The Origins and Development of Royal Australian Naval Signals Intelligence in an Era of Imperial Defence 1914 - 1945

The Origins and Development of Royal Australian Naval Signals Intelligence In An Era of Imperial Defence 1914 - 1945

Jozef H. Straczek

A thesis submitted to the University of New South Wales in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy In The School of Humanities and Social Sciences

©J. H. Straczek 2008

ORIGINALITY STATEMENT

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial portions of material which have been accepted for the award of any degree or diploma at

UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project’s design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.

Jozef H. Straczek

Canberra

August 2008

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I hereby grant to the University of New South Wales or its agents the right to archive and to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or part in the University libraries in all forms of media, now or hereafter known, subject to the provisions of the Copyright

Act 1968. I retain all proprietary rights such as patents rights. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles and books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation.

I also authorise University Microfilms to use the abstract of my thesis in Dissertations

Abstract International.

I have either used no substantial portions of copyright material in my thesis or I have obtained permission to use copyright material.

Jozef H. Straczek

Canberra

August 2008

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AUTHENTICITY STATEMENT

I certify that the Library deposit digital copy is a direct equivalent of the final officially approved version of my thesis. No emendation of content has occurred and if there any minor variations in formatting, they are the result of the conversion to digital format.

Jozef H. Straczek

Canberra

August 2008

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work has been possible through the good offices, encouragement, support, patience and guidance of a number of individuals to whom I shall be forever grateful.

Firstly I acknowledge the support and guidance of my supervisors Dr John

Reeve and Professor Peter Dennis, UNSW@ADFA. Their constructive criticisms and intellectual guidance have proven to be of enormous value to me over the years. They have helped in many ways they may not be aware of.

My employers Dr David Stevens, Director Historical and Strategic Studies at the Sea power Centre – Australia, and Mr Jim Ryan, Director Classified Archival

Records Review, provided time and various resources in order that I may complete this work.

The staff at the National Archives of Australia, in Canberra and Melbourne;

The National Archives, Kew; UK Naval Historical Branch; US National Archives and

Records Administration; Center for Naval History and the Center for Cryptologic History provided guidance and assistance in identifying and accessing records which were essential for the research associated with this work. Chris Dawkins at the ADFA Library was always available and helpful in identifying and acquiring books and other relevant reference material.

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I would also like to acknowledge the following individuals who provided guidance, insight, information and comradeship: Dr Ed Drea, Dr Ed Marolda, John

Lundstrom, Antony Best, Peter Dennerley, Michael Whitby, Brett Mitchell, Dave Griffin,

Dr Andrew McFadzen and Dr Greg Gilbert. I must also acknowledge the support of

David Brown and David Sissons both of who passed away before this research was completed. Special thanks to my friends Ross Gillett and John Mortimer both of who encouraged and cajoled me over the years thereby helping to ensure this thesis was completed.

To the many others who have assisted me but I have been inconsiderate enough not to personally acknowledge I offer my apologies and deepest thanks.

Finally I would like to mention my wife Lucy and children Alexander and

Sarah who supported my work and suffered my absences. Without their help and understanding I would not have managed to reach this point.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the origins and development of signals intelligence in the Royal

Australian Navy, during the period 1914 to 1945, within the context of an Australian contribution to Imperial defence. In doing so it demonstrates how the development of this capability was shaped by national, Imperial and international forces and events. The thesis thus fills a gap in the historiography of imperial defence and of early twentieth century signals intelligence. It also constitutes a case study of the development of a niche military capability by a small to medium power in the context of great power alliances and major historical events. The thesis is based principally upon the investigation of documents in the Australian, US and UK national archives, some of which have been newly declassified for this purpose.

During the First World War the RAN undertook a minor cryptographic effort focused on intercepting and breaking coded messages from the German Pacific Squadron.

After the War, and at the request of the RN, the RAN began to develop a signals intelligence capability aimed at the Imperial Japanese Navy. This capability was seen as part of the RAN contribution to Imperial defence. The commitment, made without

Australian political approval, would see the RAN conduct two covert intelligence collection operations against the Japanese Mandated Territories.

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and subsequent defeat of the

Western Powers in Asia, the RAN signals intelligence organisation became, as a

ix consequence of agreements between Britain and the USN, part of the USN organisation in the Pacific. At no stage however, was the RAN involved in the discussions which accompanied these arrangements nor did it have any subsequent say in the strategic direction of this capability. As a consequence, when the Pacific War was drawing to a close the future of the RAN’s cryptographic organisation came in to question. By the time the Japanese surrendered this issue had still not been resolved.

Beyond the history of the origins and development of signals intelligence in the RAN, and of its involvement in the signals intelligence war against Japan, the thesis highlights the importance of committed individuals in small military organisations and how they can greatly influence the success or otherwise of these organisations. The ability of personnel from different nations to work together in signals intelligence is reflective of the functioning of the alliance as a whole.

The development of such a niche capability by a small to medium power can have an effect on that nation’s standing, in the context of alliance relationships, as it did in this case. As the RAN found however, such capabilities do not provide for automatic access to strategic decision making within an alliance.

This thesis is dedicated to those who listened and did not talk

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Originality Statement i

Authenticity Statement v

Acknowledgements vii

Abstract ix

Dedication xi

List of Tables xiv

List of Maps xv

List of Charts xv

List of Photographs xv

Abbreviations xvii

Contents

Introduction 1

1. Origins and the First World War, 1900–1918 14

2. A Faltering Start, 1920–1929 48

3. The 1930s - Establishing an Imperial Network 84

4. Laying Australian Foundations, 1930–1935 118

5. Signs of Progress, 1935–1939 146

6. The Second World War - From Poland to Pearl Harbor,

1939–1941 176

7. The British Search for a Cryptographic Partner in

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the Pacific, 1940–1941: 220

Netherlands East Indies 221

China 229

Russia 231

United States of America 233

8. War In The Pacific, 1941–1942 253

9. FRUMEL - a Combined Organisation, 1942–1945 297

10. Conclusion 334

Appendices

1. Code Words and Terms Associated With

World War II Signals Intelligence. 346

2. The Holden Agreement on Naval Sigint. 349 3. Japanese Naval Cryptographic Systems. 352

Bibliography 363

TABLES

1.1 Reported Positions of German Warships. 36

2.1 Japanese Naval Morse Code Table Provided to

the RAN in 1921. 57

2.1 Royal Navy W/T Interception Coverage Plan 1926. 67

4.1 Personnel Performing Procedure Y Duties. 130

5.1 Estimate For Establishing and Operating Direction

Finding Stations. 149

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6.1 Staff of Special Intelligence Bureau, Melbourne 1941. 214

MAPS

facing page

1. International Wireless and Undersea Cable

Communications Networks, 1914. 20

2. Movements of Vice-Admiral von Spee across

the Pacific Ocean, 1914. 42

3. Direction Finding Tracking Exercise, 1939. 102

4. Proposed RAN Direction Finding Organisation. 142

5. D/F fixes on MV Romolo by Australian and

New Zealand D/F stations. 184

6. Location of RAN Signals Intelligence Facilities

During the Second World War. 272

CHARTS

1. Organisational Structure of the Far East Combined Bureau,

With Emphasis on its Naval Components. 96

2. The Exchange of Naval Signals Intelligence in the Pacific. 296

PHOTOGRAPHS

SY Franklin used as a signals intelligence collector by the RAN

during 1927. 118

HMAS Albatross. Procedure Y operations were conducted from

Albatross during the early 1930s. 118

HMAS Coonawarra D/F station, c1942. 272

HMAS Harman D/F station, post-war. 272

Photographic Essay – FRUMEL. 306

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACNB Australian Commonwealth Naval Board

AWA Amalgamated Wireless Australasia

CAS Chief of Air Staff

CCAF Commodore Commanding HMA Fleet

CGS Chief of General Staff

CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff

CinC Commander in Chief

CNS Chief of Naval Staff

COIS Chief of Intelligence Staff

COMSOWESPAC Commander South West Pacific

CSS Chief of the Secret Services, MI6

CST Commodore/Captain Superintendent of Training

CWR Central War Room

CZM Commander Zeemacht, CinC NEI Navy

D/F Direction Finding

DMI Director of Military Intelligence

DMO&I Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence

DNI Director Naval Intelligence

DRC Defence Requirements Committee

DSC Director of Signals and Communications

DSD Defence Signals Directorate

DSS Director of Signals Section

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FECB Far East Combined Bureau

FEDO Far East Direction Finding Organisation

FRUAD Fleet Radio Unit Advanced

FRUEF Fleet Radio Unit Eastern Fleet

FRUMEL Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne

GC&CS Government Code and Cypher School

GOC General Officer Commanding

GS(I) General Staff (Intelligence)

HF/DF High Frequency Direction Finding

HF High frequency

HIJM His Imperial Japanese Majesty

HMA His Majesty’s Australian

HMAS His Majesty’s Australian Ship

IJA Imperial Japanese Army

IJN Imperial Japanese Navy

MF/DF Medium Frequency Direction Finding

MF Medium frequency

MI Military Intelligence

NEI Netherlands East Indies

NID Naval Intelligence Department (Admiralty)

NOIC Naval Officer in Charge

NZNB New Zealand Naval Board

OIC Officer in Charge

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PMG Post-Master General

PNIO Pacific Naval Intelligence Organisation

RAFR Royal Australian Fleet Reserve

RAAF Royal Australian Air Force

RACAS Rear Admiral Commanding the Australian Squadron

RAN Royal Australian Navy

RANR Royal Australian Navy Reserve

RANVR Royal Australian Navy Volunteer Reserve

RFP Radio Finger Printing

RN Royal Navy

RNethN Royal Netherlands Navy

SIB Special Intelligence Bureau

SMS Seiner Majestät Schiff (His Majesty's Ship)

SO(I) Staff Officer (Intelligence)

SS Steam Ship

SWS Shore Wireless Service

SY Steam Yacht

TEL Telegraphist

US United States

USN United States Navy

WRANS Womens Royal Australian Naval Service

W/T Wireless telegraphy

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Introduction

“Behind one secret, there sometimes lurks an even greater secret”.1

During the final two decades of the twentieth century the secret of the extent of Anglo-

American signals intelligence activities had progressively been revealed through the release of significant volumes of archival records on both sides of the Atlantic. In the main the British archival records can be found in the HW series, with other significant collections contained within the single service series: ADM, WO and AIR, in the National Archives. American records, available at the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park in

Maryland, are predominantly in the records of the National Security Agency RG457 and of the

Chief of Naval Operations in RG38. These newly released archival records have resulted in the production of a number of books dealing with the subject of signals intelligence.

Coinciding with the release of these records was the publishing, commencing in 1979, of the multi-volume Official History of British Intelligence in the Second World War. This series of publications dealt with all aspects of British intelligence during the War. Surprisingly however, the British and more specifically the Royal Navy’s role in the signals intelligence war against Japan is not covered in this history. In his introduction to the first volume of the

1 C.G. McKay and Bengt Beckman, Swedish Signal Intelligence 1900–1945, Frank Cass, London, 2003,

p.47.

Official History Professor Hinsley states that he has “not attempted to cover the war in the Far

East; when this was so much the concern of the United States”.2

The editors of the British Government Communications Headquarters’ multi-volume

internal history of wartime signals intelligence treat the signals intelligence war against Japan

in much the same manner. The naval component of this internal history consists of three series

of which only the twenty-four volume operational history is publicly available. This series

deals exclusively with the war against Germany and Italy and only refers to Japan and the

Pacific in the context of this naval war. It is not known how much of the signals intelligence

war against Japan is covered in the still, and likely to remain, classified History of Naval

Signal Intelligence or supporting technical series contained in HW43. This official British approach to the historical coverage of the signals intelligence war against Japan is very much in accord with the wartime agreements made between the United States of America and Great

Britain with respect to the conduct of the signals intelligence war.3 Fortunately in recent times,

this historiographical gap, with respect to the British involvement in the signals intelligence

war against Japan, has been filled by a number of commercial publications on the subject.

These works include Alan Stripp’s Codebreaker in the Far East: How Britain Cracked

Japan’s Top Secret Military Codes, Peter Elphick’s Far Eastern File: The Intelligence War in

2 F. H. Hinsley, Official History of British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy

and Operations, HMSO, London, 1979, p.x.

3 Professor Hinsley was involved in the negotiation of some of these agreements late in the war and this

might have had some bearing on his subsequent editorial decisions when writing the Official History of

British Intelligence in the Second World War.

the Far East 1930–1945; Richard J. Aldrich’s Intelligence and the War Against Japan:

Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service; Michael Smith’s The Emperor’s Codes:

Bletchley Park and the Breaking of Japan’s Secret Ciphers; Antony Best’s British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia, 1914–1941and Douglas Ford’s Britain’s Secret War

Against Japan, 1937–1945.4 Military Press in the UK has also published selected official records relating to the British signals intelligence history. These commercial publications deal with and concentrate on the subject from a British perspective. They do not however address the issue from the perspective of Imperial defence and the contribution of the Dominions.

On the American side of the cryptographic story there has been no hesitation in publicising the achievements of US cryptographers against the Japanese. The scale of US publishing coupled with an initial lack of British works on cryptographic history has tended to distort the historical story in favour of the United States. Generally historical distortion, as to who achieved what and when, is further increased as many ex-cryptographers who wrote histories did so from a limited view point, as they only knew and saw their small part of the world due to compartmentalisation or national perspective.

4 Alan Stripp, Codebreaker in the Far East: How Britain Cracked Japan’s Top Secret Military Codes,

Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995; Peter Elphick, Far Eastern File: The Intelligence War in the Far

East 1930–1945, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1997; Richard J. Aldrich, Intelligence and the War

Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service, Cambridge University Press,

Cambridge, 2000; Michael Smith, The Emperor’s Codes: Bletchley Park and the Breaking of Japan’s

Secret Ciphers, Bantam Press, London, 2000; Antony Best, British Intelligence and the Japanese

Challenge in Asia, 1914–1941, Palgrave MacMillan, London, 2002, and Douglas Ford, Britain’s Secret

War Against Japan, 1937–1945, Routledge Publishing, London, 2006.

These British and American authors have revealed only one dimension of the secret war, the significant historiographical gap and ‘lurking secret’ of the RAN’s involvement in the signals intelligence war against Japan has barely been hinted at. Unlike in Britain, there has been no official history of Australian intelligence in the Second World War and the field of commercially published literature relating to signals intelligence is sparse. A small number of books such as Jack Bleakley’s The Eavesdroppers; Geoffrey Ballard’s On ULTRA Active

Service: The Story of Australia's Signals Intelligence Operations During World War II and

Edward J. Drea’s MacArthur’s ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942–1945 have been written about Central Bureau and Australian Army and Air Force signals intelligence activities in the Second World War. Desmond Ball and David Horner’s Breaking the Codes: Australia's KGB Network 1944–1950 provides an introduction to the development of signals intelligence in Australia but its main subject relates to the post-Second World War

Project Venona code breaking operations against the Soviet Union.5 Complementing these books are a small number of personal reminiscences such as D. H. Laidlaw’s Anecdotes of a

Japanese Translator 1941-1945 and A. Jack Brown’s Katakana Man: I Worked Only for

5 Jack Bleakley, The Eavesdroppers, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1982; Geoffrey

Ballard, On ULTRA Active Service: The Story of Australia's Signals Intelligence Operations During World

War II, Spectrum Publications, Richmond, 1991; Edward J. Drea, MacArthur’s ULTRA: Codebreaking and

the War against Japan, 1942–1945, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 1992, and Desmond Ball

and David Horner, Breaking the Codes: Australia's KGB Network 1944–1950, Allen and Unwin, Sydney,

1998.

Generals.6 Only a single minor volume has been published covering the history of diplomatic

signals intelligence in Australia and this is R. S. Merrillees’ Professor A. D. Trendall and his

Band of Classical Cryptographers.7 Additional research on Diplomatic signals intelligence was being undertaken by David Sissons; however, he passed away before this could be

completed.8

Notwithstanding these works, no single research project has dealt specifically with the

origins and development of a signals intelligence capability in the Royal Australian Navy.

Books such as Barbara Winter’s The Intrigue Master: Commander Long and Naval

Intelligence in Australia 1913–1945; Sharon A. Maneki’s The Quiet Heroes of the Pacific

Theater: An Oral History of the Men and Women of CBB and FRUMEL; Shirley Fenton

Huie’s Ships Belles and Ian Pfennigwerth’s biography of Eric Nave A Man of Intelligence touch on various aspects of the story from either a personal or biographical perspective.9 The volume co-authored by James Rusbridger and Eric Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How

6 D. H. Laidlaw, Anecdotes of a Japanese Translator 1941-1945, privately published, October 2001, and A.

Jack Brown, Katakana Man: I Worked Only for Generals, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra, 2006.

7 R. S. Merrillees, Professor A. D. Trendall and his Band of Classical Cryptographers, ANU, Canberra,

2001.

8 See National Library of Australia, MS 3092, D. C. S. Sissons’ Papers.

9 Barbara Winter, The Intrigue Master: Commander Long and Naval Intelligence in Australia 1913–1945,

Boolarong Press, Sheldon, 1995; Sharon A. Maneki, The Quiet Heroes of the Pacific Theater: An Oral

History of the Men and Women of CBB and FRUMEL, Center for Cryptologic History, NSA, Ft Meade,

1996; Shirley Fenton Huie Ships Belles, The Watermark Press, Sydney, 2000, and Ian Pfennigwerth, A

Man of Intelligence, Rosenberg Publishing, Dural, 2006.

Churchill Lured Roosevelt into WWII also deals with aspects of the development of signals intelligence in the RAN but this book is too deeply flawed by Rusbridger’s conspiratorial theories relating to Churchill and the attack on Pearl Harbor to be of academic value.10

This study is the first to examine the origins and development of signals intelligence in the Royal Australian Navy in an era of Imperial defence. The thesis will demonstrate how national, imperial and international events influenced and shaped that development during the period from 1914 to 1945. Australian co-operation in Imperial defence during this period can be divided into two distinct periods: the wartime experiences of the First and Second World

Wars and secondly the inter-war period. Literature covering the first period, in particular the operational aspects, is abundant. But the second period is not as well documented and, when it is, the coverage is usually from an administrative or doctrinal perspective not an operational one. John McCarthy’s classic Australia and Imperial Defence 1918–39: A Study in Air and Sea

Power and B. N. Primrose’s “Australian Naval Policy, 1919 to 1942: A Case Study in Empire

Relations” are examples of this approach.11 The paucity of literature on this aspect of Imperial

10 James Rusbridger and Eric Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into WWII,

Summit Books, New York, 1991.

11 John McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence 1918–39: A Study in Air and Sea Power, University of

Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1976, and B. N. Primrose, “Australian Naval Policy, 1919 to 1942: A Case

Study in Empire Relations” PhD Thesis, ANU, Canberra, 1974.

naval history is highlighted in Barry M. Gough’s essay “The Royal Navy and Empire” when

he makes no reference to any works covering the inter-war Imperial naval co-operation.12

During the inter-war period neither the Australian Commonwealth Military Forces nor the RAAF conducted any exercises or operations in conjunction with their British equivalents.

RAN ships on the other hand not only exercised with the RN but also engaged in imperial policing and other operations. Examples of these include HMAS Brisbane’s deployment to

Hong Kong to help protect British property in 1925, the despatch of HMAS Adelaide to the

Solomon Islands on a punitive expedition in 1927 and the service of the RAN exchange cruisers in the Mediterranean during the inter-war period.13 As well as providing operational

support for the RN, the RAN was also an integral component of the RN’s world-wide

intelligence network.14 The development of an RAN signals intelligence capability was an

extension of this co-operation and although there might not have been a direct RAN strategic

requirement for the capability, it provided the Navy and, by extension, Australia with access to

information and intelligence which it would not otherwise have been able to collect or to

12 Barry M. Gough, “The Royal Navy and Empire” in Robin W. Winks, The Oxford History of the British

Empire Vol. V:Historiography, OUP, New York, 1999, pp.327-341.

13 Details of various operations undertaken by the RAN in this period are contained in David Stevens,

Maritime Power in the 20th Century: The Australian Experience, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1998, pp.277-

279.

14 Anthony Clayton, The British Empire as A Superpower 1919–1939, University of Georgia Press, Athens,

GA, 1986, p.7. See also NAA, MP1587, 189D, Intelligence Division letter dated June 1921, and Mark

Bailey, “The Australian Role in the Development Of A Worldwide Imperial Trade Control and Naval

Intelligence System, 1919–1939” in David Stevens, Maritime Power.

which it would not have had access. With its development of a signals intelligence capability

and Imperial co-operation the Navy maintained a level of strategic relevance to Imperial and

Australian defence which the military and air forces failed to achieve during the inter-war

years.

The imperial connection was not the only important element in shaping the

development of RAN signals intelligence capability, national and international events were also major influencing factors. During the Second World War the focus of the RAN’s signals intelligence effort shifted from Imperial defence to the combined Anglo-American signals intelligence efforts against Japan. This study examines the impact this change had on the fledgling RAN capability. In particular it shows how the variety of the lines of control affecting the RAN at this stage could have resulted in problems and confusion.15

As well as tracing the development of RAN signals intelligence the study also demonstrates the limited influence a minor partner may have over the strategic decision

15 The Australian Chief of Naval Staff, an RN officer, had simultaneous responsibilities to the Australian

Government, the Commander South-West Pacific and the Admiralty. The majority of RAN ships came

under Admiralty operational control overseas. Some however, were assigned to the Commander South

West Pacific and others remained under the Australian Chief of Naval Staff in his role as Commander

South West Pacific Sea Frontiers. The RAN’s intelligence organisation, with the exception of the direction

finding and cryptographic organisations had become part of the South-West Pacific’s Allied Intelligence

Bureau. These organisations formed part of the USN’s signals intelligence organisation which answered to

the Navy Department in Washington DC. Even though elements of the RAN assigned to different nations,

commands and organisations they remained part of the whole.

making processes within a collective security arrangement, even when that partner brings

important niche capabilities and resources to the alliance. It also shows what might happen

when these niche capabilities are no longer required by the other alliance partners. These are

important political and military themes which are also of ongoing relevance today.

The source material for this work has come predominantly from the National

Archives of Australia and overseas archives. Unfortunately, unlike in the US and British

cases, there is no consolidated collection of records relating to naval signals intelligence in

Australian archives. This does not mean, however, that the subject is an archival desert.

Some oases do exist. The surviving Australian records are predominantly found in various

naval series. The most valuable of these series is MP1074. This consists of over 100 metres

of Navy Office signal packs with a recorded date range from 1938 to 1964.16 These packs

contain numerous messages relating to signals intelligence, organisation, intercepts and procedures. They do not represent an unbroken documentary chain, however; messages containing questions have survived, but the answers are sometimes missing, and answers are sometimes present without the questions. In many ways this series, like all historical evidence, represents a jig-saw puzzle with pieces missing. Other important naval series, located in the National Archives of Australia in Melbourne and containing records relating to

various aspects of the development of signals intelligence include MP1049, MP1187 and

MP1587. These three series contain general correspondence and policy files on a range of operational and administrative subjects including aspects of signals intelligence. Within these

16 The earliest signals in this series date from the 1920s.

series are files containing reports on signals intelligence operations, the construction of facilities, acquisition of equipment, provision of personnel and the payment of special allowances. Only four series of incomplete records directly related to the Fleet Radio Unit

Melbourne (FRUMEL) have survived to make it into the National Archives of Australia.

These series are B5553, B5554, B5555 (all located in Melbourne) and A10909 (located in

Canberra). Other important series of Defence providence located in Canberra are A816 and

A6923. This last is an eclectic collection of remnant records related mainly to Second World

War Army signals intelligence but containing some material relating to naval signals intelligence.

The fragmented nature of the surviving archival record makes it difficult to follow through to conclusion various activities associated with the development and use of signals intelligence in the RAN. References to particular operations or developments are available but the initiating instructions or final reports for these are often missing. This leaves the historian with tantalising historical snippets but nowhere obvious to put them. This absence of records reflects in part the lack of political-strategic direction and the subsequent ‘on again–off again’ approach to the development of naval signals intelligence in the early years. Those records that have survived the years of culling and destruction provide glimpses or snapshots of what was undertaken and achieved.17 The destruction of records was often done for security reasons, and on other occasions it was for the more practical reason of need for storage space. By way of example, at the end of the Second World War a committee comprised of senior Central Bureau

17 The most significant of these are the Navy Office Signal Packs located in the Melbourne repository of the

NAA at MP1074. This series has been drawn on heavily for this thesis.

officers decided that all “special messages” held by Central Bureau in Brisbane would be

destroyed. The only exceptions to this destruction were to be 50 or so messages selected by

Captain Nave to serve as historical examples of operational intelligence. Some other records

retained for training purposes were sent to the Director of Military Intelligence in Melbourne.18

The remaining records were destroyed. Even though a similar document has not been located with respect to FRUMEL records, the shortage of surviving material would suggest that these suffered a similar fate. Notwithstanding this, the surviving records do provide the researcher with an insight into the global nature of the activity with simultaneous and related developments occurring in a number of countries.

Another reason why it is difficult to gauge precisely the RAN’s contribution is that this contribution was made as part of an international collaborative venture. Work on codes was being undertaken in a number of centres around the world: London, Washington, Honolulu,

Kilindini, Colombo and Melbourne. Furthermore, work on one code system could provide information which allowed for a break into another system. The results of all this work were pooled and so success for a particular breakthrough might sometimes have been attributed to, or claimed by, a particular group the real situation is not that clear. What is clear is that it was the RAN’s direction finding and intercept stations which provided the vital southern ears for the Allied signals intelligence organisation during the critical early part of the Pacific War.

18 NAA, A6923, Si/2, Notes on Conference Held 29th November 1945.

The majority of histories written about the signals intelligence war against Japan refer only to two Japanese codes. These are the Diplomatic code, designated Purple by the

Americans, and the Naval General Purpose code which was designated JN-25 by the United

States Navy19. The Japanese, and in particular the Imperial Japanese Navy, used a number of different codes for specific purposes however, and these naval codes are detailed at Annex 3.

The number and variety of codes used demonstrates the complexity of the overall problem which faced the naval code breakers in the Pacific during the War. Although the RAN cryptographers in FRUMEL did not work on JN-25, they were assigned to work on other so- called minor codes. The word minor can be deceptive as some of these codes were just as important as the main JN-25. By way of example, the preparations for an operation might require the provision of additional shipping, ground forces, weather reports and logistics. A partially deciphered JN-25 message might provide some insight into the planned operation but much relevant information could have been transmitted in codes other than JN-25. Hence the ability to read these other codes provided important information which could be used to flesh out a partial decrypt or even allow further breaks into the main strategic level codes.

Overall, the history of the development of the Royal Australian Navy’s signals intelligence capabilities, from the early 1920s onwards, is very much the history of a

Dominion navy reliant upon its Imperial mother. Many of the capabilities required by modern navies were not developed by the RAN because of its reliance upon British expertise, facilities and advice and its own small size. This resulted in an unbalanced navy which, following the

19 The IJN designation was Naval Code D.

passing of Imperial ties, needed to expend substantial resources in order to reshape itself and

fill gaps in required capability. Unlike many other capabilities, signals intelligence was an area

in which a smaller navy, such as the RAN, could make a significant and visible contribution,

although not publicly so, to a collective effort, even if the there was only a limited national

requirement for it. For this reason signals intelligence was one of the capabilities which did not

suffer the usual post-war cuts and which continued into the Cold War and the twenty-first

century under the auspices of the Defence Signals Directorate.20 The hard lessons learnt by the

RAN as it developed its signals intelligence capability are being applied on a daily basis today.

Note On Terms:

Throughout this work the modern term signals intelligence is being used for simplicity and to

indicate all aspects of information obtained by electronic means. This includes codebreaking

and direction finding.

There is a technical difference between a code (where a group of numbers or letters are

used to replace a word) and a cypher (where letters are transposed or substituted according to a

pre-determined key), for the purpose of this study such a difference is immaterial and no differentiation will be made between the two.

20 A number of records relating to the origins of the Defence Signals Directorate are contained within the

records of the Hope Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security. See NAA A8908.

Chapter 1

Origins and the First World War, 1900–1918

A number of significant advances in communications technology occurred during the second half of the nineteenth century. One of the major products of these technological developments was the invention of the telegraph and subsequently by the early twentieth century wireless telegraphy (W/T), as it was originally called. The invention of these two means of rapid communications presented military organisations, and in particular navies, with a number of opportunities as well as problems. For navies the invention of the telegraph allowed ships overseas to rapidly communicate with home governments when in port. The introduction of electricity and W/T on to warships took this ability a step further by freeing warships of the need to visit ports to receive new instructions or intelligence, thereby introducing a fundamental change in the area of naval command, control and communications.1

The secure and rapid flow of information is essential for any imperial government. The larger and more widespread the area to be governed the greater the importance of

1 Willem Hackman, “Sonar, Wireless Telegraphy and the Royal Navy: Scientific Development in a Military

Context, 1890 – 1939”, The Journal of Naval Science, Vol. 18, No. 1, p.14. See also Arthur Hezlet, The

Electron and Sea Power, P. Davies, London, 1975, and Michael A. Palmer Command At Sea: Naval

Command and Control since the Sixteenth Century, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2005.

communications.2 As the world’s major imperial power during the nineteenth century, Britain

had a strategic requirement for a method of rapid, reliable and secure global communications.

Not only was there the need to communicate with its colonies but also the various naval and

military commands. The speed advantages presented by the telegraph were quickly realised.

But so was the disadvantage of a potential lack of security in that telegraph messages could

pass through potentially hostile hands in order to reach their intended recipients. The

interception of foreign communications was nothing new to Britain which had, in order to

maintain a strategic advantage over her competitors and adversaries, developed a culture of

intelligence that included the interception and reading of an enemy’s communications.3 There was also the possibility of a foreign power denying Britain the use of its cable network in a time of emergency.

As a consequence of these vulnerabilities the British government embarked on a project to create what was described as ‘an all red route’ for cable communications.4 The objective of

2 Daniel R. Headrick, Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics1851-1945, Oxford

University Press, New York, 1991, p.5.

3 For studies of early cryptographic efforts see Steven E. Maffeo, Most Secret and Confidential: Intelligence

in the Age of Nelson, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2000, and Mark Urban, The Man Who Broke

Napoleon’s Codes: The Story of George Scovell, Faber and Faber, London, 2001.

4 The description ‘all red route’ comes from the fact that the cable network was intended to touch only

British Dominions or Colonies, usually marked in red on world maps. For a description of the

development of this underwater cable system see; P. M. Kennedy, “Imperial Cable Communications and

Strategy, 1870–1914”, The English Historical Review, Vol. 86, No. 341 (October 1971), pp.728–752 and

this ‘all red route’ was to ensure that British cable communications could travel securely to any

destination in the Empire without relying upon a foreign network or passing through foreign hands. By establishing its own strategic cable network Britain achieved two significant outcomes. First, it ensured that its communications with the Empire were secure and difficult to disrupt due to the number of cables that would need to be cut to isolate particular parts of the Empire. Second, other nations with smaller imperial holdings were less inclined to outlay the large sums of money required to create and maintain their own network and so became

reliant upon the British network for the carriage of their official communications. The use of

the British cable system by foreign governments provided Britain with the opportunity either

to disrupt or intercept these coded messages. The creation of the world-wide network of cables

provided Britain with a strategic advantage in communications which was to last until beyond

the Second World War.5

The Royal Navy saw benefit in using this new cable network. Not only as a means of

communicating with its ships when they were in port, but also as a means of transmitting

intelligence information.

The Royal Navy had commenced establishing a world-wide intelligence network in

October 1893 when the Admiralty appointed a dedicated intelligence officer to the

Daniel R. Headrick, Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics1851-1945,

Oxford University Press, New York, 1991.

5 The network of cables was used extensively as a secure means of transmitting sensitive intelligence over

long distances during the Second World War.

Mediterranean Fleet and in 1900 a similar appointment was made on the China Station. These

appointments were quickly followed by the establishment of shore based intelligence centres at

Gibraltar and Malta in 1903; Colombo, Singapore and Hong Kong in 1904; St Vincent,

Pernambuco, Montevideo, Cape Town, Fremantle and Sydney in 1911; Shanghai in 1913 and,

Jamaica in 1914. The major role of these centres was to collect and disseminate information on

the movements of enemy war and merchant ships. These intelligence centres also acted as

clearing houses for communications to and from the ship borne Commander-in-Chief, as wide

scale use of wireless telegraphy was still a thing of the future.6

As well as using these cable networks for command and control purposes the

possibility of intercepting, and decoding, the secret telegraphic communications of foreign

governments also presented itself. Admiral Sir John Fisher, Commander in Chief

Mediterranean from 1899 to 1902, instituted a system of monitoring foreign diplomatic and

military cables passing through the British cable system in the Mediterranean.7 Whether any, and indeed how much, intelligence was obtained through this system is not clear. This does, however, illustrate that the man who was to have a profound impact on the strategic, technological and administrative development of Royal Navy in the early years of the twentieth century, was not only fully aware of the potential to intercept and decrypt enemy

6 NAA, MP1587, 189D, Intelligence Division letter dated June 1921 provides an overview of the

development of this organisation up to 1921. See also Anthony Roland Wells, “Studies in British Naval

Intelligence, 1880 – 1945”, PhD Thesis, University of London, London, 1972.

7 Nicholas A. Lambert, “Transformation and Technology in the Fisher Era: The Impact of the

Communications Revolution”, The Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 27, No. 2 (June 2004), p.282.

communications but was also fully prepared to do so.8 Obtaining copies of cables, however, was only half the solution. A formal system of code breaking and of exploitation of the resultant intelligence was subsequently required. Unfortunately no such formal organisation appears to have been part of the Admiralty Staff until after the start of the First World War.

As telegraphic communications was rapidly maturing as a technology the second major communications breakthrough occurred in 1896 when Guglielino Marconi transmitted the first

W/T message. In the early 1900s Marconi commenced work of establishing the commercial viability of wireless telegraphy. By 1901 he had constructed a chain of nine stations around the

British and Irish coasts. These commercial stations were also used to communicate with ships that were increasingly being fitted with W/T equipment. For other countries with imperial holdings wireless telegraphy offered an apparently secure means of communicating with their distant colonies free of the British-controlled cable network and its inherent dangers of interference and interception.9 Germany for example, built a chain of wireless stations from

Tsingtao, China to Apia, Samoa. The development of an Australian W/T network was commenced in 1910 when the Post-Master General granted a licence for the establishment of a

8 For a discussion on Fisher’s impact on the Royal Navy see Nicholas A. Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval

Revolution, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 1999.

9 At this stage there was no continuous intelligence monitoring of W/T traffic so an encoded message was

relatively safe. Cable messages were however handed to the cable companies which in turn may have

provided them to other Government agencies.

W/T station in Sydney.10 The next major development, in Australia, occurred in 1911 when the

Commonwealth Government appointed Mr John Graeme Balsillie as the Engineer for

Radiotelegraphy within the Post-Master General’s Department.11 By the eve of the First World

War, only 20 years after the first trans-Atlantic wireless message, a world-wide wireless communications network was operational.

Admiral Fisher was also aware of the potential military value of the emerging technology of wireless telegraphy. During his tenure as First Sea Lord, Fisher established a

Wireless Telegraphy branch within the Royal Navy to maintain and operate wireless sets. He also had a W/T facility installed in the Admiralty buildings. Fisher was well aware of the tactical advantages that could accrue through the interception of W/T transmissions. In his autobiographical work Memories he states that “when the war comes, the Naval Staff at the

Admiralty, listening every moment to the enemy’s wireless messages (should he dare use it), enables the First Sea Lord to let his twin at sea know exactly what is going on”.12

Unfortunately, the style of Admiral Fisher’s writing makes it difficult to comprehend if in this

passage he is making a prediction or merely reporting on what had already occurred. The

evidence that, under Fisher, the Admiralty instigated a code breaking organisation might be

circumstantial, however, the step from W/T as a means of command and control to an

10 The Australian Navy had conducted some experiments with ship to shore W/T in 1903 using the gunboat

Gayundah.

11 See Lawrence Durrant, The Seawatchers: The Story of Australia’s Coast Radio Service, Angus and

Robertson Publishers, Sydney, 1986, for the history of the Australian coastal wireless service.

12 Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher, Memories, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1919, p.108.

instrument of intelligence is not a very large one to make,13 especially as the person making

that step had previously instituted an organisation to intercept coded cable messages.

Not only were there technological changes occurring in the Royal Navy under Fisher

but also organisational ones. The development of a Naval Staff organisation had commenced

during the late 1800s.14 By the turn of the century this had become a significant shore-based

administrative, planning and intelligence collection and interpretation body. Within the structure of this organisation was a small section for the study of enemy communications

systems, the basis of a signals intelligence organisation. By the time Fisher left office, Section

16 of the Naval Intelligence Division (NID) of the Admiralty was responsible for, amongst

other matters, “Signalling and Wireless Telegraphy, as affecting Foreign Navies and Coast

Defences” and foreign “Homing pigeons for war purposes”.15 Even though it was not

specifically stated as being within the functions of the Section, it would seem incongruous if the study of foreign cryptographic systems were not part of its responsibilities. By 1912 intercepted wireless messages were to be dealt with by Section C of the Admiralty War Room.

13 See Admiralty, Naval Staff Monograph (Historical): The Naval Staff of the Admiralty – Its Work and

Development, Naval Staff, Training and Staff Duties Division, London, 1920, for details on organisation

and development of the Naval Staff and in particular references to officers responsible for investigating

foreign communications systems.

14 See ibid.; Franklyn Arthur Johnson, Defence By Committee: The British Committee of Imperial Defence

1885–1959, Oxford University Press, London, 1960; Leslie Gardiner, The British Admiralty, William

Blackwood and Son, London, 1968, and Nicholas A. Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution,

University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 1999.

15 Admiralty, The Naval Staff, p.139.

Despite this existing organisational structure when the Admiralty War Room became

operational on 30 July 1914, Section C which was delegated responsibility for dealing with

intercepted wireless messages was not established.16 Instead, intercepted wireless telegraphy and cable messages became one of the areas of responsibility of Section A of the War Room.

Unfortunately when war broke out Section A proved to be incapable of dealing with the volume of messages received.

With the commencement of hostilities the British immediately initiated censorship of all communications and, in accordance with a 1912 instruction of the British Committee of

Imperial Defence, severed all of the German-owned undersea cables in the North Sea and

Atlantic Ocean.17 The destruction of their undersea cable network forced the Germans to utilise

the cable networks of neutral countries or their own strategic W/T network as the means of

communicating with their distant colonies and warships. In either case the British had the

capability to intercept these communications. The sudden increase in the use of wireless

telegraphy by the Germans, because of the severing of their cables, resulted in the Admiralty

receiving a large volume of intercepted naval and diplomatic cable and wireless messages.

Unfortunately Section A of the NID, which had responsibility for dealing with these messages, did not have the ability to do so. Nor did Rear-Admiral H. F. Oliver RN, DNI (Admiralty)

have any other means of deciphering the volume of messages being received. Herein lies the

16 Admiralty, The Naval Staff, p.60.

17 On the development and importance of the network see; Paul M. Kennedy, “Imperial Cable

Communications and Strategy, 1870-1914”, The English Historical Review Vol. 86, No 341 (October

1971), pp.728-52.

Map 1: International Wireless and Undersea Cable Communications Networks, 1914. Source: E. von Raeder, Kreuzerkrieg in den Auslandischen Gerwassern Vol. 1: das Kreuzergeschwarder, Mittler, Berlin, 1927.

paradox, for prior to the outbreak of war there were insufficient naval messages being intercepted to justify the establishment of a substantial code breaking organisation. Based on

this experience, it is unlikely that any pre-war arrangements would have proven to be robust

enough to handle the volume and variety of messages received.18

A possible solution to Oliver’s problem presented itself in mid-August 1914. When

lunching with his friend Sir Alfred Ewing, Director of Naval Education, Oliver asked Ewing if

he would be interested in taking on the task of establishing an organisation to break and

translate the numerous intercepted coded messages. Although he was not a code breaker by

profession, Sir Alfred readily accepted Oliver’s offer as he had had a long time interest in

codes and ciphers. In essence Ewing’s job was not to break the codes personally, but to

establish an organisation that would systematically deal with the intercepts as they arrived.

This new organisation, which became known as Room 40, was not initially integrated into the

NID but remained a highly secret one whose output was provided to the Operations Staff, but

was not circulated to the remainder of the NID:19 an arrangement which would affect how the

intelligence was perceived and used by the Admiralty Naval Staff.20

18 Messages received by the DNI would have come from a variety of sources including naval, diplomatic and

economic. The first task would then have been to identify each type of message and its relative importance.

After that the real cryptographic work was undertaken. See also Jonathan Clay Randel, “Information for

Economic Warfare: British Intelligence and the Blockade, 1914–1918” PhD Thesis, University of North

Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1993, Chapter 5.

19 TNA, ADM223/285, 53756, NID 005015/41, dated 29 December 1941. Room 40 became an integral part

of NID later in the war. The organization was originally established in Room 40 in the ‘Old Admiralty

As these events were being played out in London, action had also been initiated in

Australia. On 30 July, some four days after newspaper reports were received from London as to the possibility of war and the retention of the First and Second Fleets at their home ports,

Admiral Sir George Patey, KCMG, KCVO, RN, Commander-in-Chief HM Australian Fleet, received advice that the Admiralty had transmitted a war warning message.21 Following receipt of this information Rear-Admiral Patey, with the approval of the Australian Commonwealth

Naval Board and the Minister for the Navy, ordered the ships of the Australian Fleet to return to Sydney to take on coal and provisions and prepare for war. An Australian Naval War Staff was also established in Navy Office, Melbourne, under the direction of Commander W. H. C.

S. Thring RAN to co-ordinate all actions associated with naval operations.

Building’. Hence it became known as either Room 40 OB or just Room 40. For a detailed history of Room

40 see Patrick Beesly, Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914-18, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1982.

20 Historians continue to debate whether or not the British possessed a code breaking organisation before the

First World War. The brief First World War history on GCHQ’s website, http://www.gchq.gov.uk/code

breaking/history2.html dated 30 July 2004, starts with the phrase “Almost starting from scratch”. This

statement implies the existence of a precursor organisation or at the least an effort to break codes. This

statement also contradicts the more emphatic statement made in John Johnson, The Evolution of British

Sigint 1653-1939, GCHQ, Cheltenham, 1997, on p.27 that “Britain had no signals intelligence activity until

the outbreak of the war”. See also Nicholas Hiley, “The Strategic Origins of Room 40”, Intelligence and

National Security, Vol. 2, No. 2 (April 1987) and John Ferris, “Before Room 40: The British Empire and

Signals Intelligence, 1898–1914”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4 (December 1989).

21 A. W. Jose, The Royal Australian Navy 1914–1918, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1941, p.3.

To help co-ordinate the actions of the RAN with those of the RN, the Admiralty had

drawn up and forwarded to the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board war orders for the

various ships of the RAN. Under the Admiralty scheme the first duty assigned to the battle

cruiser HMAS Australia was to “bring to action any hostile armoured ship that may happen to

be in Australian or neighbouring waters”.22 Once this task had been accomplished Australia

was, if required, to join the Commander-in-Chief, China Station, and operate against any

armoured vessels remaining in the region. With Nelsonian flair the war orders stated that upon

“the success or failure of the armoured squadron the whole situation in the East must primarily

depend”. But these statements were then made conditional by one implying that the question of

eastern security was subject at all times to the general trend of naval events in Europe.23 In the case of the light cruisers, the intention was for one of these, either HMAS Sydney or HMAS

Melbourne, was to undertake trade protection duties in the Indian Ocean, the remaining cruiser and HMAS Encounter would be used to hunt down and engage any unarmoured vessels in northern waters off Australia. The war warning was followed by an Admiralty request that the ships of the RAN move to their war stations. On 4 August the Admiralty ordered that all

German colliers in Australian ports be detained, as a precaution should war be declared. This served two purposes; it prevented them being utilised to support the German warships in the

Pacific and ensured their capture as prizes once war was declared. The following day, 5

August 1914, formal advice was received that Britain and Germany were at war.

22 NAA, MP1049, 14/157, Draft of Proposed War Orders for HMAS Australia Issued by the Admiralty, dated

15 May 1913.

23 NAA, MP1049, 14/157, Colonial Office letter dated 15 May 1913.

During this period, from late July to early August, Australian W/T stations had intercepted a number of messages being transmitted to and from German warships in the

Pacific.24 The majority of the messages being sent to the German ships were routed through

Tsingtao, China, and Yap Island. After the transmitter at Tsingtao, Yap was the most powerful

German wireless transmitter in the region. The station at Yap was also connected to China by

an undersea cable. The Dutch wireless station at Sitoebondo, Sumatra, was also heard relaying

messages to the German gunboat Geier, which was in Netherlands East Indies waters. The

Germans had also sent a number of wireless messages via the Australian stations at Port

Moresby and Thursday Island.25 But this action could have been a ruse to convince the

Australian authorities that the German warships were closer to Australia than was actually the

case, as the German W/T stations in the Pacific had sufficient range to cover the waters to

Australia’s immediate north.

At this stage, wireless operators believed that they could determine the approximate

range and bearing of a transmitter by its signal strength. These judgements, however, were very subjective and an operator varying the power of the transmitter could ensure that any estimate of range was highly inaccurate. Based on this type of estimate it was assumed that the

German ships could be as close to Australia as 1,500 miles. In actual fact the German ships

24 The existing official records provide no detail as to whether the interceptions were carried out at the request

of the Naval Authorities or on the initiative of the wireless operators.

25 NAA, MP1049, 16/0235, Report of Intelligence Branch, Navy Office, Melbourne on Wireless Messages of

German Origins Intercepted by Australian Shore Stations During the Week Preceding the Outbreak of War,

May 1916.

were dispersed throughout the Pacific on goodwill and other visits. Vice Admiral Maximilian

Von Spee, the commander of the German Asiatic Squadron, was at Ponape with the two

armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. At the outbreak of the war he instructed the

other ships of the Squadron to join him at Pagan Island where he intended to prepare his force

of war. Unaware of all this, the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board considered that the

information provided by the wireless stations might be accurate and so following receipt of the

formal declaration of war sent the battle-cruiser Australia north to search the German colonies

in case the ships of the German Asiatic Squadron were present. Operating from bases close to

Australia the German ships could have caused major disruption to the sea lanes of

communication in the Pacific and on Australia’s eastern seaboard.

With the declaration of war, Australian authorities moved to seize quickly all German

merchant ships in Australian ports. Not only did the seizure of these ships deprive the German

Asiatic Squadron of potential auxiliary combatants and support ships, it also netted the RAN a

number of code books. The Australian Commonwealth Naval Board was well aware of the

potential value of any code books found and quickly sought details of any taken.26 These early code book captures however, proved to be standard commercial codes of no military value.

This was soon to change however. On 9 August the German-flagged steamer SS Hobart, unaware that war had broken out, contacted the coastal wireless station at Perth. This information was quickly relayed to Navy Office, in Melbourne, and an immediate decision was

26 See NAA, MP1049, 1914/0351, for copies of telegrams despatched to various Australian ports seeking

advice and details of any code books found.

made to try to capture Hobart’s code books. At this stage there was no indication as to the final

destination of the ship, which was believed to be heading for either Adelaide or Melbourne.27

Early the next morning the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board received a message from the Detaining Officer, Fremantle, indicating that a code book and other documents had been seized on board the SS Griefswald in Fremantle and that these were to be forwarded to

Navy Office.28 The response from Navy Office to this message was prompt and curious. The

District Naval Officer, Fremantle, was instructed to retain the code book in Fremantle and be

“prepared to decode messages at Fremantle”.29 At least a week before the famous meeting

between Oliver and Ewing in London, which resulted in the establishment of Room 40, the

RAN had made not only a concerted effort to locate and obtain secret German code books, but

also immediate preparations to utilise them to decode any intercepted messages.30 The code book seized on the Griefswald was the Handelsverkehrsbuch (HVB), one of three code books used by the German Navy. This particular book was used for communications between

German warships and merchant ships.31 The significance of the capture was that this was the

27 NAA, MP1049, 1914/0351, telephone message from Navy Office to District Naval Officer, Port

Melbourne, 9 August 1914.

28 NAA, MP1049, 1914/0351, Detaining Officer Fremantle, telegram dated 10 August 1914.

29 NAA, MP1049, 1914/0351, Naval Board telegram dated 10 August 1914.

30 The fact that these arrangements were put into place is another piece of circumstantial evidence supporting

the theory that Room 40 was not the beginning of modern code breaking in the RN.

31 The HVB was also used by U-Boats and Zeppelins until 1916. This code was also used by patrol craft,

minesweepers, lightships etc operating in the Baltic and Heligoland Bight. See Beesly, Room 40, p.26.

code book that would ordinarily be used by the ships of the German Asiatic Squadron when

communicating with their support ships.32

At the same time that arrangements were being made to use the code book captured in

Fremantle, the steamship SS Hobart continued on her voyage. When war broke out, Hobart

was crossing the Indian Ocean and unaware of the international situation. Although fitted with

wireless she either did not keep a wireless watch or missed any messages announcing the

outbreak of war. As the vessel approached the West Australian coast she contacted the local

coastal wireless station to announce her arrival. The appearance of the unsuspecting Hobart

presented the Australian naval authorities with a golden opportunity to seize whatever

codebooks she was carrying. In order to ensure that Hobart received no word that war had broken out the various coastal wireless stations were instructed to jam her wireless as she crossed the Great Australian Bight. This jamming also prevented the Australian coastal wireless stations from listening for transmissions by von Spee’s warships. Once it was realised that Hobart’s final destination was Melbourne arrangements were made to receive her. The

District Naval Officer, Captain J. T. Richardson RAN, put together a boarding team that included two expert searchers from the Australian Customs Department. Hobart arrived off

Melbourne before dawn on 11 August and upon seeing searchlights was hesitant to enter the port. But Captain Richardson and a small party of men had managed to board the vessel and convince the ship’s captain that they were quarantine officials. Once the ship had entered Port

Phillip Bay and was anchored under the guns of the coastal forts the trap was sprung. The

32 The other code books used by the German Navy were the Signalbuch der Kaiserlichen Marine (SKM) and

the Verkehrsbuch (VB). As these books were held by warships no copies were seized in Australia.

German officers and crew were placed under guard, but the ship’s Captain was allowed a

greater degree of freedom in the hope he would lead the Australians to the location of his

secret papers and code books. Later in the morning the German Captain, thinking he had the

opportunity to destroy these documents, slipped out of his bunk and went to their hiding place.

But he had no sooner opened the compartment where the safe containing these documents was

hidden when Captain Richardson, who had been pretending to be asleep appeared, revolver in

hand, to relieve the Hobart’s captain of the code books, including another copy of the HVB.33

The Admiralty was informed of the capture of these code books on 12 August 1914.34 It was subsequently found that no similar captures of German merchant ship code books had been made by the Royal Navy.

As a consequence of the successes in capturing the code book on board Hobart and

Griefswald, the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board issued instructions to all District

Naval Officers that any incoming German vessel was to be boarded, using the same ruse. Once the vessels were secured, a thorough search was to be made for any codes or secret documents.

If necessary the Captain’s cabin was to be stripped of all furniture and fittings.35 Amongst the

various papers previously captured by the Navy were instructions for all German vessels in

Australian waters to make for the Netherlands East Indies should war be declared. They were

33 Jose, p.381.

34 NAA, MP1049, 1914/0351, Naval Board message dated 12 August 1914. In his book Room 40, Patrick

Beesly states that it was not until 9 September that the Admiralty was informed by the Australians that they

had captured these code books, p.4.

35 NAA, MP1049, 1914/0351, Naval Board message dated 13 August 1914.

instructed to sail south of Tasmania and avoid the Torres Strait area.36 Unfortunately for the

Germans, no ships were able to carry out these instructions as they had all been prevented from

sailing prior to the outbreak of war. Notwithstanding Dutch neutrality in the war there was the

distinct possibility that any vessel that reached the Netherlands East Indies would have been

fitted out as an armed merchant cruiser or used as a supply ship for other German vessels still

at large in the Pacific Ocean.37 Whether or not the actions of the RAN in capturing these codes

were part of a co-ordinated British plan designed to capture German code books in the opening stages of a war is not revealed by the extant archival records. If a co-ordinated British plan to

capture and utilise enemy code books did exist then this would almost certainly confirm the

existence of a cryptographic organisation prior to the establishment of Room 40.

In addition to the two previously reported copies of the HVB, the RAN appears to have

captured copies from the Prinz Sigismund and Wildenfels.38 The Australian Commonwealth

Naval Board moved quickly in order to obtain a strategic advantage from these books. They

sent one book, and a captured key, to HMAS Australia, in the custody of Mr Jens Lyng.39 Mr

Lyng was a Danish immigrant who was employed in the Navy Works Department as a

36 ibid.

37 For German plans to conduct cruiser warfare in the Pacific see Jurgen Tampke (ed.), Ruthless Warfare:

German Military Planning and Surveillance in the Australia-New Zealand Region Before the Great War,

Southern Highland Publishers, Canberra, 1998.

38 NAA, MP1049, 1914/0351, German Code Book For Use of Merchant Craft in War, minute dated 14

December 1926.

39 NAA, MP1049, 1914/0351, Naval Secretary letter dated 19 August 1914.

draughtsman and translator. He had earlier volunteered for overseas service and as a

consequence was asked by Captain G. Smith, Second Naval Member, to take the HVB book to

Rear-Admiral Patey and act as a translator. He agreed and returned later in the day to collect

the book and receive final verbal instructions. Although Mr Lyng’s stated function was to act

as a German interpreter, it is highly likely that he would have been responsible for the breaking

of any messages, in the HVB code, which were intercepted by ships of the squadron. The need for a cryptographer and a translator was that without knowledge of German, there was of course no way the cryptographer could be aware if he had actually broken the message ready for translation.

Unfortunately, because of the Admiralty’s confused Pacific strategy,40 Mr Lyng did not

have the opportunity to carry out these functions, as shortly after he joined Australia the ship

was ordered back to Sydney. But Mr Lyng did not return to Sydney but transferred, on 19

August, to HMAS Berrima and joined the staff of Colonel Holmes, Commander Australian

Naval and Military Expeditionary Force, as an interpreter.41 On 11 September, Mr Lyng was

commissioned into the Commonwealth Military Force as a Lieutenant and subsequently served

40 The Admiralty not only wanted to hunt down von Spee, but also provide protection to the Asiatic coast,

colonial possessions and associated sea lines of communication. There were unfortunately, not enough

ships available to carry out all of these functions. See also Geoffrey McGinley, “Divergent Paths: Problems

of Command and Strategy in Anglo-Australian Naval Operations in the Asia-Pacific (August–November

1914)” in David Stevens and John Reeve (ed.), Southern Trident: Strategy, History and the Rise of

Australian Naval Power, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 2001.

41 NAA, B2455, LYNG, Jens Lyng letter dated 28 January 1915.

as part of the Military Administration in Rabaul. When contacted after the War by the Official

Historian C. E. W. Bean, Mr Lyng provided details on his prior service in Denmark, his employment with the Navy Works Department, and, his service with the Naval and Military

Expeditionary Force, but no mention was made of his secret and potentially historic cryptographic duties.42

In concert with the decision to despatch Mr Lyng to join Rear-Admiral Sir George

Patey’s staff, the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board arranged for Dr F. Wheatley, an

Instructor at the Royal Australian Naval College in Geelong, and a German linguist, to receive

intercepted German messages and attempt to decrypt them using another copy of the HVB. In

all probability, the man behind these decisions concerning the capture and employment of the

German codes was Commander W. H. C. S. Thring RAN, Director of the War Staff and also

responsible for intelligence matters. Prior to the war Commander Thring was responsible for

writing the RAN’s War Book. This War Book contained the instructions for placing the RAN

on a war footing. Part of the War Book required that the Post Office W/T service be placed

under Commander Thring.43

Having had no response from the Admiralty to their earlier message advising of the

capture of the German codes, the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board sent a second

message. On this occasion they provided the Admiralty with greater detail as to the use of the

42 AWM43, A511, Jens Lyng letter dated 14 February 1925.

43 W. H. Thring, Naval Operations in the Pacific in 1914: An Australian Point of View, dated 28 April 1922.

Copy held by Naval Historical Section, Canberra.

code and reported that a number of intercepted German messages had already been broken

utilising it. The Admiralty were also invited to send to Australia any messages they wished to

have decoded.44 The four weeks between the first advice of the capture of the codes and this second message represents a potential missed opportunity for the Admiralty. Earlier response and action might have provided vital information on German movements which could have clarified their Pacific strategy. The Admiralty’s response to this second message was almost immediate. The Australian Commonwealth Naval Board was requested to send a copy of the code book and key to the Admiralty at the first opportunity. In addition they agreed to send copies of intercepted messages to Australia for decryption, until they received the code book.45

The code book was duly copied and sent to the United Kingdom by hand of the master of the

RMS Maloja on 22 September. The previous day the Admiralty had cabled the first of a

number of intercepts to Australia for Dr Wheatley to work on utilising the captured code book

and the key he had uncovered.46

German naval messages intercepted by the stations of Australia’s Coastal Wireless

Service were forwarded to the Post-Master General’s Department in Melbourne. From there

they were taken to the Navy Office and subsequently despatched to Dr Wheatley in Geelong.

