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Sonja Biserko, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia An Sonja Biserko, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia An Opportunity to End the Vicious Cycle of War Were you surprised by the acquittals? There was a possibility of the verdicts being overturned. Belgrade expected too much, especially in the part concerning a joint criminal enterprise. I do not dispute the verdict, nor do I want to begin to interpret it, but I have followed this debate which took place abroad, as well. Those indictments were not well-founded. Convictions were expected in Serbia because that would help a kind of interpretation of the 1990s according to which everyone was equal. That has now collapsed and, in a way, exposed our public scene. This whole idea of reconciliation was being built upon a conviction which now turned out to be unsustainable. Reactions in Kosovo and in Croatia were also emotional. How do you view them? That is different emotion. I think this is the end of a struggle for interpretation when one must finally realize that Serbia was defeated in the 1990s wars and that this should be the point of departure towards one’s own past, future and better relations in the region. However, that is not happening. Serbs are being presented as victims of a global injustice, a conspiracy... There were similar decisions in the past, as well. Let us remember the "Vukovar Three1" when the verdicts were reduced and even overturned. All the delivered verdicts did not identify the responsibility of Belgrade and Zagreb, respectively. Belgrade does not take that into account but rather reacts to the latter. I don’t think that is important, at all. I believe that this manipulated homogenization has a different task. This government which is not pro-Western has used the verdicts as an argument against the West, EU, The Hague, UN... The current thesis is that we want to join the EU but they won’t have us. The situation in the country is dramatic because of Kosovo and it is questionable whether anyone will have the courage to end a vicious cycle which has been in motion for more than two decades. In order to solve problems, we need elites that are much more mature and decisions that are well thought-out. Do you believe that the court’s decisions have created an opportunity to end this cycle? Wherever we turn, this past jumps out of every corner and you never know what kind of situation will open up a new problem. Resolving past problems is imperative and maybe this is the chance to start speaking differently about it; maybe it is a chance because those who brought this about are now in power. Perhaps it belongs to them as their responsibility and task. The entire Serbian elite always revolves around that past. In the past 12 years their successors were saying that they’ve never been at war, so they behaved as though we were not stuck with Milošević’s mortgage. There was a belief that in peace we would gain the territories marked in war, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. That has proven to be unrealistic. Such analyses were based on short-term estimates that international relations would soon change and that the new ones would be in Serbia’s favor. The international community has had its respective role in the Balkans. It established a legal and security framework, as well as an entire security system which put the Balkans under one umbrella – NATO and the EU. There are other countries, too, that still struggle with their respective problems and have difficulties in achieving tasks they have been presented with but at least they have a consensus about the willingness to go in this direction. Serbia is the only country that still doesn’t even have a political decision about it. That is what keeps Serbia imprisoned and incapable of facing the fact that Milošević’s project was defeated. It was defeated several times and the most relevant factors took part in it, including Russia. Russia never voted against a single resolution in the Security Council. Serbia has spent 12 years resisting to accept reality. It’s the same with the Hague Tribunal. Milošević recognized the Tribunal as soon as he signed the Dayton Accord. It wasn’t imposed by anyone, despite the fact that he described it as an illegal and political court. With her 1 Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) generals Veselin Šljivančanin, Miroslav Radić and Mile Mrkšić, indicted by the ICTY for the Ovčara crime that took place in 1991. Two of the defendants were sentenced for war crimes and the third (Radić) was acquitted. reactions to the verdicts, Serbia showed lack of respect for any international institution. The court is an organ of the UN. There is no discussion here about the nature of this court – it is always an anti-Serbian court. We use the argument that the majority of indictees were Serbs but that is proportionate to the number of crimes committed. Serbia’s attempt of using these two verdicts to equal responsibility and guilt has failed. The facts speak about something else. Until now, reconciliation was based on the expectation of a conviction. Can we expect the reconciliation process to take a different course after the acquittals? A lot depends on us and whether we will be able to take a look at ourselves, because that is a precondition. Let us take the example of Germany. It was defeated, bombarded, torched… No one made it easier for Germany by creating different interpretations of the war. Still, it reconciled with the world. A lot depends on us. I think there is great potential for the region but it calls for mature contemplation. The problem is that our elites are deeply rooted in arguments which started the war in the first place. After all, the legacy of this trial is enormous for future research, as well. It contains everything which would not have been possible to gather if it weren’t for the trial. It’s a legacy which will be used by generations of researchers in the region. The court’s truth is not the only truth. So, it is a beginning of a process. All its flaws notwithstanding, the Hague Tribunal played a very important role. It is not visible since all the countries had an anti-Hague attitude and only cooperated under pressure. The Tribunal will help the perception of processes which led to war. I am not only speaking about the verdicts but also about the documents which exist there. It is an extensive material which is yet to be submitted to science and researchers. To what extent do the reactions in Croatia and in Kosovo aggravate the situation and the position of Serbia? I believe that this is temporary. Such emotional reactions in the region are constantly ongoing. We should recall that after the verdict of the International Court of Justice on Srebrenica, champagne bottles were being opened in Belgrade because Serbia was not found responsible for genocide. It is not the first time. There were even fiercer emotional reactions before. The right wing in Croatia is disappointed with the statements by Gotovina who turned out to be the most rational. From his very arrival, his behavior was above that of the right-wingers. There have been emotional reactions from the beginning and right now it is important for Serbia to turn inwards. At this moment, how realistic is to expect the withdrawal of the Serbian and Croatian genocide indictments before the International Court of Justice in The Hague? There has been much talk about it on both sides. There were even some serious indications of a possible settlement but all the statements coming from Belgrade have disturbed the atmosphere created between Tadić and Josipović. We should wait for things to settle down and see whether a compromise can be found in removing the newly-created obstacles. Serbia must open itself up. At this moment, it showed a deep anti-Croatian attitude even though it wasn’t Croatia that delivered this verdict. The negative attitude towards Croatia leads us back to the beginning of the war. Serbia did not expect resistance from Croatia. It was taken aback by the reactions and this shows that the Serbian elite never respected the others as equal partners. They counted on their predominance because they controlled the army. This verdict pushed anti-Croatian sentiments back to the surface. Interviewed by Dejan Kožul Translated by Milan Bogdanović .
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