issued (or whether effectiveness of aid provided through retrospective planning permission had part-time working arrangements. subsequently been granted), depriving Government purchases of business government of a means of dissuading premises, while few in number, raised illegal construction, particularly in areas difficulties. Blockages and confusion led at serious risk. to the use of ad hoc solutions based on Two properties purchased under procedures that varied from case to amicable purchase agreements in the case, thus giving rise to unfair treatment. Vendée and one in the Var appeared to The purchase of two restaurants in be uninsured. Another property pur- L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer, which has been chased in the Var was only insured after reviewed in detail, provides an example the event. These were dangerous prece- of the difficulties and questions raised. dents and were unfair to other home- It is advisable that, in the future, the owners whose properties were not pur- rules to be applied in this type of situa- chased on the grounds that they were tion be clear and consistent. uninsured.

Insufficient checks were carried out Cour des Comptes on insurance payouts, while a basic plau- sibility check could quite easily have been conducted. This is all the more regrettable since the amount of such payouts is deducted from the amount paid out by government. of the Public Thematic Report by the Summary

25 Conclusion

Storm Xynthia and the 2010 Var floods were disasters. Faced with shortcomings in vigilance, early warning and emergency response procedures, the progress made since these crises remains to be completed, in particular to create an effective early warning network. As regards the emergency services, unsatisfactory situations remain, such as fire stations located in flood-prone areas and a lack of planning covering air assets. Compensation arrangements, although comprehensive, sometimes proved inconsistent or poorly coordinated. The post-Xynthia government purchase of many homes in the most dangerous areas gives rise to numerous comments. The hastiness with which the first decisions were made had serious consequences, based as they were on approximations, compromises, and even regulatory transgressions, and ultimately led to redundant or unnecessary expenditure. Moreover, the scale of the expenditure incurred highlighted the cost of negligence and irregularities observed in relation to urban planning. The wisest approach to protecting human life – and the least costly – is to prevent construction in undeveloped high-risk areas. In the face of local populations’ desire to build – a desire that is supported and even encouraged by local elected officials and property developers – State representatives have often proven weak in their preventive response. The burgeoning new determination in this area needs to be supported by a nationally managed approach to ensure that it is strengthened and sustained over time. A strategy for existing built property remains to be defined. Emergency efforts have been made to repair and consolidate sea flood defences in coastal areas, and the “rapid submersion plan” will lead to new and more ambitious work in this area. However, priorities need to be made consistent, with the emphasis on the most dangerous coastal areas and selecting the most effective methods. The

maintenance and reliability of flood defences will only be guaranteed if clearly identified parties take Cour des Comptes responsibility for them. However, the issue of their governance is yet to be resolved. In the Var, there are also glaring shortcomings in governance in relation to rivers; according to legislation, these rivers, being non-government owned, belong to riverside landowners who have neither the financial nor the physical means to maintain them. While it is critical than an overarching strategy be implemented via a flood prevention action programme, this does not obviate the need for more urgent action in the interim. In line with the 2007 European framework directive, a national flood risk strategy needs to be defined, particularly in high-risk areas. The way forward is to map out a consistent strategy, with measures, an organisational structure and resources appropriate to each at-risk area. of the Public Thematic Report by the Summary

Recommendations

Early warning Prevention in relation to urban planning Central government should: Central government should:  bring overall consistency to steps taken by towns in relation to lay down a national flood risk early warning procedures, in coordina- strategy as required by the “Grenelle tion with the future information and 2” Act and implement the European early warning system (SAIP); directive on floods, within the stipulat-  ensure that the forecasting of ed timescales; marine flooding is formally coordinat- ensure, in implementing the ed; European directive, that the need to immediately update risk protec- make changes to existing instruments tion plans (SDACR) and emergency does not delay the urgent implementa- response plans (ORSEC) in the most tion of mechanisms agreed upon fol- high-risk départements; lowing the 2010 disasters; put in place an in principle plan ensure that risk maps are fully covering the use of national air assets. distributed and relaunch the “information for buyers and tenants” scheme; Departmental councils and departmental ensure that priority risk preven- fire and emergency services in affected areas tion plans are implemented within the should: stipulated timescales; Cour des Comptes  close or relocate emergency ensure that towns have up-to- services centres situated in flood- date urban planning documents, if prone areas as quickly as possible. necessary by passing legislation to require them to do so; Towns in affected areas should: support the prefectoral adminis-  refine and regularly update their tration in carrying out effective verifi- local emergency action plans; cations of legality on urban planning strengthen their early warning decisions made by local authorities; procedures, on an intermunicipal basis introduce national management, where necessary. including targets and regular feedback from prefects, for the most sensitive of the Public Thematic Report by the procedures, such as the drawing up and distribution of risk maps, the imple-

mentation of prevention plans and the Summary updating of the “information for buyers and tenants” scheme. 29 Recommendations

Towns and intermunicipal bodies should: action in relation to the governance of flood defences and rivers, produce municipal major risk initiate the required legislative changes. information documents (DICRIM) Ensure that funding is made available and properly inform the local popula- and that efforts are sustained; tion of risks, in accordance with legis- ensure that the reform of the lation; “Cat-Nat” natural disaster scheme is work proactively with the prefec- completed as soon as possible, partic- toral authority to ensure that preven- ularly in relation to premium adjust- tion plans are rapidly adopted; ments for businesses and the exclusion  replace obsolete land use plans of properties constructed in breach of (POS), particularly in at-risk areas, regulations. with new generation urban planning documents and implement “territorial The compensation system: consistency plans” (SCOT). Central government should: Protecting built-up areas: put together a guide defining Local authorities and central government procedures for channelling aid directly should: to victims; determine in advance how com- Cour des Comptes move public service premises pensation is to be managed and paid, located in flood-prone areas or, where including the identification of a coor- possible, adapt such premises as dinating local authority; appropriate; merge the two existing proce- ensure that camping regulations dures governing amicable purchases of are strictly enforced. properties at extreme risk, clarifying their terms and ensuring that they are Central government should: strictly enforced, particularly in relation to building permits; accurately identify all dangerous ensure that central government coastal areas and quickly address them; aid allocated to towns after this type of

of the Public Thematic Report by the  ensure that local authorities con- crisis is more closely aligned with actu- tribute to the cost of purchasing prop- al local budgetary reality. erties at extreme risk;

Summary after reviewing prefectoral

30 Recommendations

Local authorities and central government  improve the clarity and efficien- should: cy of the help scheme for farmers by reducing the number of different pro-  organise a joint discussion cedures and access points used. process on increasing insurance cover for properties owned by local authorities; Cour des Comptes of the Public Thematic Report by the Summary