44 NAA, MP1049, 1914/0351, Navy Office message 1800/7 September 1914.

45 NAA, MP1049, 1914/0351, Admiralty message 2050/7 September 1914.

46 NAA, MP1049, 1914/0351, German Code Book for Use of Merchant Craft in War, Secretary of Naval

Board minute dated 14 December 1926. Beesly implies that the HVB presented the British cryptographers

in Room 40 with no great difficulty. He was either unaware or chose to ignore that it was an Australian, Dr

Wheatley, doing the code breaking at this stage. See Beesley p.27.

Messages from London were also sent to the College via Navy Office in Melbourne.

Notwithstanding the despatch of these intercepted messages to Australia, there is no indication

that the RAN was ever formally informed of the existence or activities of Room 40. Nor was

there a requirement that the Australians should be so informed. The willingness of the

Admiralty to seek Australian assistance in this highly sensitive and important area stands in

sharp contrast to the latter attitude of other Imperial agencies which had sought to exclude

Australian participation in intelligence matters.47

During this early phase of the war the Australian coastal wireless stations were proving

a valuable intelligence asset. Not only had they alerted the naval authorities of the approach of

the Hobart, thereby aiding in the capture of a copy of the HVB code book, but they also intercepted numerous German messages and were active in attempting to locate and track

Admiral von Spee’s Pacific Squadron. At first glance these could appear to be minor and fairly ineffectual contributions. But in the final months of 1914 they were important because from the British and Australian perspective the “German ‘East Asiatic Squadron’ exercised an influence in the first months of the war only second to that of the High Seas Fleet. Over a vast area its activity was the controlling influence in [British] dispositions”.48

The first recorded interception of a German message by one of the Coastal Wireless

Service stations occurred at 8.15 pm on 2 August when the Port Moresby station intercepted

47 See Richard J. Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the

Indian Empire 190 –1924, Frank Cass, London, 1995, p.267.

48 Admiralty, The Naval Staff, p.52.

the following message from Nauru to the German yacht Planet. This message read “Nauru to

Planet: First mobilisation day. Central”.49 Whether the message was in code, when it was translated, how long it took to reach the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board and what action was subsequently taken is, unfortunately, not known. What the message does illustrate, however, is the potential strategic and operational advantage that could have been obtained by the RAN from the interception of these German wireless messages.

Shortly after the outbreak of war, Mr John Graeme Balsillie, the Engineer for

Radiotelegraphy at the Post-Master General’s Department, began to forward to the Naval

Secretary details of messages intercepted by Coastal Wireless Stations. In a report dated 4

August, he noted that the Dutch stations in the Netherlands East Indies, had reduced their transmitting power, possibly in an attempt to reduce the chances of being intercepted, and that

Berlin was communicating with SMS Geier in the Netherlands East Indies waters via the

Dutch stations.50 The authorities in the Netherlands East Indies were pursuing a policy of

biased neutrality similar to that pursued by the United States of America prior to its entry into

both World Wars.

During the subsequent weeks a series of reports attempting to fix the position of the

German Pacific Squadron (see Table 1.1) were forwarded to Navy Office. The positions given

for the German warships were based on the approximate signal direction and strength. As such

49 NAA, MP 1049/1, 16/0234.

50 NAA, MP1049/1, 16/0235 contains extensive details of these reports.

their reliability is suspect as the transmitting ships could have varied the power of their transmissions in order to give a false indication as to distance.

Table 1.1: Reported Positions of German Warships51

5 August – Geier has not moved far from her previous position.

Call signs ASA and KCA appear to have moved to south east.

Emden heard possibly at Apia. Germans sending cable material via

Guam and not Yap.

5 August – Geier 500-600 miles from Darwin

6 August – IO, two letter call sign, of Scharnhorst and two ships with her.

Two letter call sign of either Gneisenau or Nuremberg

Emden 400/500 miles north west of Yap

Geier 500/600 miles north west of Darwin

Scharnhorst and accompanying ships have not moved.

7 August – Call sign ASB moving away from Australia. In vicinity of Santa Cruz

Islands.

Geier near Timor

Planet near or in Rabaul. Acting as a radio relay ship.

DKT (Komet) near Rabaul.

KCA (Yap) sending to Emden. Emden could be near Yap.

51 This table was compiled from information contained in NAA, MP 1049/1, 16/0234 and 16/0235.

The only interruption to these early attempts at direction finding occurred when the

German ship Hobart contacted the Coastal Wireless Service station in Perth and these stations subsequently jammed her wireless. Notwithstanding the Admiralty’s establishment of a system of reporting officers throughout the Asia-Pacific region, until the German warships actually made landfall this rudimentary direction finding capability and intercepted wireless messages were the only sources of intelligence available which could provide an indication as to the possible locations and movements of the German Asiatic Squadron. Unfortunately this system was far from perfect as it suffered from both technical limitations due to the rudimentary nature of the equipment and human limitations due to the lack of expertise in this type of work.

This was the first signals intelligence war and everything had to be developed from scratch.

The information concerning the German gunboat Geier was broadly correct. This vessel had sailed from Singapore just prior to the outbreak of war and was in waters to the north of Australia. By 22 August she had rendezvoused with Emden south of Angaur. The reported position for Emden, however, was inaccurate as she had remained near Tsingtao until

6 August when she sailed for the rendezvous with the remainder of the squadron at Pagan. The presence of two other major warships in company with Scharnhorst was detected. The British, however, believed that Gneisenau was in the Singapore area as they had incorrectly deciphered a signal which referred to the gunboat Geier which had sailed from Singapore prior to the outbreak of war. They also thought Nuremberg was off Mexico. As for the minor vessels,

Planet and Komet, they were both in the vicinity of Rabaul and the German colonies to

Australia’s north. The conflicting, and at times inaccurate, nature of the intelligence being

provided to the Australian authorities by this means meant that naval dispositions had to be made in order to protect the most vital maritime assets and these naval forces were unable to take on an offensive role in order to hunt down von Spee and bring him to battle.

Even though this new form of electronic intelligence might not have been as accurate as its operators assumed, it was the best source of information available because from a human intelligence perspective, once war had been declared, the German ships had effectively disappeared into the vastness of the Pacific Ocean. Von Spee’s movements and intentions would not become apparent until he was physically sighted and his presence reported. Even then the British could not be guaranteed that they had accurately divined his intentions. Until von Spee was brought to battle and his ships destroyed the British and Australian naval vessels in the Pacific were required to undertake a number of conflicting naval requirements: protection of trade, escort of troop convoys and blockading German colliers in neutral ports, as well as hunting for von Spee.

Concurrent with the seizure of German merchant ships on the outbreak of the war, the ships of the Australian Fleet prepared themselves for war. The early offensive operations, by both sides, in the Pacific Ocean involved a war on communications, with each side attacking the command and control mechanisms of the other. British and Empire forces destroyed or captured the German W/T stations at Yap on 12 August, Nauru on 9 September, Apia on and

Rabaul on 12 September. On the German side SMS Nuremberg destroyed the cable station on

Fanning Island on 7 September and SMS Emden attacked the Cocos Island station.52 Yap was

connected with Shanghai and Tsingtao by undersea cable and could have forwarded messages

received at Tsingtao from Germany. The German attacks did little to disrupt the British

communications network, the British attacks on the other hand, completely destroyed the

German strategic communications network in the Pacific. This left von Spee without any direct

means of communicating with Germany. The destruction of his channels of communication

had been foreseen and feared by von Spee as he realised that "without radio he would know

nothing of the war"53. Monitoring the powerful American wireless station in Hawaii would

have provided von Spee with some information but he would not be able to use it to send

messages to Germany. Ironically the British were, to some extent, also handicapped by the lack of a powerful wireless transmitter in the Asia-Pacific region. Due to their extensive cable network the British had not constructed wireless stations with the same power as those built by the Germans.

Deprived of the ability to communicate with Germany and having lost his operating and logistic bases and many of his potential support ships, von Spee made the decision to leave the

52 One of the first British acts of the war was the destruction by the cable ship Telconia of five German

undersea cables which ran from Emden, Germany, through the English Channel and on to Vigo, Tenerife

and the Azores.

53 Peter Overlack, “The Force of Circumstance: Graf Spee’s Options for the East Asian Cruiser Squadron in

1914”, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 60, Issue 4 (October 1996), p.16.

Pacific Ocean via Cape Horn.54 On the morning of 14 September von Spee was sighted for the

first time since the outbreak of war. The German ships approached Apia, but having seen a

British flag flying departed the area without firing a shot. Rear-Admiral Patey had predicted that

von Spee would head east across the Pacific towards South America. Following Apia, Patey

correctly assessed that Tahiti would be the Germans next port of call. Unfortunately, he was not

permitted to act on his instinct, probably supported by signals intelligence from Australian

sources55, and sail east across the Pacific in an attempt to overhaul the Germans. Having sailed

via Suvarov and Bora Bora the German ships arrived off Tahiti on 22 September. Von Spee’s

original intention was to capture much needed coal supplies at Tahiti. But the French thwarted

his plans by firing the stockpile. In the end von Spee conducted a short bombardment of the island before returning to the vastness of the Pacific. Throughout most of late September reports were received of intercepted wireless messages, attributed to the German ships, and of visual sightings along the South American Pacific coast, of Leipzig and another ship believed to be

Dresden. By this stage it was obvious that the German Squadron was leaving the Pacific. This appears to have been confirmed by a message intercepted by Wellington Radio on 4 October and subsequently decrypted in Australia indicating that Scharnhorst was on her way to Easter Island.

Both the Admiralty and Rear-Admiral Patey were informed of this message. Subsequently the

Admiralty requested that Navy Office forward any intercepted messages indicating the presence

54 Japan’s declaration of war against Germany on 23 August 1914 was also a contributing factor as von

Spee could not hope to match the combined British, Australian, French and Japanese naval forces now

arrayed against him in the Pacific Ocean.

55 HMAS Melbourne is reported as having heard the German ships very clearly on the nights of 7 and 8

September.

of German ships off South America to the Intelligence Officer at Montevideo so that he could warn British merchant shipping of the German presence in the area.

Even though he had lost his direct means of communicating with Germany, von Spee was not totally without sources of information. The Australian coastal wireless station at

Thursday Island intercepted German messages broadcast en clair giving the movements of

British and Australian warships. One such message, broadcast on 7 October, indicated that

Australia had left Rabaul and was heading east.56 At this stage Australia, in company with other ships, was en route to Suva, Fiji, a destination she reached on 12 October. By the time

Australia reach Suva, von Spee was at Easter Island where he was joined by the light cruisers

Leipzig and Dresden. Based on the sightings and intercepted messages, Patey began pressing

Navy Office and the Admiralty to be despatched to the east in order to try to intercept von

Spee. The Admiralty, however, would not release him for this task, fearing that von Spee could still turn west and attack shipping and British possessions in the region. There was now no chance of Patey and the Australian ships catching von Spee and bringing him to battle. Von

Spee sailed on the 18 October and on 1 November was intercepted by Admiral Sir C.

Craddock, Commander-in-Chief South American Squadron, off the Chilean coast near the city of Coronel. In the ensuing running battle the Germans completely outclassed the British and sank HM Ships Good Hope and Monmouth.

56 Admiralty, Naval Staff Monographs: Fleet Issue Volume V: The Eastern Squadrons, Naval Staff, London

1922, p.78.

On the same day as von Spee defeated the British off Coronel the Admiralty Reporting

Officer in Montevideo forwarded to Navy Office in Melbourne a long German message which

had been intercepted by the British. This message could not be decoded utilising the current

key to the HVB held by Wheatley and it became apparent that German merchant ships

operating off South America had changed the key to the HVB code. After more than two days

working on the code Wheatley finally discovered the new key and managed to decode and

translate the message. The following day the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board cabled

the Admiralty the translations of a number of messages, addressed to von Spee, which had

been recently intercepted. These messages gave the positions of German colliers and British

warships in the South Pacific.57 The Admiralty subsequently congratulated the Australian

Commonwealth Naval Board on their success in discovering the new transposition key then in

use.58

This and other intercepted messages showed that von Spee was breaching Chile’s

neutrality by using the Mas Afuera Islands, approximately 660km due west of Santiago, Chile,

as a base. Additionally, when the captain of the steamship Sacramento arrived at Valparaiso

and claimed he had been intercepted by German ships and forced to transfer his cargo of coal

to them the Admiralty knew from intercepted and decoded wireless messages that his ‘capture’

and the ‘loss of coal’ had been arranged prior to the vessel sailing from San Francisco. The

Admiralty was also able to monitor the broad arrangements being made by the Germans in an attempt to resupply von Spee. Another change to the HVB key being used to communicate with

57 AWM 124, 3/142, Sir Oswyn A. R. Murray letter dated 14 November 1934.

58 NAA, MP1049, 14/0351, Admiralty message dated 5 November 1914.

Map 2: Movements of Vice-Admiral von Spee across the Pacific Ocean, 1914. Source: Corbett, Sir Julian S., Naval Operations Vol 1: To the Battle of the Falklands December 1914,Longmans, Green and Co, London 1920

von Spee was made on 14 November. After Wheatley broke this new key it was discovered

that German merchant ships belonging to the Kosmos Shipping Company had been ordered to

sail without clearing Chilean customs. These ships could have been ordered to rendezvous with

the German Squadron at San Quentin in the Gulf of Penas.59 The information contained in

these messages should have been sufficient to convince the British finally that von Spee was

intent on leaving the Pacific and not intending to conduct some form of maritime guerrilla war

against them.

Following the British defeat at Coronel, Australia was ordered to join the Anglo-

Japanese naval squadron off Mexico in case von Spee sailed north from Valparaiso. The

Admiralty still had not fully appreciated that von Spee was attempting to return to Germany and was headed for the South Atlantic. In the meantime a strong naval force had been despatched from England to find and destroy him. After passing into the South Atlantic von

Spee headed towards the British colony and coaling station on the Falkland Islands.

Unbeknownst to him the British naval task force had arrived earlier and was at anchor. On the

8 December 1914 the approaching German ships were sighted by the British who weighed anchor and sortied to meet them. In the ensuing battle the German Squadron was destroyed.

With the defeat of von Spee and the removal of the German naval threat from the Pacific,

Australia’s naval cryptographic involvement in the First World War was almost over.

59 NAA, MP1049, 15/021, Movements and Destruction of German Pacific Squadron, by F. W. Wheatley,

dated 5 January 1915.

In April 1916 the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board requested that

Commonwealth wireless stations monitor Dutch stations in the Netherlands East Indies and

forward any messages intercepted to Navy Office for investigation. By the end of April this

instruction was rescinded as no useful information was found in the messages that had been

intercepted. The exact nature of information being sought was not stated, however, it is likely that it involved the activities of Indian separatists, since for the remainder of the war the major

interests of the intelligence organisations in the region turned towards internal security matters

such as maintaining the British Raj in India and preventing subversive activities by German or

pacifist sympathisers. The monitoring of foreign communications by Australian authorities

continued into 1918 when the Navy forwarded copies of wireless telegraph messages, to and

from Japanese residents in the Pacific, to the Attorney-General’s Department. In the main

these messages were either commercial in nature or requests for funds and payments.60

An event unrelated to the RAN’s current cryptographic efforts occurred in March 1917.

Eric Nave, a young clerk with the South Australian Railways, joined the Royal Australian

Navy. After receiving his initial training, mainly in gunnery, Nave joined his first ship HMAS

Encounter. He remained on board Encounter, patrolling the southwest Pacific and South East

Asia, until 1918 when he joined HMAS Tingira, the Boy’s Training Ship. During his service in

Tingira, the then Midshipman, Nave decided that he would apply to undertake Japanese language training. At that time a language qualification was required by naval officers for promotion to Sub-Lieutenant. Nave’s choice of Japanese was based on the fact that

60 NAA, CP506/1, 1, Copies of Radiotelegraphic Messages To And From Japanese Residents in the Pacific

Intercepted by the Navy Department June 1918.

competence in Japanese paid more than other languages. After some consideration the

Australian Commonwealth Naval Board approved Nave’s application and he commenced lessons with a tutor in Sydney. Unbeknown to the young Nave his financial decision would have a significant impact on his future naval career and on wider naval history in ways he could not foresee.61

With the removal of the German naval threat from the Pacific and the focus of Allied military planners firmly fixed on the European and Middle East theatres of operations, the

RAN no longer had any strategic requirement to maintain or develop a cryptographic capability. To some extent the RAN found itself in the same position which the RN was in prior to the First World War, aware of the potential of cryptography but lacking the volume of traffic and strategic requirement to justify an investment in significant resources. As a consequence, the RAN’s pioneering efforts in cryptography have been largely forgotten and overshadowed by the achievements of Room 40.

Even if the Australians had desired to maintain a cryptographic capability the

Admiralty, in all probability, would have dissuaded them from doing so. The primary reason

61 An excellent biography of Eric Nave is Ian Pfennigwerth, A Man Of Intelligence: The Life of Captain Eric

Nave Australian Codebreaker Extraordinary, Rosenberg Publishing, Dural, 2006. A second, although less

reliable work is James Rushbridger and Eric Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured

Roosevelt into World War II, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1992. Although Eric Nave’s name appears as a

co-author the work is actually Rushbridger’s. He has used Nave and his story in an attempt to add credence

to his, now discredited, conspiracy theories about Churchill and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

for this would have been the Admiralty desire to protect the secrets of its cryptography.62 The

creation of Room 40 and subsequent institutionalisation of cryptography in the Royal Navy

was well under way by the time of the Battle of Coronel. On 2 November 1914, for example,

the Admiralty issued a Confidential Admiralty Monthly Order instructing commanding

officers that the dissemination of information derived from intercepted W/T messages should

be done under the strictest of conditions.63

The rapid capture and exploitation of the German HVB code book by the RAN should

have provided the British and Australian navies in the Pacific with a clear advantage in their

hunt for von Spee. But a lack of experience in dealing with intelligence originating from the

breaking of enemy codes coupled with other competing political and military demands on the

available forces enabled von Spee to escape eastward. The high level of secrecy being applied

to cryptography, coupled with the lack of a spectacular Pacific naval victory to its credit, no

significant investment in infrastructure and no ongoing perceived strategic requirement

resulted in the failure of the RAN to capitalise immediately on its significant beginnings and

develop an ongoing cryptographic capability. This failure would hinder the Navy’s future

attempts to develop a cryptographic capability for the next twenty years. On the other hand, the outstanding intelligence and operational successes of the RN’s direction finding and

cryptographic organisation, especially in the European theatre, during the War ensured that

62 For an insight into Admiralty attitudes towards Australian security see Richard Popplewell, Intelligence

and Imperial Defence, p.267.

63 Admiralty, “Intercepted W/T Messages – Improper Dissemination of”, Confidential Admiralty Monthly

Orders July 1914 to June 1915, London, October 1914, p.28.

there would be an ongoing strategic requirement for its product. The issue of political control

of this important strategic asset was however a matter for future resolution.

The RAN’s participation in this first signals intelligence war highlighted to those

involved, in both Australia and Britain, how this small navy could make a significant and important contribution to the collective defence of the Empire through the provision of specialised and skilled personnel and facilities. Thereafter Dominion Navies were seen as

having the potential to provide more than just ships and men.

Chapter 2

A Faltering Start, 1919-1929

At the end of the First World War the Australian Government requested British assistance in

examining the future requirements of the RAN. To undertake this study the Admiralty

despatched Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, GCB, OM, GCVO as head of a

Naval Mission to Australia. Admiral Jellicoe undertook his Australian mission between May

and August 1919. In the third volume of his report Admiral Jellicoe made a number of

recommendations as to the requirements for W/T intercept and direction finding stations

during wartime. In particular he recommended the erection of interception facilities as soon as

war broke out. What Jellicoe failed to enunciate in his plan was the requirement to build up a

body of trained men to operate these stations and act as cryptographers. Notwithstanding this

omission however, an unidentified, member of the Australian Naval Staff commented, on the

report, that “Intelligence W/T organisation has been immeasurably important during [the last]

war”.1 Clearly the important strategic and tactical advantages gained by the British through

their mastery of the German codes during World War I was not lost on this unidentified officer.

1 Report of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, GCB, OM, GCVO on Naval Mission to the

Commonwealth of Australia (May – August 1919), Vol. III, p.210. Copy held RAN Naval Historical

Section.

Nor were the advantages to be gained from signals intelligence lost on the British War

Cabinet which, in 1919, established the Secret Service Committee to review the existing arrangements and organisation of Britain’s secret services including signals intelligence. The committee was headed by Lord Curzon, and included the future British Prime Minister, and avid intercept recipient and reader, Winston Churchill.2 One of the key recommendations of this committee was to centralise the cryptographic work, which had been undertaken by the

Royal Navy’s Naval Intelligence Division Section 25 (NID25), formerly Room 40, and the

Army’s MI 1(B) within a single organisation. This new organisation was titled the

Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) and, Lord Curzon argued, should be under the control of the Foreign Office. This view was not supported by the Admiralty which argued that the organisation should be under the control of the fighting services.3

A conference was held on 29 April 1919 in an attempt to resolve this issue of control.

Present at the conference were the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary for War, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and senior service intelligence officers. Lord Curzon chaired the proceedings.

Admiral Sir Hugh Sinclair, Director of Naval Intelligence, and the First Lord were strongly opposed to the Foreign Office controlling this new organisation. In the end a compromise was

2 Christopher Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community, Guild Publishing,

London, 1985, p.259.

3 Keith Jeffrey and Alan Sharp, “Lord Curzon and Secret Intelligence” in Andrew, Christopher and Noakes

Jeremy (ed.), Intelligence and International Relations 1900–1945, University of Exeter, Exeter, 1987,

p.104.

reached whereby the GC&CS would be a civilian organisation administered by the Admiralty.

Lord Curzon, as Foreign Secretary, would receive the intercepts and pass them on to the Prime

Minister and other Cabinet Ministers if they were of sufficient importance.4 Lord Curzon

understood that the ability to decide who received the intercepts and who did not was in itself

an immense amount of bureaucratic power.

The GC&CS formally came into being on 1 November 1919 under the direction of

Alastair Denniston (originally a member of Room 40) and included appropriate representatives from the fighting and intelligence services.5 The cryptographic organisation was first located in

Watergate House, Adelphi. The stated function of GC&CS was to “advise on the security of codes”; its real, and secret, function was to “study the methods of cypher communications used by foreign powers”.6 The raw intercept material utilised by this organisation came from the

various service intercept stations and was supplemented by material submitted by cable

companies operating in Britain7. These administrative arrangements were not to last however.

In February 1921 Lord Lee became the First Lord of the Admiralty and Lord Curzon immediately began to lobby for GC&CS to come under Foreign Office control. In early 1922

4 Jeffery, p.105.

5 For details of Denniston’s service see Robin Denniston, Thirty Secret Years: A. G. Denniston’s Work in

Signals Intelligence 1914-1944, Polperro Heritage Press, Clifton-upon-Teme, 2007.

6 Andrew, Secret Service, p.259. See also Hinsley, p.20.

7 Cable companies operating in Britain were required to hand over, within 10 days, copies of all cabled

received and despatched. See A. G. Denniston “The Government Code and Cypher School Between the

Wars” in Andrew, Christopher (ed.), Codebreaking and Signals Intelligence, Frank Cass, London, 1986,

p.49.

the Cabinet’s Secret Service Committee once again reviewed the arrangements under which

GC&CS was administered. Unlike his predecessor, Lord Lee did not object to the proposed

transfer and on 1 April 1922 GC&CS was transferred to the Foreign Office.8 This transfer was

not however an unexpected move as the majority of the work being undertaken by GC&CS at

this stage was diplomatic in nature. Lord Curzon became an avid consumer of GC&CS’s

product, especially the material relating to the clandestine activities of the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics’ trade representatives in Britain.9

Although accepting them the three services did have reservations about the

effectiveness of these new arrangements, especially in wartime.10 But they were not in a position to oppose them. In January 1923 the Director of Naval Intelligence, Director of

Military Operations and Intelligence and Director of Air Operations and Intelligence established a joint service committee to examine the question of military cryptography.11 As a consequence of this meeting the Navy requested copies of Japanese diplomatic and naval attaché traffic. At this stage no operational naval traffic was being intercepted. Throughout the

1920s GC&CS had little difficulty in reading Japanese diplomatic traffic as low grade codes tended to be used. The real difficulty was with the Japanese language, so the Admiralty provided GC&CS with a Japanese interpreter to assist in the work.

8 Christopher Andrew in Secret Service offers a different and more colourful explanation for Lord Curzon

pushing for control of GC&CS in 1921. See p.260.

9 For details on this incident see Christopher Andrew, Secret Service.

10 Hinsley, p.22.

11 Andrew, Secret Service, p.293.

In March 1923, after a hiatus for a number of years, naval cryptographic work was recommenced when the Admiralty instructed the Commander-in-Chief China Station to begin intercepting Japanese naval transmissions.12 The results of this initial work were forwarded to the

Admiralty in December of that year.13 The next step taken by the Admiralty to re-establish a naval signals intelligence capability was the establishment, in 1924, of a dedicated Naval Section within GC&CS.14 The Naval Intelligence Division (NID) was responsible for providing the staff support and obtaining the raw material for the cryptographers. The raw data for this section was initially obtained from the Royal Navy’s intercept station at Flowerdown, England, and a newly established W/T interception organisation in Malta. These land based stations were to be supplemented by a new system utilising Royal Navy ships on foreign naval stations to monitor wireless traffic. The Signals Division became responsible for the technical aspects of interception, including the provision of signals intelligence facilities. GC&CS was responsible for the cryptographic side and acted, in consultation with the service intelligence organisations, as a co-ordinating centre. This new method was given the designation ‘Procedure Y’. In part the objective was not only to obtain intelligence but also to keep alive the skills of cryptography and interception. During hostilities the length of time taken to develop appropriate technical skills and infrastructures could cost lives.

12 Prior to this naval resources had been utilised for the interception of diplomatic communications.

13 TNA, ADM116/6324, 6636, Vol. 4: Intercepted Japanese Messages, Commander-in-Chief China dated 18

December 1923.

14 Hinsley, p.22 and Andrew, Secret Service p.294.

The commencement of naval interception work on the China Station complemented the

work being undertaken by the existing British intelligence networks in the Far East. The

Royal Navy, in particular, was very active in the region as it saw its raison d'etre as being

Imperial Defence and, due to the lack of a European naval threat, saw Japan as a potential rival

in the Asia-Pacific region. Notwithstanding the previous existence of the Anglo-Japanese

Naval Alliance and the naval and military co-operation derived from it. This was a view reinforced in many eyes by the increasing amount of Anglo-Japanese political and economic competition, especially with the acquisition by Japan of the previously German colonies in

China and the Pacific. Japanese activities such as the apparently deliberate jamming of and interference with naval communications on the China Station also helped to reinforce this view.15 The problem of Japanese high powered W/T stations transmitting in such a manner as

to interfere with and jam naval traffic had been reported by the RAN as early as November

1919 and was still an issue as late as June 1921 when the Administrator, Rabaul wrote to the

Secretary of the Department of the Navy complaining about the Japanese practices.16 Although

Australia was an implied ally of Japan, through the Anglo-Japanese Naval Alliance,17 it was an

arrangement which did not sit easily with many in Australia. Japan, through actions such as

15 NAA, MP981, 622/202/440, Admiralty letter M.02956 dated 25 October 1920.

16 NAA, MP981, 622/202/440, Administrator, Rabaul, letter dated 8 June 1921.

17 See Samuel Albert Rosa, The Invasion of Australia, The Judd Publishing Co, Sydney, 1920; Neville

Meaney, Fears and Phobias: E. L. Piesse and the Problem of Japan 1909–1939, National Library of

Australia, Canberra, 1996, and Henry P. Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia From the 16th

Century to World War II, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1991.

this and her wartime demands on China, was increasingly being seen as a future threat to

Australia.18

Following his earlier decision to undertake Japanese language training Eric Nave hired a private tutor. As a consequence of his developing Japanese language proficiency, Nave was advised by the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board, on 11 September 1920, that he would be sent to Japan for two years of language training. On 26 February, with 26 gold sovereigns strapped to his waist, Nave sailed for Japan on board the SS Eastern. At the end of his two years of in-country language training Nave sat a language proficiency examination overseen by staff of the British Embassy, Tokyo including the Naval Attaché Captain Ragnar Colvin

Royal Navy. Nave achieved a remarkable score of 910 out of 1000 for his Japanese language test. The previous highest score had been registered by Lieutenant Commander Shaw RN, a member of the previous group of Royal Navy officers to undergo Japanese language training.

On his return to Australia Nave resumed his normal staff duties as a Supply Officer.19

During March 1921 a conference of the naval Commanders-in-Chief of the China, East

Indies and Australia Stations was held at Penang. The purpose of this conference was to examine a number of technical issues relating to the naval defence of this vast area. Amongst the various recommendations coming out of this conference was the proposal to establish a

18 This was a point of view argued very strongly by Admiral Jellicoe in his report. See Report of Admiral of

the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, GCB, OM, GCVO on Naval Mission to the Commonwealth of

Australia (May–August 1919). Copy held by RAN Naval Historical Section.

19 Rushbridger, p.30.

number of additional direction finding stations in the region in order to improve the monitoring of Japanese naval activities. The conference proposed that two groups of stations be

established, the first group being at Seletar, Kuching and North Borneo, the second being at

Nauru, Rabaul and in New Guinea. In addition to the land based stations ships used for trade

protection, that is to say cruisers or armed merchant cruisers, were also to be fitted for

direction finding work and a number of other portable units were to be acquired and held in

reserve.20 In March 1922 the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board took the first steps

towards implementing these proposals by deciding to fit all RAN light cruisers with direction

finding equipment.21 No similar decision, to fit direction finding equipment, was taken with

respect to the RAN’s submarines which had a potential role in both trade protection and

disruption. The new land based direction finding stations would be part of the Pacific Naval

Intelligence Organisation (PNIO) and be able to monitor the movements of Japanese warships

and merchant ships.

The PNIO was established to collate naval intelligence over an area encompassing the

east coast of Africa and the west coast of North and South America. As such it included the

China, East Indies, Australia, New Zealand and America and West Indies Stations as well as

the eastern part of the South Atlantic Station.22 Ultimately, it was hoped that the PNIO would

be headquartered at the Singapore Naval Base when this facility was completed and

20 NAA, MP1587, 311J, Report of Penang Naval Conference, March 1921, dated 11 April 1921.

21 NAA, MP1049, 22/0237, Fitting of Direction Finders (W/T) in HMA Ships, Naval Board Minute dated 10

March 1922.

22 TNA, ADM223/495, NID 001262/40, dated 30 March 1940.

operational. Until the completion of the naval base at Singapore however, Hong Kong would

serve as the headquarters for the PNIO. At the time of the Penang Conference there existed in

none of Australia, New Zealand or Canada any specialist signals intelligence facilities, including D/F stations, or any trained people to operate them. The British Empire, including

Australia, was about to commence its secret and silent signals intelligence war on Japan.

The functions to be carried out by this new intelligence organisation included maintaining secret agents, studying the workings of all communications systems (including those of shipping, air and rail services), studying the intelligence organisations of other Pacific powers, preparing propaganda, keeping a watch on any potentially subversive activity and having routing charts and instructions ready for use by merchant ships in wartime. The work of the Pacific direction finding organisation and intercept stations, although naval in nature, was ultimately controlled by the Y Sub-Committee of the Co-ordination of W/T Interception

Committee located in London. The interception program of the various fighting services was approved by this committee and determined in part by the needs of the cryptographers and in part by the needs of traffic analysts.23 The raw data from these stations was forwarded to

GC&CS. Many of the functions of the PNIO would be assumed by the Far East Combined

Bureau when it was eventually established in the 1930s. This new organisation would be

headed by a Captain, who was designated Chief of Intelligence Staff, and manned by

personnel from the RN and RAN.24

23 Captain H. R. Sandwith RN quoted in John Bryden, Best Kept Secret: Canadian Secret Intelligence in the

Second World War, Lester Publishing, Toronto, 1993, p.128.

24 NAA, MP1587, Box 67 311J, Penang Naval Conference, March 1921 Appendix J.

During the course of the Penang Conference, the Australian delegation was given a copy of the

latest version of the Japanese Telegraph Code for Naval Vessels. This code was distributed to

the ships of the Australian Fleet with instructions that Telegraphists were to be exercised in the code once a week and a monthly report made as to the proficiency of individuals.25 In addition,

all Telegraphists under training at the Signals School at HMAS Cerberus were also to be

trained in the reception of Japanese Morse. In an attempt to provide a degree of security for the

code, and for its purpose, it was originally intended to be described in communications as the

‘Asiatic Telegraphic Code’. This description was subsequently changed to the even more

innocuous description of ‘B telegraphic code’.26

The decision to train all naval Telegraphists in the Japanese Morse raised the perennial cry from the Rear-Admiral Commanding HM Australian Fleet that the young sailors in the

Fleet were fully occupied learning the International Morse and becoming proficient in the

requirements of the Fleet. He also highlighted how given the length of some of the characters

the speed of twenty words per minute equated to twenty five words per minute of International

Morse, which was the maximum speed at which qualifying Lieutenants were required to read.27 Following these representations from the Fleet Commander, and as a consequence of

additional guidance from the Admiralty, the mandatory training of all Telegraphists in the

25 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Director Signal Section minute dated 17 June 1921.

26 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Japanese Morse Code: Naval, minute dated June 1921.

27 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Japanese Telegraphic Code, Rear-Admiral Commanding HM Australian Fleet

minute dated 31 March 1922.

Table 2.1: Japanese naval morse code table provided to the RAN in 1921. Source: NAA MP1049 1997/5/196.

Japanese code was reduced to training on an ad hoc basis. In order to identify Telegraphists who had become proficient in the taking down of the Japanese morse, a notation was to be made in the ship’s Return of Signal and W/T Exercises. By this means it was still hoped to be able to train some Telegraphists and maintain a small pool of qualified personnel.

Unfortunately, the reduction in training to an ad hoc basis had the opposite effect for when a qualified rating was required, in October 1924, to assist Paymaster Lieutenant Nave in intercepting Japanese naval messages, none could be found. Steps were subsequently taken however to remedy this situation and train a Telegraphist to the required level of proficiency.

Not only was the training of RAN Telegraphists in reading Japanese morse code reduced. So was the training of naval officers in the Japanese language. In a decision which would appear to defy the strategic sentiment of the time the Australian Commonwealth Naval

Board decided that there was no longer a requirement to train RAN officers in the Japanese language, and culture, and so the training scheme was stopped. Apart from Nave only two other naval linguists had been sent to Japan to study.28 These two were Paymaster Lieutenant

William Edward McLaughlin RAN and Mr R. A. Ball, a naval civilian.

Despite reducing the level of training the RAN still an interest in Japanese naval communications systems. This interest was based on the assumption by many in the Navy that

Japan was the only nation posing a threat to Australia’s security. In 1921 a number of Japanese transmissions had been intercepted by HMAS Tasmania and these along with a copy of the

28 Pfennigwerth, p.33.

Japanese morse code were sent to an Army officer, Captain G. H. Capes,29 Staff Corps 2nd

Base District. Captain Capes, who was a Japanese linguist, examined both the messages and the code but could not decipher the former. He did, however, present a case that indicated that the Code as written might not have been accurately transcribed.30 In an attempt to ensure the

accuracy of the morse code table the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff, wrote to the Royal Navy’s

District Intelligence Officer (Singapore). As the District Intelligence Officer (Singapore) could

provide no additional information as to the accuracy, or otherwise, of the code, the Assistant

Chief of Naval Staff recommended writing to the Admiralty to obtain full information:31 a step

which should have been taken in the first place.

Behind the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff’s questions about the Japanese Morse code

was a belief that the RAN should know more about Japanese communications. Unfortunately,

the lack of trained Telegraphists would hamper the RAN’s ability to obtain this additional, and

more detailed, information on the Japanese communications systems, how they operated and

were organised. In an attempt to circumvent this problem the RAN took steps to acquire a

number of automatic W/T recorders. These machines could be used to record clear signals

from Japanese W/T stations thus freeing the Telegraphist to intercept weaker signals. But even with these recorders the RAN could make no headway into the reading of these intercepted messages if the code from which they were working had been erroneously recorded. In an

29 Captain G. H. Capes and another Army officer, Captain Broadbent, were present in Japan undergoing

language training at the time Nave arrived. See Pfennigwerth p.28.

30 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Capt Capes’ minute dated 6 August 1923.

31 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Japanese Morse Code, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff minute dated 17 January

1924.

attempt to resolve this issue it was proposed to ask the Admiralty to provide whatever

information it thought would be of use. This request was conveyed via Australia’s Naval

Representative in London32. In April the Naval Representative forwarded to the Australian

Commonwealth Naval Board a new copy of the Japanese Morse Code, with the caveat that the

Admiralty could not guarantee its accuracy. This was also accompanied by a request to forward any Japanese messages intercepted to the Admiralty.33 The new code was distributed

to RAN ships with instructions to destroy the earlier copies. A copy was also sent to Captain

Capes who advised that he felt the code was accurate in so much as there were no omissions

but that the sign O was in the place where WO would normally be, and vice versa, and that SI

should be SHI.34

When forwarding the Japanese Morse Code on to Captain Capes the Navy went

through the Intelligence Section, Army Headquarters. In doing so they appear to have

forwarded part or all of the complete correspondence on file, for Navy Office was soon

advised that Military Intelligence Officers at Base Headquarters in each state were advised to

forward copies of any intercepted messages on to Army Headquarters for forwarding to the

Admiralty. Whether it was Director of Military Intelligence’s intention to communicate

directly with the Admiralty or to pass the messages on to the DNI (Melbourne) is not clear.

Also included in the Army’s advice to the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board was a

suggestion, from the Intelligence Section, General Staff 5th Military District, based on Western

32 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Japanese Morse Code, Secretary Naval Board letter 23 January 1924.

33 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Naval Representative, London, letter dated 12 April 1924.

34 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, letter from Captain Capes.

Australia, concerning the organising of employees of Amalgamated Wireless Ltd into a

voluntary Radio Intelligence Bureau.35

As could be expected, the naval authorities were not pleased with this act of trespass

into naval affairs by the Military Intelligence officer in Perth. The possibility of utilising staff

from Amalgamated Wireless Ltd had been examined by Navy in the past but no action taken.

The Director of Signals Section, Electrical Commander F. G. Cresswell RAN, undertook to

discuss this issue with the director of Amalgamated Wireless Ltd, Mr Fisk, at the earliest

opportunity. Commander Cresswell also recommended that the best way to intercept any

Japanese messages was to establish two intercept stations fitted with high speed recorders.

These stations should be located at Navy Office, for intercepting high power broadcasts, and

Rabaul, for intercepting low power broadcasts.36 After some delay, the Navy responded to the

proposals from Major H. A. Corbet as to the possible employment of civilian operators from the Shore Wireless Stations as interception operators. The Military Intelligence Officer in

Melbourne was advised that the matter of utilising these personnel as part of a wartime

organisation had been under consideration for some time and a resolution was expected soon.

He was also informed that owing to the difficulties of obtaining operators who could read

Japanese morse, recording receivers would be installed at a number of the stations.37 The wording of the reply was such, however, as to be ambiguous as to whether the recorders would be installed only during wartime or during peacetime.

35 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Military Intelligence, General Staff letter dated 16 July 1924.

36 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Japanese Morse Code, DSS minute dated August 1924.

37 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Head of N Branch letter dated 4 December 1924.

Following his return to Australia Nave, was posted to the light cruiser HMAS Sydney.

On taking up his posting, Nave wrote to the Chief Staff Officer informing him that a current copy of the Japanese morse code had been brought to Australia by Captain J. R. Broadbent,

Australian Military Forces, and that this was at Military Headquarters in Melbourne. Nave requested that a copy of this code be obtained so he could compare it with the one currently held by the Navy and use it to help him read Japanese messages. To assist him in his endeavours, Nave requested that a Telegraphist qualified in reading the Japanese morse code be posted to Sydney and that RAN ships be instructed to intercept as many Japanese messages as possible. The intercepted messages would be forwarded to Nave so that he might attempt initially, to decode ordinary Japanese commercial messages before trying to attack any

Japanese naval ciphers.38

The Second Naval Member agreed with Nave’s proposals and instructions were issued

in order to facilitate the work he proposed to undertake. All intercepted material was to be

passed through Nave before being sent on to the Admiralty. But because the training of

Telegraphists in Japanese morse code had ceased, a qualified Telegraphist was not

immediately available to assist Nave in his work. Action was taken to remedy this situation.

This did not mean however, that the RAN was to re-commence the general training of

Telegraphists to read the Japanese morse code. Nave was also provided with copies of the earlier comments made by Capt Capes on the Japanese morse code. Since Nave’s return to

38 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Paymaster Lieutenant Nave’s letter dated 14 October 1924.

Australia a second person, Mr Ball a civilian employed by the Department of the Navy, had

been sent to Japan for language training. He was directed to become as conversant as possible

with Japanese morse procedures while undertaking his language training.39 Through the

initiative and enthusiasm of one individual and applying limited resources, the RAN had begun to establish a signals intelligence capability. Unfortunately, at this stage the RAN lacked the infrastructure, organisation and doctrine not only to intercept Japanese naval communications adequately but also to exploit the intelligence value of the material intercepted for either strategic or tactical advantage should the need arise. These shortcomings were a reflection of the size of, and limited resources available to, the RAN rather than an oversight in its strategic thinking.

Even though the Minister for Defence had been briefed on the original proposals of the

Penang Conference, there appears to be no evidence to suggest that he or anybody else in the

Government of the day were aware either of the interception operations being initiated by the

RAN or of the assistance in this area given to the Admiralty.40 Correspondence on this issue

was dispatched directly from the Secretary, Australian Commonwealth Naval Board to the

39 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Interception of Japanese W/T Messages, Secretary Naval Board letter dated 19

November 1924.

40 The concept of Australia intelligence agencies entering into agreements, with foreign governments, without

the knowledge of the Government or Ministers was described by Justice Hope as being ‘fundamentally

wrong’. See NAA, A8908, 4D, Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security: Supplement to Fourth

Report, p.31.

Secretary of the Admiralty and there was not, at this stage, a significant requirement for the expenditure of monies on specific facilities which would require the Government’s approval.

Just as the RAN was starting to put in place the basic elements of a permanent signals intelligence capability, it was dealt an unintentional blow by the RN. In late 1924 the RN requested the loan of Nave for service on the staff of Commander-in-Chief China Station.

Whether the RN had formally advised the RAN of the actual reason behind the request is not known. The RAN however, agreed and in July 1925 Nave joined HMS Hawkins, flagship of the China Station.41

As part of the overall development of intelligence in the Far East by the RN, a small naval cryptographic unit was established and attached to Hawkins. Nave was to serve as the unit’s cryptographer with the task of breaking intercepted Japanese naval messages. Assisting

Nave in this work was an RN Chief Petty Officer Telegraphist. The raw material for Nave’s work was provided by the various Y operators embarked in various ships of the China

Squadron. The China river gunboats proved to be particularly helpful in providing intercepted messages.42 Messages were also provided by shore based intelligence officers in places such as

41 The comment in Rusbridger and Nave’s book Betrayal At Pearl Harbor that the Australian Commonwealth

Naval Board was unaware of Nave’s likely employment is unlikely to be true given that the Australian

Commonwealth Naval Board had already been using Nave in a basic cryptographic capacity. Furthermore

given that the First Naval Member was an RN officer it is possible that he was informally advised of the

RN’s intent so as to ease the administrative processes.

42 Pfennigwerth, p.54.

Shanghai and Nanjing. As a consequence of the volume of messages received, Nave was able to break two Japanese naval codes. Through the naval and political intelligence derived from these codes the British began to get a glimpse of the extent of Japanese penetration and covert activities in China.

During the second half of 1925 the RN planned to fit HMS Titania, the depot ship in

Hong Kong, with a Dictaphone for intercept work. The use of this equipment would increase the ability of the RN to accurately intercept Japanese messages as the Y operators could review the transmissions a number of times thus reducing errors. Nave sent a report to the Australian

Commonwealth Naval Board in September 1925 detailing his activities and informing them of his transfer to Titania.43

By this stage the RAN had received copies of W/T Red Forms44 from the Admiralty along with instructions on their use. These instructions for the use of W/T Red Forms were general in nature and caused some confusion in the RAN as no specific instructions on the interception of W/T transmissions had been received. The forms were distributed strictly in accordance with the Admiralty instructions, although it was felt that they should also be sent to

HMA Ships Geranium and Moresby as these ships were conducting survey operations in

43 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Paymaster Lieutenant Nave letter dated 1 September 1925. This

correspondence dispels any notion that the RAN was unaware of Nave’s activities.

44 W/T Red Forms were the forms used by Telegraphists to record intercepted messages. They were printed in

red, hence Red Forms.

northern waters and could be in a position to intercept Japanese W/T transmissions.45

Additional copies of W/T Red Form and its accompanying CB 0978 were requested from the

Admiralty in order to issue them to these ships.46 After the initial consignment of forms had

been issued to the ships of the Fleet the Fleet Commander advised the Secretary, Australian

Commonwealth Naval Board that the instructions contained in CB 0978 could be carried out

“without inconvenience to the internal organisation of HMA Fleet”.47 The first group of

completed forms were dispatched to the Admiralty in November 1925. These reports crossed

correspondence from the Admiralty informing the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board

that “the results of experience of the China Squadron be awaited before any action is taken to

arrange for the co-operation of the Royal Australian Navy” in W/T interception operations.48

Yet again an attempt by the RAN to commence signals interception had resulted in a false start. The Admiralty were informed on 22 January 1926 that the RAN had ceased the interception of Japanese naval W/T.49

Throughout 1926 the Admiralty grappled not only with how to implement a system of

W/T interception but also with the need to impress upon the Commanders-in-Chief of the

45 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Instructions for Filling in W/T Red Forms, Head of N Branch minute dated 13

August 1925.

46 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, W/T Red Form, Secretary Naval Board letter dated 27 August 1925. The

degree to which the RAN relied upon the RN can be gauged by the fact that the RAN ordered new forms

from the RN rather than simply printing them in Australia.

47 NAA MP1049 1997/5/196, W/T Red Form, CCAF minute dated 4 September 1925.

48 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Admiralty letter M.03049/25 dated 19 November 1925.

49 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, CB 0978, Secretary Naval Board letter dated 22 January 1926.

various naval stations the importance of this work. The scale and scope of the operations being

contemplated by the Admiralty can be judged by the contents of correspondence to the

Commander-in-Chief North America and West Indies Station. In this letter references were

made to recent interception operations by HMS Capetown. During this period Capetown intercepted twenty USN messages, as well as a number of French naval, Chinese and Japanese

diplomatic and US Army messages. Another, unnamed, destroyer was reported as having

intercepted over 300 French naval messages.50 Although this seems to have been an exception

for by the end of the year the DNI (Admiralty) proposed to reorganise W/T interception on the various foreign naval stations. Under this new scheme the various Commanders-in-Chief were assigned specific countries to target for interception purposes.

Table 2.2: Royal Navy W/T Interception

Coverage Plan 1926

Atlantic – France;

Mediterranean – France and Italy;

North American &West Indies – USA;

China – Japan;

East Indies – French and Italian African traffic;

African Squadron – General short wave; and,

Reserve Fleet – Interception duties as directed.

50 TNA, ADM116/6320, Case 6636, letter dated 13 January 1926.

The intention was to obtain not just coded traffic for cryptographic purposes but also

information on W/T procedures, technical details of frequencies and W/T organisation. The

assignment of specific interception targets was undertaken for two reasons firstly, to prevent duplicate coverage of national W/T circuits and secondly because with the exception of the

China Station, insufficient foreign intercept material was being provided to the Admiralty by

the various other naval commands. Over 1,000 Japanese W/T messages were intercepted on

the China Station during the course of a month.51

In April of the same year, the Admiralty forwarded the RAN a copy of a letter sent to

the Commander-in-Chief China Station in January. Although the letter described the

interception of W/T as a subject to which the Admiralty attached the greatest importance, no

special organisation would be created on the China Station to undertake this work due to a lack

of resources. The matter of signals interception was to be dealt with in greatest secrecy for the

Admiralty felt that “although the Japanese may be doing the same thing, …….. they may not

credit us with an equal degree of intelligence”. In addition to signals, the Admiralty wanted

information on call signs, general communications routines and frequencies, in essence a

complete picture of the Japanese naval communications system.52 Of importance to the RAN

however were instructions to the Commander-in-Chief China Station to forward a report containing all information that would be of assistance to the RAN in its efforts in establishing

a Procedure Y capability. The Commander-in-Chief China Station also forwarded to the RAN

51 TNA, ADM116/6320, Case 6636, M.00423/26, Special W/T Intelligence Abroad, dated 6 December 1926.

52 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Admiralty letter M.00408, dated 13 January 1926.

copies of China Station Procedure Y Memorandums. These documents were divided into two parts. The first part contained information on administrative handling of Red Forms and the

selection and training of personnel for Procedure Y duties. The second part contained technical information such as telegraphic code, procedural signs, W/T procedures, call signs and details of stations.

At this stage the Admiralty did not envisage operating a shore based organisation to

conduct interception work on the China Station during wartime. The reason for this was

twofold. Firstly there were neither the financial nor manpower resources available to create

this type of organisation. Secondly the geographical position of both Shanghai and Hong Kong

made them vulnerable to attack and required the re-transmission of material, a potential

security problem. The possibility of utilising a light cruiser or other ship as a combined

interception and cryptographic centre was canvassed, as was the possibility of fitting out a

merchant ship and having it operate from neutral waters, a potential breach of international

law. A firm decision on the structure of any cryptographic organisation in the Far East was

some time away.53 The issue of the long term security of Hong Kong and of how best to

maintain the capability for conducting direction finding and interception operations during a

future war with Japan continued to exercise the minds of Admiralty officials for much of the

1920s and 1930s.54

53 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Admiralty letter M.00408, dated 13 January 1926.

54 TNA, ADM178/63, comments by Director, Signals Division 10 August 1926. The Director, Signals

Division proposed that any intercepting ship should also carry portable equipment so that temporary

intercept stations could be erected ashore.

The report requested by the Admiralty from the Commander-in-Chief China Station

was duly prepared and forwarded to the RAN. Ironically the report was compiled and signed by Paymaster Lieutenant T. E. Nave RAN. Accompanying this report was another Admiralty letter instructing the Commander-in-Chief China Station to pass on to Nave “an expression of their Lordship’s appreciation of his work in this matter”.55

As a consequence of the correspondence received from the Admiralty and Commander-

in-Chief China Station, the Director of the Signals Division, Electrical Commander F. G.

Cresswell RAN, noted the importance of having RAN ships conduct similar work

notwithstanding the Admiralty’s previous guidance to the contrary. In particular he highlighted

the possibility of using RAN units to conduct interception operations during their winter cruise

to the former German Pacific Ocean territories now administered by Australia. These ships

could then monitor the transmissions of various W/T stations in the Japanese Mandated

Territories. An alternative scheme proposed by Cresswell was to despatch a single destroyer to

the area to conduct interception operations. He warned, however, that conducting such an

operation from Rabaul could be compromised due to the presence of a Japanese naval

intelligence officer by the name of Komini. Commander Cresswell also identified the problem

of qualified personnel as it had been some six months since the RAN stopped such operations,

on the advice of the Admiralty.56

55 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Admiralty letter M.0749/26 dated 16 June 1926.

56 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Interception of Japanese Wireless Messages, Signals Division minute dated 7

July 1926.

The proposal for the RAN to target the Japanese Mandated Territories specifically was supported by the recently arrived Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (and Director of Naval

Intelligence) Commander H. T. Baillie-Groham RN. Owing to restrictions imposed on

outsiders by the Japanese and to the lack of British trade, very little intelligence was being

obtained on this region. Prior to his departure for Australia he had been briefed by the DNI

(Admiralty) on the importance of Procedure Y and the potential wartime benefits that might

accrue as a consequence of peacetime investment. The proposal to despatch a ship to New

Guinea to monitor this traffic was viewed by the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff as a very

feasible concept. He proposed that the sloop HMAS Marguerite be fitted out with the required

equipment and sent to Rabaul for up to three months to conduct interception operations. For

this purpose she would embark Warrant Telegraphist Robson and Mr Ball, who had completed

his Japanese language training and returned to Australia.57 The use of Marguerite for this

operation also meant that there would be no need to seek additional funding as the ship would

be re-assigned from her original task of Reserve training. Not needing to seek additional

funding also meant that this operation would not be exposed to external, that is, Government,

scrutiny. This would ensure that the sensitive nature of the operation would not be

inadvertently compromised through a political act.

Today the fact that an Australian Government agency would consider engaging in

covert activities against a foreign power, which if exposed could result in harm to the nation’s

57 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, W/T Procedure Y, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff minute dated 7 October

1926.

security or foreign relations, apparently without the approval or knowledge of the Government

would be inconceivable. Yet this is exactly what the RAN was planning to do. The reason that

the RAN could undertake such an activity is because of the nature of the relationship between

the RAN and the RN. The Navy was seen as not just a national asset but also an Imperial one.

So undertaking a specific mission, which might appear to be of greater strategic relevance to

Britain than Australia, was not seen as being beyond the norm. It was just a contribution to be

made towards the collective defence of the Empire.

The concept of sending a ship to conduct W/T interception operations against Japanese

Mandated Territories from New Guinea waters was agreed, and planning for the operation

commenced. In February 1927 the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff held discussions with

General E. A. Wisdom, Administrator of the Mandated Territory of New Guinea, as to the

possibility of utilising the Government yacht SY Franklin58 for this purpose. The attraction of

using Franklin was that she was a common sight in New Guinea waters and so would not

attract undue attention. She was also scheduled to leave Rabaul in April for a three month

cruise. General Wisdom agreed with the proposal, provided the yacht’s master, Commander C.

J. Webb RANR(S), also agreed.59 Electrical Commander Cresswell subsequently went to

Sydney, where Franklin was undergoing a refit, and spoke with the vessel’s master about the proposal. They inspected the vessel and agreed that she would be suitable for the purpose.60

58 The use of Franklin in this role was the first occasion a non-naval vessel was used for signals intelligence

collection purposes and foreshadowed the use of such vessels during the Cold War.

59 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, W/T Procedure Y, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff minute dated 11 March 1927.

60 NAA, MP124, 612/246/614, DSC minute dated 9 March 1927.

During the period of the operation the ship’s regular Wireless Operator would be landed and

replaced by four naval Telegraphists, including a Warrant Telegraphist.

Because some of Franklin’s on board wireless equipment was owned and operated by

Amalgamated Wireless (Aust) Ltd, the RAN required the company’s approval in order to utilise this equipment. When the company was approached they were informed that the

Australian Navy wished to use the equipment to conduct special wireless experiments. The company agreed to the use of the equipment providing the Navy met any maintenance costs associated with this work. The Navy also had to meet the costs associated with the Wireless

Operator for the time he was ashore and pay his passage to rejoin Franklin.61 Following receipt

of this letter the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff commented on how the Company’s promptness

and willingness to co-operate represented a change in attitude compared with some earlier

experience with the company. The Company’s change in attitude however could be due to the

potential for monetary gain in this instance rather than a desire to serve King and Country. The

Navy did however seek clarification on the point concerning the Wireless Operator’s expenses

as he was also a member of Rabaul’s W/T station staff and when not embarked would

normally work ashore.62 To undertake the proposed interception of Japanese morse

transmissions the RAN selected a team of four personnel. They were: Warrant Telegraphist B.

61 NAA, MP124, 612/246/614, Amalgamated Wireless letter dated 14 March 1927.

62 NAA, MP124, 612/246/614, Special W/T Experiment, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff minute dated 16

March 1927.

Harding, Petty Officer Telegraphist L. G. Porter, Leading Telegraphist C. H. Smith and

Leading Telegraphist H. J. Barnes.63

At the same time the RAN was preparing to despatch Franklin on her mission, the RN

was examining the question of the organisation of interception operations on the China Station.

In November 1926 a meeting was held in the DNI’s office in London to discuss the state of

naval cryptography in the Far East. During this meeting a very strong linkage was established between the development of the cryptographic organisation in the Far East and naval war plans for the region. The establishment of such an organisation presented Admiralty, and GC&CS, officials with a number of problems. There were insufficient numbers of trained staff to maintain two cryptographic centres, one in London and one in the Far East. The GC&CS personnel, currently in London, were deemed unsuitable for forward deployment into an area of operations. Furthermore it was felt that the volume of W/T traffic, of intercepts and decrypts, would be such that this material could not be sent to London. In order to overcome these problems it was proposed that GC&CS would control the overall cryptographic

operations and the Navy would have responsibility for such operations in the Fleet and in

distant theatres of operation.64

63 NAA, MP124, 612/264/614, W/T Trials for SY Franklin, Secretary’s minute dated 18 March 1927.

64 TNA, ADM178/63, M.01948/26, dated 4 December 1926. The Director, Signals Division present at this

meeting was Captain James Somerville RN. During the War he would subsequently command the Eastern

Fleet and have a number of disagreements with the staff of GC&CS over signals intelligence organisation

in the war against Japan.

As well as the organisation of interception operations the meeting discussed the

suitable location for the cryptographic organisation. Hong Kong the base for the China Station

was deemed to be unsuitable during wartime due to its vulnerability. A permanent base could

be overrun, the staff taken prisoner by the Japanese and their work compromised. Singapore

was thought to be acceptable as a peacetime location for the cryptographic organisation but

unsuitable as an interception site due to its distance from Japan. Wartime communications

between the interception site at Hong Kong and a cryptographic organisation in Singapore

were to be by cable as ‘transmission of the intercepted material by W/T is not considered

practicable”.65 The main reason for this was the possibility of the Japanese intercepting these

wireless transmissions and breaking the British codes, thereby exposing the British success in

breaking the Japanese codes.

A possible solution to the problem of the wartime location for the naval cryptographic organisation was to have the organisation embarked on a ship specifically fitted out for interception purposes. The vessel so designated would be used solely for interception duties, although additional direction finding sets would also be embarked. There was need for the portable direction finding sets because at this stage there were no other suitable locations where a cut could be obtained with Hong Kong. In order to provide this direction finding cut the vessel chosen would also act as a mobile direction finding facility. Additional direction finding stations would be “unostentatiously” established at Shanghai and in the Philippines

65 TNA, ADM 178/63.

utilising official residences. How the sovereign states concerned might view this use of their

territory by a belligerent power was not addressed by the planners.66

Notwithstanding that the decisions, potentially impinging on the sovereignty of neutral

countries, made during the course of the London meeting appear to have been ill-conceived,

the Admiralty was at least beginning to examine the issues surrounding the establishment,

organisation and wartime functioning of a direction finding and interception organisation in

the Far East. As it was though, the small cryptographic organisation located on the China

Station remained, for the time being, embarked on board one of HM Ships.

Given the impracticalities of providing adequate coverage and of subsequent security

of retransmission of the raw material to London from a mobile platform, a specialist intercept

station was established on Stonecutters Island in Hong Kong. A second station was

subsequently established at Kranji in Singapore. This small network was further enhanced

when, at the request of the Admiralty, the Canadians built an interception and direction finding station at Esquimalt on Vancouver Island.67 The station was controlled by the Admiralty and

instructions were issued to it via the Canadian Director of Naval Intelligence. The personnel

who manned the station were trained by the Royal Navy at either Stonecutters Island, Hong

Kong, or Singapore. The Canadians did not attempt any evaluation of the raw data from the station. This was despatched to Hong Kong via mail steamer and so took too long to arrive to

be of any immediate operational value. Although not of operational value, the Canadian

66 TNA, ADM 178/63, minute M.01948/26, dated 4 December 1926.

67 Bryden, p.8.

material was useful in helping to determine the Japanese W/T organisational structure, and

procedures and the structure of the Japanese codes.

With the commencement of cryptographic work against Japanese naval codes a number

of problems became apparent. First of these was that the Royal Navy lacked sufficient

numbers of Japanese linguists who could work on the intercepted messages. The second

problem was the training of naval Telegraphists to read the Japanese morse code and

maintaining their skill levels once they had mastered it. The problem of personnel was one which was to plague, not just the British effort, but, the efforts of all those involved in this work.

Even though the British were primarily concerned with the activities of the Japanese

they were also very concerned about the internal situation in China. The organisation established to monitor the Japanese was also utilised to provide information on the shipment of weapons to China. For example the movements of the SS Falke, carrying military supplies

from Hamburg to Whampoa (in southern China) in April 1927, were reported and monitored68.

A shipment of military supplies was also reported to be aboard the SS Taiping, bound for

Hong Kong. In this instance the information did not come from signals intelligence but from the fact that a case, marked Tasmanian Apples but actually containing 200 rounds of

68 NAA, MP1074/8, Item 44, Intercepted Messages March–April 1927: Admiralty message 1603/29 March

1927.

Winchester .45 Colt cartridges, was left on the wharf at Thursday Island. The Staff Officer

Intelligence (Hong Kong) was alerted to this discovery.69

The refitting of Franklin, including the installation of additional wireless equipment, was completed by April 1927. She subsequently sailed from Sydney for Rabaul where she was to conduct W/T interception operations from 22 April through to 30 June 1927. Although it was originally intended to conduct all of the interception operations from on board Franklin this proved not to be practicable and Mr Harding and his team were provided with accommodation and facilities ashore. In order to facilitate the interception of the Japanese transmission a clockwork motor was purchased and connected to a Dictaphone, this was used to record the stronger Japanese stations. Transmissions from other stations, which were too weak to record, were taken down by hand. A total of ninety seven recordings were made of the Japanese transmissions for latter investigation. Other information obtained during the course of the operation related Japanese W/T procedures, secret call signs and technical details of W/T stations.70 As the intercept team was no longer accommodated on board Franklin, and

because of concerns about utilising Government House as a base from which to conduct

further interception operations, Mr Harding and his team were recalled early, returning to

Australia on board the SS Marsina in early July.

69 NAA, MP1074/8, Item 56, Decyphers of General Messages 1924–1927: Navy Office message dated 11

May 1927.

70 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Special W/T Trials SY Franklin, Warrant Telegraphist Harding’s report dated

27 July 1927.

Notwithstanding Franklin’s sleek appearance she proved not to have been the best

choice. At sea, she rolled heavily and this caused problems with the transmission and reception

of messages. The vibrations in the ship due to her engines resulted in vibrations in her rigging

which created background noise and made reception difficult. Another technical issue which caused problems was the general condition of the electrical wiring on board the ship. As this wiring was not shielded electrical induction resulted in additional background noise which further interfered with the reception of the Japanese W/T messages. Living and working conditions on the ship were not the best either. The wireless office was small and owing to the additional electrical equipment became very hot in the tropics. Of the four naval personnel

embarked, only one did not succumb to a tropical illness during the course of the deployment.

Once back in Australia Mr Harding wrote a report on the deployment and prepared all

the intercepted material for despatch to London. In reviewing the results of the Franklin

deployment, a committee chaired by the Second Naval Member recommended that the

Admiralty be advised of the results obtained and permission be sought to continue such

deployments if the results warranted it. The Committee also recommended that Admiralty

guidance be sought as to what policy the RAN should follow in the future.71 Although an independent navy, the RAN very much followed the policy advice and doctrine as offered by the RN. This was in keeping with the very nature of the overall naval relationship which saw the Dominion navies as contributing to the overall Imperial defence. In wartime these navies

71 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/996, Conference Held on Monday, 12th September 1927, Second Naval Member

minute.

were placed under the operational control of the Admiralty and effectively acted as a single

Imperial Navy.

In reviewing the results obtained by Warrant Telegraphist Harding and his

Telegraphists, the Director Signals and Communications felt that they were most satisfactory.

A number of the recordings were copied for instructional purposes and Mr Ball examined the intercepted messages in order to ascertain if there were any of significance.72 Once again

however, the limited nature of the resources available to the RAN came into play. Mr Ball was

a civilian employed in the Navy Secretariat. His primary function was neither intelligence

analysis nor translation. The Acting Secretary informed the First Naval Member that Mr Ball

could not be made available on a full time basis due to the current staffing arrangements in the

Secretariat. He could however be made available on an ad hoc convenience basis to work on

the Japanese material. These arrangements were finally agreed and Mr Ball worked on the

Japanese material as convenient.73 The report of Franklin’s cruise, along with the recordings

and other information, was subsequently sent to the Admiralty in the custody of Paymaster

Lieutenant Nave in November 1927. Included in the report was a request by the Australian

Commonwealth Naval Board for further guidance from the Admiralty on how the RAN should

proceed with respect to Procedure Y. In forwarding this material the suggestion was also made

that the RAN should concentrate on the Japanese administered Marshall and Caroline Islands

so as not to duplicate the work being undertaken by the RN on the China Station.74 A month

72 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Special W/T Trials, DSC minute dated 2 August 1927.

73 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Special W/T Trials, A/Secretary’s minute dated 6 August 1927.

74 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Secretary’s letter dated 21 November 1927.

after Nave’s departure for England with this material, the Australian Commonwealth Naval

Board received a letter from the Admiralty advising that “Their Lordships are extremely

grateful at the progress made on the [China] station” and that they had “approved a favourable

notation being made in the records of the Royal Navy officers concerned”. This expression of

appreciation was also extended to Lieutenant Nave.75

Following examination by GC&CS in London, most of the messages intercepted by

Franklin were identified as either commercial or practice messages of no cryptographic or

intelligence value. Based on the information obtained to date the Admiralty advised the

Australian Commonwealth Naval Board that it did not consider it worth the RAN attempting any further cryptographic work as there appeared to be insufficient material to warrant the effort and sufficient information was being obtained from units on the China Station. But the work of identifying W/T stations and their procedures, especially in the Japanese Mandated

Territories, was considered of value and the area where the RAN could make a contribution.76

In addition to the nature of the information being obtained, there was the Admiralty’s concern about security. The British did not have a high regard for the security mindedness of

Australians.77 Whether or not it was the Admiralty’s intention to stop the development of an

independent Australian cryptographic capability, this was very much the result of this

correspondence. Thereafter the RAN maintained only a small cadre of Procedure Y trained

Telegraphists and no special facilities to support interception operations were constructed

75 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Admiralty letter M.02753/27 dated 9 November 1927.

76 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Admiralty letter M.0145/28 dated 21 February 1928.

77 See also Poplewell p.267.

during the 1920s. By the Admiralty’s own actions, the Royal Navy’s future ability to obtain

details of Japanese naval traffic in the region had been impaired as the RAN would not make

serious progress towards developing the required capabilities for another ten years.

At the same time as the RAN was beginning to delve into the intricacies of cryptography,

the Communications Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence recommended, in

1924, that the Commonwealth modernise the coastal radio stations in Perth, Darwin, Townsville,

and Rabaul. In concert with these recommendations the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board

proposed to the Commonwealth Government the construction of two strategic wireless stations,

one to be located in Canberra and the second in Darwin. These facilities were eventually to

materialise in the form of Harman W/T Station and Coonawarra W/T Station.

In 1927, as he was leaving the China Station to return to England, Nave reported that the

“whole of the Japanese W/T organisation is known”. Paymaster Captain Shaw, the senior RN

cryptographer, took umbrage at such a statement by a junior officer. The Admiralty, however,

took a different point of view and commented that the “statement that the whole Japanese W/T organisation is known and understood is correct”. Furthermore the Admiralty placed this achievement in context by acknowledging that this had been achieved despite the complexities of the Japanese language and morse procedures and that this achievement was “entirely due to the zeal and energy of the officers concerned”.78

78 TNA, ADM116/6324, 6636, Vol 4 M.02753/27, dated 21 September 1927. Whether there was more to this

remark is not known. But it should be noted that Nave out scored Shaw in the Japanese language tests and

he may not have taken too kindly to being bested by a ‘junior colonial naval officer’.

Having achieved such a level of knowledge of the Japanese naval communications and

cryptographic systems, the British were going to be hard pressed to maintain it. The main

problem facing the Royal Navy was continuity of qualified staff. Lieutenant Nave left Hong

Kong in 1927 and between then and 1934 four other officers were assigned to carry on the

cryptographic work. Of the five naval officers who carried out these duties between 1924 and

1934 only Nave and one other were to continue working as cryptographers. For the RAN the

1920s proved to be a disappointment. While a decision had been made to fit RAN cruisers with direction finding equipment, the stop-start decision making process had taken its toll on the

development of the more technically complex cryptographic and interception capability. By the

end of the 1920s the RAN still had neither dedicated facilities from which to conduct W/T

interception operations, nor a cadre of trained officers or sailors. This was despite the recognition

of the importance of, and the potential strategic benefits which could be gained from, signals

intelligence.

Chapter 3

Establishing an Imperial Signals Intelligence Network, 1930-19411

The dawn of the 1930s would bring about a strategic shift in British Imperial affairs in the Far East. In

1931 senior elements of the Kwantung Army staged an incident at Mukden which saw the Imperial

Japanese Army quickly overrun and occupy much of Manchuria.2 A year later the Imperial Japanese

Navy became involved in the Shanghai Incident, and Western observers saw at first hand the military power, and brutality, of the Japanese war machine. Whereas Manchuria was a wilderness closed to prying foreign eyes, Shanghai was an important trading and commercial area where the economic and political interests of a number of, mainly European, nations merged and at times conflicted. Having suffered, since the end of the First World War, under the combined influences of Churchill’s Ten Year

Rule, disarmament agreements and Treasury financial constraints, Britain’s armed forces were ill- prepared to meet what was perceived as an emerging Japanese economic and military threat to British interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Neither were the armed forces of the Pacific Dominions, which had relied upon British advice and power for their protection, in any better shape.

1 This section deals with the development of the British imperial signals intelligence organisation during the 1930s.

Australian aspects associated with this development will be covered in the following sections.

2 See James William Morley (ed.), Japan Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident,

1928 –1932, Columbia University Press, New York, 1984.

Throughout this period British naval strategy was predicated upon the planned dispatch of a

British Main Fleet to what was designated as the ‘main theatre of operations’.3 With no existing

European threat, and an increasing estrangement between Japan and the British Empire, the main theatre of operations was assumed by the Navy to be the Far East. Britain’s two main Imperial possessions in this area were Hong Kong and Singapore. Neither location possessed, however, the requisite logistical, repair and operational facilities to support the Main Fleet after its arrival in theatre.

As a consequence of these limitations the British commenced construction of a major naval base at

Singapore.4 The use of Hong Kong as the main fleet base had been considered but dismissed as it was

considered to be too exposed and vulnerable to Japanese attack. The Singapore naval base would also

serve as the main British naval headquarters in the region and possess appropriate command,

communications and intelligence facilities. Once in the Far East the Fleet would implement the

strategy as laid down in War Memorandum (Eastern).5 Unfortunately, the naval base at Singapore was

the victim of the same financial and political pressures which the Royal Navy as a whole experienced

during the inter-war period.6

3 AWM124, 74/42, Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation, Admiralty, February 1921, p.6.

4 Although often viewed in isolation the development of a Far Eastern naval base was but the last stop in a string of

developments which included the base at Malta.

5 See Christopher M. Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy Between the Wars, Stanford University Press,

Stanford, 2000, and Andrew Field, Royal Navy Strategy in the Far East, 1919–1939: Preparing for War Against

Japan, Frank Cass, London, 2004.

6 For the history of the Singapore Naval Base see W. David McIntyre, Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base

1919–1942, Macmillan, London, 1979; Ian Hamill, Strategic Illusion: The Singapore Strategy and the Defence of

As the Main Fleet was not permanently based in the Far East the issue of when to dispatch this

force was of critical importance. Sending the fleet too early could precipitate an unwanted reaction and

crisis, sending it too late could find the fleet arriving in a hostile environment in need of logistical

support and with, potentially, no base from which to operate. For this reason the collection, production

and dissemination of accurate and timely intelligence on Japanese activities and attitudes in the Far

East took on an added importance. The Royal Navy had commenced establishing a worldwide

intelligence network in October 1893. As part of this network a dedicated intelligence officer was appointed, in 1900, to the China Station. This function was originally based on Hong Kong.7 Despite the earlier attempt, in the 1920s, in developing a direction finding network, it was not until 1933 that the Admiralty discussed the need to develop an integrated system of direction finding stations in the

Far East in order to monitor and track the Japanese Fleet and merchant ships. These stations would also be needed to support the operations of the Main Fleet once it arrived in the theatre of operations.

Amongst the possible sites for direction finding stations highlighted by the Admiralty were Rabaul and

Port Darwin.8 The possibility that the Japanese would wage an aggressive war of territorial expansion and either overrun or threaten the security of these sites was not contemplated by the Admiralty at this

Australia and New Zealand, 1914–1942, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1981, and James Neidpath,

Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain’s Eastern Empire, 1919–1941, Oxford University Press, New

York, 1981.

7 NAA, MP1587, 189D, Intelligence Division letter dated June 1921 provides an overview of the development of

this organisation up to 1921. See also Anthony Roland Wells, “Studies in British Naval Intelligence, 1880–1945”

PhD Thesis, University of London, London, 1972.

8 TNA, ADM116/6323, 6636, D/F in the Far East in the Event of War, Admiralty memorandum M.00502/33 dated

6 March 1933.

stage. Against this background concerns as to the efficiency of British intelligence, in particular naval intelligence, in the Far East began to develop within the Admiralty. In late 1933 Rear Admiral J. C.

Dickens RN, DNI (Admiralty), sent Captain W. E. C. Tait RN to the Asia-Pacific region to conduct a review of the various intelligence organisations there and present recommendations as to how the system might be improved.9

At the same time that the Admiralty was conducting its review of intelligence organisations in the Far East the British Government had established a major defence review of its own. The committee tasked with conducting this review became known as the Defence Requirements Committee. The function of the Defence Requirements Committee was to examine the deficiencies of the armed forces and report on how to make these good. The Royal Navy, with its Imperial Defence role generally, and in the Far East particularly, anticipated a potential windfall from this review. Unfortunately, for it was not to be. Under the influence of two senior public servants, Sir Warren Fisher, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, and Sir Robert Vansittart, Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, the Defence

Requirements Committee designated Germany as Britain’s ultimate enemy and recommended that funding priority be given to the Royal Air Force in order to improve the air defences of Britain. Even though the Royal Navy was not totally neglected in the re-armament program it, along with the British

Army and the Royal Air Force, was still in no material or organisational condition to fight a potential global war on two fronts.10 Under these circumstances, timely and accurate intelligence on the

9 Even though RADM Dickens appears to have been the tasking authority it is highly likely that Tait’s mission had

higher approval given subsequent organizational decisions associated with signals and secret intelligence.

10 For discussions on the DRC see Peter Bell, Chamberlain, Germany and Japan 1933-4, Macmillan, Basingstoke,

1996; G. A. H. Gordon, British Seapower and Procurement Between the Wars: A Reappraisal of Rearmament,

capabilities, intent and operations of potential enemies was a major concern, if not essential, in order to deploy the limited military assets available to best advantage.

Adding to British concern was the Japanese withdrawal from the inter-war system of naval arms limitations. Even though various signatories to these treaties had taken steps to circumvent them, they had in general stopped an expensive and potentially economically ruinous naval arms race. These treaty restrictions were now removed from Japan, which took immediate steps to obtain a strategic advantage over its potential naval adversaries.11

At about the same time as the DNI (Admiralty) was expressing his concerns over the organisation of intelligence in the Far East, two other related actions were being taken in other parts of the British government.12 The Secretary for Dominion Affairs advised the various Dominions, in June

1933, of a proposal, initiated by the Commander-in-Chief China Station, Admiral Sir Fredric Dreyer, to hold a conference of Flag Officers in Singapore in January 1934.13 As with the previous, 1925

Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1987, and Wesley K. Wark, The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi

Germany, 1933–1939, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1985.

11 For the impact of this decision on the IJN see Sadao Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese

Navy and the United States, USNIP, Annapolis, 2006; David C. Evans and Mark Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy,

Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941, USNIP, Annapolis, 1997, and Eric Lacroix

and Linton Welles, Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War, USNIP, Annapolis, 1997.

12 Whether all of these organizational reviews, committees and conferences were linked is not known. But it is clear

that a strategic change had occurred within the British military and civil bureaucracy and its attitude towards

Imperial defence at this stage.

13 NAA, MP1049, 1990/2/275, cablegram from Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs dated 8 June 1933.

Singapore conference, representatives from the East Indies Station, the Royal Australian Navy and

New Zealand Squadron attended. The aim of this conference was to discuss British and Imperial war

plans for the Far East in light of the current strategic situation. Included in the specific issues to be

discussed was the organisation of intelligence in the Far East.14 The Australian delegation to the conference would consist of Vice-Admiral G. F. Hyde RAN CVO, CBE, Paymaster Commander J. B.

Foley RAN, Commander J. Burnett RAN, Electrical Commander F. G. Cresswell RAN and a Chief

Petty Officer or Petty Officer Writer for secretarial support.15 The 1934 Singapore Conference was convened by Admiral Dreyer RN on board HMS Kent in January. Amongst those present when the

Conference was convened was Captain W. E. C. Tait RN. Captain Tait addressed the conference and

indicated to those present, amongst other matters the importance, to the Royal Navy of increasing the

Procedure Y activities on both the China and Australia Stations.16

In examining the organisation, roles and functions of intelligence in the Far East the naval

Commanders-in-Chief were constrained in their deliberations by the fact that not all British

intelligence organisations in the Far East were naval or controlled by the Navy and by the review

being conducted at that time by Captain Tait17. Nonetheless in their final report on the Singapore

14 NAA, MP1049, 1990/2/275, Singapore Conference 1934 Agenda, Admiralty letter dated 20 September 1933.

15 NAA, MP1049, 1990/2/275, Singapore Conference: Australian Representation, Naval Board Minute dated 27

September 1933.

16 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, W/T Procedure Y Australia Station, DSC minute dated 14 March 1934.

17 When in Singapore Captain Tait made arrangements with the Manager of the Eastern Telegraph Company to pass

copies of messages from the Japanese Consul in Singapore to the local Staff Officer (Intelligence). These

messages were subsequently passed to Commander Shaw for decryption. A Similar arrangement was subsequently

put in place in Hong Kong. See TNA, ADM 223/495, 41869, DNI (Admiralty) minute dated 9 July 1934.

Conference, the Commanders-in-Chief declared that the main function of any Far Eastern intelligence organisation was to give ample warning of any impending attack by Japan. Once hostilities had commenced between the Japanese and British Empires the role of the intelligence organisation was to keep the Commander-in-Chief China Station apprised of the strategic and tactical situation.

Furthermore, the naval intelligence organisation would also be required to pass information on to the

Commanders-in-Chief of the East Indies, New Zealand and Australia Stations so that these officers might take such appropriate action as the military and political situations made necessary.

The final report of the conference also noted that as a precursor to any aggressive action Japan would attempt to ensure the safety of as great a part of her merchant fleet as possible. In order to do this she might need to initiate the recall of ships well in advance of the actual opening of hostilities.

The report recommended that one of the duties assigned to every Staff Officer (Intelligence) in the

Pacific was to monitor and report on the movements of Japanese merchant ships. Information on the movement of Japanese merchant ships would also be obtained from the various British and Dominion direction finding stations. All of this information would then be correlated at the naval intelligence centre. The senior officers also noted the lack of co-ordination of the various naval intelligence centres around the region. They proposed that this be improved by the establishment of a central intelligence bureau in either Hong Kong or Singapore to collect, correlate and interpret all the information obtained. They saw this central intelligence bureau as being an all sources intelligence centre with access to material from open sources, other intelligence agencies and the armed services, not just the navy. To this end they argued that a “prima facie case had been made out for a thorough investigation of this question of co-ordination of all forms of intelligence, and for the establishment of some sort of

Central Intelligence Bureau with this end in view”.18 How much influence Captain Tait had on these

deliberations is not known. The recommendations of the Singapore Conference did add weight

however, to the final and similar recommendations contained within his report.

The second action associated with the collection of intelligence in the Far East was a meeting

of the Co-ordination of W/T Interception Committee called by Admiral Sinclair RN, Head of the

Secret Services, in November 1934. In attendance at this meeting were the Directors of Intelligence for

the various services.19 The main subject was the expansion of British cryptographic activities against

Japan. Given the subject matter of the meeting the receipt of Captain Tait’s report and the report of the

Singapore Conference was very timely as both provided detailed and first hand information on the intelligence situation in the Far East. Following discussion on the status of the various intelligence organisations in the Far East, the Committee agreed to the establishment of a combined Far East intelligence and cryptographic bureau. This new organisation would be created by the amalgamation and co-location of existing single service intelligence organisations.20 The objective of this new

organisation was to better co-ordinate the collection and evaluation of intelligence, from all sources, in

the region and to provide an early warning of any hostile actions by the Japanese. At the time of

Captain Tait’s inspection the Royal Navy had embarked on board HMS Medway a team of eight W/T

18 TNA, ADM116/3121, Report of Singapore Conference 1943: Enclosure B, p.3.

19 Eric Nave recalled being present at a meeting in late 1934 at which the Head of the Secret Services told service

representatives that the most reliable information he [Sinclair] received came from Nave and others like him.

Whether these two meetings were the same it is not know; however they appear to be related. See Pfennigwerth,

p.114.

20 TNA, HW 4/24, HMS Anderson and Special Intelligence in the Far East, p.1.

sailors and a Petty Officer. These personnel were specifically embarked for Procedure Y work and undertook no other duties on board. Their prime target, at that time, was the Japanese Mandated

Islands.21 Unfortunately, because of the ship’s movements, on board routines and operational requirements they could not maintain a continuous watch on the Japanese circuits. Based on the experience so far obtained with strategic W/T interception by embarked teams, the Admiralty decided to move its W/T interception teams ashore.22 These W/T intercept operators would now be co-located with the new combined intelligence organisation.

Once the decision to establish a combined intelligence organisation had been made, the question of its actual location needed to be resolved. Three sites presented themselves as possible locations. These were Shanghai (preferred by the Army, as they already had an intelligence organisation located there), Hong Kong and Singapore. Because the interception and cryptographic organisation was to be co-located with the other intelligence organisations, the technical and security requirements of this new organisation ultimately played a major role in influencing the final selection of a location. During the course of their deployment on board Medway a number of the

Procedure Y personnel had been landed at Singapore to carry out interception experiments. Much of the Japanese traffic, of interest to the British, could be intercepted at Singapore but there was some which could not. In the main, the medium frequency and lower powered transmissions were the most difficult to intercept. When these findings were coupled with the lack of adequate facilities and concerns about the security of the proposed facilities, Singapore was rejected as the initial site for

21 TNA, ADM116, 6234, Interception and Cryptography.

22 It would not be until later in the Second World War that W/T interception teams would re-embark in RN ships. By

this stage any conflicts as to on board employment and functions had been finally resolved.

the new bureau. Likewise Shanghai was rejected due to concerns about the long term security of the facility. In the end, Hong Kong was selected due to its superior reception capabilities and better security and facilities.

Although Hong Kong was deemed the better location for an intercept station on technical grounds, the location of the accompanying decryption organisation offered more flexibility. Both

Hong Kong and Singapore had the communications facilities required to remain in contact with the

Commander-in-Chief China station when he was at sea. But as the intent was to establish an all sources intelligence organisation, the decision to locate the cryptographic organisation in Hong

Kong was a foregone conclusion given the presence of other British intelligence and security organisations. Hong Kong however, was not necessarily to be the permanent home for this organisation. The naval base at Singapore was always intended to have, as one of its key roles, a higher command function in wartime. In addition, the very real possibility that Hong Kong could not be defended during a conflict with Japan was well recognised. The all sources intelligence and analysis centre established in Hong Kong was a totally new type of intelligence organisation and would serve as a model for many similar organisations in the future.23

23 The Far East Combined Bureau, as the Hong Kong intelligence centre was officially designated, carried out all of

the functions of the Admiralty Operational Intelligence Centre which was established in 1937. The OIC, itself has

been described as the “progenitor of the US Navy’s own Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS)”. See

Christopher Ford and David Rosenberg, The Admiral’s Advantage: US Navy Operational Intelligence in World

War II and the Cold War, USNIP, Annapolis, 2005, p.7.

Within Hong Kong a number of possible sites presented themselves as potential locations.

Ultimately it was decided to locate the new organisation within the naval dockyard. This decision

was based on the already extant Royal Navy intelligence and cryptographic organisation in Hong

Kong and the added security of the dockyard. As the Royal Navy would make up the largest single

component of the new organisation, and to provide further cover for the organisation, it was decided that it would be headed by a Royal Navy Captain. Publicly the director’s position was described as

Captain on Staff, but his classified title was Chief of Intelligence Staff (COIS). Having decided on

the establishment, location and some manning details of the new organisation, the Committee was

then required to seek Treasury approval for the necessary funds.

In concert with the need to establish interception facilities was the requirement for an

adequate direction finding organisation. This direction finding organisation had two purposes.

Firstly it was to monitor the movements of shipping throughout the region. Secondly it aided the

interception organisation by helping to build a picture of the fixed and mobile Japanese strategic

communications network. In his report Captain Tait recommended the construction of direction

finding stations at Singapore, Hong Kong, Port Darwin, Rabaul and Kuching (Sarawak). As well as

examining the organisational, infra-structural and technical requirements for the conduct of

interception and direction finding operations, Captain Tait made a number of recommendations and

observations affecting personnel. These included the possibility of paying qualified Procedure Y

operators a financial inducement in order to maintain their skills. He recognised the time and effort

it took to become a proficient intercept operator and believed that a financial inducement would

raise the standards being achieved and attract more personnel.

This new intelligence organisation, known as the Far East Combined Bureau (FECB),

commenced operations in April 1935. Although described as a combined organisation, much of the

cryptographic and general intelligence work initially done by the FECB was naval in nature, almost

to the exclusion of the other two services, as neither the Army nor the RAF had the required

organisation or facilities in the Far East. Furthermore this concentration on naval work was in

keeping with the main role of the FECB: to warn of an impending Japanese attack on British

possessions in the Far East. Such an attack would by the maritime nature of the region involve

significant elements of the Imperial Japanese Navy.

The duties assigned to the FECB were described as being to “collect all intelligence

(including Security Intelligence) from all principal Authorities in the Indian-Pacific Oceans”.24 The collection of intelligence was performed by each of the individual services through their existing intelligence organisations. The individual service sections would then select the information that they saw as important and this would then be pooled for collation and wider distribution.

Distribution would be either in the form of a factual report or of an appreciation. Each service section would distribute the intelligence directly to its respective command. In the case of the Navy the principal recipients of this intelligence were the Admiralty, Commander-in-Chief China and

Commander-In-Chief East Indies Stations. Initially the RAN did not receive much intelligence from the FECB, but as the possibility of war with Japan increased and the RAN began to contribute directly to the product of the FECB it became a regular recipient of the intelligence produced by the

FECB. If a combined appreciation was compiled within the FECB then this would be distributed to

24 NAA, MP1185/8, 2021/5/529, Notes On CAPT Wylie’s Visit, minute by DNI dated 10 January 1941.

the three services as a whole. Any differences of opinion which occurred in the compilation of this

combined appreciation would be noted. The aim was to construct a picture of the Japanese Order of

Battle and provide advance warning of the possible outbreak of hostilities with Japan.25

An RAN officer was to serve regularly as the Deputy Commander of this new organisation.26

The appointment of RAN officers to this position exposed them to modern concepts of intelligence organisations and collection and might have subsequently lead to the establishment of the Combined

Operational Intelligence Centre in Melbourne in March 1941. RAN involvement with the FECB was not restricted to the provision of the Deputy Director. Paymaster Lieutenant McLaughlin RAN was at this time posted to HMS Bee, a Shanghai based China River gunboat. His posting is described as

Assistant to Resident Naval Officer Shanghai, but his real functions were intelligence related.

The Naval Section of the FECB included the W/T Interception and Far East Direction

Finding Organisation (FEDO), designated the W Section, whose primary targets were German,

Japanese, Russian and Italian naval units and Japanese merchant shipping. The FEDO and the

Admiralty’s Reporting Officer organisation enabled the FECB to maintain an extensive plot detailing the movements of Japanese naval and merchant shipping as well as other shipping of naval interest.27 The Y Section of the FECB was responsible for undertaking the code breaking work of

25 A. J. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Japanese Navy - Strategic Illusions 1936–1941,

OUP, London, 1981, p.357.

26 No evidence could be located in the Archival records to indicate whether this was by arrangement with the RAN.

27 In February 1935 Vice-Admiral Sir Francis Hyde, CNS, advised the Australian Minister for Defence that the

British Naval Intelligence Organisation in the Pacific paid close attention to the movements of Japanese merchant

Chart 1: Organisational structure of the Far East Combined Bureau with emphasis on its naval components. Source MP1185 2021/5/529.

the organisation. There were also separate Army and Air Force Intelligence Sections within the

FECB. Each of the service Sections communicated directly with their parent intelligence organisation in London. The interception and analysis section of FECB, also communicated with the

Government Code and Cypher School in England. The main naval signals intelligence targets of the

FECB were Japan and Russia.28 Some cryptographic work might also have been carried out on the shipping codes of other countries as it was recognised that in times of war reports from neutral ships on such subjects as minefields and foreign warship movements would be not only an invaluable source of intelligence but might be transmitted in codes of a lower security than those used by the

Imperial Japanese Navy and thus easier to break.29

The work of the Far East Direction Finding Organisation and associated intercept stations was controlled by the Y Sub-Committee of the Co-ordination of W/T Interception Committee. The interception program of the services was approved by this committee and determined in part by the needs of the “cryptographers and half by the needs of traffic analysts”.30

ships and would note any deviation from normal routes or routines in a matter of days. He did not however

elaborate on how this was done. See D. M. Horner, “Australian Estimates of the Japanese Threat, 1905-1941” in

Philip Towle (ed.), Estimating Foreign Military Power, Groom Helm, London, 1982, p.167.

28 NAA, MP1185/8, 2021/5/529, Y, W/T and D/F, notes undated c1940/41. This unsigned document is on Admiralty

embossed paper.

29 TNA, ADM116, 6234, Interception and Cryptography.

30 CAPT H. R. Sandwith RN quoted in Bryden, p.128.

The multi-facetted nature of the organisation, with its numerous channels of communications, did however result in some tensions. Captain H. L. Shaw RN, when in charge of the cryptographic organisation, saw fit to write directly to the Chief of the Secret Services in London on various internal issues on which he and COIS disagreed. The end result of such correspondence was that the Chief of the Secret Services told him to resolve these issues with COIS and that only cases of difficulty should be referred back to the Chief of the Secret Services. These incidents, although only minor in nature did foreshadow the rise of greater internal and personal tensions as the organisation was put under greater pressure in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The question of co- ordination of the interception work in Singapore was resolved to some extent when the Y

Committee in London advised that the head of the interception organisation was “to have a fairly free hand in controlling the SI and Y work – in fact it maintained the status quo”.31

With the establishment of the FECB the serious work of breaking the Japanese codes commenced in earnest. Given the, relatively, rudimentary nature of the Japanese codes at this stage it was not long before the combined efforts of the FECB and GC&CS began to bear fruit. By 1935 the main Japanese military and naval ciphers had been broken and were providing useful intelligence.32 This meant that naval cryptographic work could be redistributed so that by 1937 the

FECB worked almost exclusively on Japanese naval codes and ciphers and GC&CS concentrated on other naval codes.33 By early 1938 the cryptographers at Hong Kong had identified and were working on six IJN codes. These codes were: Flag Officer’s Cypher, used for all operational orders

31 TNA, HW4/25, History of HMS Anderson, Chapter 2, p.4.

32 Hinsley, p.52.

33 Hinsley, p.24.

and situation reports in China; General Cypher, readable at Hong Kong but not used much; Staff

Officer Intelligence Code, little used during the conditions prevailing at the time; Dockyard Code,

used for stores and ammunition; Secret Reporting Code, used for reporting movements of Japanese

ships; and the Fleet Code, which was introduced in August 1937. The British had made sufficient

headway on the Japanese codes such that when the Chief of Staff, Fifth Fleet, IJN, sent a coded

message to Tokyo, on 10 March 1938, requesting that when Tokyo formally announced the

occupation of Amoy, China, they should also include a number of additional locations including the

Chinese islands of Quemoy and Little Quemoy. The gist of this intercepted and decrypted message

was on its way to the Admiralty within seven days of its original transmission by the Japanese.34

As a consequence of increasing sophistication and technical improvements the Japanese

cipher systems were however, rendered unreadable in 1938 and 1939. This was further complicated

by the much higher volumes of Japanese naval and military traffic due to the increased operational

tempo along the China coast. It therefore became necessary not only to employ Army

cryptographers at GC&CS on the Japanese naval ciphers but also to prioritise codes on which to

work. The problems associated with running a ‘peacetime’ organisation in a ‘wartime’ situation

were already coming to fruition. As a result of these decisions, and hard work by the cryptographers,

the new Japanese naval systems began to yield to the cryptographic assault by the beginning of the

Second World War in September 1939. The first of the new systems to be penetrated was the

Japanese Fleet Code.35 On 12 September 1939 the work on this code was transferred from GC&CS

to Singapore. By December 1939 work on the Japanese Fleet Code had progressed to the extent that

34 TNA, ADM 223/495, 41869, Captain on Staff HMS Tamar message 2124/17 March 1938.

35 Hinsley, p.53.

some current messages were being read.36 But this did not mean that the codes could be read

regularly to the extent that they were providing regular, reliable and useful intelligence. In

cryptography slow and painful gains can be quickly lost. Commander J. B. Newman RAN, who had

visited the FECB, subsequently reported that the W Section had “been virtually the sole source of

intelligence since October 1940, when the Japanese codes and ciphers were last changed”37.

Unfortunately, no information is available to indicate exactly which codes these were. Commander

Newman went on to state that the degree of success being achieved had improved and that

“Consular, Diplomatic, four figure Naval and Merchant Ship broadcast codes and ciphers have now been made available from friendly sources”.38

Because of the generally deteriorating political and military situation in the Far East and the

accepted vulnerability of Hong Kong, the Admiralty had established, in late 1937, a second Procedure

Y organisation in Singapore. The creation of this additional Y organisation greatly increased the

manpower problems being faced by the RN in the Far East. In an attempt either to solve or at least

alleviate this problem the RN approached the RAN with a proposal to train RAN Y personnel in Hong

Kong.39 The advantage of this would be that the RAN personnel would receive a higher level of

training in Hong Kong than they would if similar training were undertaken in Australia. Initially there

36 TNA, HW8/102, p.5.

37 NAA, MP1185/8, 1937/2/415, Establishment of a Cryptographic Organisation in Australia, DSC minute dated 19

March 1941.

38 ibid.

39 NAA, MP1074/7, 4 April to 31 May 1938: Admiralty message 3 January 1938.

100

was some interest expressed by three RAN Procedure Y operators in going to Hong Kong40. In the end however these Australian personnel did not go to Hong Kong as they attached conditions to their service in Hong Kong which the RAN, and presumably also the RN, were not willing to meet. As well as attempting to get RAN personnel the RN began to seek out retired naval officers with appropriate qualifications. One such officer was a Commander Nichol, who was living in Sydney at the time. He was asked, by DNI (Admiralty) to contact DNI (Melbourne) about a potential job as an interpreter.

DNI (Melbourne) was requested to inform the Admiralty as to Commander Nichol’s suitability, state of health and interest in the job.41 As it turned out Commander Nichol was not recruited to the staff of

the FECB. The shortage of qualified Japanese linguists would plague the FECB and the RN, and for

that matter the RAN, throughout the coming war.

Even though headway was being made on the Japanese naval codes there was still concern

over the organisation of the HF/DF system on the China Station. In order to alleviate these concerns a conference was convened on 11 October 1938. In attendance were representatives of Commander- in-Chief China Station, Commodore Hong Kong and COIS. Although no representatives from the surrounding commands, such as the Australia Station, were present the final one page report of the conference was forwarded to them. The conference dealt mainly with the problems of controlling

and co-ordinating the work of the direction finding stations. The major technical topic concerned the accuracy being achieved by direction finding stations. In order to improve this accuracy it was proposed that the direction finding stations take regular bearings of known stations. This action

40 NAA, MP1074/7, 4 Jan 1938 to 28 Dec 1939: ACNB message 1725/11 January 1938.

41 NAA, MP1074/7, 4 April to 31 May 1938: DNI (Admiralty) message 12 February 1938.

101

would help to establish if errors were consistent and thus allow for a correction to be applied.42 This

conference was followed by another in March 1939 to discuss ways of improving the W/T

communications network in the region. Amongst those attending on this occasion was the RAN’s

Director of Signals and Communications, Lieutenant Commander Newman.43

Some six months after the conference on direction finding, the Commander-in-Chief China

Station ordered the conducting of a direction finding tracking exercise. The objective was to

improve the efficiency of the direction finding organisation and get an idea of the usefulness of the

various existing direction finding stations in the region. The exercise was conducted by tracking a

known target, HMS Kent, over an extended period of time. During the course of the exercise Kent sailed from Hong Kong and proceeded south to Bangkok, Singapore and on to north-east Borneo. At various pre-determined times the direction finding stations at Stonecutters Island (Hong Kong),

Kranji (Singapore) and Bombay Fort (India) took bearings on the ship’s transmissions. The fixes obtained were then plotted and compared with the known position of the ship. The results were mixed with Kent at one time being fixed well to the west of Saigon. Stonecutters’ results were assessed as fair due to the poor location of the station, Kranji’s results were considered good, and those from Bombay Fort were also assessed as good. This exercise highlighted the importance of

bringing the Australian direction finding stations on line as quickly as possible. The stations at

42 NAA, MP1185, 1997/5/328, Commander-in-Chief China Station letter dated 2 November 1938.

43 NAA, MP1074/7, Inwards Signals January to March 1939: Commander-in-Chief China message 17 February

1939.

102

Map 4: Direction Finding tracking exercise 1939. The blues represents the ship’s track and position. The red dots indicate the position of the ship as fixed by direction finding. The red letters S, B, and K indicate the position was obtained using bearings provided by Stonecutters (Hong Kong), Bombay and Kranji (Singapore) respectively. Source: NAA MP1185 1997/5/343.

Darwin and Jandakot, in particular, were so located as to be able to provide a good cut for the station at Kranji and a check on Stonecutters.44

As the military situation in China, and Britain’s relations with Japan, deteriorated planning

for the relocation of the FECB to Singapore gained momentum. In January 1938 the Admiralty

requested advice as to when full interception and cryptographic operations could commence at

Singapore. The Commodore Malaya informed the Admiralty that the required security measures and

equipment were not yet ready and that the earliest possible date would be 15 April. Commander-in-

Chief China Station also informed the Admiralty that the initial intention was to conduct only

interception operations at Singapore; the cryptography would continue to be carried out in Hong

Kong. By 1938 a plan for the relocation of the FECB to Singapore had already been drawn up. One

of the major influences upon this plan was the technical suitability of Singapore as a location for an

intercept station.45 Notwithstanding the realisation of the vulnerability of Hong Kong, there was

concern as to the potential organisational disruption the move would cause to the FECB, in

particular the W/T intercept component, as this organisation was by now recognised as the “most

valuable and reliable of all sources of information in the Far East”.46

By August 1938 interception operations, primarily aimed at the Japanese, were being conducted from

Stonecutters Island (Hong Kong), Kranji (Singapore), Melbourne,47 Esquimalt, Bombay, Nauru Island

44 NAA, MP1185, 1997/5/343, D/F Exercise, COIS letter dated 17 May 1939.

45 TNA, AIR20, 374, Tour of Intelligence Organisations Far East, 1938, p.67.

46 TNA, AIR 20, 374, p.54.

47 Australian developments will be discussed in the following chapters.

103

and ships of the RAN and China Fleet.48 Participation by other Dominions in Procedure Y work was encouraged by the Royal Navy in order to build up expertise, reduce costs and continue Dominion support for Imperial defence. From the perspective of the Dominions this co-operation represented one of the few tangible examples of burden sharing in Imperial Defence. The establishment of this

Imperial network was also important for a number of technical reasons. It provided coverage over a wider area than would otherwise be possible, thus eliminating reception blind spots due to skip or atmospheric conditions. The dispersal of facilities also improved the survivability of the network and in the case of HF/DF the accuracy of fixes. Dominion involvement also enlarged the pool of available trained and experienced personnel.

When the decision was finally taken to relocate the FECB to Singapore it was not because of any overt Japanese threat to Hong Kong, but due to an expectation of imminent war with Germany and the unknown attitude of the Japanese to such a conflict at this time. Behind this decision was the recognition by the British that, should the situation arise, they would not be able to defend Hong

Kong in the face of a determined Japanese assault. On 2 August 1939, HMS Birmingham sailed for

Singapore carrying much of the equipment and records of the FECB. A small residual organisation was retained in Hong Kong to cover frequencies and circuits which could not be picked up in

Singapore. With the relocation of the FECB to Singapore, accommodation had to be found for staff and their families. In most cases this was done by initially sharing quarters. By late 1941 additional quarters had been built to accommodate the families and staff of the FECB.

48 TNA, HW3/24.

104

In keeping with the original intention of creating an all sources intelligence organisation, a counter-espionage section, known as the Far East Security Section, was added to the FECB in

November 1939. The function of the Security Section was to build a picture of persons and organisations that represented a potential threat to British interests in the Far East.49 In this they were aided by the various service, police, security, diplomatic and consular organisations throughout the region.50 The movements and activities of Japanese visitors to Australia had already been reported to the FECB as a matter of course prior to the establishment of the Far East Security Section.51

As the FECB developed, so did the need for Imperial co-operation. Not only was there an

Australian contribution but other Dominions and Colonies provided resources which allowed for the electronic net to be cast further afield. Additional interception and direction finding facilities were established in Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo and on the Cocos Islands. The work being carried out by the Canadians at Esquimalt continued and in 1940 a direction finding station was constructed there.52 This station commenced operations on 26 August 1940. The direction finding and interception facilities at Esquimalt were used to cover German and Japanese traffic to North and South America as well as Combined Fleet traffic.53 The existing Esquimalt intercept station was relocated to the site of

49 NAA, MP1185, 1937/2/159, Security Intelligence in the Far East, COIS minute dated 1 December 1939.

50 NAA, MP1185, 1937/2/159, Security Intelligence in the Far East, COIS minute dated 9 March 1940.

51 NAA, MP1074/7, 4 Jan 1938 to 28 Dec 1939: DNI message 1730/8 September 1938 is an example of one such

report.

52 See John Bryden, Best Kept Secret: Canadian Secret Intelligence in the Second World War, Lester Publishing,

Toronto, 1993, and Timothy Wilford, “Canada and the Far East Crisis in 1941: Intelligence, Strategy and the

Coming of the Pacific War”, PhD Thesis, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, 2005.

53 NAA, MP1074/7, 21/8/1940 to 7/9/1940: NOIC Esquimalt message 2342Z/26 August 1940.

105

the direction finding station. A suggestion was made that the capacity of the station be increased in

order to cover Russian traffic as well. The Canadians were hesitant to do this however, due to

shortages of trained Y operators.54 The issue of adequate numbers of trained personnel was to be a

major concern throughout this entire period.

By the time the Japanese attacked, in December 1941, the Canadian signals intelligence

organisation was fully integrated into that of the British Empire. The majority of the Canadian effort was directed towards German U-Boat traffic as well as French naval and diplomatic traffic, however, a

number of stations in British Columbia were allocated for Japanese naval duties. But the Canadians

had very few operators trained to read the Japanese morse and this restricted the volume of intercepted

material. One proposed solution was to divert trained operators from direction finding duties to interception duties.55 But the ultimate contribution made by the Canadians in the war against Japan

would be decided at the various wartime co-ordination meetings held between the British and

Americans.

As part of the British Imperial network New Zealand had an important role also in the collection of raw material for the FECB during the pre-war years. In early 1939 the SO(I) Wellington advised the Admiralty that Awarua wireless station was conducting interception operations. DNI

(Admiralty) requested details of these operations and was advised they were intercepting commercial

transmissions in order to keep track of German ships in the area.56 By late 1939 the New Zealanders

54 NAA, MP1074/7, 25/4/1940 to 31/5/1940: CNS Ottawa message 1651Z/15 May 1940.

55 NAC, RG24, Vol. 3806, 1008/75/20, Report on Royal Canadian Naval Y Organisation, 19 May 1942.

56 TNA, HW3/1, Item 80, DNI London message dated 13 February 1939.

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were also forwarding to the Admiralty some intercepts of Japanese traffic. These intercepts could have been obtained by obtaining copies of coded Japanese diplomatic telegrams at the point of origin as the contact for these was Mr W. R. Newall, Acting Deputy Director General Post and Telegraph

Department in Wellington.57

In early 1940 Warrant Telegraphist Philpot and another New Zealander went to Singapore to

establish direct liaison with the FECB. In November 1940 New Zealand forwarded a short report on

the W/T practices of Japanese merchant ships of the Mitsui Line.58 This type of information was useful because a change in the communications practices or procedures of a ship or group of ships could indicate that the vessel was being used for military purposes or whether information of a military nature was being passed by these ships. The New Zealand organisation also provided the FECB with reports on the noon positions of Japanese merchant ships, known as Special Shipping Reports. The

Special Shipping Reports were of particular interest to the FECB as any unusual movements of

Japanese merchant ships could provide the first clues as to impending hostilities.

By 1941 the New Zealanders were also working on copying the Japanese five figure

operational code, on Consular traffic and on Russian Far East wireless traffic for the FECB. From

small beginnings, the New Zealand naval signals intelligence capacity would develop so that it

possessed a chain of HF/DF stations located at Awarua, Musick Point (Auckland), Waipapakauri

57 TNA, HW14/2, minute DNI to Captain on Staff HMS Terror dated 3 November 1939.

58 NAA, MP1074/7, 12/11/1940 to 26/12/1940: SO(I) Wellington 0458Z/15 Nov 40.

107

and Suva (Fiji).59 These stations had direct communications with each other so as to be able to obtain simultaneous bearings. Their work was directed and coordinated by the FECB. Additional radio intercept stations would be established at Awarua, Wairouro, Suva and Nairnville

(Wellington). Any transmissions intercepted by these New Zealand stations were sent to Navy

Office in Wellington for on forwarding to the RN in Singapore and subsequently the RAN in

Melbourne. Another station had also been established at Blenheim, commencing work in August

1942. This station, designated as Naval W/T Station Rapaura, carried out a Radio Finger Printing function.60

To further enhance electronic surveillance coverage of the Pacific Ocean the Admiralty commenced construction of a direction finding station at Suva during late 1940. This station eventually came under the control of the Royal New Zealand Navy. Completion of the HF/DF station at Suva was significantly delayed due a severe hurricane and subsequent bad weather. During the hurricane the main masts of the station were blown down. Heavy rains followed the hurricane and this flooded the rice fields over which the power lines were to be erected. Once the weather cleared, construction was further delayed because the Army on Fiji, which was to erect the power lines, did not see the completion of the HF/DF station as a high priority. Notwithstanding all these setbacks the station finally commenced operations on 13 May 1941. Once operational, the Suva station began

59 Royal New Zealand Navy and Naval Facilities in New Zealand, dated 30 April 1944, p.25. Copy held Naval

History Section.

60 Grant Howard, Happy in the Service, privately published, Auckland, 1985, p.50. Radio Finger Printing involved

displaying the W/T transmission on an oscilloscope and taking high speed photographs of the display. By this

method it was hoped to be able to link specific transmitters with units.

108

keeping a watch on Japanese units in the Mandated Islands and the Combined Fleet. Commencing on

17 May the station was also allocated the duties of covering German Series B and Norddeich Silent

Periods, when German U-boats would be transmitting.61 The Suva site proved a major asset. Given the geographical location of Fiji in relation to the Japanese Mandated Islands it could receive Japanese naval traffic 24 hours a day. The OIC of the Suva HF/DF station proposed that provision be made for the erection of additional interception facilities at Suva and the required personnel be posted to man the station. The increase in capability would allow for the interception of a greater volume of traffic than was then the case.62

Like the British and Australian organisations, the New Zealanders were having difficulty finding suitable manpower. This problem to some extent vindicated the British concerns over the

Dominions establishing their own cryptographic organisations. But in the case of the direction finding stations it was the British who wished to see them established as part of the Far East Direction Finding

Organisation. The manpower requirements for direction finding had to compete against other requirements such as the coast watching organisation being established in the central Pacific Islands by New Zealand. The difficulty in getting suitable manpower also resulted in a distortion of the organisational rank structure at the direction finding station at Suva. This problem was alleviated with the promotion of one of the junior sailors to Petty Officer.63

61 NZNA, N Series 1, 030/33/18, Suva W/T Station: Report No 1, dated 12 June 1941.

62 NZNA, N Series 1, 030/33/18, Additional Y Receiving Position at Suva, Charge Hand Fiji HF/DF Station minute

dated 24 June 1941.

63 NZNA, N Series 1, letter to Resident Naval Officer, Suva dated 13 August 1941.

109

As well as establishing a number of direction finding stations, New Zealand created its own

small cryptographic organisation. This was done with the support of the COIS who wished to establish

a number of nucleus organisations in as many parts of the Empire as possible. On the surface this

might seem to have gone against the idea of not dispersing assets, it did create a pool of trained, or

semi-trained, personnel which could be utilized as required. In addition the facilities thus developed

ensured that if some were to be lost then there were others available to fill gaps.64 In establishing their

cryptographic organisation the New Zealanders had to start from scratch, even to the extent of identifying and locating basic texts such as The Solution of Codes and Cyphers by Louis Mansfield. In

August 1940 the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board were requested by the RNZN to locate and

acquire a copy of this work.

A further three intercept stations were located in South Africa. These stations were sited at

Klaver Camp (Simonstown), Point Natal (Durban) and Roberts Heights (Pretoria).65 As well as the

ever expanding- Imperial naval interception and direction finding organisation, a number of local

interception organisations were created by the various colonial administrations, including Mauritius,

the Gold Coast, Cyprus and Burma. In the main these were established for the purpose of intercepting

illicit wireless transmissions by enemy agents.66

64 TNA, ADM223/496, NA030/68/2, Additional Y Receiving Position at Suva, Secretary NZNB letter dated 15

October 1941.

65 TNA, HW14/3.

66 TNA, HW14/11, Overseas Local Civilian Interception Organisation.

110

One of the more unusual British stations intercepting Japanese traffic had been established on the island of Mauritius, in October 1940, by a Lieutenant Commander Twining RN (rtd), in the truly

English traditional manner of an amateur gentleman.67 This station was not part of the regular Y

Service, but a personally established and run organisation. Since the product from this site was so valuable the Y Board sanctioned its continued operation. By 1942 this station had seven operators and

24 receivers and was handling some 1300 messages daily.68 As well as Japanese traffic the station monitored a number of African circuits. All of the station’s staff were civilians employed under cover of censorship activities. By 1942 the station’s work on French Colonial traffic had ceased and the future of the station had appeared in doubt. As the work on French traffic had decreased however, the work on Far East traffic had increased to the point where some 700 messages were being handled daily. The fact that the Mauritius station was not part of the official Y organisation however caused some concern in London. A review of the station was undertaken by the Y Board and it was decided to retain it because of its ability to intercept Japanese and other Far East traffic. By February 1943 the station had expanded to some 80 operators and was an important source of Far East traffic. The station, by this stage known as Chesor, monitored a variety of Japanese and Far East circuits including traffic between Japan and Europe, to and from Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, Indo-China and Thailand and Japanese traffic from stations at Shanghai, Tientsin and Shintsing (sic).69 The reaction of the British authorities to the establishment and operation of this station appears to have

67 Commander Twining was a member of the Mauritius Colonial Service and on the outbreak of war became the

Island's Chief Censor and Information Officer. It was in his role as censor that he established the monitoring

service with a view to monitoring French colonial traffic.

68 TNA, ADM 223/505, NID Vol. 53.

69 TNA, ADM223/505, Cypher Security and W/T Deception.

111

been in contrast to their response to the initial Australian approaches seeking guidance on the

establishment of an Australian cryptographic organisation. The possible reason for this was that by

1943 the British were desperate for stations to cover Japanese and Far East traffic, having lost most of

their Asian based interception network in the opening stages of the Pacific War.

As the size and scope of the Imperial direction finding and interception network was increasing

COIS added yet another string to his bow. British warships on the China, East Indies, Australia and

New Zealand Stations were directed to commence interception operations on an opportunity basis. But no cryptanalysis were embarked for code breaking purposes. The targets for these operations were

Russian, German, Italian and commercial broadcasts. Coverage of these broadcasts by ships allowed other assets to be dedicated to covering Japanese broadcasts.70 Ships of the RNZN were specifically

tasked to cruise close to the Japanese Mandated Islands and monitor wireless traffic there. The effectiveness of these ad hoc operations would have been limited by the number of Telegraphists

trained to intercept and record Japanese morse.

By late 1940 the FECB had developed into an all sources intelligence collection and analysis

organisation located at the naval base in Singapore. The collection assets available to the FECB

included Naval, Military and Air Force intelligence organisations, the SIS (MI6), French

Intelligence Services, defence security officers, diplomatic and consular offices and the signals

intelligence network. The signals intelligence network consisted of the main RN intercept stations

located at Stonecutters Island and Kranji, eight operational HF/DF stations with a further seven

70 NAA, MP1074/7, 25/4/1940 to 31/5/1940: COIS message 0811Z/28 May 1940.

112

stations either under construction or planned.71 These stations were complemented by those

constructed and operated by Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Unfortunately, as a consequence

of the outbreak of the war in Europe, interception reports from Esquimalt were delayed because

British flagged ships which were operating in the Northern Pacific had been reassigned to support

military operations in the Atlantic, this meant that intercepted traffic could not be dispatched to the

FECB on a regular basis.72 Other sources of intelligence available to the FECB included local press,

police reporting and shipping movements reported by the Staff Officer (Intelligence) in ports such as

Hong Kong, Colombo and Singapore.73 In addition DNI (Melbourne), Wellington and other Empire

sources contributed to the overall intelligence picture in the Asia-Pacific region.74 The prime function of the FECB was still to collect and collate information for the Navy, Army and Air Force but above all to provide a warning of impending hostilities by Japan. Naval intelligence material collected and analysed by the FECB was dispatched to NID (Admiralty) where it was provided to the Operational Intelligence Centre and the relevant geographical sections of the NID.75

Unfortunately the intelligence being forwarded by the FECB to the Admiralty did not receive the necessary attention as the NID were completely immersed in the European War.76

71 NAA, MP1185/8, 2037/3/29, Admiralty letter M.01003/40 dated 1 February 1940.

72 TNA, HW14/2, Interception and D/F Bearings East Coast Canada, minute DNI, Ottawa dated 26 December

1939.

73 Marder Papers, Harkness to Marder, 11 July 1978.

74 For a detailed description of the various British intelligence organisations in the Far East on the eve of the Pacific

War see TNA, AIR20, 374, Tour of Intelligence Organisations in the Far East.

75 Marder Papers, Letter from Harkness, 7 February 1979.

76 Marder Papers, Marder to Harkness, 30 June 1978.

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Even though the movements of Japanese warships were of considerable interest to the FECB, the various direction finding stations of the FEDO were instructed not to signal bearings using a traffic precedence higher than IMPORTANT. This was so as not to place too much high precedence traffic on the communications network and thus delay other messages of higher importance such as the locations of German warships.77 The expansion of the FEDO during 1940 allowed for the temporary reallocation of resources to other tasks such as monitoring the movements of German commerce raiders operating in the Pacific.78

The facilities available at Kranji were further expanded when in early 1941 a radio fingerprinting (RFP) capability was installed.79 By mid-1941 an extensive film library of IJN transmissions had been built up as a result of RFP. When this information was combined with direction finding and cryptography it provided a dictionary of the major IJN transmitters. It was thought that by using the RFP films, W/T transmitters could be identified irrespective of call signs used and that this would aid in traffic analysis thereby providing a source of signals intelligence should the Japanese codes become unreadable at any time.

This is exactly what happened in late 1940. Commander Newman had reported that as a result of the Japanese naval codes being unreadable the W Section was the sole source of signals

77 NAA, MP1074/4, COIS message 0444Z/14 August 1941.

78 NAA, MP1074/7, Inwards Messages 27/12/1940 to 3/2/1940: SO(I) Wellington message 0114Z/14 January 1941.

79 Radio finger printing involved displaying a transmission onto an oscilloscope and taking a photograph of it using

high speed film. The resultant image could then be used to identify the transmitter even if call signs are changed.

114

intelligence currently available.80 Unfortunately no information was provided as to exactly which

codes these were. Commander Newman went on to state that the degree of success being achieved

had improved and that “Consular, Diplomatic, four figure naval and Merchant Ship broadcast codes

and cyphers have now been made available from friendly sources”.81 Whether the “friendly

sources” referred to by Commander Newman were a single source, or in fact two or more sources, is

not clear.

Notwithstanding the small size of the signal intelligence assets available to the individual

Pacific territories of the Empire, they represented, collectively, a significant capability. This

communal asset was put to use in an attempt to obtain as much traffic in the Imperial Japanese Navy’s

5 Figure General Purpose Code (or JN-25 as it was latter designated by the USN) as possible. In an

attempt to concentrate on this code Stonecutters Island was directed to cease watching Russian traffic

and switch to Combined Fleet and North China traffic or, if this was light, South China traffic.

Auckland was directed to concentrate on traffic from the Japanese Mandated Islands.82 By August

1941 the FECB’s main commitment was to the breaking of JN-25. Of their available staff four officers, one Clerk and 18 Temporary Women Assistants worked full time on this code.83 This effort took on increasing importance as evidence began to build of possible hostile Japanese actions.

80 NAA, MP1185/8, 1937/2/415, Establishment of a Cryptographic Organisation in Australia, DSC minute dated 19

March 1941.

81 NAA, MP1185/8, 1937/2/415, DSC minute dated 19 March 1941.

82 NAA, MP1074/7, 12/11/1940 to 26/12/1940: COIS 0952Z/19 December 1940.

83 TNA, ADM 223/496, 1006/040.C/3, Australia Special Intelligence Organisation, COIS minute dated 3 September

1941.

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The November 1941 report from the Suva direction finding station indicated that much of its time had been spent in monitoring German naval traffic. During the period in question the reception of these broadcasts was poor, and so little if any useful information was obtained. Some monitoring of

IJN and Japanese merchant ship traffic was also conducted. The night-time reception was good but day-time reception was poor. The transmissions that were monitored by this station appeared to be concentrated in two areas: the Marshall Islands and French Indo-China. Very little merchant ship traffic was heard. The withdrawal of merchant ships from trade was always seen as a precursor to aggressive action by the Japanese and here was evidence, backed up by naval ships in Indo-China, of just such a possibility.84

From small and single service origins the FECB developed into a significant multi-sourced intelligence organisation. Based on the various sources available, the FECB was engaged continually in building up a picture of the order of battle of the IJN, of Japanese political and subversive activities and of the movements of Japanese merchant ships. Notwithstanding the improvements in overall capabilities the single most important asset utilized by the FECB was the direction finding network. Based on information obtained by this means, and supported by cryptography, the FECB made a fairly accurate assessment as to the possibility of the outbreak of hostilities. With the availability of this intelligence British long range reconnaissance of the approaches to Malaya began on 1 December 1941. The British were aware of, and tracking, the movements of the Japanese invasion force but they were unsure of its final destination.85

84 NZNA, N Series 1, 030/33/18, Suva W/T Station: Report No. 7, dated 28 November 1941.

85 Marder Papers, Harkness to Marder, 11 July 1978.

116

Unfortunately any strategic advantage this intelligence could have provided was squandered by political and military inertia in London and Singapore. Just as important as the hard intelligence being obtained by the British and their Dominion partners on Japanese movements and possible intentions was the soft intelligence on Japanese cryptographic culture, on the way the Japanese communications systems operated and how the Japanese constructed their codes. This soft intelligence was to prove beneficial as the Japanese changed their codes in the early stages of the

Pacific War.

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Chapter 4

Laying Australian Foundations, 1930-1935

Although the importance of signals intelligence was recognised by the RAN, no real progress

had been made during the 1920s in establishing a credible signals intelligence capability.

Contradictory guidance from the Admiralty, a lack of facilities, funds and manpower all

contributed to delaying and hindering any independent capability. Developments in the 1930s

in concert with British developments suggest that this situation was about to change.

Given the generally inadequate state of Australia’s defences during the 1930s the

collection of accurate and timely intelligence on the activities of the Japanese, and in particular

the Imperial Japanese Navy, took on an added importance.1 In order to assist in acquiring such

intelligence, ships of the RAN were instructed to monitor Japanese transmissions. In particular

information was required on call signs, wave lengths and procedures of the various Japanese

stations heard. This information was to be reported to Navy Office.2 These instructions were

subsequently relayed to the various ships of the Squadron. Acting on these instructions Captain

H. J. Feakes RAN, Commanding Officer HMAS Albatross, submitted a report detailing the

1 For details on Australian defences between the wars see B. N. Primrose, “Australian Naval Policy, 1919–

1942: A Case Study in Imperial Relations”, PhD Thesis, ANU, 1974, and John McCarthy, Australia and

Imperial Defence 1918–39: A Study in Air and Sea Power, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1976.

2 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, letter Secretary, ACNB dated 15 August 1930.

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SY Franklin used as a signals intelligence collector by the RAN during 1927. She is seen here during her naval service in the early 1920s prior to paying off. (RAN).

HMAS Albatross. Procedure Y operations were conducted from Albatross during the early 1930s. (RAN).

twelve stations that were monitored by Albatross during her cruise through New Guinea waters

and Rabaul in September 1930. This report identified the various Japanese wireless stations by

call signs, locations, frequencies used and other stations they worked with.3 Even though such

work did provide information on Japanese wireless traffic and procedures, it was ad hoc in nature

and usually carried out when “service work permitted”.4 Unfortunately for the RAN, as these initiatives were occurring its only competent code breaker, Paymaster Lieutenant Commander

Eric Nave RAN, was in the United Kingdom working at GC&CS. In November 1930 Nave formally transferred to the Royal Navy and his services were lost to the RAN.5

In forwarding the results obtained by Albatross and HMA Ships Australia and Anzac, the

Flag Officer Commanding HMA Squadron noted that the results achieved were good considering

“the amount of Service traffic interfering with Procedure Y work during the recent cruise”. He

went on to suggest that this interception work should continue, as regular and coordinated

interception collects more reliable and complete information than sporadic work. In making this

suggestion the Flag Officer Commanding HMA Squadron highlighted how similar work was undertaken by the Royal Navy on various foreign stations and coordinated by the local command authorities. He also suggested that information concerning Procedure Y be downgraded from

Most Secret to Secret and in some cases Confidential so as to provide the intercept operators

3 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, W/T Procedure Y, letter Commanding Officer, HMAS Albatross dated 30

September 1930.

4 ibid.

5 Rusbridger, p.68. Nave subsequently returned to Australia and helped establish the Special Intelligence

Bureau, the RAN’s code breaking organization.

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with further useful additional knowledge.6 The suggestion to downgrade the classification of this

work was never adopted. In fact as time progressed and signals intelligence became more

sophisticated the security regime applied to it increased.

The appropriate Navy Office authorities agreed with the comments by the Flag Officer

Commanding HMA Squadron and it was recommended that he be supplied with copies of China

Most Secret Memorandum No.02508–W/T Procedure Y. This document, issued by the

Commander-in-Chief China Station to the W/T stations at Stonecutters Island (Hong Kong) and

Seletar (Singapore) as well as to Rear-Admiral Yangtze, Captains (D) and (S) and to cruisers,

provided general instructions for carrying out interception operations and guidance on the

training and selection of personnel. It also allowed for some information to be held at the

Confidential level so that it might be communicated to sailors employed as intercept operators.

Why this document was not provided to the ships conducting interception operations prior to

their undertaking the northern cruise is not known. But the problem was overcome and action

taken to ensure that Australia, Canberra and Albatross received copies of these instructions.7

Although the results obtained by the RAN ships contained no information worthy of note, they were forwarded to the Admiralty in accordance with the established procedures.8

The commencement of interception operations on board RAN ships on a more or less permanent footing presented the Navy with another problem, that of the lack of trained

6 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, letter Rear-Admiral Commanding HMA Squadron dated 5 November 1930.

7 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, W/T Procedure Y, letter Secretary, ACNB dated 1 December 1930.

8 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, W/T Procedure Y, letter Secretary, ACNB dated 3 January 1931.

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personnel. Although the Navy had conducted interception operations in 1927 utilising the yacht

Franklin this was an ad-hoc been arrangement. In order to provide the qualified personnel,

RACAS wrote to the Captain Superintendent Training at Flinders Naval Depot seeking to have

qualified Telegraphists posted, in the first instance, to Albatross. The Flag Officer Commanding

HMA Squadron also noted that these sailors would still need to spend time in shore postings.9

But this presented another problem, for if no suitable shore interception organisation existed then these sailors would quickly lose their skills.

In May 1931 the Flag Officer Commanding HMA Squadron forwarded to the Australian

Commonwealth Naval Board a summary of progress made in establishing interception operations in ships of the RAN. The ships in commission, specifically the cruisers and Albatross but not the destroyer leader Anzac, had been issued with copies of the China Station

Memorandum. Anzac was thought not to be an appropriate platform for these operations except in special circumstances such as cruises to the northern islands. The Flag Officer Commanding

HMA Squadron noted the keenness and satisfactory progress of the sailors selected to undertake training in interception procedures, and how they had received lectures on the Japanese language from Paymaster Lieutenant W. E. McLaughlin RAN. A technical report of the results achieved was to be sent to Navy Office at the end of June.10

9 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Telegraphist Junior sailors Qualifying in W/T Procedure Y, letter RACAS

dated 11 February 1931.

10 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, W/T Procedure Y, letter RACAS dated 22 May 1931.

121

At the end of June, the first of what would become quarterly reports was forwarded by the

Commanding Officer HMAS Albatross to the then Commodore Commanding HMA Squadron.

In his covering minute Albatross’ Commanding Officer noted that “W/T watch on the above duty (Procedure Y) had been carried out whenever service work permitted. This had been possible on all but fourteen days when flying was in progress or junior sailors were required for duty in connection with “Landing Operations”.11 Notwithstanding the obvious desire to establish

an interception organisation within the RAN the task was still seen as being outside the normal

regime of service work, and so the few qualified operators available were seen as additions to the

ship’s staff rather than specialists with a specific full-time task. Albatross’ Commanding Officer

went on to state that the interception operations concentrated on naval ships and shore stations

transmitting messages within the high frequency range.

As a result of the information obtained, the routine schedules for major Japanese shore

W/T stations were established. The report also included details of stations, fixed and mobile,

which were monitored as well as almost two hundred W/T Red Forms containing intercepted

messages. This seemingly mundane information helped in the compilation of the picture of

Japanese naval communications. Significant changes to routine or increases in traffic could be

identified and act as a warning that something important might be about to occur. Much of the

credit for the results achieved was given to Leading Telegraphist H. J. Barnes, who was

subsequently described as the moving force behind Procedure Y operations in the squadron. As

well as supervising the interception operation he was responsible for the training of the other

11 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Quarterly Report of W/T Procedure Y, minute from Commanding Officer

HMAS Albatross dated 30 June 1931.

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four Telegraphists; namely A. Herman, A. G. Oswald, W. E. Ralston and G. S. Davis.

Notwithstanding the apparent priority being attached to the interception of Japanese wireless

transmissions, the resources being applied were still meagre.

The importance of Leading Seaman Barnes for these early efforts resulted in him

receiving a rare commendation from the Commonwealth Naval Board. Leading Seaman Barnes’

abilities also presented the Navy with an administrative problem. He was only provisionally

passed Petty Officer Telegraphist. In order to be fully qualified in that rank he needed to attend

the appropriate course at the Signal School, Flinders Naval Depot. Unfortunately this promotion

course coincided with the Squadron’s summer cruise. Neither Albatross’ Commanding Officer

nor the Commodore Commanding the Australian Squadron wished to lose Barnes for this period.

In order to resolve this issue and so as not to place Barnes at a disadvantage, the Navy did what

all good bureaucracies do, they bent the rules to ensure that Barnes would not be disadvantaged

by attending a later course. This enabled Barnes to remain on board Albatross during the

northern cruise, to Townsville, and to supervise the interception operations.12 But it did not

address the critical issue of the overall lack of trained personnel and resources dedicated to

Procedure Y activities. By the time Leading Telegraphist Barnes was posted off Albatross, in

November, he had managed to arrange for Leading Telegraphist Burgess to take on the

additional duties of supervising Procedure Y operations.

12 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Quarterly Report of W/T Procedure Y, minute from Secretary ACNB dated 4

August 1931.

123

A subsequent report on interception operations was forwarded to the Commodore Commanding

HM Australian Squadron on 30 September 1931. This report noted that due to changes in the

Japanese operating schedules, interception operations were limited to the checking and

augmentation of data for Japanese H/F stations. The interception work was carried out by

Leading Telegraphist Barnes and his four trainees. One of the trainees, Telegraphist Ralston was seconded to HMAS Australia for that ship’s cruise to Western Australia. On this occasion the work suffered from atmospheric conditions prevalent at the time of the Squadron’s summer cruise and interference of the Squadron W/T guards13 when operating in company.14 On this occasion some 105 W/T Red Forms were submitted with the report. These reports were forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief China Station, aboard his flagship HMS Suffolk. The

Australian Commonwealth Naval Board also requested that five copies of all new material and instructions be forwarded when issued. Notwithstanding the volume of material collected, it was clear that even though the interception of Japanese naval W/T traffic was considered a high priority, this activity was not to interfere with the normal routines of the Squadron. Nor did the training of personnel take precedence over manpower requirements for other ships.

In October 1931 the Admiralty sent the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board an assessment of the material that had been intercepted and forwarded in August. Predominantly the messages were plain language personal messages with such things as family news, greeting and

13 When ships operated in company one or two were designated as W/T Guard Ships and it was their role to

receive and transmit all W/T traffic on behalf of the other ships in company.

14 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Quarterly Report of W/T Procedure Y, minute from Commanding Officer

HMAS Albatross dated 30 September 1931.

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news reports. Only two of the intercepted messages were in code. These two messages consisted

of a situation report from Peking (Beijing) and a general message from the Vice-Minister of

Marine. The Admiralty advised that notwithstanding the accuracy of the interception the

messages themselves were of “little value for cryptographic purposes”.15 Although no

description was given as to the type of messages the Admiralty desired, it was stated that these

messages were difficult to obtain. On the other hand the technical details of the Japanese W/T

stations, their routines, frequencies and procedures were considered useful and any further

similar information was requested. The Admiralty went on to state that Procedure Y work in the

Australian Squadron should concentrate on obtaining call signs, schedules and frequencies of

Japanese stations rather than on intercepting messages. In other words the Admiralty sought to

restrict the Australians to a traffic analysis role rather than encouraging any form of

cryptography. Notwithstanding this however, the Admiralty indicated their appreciation of the efforts and did express interest in continuing to receive further reports.16 These instructions were

duly forwarded to the Commodore Commanding HM Australian Squadron.

In February 1932, the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board advised the Commodore

Commanding HM Australian Squadron and the Captain Superintendent, Sydney, that H/F traffic

from the China Station was to be intercepted by the Garden Island W/T Station. Previous to this

the Navy had conducted its recent interception operations from ships rather than shore.

Intercepted message traffic which was considered to be important or of interest was to be

15 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, letter from Admiralty dated 23 October 1931.

16 ibid.

125

forwarded to Navy Office.17 Unfortunately, no instructions or facilities were provided so that the

intercepted messages could be evaluated either for interest or importance. Nonetheless, on 8

February the Captain Superintendent, Sydney advised the Australian Commonwealth Naval

Board that “numerous undecipherable messages had been intercepted to and from Diplomatic

Authorities. No decypherable messages of interest or importance received”.18 Whether or not the

undecipherable messages were of interest or importance could not be determined because

Australia had no means of decoding the messages. Interception of message traffic by Garden

Island was stopped on 16 February, although the interception operations by ships of the

Australian Squadron, targeting Japanese destroyers and submarines, were to continue on an ‘as convenient’ basis.

In an attempt to replace the earlier loss of Paymaster Lieutenant Commander Nave it was proposed to forward copies of intercepted material to Paymaster Lieutenant William E.

McLaughlin RAN. McLaughlin was another RAN officer who had undergone Japanese language training and was conversant with Procedure Y. The intention was for McLaughlin to examine the intercepts and determine which ones should be forwarded to London for the code breakers at

GC&CS to work on. The other advantage in this proposal was that it would help McLaughlin keep up his language, and potentially code breaking, skills19. This recommendation was adopted

17 NAA, MP1074, 197/5/196, Navy Office message, Melbourne dated 1458/3 February 1932.

18 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Captain Superintendent, Sydney letter dated 1359/8 February 1932.

19 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Quarterly Report on Procedure Y: Reception During Quarter Ending March,

1932, note by Head of Naval Branch, appended to letter from Rear-Admiral Commanding HM Australian

Squadron dated 9 April 1932.

126

and the Rear-Admiral Commanding HM Australian Squadron was instructed to forward all intercepts to Naval Office for examination by McLaughlin.

In March 1932 McLaughlin had been assigned as the liaison officer for the visit to

Australia of the Imperial Japanese Navy Training Squadron, the same role Eric Nave had performed in the 1920s. Prior to the visit the Japanese were advised that there would be no restrictions placed on them with respect to the use of W/T. But they were requested to provide details of their transmission schedules and frequencies so as to prevent mutual interference. This information would also mean that the RAN’s few intercept operators would not have to maintain a constant watch in order to ensure that they did not miss any transmissions. The Japanese did not respond directly to the Navy’s request. On 17 May however, McLaughlin reported the transmission frequencies and times that HIJM Ships Asama and Awate would use during their visit to Melbourne in April 1932. During the course of the visit, the RAN made a special effort to intercept the transmissions of these Japanese ships. The resultant intercepts were forwarded to

McLaughlin for examination. He identified a number of messages which were in code and these were forwarded to London along with the Procedure Y report for the June quarter.20 The

Admiralty subsequently advised that the coded messages were in the main exercise messages.21

The RAN’s hopes for a cryptographic coup had been dashed.

20 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Procedure Y Reception in HMA Squadron, letter from Secretary, ACNB dated

26 July 1932.

21 NAA, MP1049, 1887/2/35, letter from Secretary of the Admiralty dated 5 October 1932.

127

Since the commencement of interception operations in late 1930 the only information of any value which the RAN had managed to produce was via traffic analysis. The hoped-for intelligence, from cryptographic sources, on Japanese activities, particularly in the Mandated

Territories, had not been obtained. Accurate and up to date information on Japanese activities in this area was extremely difficult to ascertain. So in most cases naval authorities had to resort to such measures as interrogating businessmen or travellers who had been in the region.22 One

suggestion, made by the District Intelligence Officer, Sydney was to employ W/T operators from

the Eastern & Australian Steamship Co to act as intercept operators.23 This suggestion was

quickly rejected by the Director of Signals and Communications as being not only impractical,

but also because he felt that intercepting signals for intelligence purposes should not be

conducted outside of the naval service.24 The possibility that somebody might have questioned the latter argument was quickly laid to rest when a letter arrived from the Admiralty re-iterating the need for absolute secrecy with respect to Procedure Y. This letter was the result of an

enquiry, by a foreign naval officer, during a port visit by an RN warship. The officer concerned

questioned whether the ship conducted Procedure Y operations. As a consequence the Admiralty

22 See John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese

Navy in World War II, Random House, New York, 1995 for details of similar American attempts to

penetrate the ‘Coconut Curtain’ around the Japanese Mandated Territories.

23 The Eastern & Australian Steamship Co maintained a regular service between Australia, the South West

Pacific Islands, Manila, China and Japan.

24 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Report on Establishment of Submarine Base in Japanese Mandated Islands –

W/T Interception, minute from Director Signals and Communications dated 22 April 1932.

128

highlighted the need for officers to be “reticent” when discussing Procedure Y, especially in the

presence of foreign naval officers.25

Albatross, which had been described as the Squadron’s Procedure Y guard ship, was

paid-off on 23 April 1933 due to financial constraints.26 This left the RAN without an

intelligence collection platform. In May it was observed that no quarterly reports on Procedure Y

activities had been received since June 1932. As a consequence of this break in despatching

Procedure Y reports the Director of Signals and Communications, Electrical Commander Frank

G. Cresswell RAN, compiled a report of activities during recent years. In this report he

highlighted the fact that a ‘private ship’ as opposed to the flagship, must be used for this duty as

the frequent number of transmissions from a flagship would prevent good results from being

obtained.27 The second point made by Commander Cresswell was that the Y operators had to be

particularly enthusiastic as a Y watch involved long periods of listening in a man’s own time.

This was still the situation in 1936 and was expected to remain so for some time to come.28

Notwithstanding the fact that the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board viewed this work as important, it was not of sufficient importance to rate additional and dedicated manpower. In his

25 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, letter from Secretary of the Admiralty dated 7 July 1932, forwarding a copy of

Admiralty letter M.01597/32, dated 7 July 1932.

26 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Procedure Y – Reception in HMA Squadron, letter from Secretary Naval

Board dated 26 July 1932.

27 In naval parlance a ‘private ship’ was a warship where no flag officer was embarked. It does not indicate

that the vessel was a non-naval vessel.

28 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, Procedure Y – Training of Personnel, A/DSC minute dated 23 September

1936.

129

summation Commander Cresswell identified the personnel in Table 1 as having undertaken

Procedure Y duties over the past two years.

Table 4.1 - Personnel Performing Procedure Y Duties

Leading Telegraphist H.J. Barnes

Leading Telegraphist E.C. Burgess

Telegraphist A. Herman

Telegraphist A.C. Oswald

Telegraphist D.M. Bowden

Telegraphist C.S. Davis

Telegraphist W.E. Ralston

To this list could be added, retrospectively, Mr B. Harding a Commissioned Telegraphist.29

In his report on RAN Procedure Y activities, the Director of Signals and Communications once again articulated the importance of the interception operations in providing valuable information on Japanese W/T procedures, organisation and codes, as well as providing the RAN with a body of personnel who were trained and capable of reading Japanese morse should the situation in the Far East deteriorate. In an attempt to recommence interception operations he proposed that a Petty Officer or Leading Telegraphist and two or three Telegraphists qualified in

29 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, W/T Procedure Y – HMA Squadron Quarterly Report, DSC minute dated 17

May 1933.

130

Y work be always posted to HMAS Australia. In addition, one or more qualified sailors should

be posted to Flinders Naval Depot to carry out interception operations from there. The provision

of a shore interception posting would allow qualified sailors to maintain their skills when posted

ashore.30 Unfortunately this proposal still failed to address the fundamental problem in that the

seagoing sailors were borne on HMA Ships for W/T duties with the interception function being

something done when and as time permitted. This final point was made when DSC’s proposals

were forwarded to the Rear-Admiral Commanding HM Australian Squadron and the Captain

Superintendent of Training at Flinders Naval Depot.31

Discussions between the various naval authorities on the future of Procedure Y in the

RAN continued for some time. During the course of these discussions it was acknowledged that during the preceding years the intercepted messages forwarded to London had proved to be of little value. The reasons for this were the time taken for the messages to reach London and the fact that the Royal Navy was getting sufficient intercepts from the intercept station at the Nore.32

Noting the Admiralty’s earlier advice concerning the value of information on the Japanese naval

W/T organisation, call signs, procedures and frequencies there was obviously some material of intelligence value being obtained by the RAN.33 In order to provide a solution to the need for

Telegraphists qualified in Procedure Y, the Captain Superintendent of Training proposed that

30 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, minute by DSC dated 17 May 1933.

31 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, W/T Procedure Y, letter from Secretary ACNB dated 9 June 1933.

32 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, W/T Procedure Y, minute from Captain Superintendent of Training dated 23

June 1933.

33 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, W/T Procedure Y, minute by RACAS dated 30 June 1933.

131

they be fully trained at Flinders Naval Depot and then sent to join ships of the Australian Fleet

where they would be required to maintain their levels of proficiency. The logic behind his

remarks was that Flinders Naval Depot was a training establishment with all the facilities needed

to train Telegraphists in Japanese Morse. He felt that the best method would be to use a

Dictaphone, whereby the speed could be increased or reduced and the recordings made during

the cruise of the Franklin in the late 1920s. The Rear Admiral Commanding HM Australia

Squadron agreed with these proposals and also recommended that where a senior sailor was borne to supervise this work his position should be in addition to the existing complement. These proposals were agreed to and the Secretary of the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board duly informed Captain Superintendent of Training of this decision.34

At the same time that these issues were being considered by the RAN, the Australian

Government was advised that the Admiralty was arranging a meeting of Flag Officers in

Singapore during January 1934.35 The objective of this conference was to discuss British war

plans for the Far East in light of the current and foreseeable strategic situation. Included in the

specific issues to be discussed was the organisation of intelligence in the Far East.36 The

Australian Commonwealth Naval Board decided that the Australian delegation to the conference should consist of Vice-Admiral G.F. Hyde CVO, CBE, Paymaster Commander J.B. Foley RAN,

Commander J. Burnett RAN, Electrical Commander F.G. Cresswell RAN and a Chief Petty

34 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, W/T Procedure Y, letter from Secretary, Naval Board dated 19 July 1933.

35 NAA, MP1049, 1990/2/275, cablegram from Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs dated 8 June 1933.

36 NAA, MP1049, 1990/2/275, Singapore Conference 1934 Agenda, letter from Admiralty dated 20

September 1933.

132

Officer or Petty Officer Writer, for staff support. The serious financial constraints which the

RAN was operating under at this time are demonstrated by the fact that in the interests of

economy the delegation was to travel to Singapore on a passenger ship, via Colombo, and to

return to Australia via Thursday Island. The Australian Commonwealth Naval Board also made

provision for the delegation to be paid additional travelling allowances due to the higher costs in

Singapore. Senator George Pearce, the Minister for Defence,37 subsequently reduced the

allowances the Admiral and his senior staff were to be paid when ashore in Singapore.38

In December, the Captain Superintendent of Training advised the Secretary, Australian

Commonwealth Naval Board that the Revision Course for Leading Telegraphists and

Telegraphists had been revised and that this now included three hours per week of training in

Procedure Y. Those who showed a particular aptitude for the work would be given an extra two weeks of formal instruction. The Procedure Y syllabus for the course consisted of:

• Instruction in Japanese morse code alphabet and signs.

• Reading morse code messages from buzzer and Dictaphone.

• Japanese language instruction, utilising lectures prepared by Paymaster

Lieutenant Commander McLaughlin.

37 For a recent study of Pearce see John Connor, “Senator George Pearce As Defence Minister”, PhD Thesis,

ADFA, Canberra, 2004.

38 NAA, MP1039, 1990/2/275, Singapore Conference – Australian Representation, Naval Board Minute

dated 27 September 1933. Includes penscript comments by the Minister for Defence.

133

• Instruction in Japanese W/T procedures and organisation as described in the

various China Station Memoranda.

• Interception of Japanese ship-borne and shore W/T transmissions.

Given his expertise and experience in conducting and teaching interception operations it was deemed essential that Leading Telegraphist Barnes be posted to Flinders Naval Depot to act as the course instructor. Unfortunately Barnes was on loan to the Administrator Nauru Island and would not be immediately available. As a consequence, the first of the revised courses was planned for February 1934.39 The proposals put forward by Captain Superintendent of Training were agreed to by Navy Office. But it was noted that Leading Telegraphist Barnes would not be available to instruct at Flinders Naval Depot until the second half of 1934 and that Captain

Superintendent of Training should conduct his course planning accordingly. In supporting the proposals the Acting Director Signals and Communications Lieutenant-Commander Jack B.

Newman RAN commented that “Leading Telegraphist Barnes is considered to be exceptional in operating and knowledge of Procedure Y and it is considered most desirable that he instruct junior sailors in this subject until such time as another rating can be found to approach the same standard”.40 The importance attached to the availability of Barnes, now an Acting Petty Officer, for the training of subsequent Procedure Y operators can be seen in the proposal to promote him

39 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, W/T Procedure Y, CST minute dated 14 December 1933.

40 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Instruction of Telegraphist Junior Sailors in Procedure Y, A/DSC minute

dated 29 December 1933.

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to Acting Warrant Officer. Although he was qualified for the rank he was yet to be selected and

to undertake the appropriate training courses.41

Not only was the RAN attempting to tackle the problem of trained intercept operators but

with the return of the Australian delegation from the Singapore Conference other aspects of interception and cryptographic work began to be addressed. On the personnel side it was proposed that budgetary provisions should be made, in the 1934/35 estimates, to cover the costs

of additional personnel estimated at four Leading Telegraphists and six Telegraphists; and of

material to carry out this function. The first tentative steps towards putting interception work on

to a firmer footing were being taken. In addition it was also proposed that a commissioned

officer, who was also a Japanese linguist, be placed on the staff of the DNI and take over

responsibility for all Procedure Y work.42 Unfortunately, the RAN had only trained three officers

as Japanese linguists. Of these one, Eric Nave, had been transferred to the Royal Navy. The second, Paymaster Lieutenant Commander McLaughlin, was attached to the China Station for the next two years and the third Mr R.A. Bell, was the Assistant Armament Supply Officer,

Spectacle Island and had not been involved in interception work for an extended period. So due

to the lack of trained linguistic personnel the RAN was unable to establish a small cryptographic

organisation even when it wanted to do so. Unfortunately, the opportunity was not taken at this

stage to initiate the training of additional Japanese linguists in order to have officers capable of

doing these duties in the future.

41 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, W/T Procedure Y Australia Station, DSC minute dated 14 March 1934.

42 ibid.

135

Following consideration of the proposal for additional manpower it was decided to include in the

1934/35 draft estimates provision for four Leading Telegraphists, four additional Telegraphists in ships and four Telegraphists under training. On 18 April the Australian Commonwealth Naval

Board agreed to make financial provision for four Leading Telegraphists and four Telegraphists for duties in connection with Procedure Y.43 Unfortunately, the proposal to promote Barnes to

Acting Warrant Officer was not supported.44 Even though approval had finally been obtained for the additional personnel, this did not resolve the issues surrounding Petty Officer Barnes, who was the key to the whole project and whose enlistment was due to expire in October 1935.

On his return from Nauru, Barnes took up Procedure Y instructional duties at Flinders

Naval Depot training selected Leading Telegraphists and Telegraphists in interception procedures. The pupils in his first class were those personnel who had previously been carrying out interception operations on board Albatross.45 Notwithstanding improvements in the

competency and professional knowledge of these individual sailors, the RAN had not managed to increase the number of skilled operators. During the course of instruction, extensive use was

made of the recordings made during Franklin’s cruise in the area around Rabaul in the late

1920s. The small investment in the recording equipment was paying dividends in a manner not

envisaged at the time. Unfortunately for the RAN, Barnes took his discharge in early 1935 and

returned to Nauru as the Officer-in-Charge of the Island’s wireless station.

43 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/201, ACNB minute dated 18 April 1934.

44 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, NA to Second Naval Member minute dated 26 March 1934.

45 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Special W/T Course, CST minute dated 30 November 1934.

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Barnes’ association with the W/T station on Nauru had began in late 1933 when the

Administrator, Mr R.C. Garcia applied to the Navy for the loan of an RAN Telegraphist for

duties as the OIC of the Nauru Radio Station. Mr Garcia was at this time also a Commander on

the RAN Emergency List. As the request was being considered, the potential for utilising the

radio station to monitor Japanese transmissions in the Marshall and Caroline Islands became

apparent. With this in mind Leading Seaman Barnes, who was also a volunteer for the job, was

loaned to the Administrator. On his arrival Barnes found the radio facilities to be in very poor

condition and in need of urgent overhaul. This work he immediately undertook. In June 1934

Barnes was replaced by Leading Telegraphist Moodie, who was not trained in Procedure Y, so

he could return to Australia to instruct the first Special W/T Course commencing at Flinders

Naval Depot in October. In December, Moodie had an accident and this resulted in his return to

Australia in February 1935. Petty Officer Barnes, now having been promoted, subsequently took his discharge from the RAN and was appointed OIC of the Nauru Radio Station.46

In 1936 Barnes wrote to the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board seeking enlistment

in the Royal Australian Fleet Reserve. In his letter Barnes’ indicated that the matter had been

discussed and agreed, with the Director Signals Communications, prior to his departure for

Nauru. Part of the arrangement was that any work in relation to Procedure Y which he undertook

would be considered to be drill for the purposes of the RAFR regulations.47 The Director Signals

and Communications supported Barnes’ application.48 After some discussion as to who should

46 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, W/T Procedure Y, DSC minute dated 26 February 1936.

47 NAA, MT1214, 432/204/441, Mr H. Barnes’ letter dated 14 February 1936.

48 NAA, MT1214, 432/204/441, Mr H.J. Barnes PO TEL RAFR, OIC Nauru W/T Stn, DSC minute.

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be responsible for providing the required ‘certificate of attendance’ it was decided that Director

Signals and Communications, as the recipient of Barnes’ reports, would provide the certificate and the proposal was approved by the Second Naval Member.49 As an active member of the

Royal Australian Fleet Reserve (RAFR), Barnes would also be entitled to the payment of an annual retainer of ₤5 per annum.

Unfortunately for Barnes and the Navy, the bureaucracy intervened to stop the payment of the retainer. The financial area within the Department of Defence argued that Barnes could not be paid the retainer as he was not attending any drills.50 The Secretary of the Australian

Commonwealth Naval Board duly advised those concerned that the Australian Commonwealth

Naval Board were unable to approve payment of the retainer. Commander Cresswell wrote to the

Second Naval Member explaining the importance of the work to the Navy. He also informed the

Second Naval Member that in conducting these operations Barnes would be rendering some 182 hours a year service compared to the 48 hours he would undertake if he were to attend normal

RAFR drills. The other aspect of this was that as long as Barnes was doing the job there was no need for the Navy to send a Procedure Y qualified sailor to Nauru specifically to undertake these interception operations, a significant all-round saving for the Navy.51 Fortunately the Australian

49 NAA, MT1214, 432/204/441, Mr H.J. Barnes PO TEL RAFR, OIC Nauru W/T Stn, Second Naval Member

minute dated 23 March 1936.

50 NAA, MT1214, 432/204/441, Petty Officer Telegraphist H. J. Barnes, RAFR, Accountant Branch minute

dated 15 July 1936.

51 NAA, MT1214, 432/204/441, Petty Officer Telegraphist H. J. Barnes, RAFR, DSC minute dated 21 July

1936.

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Commonwealth Naval Board recognized the intelligence benefits and savings to be achieved by

having Barnes undertake the required tasks. In order to ensure that he was recompensed for these

duties the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board decided to pay Barnes a special allowance of

₤5 per annum.52 This was a fair outcome as the work undertaken by Barnes was done in his own

time and in his residence so as not to alert other personnel on the island.

DNI (Admiralty) became privy to the fact that the RAN was conducting covert W/T

interception operations from Nauru. He discussed, with COIS in Hong Kong, his concerns for

the security of the operations. COIS advised him that he supported the concept and was seeking

to arrange for any intercepted material to be forwarded to Hong Kong.53 The fact that, at this

juncture, the RAN did not have an independent decryption and analysis organisation ensured that

any material obtained would be sent to the RN, either in London or Hong Kong, for analysis. The

Australian DNI, Commander P. N. Walter RAN, confirmed to COIS that any intercept material obtained from Nauru would be sent to Hong Kong. Additionally he advised COIS that the

intercepted material was sent from Nauru to Australia in the custody of the captains of British

merchant ships.54 Using the captains of British merchant ships to courier classified material was

a common practice during the 1920s and 1930s. Procedure Y material for COIS in Hong Kong

52 NAA, MT1214, 432/204/441, Petty Officer Telegraphist H. J. Barnes, RAFR, Naval Board Minute No. 165

dated 5 August 1936.

53 NAA, MP1049, 1997/5/196, Nauru W/T Station–Interception of Japanese Messages, COIS minute dated 14

January 1936.

54 NAA, MP1185, 1997/5/305, Procedure Y, DNI minute dated 23 April 1936.

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was dispatched from Melbourne in the same manner.55 The dispatch of secret material by ship was relatively safe in peacetime, however, during wartime there was the ever present danger of the ship being captured and the secret documents falling into enemy hands.56

The interception operations undertaken by Barnes were done so with the full knowledge

of the Island’s Administrator, who at this stage was also a member of one of the branches of the

Royal Australian Naval Reserve. In late 1938 when a new Administrator was appointed, who

was not a naval reserve officer and who could not be made privy to the W/T interception operations, the DNI informed the incumbent Administrator that the interception operations would cease on his departure from Nauru.57 As he could no longer carry out the interception work, in lieu of attending parade nights, Barnes ceased to be an effective member of the RAFR

and as such was discharged to date 31 December 1938.58 Thus the career of the RAN’s most

competent Procedure Y operator ended.

At the same time as the Navy was attempting to increase the number of qualified

interception operators it was also taking steps to erect a number of HF/DF stations. The initial

55 NAA, MP1185, 1997/5/305, Transmission of Procedure Y Correspondence, H of N Branch minute dated

13 August 1936.

56 For an example of the impact of the capture of secret documents see Eiji Seki, Mrs Ferguson's Tea-Set -

Japan and the Second World War, Global Oriental, London, 2007. This book deals with the capture of the

SS Automedon and its documents by the German raider Atlantis.

57 NAA, MP1074/7, 4 Jan 1938 to 28 Dec 1939: DNI message 1555/20 September 1938.

58 NAA, MT1214, 432/204/441, Petty Officer Telegraphist H. J. Barnes RAFR No S/565, 2nd Naval Member

minute dated 24 October 1938.

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proposal, put forward during the 1925 Singapore Conference, had been for two stations, one at

Darwin and one at Rabaul.59 This issue was also raised at the 1934 Singapore Conference and the

Australian delegation informed the Conference that the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board did not support the construction of an important strategic HF/DF station at Rabaul, it being considered too vulnerable due to its proximity to the Japanese Mandated Islands. The Conference was also advised that the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board would make provision in the

1934/35 estimates for the construction of the Darwin station and that once an alternative site to

Rabaul was identified similar provision would be made for its construction. The funds for the

Darwin HF/DF station were provided under a financial allocation described as ‘upkeep of special wireless services’.60

The location for the second HF/DF station was subsequently investigated by the Director of Signals and Communication. His new proposal was to establish direction finding stations at

Darwin, Perth and Sydney (Liverpool). The Liverpool station would be located at the Army base and near the Radio Research Board’s existing station. This station would also be used to test and calibrate the various HF/DF sets. This proposal created three base-lines for direction finding purposes, namely Sydney-Perth, Sydney-Darwin and Darwin-Perth. These base-lines provided coverage in an arc from the north-west through to the north-east. These proposals provided for a

59 In 1933 the Admiralty still viewed these as the locations for the Australian HF/DF stations. See NAA,

MP1049, 1997/5/199, Signal Communication in the Far East, Admiralty memo M.00517/33, dated 9

October 1933.

60 NAA, MP1049, 1997/6/20, Establishment of Strategic W/T Direction Finding Stations at Port Darwin and

Rabaul, DSC minute dated 19 February 1935.

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greater coverage and addressed the concerns over the vulnerability of the proposed Rabaul

station.61 The concerns over the vulnerability of any facility built in Rabaul were proven to be

fully justified when the town fell to the Japanese in 1942. When the proposed RAN stations

combined with existing, and planned, Royal Naval stations they provided a powerful electronic

weapon with which to track an enemy force. On 26 April 1935 the Chief of Naval Staff informed

the Minister for Defence that the Admiralty generally agreed with the W/T proposals of the 1934

Singapore Conference.62

Even though some of the equipment for the direction finding stations was to be ordered

and assembled locally, the RAN sought to obtain from the Admiralty HF/DF sets of the type used at the Flowerdown station in England. But the Admiralty were initially reluctant to supply these as they believed that the Australian stations would be manned by civilians in peacetime.

Once the Admiralty became aware of the intention to fully man these stations with naval personnel their objections were dropped and they were willing to supply the required sets.63 But before orders could be placed for this equipment the Minister for Defence questioned whether some synergies could be obtained with respect to what were perceived as being similar requirements for the RAAF, the Department of Civil Aviation and the Marine Branch of the

Department of Commerce.64 In its response to the Minister, through the Secretary of the

61 NAA, MP1049, 1997/6/20, Establishment of Strategic W/T Direction Finding Stations at Port Darwin and

Rabaul, DSC minute dated 19 February 1935.

62 NAA, MP1049, 1997/6/43, CNS minute dated 26 April 1935.

63 NAA, MP981, 612/246/1968, W/T Direction Finding Stations, DSC minute dated 6 June 1935.

64 NAA, MP981, 612/246/1968, DSC minute dated 19 June 1935.

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Map 3: Proposed RAN W/T Direction Finding organization. The blue lines show the proposed RAN network based on Sydney, Darwin and Fremantle, with the earlier proposed station at Rabaul. Bearing from these RAN stations to three enemy ships are shown in red. Source: NAA MP1049 1997//6/105.

Department of Defence, the Navy pointed out that this equipment was for purely naval strategic

purposes, and that the requirement could not be modified to meet the needs of the other

Departments. The Acting Controller of Civil Aviation was also concerned that the erection of the naval direction finding station would mitigate against the future approval for the construction of wireless aerial navigation aids.65 At no stage during the course of providing the Minister with the

additional justification for purchasing this equipment does the Navy appear to have actually

disclosed the specific purpose of the equipment and the direction finding station. Approval to

order this equipment was finally obtained in July 1935. Two additional HF/DF sets were also

ordered from Admiralty. These were intended to equip the planned direction finding stations

located at Rottnest Island and Sydney.66 Ultimately however, these two stations were built in

Fremantle67 and Canberra respectively.

By 1 October 1935 assembly of the MF/DF equipment for the Darwin direction finding

station had been completed at the Garden Island Dockyard. The unit was then sent to Liverpool

for testing. Testing of the direction finding set would take a couple of months and was to be

carried out by physicists of the Radio Research Board under the direction of Professor Madson

of the University of Sydney.

65 NAA, MP981, 612/246/1968, D/F W/T Stations Darwin, Secretary, Naval Board minute dated 4 July 1935.

66 NAA, MP1049, 1997/6/23, DSC minute dated 1 October 1935.

67 The actual location was at Jandakot near Fremantle. The direction finding station was bounded by Holmes

St, Henderson Rd and Easton Rd. With the direction finding hut located near the upper northern section of

the block. The land was cleared and levelled for 50 metres around the direction finding hut and to stump

height for a further 220 metres. See NAA, MP1049/5, 2037/3/193.

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As with Procedure Y, manning for the proposed direction finding stations was a problem

due to the lack of trained Telegraphists. One Petty Officer Telegraphist was sent to England for

training on the HF/DF equipment which was on order.68 In May 1937 Mr A. D. McLachlan,

Commissioned Telegraphist, was nominated to undertake the RN course on HF/DF equipment.

The main reason for his selection was that he was already in England and due to return to

Australia following service with the RN.69 Peace-time manning for each of the direction finding

stations was established at one Petty Officer Telegraphist and one Leading Telegraphist. Such

low manning levels prohibited operating the direction finding stations on a continuous basis

during peacetime and would not allow for the building of a pool of skilled personnel for use in

time of war.

Whereas the 1920s were a disappointment from the perspective of the development of

signals intelligence in the RAN, the first half of the 1930s provided it with potential foundations upon which to build. These new foundations were established in conjunction with and in

response to the development of a British Imperial network in the Asia-Pacific region and not necessarily in response to any particularly Australian strategic requirement. These new foundations did, however, have their vulnerabilities. The construction of the proposed HF/DF facilities was dependent upon sufficient funding being made available. In the economic climate of the 1930s this was not always assured. W/T interception was still being carried out as an adjunct to normal operations and not seen as a function in its own right. But more critically, there

68 NAA, MP1049, 1997/6/23, Letter Secretary, ACNB dated 10 October 1935.

69 NAA, MP1049, 1997/6/23, DSC minute dated 21 May 1937.

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were insufficient trained personnel available to carry out the functions associated with the D/F

stations and W/T interception operations. Nor were there plans in hand to establish a cadre of language officers who could undertake cryptographic duties. Notwithstanding that some of these shortcomings would be resolved in the following years, the issue of trained personnel would remain as an Achilles’ heel.

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Chapter 5

Signs of Progress, 1935-1939

An internal review of the RAN’s signals intelligence capability and future plans was undertaken in 1936. In the course of this review it was noted that the Admiralty relied on the British controlled intercept stations located at The Nore, on the China Station and in India for their intercepts of Japanese naval transmissions. These stations however, did not provide good coverage of the Marshall and Caroline Islands. The British requested that Australia concentrate on this area so as to obtain as complete a coverage as possible. This tasking limited the

Australian effort predominantly to collecting information on W/T organisations and call signs as very little naval traffic of significance had been noted previously as originating from the

Japanese Mandated Territories. The work being done by ex-Petty Officer Telegraphist Barnes on

Nauru was part of the overall Australian effort collecting information on the Japanese communications and cryptographic systems. Copies of Barnes’ reports were being forwarded to

COIS in Hong Kong. Commander Cresswell, Director Signals and Communications however, believed that the Australian contribution to the overall Imperial intelligence gathering effort should not be restricted to being just a supplier of intercepts but expanded into a co-operative arrangement whereby Australia maintained its own cryptographic capability exchanging information with the British. This proposed cryptographic organisation would be based at Navy

Office in Melbourne and staffed by a trained Japanese linguist and cryptographer who would

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decode and analyse the intercepted material. The whole Australian organisation would come

under the control of the Assistant Director of Signals and Communications.1

Cresswell saw the need for a free flow, or exchange, of information between the

Admiralty organisation and the RAN’s direction finding stations. Unfortunately, the Admiralty

was unreceptive, and would continue to be so, to these proposals for the development of an

independent Australian analytical organisation. Cresswell’s vision would need to wait until the

outbreak of war with Japan, before becoming a reality. In the meantime, progress was being

made on the establishment of the direction finding stations. Equipment for the Darwin station

was under test near the Radio Research Board’s station at Liverpool and the Department of

Works had the responsibility to erect the required buildings. The required equipment for the

Rottnest Island and east coast direction finding stations were on order from the Admiralty and

construction had started on the Rottnest Island facility. A site for the east coast station had as yet

not been selected.2

Unfortunately, the situation with respect to Procedure Y was not as promising.

Notwithstanding the attempts to establish a formalised course for intercept operators, no interception work had been carried out in Australia since 1932. Three primary reasons were identified as being responsible for this. The first was the lack of trained Telegraphists.

Notwithstanding the establishment of a specialised training course and provision in the estimates

for additional personnel, there were just insufficient numbers available to conduct 24 hour

1 NAA, MP1185, 1997/5/305, W/T Procedure Y, DSC minute dated 1 April 1936.

2 NAA, MP1185, 1997/5/305, Position In Regard to H/F Stations in Australia, undated document.

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operations and maintain an appropriate skill base. This meant that priority was always given to

other operationally more important areas. The second reason was the lack of a suitable ship from which to operate. The RAN had only one cruiser in commission, and with that ship serving as a flagship the volume of transmissions from the flagship severely limited the opportunity to conduct interception operations. The third, and most important, reason identified was the RAN lack of a co-ordinated policy for the administration, conduct and exploitation of signals intelligence.3 In an attempt to overcome this situation the Director of Signals and

Communications proposed that the Navy establish an organisation and allocate resources to

concentrate on monitoring the wireless traffic originating in the Japanese Mandated Territories.

To overcome the shortage of personnel, and create a critical mass of qualified individuals, the

number of Procedure Y qualified Telegraphists would be increased to twelve. Oversight of this

operation would be in the hands of a naval officer who would also be qualified in Procedure Y.4

In May 1936 the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board informed the Admiralty, and

COIS, of their broad policy and plans for the development of an RAN signals intelligence capability. Included in the letter was an extract of a report from Barnes of his activities on

Nauru. The Australian Commonwealth Naval Board advised that construction of the HF/DF stations proposed at the earlier Penang and Singapore Conferences was being proceeded with.

But these direction finding stations would not be sited in the locations originally proposed during these conferences. The station intended to be built in New Guinea would be constructed near Darwin. Initially the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board decided to build

3 NAA, MP1185, 1997/5/305, Procedure Y (Japanese Section), A/DSC minute dated 27 March 1936.

4 ibid.

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the remaining direction finding stations at Rottnest Island (off Fremantle) and Sydney as planned.5 Ultimately however, these two stations were to be build at Jandakot (near Fremantle) and Canberra.

The establishment and operation of these direction finding stations represented a significant financial, and manpower, investment by the Australian Commonwealth and a significant shore based effort by the RAN. The following table provides an indication of the financial costs associated with elements of this project.

Table 5.1: Estimate For Establishing and Operating Direction Finding Stations6

Darwin capital cost (does not include site acquisition) ₤1,200

Upgrade and purchase of four sets of direction finding equipment ₤2,200

Darwin - Annual Operating and Maintenance cost ₤761

Sydney and Perth - Annual Operating and Maintenance cost ₤720

5 NAA, MP1049/5, 1997/6/20, Establishment of Strategic W/T Direction Finding Stations at Port Darwin

and Rabaul, DSC minute dated 19 February 1935.

6 ibid. Total naval expenditure for 1936/37 was estimated at ₤2,577,383. See David Stevens, A Critical

Vulnerability: The Impact of the Submarine Threat on Australia’s Maritime Defence 1915–1954, Sea

Power Centre-Australia, Canberra, 2005, p.139.

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All three stations were intended initially to be operational by 1937. Equipment for Darwin and

Sydney had already been ordered and that for the Rottnest Island station was to be provided for

in the 1937/38 estimates.

Once operational, these direction finding stations would form an Australian-based

strategic triangle which could work in conjunction with the RN’s China Station organisation.

The Darwin-Singapore direction finding stations would monitor waters north of Australia,

Darwin-Sydney forming a base-line for the north-east arm and Darwin-Rottnest a base-line for

the north-west arm. H/F receiving range for these stations was estimated to be in the order of

8,000 miles.7 The covert interception operations carried out from Nauru would continue, with

the results being forwarded to the Admiralty and COIS. Staff allocated to Procedure Y operations would be increased and as the additional personnel became available Procedure Y would once again be conducted from RAN ships. The Australian Commonwealth Naval Board also informed the Admiralty that they believed that in wartime control of interception

operations should be vested in the Commander-in-Chief China Station and that in peacetime

they would also allow for co-ordination of activities by this authority.8 The RAN direction

finding stations were to become part of the RN’s Far East Direction Finding Organisation.

The Admiralty generally concurred with the RAN’s proposals for the development of

the RAN’s capabilities in this area.9 In doing so they reiterated the importance of improving

7 NAA, MP1185, 1997/6/43, Letter Secretary Naval Board dated 18 February 1937.

8 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, Letter to Secretary of Admiralty dated 26 May 1936.

9 NAA, MP1185, 1997/5/305, Admiralty letter M.03752/36, dated 14 August 1936.

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coverage in the Marshall and Caroline Islands. Two other points were made by the Admiralty.

They wished the RAN to test the three sites selected for the direction finding stations for suitability as interception sites. The Admiralty expressed doubts as to the ultimate suitability of

the sites at Sydney and Rottnest Island for intercept stations. As well as committing to the

construction of a shore based direction finding organisation, arrangements were made for the heavy cruisers HMA Ships Canberra and Australia to be fitted with direction finding gear during their next refits.10 The fitting of this equipment would provide the cruisers with the capability to locate, and then proceed to intercept the transmissions of enemy ships, especially commerce raiders.

These decisions were to go a long way towards providing for the equipment and facilities for a basic direction finding capability, however, the Navy still needed to provide

sufficient numbers of trained and qualified sailors to man these stations. Instead of taking

every step possible to provide additional personnel the naval bureaucracy appears to have been

at pains to ensure the opposite. Apart from the difficulties in having the number of personnel

who could receive the Special Duty Allowance increased,11 qualified personnel were not

released from other areas to concentrate on Procedure Y. A case in point was that of Leading

Telegraphist G. S. Davis who was a Telegraphist Air Gunner and qualified in Procedure Y. As

there was also a shortage of Telegraphist Air Gunners the Director of Naval Intelligence saw

no reason why he should be released to carry out Procedure Y duties and neither should he be

paid the Special Duty Allowance, although the number of personnel allowed to receive the

10 NAA, MP1185, 1997/6/23, Secretary minute dated 10 August 1938.

11 The term ‘special duty’ became a euphemism for Procedure Y work.

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allowance had yet to be reached. It was acknowledged however that Davis should carry out

Procedure Y work, as opportunity arose, in order that he maintains his proficiency.12 The Navy

was happy for Davis to maintain his skills but would not provide a financial inducement for

him to do so.

Not only was the RAN experiencing shortages of qualified personnel, so too was the

RN. In September 1937 the Deputy Director of the FECB, Commander A. H. Spurgeon RAN,

wrote to Lieutenant Commander Newman enquiring if it were possible to send RAN operators

to Hong Kong for twelve months to help relieve the shortages being experienced by the

British. The loan of these personnel to the RN would have greatly limited the RAN’s ability to

conduct Procedure Y operations. But the personnel loaned to Hong Kong would gain a wealth

of experience and proficiency they would otherwise not have the opportunity to achieve. A

formal request seeking the loan of Australian sailors for eighteen months was made by the

Admiralty of the RAN in January 1938.13 The initial intention of the Australian

Commonwealth Naval Board was to offer as many eligible personnel as possible in exchange

for RN sailors who were not qualified in Procedure Y. The objective was to have the RAN

sailors trained and at the same time not to create additional shortages of Telegraphists. This

arrangement was to be subject to Ministerial approval. Three Telegraphists volunteered for the

posting but in each case there were strings attached. One’s engagement was about to expire

and he did not wish to re-enlist for a further five years, and the other two were requesting

12 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, W/T Procedure Y – Personnel, DNI minute dated 10 May 1937.

13 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, Admiralty message 2004/3 January 1938.

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passage for their wives to Hong Kong and England respectively.14 The RAN was not willing to

meet these pre-conditions and so advised the Admiralty that there were no suitable volunteers

forthcoming.15

The Admiralty did not however, let the matter rest. On 20 January a personal letter was

sent to Commander R. J. O. Otway-Ruthven RN, DNI (Melbourne), requesting that he raise

the matter again with the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board.16 The Admiralty did not

have to wait long. In February Lieutenant Commander J. B. Newman RAN, Acting Director of

Signals and Communications, articulated the problem facing the RAN with respect to sailors

qualified in Procedure Y. Not only were there no suitable volunteers, but the seven RAN sailors who were Procedure Y qualified were comparatively old and two of these had less than a year to serve. He observed that the number of sailors able to do Procedure Y work in 1939 could be as low as two or three. In order to alleviate this shortage Lieutenant Commander

Newman requested that the full number of twelve sailors previously requested be included in the 1938/39 Estimates. Lieutenant Commander Newman justified his request by highlighting the recent contributions made by the RAN in this area. The RAN’s main contribution was building up a picture of the Japanese communications network and methodologies in the

Japanese Mandated Territories and monitoring the activities of Japanese warships visiting this region. Typically intercepts forwarded by the RAN contained little information of direct military value, but COIS acknowledged that it was ‘important to keep watch on Mandated

14 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, RACAS message 1120/11 January 1938.

15 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, Naval Board message 1721/11 January 1938.

16 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, Admiralty Intelligence Division letter dated 20 January 1938.

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Territories”.17 Secondly, the RAN undertook specific tasks for COIS such as investigating how the Japanese naval intelligence officer at Palau passed naval messages back to Tokyo. These communications links were discovered and COIS was subsequently advised and was sent the intercepted Japanese messages. The third area of assistance was to provide trained Y personnel to Hong Kong and Singapore. This, Lieutenant Commander Newman felt, was the most valuable contribution the RAN could make. The shortage of trained RN personnel on the

China Station had recently been highlighted by Commander Nave, now serving in the RN, when he passed through Melbourne. In order to ensure that a number were available for service on the China Station, Newman further recommended that in future sailors volunteering for Procedure Y work be advised that they were also volunteering for service on the China

Station if required.18

Given the disincentives to volunteering for Procedure Y work it is not surprising that there was a lack of suitable volunteers. The work was more difficult and complex that the normal tasks undertaken by Telegraphists. Those that did volunteer had to undertake such work in their spare time and if they were employed solely on the basis of these duties they would be disadvantaged, when compared with their peers for promotions. To compensate them, the Procedure Y sailors were paid a Special Allowance of 3d per day. But this was not much of an incentive as it represented an increase in pay of only 3.45%. The same allowance for RN sailors undertaking the same tasks represented an increase of 7.7% of their pay. This percentage differential is deceptive however as RN sailors were paid less than those in the

17 NAA, MP1074/7, 4 Jan 1938 to 31 May 1938: COIS HK message 1034/8 April 1938.

18 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, W/T Procedure Y, A/DSC minute dated 1 February 1938.

154

RAN. In an attempt to make this task more attractive, Lieutenant Commander Newman

proposed doubling the Special Allowance to 6d per day.19

Despite the fact that over the preceding five years no Telegraphists had qualified for

Procedure Y work when serving at sea, the financial section of Navy Office did not support

any increase in the Special Allowance. The basis of its argument was that non-substantive allowances had always been based on the RN rates for such allowances, without taking into account any local conditions. They might have feared that any deviation from this principle

would undermine the entire system of fixing non-substantive allowances and see a great

increase in expenditure. Not wishing to state their opposition specifically, the Finance Section

commented that a doubling of the rate of allowance might in fact not in itself be a sufficient inducement to attract additional personnel.20

When asked for his opinion on the various proposals to increase the number of

Telegraphists qualified in Procedure Y, Rear Admiral Commanding HM Australia Squadron observed that part of the problem lay in the very type of person they wanted. In essence the type of person deemed suitable for Procedure Y work was an individual who was highly motivated and maintained high professional standards. These were just the types of sailors who

would also be expected to achieve a faster rate of promotion and as a consequence be no

19 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, Telegraphist Junior Sailors – Special Duty Allowance, A/DSC minute dated

10 February 1938.

20 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, Telegraphist Junior Sailors – Special Duty Allowance, NA to Second Naval

Member minute dated 15 February 1938.

155

longer able to carry out Procedure Y work. The Rear Admiral Commanding HM Australia

Squadron also advised Navy Office that even though the proposed increase in the Special Duty

Allowance would be welcome to them, the possibility of service on the China Station for

extended periods was not, especially amongst the more senior personnel who were married and

had families. To make the possibility of service on the China station more attractive, the Rear

Admiral Commanding HM Australia Squadron recommended that consideration be given to

the provision of free assisted passage for wives and families to accompany their husbands to

Hong Kong. In an attempt to increase the number of Telegraphists qualifying as Procedure Y

operators, the Rear Admiral Commanding HM Australia Squadron also proposed that two

qualified sailors be posted, in excess of complement, to ships so that they could train more

personnel.21 Notwithstanding the fact that the posting of Telegraphists for training duties would cause shortages elsewhere, this action was undertaken in an attempt to increase the number of qualified Procedure Y operators to twelve by the middle of 1939. The priority which would be attached to the training of additional personnel would be determined by obtaining from COIS an indication as to the value of the work currently being undertaken.22

Notwithstanding the difficulties the RAN was having in identifying suitable volunteers there was no intention to ‘press gang’ sailors to undertake these duties. The reason for this was

21 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, Junior Sailors Qualifying in Procedure Y Duties, RACAS minute dated 14

March 1938.

22 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, W/T Procedure Y – Personnel, ADSC minute dated 30 March 1938.

156

that it was felt that not only would volunteers perform better but they represented less of a

potential security risk.23

The increase in the Special Duty Allowance requested in February 1938 was approved

in July. But by September this increase had neither been promulgated nor paid. To make

matters worse the number of qualified Procedure Y operators had fallen to just six. The posting

of two additional qualified personnel to sea to train more Telegraphists in Procedure Y had not

produced the hopes for increase. In one final effort to circumvent this personnel shortage, and

obtain the numbers required for the direction finding stations under construction, it was

proposed by the Assistant Director of Signals and Communications that in future Procedure Y

operators would need to be trained after they are transferred to the Shore Wireless Service.

This meant that there would be a further delay in the direction finding stations becoming fully

functional as personnel underwent training. The actual length of the delay was dependent upon

how many of the currently qualified personnel transferred to the Shore Wireless Service.24 The

Shore Wireless Service had been created primarily to man the naval wireless stations at

Darwin and Canberra and its members were not required to serve at sea.

Personnel for the Shore Wireless Service were recruited from the seagoing naval forces

and were required to be fully qualified Telegraphists. Ex-Navy Telegraphists could also apply

but they had to re-enter the RAN and complete a refresher course and sea training before

23 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, Naval Board message 1721/11 January 1938.

24 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, D/F Stations Probable Delay in Commencing Duties, ADSC minute dated 22

September 1938.

157

transfer to the Shore Wireless Service. Information was even obtained on a number of ex-Navy

Telegraphists residing in New Zealand.25 On the surface it would appear that this method of recruitment could deplete the already short limited numbers of serving Telegraphists and, in the case of re-entries, take up limited resources which could otherwise be training

Telegraphists. By 1939, of the number of personnel required to man the communications and direction finding stations, only half had been recruited. Transfer to the Shore Wireless Service was not attractive to permanent sailors. The main reasons for this were related to conditions of service and the locations of the various stations. Neither Canberra nor Darwin were looked upon with any favour by the sailors concerned. Both locations were rightly viewed as being isolated and with limited facilities for families.

In August 1936 the Admiralty had informed the Australian Commonwealth Naval

Board that COIS had been instructed to provide the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board with a quarterly report providing details as to the Procedure Y results achieved by the RAN.

No such report had been received. In fact very little information or guidance relating to the undertaking of Procedure Y work had been received from COIS.26 As such the Australian

Commonwealth Naval Board would not have been too pleased to receive a letter from the

Admiralty not only advising them that the equipment for the direction finding station at

Darwin was ready but also giving them a hurry up with respect to the completing the facilities

25 NAA, MP1074/8, Inwards signals April to June 1939: Secretary First Naval Member message 21 April

1939.

26 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, W/T Procedure Y – Personnel, ADSC minute dated 30 March 1938.

158

at Darwin.27 Despite the shortages of qualified Procedure Y personnel and the lack of guidance from COIS the RAN continued to monitor Japanese naval traffic and compile details of the

Japanese W/T organisation and procedures. This information was placed in ACB 08728 and regularly updated.

Following additional consideration, in July 1937, of the site requirements for the direction finding stations in Fremantle and Darwin, the Australian Commonwealth Naval

Board decided that the sites selected were unsuitable and that the District Naval Officers should investigate new locations.29 One of the new site requirements was for the direction finding station to be away from the coast. This meant that the station planned for Rottnest

Island could no longer be built there and a new site, close to Fremantle, needed to be identified. As well as new site requirements, there were also a number of minor technical changes to the proposed direction finding stations. This included the construction of steel lattice masts in lieu of the originally planned wooden pole masts. The bulk of the site work for the three direction finding stations was to be undertaken by the Department of the Interior with

Garden Island Dockyard being responsible for the installation of the direction finding

27 NAA, MP1185, 1997/5/305, Admiralty letter M.02134/38 dated 25 April 1938.

28 As the reference to this publication was made in contemporary correspondence there was no requirement

for the author to fully articulate what its function was. Based on the information available it appears this

publication, or document, was a concise listing of all information known about Japanese, in particular

naval, communications.

29 NAA, MP981, 612/246/1968, D/F Station at Rottnest Island and Darwin, Secretary Naval Board minute.

159

equipment.30 When reviewing the progress of the establishment of the three direction finding

stations in June 1938, Newman described their history as being one of delays. Progress

however was being made. The equipment for two stations was at Garden Island and that for the

third was on order. The site the Darwin station had been acquired and the sites for the

Canberra and Jandakot stations were being acquired. Funds were available to commence

construction as soon as the sites were prepared and the necessary equipment had arrived from

England.31

As the establishment of these direction finding stations was progressing, the issue of wireless interception arose from a most unlikely source. On 29 June 1937 a meeting was held

at the offices of the Committee of Imperial Defence in London. This meeting was chaired by

the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence to discuss issues associated with cable

censorship. Attending this meeting were representatives from various colonies and dominions.

Australia was represented by a Mr Bourne of the Post-Master General’s Department.32 During the course of this meeting those present expressed concern that the matter of wireless telegraphy had not been raised and subsequently agreed to hold a further meeting, without agenda or minutes, on 28 July. The main subject of this meeting was the issue of interception of W/T messages and the need not only to undertake this work in peacetime but also to co-

30 NAA, MP981, 612/246/1968, D/F Stations at Canberra, Darwin and Fremantle, Secretary Naval Board

minute dated June 1938.

31 NAA, MP1185, 1997/5/305, Naval W/T Direction Finding Stations, DSC minute dated 9 June 1938.

32 Others present were, Colonel Smart and Mr McLeod, Canada; Colonel Sturman, Sth Africa; Mr

McNamara, New Zealand; and Mr Bewoor, India.

160

ordinate the efforts throughout the Empire. As a consequence, a letter was forwarded to the

Secretary of the Australian Prime Minister’s Department bringing this issue to the attention of

the Commonwealth Government and suggesting, if the Commonwealth Government wished to

co-operate, that they provide the details of a contact officer.33

The Secretary of the Department, Mr F. Strahan, forwarded the request on to the

Department of Defence. Mr M. L. Shepherd, acting Secretary at the time, acknowledged receipt of the correspondence and informed Mr Strahan that the matter was receiving consideration and a response would be provided in due course.34 This issue was discussed at a

meeting of the Defence Committee. The sighted records of this meeting make no reference to

the interception work being undertaken by the Navy and it was not clear if other members of

the Committee were aware of this activity. The following April the Secretary of the

Department of Defence, Mr F. Shedden,35 sent a personal letter to Mr Strahan informing him

that the matter was one of extreme secrecy and sensitivity and no action is considered

advisable from a Defence point of view. Mr Shedden also noted that the interest of the Post-

Master General’s Department in this issue was purely commercial. This letter was followed by

an official memorandum stating that “no action in this matter is desired from a defence point

of view”.36 It would appear from the surviving correspondence that Strahan was not aware, nor

33 NAA, A1608, O14/1/1, UK High Commissioner letter dated 20 October 1937.

34 NAA, A1608, O14/1/1, A/Secretary Department of Defence letter dated 1 November 1937.

35 For a biography of Shedden see David Horner, Defence Supremo: Sir Francis Shedden and the Making of

Australian Defence Policy, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2000.

36 NAA, A1608, O14/1/1, Secretary Department of Defence letter dated 6 April 1938.

161

made aware, of the extant arrangements for intercepting W/T messages. Strahan’s lack of

knowledge would be in keeping with the fact that this information was tightly controlled and

known to only a few within the Navy and Department of Defence generally.

Additional correspondence on the subject was subsequently addressed to the Minister

for Defence, The Hon Sir Archdale Parkhill, by two veterans of the 1st AIF.37 These gentlemen

pointed out to the Minister the interception activities undertaken in Mesopotamia during the

First World War, and described in C. E. W. Bean’s Official History of Australia in the War

1914 – 1918 Volume V: The AIF in France: December 1917 – May 1918,38 and recommended

setting up an intercept station in Canberra. Given that this was what was planned, the receipt of such a suggestion from a couple of ex-servicemen in Mudgee would presumably have caused concern amongst senior naval and Defence officials. The authors of this letter subsequently received a bland thanks from the Minister’s office indicating that a further response would be forthcoming. When no such response was received one of the authors, Mr O. R. Thwaite, wrote to the Prime Minister’s office again reiterating the original suggestion.39 The dilemma

now faced by the Minister’s Office, and other authorities concerned, was how to terminate this

correspondence before additional persons became involved. The Secretary of the Prime

Minister’s Department was advised that this topic was a “matter of the greatest secrecy” and

37 NAA, A461/10, T422/1/1, letter to Minister of Defence dated 17 August 1937.

38 C. E. W. Bean, Official History of Australia in the War 1914–1918 Volume V: The AIF in France:

December 1917–May 1918, Angus and Robertson Ltd, Sydney, 1937, pp.703-762 in particular p711and

p712.

39 NAA, A461/10, T422/1/1, letter to Prime Minister dated 15 March 1938.

162

that Mr Thwaite should simply be “thanked for his information and suggestions”.40 If either the

Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department had previously been in ignorance of the

development of a signals intelligence capability he was now surely aware of, or at least might

have suspected it, as a consequence of the correspondence.

As this little episode was being played out on the bureaucratic sidelines, the Navy

provided the Admiralty with details as to the status of the three Australian direction finding stations. On receipt of this information the Director Signals Division in the Admiralty responded with a very hearty ‘excellent ….. just what we wanted’. He went on to add that as a consequence of the re-location of the Sydney station to Canberra the results achieved on the

RM2 MF/DF receivers might not be what was expected due to its limited range and inherent night-time errors. The Admiralty was investigating the use of the Adcock MF/DF system in order to overcome these problems. But these investigations were not completed, and the installation of the RM2 outfit was still advised. It was recommended that consideration be given to the fitting of the Adcock system in the future.41

The advice that the Sydney direction finding station was to be re-located to Canberra

came as a surprise to elements of the Admiralty’s Naval Intelligence Division. A subsequent

letter, to the Australian First Naval Member, Vice Admiral Sir R. Colvin KBE CB RN, signed

on behalf of the DNI (Admiralty) stated that the original decision to locate the direction

40 NAA, A461/10, T422/1/1, Secretary, Department of Defence minute dated 7 April 1938.

41 NAA, MP1185, 1997/5/305, Naval W/T and D/F Stations – Australia, Signal Department, Admiralty, letter

dated 7 July 1938.

163

finding sites in Fremantle, Darwin and Sydney made good strategic sense. The justification provided to the RN at the time was that in accordance with their instructions the direction finding stations needed to be close to communications facilities in order to allow for the rapid and secure transmission of information. The DNI (Admiralty) advised Admiral Colvin that the preference was for the station to be relocated to Sydney as originally proposed and that direction finding bearings be forwarded to Canberra via telephone or telegraph for on- forwarding to Commander-in-Chief China Station. The DNI (Admiralty) felt that the advantages of a direction finding site in Sydney outweighed the slight delay in transmitting results. Their other concern was that the performance of the MF/DF equipment on order by the

RAN would be unsatisfactory if located so far inland.42 The opinions of the DNI (Admiralty) seemed to be at variance, however with those of the Director Signals Division, whose only concern was the technical performance of the MF/DF set.

Receipt of the DNI’s letter in Australia caused some consternation. The Director

Signals and Communications, who was the RAN’s technical authority on this issue, advised the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff that Sydney held no advantages over Canberra with respect to the location of the direction finding station. In fact the opposite was the case.

Canberra was seen as being far less vulnerable and it was better suited for the reception of H/F.

Furthermore, the distance between either Sydney or Canberra and the other direction finding stations was almost identical so that the base lines for plotting direction finding fixes were almost unchanged. The poorer performance of the M/F direction finding equipment was

42 NAA, MP1185, 1997/5/305, Admiralty letter M.04126/38 dated 28 July 1938.

164

acknowledged, but again it was pointed out that the bulk of the work would be in the H/F

band. The Director Signals and Communications went on to state that he had conducted two

surveys of the Sydney area in an attempt to locate a suitable site and could not do so.43 After

this review the decision was made that the Australian DNI would advise his Admiralty

counterpart that the location of the proposed direction finding stations would not be changed.44

After receipt of the Australian letter, the DNI (Admiralty) responded, advising that not only was he in agreement with the proposals but this letter had been seen by the Director Signals

Division who also agreed. This particular piece of correspondence was signed by the DNI

(Admiralty) personally and not a member of his staff.45

Finally, in October 1938, the metal earth mats required for the direction finding stations

had arrived in Australia and the Department of the Interior was in a position to commence construction of the stations. The stations at Harman and Coonawarra would be built

simultaneously and the one at Jandakot would be commenced later. The electrical equipment,

some of which had been at Garden Island for three years, was to be installed at all of the

direction finding stations by the same technicians. Notwithstanding the concerns over the

possible performance of the M/F direction finding equipment available, the decision was made

43 NAA, MP1185, 1997/5/305, Naval W/T and D/F Stations – Australia, DSC minute dated 12 September

1938.

44 NAA, MP1185, 1997/5/305, Naval W/T and D/F Stations – Australia, DNI letter dated 14 September 1938.

45 NAA, MP1185, 1997/5/305, DNI letter M.04126/38, dated 23 December 1938. The Commander-in-Chief

China Station appeared however less convinced about the relocation of the Sydney station to Canberra. See

NAA, MP1185/8, 1997/5/343, Strategic D/F Station, DSC minute dated 20 July 1939.

165

to install it. If the equipment’s performance was disappointing there was still the possibility of establishing an M/F direction finding station closer to the coast or substituting the new Adcock

M/F/direction finding equipment, if this were superior in performance. This decision was communicated to the DNI at the Admiralty.46

With the decision to transfer most of the positions associated with Procedure Y duties to the Shore Wireless Service and the imminent commissioning of three direction finding stations and two intercept stations, the issue of manpower and or payment of the Special

Allowance was once again raised. An initial establishment of nine positions was proposed for the Shore Wireless Service, with the possibility of a further three once experience in the operation of the new intercept stations had been obtained. Six positions were retained at sea, two per cruiser, for Procedure Y operators. In addition to the confirmed positions another three, two Shore Wireless Service and one seagoing, were required as a pool and a further six

Shore Wireless Service as a war complement to allow a continuous watch on the direction finding stations. Altogether the RAN estimated that the requirement for trained personnel to man the direction finding and intercept stations was seven seagoing and seventeen (possibly twenty) Shore Wireless Service. At this time however, the RAN had only six qualified seagoing Procedure Y operators and none of these were willing to transfer to the Shore

Wireless Service.

46 NAA, MP1185, 1997/5/305, Naval D/F Stations Australia, DNI (Melbourne) letter dated 17 February

1939.

166

As there were no qualified Procedure Y personnel in the Shore Wireless Service, the

required personnel had to be trained from scratch. The estimated time needed to train these

personnel to sufficient standard so that they qualified as Procedure Y operators was at least

three months. Included in this training was a significant component of practical Japanese interception work. But the required equipment, earmarked for the intercept station at Harman, was not available and would not arrive until after mid-July 1939. But, by coincidence, as a consequence of the cessation of interception operations on Nauru the intercept equipment used there was being returned to Australia. In order not to delay the training of the Shore Wireless

Service personnel in Procedure Y unduly, it was proposed to use this receiver at either Harman or the transmitting station at Belconnen. Even with this receiver, the estimate to train personnel to a ‘Good’ standard had now increased to four or five months.47

Apart from the advantage of increased availability of manpower, the relocation of

Procedure Y functions from sea to shore had a number of technical advantages. The close

proximity of direction finding stations to intercept stations allowed the two to work together.

Shore stations could communicate with each other directly over landlines and thus reduce the

delays inherent in using the regular naval communications system. The performance of shore

based equipment was not compromised by the need to reduce its size so that it could fit into

small compartments, and there was no mutual interference from a ship’s transmitters with the

direction finding and interception equipment. Given the technical, and potential manpower,

advantages to be accrued by transferring the primary functions of these operations from sea to

47 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, W/T Procedure Y – Proposals, ADSC minute dated 8 December 1938.

167

shore, it is curious as to why this was not done sooner. The only reasons for this that can be

discerned are that the RAN saw no requirement from its own perspective to do so, especially

when considering the shortages of qualified Telegraphists. Secondly the required land based facilities did not exist. Another deterrent to this shoreward expansion was that the Navy saw itself as a seagoing service. Hence the use of permanently shore based servicemen was not an approach which would have been readily considered by the senior staff.

The payment of the Special Duty Allowance to members of the Shore Wireless Service who qualified as Procedure Y operators was a matter of some debate. The Shore Wireless

Service was a branch of what were described the Navy’s Auxiliary Services. Members of these services were not paid normal allowances. But the Director Signals and Communications argued that Procedure Y work was voluntary and that unless the Navy had the trained personnel to man and operate the direction finding and interception facilities under construction the ₤14,000 spent on such construction would be wasted. Furthermore as the work was highly secret, it was felt that volunteers were better than pressed men. To seal his argument for the payment of the allowances the Director Signals and Communications informed the Second Naval Member and DNI (Melbourne) that the results being obtained were of great value to the COIS who wished to see an increase in the output from the Australian stations.48 These arguments finally won the day and the Second Naval Member recommended

payment of the allowance. In January 1939 Ministerial approval to pay the allowance to

48 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, W/T Procedure Y, DSC minute dated 9 December 1938.

168

members of the Shore Wireless Service was sought by the Australian Commonwealth Naval

Board.

Notwithstanding the inducements for ex-Telegraphists or serving Telegraphists to join the Shore Wireless Service there were still insufficient numbers to man the new direction finding stations. In an attempt to increase the pool of potential recruits the Australian

Commonwealth Naval Board recommended that an attempt be made to recruit ex-RN

Telegraphists in the United Kingdom and New Zealand. The minimal service requirement for

entry into the Shore Wireless Service, for these personnel, was two years service as a

Telegraphist (including one year at sea); a passing of the Educational Test 1, and having

attained a non-substantive rating of Wireless Telegraphist Class III. As an additional

inducement for married applicants, the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board offered to

provide assistance towards the costs of passage for families.49 The shortages of personnel also

meant that some latitude was being shown in the recruitment of individuals, in particular in

terms of the seagoing requirements.50 The requirement to meet the criterion of seagoing

experience in a branch that was essentially shore based appears to have been more of an

administrative issue than of any practical value.

49 NAA, MP692, 349/1/2122, Canberra and Darwin Naval W/T Stations – Shortage of Junior Sailors, Naval

Board minute No. 58, dated 22 March 1939.

50 NAA, MP692, 349/1/2116, V. A. Malcolm ex-Telegraphist: Entry for Qualifications for Shore Wireless

Service, Finance and Civil Member minute dated 8 May 1939.

169

Tests, by the Admiralty, of the Adcock M/F direction finding system had proven successful and the Admiralty advised that the first such station would be erected at Malta. The question of communications between the various direction finding stations and the plotting centre was a matter of some discussion. This was one of the reasons for locating the direction finding stations, except for Jandakot, close to the new W/T stations. In the case of Jandakot the solution was to provide a link between Harman and Jandakot via a secure telephone. Any bearing would be telephoned to Harman and the information rebroadcast by the W/T station if required. The Admiralty was also very anxious to have the new W/T station at Coonawarra completed for this very reason. Bearings from the Darwin direction finding station could then be quickly transmitted to either Hong Kong or Singapore.51 The importance of the Australian direction finding stations, especially Darwin, to the Imperial network became apparent during the direction finding tracking exercise carried out from March to April 1939 utilising HMS

Kent. The results showed clearly that accuracy of the fixes would be improved by the operation of the direction finding station at Darwin.

Those sailors that re-entered the Shore Wireless Service were sent to the Signals

School at Cerberus to undergo training on the new equipment they would be operating at

Harman and Coonawarra. But few would have had any recent experience at sea and would have had little knowledge of the equipment on ships. Nonetheless it was suggested that they be given a technical examination on this equipment as a promotion pre-requisite. These suggestions, coupled with the requirement to undertake sea time, clearly demonstrated how

51 NAA, MP1185, 1997/5/305, Naval D/F Stations Australia, NID letter M.04126/38, dated 17 April 1939.

170

some senior officers had not fully grasped the manpower problems or were not capable of

thinking beyond a seagoing-oriented career structure for sailors. Interestingly, the sailors who

transferred to the Shore Wireless Service from the Fleet were accepted on the basis of their

knowledge of equipment they would no longer be using.52

The inclusion of Procedure Y work as a function to be carried out by the Shore

Wireless Service and the subsequent transfer of qualified Telegraphists had the obvious

impact. The number of qualified Procedure Y operators at sea declined markedly. These transfers also had an adverse impact on the number of Telegraphists overall. In essence

because the Navy had not addressed the issue of qualified Procedure Y personnel in the early

1930s, through the increase in numbers and payment of allowances it was now robbing Peter to pay Paul. The result was a marked decrease in Procedure Y work being undertaken by

HMAS Sydney, the only ship at this stage carrying out such work. Faced with this situation,

DNI (Melbourne) proposed that responsibility for all Procedure Y work be transferred to the

Shore Wireless Service.53 The Director Signals and Communications supported this proposal

but he pointed out that this meant that ships would not be able to carry out tactical Y work and that there were occasions when ships would be in a position to intercept messages which the shore stations could not. Notwithstanding these disadvantages the Director Signals and

Communications did support the DNI’s proposal.54 The Australian Commonwealth Naval

52 NAA, MP692, 349/1/2116, Shore Wireless Service- Re-entry Junior Sailors, DSC minute dated 19 May

1939.

53 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, W/T Procedure Y Work in HMA Squadron, DNI minute dated 21 June 1939.

54 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/360, W/T Procedure Y Work in HMA Squadron, DSC minute dated 27 June 1939.

171

Board agreed and the function of intercepting Japanese communications was transferred to the

Shore Wireless service. The Australian Commonwealth Naval Board also advised that should

the need arise qualified personnel from the Shore Wireless Service might be posted to ships to

carry out this work.55 It is doubtful that the sailors who were induced to join the Shore

Wireless Service on the basis of that there was no requirement for sea service were aware that

this condition of service had been changed.

Apart from personnel to operate the intercept and direction finding stations, there was

also a need for qualified linguists. As we know the RAN had only trained three Japanese linguists since the end of the First World War and none of these were actively engaged in

cryptography or other linguistic duties in Australia.56 Similarly, the training of Japanese

linguists by the Army had ceased. In fact it was discovered during legal proceedings against a

Japanese lugger in Darwin that there was not a qualified Japanese linguist available to act on

the Commonwealth’s behalf. This issue was highlighted by the Minister for Defence and

considered by the Defence Committee at a meeting in September 1938.57 At a subsequent meeting in March 1939 the Service Chiefs decided to establish a sub-committee, made up of representatives of all the Services, to investigate this requirement fully. A report from the sub- committee was considered by the Defence Committee in February 1940 and it was decided that further consideration of this issue should be deferred until the end of the war with

55 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, W/T Procedure Y, DNI minute dated 28 June 1939.

56 By this stage Nave had transferred to the RN.

57 NAA, A2031, 47/1938–58/1938: Defence Committee minute 58/1938: Study of Japanese Language in the

Services, dated 9 September 1938.

172

Germany.58 This was a very short sighted decision given the general concerns about Japan’s future actions.

Based on the results of the China Station direction finding tracking exercise utilizing

HMS Kent the Commander-in-Chief China Station desired that the Darwin and Jandakot direction finding stations become operational as a matter of priority. But the RAN’s priority was the completion of the Canberra direction finding station. The reason for the differing priorities was that Commander-in-Chief China Station needed these direction finding stations in order to improve the accuracy and coverage of the FEDO network. From the RAN’s perspective once Harman was completed it could be put at the disposal of the Commander-in-

Chief China Station and also used to train the personnel required for both Coonawarra and

Jandakot. Pending completion of the W/T stations at Harman and Coonawarra any bearings by the direction finding stations would be reported to Navy Office, in Melbourne, and signalled to Commander-in-Chief China Station once a day. The Second Naval Member supported these proposals describing the completion of the direction finding stations as being most urgent.59

Even at this late stage however, questions concerning the final technical configuration of the direction finding stations and the Navy’s new W/T stations were still being raised. In

January 1939 the RAN Liaison Officer in London questioned whether the RAN stations were

58 NAA, A816, 44/301/9, Defence Committee minute 12/1940: Study of Japanese Language in the Services,

dated 16 February 1940.

59 NAA, MP1185, 1997/5/343, Strategic D/F Stations, DSC minute dated 20 July 1939.

173

to be fitted with a sense finder.60 This piece of equipment allowed a single direction finding

station to determine the actual bearing of a transmission by eliminating the reciprocal bearing.

Construction of the W/T stations was temporarily suspended pending Admiralty advice on the

outcome of the Singapore conference on W/T in the Far East in March.61 Yet again delays ensued in the construction of vital facilities because of a perceived need to seek Admiralty advice.

By August sufficient progress had been made on the direction finding station in Darwin such that a firm timeline could be established for its completion. In October, after spending four weeks studying the equipment for the W/T and direction finding stations, Warrant

Telegraphist Phaup and two other Telegraphists were to proceed to Darwin. They would install the equipment, a task expected to be completed by December, and then calibrate it. By the time the station was expected to be able to commence operations in January 1940, two direction finding operators were expected to be fully trained and ready to operate the new station, although two operators did not allow for continuous operation of the station.62 Material

progress was at last being made on the development of the RAN’s strategic direction finding

60 NAA, MP1074/8, Inwards Signals January to March 1939: NLO London message 20 January 1939.

61 NAA, MP1074/8, Outwards Signals January to July 1939: Secretary, Department of Defence message

dated 9 May 1939.

62 By way of an indication of the manning requirements for twenty-four hour continuous watch a four channel

direction finding set required at least nine personnel. NAA, MP1049, 2037/3/174, ADM message 0033/18

February 1943

174

and interception capability. Where progress was currently lacking however, was in the establishment of an Australian cryptographic organisation. This situation would also soon change however, due to the urgent demands of war.

During the second half of the 1930s the pace of development of an RAN signals intelligence capability quickened. To some extent this reflected, but lagged behind, the development of the overall Imperial network in the Far East. Some of this lag resulted from the perceived need to seek British advice on technical issues and some was a result of the need to import technical equipment from the United Kingdom. The Australian Naval administration also began to tackle the issue of qualified personnel to operate these facilities. The personnel needs of the developing signals intelligence capability had, however, to compete with general

Naval requirements. Unfortunately, the Navy did not commit itself to the training of Japanese language officers who could form a cadre of cryptographers. Despite these shortcomings real progress was belatedly being made. Had the need for a signals intelligence capability been more RAN focused, rather than Imperially influenced, the pace of progress might have been even quicker.

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Chapter 6

The Second World War: From Poland to Pearl Harbor, 1939-1941

Throughout 1939 international tensions in Europe and the Far East continued to rise. By this stage most people were convinced that it was simply a matter of when, not if, war would erupt in

Europe. On 23 August 1939, seemingly against the flow of international events, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact. Under this agreement each country agreed not to go to war with the other for a period of ten years. A secret protocol to the agreement in effect gave Germany the green light to attack Poland. On 1 September 1939 Germany, having neutralized the Soviet Union, attacked Poland. In the wake of the German assault Britain issued

Germany with an ultimatum which was ignored. As a consequence, on 3 September Britain declared war on Germany. The Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies immediately followed, and Australia found itself involved in another European war. Unlike in the First World

War, Australia faced a major naval power in her region, that of an expansionist and aggressive

Japan.

With the outbreak of war in Europe the focus of Britain, and thus her Empire, was the prosecution of the war against Germany and her subsequent ally Italy. Towards this end all efforts, including cryptographic ones, were directed. The consequence was that the security of the British possessions and Dominions in the Far East was not accorded the priority in terms of men, material and other resources as would normally have been the case. Thus the Pacific

176

Dominions were not only required to provide assistance to Britain in a European war, but also

with building up their own capabilities as a deterrent to the possibility of an expansion of

Japanese aggression beyond the Asian mainland.

It was the potential threat of Japan that had provided the impetus for the establishment

of a signals intelligence organisation in Australia during the 1930s. But due to financial,

manpower and organisational constraints progress on the development of this capability had

been frustratingly slow. The outbreak of the Second World War provided a catalyst to change

this situation. On 30 November 1939 Commander R. M. B. Long RAN,1 DNI (Melbourne)

wrote to the Chief of Naval Staff recommending that advice be sought from British authorities as to whether the RAN should establish a cryptographic organisation and if the British could provide required specialists and equipment.2 Vice Admiral Sir R. M. Colvin RN, the Chief of

Naval Staff, took the issue up with the Chief of the General Staff and Chief of the Air Staff.

Notwithstanding Admiral Colvin’s willingness to broach the subject with the other service

Chiefs, he was cautious about the concept and felt that the establishment of such an organisation would only duplicate the efforts of the British in the region. Additionally he felt that such an organisation would not be able to provide assistance to the British in the prosecution of the European War.3 On the other hand Long’s perception and concerns were

from the perspective of an Australian naval officer looking to the future Defence capabilities

1 For a biography of Long see Barbara Winter, The Intrigue Master: Commander Long and Naval

Intelligence in Australia 1913–1945, Boolarong Press, Sheldon, 1995.

2 NAA, A6923, 37/401/425, Cryptographic Organisation in Australia, DNI minute dated 2 November 1939.

3 NAA, A816, 43/302/18, Cryptographic Organisation in Australia, CNS minute dated 12 December 1939.

177

of the RAN, in particular should the Japanese enter the war on the side of Germany. Colvin’s

focus was more strategic and concerned with the immediate British Imperial concerns in the

prosecution of the war against Germany.

The Australian Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General E. K. Squires,

recommended that if a cryptographic organisation were established it should concentrate on

Japanese material obtained as a consequence of Japanese operations in China. He also agreed

that advice should be sought from GC&CS prior to the establishment of any such

organisation.4 The Chief of the Air Staff, although not supportive of the concept of establishing an Australian organisation, also recommended that the GC&CS be consulted on the issue prior to any decision.5 The attitude of the Chief of the Air Staff on this issue is

reflective of the attitude of the RAF with regards to the establishment of GC&CS.6 On receiving the recommendations of the other service Chiefs, the Chief of Naval Staff recommended to the Acting Minister for the Navy that the matter be considered by the

Defence Committee.7 At its meeting on 15 February 1940 the Committee decided that no action would be taken on the establishment of a cryptographic organisation until advice had

4 NAA, A816, 43/302/18, Cryptographic Organisation in Australia, CGS minute dated 16 December 1939.

5 NAA, A7942, Z146, Cryptographic Organisation in Australia, CAS minute dated 21 December 1939.

6 Frank Birch, (edited by John Jackson), The Official History of British Sigint 1914–1945: Volume 1 Part 1,

The Military Press, Milton Keyes, 2004, p.11.

7 NAA, A816, 43/302/18, Cryptographic Organisation in Australia, CNS minute dated 5 January 1940.

178

been received from British authorities.8 Following this decision Mr F. Shedden, the Secretary of the Department of Defence, wrote to the Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department, requesting that the Prime Minister write to the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs seeking the advice of the Government Code and Cypher School as to whether or not Australia should establish an independent cryptographic organisation.9

In April 1940 the Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, wrote to the Secretary of

State for Dominion Affairs seeking the views of the British as to the desirability of establishing a cryptographic organisation in Australia. This might have been the first occasion that an

Australian Prime Minister had had direct knowledge of the RAN’s signals intelligence activities and been directly involved in any part of the decision-making process in this field.

Unfortunately, Mr Menzies’ enquiry was couched in such terms as to appear a rhetorical question seeking a negative response. After stating that there would be insufficient European traffic to work with and that any organisation working on Asiatic codes would only duplicate the work of the FECB, Menzies went on to say “there seem no valid reasons for setting up a full-scale cryptographic organisation along the lines of the Government Code and Cypher

School”. He did however suggest the establishment of a small scale organisation as a contingency against operations near Australia.10 Unfortunately, the same arguments Menzies

8 NAA, A816, 43/302/18, Cryptographic Organisation in Australia, Minute of Defence Committee dated 15

February 1940.

9 NAA, A816, 43/302/18, Cryptographic Organisation in Australia, Secretary Dept of Defence letter dated 3

April 1940.

10 NAA, A816, 43/302/18, Prime Minister’s letter dated 11 April 1940.

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used against working on European codes held true for the proposed small scale organisation.

What codes would it work on and would there be enough traffic to make the effort worthwhile

and of value? The proposal sent to England should have been for an organisation that was capable of monitoring German operational activities in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, working on Japanese codes and complementing and expanding the work being done in the FECB. Such an organisation could have also been used for monitoring for, and deciphering, broadcasts from clandestine transmitters. The proposal put forward by Menzies should have been for a more substantial organisation capable of providing independent support to the British efforts.

Unfortunately the lack of firm direction and assistance from the British during the 1920s precluded such a scheme.

As consideration was being given to the establishment of a cryptographic organisation work was continuing on the establishment of the various HF/DF stations. By August 1939 the

direction finding equipment for the HF/DF facility at Harman, near Canberra, had been installed

but was yet to be tested. After testing and calibration the station became operational in October.

Its technical performance was described as satisfactory and bearings taken by the station were

forwarded to the FECB. At this stage, Harman direction finding station was staffed by two junior

sailors qualified in HF/DF and ‘special duties’, and a third junior sailor was under training.

The Darwin direction finding station, located at Coonawarra, was expected to be able

to commence calibration by mid-January 1940. This work was to be supervised by Warrant

Officer Telegraphist Phaup. The process of calibrating the station’s equipment was expected to

take approximately three weeks because of the wet season. The impending completion of the

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Darwin station presented the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board with some

administrative problems. The main problem being that under regulations in force at the time,

only a commissioned officer could have charge of the classified books and papers required to

run the direction finding station. As the RAN did not have a qualified commissioned officer

available it was appointing a Warrant Officer as the Officer-in-Charge of the direction finding

station.11 As the publications concerned and the instruction on their safe keeping originated

from the Admiralty, the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board advised it of the situation.

Given the larger pool of qualified officers available to the RN this was a situation they would

not normally experience. In the meantime the required publications were forwarded to Darwin.

The sensitivity of some of the documents meant that they needed to be held, when not in use,

by NOIC Darwin.

So that Warrant Officer Phaup could proceed to Western Australia to oversee the

installation of equipment at Jandakot direction finding station, Chief Petty Officer Telegraphist

E. Newman was posted to Darwin. Newman was responsible for the technical administration and

maintenance of the Coonawarra direction finding station. As he was not a commissioned officer,

he would not be allowed to hold certain classified publications required for carrying out the

stations functions. These would be held by NOIC Darwin and accessed by Newman daily. This

involved travel from the direction finding station site to the NOIC’s office. When required for

use at the direction finding station they would be collected by Newman and driven to the

direction finding station. At the direction finding station the publications were kept in a steel

11 NAA, MP1185, 2037/3/25, CBs for Coonawarra W/T Station, Head of N Branch minute dated 16 February

1940.

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chest under the direct supervision of the direction finding station staff. When the station was shut

down at the end of the day the publications were returned to NOIC Darwin. To ensure the

security of the facility an armed naval guard was posted on a continuous basis.12

Notwithstanding these administrative issues, the Australian Commonwealth Naval

Board decided that the direction finding station at Darwin would commence operations on 26

February. In order to check the interception capabilities of the station, COIS requested that

readability trials be conducted utilizing the German naval transmitter at Kiel. The station was

to monitor Kiel’s primary and secondary frequencies, over a 24 hour period, and report on

whether the transmissions were received regularly, intermittently or not at all. Once the results

of these tests were analysed the station would then be allocated FEDO duties co-ordinated by

the FECB.13 Once fully operational any bearings taken of German warships were to be immediately signalled to the Admiralty. Two junior sailors qualified in HF/DF and ‘special

duties’ manned the station initially. Due to the fatiguing nature both of the work and the

climate a four watch system, with watches no longer than 10 hours, was recommended for

Darwin, once sufficient personnel were available.

Once he had completed calibration and testing at Darwin, Warrant Officer Phaup was

to proceed to Jandakot and commence installing equipment there. The direction finding hut at

Jandakot had been completed in January. An electrical fitter was to be sent to Perth from

Garden Island to aid in the installation of the direction finding equipment. As completed,

12 NAA, MP1185, 2037/3/25, Naval Board signal 0051Z/17 February 1940.

13 NAA, MP1185, 2037/3/25, Naval Board signal 0532Z/18 February 1940.

182

Jandakot was fitted with only one receiver. This receiver was allotted for ‘Duty N’, listening

for German surface raiders. As a consequence of this work, the staff at Jandakot could not

maintain their skills as Japanese intercept operators. This was important if the station were

allotted ‘Duties A to G’, which related to listening for Japanese W/T transmissions. In order

that the staff at Jandakot could maintain their Japanese skills approval was requested, and

granted, to purchase an additional receiver for the station.14

Generally, Shore Wireless Service operators were ¾ trained to undertake ‘special duties’

but only the four operators stationed at Canberra and Darwin were also trained in HF/DF operations. No opportunity had occurred for the training of additional Shore Wireless Service personnel as HF/DF operators. When the first class of RANVR Telegraphists became available it

was intended to send six of these men to Canberra. This would also allow the training of two to

four additional Shore Wireless Service junior sailors in HF/DF. Training was to take about four

to six weeks, and would be completed before the Jandakot direction finding station was

operational thus allowing them to be sent to Western Australia to staff this station. Until enough

trained personnel were available stations could not keep up a continuous watch on the various

frequencies used by the Germans or Japanese.

During the Italian crisis in March and April 1940 sailors at Harman monitored Italian

merchant ship wireless traffic and were able to provide information as to changes in their regular

W/T routines. They also advised when the Italians resumed normal routines presumably

14 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, Jandakot D/F Station, DSC minute dated 1 November 1940.

183

indicating a lessening of tensions. Other monitoring activities included listening for enemy traffic as well as that of Allied and neutral merchant ship traffic, an activity now known as communications security. As a result of this monitoring, a number of German amateur radio stations were identified, as were transmissions made by the pro-German captain of a Norwegian merchant ship in Australian waters. This monitoring activity was, however, sporadic and could only be undertaken when a spare W/T receiver was available. Carrying out these general monitoring tasks also precluded any Procedure Y work. So as not to have the normal communications function of the W/T station interfered with future wireless interception operations, it was proposed to acquire additional receivers and build a dedicated facility for them. In essence this would be Australia’s first purpose-built W/T intercept station.15 As envisaged the intercept station would have four H/F receivers (one for internal security monitoring) and one L/F receiver. The eight additional personnel required to man this station were to be drawn from the RANR or from the permanent naval service, where they could be replaced by RANR personnel.

As the Navy’s embryonic direction finding organisation began to take shape it was being drawn into closer co-operation with the FECB. Detailed W/T and direction finding intelligence concerning the movement of Japanese warships and originating from the FECB was being distributed to Australia and New Zealand. The information being provided included such details as ship names and locations and estimates of the volume of W/T traffic.16

15 NAA, MP1185, 2037/3/41, Harman W/T Station Duties, DSC minute dated 14 May 1940.

16 NAA, MP1074/7, Signal Packs 1/6/1940 to 30/6/1940: COIS message 0844Z/26 June 1940 is an example

of the type of information being provided.

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Map 5: D/F fixes on MV Romolo by Australian and New Zealand D/F stations. Source: G. Hermon Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1939‐1942, AWM, Canberra, 1957.

Information concerning the volume of W/T traffic being generated was important as sudden

changes to this could be the precursor to an impending operation. Occasionally, however, the

information obtained from this organisation could be misleading. During August 1940 a

direction finding bearing taken by Harman of an unidentified German naval unit placed it in

the vicinity of Stewart Island (NZ). New Zealand Naval authorities considered that the

reciprocal of the bearing was the more likely as it placed the unit in the North Atlantic.17 Such incidents also highlighted the requirement for multiple stations to ensure good fixes using triangulation.18

With progress being made on the construction of facilities and the acquisition of

equipment, trained manpower was an ongoing concern and a limiting factor in the capability of

the network. As late as May 1940, personnel engaged in Procedure Y operations were still

expected to undertake this task in their own time. By way of compensation for this additional

duty an allowance of 6d a day had been approved, although this was only payable to fifteen

17 NAA, MP1074/7, Signal Packs 21/8/1940 – 7/9/1940: SO(I) Wellington message 1857/22 August 1940.

The German raider Orion was operating in New Zealand waters at this time. For a fuller description of this

incident see S. D. Waters, The Royal New Zealand Navy, Historical Publications Branch, Wellington, 1956,

p.130.

18 After Italy’s entry into the war on the side of the Axis in June 1940 Australian and New Zealand direction

finding stations attempted to get a fix on the Italian merchant ship Romolo. Two fixes were obtained but

both were a significant distance from the ship’s actual location. See G. Hermon Gill, Royal Australian Navy

1939–1942, AWM, Canberra, 1957, p.120.

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sailors at any one time.19 In August it was recommended that the number of sailors eligible to receive this special allowance be increased to twenty two. This increase reflected the higher numbers of qualified personnel being used to man the direction finding stations and also conduct interception operations.20 Such penny pinching reveals how tightly naval expenditure

was controlled during these early war years despite the need to prepare for a possible second

front in the Asia-Pacific region. Notwithstanding these shortcomings the RAN, unlike the

other two services, had managed to establish a cadre of highly skilled and dedicated Procedure

Y operators.

Paymaster Commander T. E. Nave RN had returned to Australia, for medical reasons,

in May 1940 and was subsequently found to be medically unfit for further service in tropical

areas. At the request of the Chief of Naval Staff, the Admiralty agreed that he remain in

Australia to assist in the establishment of a small cryptographic organisation known as the

Special Intelligence Bureau (SIB) within Navy Office to work specifically on Japanese codes.

Initially the main cryptographic task being undertaken by Nave was a study of the codes and procedures of Japanese merchant ships. The information obtained was important, as it was correctly believed that the first indications of any hostile act by the Japanese would be the recall of merchant shipping. One of the earliest outcomes of this study was the recognition that

Japanese merchant ships trading abroad reported their noon positions back to their head

19 NAA, MP1185, 1997/5/259, ACB 00205: Instructions for W/T Procedure Y Australia Station, 17 May

1940.

20 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, W/T Procedure Y Special Duty Allowance, DSC minute dated 15 August 1940.

186

offices. Some reports were in a house code and others were in plain language.21 This

information aided the FECB in maintaining an up to date plot of the likely positions, and future

movements, of Japanese merchant ships.

In October 1940, after a six month delay, the British finally replied to the Prime

Minister’s earlier letter seeking guidance on the establishment of an Australian cryptographic

organisation. Predictably, given the tone of Mr Menzies’ letter, the British authorities

recommended against the creation of a large organisation duplicating the work of the GC&CS in Britain. Instead they recommended that the small naval cryptographic organisation built around Paymaster Commander Nave might be expanded if there were sufficient cryptographic work for it. But Nave was due to return to Singapore in early 1941. This would then leave the

RAN, and the newly created SIB, without any qualified cryptographers.22 Notwithstanding that

the British were not supportive of the creation of an independent organisation they did see

advantage in the training of a group of qualified cryptographers. It is possible in making these

recommendations, the British saw more advantage for themselves than for Australia. Limiting

the scope of Australian development, and at the same time being supportive of the creation of a

pool of trained personnel, prevented Australia from establishing an independent intelligence

collection and assessment organisation but ensured the availability of trained personnel who

could be utilised in the FECB should war break out with Japan. The inability of Senior

Australian political and military leaders to make up their own minds on such issues impacted

21 NAA, MP1074/7, Signals 30 July 1940 to 20 August 1940: ACNB message 16 August 1940.

22 NAA, A816, 43/302/18, Cranbourne letter dated 15 October 1940.

187

upon Australia’s national security and contrasts markedly to the more assertive decision making processes following the entry into the war of the United States of America.

As the RAN’s direct involvement in the signals intelligence area increased so did the information it received from the RN. Previously the RAN had been given technical advice on the construction of facilities, how to conduct operations and feedback on what it was intercepting. In August 1940 that changed when the Admiralty authorised the release to the

RAN of intelligence derived from Y sources.23 In addition to this information the RAN began to receive copies of the Far East Weekly reports generated by the FECB.

By this stage not only were the communications of the Japanese Consulate being monitored but so too were those of the French Consul in Sydney. In August 1940 the

Admiralty requested that DNI (Melbourne) send them copies of coded and decoded cables sent to the French Consulate.24 Unfortunately, the surviving documents provide no further details as to who did the code breaking or how the cables were intercepted. Although, it is highly likely that copies the cables were handed over by the cable companies after they had been lodged for transmission by the French. The timing of this request indicates that it could have been related to subsequent British support, utilising the RAN, for the removal of the pro-Vichy, and pro-

Japanese, administration in New Caledonia during September 1940.25 New Caledonia was

23 NAA, MP1074, 21/8/1940 to 7/9/1940: COIS message 0427/21 August 1940. This message advises that the

Admiralty had approved the distribution of signals intelligence to Australia, New Zealand and Canada.

24 NAA, MP1074/7, Signals 30 July 1940 to 20 August 1940: Admiralty message dated 16 August 1940.

25 See Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1939–1942, p.263.

188

important not just for its geographical position but also because of its rich deposits of nickel,

chrome and iron. All of which the British did not want falling in to Japanese hands.

The activities of the Japanese in Australia had long been of concern to the Australian

authorities, and the general populace.26 Because of this suspicion and a desire to better monitor

the activities of the Japanese Consular staff and Japanese nationals the Chief of the General

Staff instructed, in September 1940, the Officer-in-Charge, General Staff (Intelligence) Eastern

Command, in Sydney, to establish a nucleus group to work on Japanese diplomatic codes. The

Officer-in-Charge was also instructed that “there must be no indication that either a

cryptographic branch is either in existence or is contemplated”.27 Whether this information was also withheld from the other members of the Defence Committee is not clear. In order to establish his cryptographic organisation the OIC General Staff (Intelligence), through the

Military Intelligence office in Sydney, initially approached two Sydney University academics,

Professor T. G. Room and Mr R. J. Lyons. Both agreed to undertake the study of Japanese codes. A further two members, Dr A. D. Trendall and Mr A. P. Treweek, were added to the group shortly afterwards. None of these academics were cryptographers and only Treweek had any knowledge of Japanese. The possibility of recruiting Professor A. L. Sadler, Chair of

Oriental Languages and a Japanese speaker, into the group was considered but rejected by the

26 See NAA, A8908, Report of the Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security Seventh Report Volume 2

and Pam Oliver, “Interpreting “Japanese Activities” in Australia, 1888–1945”, Journal of the Australian

War Memorial, Vol. 36, (May 2002), http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j36/oliver.htm cited 18 June 2007.

27 NAA, A6923, 37/401/425, Cryptography, DMO&I minute dated 8 February 1941.

189

Army. The rejection was based, in part, because his wife was half-Japanese28 but more

importantly because he was considered to be indiscreet.29 This group met on weekends at

Victoria Barracks and taught themselves code breaking. They worked on coded telegrams sent

or received by the Japanese Consul-General in Sydney. This material was provided to them by

the cable operators AWA Ltd at the behest of the Army.

The progress made by the Sydney University academics was such that on 28 October the

OIC General Staff (Intelligence) reported that “considerable progress had been made in

connection with the breaking of Japanese diplomatic codes”.30 During the course of their work

on codes the group was asked to examine a suspicious letter which had been intercepted by the

censorship authorities. In the course of examining this piece of correspondence they exposed an

extra-marital liaison between a Mrs G. Malley, who was married to a serving RAAF officer, and

Sir Fredrick Maze, Inspector-General of Customs in Hong Kong. The material contained within the correspondence was considered to be of an “intimate and salacious nature, while harmless from a security point of view”.31 Nonetheless a continuing security watch was kept on the

activities of the pair. The OIC General Staff (Intelligence) reported this to his superiors in

Melbourne. Unfortunately, his superiors in Army Office were not impressed that he had

28 R. S. Merrillees, Professor A. D. Trendall and his Band of Classical Cryptographers, ANU, Canberra,

2001, p.7.

29 NAA, A6923, 37/401/425, Cryptographic Organisation in Australia, GOC Eastern Command minute dated

28 June 1941.

30 NAA, A6923, 37/401/425, Cryptography, GS(I) Eastern Command minute dated 28 October 1940.

31 NAA, A6923, 37/401/425, Cryptography, GS(I) Eastern Command minute dated 4 December 1940.

190

potentially revealed the existence of the Sydney University cryptographic group and informed

him of this in no uncertain terms.32

As discussions on, and initial steps towards, the establishment of a cryptographic organisation were taking place within the Navy and Army, other areas of the Australian government were dealing with associated issues. During the second half of 1940 the decision had

been made that Australia and Japan would exchange diplomatic representatives. Australia’s

newly appointed representative in Japan, Sir John Latham, arrived in Tokyo in December 1940

and the Japanese representative Mr Tatsuo Kawai arrived in Australia in early 1941. The second

issue was a request, made some time in 1940, by the Japanese Government for the establishment

of a radio telephone service between Australia and Japan. The establishment of such a link, and

the use of Japanese language on it, was opposed by the Army.33 The Army obviously did not

wish to see its fledgling cryptographic group undermined by the use of voice communications

between Japan and Australia. The monitoring of such a link would prove to be tedious and

difficult even with the use of recording equipment. Furthermore the lack of Japanese linguists

meant that the translation of any intercepted messages could only be done to the detriment of

other activities. In essence the Army wanted to restrict the Japanese ability to communicate with

Tokyo to methods which they, and the Navy, could intercept. The Army’s position placed them

32 NAA, A6923, 37/401/425, Cryptography, DMO&I minute dated 8 February 1941.

33 NAA, A5954, 346/1, letter Minister for External Affairs dated 6 January 1941.

191

in conflict with the Department of External Affairs.34 The RAN undoubtly would have taken a similar attitude for much the same reasons.

As he was unable to return to the tropics, approval was given for Commander Nave to remain in Australia and work on Japanese codes. In November 1940 COIS requested that Nave concentrate, if sufficient material were available, on the Japanese 45 Code.35 Nave advised COIS that he could not identify any 45 material as the traffic had dropped off considerably over the past month. As the Australian intercept stations were only just commencing continuous Y watches he would wait and see what results were achieved before making a further report on the matter. Nave was also able to provide technical reports on other Japanese cryptographic systems such as one described as Nigory Break.36 These reports allowed the staff of the FECB to concentrate on decryption and translation of the intercepted messages. By the 26 November

Nave was able to report that the interception of the 45 Code had improved and sufficient traffic was available to work on this code.37 In order to facilitate this work COIS proposed to fly Nave, subject to his health being satisfactory, to Singapore to examine earlier work on this code.

Unfortunately, Nave’s health was such that he was not able to travel there and it was

34 No archival record has been located linking directly the three issues of the establishment of a cryptographic

group, Australian-Japanese diplomatic relations and the proposed radio telephone service between Japan

and Australia. But the possibility of a connection cannot be ruled out.

35 NAA, MP1074/7, 12/11/1940 to 26/12/1940: COS Singapore 0826Z/13 November 1940. The designation

‘45 Code’ was a British one.

36 NAA, MP1074/7, 12/11/1940 to 26/12/1940: NB 1301Z/19 November 1940.

37 NAA, MP1074/7, 12/11/1940 to 26/12/1940: NB 0529Z/26 November 1940.

192

recommended that the information be sent to Australia by safe hand.38 It was suggested that Mr

Massey, the RAN’s Director of Victualling, bring the material with him on his return to Australia

from Singapore, but this proposal was rejected by COIS. A second suggestion was to send an

officer from Singapore to brief Nave. Following consideration by COIS the material was

forwarded to Nave by a combination of air and surface safe hand.

During November 1940 the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board discussed with

Captain F. J. Wylie RN, the outgoing COIS, the possibility of visiting Australia prior to his

departure from the Far East to discuss ways of better coordinating their combined

cryptographic efforts. The Commander-in-Chief China Station informed the Admiralty of the

proposed visit and of his support for it. On 5 December 1940 the Defence Committee

considered the response received from the United Kingdom and, in view of the impending visit

by Captain Wylie RN decided to defer any final decision on the establishment of an Australian

cryptographic organisation pending the outcome of discussions between the Chief of Naval

Staff and COIS when he visited Australia.39 Notwithstanding this decision, the Chief of the Air

Staff had not changed his opinion since the concept of establishing an Australian cryptographic organisation was first muted by Admiral Colvin. He believed that such an organisation was not

“likely to be of much immediate use” to Australia.40 In holding this position he missed the

38 NAA, MP1074/7, 12/11/1940 to 26/12/1940: NB 0606Z/4 December 1940.

39 NAA, A816, 43/302/18, Defence Committee Minute 121/1940: Special Intelligence Organisation In

Australia, dated 5 December 1940.

40 NAA, A7942, Z146, Defence Committee Minute 121/1940: Special Intelligence Organisation In Australia

– Notes on Agendum 2/1940 (Supplement), dated 5 December 1940.

193

point that to establish a D/F and cryptographic organisation and build up the required facilities

and expertise takes time, something of which Australia was running out.41

On 21 December 1940 the Commander-in-Chief China Station advised the Australian

and New Zealand Naval Boards that Captain Wylie would depart Singapore for Australia and

New Zealand on 27 December. As requested by Commander-in-Chief China, the Australian

Commonwealth Naval Board arranged an itinerary for Wylie which included discussions in

both Australia and New Zealand.42 Wylie departed Singapore by aircraft at 0800 on 28

December and four hours later the aircraft was in Tanjong Priok. During his stay in Tanjong

Priok Wylie met Commander Burrows RN, the Royal Navy Liaison Officer and delivered a verbal message concerning Y co-operation. Although the exact nature and details of the message were not recorded it more than likely dealt with the extent to which co-operation with the Dutch could be undertaken as the British would not wish the Dutch to become aware that there was anything less than full co-operation from the British side. Wylie’s aircraft departed

Tanjong Priok that afternoon to continue the journey to Australia; he arrived in Sydney at 1530 on 31 December. That night he boarded a train for Melbourne arriving the following morning.

41 The advantage obtained by the RN and USN, through their long experience with Japanese codes and

cryptographic culture, is clearly evident by how quickly they mastered new versions of JN-25 as these were

introduced. This contrasts with the difficulties faced by the Army-centric Central Bureau, in building

experience and capability, while at the same time being expected to produce results in the early months of

the Pacific War.

42 NAA, MP1074/7, 12/11/1940 to 26/12/1940: Naval Board message 1259Z/23 December 1940.

194

During his stay in Australia Captain Wylie held discussions with representatives from

all services on a variety of intelligence issues. In discussing issues associated with the

interception of Japanese naval W/T traffic he advised that the FECB receivers at Kranji, in

Singapore, could not read the W/T traffic of the Japanese Combined Fleet by day.43 Some

additional coverage of these transmissions was however being provided by Stonecutters Island

and Esquimalt. Unfortunately material from Esquimalt took time to arrive at Singapore so its

only use was to help fill in gaps. As well as reception difficulties relating to listening to the

Combined Fleet, Kranji also could not read the day traffic originating in the Japanese

Mandated Territories. Continued coverage of the Mandated Islands by Australia was therefore requested by Captain Wylie. Of lesser importance, but also requested, was assistance in covering Japanese consular and commercial (H/F and M/F) traffic and South China traffic.

Captain Wylie also advised his hosts that the FECB was also interested in receiving

Russian naval and general traffic and Japanese traffic to its consular offices in South America that was being intercepted by the Australians.44 The expected information would be mainly in the nature of political, trade and subversive activities. The Russian material was required mainly, according to Wylie, for traffic analysis purposes. The reception of Russian Far Eastern

43 For technical reasons the Imperial Japanese Navy, and other navies, used day and night frequencies for

their communications. As a consequence, as an intercept station moved further away from the longitude of

the transmitter the poorer the reception as the intercept station would be in daytime whereas the transmitter

was using the night frequency.

44 Pfennigwerth, p.167.

195

traffic at Kranji was also described as poor.45 This traffic had been previously monitored by

Stonecutters Island and Auckland but both stations had been switched to intercepting the

Japanese 5-figure code. Although it appeared that the traffic could not, currently be read, it was viewed as a potential future source of intelligence which should not be ignored.46

In light of these requests and in order to best utilize the resources available, an arrangement was reached between Captain Wylie and the Australian naval authorities that the

Royal Navy would intercept Japanese communications covering “Japanese and Asiatic waters; and of the Combined Fleet, 1st Fleet, 2nd Fleet and their associated units in any waters”47 and

that Australia would provide intelligence, to the best of its abilities, on “Japanese Naval

activities in the Mandated Territory, and of the 4th Fleet”.48 The need to co-ordinate coverage

of frequencies and circuits being utilized by enemy combatants was highlighted by the

requirement to take Auckland direction finding station off coverage of Japanese naval

frequencies in order to cover known frequencies used by German raiders. This change was due

to concerns about German raiders operating in the Pacific region at that time. The Auckland

direction finding station could only cover the Japanese frequencies during periods when the

German station at Nordeich was not operating.

45 NAA, MP1185, 2021/5/529, Y, W/T and D/F undated.

46 TNA, AIR20, 374, Tour of Intelligence Organisations Far East, 1938, p.64.

47 NAA, MP1185/8, 2002/2/260, W/T Procedure Y – Personnel, minute by DSC dated 26 March 1941.

48 NAA, MP1185/8, 2002/2/260 W/T Procedure Y - Personnel.

196

In order to better cover the Japanese Mandated Islands the establishment of an intercept

station in New Guinea was proposed. The RAN had conducted successful ship borne W/T

interception trials in the Rabaul area in the late 1920s and operated a covert interception facility on Nauru during the late 1930s. Both of these were aimed at monitoring Japanese traffic in the Mandated Islands. Similar interception operations were undertaken by ships of the New Zealand Squadron in the middle of 1941. During this period HM Ships Achilles and

Monowai, manned by New Zealanders, conducted patrols in the vicinity of Nauru and Ocean

Island. As part of their patrol duties both ships were undertaking communications interception

operations with a view to penetrating the veil of secrecy which the Japanese had erected

around the Mandated Territories.49 This type of operation further added to the British

knowledge on Japanese communications procedures and networks in the region.

As well as discussing general intercept and direction finding operations, Commander

Nave raised the issue of an Australian cryptographic organisation with Captain Wylie. During

the course of their discussions, Wylie reiterated the UK line that the establishment of a large

organisation was not recommended because of the advantages of concentrating resources.

Wylie did however acknowledge the valuable assistance being received from Australia and

recommended a small increase in the current staff levels. He doubted however that the British would be able to provide any Japanese interpreters. Nave was also advised that the Japanese

Consular codes were now more complex than before and required a larger staff to work on

49 Correspondence between Lieutenant Commander P Dennerly RNZN and author, 22 September 1999. See

also NAA, MP1074/7, 24/5/1941 to 13/6/1941: SO(I) Wellington message 1016M/11 June 1940. This

message provides details as to the areas in which HMS Monowai operated.

197

them. In an attempt to resolve these issues he proposed visiting Professor Sadler to see if he could recommend anybody in Sydney who would be suitable as an interpreter. He also suggested that the Army’s Sydney University group should come under the supervision of

Navy’s Director of Signals and Communications.50

As the military and political situation in Asia and the Pacific continued to deteriorate, a

number of planning conferences were held involving Australia, Britain, the Netherlands East

Indies and the United States. Even though the subject of these conferences related more to

issues associated with general naval co-operation and co-ordination rather than signals

intelligence, the conferences did help to lay the groundwork for co-operation that would

develop latter. They also provided an opportunity for Australian officers to meet and discuss

other issues with their Royal Navy and Netherlands East Indies counterparts. In February 1941

a number of Australian service representatives, en-route to Singapore, visited the Netherlands

East Indies to discuss issues of mutual concern. During this visit Commander V. E. Kennedy

RAN raised the subject of signals intelligence with the Netherlands East Indies Naval

authorities. The Australians were advised of the working relationship between the Netherlands

East Indies and COIS, this information confirmed information previously provided by the

Dutch Consul-General in Australia. The issue of secure communications between the

Netherlands East Indies and Australia also arose. In order to facilitate direct and secure

communications the Netherlands East Indies naval authorities offered to supply the RAN with

a Dutch Enigma machine. An Enigma machine was also being used as the secure means of

50 NAA, MP1185, 2021/5/529, Special Intelligence Organisation, minute by Commander Nave dated 12

March 1941.

198

communications between Batavia and the FECB.51 This arrangement was put in place and

messages originating from the Netherlands East Indies naval authorities were encrypted using

an Enigma machine.52

As co-operation increased between Australian, British, the Netherlands East Indies and

the United States greater technical and operational information had to be revealed by the

various participants. One of the technical conferences held in Singapore was the Inter-Allied

Communications Conference held on 27 February. The RAN’s main representative at this

conference was Commander J. B. Newman RAN, Director of Signals and Communications.

An outcome of this conference was the establishment of the Anglo-Dutch-Australian

Communications Organisation. This organisation was to become active in the event of war

with Japan. The United States was also a participant in this Conference but because of political

constraints they were unable to make any firm commitments. Notwithstanding this, by July

Australia was providing the USN with point to point communications services between Cavite,

in the Philippines, and Pearl Harbor. Although neutral,53 the United States was increasingly

being drawn into the conflict in the Atlantic. Similarly in the Pacific, it was becoming involved

51 NAA, MP1185, 2021/5/570, Discussions with Netherlands East Indies Defence Authorities, NLO Batavia

letter dated 14 February 1941.

52 These messages were usually identified as being originated by CZM. This is an English abbreviation for

Kommandant Zee-macht.

53 The phrase ‘qualified neutrality’ has been used to describe the United States’ status at this stage. See

Edward S. Millar, Bankrupting the Enemy: The US Financial Siege of Japan Before Pearl Harbor, NIP, Annapolis,

2007, p.77.

199

in the developing naval and military activities and structures aimed at deterring further

Japanese aggression in the region.54

During his time in Singapore Commander Newman took the opportunity to visit the

FECB and observe the structure and functioning of the organisation. On his return he

recommended that the RAN establish an interception and direction finding organisation similar

to the W Section of FECB and that this organisation concentrate on the Japanese Mandated

Territories. The information provided by this organisation would be used to maintain a plot of

Japanese warships and merchant ships. He also recommended extending co-operation with the

Netherlands East Indies to increase the amount of traffic being intercepted by co-ordinating

their efforts in order to reduce duplication. COIS would be provided with details of any

unusual activities or movements in the Mandated Islands.55 One of the major limitations to this

proposed organisation was manpower. In March there were still only four sailors manning the

intercept station at Harman. Commander Newman recommended an increase in the overall

number of intercept operators to fifty, with priority being given to providing Harman with a further eight sailors, this would allow three intercept positions to be manned on a continual basis.56

54 For details on US planning activities prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor see Maurice Matloff and

Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941–1942, USGPO, Washington, 1990.

55 NAA, MP1185, 1937/2/415, DSC minute dated 19 March 1941.

56 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, W/T Procedure Y Personnel, DSC minute dated 26 March 1941.

200

In February 1941 a major development occurred in the diplomatic relations between

Australia and Japan, the Japanese representation in Australia was formally raised to the level

of a Legation. The elevation of Japanese diplomatic representation in Australia presented the

Japanese with an opportunity to observe Australia and its wartime military preparations at close hand. But the benefit was mutual as it also afforded the Australians the opportunity to monitor higher level Japanese diplomatic communications and activities. As previously discussed, it was this interest in Japanese codes and ciphers which acted as a catalyst in the development of the Australian cryptographic organisation.57

The ability to break the Japanese Consular codes allowed Australian authorities to

monitor Japanese espionage activities in Australia and the Asia-Pacific region generally. An

example of the type of information available was the fact that the Japanese Consul General in

Sydney was keeping Tokyo, and by extension the German Naval Attaché in Tokyo Admiral Paul

W. Wenneker,58 apprised of the movements of the ‘monster transports’ Queen Mary and Queen

Elizabeth as these ships arrived and departed.59 To support his intelligence gathering activities

57 See also Wayne Gobert, The Origins of Australian Diplomatic Intelligence in Asia 1933–1941, SDSC,

ANU, Canberra, 1982; R. S. Merrillees, Professor A. D. Trendall and His Band of Classical

Cryptographers, SDSC ANU, Canberra, 2001, and David Sissons papers at the National Library of

Australia, MS 3092.

58 For details on this relationship see John W. M. Chapman (ed.), The Price of Admiralty: The War Diary of

the German Naval Attaché in Japan, 1939–1943, Saltire Press, Sussex, 1989. The diary contains a wealth

of information and has been extensively annotated by the editor.

59 Pfennigwerth, p.172.

201

the Japanese Minister in Melbourne had been allocated, in 1941, an intelligence fund of thirty

million yen.60

Shortly after the establishment of the Japanese Legation, intercepted messages revealed

that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs intended to appoint Naval and Military Attaches to

the Legation in Melbourne, irrespective of the reaction of the Australian government.61 The prospect of these appointments was viewed with concern by the British, especially given the state of affairs between Britain and Japan. On the same day as the British advised the Australians of the Japanese intentions, the Japanese Charge d’Affaires in Sydney forwarded a letter to the

Minister for External Affairs advising him of the staff for the Japanese Legation and the intention of the Japanese Government to appoint Military and Naval Attaches62. The Australians

responded by informing the Japanese that the matter of service attaches was under consideration

as the Commonwealth’s policy was that such appointments should be made on the basis or

mutual agreement and reciprocity.63

In the course of discussions with the Australians, the Japanese claimed that such appointments were part of the normal Legation Staff. The issue was raised with the Chiefs of

Staff, who, already aware of the British attitude, expressed their concerns and advised that, owing to the war situation Australia would not be able to provide officers to take up reciprocal

60 NAA, MP1074/7, 6/7/1941 to 28/7/1941: COIS message 0751Z/9 July 1941.

61 NAA, MP1074/7, 1/3/1941 to 1/4/1941: COIS message 1003Z/3 March 1941.

62 NAA, A816, 19/304/276, Charge d’Affaires, Japanese Legation letter dated 3 March 1941.

63 NAA, A816, 19/304/276, Secretary, Department of External Affairs letter dated 8 March 1941.

202

appointments in Japan. The Australian Minister in Japan was similarly unsupportive.64 The

Minister for External Affairs met with the Japanese Minister, Mr Kawai, on 28 March1941. The main topic for discussion was the appointment of the naval and military attaches. Mr Kawai pushed Tokyo’s position but in the end was unable to obtain the agreement of the

Commonwealth.65 Forewarned of the Japanese intentions the Australians were prepared and able to provide an immediate counter.

Increased Japanese activity in Australia was not however limited to the diplomatic arena.

Under the guise of either increasing economic relations between Japan and Australia or of recreational visits an increasing number of Japanese were visiting Australia during the early

1940s. One such visitor was Major Sei Hashida, Imperial Japanese Army. Major Hashida visited

Australia for two months in early 1941.66 He travelled widely and took extensive notes during the course of his travels. It appears that the only time he believed his movements were restricted due to surveillance was when he was in Adelaide.67 After leaving Australia he apparently went to

Singapore and then Sourabaya from where he had planned to return to Japan on board the Kitano

Maru. But Dutch authorities arrested him in Batavia on 13 March. When the Dutch examined

Major Hashida’s belongings they found his collection of notes and sketches. These were handed

64 NAA, A816, 19/304/276, Australian Minister Tokyo cablegram 18 March 1941.

65 NAA, A816, 19/304/276, Minister for External Affairs minute dated 28 March 1941.

66 See NAA, A2684, 176, Visit of Maj Sei Hashida from Japan to Australia, British Consulate General,

Batavia letter dated 19 March 1941 for details of the instructions issued to Major Hashida.

67 NAA, MP1049/7, 1/3/1941 to 1/4/1941: COIS message 0351Z/5 March 1941.

203

over to the British liaison officers in the Netherlands East Indies.68 The Dutch requested that no

publicity be given to the fact that they had transferred this material to the British as it would

surely have resulted in a strong Japanese reaction.69 With the ability to read the Consular ciphers

the Australian and British authorities could follow the Japanese reactions to Major Hashida’s

arrest by the Dutch and also ascertain if the Japanese were aware of the transfer of copies of

Hashida’s notebooks to the British. Such monitoring activities provided the British and

Australians with an important insight into Japanese subversive activities in Australia and the

region.

Within the context of the increasing Japanese interest and activity in Australia, the

possibility of establishing an enlarged Australian cryptographic organisation took a major step

forward with the holding of a conference in Melbourne on 2 May 1941. Amongst those

attending were Commander Nave, Professor Room and Major Treweek. During the course of

the conference it was recognised that not only was the breaking of Japanese diplomatic codes

possible but that an organisation should be set up to undertake this function.70 Although the

organisation was to be a combined service one it was agreed that the work undertaken would initially be on naval codes. An interesting point that arose during the course of discussions was that the code breakers considered that the facilities at Singapore might not always be available.

68 Antony Best, British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia, 1914–1941, Palgrave MacMillan,

London, 2002, p172.

69 NAA, MP1074/7, 1/3/1941 to 1/4/1941: Consul General Singapore message 1345Z/23 March 1941.

70 Ian Pfennigwerth credits Commander Long with being the architect of this decision. See Pfennigwerth,

p.167.

204

The reasons for this were the possibility that Singapore would fall or be isolated to the extent

where secure communications were not possible. The Sydney University code breakers

advised Commander Nave that they were willing to go to Melbourne to continue their work

there. But that their appointments would need to be negotiated with the Sydney University

authorities. The availability of Mr R. J. Lyons was also discussed and it was felt that, if required, he would also be available.71

Two weeks after the conference the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff wrote to the Chief of

the General Staff about how best to deal with the material being decoded by the Sydney

University group. He proposed that the naval group and the Sydney University group be

combined into a single organisation so as to allow for the interception and decryption of

Japanese Consular and Diplomatic traffic in Australia. He also expressed doubts about relying

too much on the facilities at Singapore. The need to send some of the personnel to Singapore

to undertake training was recognized and accepted.72 Enquires were made about the suitability, from a security perspective, of Professor Sadler for the position of Japanese translator.

Ultimately he was not utilized in this capacity. The Chief of the General Staff wrote to the

Army Minister seeking approval to mobilize the Sydney University group and bring them to

Melbourne to help create the cryptographic organisation. Approval was subsequently given to

71 NAA, A6923, 37/401/425, Notes on Conference 2/5/41-1200 Hours.

72 NAA, A6923, 37/401/425, ACNS minute dated 15 March 1941.

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mobilize Major A. P. Treweek, Professor T. G. Room and Professor R. J. Lyons for full time duty and Professor A. D. Trendall for part time duty.73

Once it was decided to mobilize the Sydney University group, discussions were held with the University to obtain their release. Initially the Chancellor of Sydney University sought appropriate military rank for these men but was unable to obtain this. Eventually however, agreement was reached on remuneration and medical coverage during his Army service as well as the costs associated with the relocation of the academics to Melbourne. The Army agreed that these personnel would come under the control of the Officer-in-Charge of the Special

Intelligence Bureau and appointed a liaison officer in the Directorate of Military Intelligence to act as a point of contact between the SIB and the Army.

As the small cryptographic organisation began to take shape, Commander Newman proposed the establishment of two additional intercept stations. These additional stations were needed to improve the coverage of W/T traffic originating in the Japanese Mandated Islands.

Although Harman could intercept distant transmissions by day and long and medium range by night, it could not intercept any short range transmissions or medium distance transmissions by day. To fill these gaps it was proposed to establish an intercept station in Townsville and another in New Guinea. The selection of Townsville was based on the fact that there was already a requirement to provide communications support for the Area Combined

Headquarters in Townsville and the addition of the intercept station would be masked by this

73 See NAA, A6923, 37/401/425, for details.

206

function. The Townsville site, it was proposed, would be operated predominantly by the

Women’s Royal Australian Naval Service (WRANS). The second site in New Guinea was to be established once additional manpower was available.74 As it transpired, the outbreak of war with Japan and the subsequent rapid Japanese advance south, including the capture of New

Guinea, precluded the construction of the New Guinea station. The Australian Commonwealth

Naval Board acted quickly on the recommendations of the Director Signals and

Communications, deciding on 25 June to recommend to the Minister the entry of the required number of additional WRANS.75

The formation of the WRANS had been authorized by the Minister for the Navy in

April 1941. The initial intake of WRANS consisted of twelve Telegraphists and two cooks and these were posted to HMAS Harman.76 This initial group of WRANS was soon followed by others. The early decision by the Navy to employ WRANS in Procedure Y work appears to have paid off. While progress in Procedure Y training was described as being slower than that of enlisted Naval Telegraphists their proficiency was described as being “150% ahead of the only class of Military Telegraphists”. From the time the first WRANS completed their

Procedure Y training they were an integral and indispensable component of the Navy’s wireless interception and direction finding organisation. By 16 July 1941 the initial twelve

74 NAA, MP1049, 2037/3/102, Townsville W/T Communications and Procedure Y, DSC minute dated 17 June

1941.

75 NAA, MP1049, 2037/3/102, Entry of WRANS, Naval Board Minute dated 25 June 1941.

76 For the history of the WRANS see M. Curtis-Otter, W.R.A.N.S., Naval Historical Society of Australia,

Sydney, 1975, and Shirley Fenton Huie, Ships Belles, The Watermark Press, Sydney, 2000.

207

WRANS Telegraphists were undertaking duties at Harman with a further eight WRANS

earmarked for Procedure Y duties.77

The entry of WRANS would eventually help solve the staffing problems associated with the expansion of intercept and direction finding facilities they, however, were not immediately available. Even once qualified they would not have the seniority or experience to supervise watches and run the intercept and direction finding stations. In order to resolve this issue, and because of the nature of the work involved, it was proposed, and agreed, that

Telegraphists employed on ‘Special Duties’ be promoted on the basis of time served and a recommendation for promotion. Yet notwithstanding this proposal the Commander Newman still had to wage a battle to overcome administrative inertia to have the arrangement implemented.78 The Director of Naval Accounts argued that the relevant promotion provisions

should not be relaxed for the benefit of those RANVR personnel employed on Special Duties

and that they should be promoted on the same basis as other RANVR Telegraphists. He also

argued that as they were paid a special allowance they were not being financially

disadvantaged. The Newman responded by pointing out that this was a breach of faith as these

sailors were originally employed on a non-seagoing basis. He also sought guidance, from the

Director of Naval Accounts, as to which direction finding stations were to be closed down

when the junior sailors concerned went to sea. Ultimately the issue would be resolved

following discussions with the Chief of Naval Staff.79 In a face saving decision it was agreed

77 NAA, MP1049, 1987/3/60, Memo from Secretary Naval Board dated 16 July 1941.

78 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/20, DSC minute dated 15 August 1941.

79 NAA, MP1185, 2002/2/260, Telegraphists RANVR, DSC minute dated 6 October 1941.

208

that as these personnel were offered certain inducements to enlist it would be inappropriate to withdraw these inducements now.

Slowly, many of the pieces of Australia’s embryonic signals intelligence organisation began to fall into place. By August 1941 much of the required infrastructure was either

operational or approved. A real attempt was at last being made to solve the chronic manpower

situation with respect to staffing the intercept and direction finding stations. The Special

Intelligence Bureau had been established, and by early September had commenced work on

Japanese commercial, consular and naval codes. Two of the SIB staff, Professor Room and

Paymaster Lieutenant A. B. Jamieson RANR, had been sent to Singapore in September 1941

for a two week training period. En-route to Singapore they visited the Dutch cryptographic

organisation Code Bureau Indies, also known as Kramer 14, located at Bandoeng in the

Netherlands East Indies.

In addition to the Sydney University professors, an approach was made to the British

Foreign Office via the Admiralty, in May 1941, to have Mr Henry Archer, former British

Consul-General in Harbin, attached to the Special Intelligence Bureau. The Foreign Office

agreed, but in a most undiplomatic gesture included the proviso that Australia should pay for

his salary and allowances. In response, the First Naval Member noted the significant number

of Australians who had been trained and made available to the Admiralty at the expense of the

Australian taxpayer and with no question of recompense by the Australian government. He

argued that it was not an issue of costs, but one of principle, and the Commonwealth should

209

not have to bear the financial burden, especially as the product would be provided to the

British. His arguments carried the day and the Foreign Office dropped its demands.

On 8 July 1941 the British Naval attaché, in Tokyo, advised Commander-in-Chief

China that summer leave for the IJN had been cancelled. Under the prevailing circumstances

such action would have been viewed with a high degree of concern by the British military

authorities in Asia. However an intercepted message from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in

Tokyo to the embassy in Vichy, on 12 July 1941, put these actions into perspective by advising

of the Japanese intent to occupy French Indo-China. This message was intercepted and the

plain language text was available to the British by the 16 July. This message also put into perspective other Japanese actions such as the cancelling of the sailing of merchant ships to

Australia,80 increased wireless activity, especially to ships in the Mandated Territories,81 and instructions to Japanese ships not to enter British, Dutch and American ports.82 From this and

subsequent messages the British were able to monitor the Japanese occupation of southern

French Indo-China and see the type of pressure and assurances the Japanese were giving the

French. In essence the French in Indo-China were in no position to resist any form Japanese

occupation.83 Indications that the Japanese felt secure and did not expect any military retaliation came in August when the ban on merchant ships entering British and American

80 NAA, MP1074/7, 6/7/1941 to 28/7/1941: ACNB message 1039Z/16 July 1941.

81 NAA, MP1074/7, 6/7/1941 to 28/7/1941: COIS message 0528Z/19 July 1941.

82 NAA, MP1074/7, 6/7/1941 to 28/7/1941: CWR message 0635Z/29 July 1941.

83 TNA, HW8, 128, Summary of telegrams, 16 July 1941.

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ports was lifted and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised the Japanese Consul in Melbourne that orders for an evacuation of Japanese citizens were premature.84

One, apparently non-military, aspect of the work being undertaken by the Special

Intelligence Bureau was the breaking of Japanese shipping company codes. From these it was possible to ascertain the reported positions and movements of various ships as well as any weather reports they transmitted back to Tokyo. This information was correlated with the merchant ship plot maintained by the FECB. Details of intercepts were provided to COIS,

NZNB and CZM. Unknown commercial codes were examined once sufficient material was available for analysis. Copies of messages in these codes were also forwarded to Melbourne from New Zealand. The majority of the work on these commercial codes was now being undertaken by Lieutenant Lloyd, Australian Military Forces. Apart from work on the purely commercial codes, some was undertaken on the Japanese naval broadcasts to merchant ships although most of this was done in Singapore. The ability to read these codes and monitor the movements of Japanese merchant ships in the Pacific could allow the FECB to obtain important indicators of future Japanese activities or intentions.

The interception and decryption of consular codes was the second area of work undertaken by the Special Intelligence Bureau. The low grade Japanese LA Code was being read, but no information of any significance was being obtained. Nave proposed that the

Special Intelligence Bureau commence work on some of the higher grade and possibly

84 NAA, MP1074/7, 12/8/1941 to 31/8/1941: COIS message 0649Z/15 August 1941.

211

machine codes such as the Fuji Code. Work on the Consular codes was being undertaken by

Nave, Lyons and Paymaster Lieutenant A. B. Jamieson RANR who did translation work.

Much of the intercepted Consular traffic was being sent by telegraphic cable and access to this

was obtained with the assistance of the cable companies. In October 1941 when Air Chief

Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief Far East Command visited

Australia, the Japanese report of his visit, and a report of a subsequent conversation between

the Australian Prime Minister John Curtin and the Japanese Consul-General were intercepted,

decrypted and circulated to various authorities in London.85 The majority of the information

contained in the intercept could have come from open sources such as newspapers. There was

however, reference to an ‘unofficial’ remark by the Australian Prime Minister, John Curtin, to the Japanese Minister, indicating that New Zealand was in complete agreement with the actions of Australia.86 If such a comment was made by Curtin it was hardly unofficial and

always intended to reach Tokyo. The ability to read this diplomatic traffic allowed the

Australians, and British, to see what information was being sent back to Tokyo and how Tokyo

was responding to this.87

85 TNA, HW1, 179, Japanese Minister Melbourne, Reports on British Defence Measures in the Far East

dated 30 October 1941. There is no indication in the document as to whether the message was intercepted

and decrypted in Melbourne, Singapore or London. For a recent work on the relationship between Curtin

and the Consul-General see Bob Wurth, Saving Australia; Curtin’s Secret Peace with Japan, Lothian

Books, Sth Melbourne, 2006.

86 TNA, HW1, 179, Japanese Minister Melbourne Reports on British Defence Measures in Far East,

Intercept Number 097120, dated 30 October 1941.

87 A good example of the use of this type of intelligence is contained in The Magic Background of Pearl

Harbor (5 Volumes), Department of Defense, Washington, 1977. These volumes detail the history of US-

212

Naval traffic was the third important area of work for the Special Intelligence Bureau.

Although some work was being attempted on the new JN-25 code, most of the effort was

concentrated on naval codes from the Mandated Islands. The main codes were designated the

Na Break, which was being read, and the Nigory Break code. These codes were seen as

important because of the insight they could provide into Japanese activities in the Mandated

Islands. Work on these naval codes was undertaken by Major Treweek and Lieutenant K. S.

Miller RAN. Lieutenant Jamieson assisted in the translation of the various decrypts.88 Other naval codes such as JN-4, JN-11, JN-14, JN-20 and JN-147 were also worked on by the SIB.

This allowed cryptographers at Singapore to concentrate on breaking the strategically important, and difficult, JN-25.

Information obtained by the SIB was passed to Singapore where it was added to the intelligence being obtained from locally intercepted messages and other sources. When this intelligence was of direct interest to Australia it was passed to Navy Office and subsequently

Japanese diplomatic discussions from February 1941 through to the attack on Pearl Harbor. The narrative is

supported by numerous intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages.

88 TNA, ADM 223/496, DNI (Melb) letter dated 30 July 1941; Nave letter dated 28 August 1941;

1006/040.C/3, COIS minute dated 3 September 1941. Nave’s letter to Singapore was in two parts, a formal

typed letter, a copy of which would have been retained on file in Australia, and a hand-written attachment,

a copy of which would not have been retained on file in Australia.

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disseminated to the operational authorities.89 The Combined Operational Intelligence Centre, established by Commander Long, DNI (Melbourne) was also a recipient of this intelligence, as were the Service Chiefs. In addition, copies of intercepts were being passed to Australia from the United Kingdom and these were being seen by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister also received the analytical product based on this intelligence via briefings from the Service

Chiefs.90

On the eve of the Japanese attack on the European powers and America, the Australian

Special Intelligence Bureau consisted of:91

Table 6.1: Staff of Special Intelligence Bureau, Melbourne 1941

Commander T. E. Nave, RN – paid by Admiralty92

89 NAA, MP1074/7, Signals 12/8/1941 – 31/8/41: Message advising that COIS’ 0649Z/15 relating to a

communication between the Japanese Foreign Minister and the Japanese Minister to Australia, had been

passed to RACAS.

90 For an early study of the flow of intelligence to the Prime Minister see D. H. Wilde, “Curtin and the Secret

War in Australia 1941 – 1942”, BA Hons, Flinders University of South Australia, Adelaide, 1979.

Reference is also made in Pfennigwerth, Man of Intelligence to the Prime Minister seeing the ‘Winds Code’

intercept, see p.175.

91 A name absent from this list was Paymaster Lieutenant Commander W. E. McLaughlin who was posted to

HMAS Penguin. His service records provide no indication if whether he was undertaking any duties other

than administrative ones at this time.

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Navy

Lieutenant K. S. Miller, RAN Emergency List

Lieutenant A. B. Jamieson, RANR

Miss Robertson

Miss Eldridge

Miss Shearer

Army

Major A. P. Treweek

Professor T. G. Room

Mr R. J. Lyons

Lieutenant I. Longfield-Lloyd

Based on the work of Nave and the SIB a number of intelligence publications were produced by the RAN and distributed to the FECB and New Zealand. These included: ACB

00215 Transmission of Shipping, Meteorological Intelligence by Japanese Merchant Ships93

92 By August, Nave had sufficiently recovered his health to be able to return to England. He was not however,

fit for further duties in the tropics. Instead of losing the services of Nave the Naval Board recommended to

the Admiralty that he be allowed to remain in Australia and continue his cryptographic work. COIS

supported this proposal and indicated that the work being undertaken by Nave was complementary to that

currently being done at the FECB. See NAA, MP1074/7, 21/8/1940 to 7/9/1940: Naval Board message

1141Z/22 August 1940 and NAA, MP1074/7, 21/8/1940 to 7/9/1940: COIS message 0322Z/23 August

1940.

93 Copy held by Naval Historical Section, Dept of Defence Canberra.

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and ACB 00209.94 These publications gave details of commercial codes and communications

routines; such as the reporting of departures and arrivals, noon positions and fuel states, for various Japanese shipping lines. This allowed very extensive and detailed monitoring of the movements of the Japanese merchant fleet. The intelligence gained from the interception and decryption of Japanese merchant shipping messages was supplemented by intelligence gained from other sources such as direction finding reports and Admiralty Reporting Officers located in various ports.

As a consequence of the earlier attitude of the then Chief of the Air Staff, there were no

RAAF personnel attached to or supporting the SIB. But by 1941 the Air Force had taken steps to correct this situation, eight RAAF Y operators were trained by the Navy and the first RAAF

Y station was opened in Darwin on 6 October 1941. The primary role of the RAAF Y station was to intercept IJN and IJA aircraft transmissions. The secondary role was to support the

FEDO. Notwithstanding this modest beginning the Director of Air Force Intelligence still wished to defer co-operation with the other services.95 The Royal Australian Air Force had yet

to appreciate the benefits to be gained by a combined organisation. The Defence Committee

recommended, on 28 November 1941, that further additions to the SIB should be made when

94 NAA, MP1074/7, 12/8/1941 – 31/8/1941: DNI Melbourne message 0303Z/25 August 1941. Unfortunately

the title of ACB 00209 is unknown.

95 See NAA, A11093, 311/236G, RAAF Headquarters: Y Signals Communications, Director of Intelligence

minute dated 15 October 1941.

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necessary and that the Air Force should participate in the naval organisation and take part in cryptographic work as “a matter of principle”.96

The information obtained by the SIB was fed into the total intelligence picture of

Japanese activities and operations being developed by the FECB. The extent and detail of the

information being gathered by the FECB was such that by the second half of 1941 the British

had every right to be confident in their ability to warn of an impending Japanese attack. The Far

East Direction Finding Organisation was able to monitor the movements of Japanese warships

and merchant ships. Traffic analysis provided details of fleet organisation and W/T traffic

intensity whereas cryptography was providing an insight into political and operational matters.97

Significant or unexpected variations from the established patterns or procedures could be a precursor to a major Japanese operation. Yet this entire electronic intelligence gathering had an

‘Achilles’ Heel’, it relied on the Japanese units and commands communicating with each other and those communications being accurately interpreted by the Allies. By December 1941 it was clear that the political and military situation in the Asia-Pacific region had deteriorated to such an extent it was a matter of when and where Japan would strike and not if.

96 NAA, A7942, Z146, Defence Committee Agendum 104/1941: Special Intelligence Organisation – Notes on

Agendum 104/1941, dated 28 November 1941.

97 Regular reports such as Far East D/F Organisation Periodic Analysis, dated 16 October 1941, provided

information about fleet movements, W/T organisation and routines, call signs and general information on

w/t interception in the region. See TNA, HW 4/26.

217

One of the early indications that hostilities might not be far off was obtained in

September 1941 when a Consular message to Melbourne was intercepted and decoded. This message instructed the Japanese Consul to transfer the management of Italian affairs to another neutral country.98 This was followed in late November by the intercepted message setting up the

‘Winds Code’.99 On 3 December the British advised the Americans that the Japanese

Government had ordered the Embassy in London to destroy their Purple machine, and that the

Embassy had responded that they had done so.100 A clearer indication that war was imminent could not have been given. What was missing however was the details as to where, when and how.

Initially it was Imperial concerns about the Japanese that gave rise to the creation of an

RAN signals intelligence capability, it was a European War which provided the real impetus to bringing the plans developed in the late 1920s and 1930s to fruition. By the time the Japanese

98 Pfennigwerth, p.172. The Japanese had taken over the management of Italian affairs when Italy declared

war on Britain. The transfer of this function was, in retrospect, an indicator of a possible break in

diplomatic relations or worse.

99 The SIB intercepted and decrypted a Japanese Consular circular advising that a warning in the form of a

weather forecast would be broadcast prior to any break in relations. The possible warnings were:

‘Hibashi no Kaze ame – East Wind Rain – Break in relations with USA’

‘Nishi no Kaze hare – West Wind Fine – Break in relations with Britain’

‘Kita no Kaze humori – North Wind Cloudy – Break in relations with Russia’

100 TNA, HW8, 129, GC&CS message dated 3 December 1941. The destruction instructions were also

intercepted in Australia on 2 December and the reply ‘Harunna’ indicating that this had been done was

intercepted on 4 December. Japan’s formal decision to go to war had been made on 1 December 1941.

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finally struck in December 1941, the RAN had in place an organisation capable of carrying out

HF/DF and interception operations. This organisation was supported by a small cryptographic

bureau. The modest capabilities so painstakingly developed would prove an invaluable resource, for the Allied cause, during the early years of the war with Japan. Notwithstanding the creation of this capability, the 1930s were a period of missed opportunity, and one for which a price would be paid once Japan finally struck.

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Chapter 7

The British Search for a Cryptographic Partner in the Pacific, 1940–1941.

While Australia and other Dominions and Colonies were contributing to the overall British signals intelligence capabilities in the Asia-Pacific Region, Britain sought to cast her net even wider by developing signals intelligence relationships with other countries in the region. Such an expansion of contacts was both potentially beneficial and dangerous at the same time. The benefit that might accrue from such a relationship is an enhancement of the knowledge of

Japanese cryptographic systems and the subsequent ability to penetrate them. The negative side to such an exchange is the possibility that the information and code breaking methods exchanged might be compromised by a nation which did not have the same interests as Britain.

Such a compromise would reveal the extent of British activities and successes against Japan and might also result in the Germans taking a closer look at their cryptographic security. A compromise of this nature would be seen as being unlikely when dealing with the Dominions as they were all subjects of the crown.

Notwithstanding these reservations, Britain established or attempted to establish a cryptographic relationship with the Netherlands East Indies, China, the Soviet Union and the

United States. Of these only the relationship with the United States flourished. France, although a major European power in the region, was not included in these exchanges because of security concerns over the relationship between Vichy France and Germany. 220

Netherlands East Indies

Although co-operation between the United States Navy and GC&CS on Japanese naval cryptographic systems was of great importance to the British it was, at least prior to the fall of

Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies, not the first co-operative arrangement entered into by the British. Shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War the FECB and the

Netherlands East Indies cryptographic organisation designated Code Bureau Indies, or more generally Kramer 14, entered into a co-operative arrangement for the exchange of Japanese cryptographic information.1 The reason for this arrangement was that both the British and the

Dutch had similar strategic concerns, and weaknesses, in the region and were greatly interested in what the Japanese would do as the war in Europe progressed.

A year before the British established the FECB in Hong Kong the Dutch had established a listening post in Batavia to monitor the wireless traffic of the British, French and American navies in the region. When in early 1934 the Japanese cruiser Kuma visited the Netherlands East

Indies it became the target for this monitoring operation. Subsequently the Dutch monitoring station became part of the newly created naval intelligence section, Afdeling I, in the

Netherlands East Indies. The primary function of this organisation was to monitor the activities of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Responsibility for monitoring the activities and plans of other

1 Kramer 14 was the designation of the Dutch signals intelligence organisation based in Bandoeng on the

island of Java. Its official title was Code Bureau Indies. See R. D. Haslach, Nishi No Kaze Hare, Unieboek

BV, Weesp, 1985.

221

major navies in the region, namely the British, French and American, had been transferred to

the naval intelligence section at The Hague. As well as this small naval organisation, the

Netherlands East Indies Army had its own intelligence organisation based at Bandoeng. Due to

the inability to intercept military codes, and for reasons of internal security, the military

cryptographers were concentrating on the Japanese diplomatic codes.2

The first break into the Japanese diplomatic codes achieved by the Dutch Army cryptographers occurred in 1932. Unfortunately the small naval cryptographic organisation was

not as successful. The naval intercept station operated only at night as this was the only time

that reception of the Japanese transmissions was good and as a result did not intercept a

sufficient volume of material for cryptographic work. The diplomatic traffic, on the other hand, was obtained on a regular basis, and in volume, from the Netherlands East Indies Post,

Telegraph and Telephone Service with which the Japanese lodged coded cables for transmission to Japan.

Oversight of the newly established naval intelligence organisation was vested in

Lieutenant Commander J. F. W. Nuboer Royal Netherlands Navy. Prior to his departing for the

2 Due to the lack of English language source material relating to NEI signals intelligence activities much of

the early part of this section is based on J. F. W. Nuboer, “A History of Afdeling I (Intelligence), Naval

Staff Batavia, Netherlands East Indies From August 1934 to January 1938” The Cryptogram, Vol. XLVII,

No 2 (March–April 1981). Two Dutch language books which provide information on Netherlands East

Indies code breaking activities are: J. C. Bijkerk, Vaarwel, tot Betere Tijden, Wever BV, The Hague, 1974

and R. D. Haslach, Nishi No Kaze Hare, Unieboek BV, Weesp, 1985.

222

East Indies he made an effort to become conversant with the Japanese naval codes. At this stage they were fortunately still fairly unsophisticated, and he was able to achieve some success in obtaining intelligence from the codes. The Dutch naval authorities though, did not have the luxury of a full-time Japanese linguist to help translate and interpret the intercepts. A trained cryptographer, Lieutenant Schalkwijk RNethN, arrived in June 1935 to assist Lieutenant

Commander Nuboer. Shortly before the arrival of Lieutenant Schalkwijk the Japanese Naval

Training Squadron visited Singapore and Batavia. This provided the cryptographers with a substantial volume of material with which to work. It was during the examination of this new material that the first Dutch break into the naval traffic occurred.

Unfortunately for the Dutch, their cryptographic triumph was short lived. In August 1935 the Japanese replaced the code they were reading. It took the small team twelve months solid

work to break into this new code. A few other naval codes were also broken by the two Dutch naval cryptographers. Additional information on the movements and disposition of Japanese warships was provided by traffic analysis.3 This cryptographic effort was complemented by a

small direction finding organisation with stations at Tarakan and Soerabaya. These direction

finding stations were used exclusively for intelligence purposes.

With the outbreak of war in Europe and the fall of Holland the security position of the

Netherlands East Indies became precarious. Various secret talks were initiated between the

3 Kluiters, F. A. C. at http://lists.his.com/intelforum/msg04365.html dated 7 March 2001.

223

Dutch and the British and Australians to discuss aspects of defence and security4. In November

1940 COIS proposed to initiate an exchange of signals intelligence material with the Dutch.

This was agreed by GC&CS on stipulation that it only involve the Consular Codes.5 As a result of these, and other discussions, there began an exchange of intelligence, including signals intelligence, between the British in Singapore and the Dutch in Batavia. This intelligence was passed between Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies Naval authorities via a direct line.

When this direct connection failed, the British received the Dutch information via the Dutch

Consul-General in Singapore and the Dutch received the British information via the British

Consul-General in Batavia. This direct connection between the Dutch and FECB was via a machine cipher held solely by each party.6 This machine cipher was in fact a version of the

Enigma machine purchased from the Germans before the war.7

Eventually a similar method, including the use of a Dutch Enigma machine, would be used to exchange information between the Australians and the Dutch. Before they commenced using the Enigma machine the Australians sent a coded cable to the Commander in Chief China

4 Herman Bussemaker, “Australian-Dutch Defence Co-operation 1940–1941”, Journal of the Australian War

Memorial, Issue 29, (November 1996), (http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j29/herman.htm). While this

article does not discuss intelligence co-operation it does provide a good over-view of discussions between

the Dutch and Australia and Britain.

5 TNA, HW50/88, Organisation and Evolution of Japanese Naval Sigint, p.30.

6 NAA, MP1185, 2021/5/529, Notes on CAPT Wylie’s Visit, dated 10 January 1941.

7 A number of different models of Enigma cypher machines were manufactured and possession of one

particular model did not provide an ability to break into another version of the machine.

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Station seeking clarification as to the machine’s level of security.8 The response, which was

transmitted by wireless, stated that “given an equal volume of traffic it is considered [a]

cryptographer could break Enigma more easily than either subtractor or Type X cipher. It is however superior to any substitution system”.9 This may have been a fair assessment of the

machine’s vulnerability, but the fact that it was sent by wireless potentially endangered the

entire British code breaking operation against the Germans. Had the Germans obtained a copy

of this message their perception of Enigma’s vulnerability may have been different.10

A further indication of the extent of intelligence liaison between the Netherlands East

Indies and the British was provided by documents relating to Captain F. Wylie’s visit to

Australia in early 1941. While travelling to Australia, on 28 December 1940, Wylie’s aircraft made a stopover at Tanjong Priok where he was met by Commander Burrows the RN Liaison

Officer11. Burrows boarded the aircraft and received a verbal message from Wylie concerning

'Y' co-operation.12 In the course of his subsequent discussions with senior RAN officers Wylie stated that there was an interchange of intelligence between the FECB and the Dutch but that no

8 NAA, MP1074, 1/4/1941 to 30/4/1941: Naval Board message 0615Z/26 April 1941.

9 NAA, MP1074: 1/4/1941 to 30/4/1941: Naval Board message 0437Z/27 April 1941.

10 See R. A. Ratcliff, Delusions of Intelligence: Enigma, Ultra and the End of Secure Ciphers, Cambridge

University Press, Cambridge, 2006.

11 Commander Burrows was a retired RN officer turned business man who had been recalled to duty to serve

as the RNLO in Batavia.

12 NAA, MP1185/8, 2021/5/529, Visit Report: Appendix 1- Itinerary, by Captain F. J. Wylie dated 17 January

1941, p.1.

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real intelligence was being provided by the Dutch.13 The surviving records do not indicate that

during the course of these discussions there was any specific mention of Anglo-Dutch signals

intelligence co-operation.

As well as the Consular traffic, which was exchanged with the British, the Dutch were

intercepting naval and some military traffic. Unfortunately they were not attempting to break

the naval and military traffic due to a lack of resources. The Dutch passed this material on to the

British. Notwithstanding that there was no formal agreement for the exchange of naval signals

intelligence material, any naval material of interest to the Dutch was paraphrased and then passed on to them.14 Despite this co-operation, there was reluctance on the part of the British to

pass on all information. The British intercepted and decoded a message indicating that the

Japanese had been given approval to extend air services to Portuguese Timor. In passing this information on to Australia COIS specifically requested that the information not be passed to the Dutch.15 In applying such distribution caveats there is often a desire to protect the source of

the information.

13 NAA, MP1185/8, 1945/2/6, Minutes of Conference in Naval Board Room, dated 4 January 1941. A similar

statement was made to the Admiralty in August 1941 by Captain Wylie’s successor. See TNA, HW14/18,

message COIS Singapore to Admiralty 5 August 1941.

14 TNA, HW14/18, message COIS Singapore to Admiralty 5 August 1941.

15 NAA, MP1074/7, 21/8/1940 to 7/9/1940: COIS message 0518Z/26 June 1940.

226

In February 1941 Commander Newman attended a tri-national Combined Services

Communications Conference in Singapore. While the report of the conference16 made no specific mention of signals intelligence co-operation a separate report rendered by Newman did.

In this report Newman stated that the British had arrangements in place exchange Diplomatic and Consular intercepts for Dutch intercepts of Japanese naval traffic originating in the

Mandated Islands. In addition to this exchange of intercepts, the Dutch had also been requested, by the British, to co-operate with Australia in the interception of naval traffic originating from the Mandated Islands. The proposal was for the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board and the

Dutch authorities to co-ordinate their interception of Japanese naval traffic in the Mandated

Islands so as to eliminate any duplication of effort and ensure as complete a coverage as possible.17

In a letter to the Secretary of the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board, in February

1941, Acting Commander V. E. Kennedy RAN, RAN Liaison Officer Batavia, provided some details on the co-operation between the Netherlands East Indies authorities and Australia. He verified that the information being supplied by the Dutch Consul-General to Commander Long,

DNI (Melbourne) was accurate and that there was a complete working arrangement for the exchange of intelligence with COIS. He also advised that the Netherlands East Indies naval staff

16 NAA, MP1185/8, 2037/2/783, Report on Anglo-Dutch-Australian Combined Services Communications

Conference.

17 NAA, MP1185, 1937/2/415, minute by DSC dated 19 March 1941.

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had offered to supply an Enigma machine for direct communications between Batavia and the

Australian Commonwealth Naval Board.18

By mid-1941, a healthy, but limited exchange of cryptographic information had been

established between the Netherlands East Indies authorities and the British. This exchange was

subsequently extended to include Australia. The main beneficiaries of this exchange were the

British authorities who were not only receiving the benefits of the Dutch work on Consular

codes but an increased number of raw intercepts of naval and military traffic. Unfortunately, the

possibility of a deeper Anglo-Dutch cryptographic relationship did not exist because the

European Netherlands was an occupied territory and Dutch personnel could be recalled to

Europe and find themselves in the hands of the Germans. In addition there were indications that

Japanese agents in the South East Asian region were able to obtain secret information originated

by the Netherlands East Indies authorities.19 There was also, in senior British circles, a mistrust

of the Dutch possibly as a result of their pro-German stance during the First World War.

18 NAA, MP1185/8, 1855/2//339, letter by RANLO Batavia dated 14 February 1941. Kennedy describes the

Enigma machine as being portable and similar in appearance to one recently illustrated in a Confidential

Admiralty Fleet Order. The machine was ultimately provided as shown by a number of messages in

MP1074 which originated from Batavia are identified as having been encoded with the Enigma machine.

19 See Magic Background of Pearl Harbor: Vol 1, Department of Defense, Washington DC, 1977, pp.52-53.

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China

As well as exchanging information with the Dutch, the British attempted to establish some form of cryptographic liaison with the Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek. In doing so the British always had anxieties over the security of any information which was provided to the Chinese. The compromise of any cryptographic information could of course have had disastrous ramifications for the whole program.

The earliest effective cryptographic co-operation between China and Britain commenced in November 1940 when a group of Chinese cryptographers began operations in Hong Kong.

Although the British received the decrypts of intercepted Japanese messages the Chinese did not show them how they decoded the messages.20 In essence the Anglo-Chinese relationship resembled that between Britain and the United States during the First World War, except in this case Britain was the recipient of Chinese cryptographic successes. As the Japanese were preparing to attack Hong Kong the Chinese intercepted and deciphered the orders. With the impending fall of Hong Kong the cryptographic unit returned to China.

In January 1942 a second group of Chinese cryptographers were sent to aid the British, this time in Burma. The group set up operations in Rangoon intercepting Japanese air-ground

20 Maochun Yu, “Chinese Codebreakers, 1942–1945” in David Alvarez (ed.), Allied and Axis Signals

Intelligence in World War II, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 1999, p.208.

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communications. It soon became apparent however that Rangoon would fall to the Japanese and

this group also returned to China.

In August 1942 the Y (India) Board, which was responsible for co-ordinating Y

operations by the Indian Army, sought guidance from London as to the extent of co-operation

and exchange of Y information which could be undertaken with the Nationalist Chinese. Part of

the reason for this proposed interchange was that they believed the Chinese had access to

material originating from Russian Y sources.21 Major Ninaiping, officer commanding the new

Chinese Y Unit in India, had also advised that the Chinese were especially interested in Y

intelligence from naval sources. London agreed to provide Major Ninaiping with intelligence on the local situation and Y inference22 information only but no specific information on techniques.23 Here at last there appeared a degree of co-operation from the British side. The

British had also agreed to provide any technical equipment the Chinese required.

The Chinese unit was soon established in Delhi and commenced passing intercepts to the

British. But unbeknownst to the Chinese the British had also established their own intercept

organisation near Delhi. This was intercepting the same messages as the Chinese and ‘reverse

engineering’ the Chinese solutions to help in their own code breaking efforts. Once the British

21 TNA, WO208, 5037, Commander-in-Chief India message 2210Z/24 August 1942.

22 See Appendix 1.

23 TNA, HW57, 11.

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had managed to solve the Japanese systems the ‘assistance’ of the Chinese was no longer required and co-operation ended.24

Russia

The third minor cryptographic player in the region whom the British attempted to engage was the Russians. The German attack on Russia provided Britain with a new but unlikely ally, the

Soviet Union. Although their main attention was focused on the German onslaught, the

Russians were deeply interested, and suspicious of, Japanese intentions towards the Maritime

Provinces. These suspicions had their origins in the experience of the Russo-Japanese War of

1904-05, and in the multi-national intervention in Siberia, in which Japan had played a prominent part. They were reinforced in more recent times as a result of the two significant border ‘incidents’ at Nomonhan and Changkufeng/Lake Khasan in the late 1930s. As a consequence the Russians established an extensive defence network along their shared frontier.

Part of this frontier defence scheme might have involved a capacity for electronic eavesdropping. The extent and success of any such intelligence gathering operations is not known.

Britain began to supply the Russians with intelligence, including signals intelligence, following the German attack in 1941. In return, the British expected intelligence and other

24 See Yu, p.211. It should be noted that the United States also dealt with the Chinese in a similarly manner.

In the case of the US it was their failure to implement Article 18 of the SACO Agreement which dealt with

cryptographic co-operation between the two parties.

231

information. Negotiations with the Russians on formal exchanges were, to say the least,

difficult and no formal arrangements were entered into along the lines of the exchanges which

would eventually develop with the United States. The British, especially Admiral Godfrey the

Director of Naval Intelligence, were pressing the Russians to allow them to establish a liaison office in Vladivostok.25 Had they been allowed to establish such an office there is every

likelihood that they would have attempted to establish an interception facility along the lines of

the one established at Polyarno. The Russians, however, refused. One of their concerns was the

possible Japanese reaction.

This did not mean however that they did not exchange intelligence with Britain on

Japan. In July 1941 the Russians informed the British that the Kwantung Army was being

placed on a war footing. This was followed by a series of Anglo-Russian meetings on Japanese

order of battle topics. The information supplied to the British Army by the Russians was of

great value due to the paucity of real intelligence the British held on the Japanese Army. Shortly

after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor the Soviets advised the British that the Germans had

provided Japan with the key to one of the British naval codes.26 On 30 December 1941 the

Russians provided the British with complete details of the Japanese naval communications

network as at October, and informed them that all warship call signs had been changed.27 While

25 Bradley Smith, Sharing Secrets With Stalin - How the Allies Traded Intelligence 1941-1945, Kansas

University Press, Lawrence, 1996, p.39.

26 ibid, p.78.

27 ibid.

232

the Russians did provide some information which was of value to the British it did not reach the

quantities or quality that the British had hoped for.

Ultimately, attempts by both the RN and USN to develop a full and comprehensive

exchange of information with the Russian Navy on Japanese naval cryptographic systems

appear to have been fruitless.

United States of America

These international attempts by the British to broaden their cryptographic connections beyond her Dominions were minor in nature when compared with the establishment and development of the cryptographic relationship between the United States of America and the British.28 By far

the most complex, non-British, signals intelligence operation in the Pacific was that run by the

region’s second largest imperial power, the United States of America. The US Navy worked on

Japanese naval codes whereas the United States Army generally concentrated on Japanese

diplomatic codes. The course of the Anglo-American intelligence relationship during the war

years was not however always smooth sailing. Both nations had to overcome issues related to

self-interest, mutual suspicion and unco-operative officials. Ultimately goodwill and

28 Until the establishment of a single national cryptographic authority in the United States the British were

dealing with the single services, namely the Army and Navy. Hence the BRUSA Agreement was between

the US Army and the GC&CS, and likewise the Holden Agreement was between the US Navy and the

GC&CS.

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commonsense prevailed however and the relationship developed and flourished to the mutual advantage of both navies.29

General and signals intelligence co-operation between the United States and Great Britain

had its origins in the First World War. In the case of signals intelligence however the United

States was a recipient of processed British information, not a partner in the sense that would

develop during the Second World War. Prior to the United States entry into the War the greatest

single piece of signals intelligence provided by Britain to the United States was the Zimmermann

Telegram.30 This document, astutely used by Admiral W. R. Hall RN, was the catalyst for finally

bringing the United States into the War on the Allied side. With its entry into the War and the arrival of American warships in British waters the United States Navy became a consumer of

British signals intelligence. American ships, especially anti-submarine escorts, were provided

with charts showing the last known positions and movements of German submarines. This

information was obtained by the Admiralty’s chain of direction finding stations. Although such

29 Published histories of the development and workings of this relationship include Bradley F. Smith, The

MAGIC-ULTRA Deals, Airlife Publishing Ltd, London, 1993; R. L. Benson, A History of US

Communications Intelligence During World War II: Policy and Administration, National Security Agency,

Washington, 1997; Alan Harris Bath, Tracking the Axis Enemy: The Triumph of Anglo-American Naval

Intelligence, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 1998; Phyllis L. Soybel, “The Necessary Relationship:

The Development of Anglo-American Co-operation in Naval Intelligence, 1939–1943”, PhD Thesis,

University of Illinois, Chicago, 1997 and Gregory J. Florence, Courting A Reluctant Ally: An Evaluation of

US/UK Naval Intelligence Co-operation, 1935–1941, Joint Military Intelligence College, Washington DC,

2004.

30 See Barbara Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram, MacMillan Publishers, London, 1981.

234

information was made freely available to the Americans, the British ensured that no American

was granted access to the inner sanctum of Room 40. The British attitude, at this time, towards

cryptographic security is illustrated by a remark attributed to Admiral W. R. Hall, DNI

(Admiralty) during the First World War, when he is reported as having said “it is better to lose a

French auxiliary cruiser than let the Germans know intelligence secrets”.31 Britain’s cryptographic advantage in terms of the German codes was so great at this time of the War that

Britain had no need for anybody’s assistance and could call whatever tune it liked.

After the First World War the exchange of general intelligence between the two nations continued, although at a lower and more informal level than had been the case during the War.32

In part this was due not only to the USN’s view of the RN as a competitor, as well to the lack of any real need to exchange intelligence, but also to the general attitude of the governments on both sides of the Atlantic. By the early 1930s Mr Jay Moffat, Chief of the Division of Western

European Affairs in the State Department, noted ‘Anglo-American relations are growing visibly worse”.33 Throughout the 1930s however, a series of issues arose which resulted in a degree of

confidence building between the two nations and navies. One of these was mutual concern over

the expansionist activities of Japan. As a consequence, the United States Navy and Royal Navy

agreed, in 1937, to exchange technical information about the Imperial Japanese Navy.

31 Robert M. Grant, U-Boat Hunters: Code Breakers, Divers and the Defeat of the U-Boats, 1914–1918,

Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2003, p.41.

32 Bath, p.10.

33 Quoted in Greg Kennedy, Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the Far East, 1933–1939, Frank Cass,

London, 2002, p.122.

235

Information derived from signals intelligence was not specifically identified as included in this

exchange. It is possible that such information might have been provided with the source being disguised. Co-operation was further enhanced by the naval discussions held between Captain R.

E. Ingersoll USN and senior RN officers in London during 1938 and 1939. Discussions held on

14 January included an officer from GC&CS.34 There is no indication that his inclusion was a

precursor to a discussion on the possibility of a cryptographic exchange. Subsequent events

would indicate that the topic of code breaking had not been raised.

The first hint of a desire to initiate a formal cryptographic exchange occurred in October

1939 when the United States Naval Attaché in London, Captain Alan Kirk USN, was

approached by British naval authorities with a proposal to commence an exchange of

cryptographic material relating to the Imperial Japanese Navy.35 As a consequence of this

approach Captain Kirk sent a message to the US Navy Department advising: “intimation received willingness exchange full Orange cryptographic information if you agreeable”. As

Kirk had not received a response to this message by 27 November he repeated it. The next day the Navy Department advised that they were declining the offer as the USN was unable to offer an “equitable exchange” of information.36 This wording is interesting. The USN was, at this

stage, unaware of the state of the British code breaking effort against Japan.

34 NARA, RG38, Box 116, Correspondence re-British/US Conversations in London, 1938–1939.

35 Captain Tracy B. Kittredge, US – British Naval Co-operation, 1940–1945, US Naval Historical Center,

Operational Archives, Box 643, Folder 4, pg.267.

36 I am grateful to Mr John Lundstrom for providing me with the details of these messages.

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The British were not deterred however, and another approach was apparently made in

1940, although this time for co-operation on a wider basis.37 It is possible, however, that the approach referred to as being made in early 1940 was the same one initiated in October/

November 1939. All of these approaches were ultimately rejected by the United States Navy.

Even though the USN was interested in obtaining information on the Imperial Japanese Navy it was, however, not yet inclined to engage in an extensive intelligence co-operation, either internationally or on an inter-service basis with the US Army. The rejection of these British approaches also came at a time when the administration in the United States was not in a position, politically, whereby it could engage in formal international military co-operation.

These British approaches for co-operation came six months after the introduction of JN-

25, or as the British referred to it the ‘5 Figure Operational Code’. This provides some indication as to the degree of difficulty the British were having in breaking JN-25. The British were very anxious to achieve a meaningful break into JN-25 so as to obtain adequate warning of

Japanese intentions and moves. Their entire military and political position in South East Asia

depended upon it.

The approaches to the Americans stand in marked contrast to the British attitude towards

the French earlier in 1939 when DNI (Admiralty) authorised discussions with local French naval intelligence officers. Issues which could be discussed were limited to measures associated with trade protection and disposition of warships. The only restriction put in place related to

37 Benson, p.16.

237

‘Most Secret sources’38 and the workings of its associated organisation. Any information which fell into this category had to be disguised so as not to reveal the actual source.39

By mid-1940 the Anglo-American suspicions of the late 1930s had slowly given way to

a realisation of the need for mutual support and co-operation. In August 1940 the first

formalised staff talks took place between the American and British. These talks, styled the

Standardisation of Arms Committee in order to hide their true purpose, laid the groundwork for

future intelligence co-operation between Britain and America. It was during these talks on 31

August 1940 that Brigadier General George Strong, US Army, stunned his fellow participants

by suggesting a full exchange on cryptographic methods.40 In extending his offer Strong was

doing so as an Army officer and could not speak on behalf of the USN. He was also unaware of

the previous British overtures to the USN and that organisation’s rejection of them.

Subsequently, Strong advised US Army authorities in Washington of his proposal to exchange

cryptographic information. On 11 September 1940 General Miles responded by advising that cryptographic information could be passed to the British Empire.41 As a consequence of the US

Navy’s previously hostile attitude towards a cryptographic exchange Admiral R. L. Ghormley

USN, the United States Special Naval Observer (London), had to seek advice from his superiors

38 A euphemism for signals intelligence.

39 NAA, MP1074/8, Inwards signals April to June 1939: DNI message 3 May 1939

40 Smith, The MAGIC-ULTRA Deals, p.43.

41 NARA, RG457, Box 1413, Chronology of Co-operation Between SSA and the London office of GC&CS,

p.3.

238

as to the Navy’s current position on such an exchange in view of the position taken by the US

Army.

Following this initial offer, relatively slow progress was made towards co-operation. The next tentative steps appear to have been at a meeting in London on 23 October 1940, between

Admiral Ghormley USN, Admiral Godfrey RN (DNI) and Brigadier Menzies, Chief of SIS/MI6

(who administered GC&CS). Those present agreed to hold discussions in Washington in an attempt to broker an agreement. This initial agreement was eventually concluded in December

1940.42 Neither Australia nor any other Dominions were consulted or advised of these decisions.

Once the discussions by the Standardisation of Arms Committee were completed, the

US Army and Air Corps representatives returned to the United States. Admiral Ghormley remained behind in London and continued to hold discussions with the Royal Navy. Although sent to the United Kingdom by Admiral H. R. Stark USN, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral

Ghormley’s position was not as straight forward as it might have appeared. During the course of his discussions he was told, in no uncertain terms, by Admiral Stark that “he was expressing only [his] own views”.43 This statement would subsequently allow Stark to withdraw any commitments made by Ghormley should they become politically or militarily unacceptable.

Prior to the commencement of the Standardisation of Arms talks the Royal Navy had established a committee entitled the ‘Committee on Naval Co-operation With the United States

42 Smith, The MAGIC-ULTRA Deals, p.52.

43 NHC, Kittridge Papers, Folder 4, Stark to Ghormley, 17 October 1940, p.239.

239

Navy in the Event of the USA Entering the War’. This was chaired by Admiral Sir Sidney R.

Bailey RN, and became known as the Bailey Committee. Ghormley’s new task, in association

with the Committee, was to flesh out some of the details of future co-operation between the two

navies. In the ensuing weeks a number of meetings were held. The meetings of 23 September

and 16 October dealt with intelligence exchanges in the Far East. The 16 October meeting also

dealt with co-operation in the Far East.44

At these meetings it was agreed that there would be an exchange of details on intelligence centres and HF/DF stations. In addition it was recommended that the FECB should provide information to the USN. No specific mention was made at this stage of a cryptographic

exchange. This did not however exclude one country from providing the other with information

derived from cryptography without identifying the nature of the source. The recommendations contained within the Bailey Committee report was endorsed by the USN CNO in late November

1940.45 In December 1940 initial discussions were also held between the British and Americans

with a view to improving co-operation on Far Eastern intelligence.

As the general climate of trust and co-operation improved a team of US Navy and Army

cryptographers departed America, in early 1941, to visit Bletchley Park. They took with them a

number of cryptographic items including a Purple Analogue machine.46 For the British these

44 NHC, Kittridge Papers, Folder 4, p.289.

45 Bath, p.43.

46 The first US team to visit Bletchley Park took with them two Purple Analogue machines and an amount of

other material. By the end of 1941 the British had also received two J-19s and two Red machines for

240

items were just as significant as the technology transferred to the United States by the Tizzard mission.47 Arriving in February the American group remained in the UK until April 1941 when they returned to the US on board a British destroyer. During their stay they were shown

“everything” and briefed on Enigma. The Enigma briefings were sensitive but not in sufficient technical detail so as to allow the Americans to duplicate the work being done at Bletchley

Park.48

Shortly after the arrival of the US mission to Bletchley Park the Admiralty authorised the FECB to commence a formal exchange of cryptographic information with US Naval authorities at Station CAST in the Philippines. Even though an exchange had been authorised between that FECB and CAST, the RAN was not included in this arrangement and any

Australian material was forwarded via the FECB. The British had ensured they would be the conduit for any contact between cryptographic organisations. The first exchange of JN-25 material occurred on 28 February 1941.49 Shortly after the commencement of the exchange of

reading the naval attaché codes. One each of the later was forwarded to Singapore. See Ronald W. Clark,

The Man Who Broke Purple, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1977, p.121.

47 For details on the Tizzard Mission see David Zimmerman, Top Secret Exchange: The Tizzard Mission and

the Scientific War, Sutton Publishing, London, 1997.

48 Benson, p.20.

49 Pfennigwerth, p.147. Another source, TNA, ADM 223/496, Case 53820, Collaboration of British and US

Radio Intelligence, shows that the co-operation started in May 1941. This document also indicates that the

British might have been well ahead of the USN in solving JN-25. The Admiralty also authorized a full

exchange of information in the West Indies, see TNA, ADM 116/6320, Case 6636, Admiralty message

1351/18 February 1941.

241

technical cryptographic data Lieutenant Dennis USN arrived in Singapore to act as liaison officer between the British and USN organisations.50 Dennis brought with him copies of the

Merchant Ship Code, Japanese Naval Call signs (in tabular form), the Japanese Naval Personnel code and the Hagi diplomatic code. In return, the Americans received a copy of the current JN-

25 book including indicators and subtractor tables.51 The Australian SIB subsequently received a copy of the Japanese Merchant Ships Naval Liaison Code in June 1941. This was almost certainly a duplicate of that provided to the FECB by the Americans, and was possibly the code referred to by Commander Newman when he wrote that “Consular, Diplomatic, four-figure

Naval and Merchant Ship broadcast codes and ciphers have now been made available [to the

FECB] from friendly sources”.52

As the American team was being shown the secrets of Bletchley Park, a British naval officer Lieutenant W. S. L. Bartram RNVR was in Washington discussing the possibility of co- operation between the RN and USN direction finding organisations in the Atlantic. In the course of his visit to Washington Lieutenant Bartram had discussions with Commander L. F. Safford

USN who requested copies of wireless activity reports and Admiralty Chart Folio Y, as used for plotting direction finding fixes. Arrangements were also made for the training of a USN officer and Petty Officer. The biggest hurdle with respect to co-operation on direction finding issues was technology. At this stage the USN equipment could not lock on to the short messages which

50 TNA, HW4, 25, History of HMS Anderson, Chapter 3, p.2.

51 ibid. The history also claimed that the Americans had no information on the JN-25 book, indicators or

subtractors.

52 NAA, MP1185, 1937/2/415, minute by DSC dated 19 March 1941.

242

were being used by the Germans. In order to rectify this, the British were considering supplying

Adcock direction finding equipment to the USN.53

During the course of the Anglo-American Staff Conversations (known as ABC-1), held in Washington from 29 January 1941 through to 29 March 1941, the issue of intelligence co- operation was raised and it was agreed that there would be a “full and prompt exchange of pertinent information”54 and that “intelligence liaison will be established not only through the

Military Missions but also between all echelons in the field”.55 Although signals intelligence,

and in particular cryptographic co-operation, was not specifically mentioned in the context of

intelligence co-operation it appears to have been included as part of the spirit of the agreement.

This is borne out by the inclusion of H/F direction finding as part of the communications annex

to the report. This annex stated that both the USN and RN would exchange information

essential for communication between them. Included was “data as to locations and organisation

of strategic direction finding stations”.56 Furthermore, plans were to be drawn up for the joint

53 TNA, ADM116, 6320, Special Intelligence, Commander-in-Chief America and West Indies Station letter

dated 28 March 1941. Commander Safford’s willingness to cooperate on direction finding issues is

interesting given his attitude towards a cryptographic exchange with the British. See also Kathleen Broome

Williams, Secret Weapon: US High-Frequency Direction Finding in the Battle of the Atlantic, NIP

Annapolis 1996 for technical details concerning the development and operation of direction finding

equipment.

54 AWM124, 4/149, United States-British Staff Conversations Report (ABC-1), dated 27 March 1941,

paragraph 19.

55 ibid.

56 ibid, Annex 4 Communications.

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operation of USN and RN strategic direction finding stations.57 The British military authorities

having sanctioned these technical discussions and agreements still reserved the right to examine

and approve them on an individual basis.58

On 14 March 1941 COIS advised the Admiralty that co-operation with the USN was proving successful and enquiries were made of the USN Observer at Singapore if similar co- operation between the FECB and the US Army were possible. In initiating this approach COIS

acknowledged the lack of co-operation between the USN and US Army.59 The Admiralty

responded by indicating to COIS that full co-operation between the FECB and the US Army

organisation in the Philippines should be established. The possibility of assigning two Army

interpreters to the FECB was also raised by the Admiralty and supported by COIS.60

Unfortunately for all concerned it appears as if the proposed attachment of US Army linguists to the FECB was overtaken by the Japanese attack on the European powers in the Asia-Pacific region.

To further improve co-ordination between the British and American cryptographic organisations the Director GC&CS, Commander Alistair Denniston RNR, flew to the United

States, in mid-1941, in an attempt to convince the Americans to concentrate all their efforts on

Japanese naval and military codes and ciphers and to leave the German work to the United

57 ibid.

58 ibid. This Annex carried the caveat “Subject to the Approval of the British Chiefs of Staff”.

59 TNA, WO208, 2049A, message from COIS to Admiralty 1608Z/14 March 1941.

60 TNA, WO208, 2049A, message from Admiralty to COIS 1819Z/22 March 1941.

244

Kingdom. He was successful in having the US Army agree to his proposal and as a consequence

arranged for an Army cryptographer from the FECB to go to Washington as a liaison officer.61

The USN wished however to avoid a repeat of the situation in the First World War whereby it was just a consumer of the British cryptographic product and refused to agree. During the course of this visit Denniston commented on the possibility of cryptographic co-operation between the British and the Netherlands East Indies. Had the Americans already been aware that such an arrangement was already in place they might have been left wondering how open he was being with respect to other issues.

On 6 June 1941 the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee of the War Cabinet discussed the proposal from Brigadier General Raymond E. Lee US Army that “all echelons of the intelligence personnel in the Far East should co-operate completely with American agencies there”. The Foreign Office prepared a statement in which they recommended the “complete exchange of intelligence” with the Americans including information from SIS sources, which was to be released from the FECB only. In essence the FECB was to be the single conduit for the release or exchange of intelligence with the US in the Far East. This also precluded the RAN from negotiating a separate agreement with the Americans should either party have the desire to do so. Details on the British Special Operations Executive organisation in the Far East were excluded from any exchange of information. Notwithstanding the fact that General Lee could not talk on behalf of the US Navy, the Admiralty were keen to ensure that this co-operation covered both the Army and the Navy. A letter advising General Lee of the British desire to co-

61 TNA, HW43/76, Allied Sigint Policy and Organisation: Chapter IV, p.269.

245

operate and have this extended to the Navy was prepared. The British also wished to include the

Soviet Maritime Provinces, especially Vladivostok, in this agreement. In the course of their discussions the Sub-committee noted that an American representative was already “associated with” the FECB.62

With the initial burst of goodwill cryptographic co-operation between the two future allies blossomed. The diplomatic and strategic tensions and trials of the War lay in the future.

The British in Singapore provided the US Navy cryptographers in Cavite with copies of intercepted B machine traffic. Work on keys to the main diplomatic cypher, known as FUJI, was to be divided between the US and the British with the latter handling European traffic and the US handling American and Asian.63 In order to facilitate co-operation between the USN at

Cavite and the British in Singapore an exchange of liaison officers, actually described as observers, was arranged. All traffic to be sent to Cavite was encoded into American codes in the

USN liaison officer’s office in Singapore and then transmitted to Cavite.64 There was no direct

Australian participation in this arrangement except for Australian material which might have been passed by the British to the Americans.

Further evidence of the deepening intelligence relationship between the United States and Britain became evident when on 2 September 1941 a message from the Australian Legation

62 TNA, CAB81/88, JIC(41)15–Co-operation with the USA in Intelligence Matters in the Far East, dated 6

June 1941.

63 TNA, HW57, 9, message from Denniston dated 19 August 1941.

64 TNA, HW57, 9, COIS message dated 16 August 1941.

246

in Washington advised that the British government had agreed to an exchange of intelligence between US and British officials in Far East. The following guidelines were issued by UK officials:

a. US not at war: US officials are to be treated frankly but not given information on future

plans without special authority. Information from most secret sources to be exchanged

via FECB. b. US in war: existing intelligence agencies co-operate as independent agencies but will

maintain close liaison.65

This message appears to be the first occasion whereby Australia has been formally advised of discussions or decisions emanating from Washington. Previous advice had reached

Australia by either London or the FECB.

In October 1941 the Assistant Naval Attaché in Washington, Lieutenant Commander C.

C. Martell RN, reported to the DNI (Admiralty) that the USN had cracked a particular Japanese code, which he did not identify, and were obtaining a good deal of information from it. He went on to report that the Consular Codes had been obtained by break-in rather than cryptographic effort. Utilising burglary to obtain copies of secret codes, or other documents, is an extremely dangerous approach as there is always the possibility that the break-in will be discovered and any strategic advantage gained quickly negated by a change of codes or operational plans.66

65 NAA MP1049, 1877/10/37, Cablegram From Secretary State dated 2 September 1941.

66 TNA, ADM223/505, NID Volume 53, Report on USN Communications, dated October 1942.

247

With the situation in the Far East rapidly deteriorating, the Admiralty sent Commander

J. M. de Marbois, the Canadian DNI, to visit the US Navy Department to discuss the possibility of an exchange of HF/DF bearings between US and Canadian direction finding stations. These discussions took place on 5 November 1941 and resulted in the exchange being implemented.67

The decision, by the USN, to directly negotiate with the Canadians on this exchange was at variance with its earlier attitude when the issue of trilateral co-operation between Britain,

Canada and the USN was raised. On that occasion the USN told the British that the signals intelligence relationship was a Washington/London one and the USN would not deal directly with Ottawa, or other British Dominions for that matter.68 Whereas the USN’s attitude in how it

dealt with the Canadians changed during the war, this change was not extended to either

Australia or New Zealand. In the case of both countries their interests were looked after by the

British, and neither had a seat at the decision-making table. This was a reflection of the

American view that these countries were subordinate to London. It also negated the requirement

for the USN to deal with the Dominions on a one on one basis.

With the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941 the exchange of cryptographic

information was no longer an issue. The Australian Legation in Washington was able to inform

Canberra, on 19 December, that ‘certain intelligence based on official communiqués I am

informed is now being passed to Admiralty only as it is felt they are in best position to compare

67 NARA, RG38, Box 22, Exchange of Bearings With Canadian HF/DF Organisation, Navy Department

memorandum dated 14 November 1941.

68 TNA, HW57, 9, message from Denniston dated 19 August 1941.

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and evaluate before distribution’.69 But the machinery and methodology associated with co-

operation between and co-ordination of the various cryptographic organisations had yet to be

fully resolved. The negotiations associated with these issues would last almost as long as the

War itself.

During 1942, in an attempt to resolve the many issues of cryptographic co-operation and

co-ordination, Commander Edward Travis RN led a GC&CS delegation in the first formal

cryptographic negotiations with the USN. The agreement that resulted from these discussions

was signed on 2 October 1942 by Captain Carl F. Holden USN, the US Navy's Director of

Communications, and as a result is generally known as the Holden Agreement.70 In essence the

Holden Agreement recognised US dominance and expertise in the breaking of Japanese naval codes and effectively restricted British efforts to research only.71 On the issue of German naval

codes however there was to be full collaboration.72 As a consequence of this agreement the

British cryptographic effort against Japan was based in GC&CS and the new facility at Kilindini.

Australia, and the small RAN cryptographic organisation, was not a party to these negotiations

and as it fell within the US sphere of defence responsibility the British were not inclined to raise

issues or arguments on Australia’s behalf. Co-operation on naval signals intelligence was no

69 NAA, MP1049, 1877/10/45, cablegram from Australian Legation Washington dated 19 December 1941.

70 The Holden Agreement is reproduced in full in Appendix 2.

71 In reality the British did not have the human resources to commit to solving IJN codes. See TNA, HW8/49,

History of Liaison With OP20G, p.8.

72 Ralph Erskine, “The Holden Agreement on Naval Sigint: The First BRUSA?”, Intelligence and National

Security, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer 1999), p.187.

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longer seen as being a sharing by equals. The US Navy was clearly intent on achieving a position of cryptographic dominance based on British expertise. For the most part the RAN was on the sidelines and not involved directly in the arguments or discussions over signals intelligence policy and organisation.

The restriction of British work on Japanese naval code breaking appeared to be a natural decision in 1942 when the Royal Navy had virtually withdrawn from the War against Japan. But it became an issue of concern later in the War when the Royal Navy returned to the Pacific. The cryptographic division of labour formalised under the Holden Agreement could also have been the basis for the rather cryptic comment by Professor F. H. Hinsley where he states “we have not attempted to cover the war in the Far East; when this was so much the concern of the United

States, it is not possible to provide an adequate account on the basis of the British archives alone”.73 Subsequent releases of archival records from the Public Records Office clearly show that this cannot be the sole reason for the omission.74 The Holden Agreement established the future direction of subsequent signals intelligence agreements between the United States of

America, Great Britain and other nations whereby the United States would be the first amongst equals with Great Britain and other nations relegated to the second tier. As Alan Bath put it “co- operation did not mean partnership”.75

73 Hinsley, p.ix.

74 Professor Hinsley, as an officer of GC&CS, formed part of a team responsible for negotiating an extension

to the Holden Agreement later in the War. It is possible that the outcome of these agreements influenced

what was included and what was excluded from the Official Histories.

75 Bath, p.8. This comment applies equally to both partners.

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One of the outcomes for the Royal Navy, of the Holden Agreement was that it began to

obtain sufficient intercepted material to concentrate on a small number of Japanese naval codes.

Included in these was JN-25. Research on this code had almost come to a standstill in 1942.76

This concentration of cryptographic material also facilitated the training of future cryptographers, as they had a consistent level of intercepted messages from specific codes from which to work. In February 1943 a complete training package of JN-25 material was sent from

Washington to GC&CS.

In negotiating the Holden Agreement the British realised that they were dealing with just the USN. Although they appreciated this, what they failed to realise was that the Agreement was with the Director of Communications who controlled the cryptographic functions, but had no responsibility for intelligence generally.77 This function lay with the Office of Naval

Intelligence. This omission was to cause some angst between the British Naval Intelligence

Division and the Office of Naval Intelligence with respect to the flow of USN originated

intelligence to the British Eastern Fleet. A further issue of concern for the British lay in the

designation, as a consequence of the Holden Agreement, of Colombo as an exploitation centre,

rather than a code breaking centre. Once the British decided to relocate functions from Kilindini

to Colombo, Colombo ceased being an exploitation centre and took on the roles previously

undertaken at Kilindini. However because the Americans continued to view it as an exploitation

76 TNA, HW43/76, Allied Sigint Policy and Organisation: Chapter IV, p.298.

77 TNA, HW43/76, p.301.

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centre, rather than a fully functioning code breaking organisation, it was not initially made part of the Melbourne-Honolulu-Washington information exchange circuit.

The development by the RN of an Imperial signals intelligence organisation in the Far

East had been the initial impetus for the establishment of an RAN signals intelligence capability. While the British, with their greater resources and broader requirements were able to establish a functioning organisation during the 1930s, the RAN was more constrained in what it could achieve. In an attempt to enhance their capability the British approached various countries with a view to establishing a signals intelligence exchange. Ultimately, they were able to establish co-operative agreements with the Netherlands East Indies and the USN. In the case of the agreement with the Netherlands East Indies the RAN was a knowledgeable and active participant coordinating its efforts against the Japanese with that of the Netherlands East Indies authorities. The USN on the other hand, with its interests in both the Atlantic and Pacific

Oceans, dealt only with the British as they saw the Dominions navies as being British rather than national sub-elements of a larger capability. The British, on the other hand, did not understand the internal divisions within the USN. Notwithstanding these misperceptions and occasional obstinacy and confusion, co-operation between the USN and Britain on naval signals intelligence developed. But this development was to have an important and unforeseen impact on the RAN’s signals intelligence capability during and after the Pacific War.

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Chapter 8

War In The Pacific, 1941-1942

On 6 December 1941, with almost impeccable timing, the Secretary of State for the Colonies dispatched a message to the Governor of the Straits Settlements asking if he had any indications that Japan was about to attack Thailand.1 This message was received in Singapore on 7

December, the day before the Japanese attack on Malaysia, had commenced.

During late November and early December the British and RAN signals intelligence organisations had intercepted various messages which provided indications of imminent military action by the Japanese.2 In addition to these intercepted messages the FECB had monitored the withdrawal of Japanese merchant ships from regular trade routes. On 21 November the

Combined Operational Intelligence Centre in Melbourne reported, based on information received from Singapore that only one Japanese merchant ship, the Terukawa Maru, was in a South

American port3. On 1 December all Japanese Naval call signs were changed.4 This change was

1 TNA, ADM199/142A, 53756, Secretary of State for the Colonies message 1863 dated 6 December 1941.

2 These indicators include the previously mentioned Winds Message and instructions to destroy

cryptographic material.

3 COIC Daily Summary of Operational Intelligence, dated 21 November 1941. Even though the summary is

dated 21 November the contents reflect activities over the preceding 24 hours.

4 The Japanese decision for war was made at an Imperial Conference on 1 December 1941.

253

another indicator of a possible Japanese strike as the call signs had been changed on 1 November and usually remained in force for six months. Following this change the Commander-in-Chief

China Station ordered all British and Allied merchant ships north of Hong Kong to withdraw and ships over 4,000 tons to sail south for Singapore. Restrictions were also placed on ships sailing from Singapore. The Netherlands East Indies authorities issued similar instructions. The

Combined Operational Intelligence Centre Daily Summary for 6 December 1941 noted the sailing of the last Japanese merchant ship in South and Central America and added the comment that this “completes the evacuation of all such shipping from outside Japanese controlled waters”. A second item detailed was the content of a message from the Japanese Consul General in Sydney, dated 5 December, to the Japanese Society in Darwin seeking details of how many

Japanese pearlers could leave immediately.5 When these messages and other indicators were coupled with the movement of Japanese Naval forces in to the Gulf of Thailand it became apparent that the Japanese had decided to act. What was not evident in the intercepted messages was the actual target of the Japanese. The lack of this information, coupled with political considerations, resulted in strategic paralysis in the British higher command. As a consequence the pre-war plan for the defence of Malaya, Operation MATADOR,6 was not implemented.

When the Japanese transports arrived at their destinations and landed their troops the British

5 Combined Operational Intelligence Centre Daily Summary, dated 6 December 1941. The reference to

pearlers was to indentured labourers and not pearling luggers.

6 For a history and development of Operation MATADOR see Ong Chit Chung, Operation Matador:

Britain’s War Plans Against the Japanese, 1918–1941, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1997.

254

were unable to mount an effective resistance and thus allowed the Japanese to consolidate their

positions ashore rapidly and strike south.7

The FECB had been able to provide sufficient information as to constitute a war warning, however, the subsequent failure by the operational commanders to act in sufficient time to prevent the Japanese from establishing themselves in northern Malaya is inexcusable. The importance of preventing such an occupation was clearly articulated by the British Chiefs of

Staff in August 1940.8 The failure by the British to, not only act, but also to hold the Japanese

could be blamed in part on the lack of material but also on an attitude of cultural superiority

which either ignored or misinterpreted the available intelligence.9

With the failure to take the necessary decisions to implement Operation MATADOR, the

British plans for the defence of Malaya were thrown into disarray. Adding to this operational

confusion was the fact that with the outbreak of war, the war warning functions of the FECB

ceased and thus its raison d’être. Even though the FECB had not been able to provide the

information as to exactly when and where the Japanese would strike it did provide the indicators,

7 See Sir Andrew Gilchrist, Malaya 1941: The Fall of a Fighting Empire, Robert Hale, London, 1992.

8 NAA, MP1049/5, 2026/2/382, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs cablegram dated 11 August 1940.

This cablegram forwarded to the Australian Prime Minister a copy of the British Chiefs of Staff

appreciation of the situation in the Far East. This appreciation articulated the requirement to plan for the

defence of Malaya and not just Singapore.

9 See Douglas Ford, Britain’s Secret War Against Japan, 1937–1945, Routledge, London, 2006, in particular

Chapter 1 and Arthur J. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies: the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese

Navy Strategic Illusions 1936–1941, OUP, London, 1981, p.349, et seq.

255

as was suggested in 1934, of impending Japanese action. Within a fortnight of the Japanese

attack the Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet agreed to the removal of the Army and Air

Intelligence components from the FECB. The Army and Air Sections were relocated closer to

the newly established Combined Army and RAF HQ near Singapore Town. This organisational

dislocation at such a critical time is perhaps an example of the inter-service tensions which

existed within the FECB in the pre-war days.10 Another casualty of the commencement of

hostilities was the Diplomatic Section of the FECB. The outbreak of the Pacific War saw a

change in the patterns of Japanese diplomatic traffic in the region. The British were no longer in

a position to attempt to exploit this traffic as the all resources of the FECB were now dedicated to the production of operational intelligence.11 This allowed for the redeployment of the

diplomatic staff to other functions either within the organisation or elsewhere. One of these men

was Paymaster Lieutenant Commander Alan Merry RN who was eventually sent to Melbourne.12

The effects of the lack of resources devoted to the solution of Japanese cryptographic

systems prior to the war began to show under pressure of daily combat operations. Not a single

Japanese naval or military cryptographic system was being read currently.13 The result was that

the British forces in the field were receiving little intelligence of any use on Japanese

10 See Peter Elphick, Far Eastern Intelligence File: The Intelligence War In The Far East 1930–1945, Hodder

& Stoughton, London, 1997.

11 Marder Papers, Harkness to Marder, 11 July 1978.

12 TNA, HW4/25, 61443, History of HMS Anderson, p.28.

13 TNA, HW43/76, Allied Sigint Policy and Organisation: Chapter IV, p.270.

256

dispositions, plans or movements, and by the time they did it was out of date. Some minor

tactical information however was being obtained by traffic analysis and direction finding.

Following their landings on the Kra Isthmus the Japanese advanced rapidly down the

Malay Peninsula, thus undermining the pre-war assumptions and military infrastructure that

under-pinned the defence of Singapore. As a consequence of the failure of these pre-war plans

and the rapidly deteriorating military position, the decision was made to withdraw the FECB

from Singapore lest the organisation become trapped and its irreplaceable personnel and records

be captured by the Japanese. Such an outcome would have been a far greater disaster than any of

the military defeats suffered in the first half of 1942 as it would have alerted the Japanese, and by

extension the Germans, to the extent of the Anglo-American signals intelligence operations.14 On

22 December 1941 the Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet requested advice from the Australian

Commonwealth Naval Board as to whether facilities existed to cater for the relocation of the

Navy Y and Special Intelligence Sections to Australia.15 The Australian Commonwealth Naval

Board responded by advising that office accommodation could be arranged. There were,

however, no spare receiving stations in Australia. Both the British and Australians were now

paying the price for their slowness in developing adequate facilities during the late 1930s and early 1940s.

14 The Commander-in-Chief India, observing the deteriorating situation in Malaya, signaled, the Commander-

in-Chief Far East on 17 December requesting the transfer of Army intelligence, including Y, personnel to

India. The following day his request was a recommendation. See TNA, WO194/920.

15 NAA, MP1185/8, 1937/2/159, Commander in Chief Eastern Fleet message 1729Z/22 December 1941.

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By 21 December ‘consideration’ had given way to ‘urgent consideration’ as a new home was sought not only for the naval signals intelligence component of the FECB but also for the Army and RAF components.16 The safety of Singapore was proving to be illusory with almost daily

Japanese air raids.17 Shortly after the fall of Hong Kong, the decision was made to relocate the

FECB to a safer operating base. The first steps towards the evacuation of the command elements

from the Imperial bastion at Singapore were being taken barely three weeks after the outbreak of

war in the Far East.18 On 2 January 1942 the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board advised

Australian authorities that the Admiralty had decided that the naval component of the FECB

would be operating from Colombo from 5 January 1942.19

In preparation for the relocation to Colombo, the Naval Section of FECB was split into

two roughly equal components. The Singapore unit was to remain operational until the new

Colombo organisation had been established and was up and running. Once this occurred the

Singapore contingent would then be withdrawn to Colombo. On 5 January 1942 the Naval

Section of FECB with much of their equipment and records were embarked on board the

16 TNA, WO193/875, message CIGS to Wavell 21 December 1941 “Question of transfer of Y personnel

under urgent consideration by Inter-service Y Board”.

17 By this stage the British had already lost the direction finding stations at Penang, demolished on 13

December, and Kuching, demolished on 24 December. Personnel from these stations escaped capture by

the Japanese. The facilities at Stonecutters Island were destroyed when Hong Kong fell to the Japanese. See

TNA, HW4/27, 53347, Quarterly Y Report, dated 30 April 1942.

18 The earlier American reluctance to commit the Pacific Fleet to the defence of Singapore was fully justified.

See Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare.

19 NAA, MP1185/8, 1937/2/159, Naval Board message dated 1356Z/2 January 1942.

258

transport Devonshire at Singapore. In the course of the final evacuation and subsequent surrender of Singapore all the remaining records and equipment held by FECB, were to be destroyed.20 Included in the equipment left behind and, assumed to have been destroyed, was one of the American Purple analogue machines.21 The naval component was transferred to

Ceylon and the Army and Air Force elements relocated to India. To all intents and purposes, with the evacuation of the dispersal of the Service Sections the FECB ceased to exist. The function of the Naval Section now became to provide naval intelligence to Admiral Sir James

Sommerville, Commander-in-Chief East Indies Fleet; Vice Admiral Sir G. Layton RN and the

Flag Officer (Ceylon).22 A USN liaison officer was subsequently attached to the cryptographic organisation in Colombo.

The loss of Singapore and almost all of the British intercept and direction finding stations necessitated a re-organisation of the RN's signals intelligence organisation. Initially the Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet intended to reconstitute an organisation similar to the

FECB in Ceylon under Captain K. Harkness, RN. The Army and RAF components of this organisation would come from personnel evacuated from Java. This plan did not materialise however.23 The main base for a reconstituted naval only signals intelligence organisation was to be HMS Anderson on the outskirts of Colombo, where were located about half the former

20 J. Bleakley, The Eavesdroppers, AGPS, Canberra, 1992, p.26.

21 Ralph Erskine, “When a Purple Machine Went Missing: How Japan Nearly Discovered America’s Greatest

Secret”, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 12, Issue 3 (July 1997).

22 Marder Papers, Harkness to Marder, 11 July 1978.

23 TNA, WO208/2049, message from Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet to Admiralty 0621/10 March 1941.

259

FECB naval staff. Intelligence reports from Anderson were originated under the signal address of Captain on Staff, Colombo. The remainder of the staff would be transferred in June to

Kilindini, Mombassa, to form HMS Alidina, and originated signals as Captain on Staff,

Kilindini.24 The organisational splitting of the RN signals intelligence resources was

undertaken by the local commanders and not referred back to GC&CS. The decision was to have a major impact on the future of signals intelligence support for the Royal Navy in the region.25 The new naval signals intelligence organisation established following the evacuation

from Singapore served the Commander-in-Chief Far East Fleet and no longer had the veneer

of being a joint service organisation. Military and Air intelligence needs would be met by a

second organisation established in India.

As the British were in the process of re-locating to Ceylon and elsewhere there occurred

an event off Darwin which had the potential to alter significantly the tide of the signals

intelligence war. On January 1942 the Australian corvette HMAS Deloraine, in company with

other ships, sank the Japanese submarine I124 in shallow waters off Darwin. This was a small singular victory, in an otherwise long chain of disasters. Once the sunken vessel was located and

secured, divers were sent down to attempt to enter the submarine.26 The purpose was to obtain

whatever intelligence, including code books, was available and accessible in the submarine.

24 NAA, MP1074/7, 4/6/1942 to 14/6/1942: COS Colombo message 0541Z/12 June 1942.

25 TNA, HW43/76, Allied Sigint Policy and Organisation: Chapter IV, p.284.

26 NAA, MP1074/7, 13/1/1942 to 29/1/1942: ACNB message 0546Z/28 January 1942.

260

Unfortunately there appears to be no details as to what, if anything at all, was retrieved from the sunken submarine.27

The rapid Japanese advance and corresponding collapse of the Allied positions in the

South East Asian region resulted not only in the displacement of these highly specialised personnel but also in the loss of a significant proportion of the Allied signals intelligence infrastructure. As a consequence, there was a need for re-organisation and consolidation. But these changes had to be carried out against the background of the ongoing conflict with Japan.

One of the first organisational changes to occur was as a result of a New Zealand proposal that the signals intelligence efforts of Australia and New Zealand would be co-ordinated by

Australia.28 In effect this meant that the Australian and New Zealand naval signals intelligence organisations would become a single entity co-ordinated by the RAN. The operational tasking of the Australian organisation also changed to meet the new strategic circumstances and it was no longer required to intercept or monitor German frequencies.

As the staff from the now defunct FECB began to settle into their new homes, the British began to take stock of the signals intelligence situation not only at the operational level in the Far

East but also at the strategic level in London where the role of the Y Committee was being

27 Normal Polmar and Dorr Carpenter claim that US Navy divers entered the sunken submarine and retrieved

its code books. No additional evidence has been cited which supports this claim. See Norman Polmar and

Dorr B. Carpenter, Submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy 1904–1945, Conway Maritime Press,

London, 1986, p.19.

28 NAA, MP1185/8, 1937/2/159, DNI (Wellington) message 1016M/9 January 1942.

261

reviewed.29 As part of this organisational assessment Commander Nave, at the Admiralty’s

request, provided the British authorities in London with a synopsis of the state of intercept work

in Australia. Intercepted material was still being received from the Dutch, although this would

shortly cease. Japanese consular messages were partly readable and a degree of progress had

been made on unspecified codes linked to the Mandated Islands.30 In addition, messages on

various Diplomatic circuits were also being intercepted in Australia:

• Tokyo to Santiago;

• Tokyo to Bangkok;

• German diplomatic traffic from Santiago;

• Japanese diplomatic traffic from Santiago;

• Rio de Janeiro to Tokyo; and,

• from Berlin, Japanese Naval and Military Attaches and German diplomatic traffic.31

The Australian intercept material was being supplemented by material intercepted in New

Zealand. This included Naval Attaché and B Machine (designated as Purple by the Americans) messages. These intercepts were sent to Melbourne and then subsequently forwarded to the

United Kingdom.32 The increased volume of intercepted diplomatic traffic put a strain on the

29 TNA, ADM223/285, 53756, DNI letter dated 21 January 1942.

30 NAA, MP1074, ACNB message 0556Z/19 January 1942. Unfortunately the Admiralty message referred to

has not been found.

31 TNA, HW14/27, ACNB message 0547Z/18 January 1942.

32 NAA, MP1074, ACNB message 1002Z/3 April 1942.

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limited resources available to the SIB. In order to improve this situation the Foreign Office was

requested to lend Mr H. A. Graves, of the Japan Consular Service, to the SIB.33 The advantage to the SIB of having the services of Mr Graves was not only that he was a Japanese linguist, but that he was also experienced in the intricate language of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign

Affairs.

Included in the intercepted message traffic was valuable economic and political

intelligence. Through these intercepted messages Allied military planners could gauge the impact

of the War on the Japanese economy and thus its combat capability.34 Allied intelligence could

note the movement of oil, rice, rubber and other materials from the occupied territories back to

Japan as well as Japanese attempts to obtain items such as mercury from Italy, lead from Spain

and ball bearings from Sweden.35 Some of this information, especially the movement of ships

carrying imports to Japan, was of direct operational usefulness.

Economic intelligence collected in the second half of 1942 indicated that the Japanese

were attempting to export increasing amounts of rice and cereals from the occupied territories, in

33 NAA, MP1074/7, ACNB message 0622Z/4 February 1942.

34 The only book dealing with this subject is Shannon McCune, Intelligence on the Economic Collapse of

Japan in 1945, University Press of America, Lanham, MD, 1989.

35 NAA MP1074/7 contains a number of signals illustrating Japanese attempts to acquire strategic materials

from other countries. Samples of these intercepts cease in 1943 due to the transfer of the diplomatic

function to the Australian Army.

263

particular Thailand and French Indo-China,36 to make up for production shortfalls in Korea and

Formosa (Taiwan) due to drought. The ships carrying the cereals, and other products to these destinations were at this stage not travelling in convoys and thus easy targets for American submarines.37 Even at this early stage of the War Japanese shipping shortages and backlogs at ports were beginning to impact upon the flow of raw material into Japan.38

Political intelligence provided information about the extent of Japanese activities in

South America. The Allies, especially the United States of America, were deeply concerned

about the activities of Axis diplomats and agents there.39 Some of the South American countries

had large resident expatriate German and Japanese populations and these were a potential source

of support for the Axis nations. To eliminate or reduce the activities of the Germans and

Japanese the Americans placed great pressure upon various South American governments to

36 NAA, MP1074/7, 5/7/1942 to 17/7/1942: ACNB message 0707Z/9 July 1942 details quantities of

agricultural products the French agreed to deliver and what had been delivered.

37 TNA, HW53, 51, ACNB message 1221Z/19 August 1942.

38 NAA, MP1074/7, 5/7/1942 to 17/7/1942: ACNB 0546Z/13 July 1942 and 16/10/1942 to 31/10/1942:

ACNB message 0642Z/16 October 1942 illustrates the problems posed by the lack of ships.

39 For details on Japanese espionage activities see Tony Matthews, Shadows Dancing: Japanese Espionage

Against the West 1939–1945, Robert Hale, London, 1993, and Ronald Seth, Secret Servants: A History of

Japanese Espionage, Greenwood Press, Westport 1975. A study of German activities in South America is

contained in Stanley E. Hilton, Hitler’s Secret War in South America 1939–1945, Louisiana State

University, Baton Rouge, 1981.

264

restrict and if possible deport these expatriates. Eventually this pressure would be successful.40

Meanwhile however signals intelligence provided the Allies with an insight into Japanese activities and the responses of the host governments.

Not only were the activities of the Japanese revealed, but also those of sympathetic South

Americans. On 4 July 1942 Tokyo advised Santiago that Mr Jorge Rosero, formerly of the

Chilean Consulate at Yokohama, was carrying as part of his official luggage Japanese propaganda films for delivery to the Japanese Minister at Santiago. Mr Rosero had also stated that when he arrived in his new post of Lima he would get into ‘friendly contact’ with a secretary at the American Embassy in order to collect intelligence reports which he would pass on to the

Japanese. For these services Mr Rosero declined any form of payment but Tokyo insisted that the

Japanese Minister pay him ¥10,000.41

Apart from propaganda the Japanese sought to maintain the neutrality of South

American states by increasing trade with them. In the case of Chile the Japanese proposed the

purchase of all its copper and nitrates, a tactic used by Britain in the First World War to prevent

Germany from acquiring strategic materials. Japan would also carefully consider Chile’s

40 See Max Paul Friedman, Nazis & Good Neighbours: The United States Campaign Against the Germans of

Latin America in World War II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003. This book contains minor

references to the Japanese in South America.

41 NAA, MP1074/7, 28/6/1942 to 4/7/1942: ACNB message 0730Z/4 July 42 and ACNB message 1031Z/4

July 42.

265

requirements for commodities from Japan.42 Exactly how this trade was to be conducted across the Pacific war zone was not detailed. But if the trade carrot did not work the Japanese were prepared to try a harder line. The Japanese Foreign Minister informed the Japanese Minister in

Santiago that he wished the Chilean government to be advised that Japan had the ability to attack anywhere in the Pacific, but that to date it had taken great care to respect the neutrality of

Chilean shipping. The Foreign Minister went on to say that it should be “impressed on Chilean authorities that safety of their shipping and preservation of neutrality will be facilitated by [their] acceptance of trade arrangements”;43 although the Chileans were probably aware the Japanese were not in a position to carry out their threats.

Sometimes the consular traffic provided an insight into the internal political activities of the Japanese. In September 1942 the Japanese First Foreign Minister advised the various diplomatic posts that he had resigned because the policy towards the occupied territories advocated by him was not accepted by the Japanese Cabinet.44 The Cabinet endorsed the creation of the Greater East Asian Ministry to oversee the handling of all matters relating to the occupied territories as well as Thailand and Manchukuo. The Minister believed that the occupied territories would interpret these changes in terms of Japan not intending to fulfil commitments to maintain the territorial integrity and ultimate independence of these areas. He feared that these

42 NAA, MP1074/7, 28/6/1942 to 4/7/1942: ACNB message 0505Z/2 July 1942.

43 NAA, MP1074/7, 28/6/1942 to 4/7/1942: ACNB message 1133Z/2 July 1942.

44 NAA, MP1074/7, 1/9/1942 to 15/9/1942: ACNB message 1128Z/2 September 1942. The description First

Foreign Minister is used in the decrypt.

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countries would feel that they were being reduced to the status of vassals of Japan.45 This minor

incident demonstrated the insight that signals intelligence could provide into the tensions and power balances within the Japanese Cabinet.

With the increased flow of political and military signals intelligence in the Far Eastern theatre the need to establish standard and secure procedures for the rapid transmission, handling and distribution of this material over a wide area became paramount. The initial solution was to place restrictions on the methods of transmissions, details of intercepted messages were sent in the highest possible code (preferably one time pads) and where practicable by cable as opposed to W/T transmission. Use of the long standing Imperial cable network ensured that the messages could not be intercepted and also reduced the amount of W/T transmissions. The second security precaution was to identify this material by the use of a caveat, similar to ULTRA. In the case of

Special Intelligence originating from either Melbourne, Washington or Kilindini the word

ZYMOTIC was used.46 These arrangements were put into place within the British Imperial

network only as no formal co-ordinating agreement existed, at this stage, between the British and

USN concerning the handling of Japanese signals intelligence.

As with the British, US signals intelligence operations in the Western Pacific, and

especially the Philippines, were also severely disrupted and eventually over-run. Fortunately for

the US its main signals intelligence organisation and infrastructure in the Eastern Pacific

remained intact. The US Navy cryptographers of Station CAST, in the Philippines, were

45 NAA, MP1074/7, 1/9/1942 to 15/9/1942: ACNB message 0830Z/3 September 1942.

46 TNA, ADM223/285, 53756, Admiralty message 2158A/8 February 1942.

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relocated from Cavite to Corregidor Island as US forces withdrew to the Bataan Peninsula. In

order to prevent these personnel falling into Japanese hands they were progressively evacuated by submarine commencing on 4 February, when the first party departed on board the USS

Seadragon. This group were sent to Bandeong, Netherlands East Indies, where they attempted to re-establish interception operations. But it soon became apparent that this position would also become untenable and once more they embarked on board a submarine, USS Snapper, and proceeded to Australia. On 26 February they were transferred to the submarine tender USS

Holland at Exmouth, West Australia. The Holland sailed for Fremantle shortly afterwards, arriving on 3 March. Other USN personnel arrived at Darwin via the USS Chaumont on 5

January. In order to conceal the evacuation of these personnel, and their functions, the level and type of message traffic they produced was maintained through the transmission of dummy messages in the appropriate codes.

As these evacuations were being undertaken the Australian Naval Attaché in Washington,

Commander H. Burrell RAN, advised the Chief of Naval Staff that there were 20 signals intelligence specialists on Java and that the RAN might consider investigating how these, and further personnel to be evacuated from the Philippines, could be employed to augment existing signals intelligence organisations in Australia. He informed the Chief of Naval Staff that Vice

Admiral W. A. Glassford USN had already recommended to the US Navy Department that some or all of these personnel should proceed to Australia.47 In response the Australian Chief of Naval

Staff advised the Naval Attaché that the signals intelligence personnel would be a valuable

47 NAA, A816, 43/302/18, Naval Attaché message (Tropic No 178) dated 19 February 1942.

268

addition to the staff of the existing organisation in Australia and that he would be glad of the services of any who could be made available.48 From the tone of his reply it would appear that the Chief of Naval Staff had intended to place the USN personnel under the SIB. If this were the case, he had seriously misread the politics of the issue and the intent of the USN. The USN had no intention of making themselves subservient to any other organisation. They were intent on running their own show. This response is also interesting when compared to the reply to the

British enquiries as regards to available facilities.

With the collapse of the Malay barrier the Japanese turned their attention towards

Australia and the Indian Ocean. On 19 February 1942 Japanese naval aircraft attacked Darwin, sinking or damaging most of the ships in harbour. The Japanese strike force then moved into the

Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal.49 As the Japanese swept through the Indian Ocean area they attacked, but did not occupy, the Cocos Island group where the British had previously established a direction finding station. Following this attack the British banned all wireless transmissions from the Islands in order to give the impression that the Japanese had destroyed the facilities.50 Because of its strategic location the British were concerned to keep the direction finding station operational. To this end, access to and use of the Cocos Islands remained a major

48 NAA, MP1074, CNS Australia message 0742Z/22 February 1942.

49 See HW50/59, Organisation and Evolution of Japanese Sigint, p.5 for details of British signals intelligence

on the Japanese Indian Ocean operations.

50 Communications with the Cocos Islands were to be via undersea cable. The same cable that the SMS

Emden had tried to destroy in the First World War.

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British concern throughout the war.51 As a precaution against the possibility of the Japanese intercepting a message relating to the Cocos Islands they were allocated the code word ‘James’.

This special code word was to be used in any signals transmitted which referred to these

Islands.52

With continuing Japanese operational successes there were major changes in the Allied signals intelligence organisations and also in the Allied command structure in Australia and the surrounding operational areas. Vice Admiral H. F. Leary USN was appointed Commander

ANZAC Area and assumed control of naval operations. This had ramifications with respect to the existing RAN intelligence organisation, which for the first time became responsible to a non-

British authority. Furthermore Leary, as a theatre naval commander, was interested more in tactical rather than strategic intelligence. This latter would be provided by the resources of the

United States rather than by the more limited RAN organisation. Another change was that the

RAN’s intelligence organisation was now responsible for providing tactical intelligence to a greater number of recipients as opposed to forwarding the information on to Singapore for dissemination by the British. Australia had now become the frontline of the signals intelligence war against Japan. As the war progressed, these new command arrangements, as well as service politics, would result in a number of organisational changes affecting the RAN.

51 NAA, MP1074/7, 26/3/1942 to 4/4/1942: Admiralty message 1504A/28 March 1942.

52 NAA, MP1074/7, 1/6/1943 to 15/6/1943: Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet message 0933/5 June 1943.

During 1943 consideration was being given by other organizations to use the Cocos Islands as a refueling

base for aircraft. The British opposed this most vigorously as they did not wish to draw undue attention to

the Island and its operations. They were supported in this by Commander South West Pacific Area.

270

The main change was that the defence of Australia became an American responsibility.

Operational command of RAN ships operating in the South West Pacific Area was vested in

Admiral Leary and the Chief of Naval Staff was given operational responsibility for the

protection of merchant shipping in these waters.53 The RAN’s dockyards and other support facilities were also placed at the overall disposal of the Commander South West Pacific, General

Douglas MacArthur. The SIB however, was to remained outside these arrangements.

On 8 March COMSOWESPAC ordered Lieutenant Commander Redfield Mason USN

Fleet Intelligence Officer, to proceed with the Station CAST personnel to Melbourne54 and

establish a USN Fleet Radio Unit, designated FRUMEL. This organisation was to work in co-

ordination with the RAN’s SIB.55 USN signals intelligence personnel evacuated from the

Philippines and Java began to arrive in Australia in March 1942. Also in Australia were a

number of ex-FECB personnel including Lieutenant Commander Colegrave RN. To make maximum use of these personnel they were all directed to Melbourne where they would work in a co-located signals intelligence organisation. Colegrave, however, was directed to New Zealand first in order to examine the status of the current organisation there and report on what would be

53 In March 1943 this function was designated Commander South West Pacific Sea Frontiers.

54 An extract of a USN instruction quoted in SRH-180 describes Melbourne as being located in New South

Wales. See SRH-180, U.S. Naval Pre-World War II Radio Intelligence Activities in the Philippine Islands,

p.67.

55 SRH-355, Naval Security Group History to World War II Pt 2, p.114.

271

required to enable New Zealand to handle some of the cryptographic work locally.56 The Sydney

University professors, Room and Trendall, were released from their University duties so that

they could continue their cryptographic work with the SIB.57 In essence there were now to be three distinct naval cryptographic organisations working together, but as yet with no defined relationship between them, no clear lines of command and control or instructions on intelligence sharing with Allied commanders. This situation represented a most unsatisfactory state of affairs in a field of great secrecy and sensitivity, and would soon change.

The arrival in Australia of General Douglas MacArthur, and other members of his staff, introduced aspects of organisational politics previously absent from the Australian cryptographic effort. On 30 March 1942 a meeting of “Y Officers” was held chaired, initially, by Colonel E. R.

Thorpe US Army. Present were representatives from the US Army, the Australian Army and the

RAAF. Notably absent were any naval representatives. Whether they were unable to attend or not invited is unclear from the surviving minutes. The meeting discussed the possibility of establishing in Melbourne an Army/Air Force cryptographic organisation to serve the

Commander South West Pacific Area. Those attending the meeting felt that this proposed new organisation should, if possible, be co-located with the existing naval cryptographic organisation and maintain close liaison with it but, notwithstanding the pre-war integration of the Australian

Army sponsored Sydney University professors into the RAN’s small cryptographic group, remain a distinct organisation. The lack of naval representatives present at this meeting meant that any discussions or decisions impacting upon Navy might not be viewed sympathetically

56 NAA, MP1074, ACNB message 1016Z/6 March 1942.

57 NAA, A6923, 37/401/425, Sydney University letter dated 9 February 1942.

272

Map 5: Second World War RAN intercept and D/F sites.

HMAS Coonawarra D/F station, c1942. (RAN). HMAS Harman D/F station, post-war. (RAN).

when referred to Navy for formal comment or endorsement. The meeting also agreed to the size and structure of the new organisation. This new Army focused organisation would also keep in close contact with Washington, London, India and other cryptographic centres.58 In many ways

this meeting had the appearance of being an Army/Air Force exercise preparatory to a

subsequent one with the relevant naval representatives.

Following the meeting, the Australian Director of Military Intelligence, Colonel C. G.

Roberts, continued to argue strongly for the creation of an independent Army-centric Central

Bureau59 to carry out interception and cryptographic research on Japanese military codes and

systems. Colonel Roberts argued, correctly, that Japanese Naval W/T traffic and cryptographic systems were totally different in character from those used by the Imperial Japanese Army.60

Notwithstanding this difference however, there was a need for close liaison as the operations of the IJA in the South West Pacific area were dependent upon naval logistical and combat support.

The breaking of naval codes could thus provide a valuable insight into future operations of the

Imperial Japanese Army.61 In addition, many of the fighting units, such as Special Naval

Landing Forces and naval air squadrons, engaged ashore in the South West Pacific were IJN

units and hence much valuable information concerning ground operations could be obtained by

breaking naval codes.

58 NAA, A6923, SI/2, Minutes of No.1 Meeting of Y Officers, dated 30 March 1942.

59 The phrase Central Bureau appears to originate from the British Central Bureau in the Middle East.

60 NAA, A6923, SI/2, Interception of Enemy Wireless Traffic, DMI minute dated 5 April 1942.

61 For Example see NAA, B5555, 5, Kokoda Trail: First Information.

273

A second conference dealing with the co-ordination of Y intelligence in Australia was

held on 6 April. In attendance at this meeting were a number of officers who attended the first

conference as well as Commander Newman RAN, Commander Nave RN and Lieutenant R. J.

Fabian USN. The minutes show a remarkable similarity to the minutes of the first meeting in

March.62 This could imply that the first meeting was a rehearsal by Army and Air Force personnel to ensure that they were all reading from the same script when they met with the naval officers to discuss the co-ordination of signals intelligence in Australia. A third meeting, of what

was now described as the Y Committee, was held on the following day. Both Nave and Fabian

were absent from this meeting. But Commander Newman was present and played an active part

becoming involved in what were described as the Training and Technical Sub-Committees. The

reasons for the absence of both Nave and Fabian are not known but might indicate problems

associated with co-operation between the service focused cryptographic organisations were

already evident.

At the same time as the conferences dealing with co-ordination of Y intelligence in

Australia were being held in Melbourne, a similar conference was being held in Washington,

D.C. Attending this conference were representatives from the United States, Britain and Canada.

But despite the pre-War and current contributions being made by Australia, in terms of facilities

and personnel to the RN cryptographic efforts, no Australian representatives were present at this

62 NAA, A6923, SI/2, Minutes of No 2 Conference Co-ordination of Y Intelligence in Australia Victoria

Barracks Melbourne – 6 Apr 42. Colonel Roberts had successfully argued that Australian Army Special

W/T Sections should be attached to the Central Bureau. See NAA, A6923, SI/2, DMI minute dated 3 March

1942. This proposal was agreed to by DCGS, Major General Rowell in April.

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important conference.63 The presence of Canada was based on its role in the Battle of the

Atlantic and not on any contribution it was making to the war against Japan. This conference,

titled the Radio Intelligence Conference, dealt with a number of issues associated with signals

intelligence including interception of German and Japanese W/T, equipment utilised, technical

methods and radio and radar countermeasures. From an Australian perspective one of the more

important outcomes of this conference was the allocation of responsibilities for attacking the

various Japanese cryptographic systems to different signals intelligence centres. The Radio

Intelligence Conference was possibly unprecedented in the range and openness of discussions on

these sensitive issues.64 Unfortunately for Captain H. Sandwith RN, the senior British representative, it appears that he was too open and co-operative. Shortly after his return to the

United Kingdom he was reprimanded for revealing too much about British signals intelligence

63 There was a marked difference in the treatment of Canada and Australia in the context of signals

intelligence decision making. Australia, and for that matter New Zealand, were seen by the Americans as

being part of the British Empire with Britain as their spokesperson. On the other hand Canada, which was

also part of the Empire, appears to have had an independent voice on a number of issues.

64 See NAC, RG24, Vol. 3806, 1008/75/20, Canadian Report on United States–British Radio Intelligence

Conference April 6–16, 1942, p.6. Allocation of responsibility was:

JN-25 - Washington DC;

Flag Officer’s code - Washington DC, London;

Japanese Army - Washington DC and London if requested;

Japanese Diplomatic - Washington DC and London as required;

Japanese Naval Attaché - Washington DC and London;

Japanese Military Attaché - Washington DC and London; and

Japanese Weather - Washington DC.

275

operations. Even at this stage of the War co-operation did not necessarily mean full and

unrestricted disclosure of sensitive information to an ally.

During the course of their discussions the British team had agreed that JN-25 traffic

would go to Washington and Flag Officer and Naval Attaché traffic would be sent to

Washington and London. One of the sticking points, used by the USN, for the distribution of

intelligence was that the British could not access the US cryptographic machines which were used to encode intercepted traffic and the Americans would not use the British systems as they believed them to be insecure. As a consequence the British could not gain access to USN JN-25 material. But as the Americans sent JN-25 recoveries to Melbourne the British could obtain these as they were retransmitted using British systems.65

By this stage the cryptographic landscape in Australia had undergone significant changes,

with more to come. Operating under the command of Commander Nave was the original RAN

SIB cryptographic organisation. Co-located with the SIB was the RAN direction finding

organisation under Commander Jack Newman. Both of these organisations reported to Australian

Chief of Naval Staff and exchanged information with the British. The third naval signals

intelligence body consisted of the USN Special and W/T Intelligence organisation, under

Lieutenant Commander Fabian USN. This USN organisation consisted primarily of personnel

evacuated from the Philippines. This organisation worked primarily on JN-25 and received most

of its information from either the USN cryptographic organisation in Honolulu or Washington.

65 TNA, HW43/76, Allied Sigint Policy and Organisation: Chapter IV, p.286.

276

Although the USN personnel were co-located with the RAN SIB they had, at this stage, very little contact with the Australian group. Part of the reason for this was that both groups were working on different codes.66 The main function of the USN group was to provide the USN

Commander-in-Chief with what was described as ‘hot intelligence’.67 To support the USN

cryptographers in Melbourne Lieutenant Commander Joe Rocheford USN advocated

establishing a USN cypher staff in Australia to send and receive special messages using USN

communications equipment. The USN did not like the British Andus Cypher as they felt it was

cumbersome and took too long to set up.68 Notwithstanding these concerns, the Navy Office

Signals Office was, for the time being at least, the conduit through which all wireless traffic passed. Also located in Melbourne was the recently created Central Bureau, a combined

US/Australia Army and Air Force organisation which concentrated on Imperial Japanese Army codes and cyphers.

Although they were co-located co-operation between the two naval cryptographic units concerned was not of the best due to the apparent inability of Nave to establish a rapport with either Newman or Fabian.69 Although Nave is often painted as the villain of the piece, the fault

might not have been all his given the USN’s history of general unco-operativeness in the area of

66 TNA, HW53, 51, message dated 13 March 1943.

67 TNA, ADM223/496, General Notes on Special and W/T intelligence in Australia and New Zealand, c April

1942.

68 NAA, A6923, 1877/10/45, DNI minute dated 27 January 1942 and NZNB signal 1114M/27 January 1942.

69 TNA, ADM223/496. There are no previous references as to any problems between Nave and Newman.

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cryptography.70 Nave was also Fabian’s senior, in terms of both rank and experience, and it would have required special skills for these two to deal with each other as equals. In addition, middle ranking USN officers, such as Fabian, might have had difficulty fully comprehending the relationship between the RAN and RN and its internal structures.71 The concept of an independent yet subordinate navy would have been totally alien to these officers as many would not have had much exposure to the internal workings of the RN or Dominion Navies. Nave was eventually removed, partially due to his inability to work with Fabian, but also because he was a better cryptographer than he was an administrator.72 Fabian proved however to be a regular thorn

70 Forrest R. Biard, who served with the USN at FRUMEL, is critical of the attitude of USN officers at

FRUMEL during this period. See Biard, Forrest R, “Wartime Melbourne–Heaven and/or Hell”, NVCA

Cryptolog, Vol. 19, (Winter 1998), p.2. In an earlier article he described the Executive Officer, Station

CAST (Lieutenant R. J. Fabian USN) as “one of the snottiest, meanest, despicable bastards ever to wear a

naval uniform” see NVCA Cryptolog, Vol. 18, (Spring 1997), p.9.

71 See NARA, RG457, SRMD -009, JICPOA/F-22, File of Administrative letters/Correspondence Jan 42-

Sep 45. COM7THFLT advised of its concerns about the distribution of signals intelligence material in

Navy Office. The main area of concern was the multiple distribution of signal traffic to civilian staff. In

part these concerns may have been raised due to confusion surrounding the positions of CNS and ACNB.

ULTRA Bulletins were passed to CNS by courier.

72 TNA, HW53, 51, message from BRISBANE dated 13 Mar 1943. One of Fabian’s specific complaints about

Nave, and a general concern amongst USN officers, was his perception of a lack of security associated with

the SIB. Although as late as mid-1943 personal mail to USN personnel at FRUMEL was sometimes being

addressed as “Radio Intelligence Navy Radio Station Belconnen, Australia”. In part this concern could have

arisen because the USN did not fully understand the ACNB and the relationship with the RN. Both the

USN and RN appeared to have had a different perspective on security which impacted upon liaison

throughout the war. See also TNA, HW8, 49, History of Liaison With OP20G, p.35.

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in the side of Anglo-American cryptographic co-operation.73 The removal of Nave from the SIB

was to be one of many Australian compromises in an effort to establish and maintain a close

relationship with the USN.

The loss of facilities and organisational dislocation also resulted in a breakdown in the

exchange of information. In April 1942 the US Navy Department in Washington advised that no

key recoveries were being received from Colombo. These were initially forwarded via

Corregidor and then Melbourne, but none had been received since March. GC&CS advised

Washington that recoveries would be forwarded via themselves.74 GC&CS, obviously unaware

of the friction existing in Melbourne, sought advice from both Shaw and Nave as to the best

means of collaboration between themselves and the USN in Melbourne.75 A merger of the NZ group with Australians in Melbourne was also proposed, but Nave replied they were few and inexperienced and that the current arrangements were best.76

Despite these problems some cryptographic progress was being made, albeit slowly. On

20 June Shaw reported that by working with Melbourne, 350 out of 21,000 indicator subtractors

73 See TNA, HW8, 49, History of Liaison With OP20G, p.19 for an indication on how the British saw Fabian.

At p.52 of this document Fabian is described as being “most thoroughly imbued with those hierarchical and

uncooperative principles”.

74 TNA, HW8, 102, Typed Copies of Signals Between GC&CS, Washington–Melbourne and Colombo 1939–

1942, p.8.

75 TNA, HW8, 102, p.9.

76 TNA, HW8, p.9. Also NAA, MP1074/7, 4/6/1942 to 14/6/1942: ACNB message 0947Z/13 June 1942.

279

had been solved. He estimated it would take 6 to 9 months to break into the new JN-25.77 Shaw advised GC&CS that Melbourne and Kilindini were exchanging indicator subtractors and would soon commence exchanging recyphered group subtractors and group recoveries. The exchange was done utilising the same method devised for exchanging special intelligence between

Singapore and Corregidor. Melbourne would also become the link with Honolulu and

Washington.78 Nave also advised GC&CS that FRUMEL had about 1,000 JN-25 groups

identified and wished to commence an exchange with Kilindini. He requested a TypeX machine

so he could undertake encoding of groups for transmission to Kilindini. The USN did not

however want this material handled by personnel other than those in their signals intelligence

organisation.79 The only cypher common to Melbourne and Kilindini was the TypeX machine with special settings and it was proposed to use this to initiate an exchange of information as quickly as possible between Melbourne, Colombo and Kilindini. Melbourne would then provide the link with Honolulu and Washington.80 FRUMEL was considered by the USN to be a limited

participant with respect to the exchange of signals intelligence data.81 Notwithstanding delays

and other concerns there existed a healthy exchange between the cryptographic centres of

information not only on JN-25 but other codes as well. This exchange allowed for a more rapid

solution of codes than might otherwise have been possible had each centre been working in

isolation.

77 TNA, HW8, 102, p.10.

78 ibid.

79 ibid.

80 NAA, MP1074/7, 4/6/1942 to 14/6/1942: ACNB message 1341Z/11 June 1942.

81 TNA, HW3/149, p.28.

280

Co-operation and information exchange between the naval cryptographic organisations and Army/Air Force focused Central Bureau was even more limited.82 But there appears to have

been far less internal friction within Central Bureau than there was between the two naval organisations. Notwithstanding the desire expressed in the earlier 6 April meeting, in Melbourne,

for co-operation and liaison between Central Bureau and the navy organisations the opposite was

the situation.

Other organisational changes were also taking place which would impact on future

operations and structures. General Douglas MacArthur had been named Commander-in-Chief

South West Pacific Area. Assigned to him were various USN and RAN forces. The Combined

Operational Intelligence Centre, located in Melbourne, was incorporated into GHQ SWPA and

the newly created Central Bureau became MacArthur’s private signals intelligence organisation.

The USN cryptographic organisation in Melbourne was responsible to the Navy Department in

Washington but provided MacArthur, on an eyes only basis, with intelligence. Beyond this personal service, there was little direct contact between Central Bureau and the USN signals

intelligence personnel in Melbourne. On the other hand there existed not only contact, but also

the provision of technical information, between the RAN’s organisations and Central Bureau,

82 The history of Central Bureau is covered in Jack Bleakley, The Eavesdroppers, Australian Government

Publishing Service, Canberra, 1982; Geoffrey Ballard, On ULTRA Active Service: The Story of Australia's

Signals Intelligence Operations During World War II, Spectrum Publications, Richmond, 1991, and Ed

Drea, MacArthur’s ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942–1945, University of Kansas

Press, Lawrence, 1992.

281

initially through Commander Newman when he attended meetings of the Y Committee83 and

later through Lieutenant Brooksbank RANVR who had replaced him on the Committee.

Information derived from signals intelligence continued to be provided to the Combined

Operational Intelligence Centre.

As the various cryptographic organisations were taking shape and coalescing, the Allied

military situation in the Pacific continued to deteriorate. By the end of March 1942 the Japanese

had occupied Java and Sumatra. The British had lost Rangoon and were preparing to defend

India. The Americans on the Bataan Peninsula, in the Philippines, surrendered on 9 April 1942

and finally on 7 May those holding out on Corregidor surrendered. These defeats saw the Allied

forces not only pushed out of South East Asia but also the Central Pacific. Included within the

lost territory were the bulk of the Allied signals intelligence assets, such as intercept and

direction finding stations. While efforts were made to ensure that the personnel who operated

these important facilities were moved to safety, this was not always possible. The Dutch lost all

save one member of their special intelligence and Y staff.84

The RN personnel from the FECB had been dispersed throughout the region with most of

the Special Intelligence personnel relocating to either Colombo or Kilindini with a small number in Australia. A small naval Y contingent was also established in New Delhi with the Director

Military Intelligence (India). The function of this small group was to help deal with the naval

83 NAA, A6923, SI/2, Committee Meeting No 5 – Central Bureau, 2 May 42.

84 NAA, MP1074, ACNB message 0521Z/14 Apr 1942.

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aspects of joint intelligence in the South East Asia Command area.85 During the first three

months of 1942 the naval Y organisation based on Colombo intercepted 31,628 messages. Of

these 21,784 were in the 5 figure code (JN-25) the remainder involved minor codes and consular

messages, procedural and plain language traffic.86 The volume being intercepted made it essential that additional personnel in the form of operators, linguists and cryptographers, be sent to the Far East to join in the battle against the Japanese codes. Unfortunately due to the lack of firm action prior to the outbreak of the War these personnel were not available in either Britain or Australia and training new staff to an operational standard took time.

In April 1942 the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernst J. King USN, issued instructions to Admiral Chester Nimitz USN, Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet. In these he tasked Nimitz with securing the sea lines of communication between Australia and the United

States. In doing so Nimitz was also to “contain Japanese forces within the Pacific theatre”,

“protect essential sea and air communications” and “hold island positions …… necessary for security of line of communications”.87 Given these instructions, the interception of Japanese naval messages indicating a major offensive in the South West Pacific could not go unheeded.88

85 NAA, MP1185/8, 1937/2/159, Deputy Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet message 0506Z/27 April 1942.

86 TNA, HW4/27, 53347, Quarterly Y Report, dated 30 April 1942.

87 Information and Instructions Relative to the Pacific Campaign (WPL-46-PC), dated cApril 1942. Copy

provided by Mr John Lundstrom.

88 NAA, B5555, File 3, FRUMEL records (incomplete) of Communications Intelligence Relating to the Coral

Sea Battle APR 42-MAY 42, provides a summary of intercepts relating to the planned Japanese attack on

Port Moresby.

283

In response to this intelligence Nimitz despatched Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher USN,89 with the aircraft carriers USS Lexington and USS Yorktown, to intercept and engage the Japanese task force and prevent the planned amphibious assault on Port Moresby and subsequent Japanese attacks on northern Australia. In the ensuing Battle of the Coral Sea the Americans lost an aircraft carrier but prevented the Japanese from achieving their strategic objective. On the

Japanese side the two large Japanese aircraft carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku were badly damaged and had suffered such losses that they were unavailable for the planned Midway campaign. A third, smaller, Japanese aircraft carrier Shoho had been sunk.90 Signals intelligence had played a

major part in this victory.

In an early intercept USN translators had originally translated Shoho’s name as Ryukaku.

The problem of mistranslation or consistent translation of intercepted messages by different

cryptographic centres was an issue of some concern to the cryptographers. Additionally if an

intercepted text was garbled there was a good chance that the final translation might not

accurately reflect the initial Japanese message.91 The important issue was that the intent and meaning of the message could be extracted. The issue of mistranslations was one of the

89 For a new biography John Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea,

Midway and Guadalcanal, USNIP, Annapolis, 2006.

90 Fredrick D. Parker, A Priceless Advantage: US Navy Communications Intelligence and the Battles of Coral

Sea, Midway and the Aleutians, NSA, Ft Meade, 1993.

91 For a discussion on the issue of mistranslation see Keiichiro Komatsu, Origins of the Pacific War and the

Importance of ‘MAGIC’, Japan Library, London, 1999.

284

fundamental issues in deciding how much work beyond the initial decryption and rendering of an

intercepted message into Japanese that Nave and his team would be allowed to do. In the end it was decided to accept the risk of mistranslations and allow Nave to render the messages into

English.92

Early indications of a Japanese attack in the Central Pacific Area were obscured by

messages associated with the attack on Port Moresby. But by early May, indications of a separate

attack were becoming clearer. On 27 April FRUMEL provided information that the Commander-

in-Chief Second Fleet had requested naval charts of the area around the Gulf of Alaska93.

Subsequently a Japanese naval auxiliary vessel requested copies of naval charts associated with the Midway/Hawaii area.94 This information, coupled with other intercepted messages, began to provide a picture of the broad scope of the Japanese operations. Another indication as to the area of operations was the positioning of weather reporting vessels in the vicinity of Kamchatka,

Wake Island and the Marshall Islands.95 But uncertainty still existed as to the actual intentions of

the Japanese.

One of the problems faced by Nimitz in Hawaii was that the Japanese had not referred to

their objective by name. In order to mask the identity of geographical locations in the Pacific the

92 TNA, HW53, 51, Captain J. R. S. Haines RN letter dated 6 July 1942.

93 Parker, p.43.

94 NAA, B5555/1, Item 4, FRUMEL Records (Incomplete) of Communications Intelligence Relating to the

Midway Battle.

95 NAA, MP1074/7, 26/5/1942 to 3/6/1942: Commander-in-Chief PAC message 0137Z/27 May 1942.

285

IJN employed a system of geographical designators. These consisted of two or three letter groups where the first letter; A, R or D correlated with either American Pacific possessions,

Australian/British Pacific possessions and Australian/British Indian Ocean possessions. For example; AF – Midway, RZQ – Port Moresby, and DP – Darwin. By the end of March 1942 some 89 geographical designators, including AF, had been identified.96

When the designator AF was first used is unclear, but in response to an Admiralty enquiry concerning possible Japanese action against Midway, the Aleutians or Hawaii,

Commander Long, DNI (Melbourne), was able to respond on 20 May providing a fairly broad description of the Japanese plan.97 What was unknown at this stage was the actual commencement date of the operation.98 By this stage both King and Nimitz were convinced that the main target of the Japanese thrust would be Midway Island.99 Unfortunately, the same

96 Parker, p.21.

97 NAA, MP1074/7, 19/5/1942 to 25/5/1942: DNI (Melbourne) message 0848Z/20 May 1942.

98 This information was provided to the Admiralty vide ACNB message 0044Z/29 May 1942. See NAA,

MP1074/7, 16/5/1942 to 3/6/1942.

99 Parker, p.47. About 18 May King sent the Admiralty a message indicating the possibility of an attack on

Midway or Alaska but not indicating the source of the intelligence. Following receipt of the DNI

(Melbourne) message 0848Z/20 May 1942 the First Sea Lord sent a very terse message to the First Naval

Member indicating that he expected to be fully informed of all developments in future. This message was

reinforced with a DNI London message to DNI Melbourne claiming that London’s lack of knowledge had

caused considerable inconvenience between London and Washington. It may have been the issue of the

forwarding of signals intelligence from Australia to London which formed the basis of Fabian’s claims

286

conviction was not held by the USN’s War Plans Department or OP-20-G. However all

arguments ended when FRUMEL reported, on 21th May, that they had intercepted a Japanese

message stating that Midway only had enough fresh water for two weeks.100 As a consequence of

this intelligence, Nimitz was able to deploy his carriers, again under the command Admiral

Fletcher, in time to meet and destroy the Japanese carrier force.101

Not only are the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway good examples of the operational use

of signals intelligence they also highlight the difficulty in allotting credit for cryptographic

breakthroughs to individual organisations. The fact that work on JN-25 was being undertaken in

Colombo, Melbourne, Pearl Harbor and Washington with results achieved being freely

exchanged meant it is difficult to credit an individual organisation with a particular success. The movement of the weatherships would also have been tracked by the RAN and USN direction finding stations and the weather reports, transmitted in a different code, intercepted and if possible decrypted. All of this information, provided from Australian, British and American sources helped in the unravelling of the Japanese plans and the ultimate victories.

relating to Nave’s lack of security. See NAA, MP1074/7, 19/5/1942 to 25/5/1942: Admiralty message

2338B/20 May 1942 and Admiralty message 2016B/20 May 1942.

100 NAA, B5555/1, Item 4. This relates to the famous ruse, apparently originated by FRUPAC, for Midway to

broadcast in the clear that they were out of fresh water. See Parker, p.51.

101 For details of the Battle of Midway see Johnathan Parshall and Anthony Tully, Shattered Sword: The

Untold Story of the Battle of Midway, Potomac Books, Washington, 2005.

287

Shortly after its establishment Central Bureau commenced producing and distributing its own W/T Activity Reports. One of the recipients of these reports was Commander Newman. In

May 1942 he wrote to the senior Australian army officer at Central Bureau, Captain A. W.

Sandford AIF, a minute based on his observations of what was contained in these reports. In essence he believed that Central Bureau was not producing anything original and that to some extent it was performing functions of a naval nature. Newman considered that “Central Bureau should concentrate on the original object of that body when inaugurated – viz – Radio

Intelligence of Japanese Naval and Military air activities (particularly in regard to short-range air attacks); and of the Japanese Army”.102 At approximately this time Newman had attended the fifth Central Bureau Committee meeting.103 This was to be the last such meeting attended by

Newman and could have reflected the changing organisational circumstances as MacArthur and the new South West Pacific Command took many existing Australian organisations under their wing, although Newman’s naval direction finding and W/T interception network was not one of these organisations. By July Newman’s attitude towards Central Bureau appears to have mellowed. Once again he wrote to Sandford, indicating that he felt Central Bureau were now on the right track and “likely to make a good job of it”.104 This change in attitude might also have been the result of a lessening of pressure due to the recent naval victories at Coral Sea and

Midway.

102 NAA, A6923, SI/2, CMDR Newman minute dated May 1942.

103 NAA, A6923, SI/2, Committee Meeting No 5 – Central Bureau, 2 May 42.

104 NAA, A6923, SI/2, CMDR Newman letter dated 25 July 1942.

288

At this stage, and for some time to come, Central Bureau was unable to break into the

Imperial Japanese Army’s codes. In part this was due to the immaturity of the interception

infrastructure and the lack of experience on the part of the personnel involved.105 This inability

of Central Bureau to quickly break into the Japanese Army codes highlights the priceless

advantage gained by the Allied Navies as a consequence of their long experience with Imperial

Japanese Navy’s codes.

Although it might be possible that Newman was protecting the Navy’s turf from Army

trespassers, it is also possible that this correspondence originated as a consequence of the

changing inter-service relationships in Australia. The loss by the British and Americans of their

various signals intelligence facilities meant that the remnants of these organisations were initially

forced into a situation of mutual reliance and support. Along with the appointment of US officers

to command positions in Australia came their pre-war inter-service prejudices. Vice Admiral H.

F. Leary USN was appointed as COMANZAC with command of naval forces in the ANZAC

Area, based on the north eastern portion of the Australia Station. One of the organisations which came under the administrative authority of Admiral Leary was the naval signals intelligence organisation. On assuming command of the naval organisations Leary issued instructions to limit the distribution of signals intelligence to a select number of organisations. Central Bureau was not one of those authorised to receive naval signals intelligence.106 This exclusion was not

however total, as a message sent from Army Headquarters in Melbourne to the War Office in

105 NAA, B5463, Central Bureau Technical Records – Part A Organisation, p3.

106 NAA, A6923, SI/2, Minutes of Committee Meeting No. 11 – Central Bureau 16 Jun 42.

289

London stated that 25% of the contents of an earlier message had been provided by Nave who

also approved the final message.107

The extent to which Australia’s political leadership was receiving signals intelligence was also raised at about this time, although this issue was raised by the UK Foreign Office and not the USN. Prior to the Pacific War, senior Australian political and governmental officials were in receipt of information either derived from signals intelligence or copies of intercepts obtained from Australian or British sources.108 In July 1942 the Foreign Office indicated that it

had on a number of occasions wished to pass on to the Australian Prime Minister copies of

intelligence derived from intercepted Japanese messages but it was unsure what the Australian

Prime Minister was receiving. Advice was requested of Nave as to what Japanese material he

was passing on to the Prime Minister. If he was already passing material the intention of the

Admiralty was to forward, as ULTRA, any information the Foreign Office wished the Prime

Minister to see to Australia.109 Nave responded that the results of his work were only passed to

selected service authorities and that information which was important for the Prime Minister to

know was provided via a verbal briefing by the Chief of Naval Staff. Nave was not however

present at these briefings and so was unaware as to what John Curtin was or was not being

107 NAA, A6923, SI/10, Landforces Melbourne message 0550Z/21 July 42.

108 See D. H. Wilde, “Curtin and the Secret War in Australia 194 –1942”, Flinders University of South

Australia, Adelaide, 1979. Pfennigwerth also refers to the ‘Winds Message’ being shown to the Prime

Minister, Man of Intelligence, p.175.

109 TNA, HW53/51, Commander Denniston RN letter dated 9 July 1942.

290

told.110 In view of the wording of Nave’s response, the Foreign Office decided that they could not provide anything beyond what was already, in theory, being provided to the Australian Prime

Minister, and that if they needed to pass information on to Mr Curtin they would do so via

Nave.111 Unfortunately, this ad hoc arrangement was not to last long because of a reorganisation

of signals intelligence in Australia. As a consequence of this reorganisation Nave would no

longer be in a position whereby he could receive and pass on information to the Prime Minister.

By the end of July 1942 a new Allied signals intelligence framework was beginning to

take shape in the Far East. Within this new framework an important element was the remaining

direction finding stations controlled by the various Allied nations. This included nine Canadian

and American stations on the west coast of America, running from Dutch Harbor to Balboa; six

American stations on various Pacific Islands; seven British Commonwealth stations in the

Pacific; and a number of other British stations in the Indian Ocean.112 Supporting these were a

number of intercept stations, including those in Australia, and the various cryptographic centres

located in Washington, Honolulu, Melbourne, Kilindini and Colombo. The work of these stations

was not just interception but also traffic analysis; the monitoring of IJN transmissions for

changes in call signs, frequencies, transmission schedules and circuit traffic densities.113 The

110 TNA, HW53/51, message from Nave dated 15 July 1942.

111 TNA, HW53/51, minute dated 17 July 1942.

112 NAC, RG24, Vol. 3806, 1008/75/20, Report on Royal Canadian Naval Y Organisation, dated 19 May

1942.

113 For example, NAA, MP1074/7, 19 May 1942 to 25 May 1942: ACNB message 0354Z/19 May 1942

provides details of frequencies used between 2100 and 0800 GMT.

291

problem for the Allies was how to co-ordinate and utilise these assets in the most advantageous

manner.

Such issues, especially in the Melbourne context, were also highlighted by Commander

M. Saunders RN after a tour of Pacific code breaking centres. In relation to Melbourne he

highlighted its small size, its lack of policy direction, its serving of two masters, and his doubt as

to what would happen to the RAN component if the USN moved its personnel forward as the

War progressed. From his perspective, he felt that the Melbourne unit was a redundant

organisation and its staff should be re-deployed to either Honolulu or Colombo.114 In this report

Saunders complimented the Wellington-based organisation on its productivity and was also complimentary towards Central Bureau in Brisbane. This raises the question as to what had happened in Melbourne to reduce the SIB’s standing in the eyes of the British. Clearly there were issues that had arisen subsequent to the arrival of the USN staff.

The personality difficulty between Nave and Fabian could go some way to explaining the decline in Melbourne’s standing as seen by Saunders but it could not be the full reason. The concerns expressed by Saunders as to the size, policy direction and lines of control combined to create an organisation that was increasingly becoming dysfunctional. Where strong leadership and clear lines of control could have helped, none were present. But this situation would not last for much longer.

114 TNA, ADM223/496, Report on Visit to US and Other Signals Intelligence Centres, September–October

1942.

292

In order to resolve the broader issues of cryptographic co-ordination and exploitation, a

British delegation, under Commander Edward Travis RN, was sent to Washington to negotiate a

general naval cryptographic agreement. The agreement that resulted from these discussions was

signed on 2 October 1942 by Captain Carl F. Holden USN, the US Navy's Director of

Communications, and is generally known as the Holden Agreement.115 Here at last was a firm

policy direction and organisational clarity.

After the signing of the Holden Agreement the Admiralty forwarded a message to the

Australian Commonwealth Naval Board, and other addressees, advising that discussions were

underway as to the future organisation and structure of the signals intelligence effort against

Japan. The Australian Naval Board was advised that a re-organisation along the following lines was proposed:

• Washington was to be the main ‘key recovery’ centre on JN-25 and other major Japanese

naval codes. Recoveries would be passed to GC&CS who would pass them on to

Kilindini.

• Washington would pass to the Admiralty any intelligence indicating a strategic move in

any area.

115 In subsequent documentation USN officials also describe it as the ‘Basic Agreement’. See also Ralph

Erskine, “The Holden Agreement on Naval Sigint: The first BRUSA?”, Intelligence and National Security,

Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer 1999), p187.

293

• Kilindini would act as book recovery and exploitation centre for Commander-in-Chief

Eastern Fleet. They would also work on other codes such as JN-167.

• The US and ‘British Bureaux’ in Melbourne would be combined in one organisation

under US control. It would receive recoveries and intelligence from Washington. An

exchange of intelligence between Melbourne and COIS Commander-in-Chief Eastern

Fleet in Colombo was to be established.

• The Australian government could decide whether work on Japanese diplomatic codes

would be conducted independently or in the Anglo-US bureau.

• The UK would undertake research based on material provided by Washington.116

Clearly a significant policy decision had been taken by the British and Americans however, as with earlier policy discussions between British and US Naval staffs on signals intelligence,

Australia was neither consulted about nor a party to the negotiations. It was, however, asked to comment after the event when on 16 October 1942 the Admiralty advised the Australian

Commonwealth Naval Board that the British and US Naval authorities were discussing the re- organisation of the cryptographic effort against Japanese naval codes. The Admiralty sought the views of the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board on the various proposals, which included

116 TNA, ADM223/285, 53756, Admiralty message 1815A/16 October 1942. The description of the RAN’s

SIB as ‘British’ is interesting to note. Whether the Australian Government or Naval Board saw it as such is

doubtful.

294

the merging of what was described as ‘the US and British Bureaux in Melbourne’. This stands in

contrast with the full and active Canadian involvement in the Radio Intelligence Discussions in

Washington during April 1942 when the Canadians not only attended but were actively involved

in the discussions in their own right. Being presented with an effective fait accompli, the

Australians could do nothing more than agree, although they did try to have excess service personnel from Kilindini transferred to Melbourne.117 In November the new structure was put

into place. Nave was replaced by Paymaster Lieutenant Commander Merry RN and, as the USN

did not wish to employ civilians, the various Foreign Office officials and University professors

were redeployed.118 Notwithstanding the agreement that the Australian government could decide

where work on Japanese diplomatic codes would be carried out, the USN had an agreement with

the US Army not to do diplomatic work so this function was transferred to a new Australian

Army controlled organisation.119 Within a month of these new arrangements coming into force

Captain Sandwith RN was complaining about the lack of information being received, in

Colombo, from London and recommending reverting to the previous arrangement whereby there

was direct communications between Melbourne and Kilindini.120

117 TNA, ADM223/496, 53820, ACNB message 0506Z/11 November 1942.

118 TNA, ADM223/285, 53756, Admiralty message 1355A/20 November 1942. This message, sent to a

number of addressees, also made it very clear that the only contact between Melbourne and Kilindini was to

be to exchange intelligence which affected Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet. All recoveries were to be

sent to Washington for on forwarding to the UK.

119 For details on this group see the Sissons Papers at the National Library of Australia, MS3092.

120 TNA, ADM233/496, 53820, Report on Special Intelligence, dated 9 December 1942.

295

The RAN had been prepared for, and anticipated, a future war with Japan, but it expected to

fight this war alongside the RN. The early Japanese successes and rapid advance ensured that

these early plans were no longer practicable. In response to this situation the Australian

Government invited the United States to assist in Australia’s defence. This political decision had

major ramifications for all the Australian services, not the least being the RAN. The RAN’s

small SIB found itself initially co-located with the USN code breaking organisation and

subsequently subsumed within it. Between these developments the performance of the

organisation suffered as a consequence of personality issues and a lack of clear direction and

policy. It took the better part of a year to resolve the issues surrounding the SIB and its lines of

control. In the end these decisions were made by the British, without Australian input, following

negotiations with the USN. What little national control Australia might have had over the SIB

disappeared as a consequence of the Holden Agreement. The future of Australian Naval signals

intelligence was now irreversibly linked to and dependent upon the USN.

296

Late 1941

1943

Chart 2: The exchange of naval signals intelligence information in the Pacific.

Chapter 9

Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne – A Combined Organisation, 1942-45

With the merging of the SIB and USN cryptographic personnel into a single combined organisation following the Holden Agreement, the USN advised that there was no ongoing requirement for civilian, and in fact virtually all non-naval, code breakers in the new organisation. Unlike the US Army, the USN appeared to prefer that its code breaking was done by serving naval officers rather than civilians.1 The British consular officials who had been undertaking cryptographic work with the SIB could no longer be employed by the RAN.

Furthermore, in view of their agreement with the USN to remove Nave from involvement in naval code breaking, the Admiralty advised the RAN that arrangements were to be made for the return of Commander Nave to Britain as his services were no longer required by the RAN. On becoming aware of these changes, Australian military authorities approached the Navy, seeking its support in having Nave retained in Australia on loan to the Army for service with Central

Bureau. On Christmas Eve 1942 the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board were advised by the Admiralty that the decision to recall Nave must stand. In the meantime Nave had moved to

Brisbane, in October, to join Central Bureau.2

1 This did not appear to apply to Agnes Driscoll. For details of this woman’s career see Susan M. Lujan,

“Agnes Meyer Driscoll” in A History of Communications Intelligence in the United States With Emphasis

on the United States Navy, Naval Cryptologic Veterans Association, 2004.

2 TNA, HW 50/20.

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The Australian Army argued strongly for Nave’s retention in Central Bureau claiming, his return to the United Kingdom would be “little short of disaster”.3 Unfortunately, politics once more seems to have interfered with the Australian position when General S. B. Akin,

MacArthur’s Chief Signals Officer, advised Australian Army authorities that GHQ SWPA had withdrawn its support for Nave’s retention in Central Bureau.4 In one last attempt to have Nave retained it was proposed that both MacDermott and Lloyd, who were Foreign Office employees, be recalled to the United Kingdom5 and that an Australian Army officer, Major A. W. Sandford, from Central Bureau visit London to explain the signals intelligence organisational arrangements in Australia.6 Sandford’s visit to London would have important ramifications for the RAN for the rest of the war. As a consequence of this visit, GC&CS and the Australian Army, which had created a separate organisation to intercept and decrypt political and diplomatic communications, established a cryptographic link with London, independent of the Americans, and maintained this throughout the Pacific War. The pre-war cryptographic relationship between the RAN and the

RN cryptographic organisations was however effectively severed by the various co-operative agreements between the USN and the GC&CS. The Australian Army connection was of more immediate concern to the British as the British Army was fighting the Imperial Japanese Army in

3 NAA, A6923, 37/401/425, Landforces Melbourne message 0900Z/8 January 1943.

4 NAA, A6923, 37/401/425, Signal Officer GHQ message 0637Z/11 January 1943.

5 NAA, A6923, 37/401/425, AAS London message 1250/15 January 1943.

6 NAA, A6923, 37/401/425, Landforces Melbourne message 0630/16 January 1943.

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Burma, whereas the RN was to have little further contact with the IJN until the final stages of the

Pacific War.7

The British were to maintain contact with Central Bureau throughout the war, co-

operation between FRUMEL and Central Bureau on the other hand was somewhat problematic

due to the cryptographic relationship between the US Army and US Navy and some of the

personalities involved.8 This was not helped by the administrative arrangements by which these

organisations communicated. There was no initially direct official working level liaison between

Central Bureau and FRUMEL. Liaison was either via senior officers or through the major

headquarters.9 The wartime report on Central Bureau activities puts it more succinctly when it states that there was a “lack of proper co-operation between Central Bureau and the Naval ‘Y’ service” and that such “co-operation was not achieved until almost the very end of the war”.10

But this did not imply that co-operation between FRUMEL and Central Bureau did not exist at the organisational level.11 This co-operation though did not directly involve the RAN personnel

working within FRUMEL, they remained in the background.

7 See John Winton, The Forgotten Fleet: The Story of the British Pacific Fleet 1944-5, Douglas Boyd Books,

Sussex, 1989.

8 See Drea, p.24.

9 NAA, B5436, Central Bureau technical Records Part A: Organisation, makes no references to liaison

officers with FRUMEL nor does it show that FRUMEL was a direct recipient of Central Bureau product.

10 NAA, B5436, Central Bureau Technical Records Part K – Critique.

11 At NAA, A6923, 16/6/289, Landops Brisbane message 1205/6 January 1943 asked Landforces Melbourne

to ascertain whether Fabian had received an earlier message from Central Bureau. See also Drea p.92.

299

Both FRUMEL and Central Bureau concentrated on the interception, and breaking, of operational messages. In the case of FRUMEL this was mainly JN-25, ‘minor codes’ and initial research on newly identified IJN systems.12 These intercepted messages were then passed to the respective commands in the Central and South-West Pacific as well as to Washington. Not included initially in this new cryptographic framework was an organisation for the interception and exploitation of diplomatic messages. The Australian Army however sought to retain the expertise of some of the ex-SIB British civilian cryptographers for this task. Although the British were not completely happy with the creation of this new organisation they realised that not only could they not do anything about it but there might be some advantage in it for them.13 This

Army’s intent was supported by Consul Archer, who had been part of the original SIB under

Nave.14 Archer’s request to remain in Australia and an almost simultaneous Australian approach caused much concern in London as not only were concerns over security involved but it was also believed that the four Foreign Office officials would be more gainfully employed in London.

Ultimately however, London agreed to the proposal and the men remained in Australia working on Japanese diplomatic and consular traffic.

As well as resulting in personnel and organisational changes, the Holden Agreement and the establishment of FRUMEL as a combined USN/RAN organisation necessitated the creation of a special communications link between the various cryptographic centres. This became known as the BRUSA circuit. FRUMEL was an integral element of this new cryptographic network and

12 TNA, HW50.

13 TNA, HW53, 51, draft letter dated 21 January 1943.

14 TNA, HW53, 51, message LHQ Melbourne to War Office dated 2100/30 October 1942.

300

exchanged information with the other centres, Washington, Honolulu and Ceylon. The BRUSA

circuit also included a direct link between Washington and London as well as the various British

commands in the Far East and London. Traffic on the circuit would be encyphered using what

was described as a Combined Cryptographic Machine, CCM.15 The British liaison officer at

FRUMEL used a modified TypeX machine for British to British communications. These

machines were used because the USN would not allow the British access to its coding machines.

Prior to the establishment of this special circuit the majority of intelligence transmitted to the

United States from Australia was sent via Vancouver using the trans-Pacific undersea cable.

Coupled with the development of this international communications network was an attempt, made throughout 1943, to improve the speed of transmission, accuracy and content of direction finding fixes transmitted by Australian and New Zealand direction finding stations.

Fixes transmitted between Australia and New Zealand were to be sent in a machine cypher, possibly TypeX, direct to the direction finding plotting centres.16 This was intended to increase

the speed of transmission and allow for direct delivery of messages, rather than having it

processed through the normal naval communication channels in Navy Office and suffer resultant

delays in distribution to the centres. Another proposal, to improve the quality of information

transmitted, was for direction finding stations to provide details of Radio Finger Printing (RFP)

and TINA observations, if taken.17

15 NAA, MP1074/7, 1/3/1944 to 10/3/1944: Admiralty message 1007A/03 March 1944.

16 NAA, MP1074/7, 1/5/43 – 15/5/43: ACNB message 0855Z/07 May 1943.

17 NAA, MP1074/7, 1/5/43 – 15/5/43: ACNB message 0910Z/14 May 1943. Whether these proposals were

finally adopted is not clear because of gaps in the surviving archival record.

301

By mid-1943 significant organisational advances had also been made in establishing

FRUMEL and developing its capabilities. Additional intercept facilities had been established by the USN at Adelaide River (NT),18 Cooktown (Qld), Exmouth Gulf (WA) and Moorabbin (Vic).

In addition to these, the RAN had established an intercept station at Townsville (HMAS

Magnetic). The site was to prove especially valuable as it was capable of intercepting material

not received at other stations.19 Additional staff, in the form of WRANS and USN personnel, had

also arrived and commenced duties with the interception organisation. WRANS served as watch-

keepers and day-hands at the various RAN facilities as well as the USN station at Moorabbin,

outside Melbourne.

On joining FRUMEL the WRANS were given a written test by Commander Newman.

The object of this examination was to instil a high degree of security consciousness. One

question in this test was “Give your answer to the following question …………….. Just exactly

what do you do in the Navy?” Actual responses included:

“25 w.p.m.”,

18 The Adelaide River W/T site, was also known as USN Supplementary W/T Radio Station Adelaide River

and was erected at the request of COM 7th Fleet. The station had always been regarded a USN commitment

even although it was jointly manned by USN and RAN personnel. See NAA, MP1049/5, 2037/3/187 DSC

minute 22 August 44.

19 SRH-275, OP20G File on Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne – News Memorandum for Period Ending September

15, 1943.

302

“I’m the one who makes the tea and scrubs out”, and

“Usually they get told to mind their own business”.20

Not only was Newman concerned for the security of the signals intelligence operations.

He was also deeply interested in the welfare of the WRANS who served under him. The original

WRANS were entertained on weekends by a number of senior naval officers and their wives.21

This concern for their welfare did not mean however that the WRANS were given an easy time.

Those posted to the USN W/T station at Moorabbin were given three weeks to adapt to the USN methods and procedures. Once up to speed these WRANS stood watches and intercepted

Japanese transmissions, alongside the US servicemen based at Moorabbin. Eventually the number of WRANS wireless operators at Moorabbin would almost equal the number of USN operators, 24 as against 35.22

Similarly a large number of WRANS were employed in various tasks at the FRUMEL

offices in the Monterey Flats.23 Here they carried out a variety of administrative tasks associated

with the running of a signals intelligence organisation. During the war years it was the WRANS who were the backbone of the RAN’s signals intelligence effort, performing a wide range of

20 SRH-275, OP20G File on Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne – News Memorandum for Period Ending 15

January 1944.

21 See Huie, Ships Belles, p169.

22 As a consequence of the close working relationship between the USN personnel and the WRANS a number

of relationships developed and some of the WRANS subsequently married USN sailors.

23 Located at Arthur St. South Melbourne.

303

duties such as interception, RFP and direction finding operations, punch card machine

operations, encyphering, administrative tasks and the many minor jobs which keep such an

organisation functioning. Without the WRANS the RAN contribution to the signals intelligence

effort against Japan might have been much less valuable. Sadly theirs was an invisible contribution and one which they could not discuss nor for which they could receive public

recognition.24

Towards the end of the Pacific War, as USN personnel were withdrawing from FRUMEL

the number of WRANS serving there increased significantly. In order to cope with this increase a

barracks was constructed within the grounds of the Monterey Flats for them. When the building

was completed and handed over for occupation by the WRANS, it lacked fire hoses, bath and

basin plugs, refrigerators, and curtains in the sleeping quarters.25 This standard of

accommodation was not a great improvement on that which had greeted the first WRANS at

Moorabbin. When they had first arrived, their accommodation lacked doors as well as curtains on the windows.26

Poor workmanship was not the only logistical issue to plague FRUMEL. Shortages of

technical equipment were of ongoing concern, but orders for new equipment had been placed.

Sometimes it was necessary to take steps to disguise attractive equipment, such as typewriters;

24 For further details of the WRANS’ contribution to the secret war see Shirley Fenton Huie, Ships Belles and

Cryptolog, (US) Naval Cryptologic Veterans Association newspaper.

25 SRH-275, OP20G File on Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne – News Memorandum Number 4 dated 1 July 1945.

26 Huie, p.178.

304

for fear that it might not reach its intended destination.27 With the expansion in personnel the size

and security of the Monterey Flats also began an issue. An initial proposal was to relocate the

organisation into a vacant inner city department store building. The proposed building was

examined and deemed suitable for FRUMEL’s purposes. Unfortunately, the Commander

Seventh Fleet had some concerns about the fact that the building was located in the middle of the

central business district.28 In order to provide the working space required by the code breakers

additional facilities were build at the Monterey Flats. A detachment of US Marines also arrived to help improve the physical security of the facility. By June 1943 there were some 200 USN

personnel attached to FRUMEL although the estimated requirement was for 300.29 On a brighter

note, personnel changes at FRUMEL also seemed to result in a positive and co-operative

atmosphere in the organisation. The friction which had existed when Lieutenant Commander

Fabian was in command of the USN code breakers was gone, and during 1943 a more co-

operative relationship appears to have developed between Commander Newman and Lieutenant

Commander J. S. Holtwick USN.

During late 1943, with the intent of improving the interception and direction finding

coverage of the Australian based network Commander Newman, accompanied by, then,

27 SRH-275, OP20G File on Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne – News Memorandum for Period Ending June 21,

1943.

28 SRH-275, OP20G File on Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne – News Memorandum for Period Ending August 10,

1943.

29 SRH-275, OP20G File on Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne – News Memorandum for Period Ending June 21,

1943.

305

Commander J. Holtwick USN and Radio Electrician Burnett, undertook an inspection of various

existing intercept and direction finding facilities as well as sites for future development. As a

result of this tour a decision was made to establish an additional USN intercept station at

Cooktown. This station was intended to help cover Japanese circuits either difficult to intercept

or not heard at all by the existing direction finding or intercept stations.

In addition to the new USN station at Cooktown a new RAN direction finding station was

to be built at Exmouth Gulf. Originally a site at Onslow was considered but not proceeded with,

possibly because of advantages in locating the new direction finding station close to the existing

USN facility at Exmouth Gulf. The USN station provided coverage for the Pacific ocean areas.

During the period the RAN facility was under construction, RAN personnel were integrated into the manning of the USN station. During this period an unfortunate accident occurred in which one of the RAN sailors fell from the direction finding platform and dragged the direction finding set over the edge with him. Fortunately the sailor concerned did not receive any serious injuries; the same could not be said for the direction finding set which suffered major damage. An operational unit was put together using parts from both the USN set and RAN equipment. The dipoles, broken in the fall, were replaced by ones obtained from the RAAF in Perth.30

The new RAN direction finding station at Exmouth was intended to support Commander-

in-Chief Eastern Fleet and potentially provide a backup to the facility on Cocos Island should the

Japanese discover that the direction finding station was still operational. British concerns for the

30 SRH-275, OP20G File on Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne – News Memorandum for Period Ending 15

January 1944.

306

FRUMEL – Photographic Essay Source: NAA A10909

Monterey Flats home to FRUMEL. Monterey II.

WRANS barrack, possibly at Moorabbin. WRANS barrack, possibly at Moorabbin.

Commander Newman and RAN staff officers. USN Officers.

RAN and USN Officers. WRANS Serving In FRUMEL

FRUMEL’s WRANS Officers. WRANS Petty Officers.

WRANS P1 Watch. WRANS P2 Watch.

WRANS S1 Watch. WRANS S2 Watch.

WRANS day workers at FRUMEL. FRUMEL’s Inner Workings

Code Room. Translation Section.

Correlation and Interpretation Section. Radio control room.

Teleprinter room. Radio and Teleprinter Repair room.

Traffic Analysis, direction finding and RFP file Traffic Analysis, direction finding and RFP File room. room.

Punch room for machine processing. Machine processing equipment room.

Machine processing equipment repair room.

security of the direction finding station on Cocos Island were raised again when the Dutch

proposed a direct air link between Australia and Ceylon. The Dutch proposal envisaged utilising

Cocos Island as a re-fuelling stop for Catalina flying boats. As on the previous occasion when

the RAAF sought to use the Island the British refused to support the proposal as they felt that any

increased activity around the Cocos Island group would only attract the attention of the Japanese

and result in another attack, or worse an assault, on the Island and the possible loss of facilities

there.31

Equipment for the RAN station arrived in Australia in 1944 on board the cruiser HMAS

Shropshire. It was subsequently trans-shipped to Exmouth Gulf and USN personnel assisted in final site selection and erection. The five RAN personnel who were posted to the direction finding station were supported by the USN staff already in the area. All the effort in establishing

this new station came to nought however when at 5 pm on 3 February 1945 it was hit by a severe

cyclone. The direction finding equipment was completely wrecked and spread over a quarter of a

mile from the site. Station staff who took shelter in a hut found themselves up to their necks in water as a consequence of the resulting tidal surge. After about four hours they moved to one of

the ‘ice boxes’ located on higher ground and remained there until the winds abated.32 Once the full extent of the damage was known and after consultation with the USN, who informed the

RAN authorities that the USN direction finding station was only a temporary facility, the RAN decided not to rebuild the station as this would have been a long and resource-intensive process.

The Australia war economy was stretched to the limit. Construction of additional facilities for

31 NAA, MP1049, 2037/3/187.

32 NAA, MP1049, 2037/6/85, letter dated 5 February 1945 from Leading Telegraphist A. P. Donnelly

307

FRUMEL had to compete against other projects of equal or higher priority. In part the very use to which these proposed new facilities were to be put mitigated against them receiving a higher priority, as it was easier to justify a higher priority for facilities which had less secrecy surrounding their functions. Extensions planned, during 1943/44, for the Adelaide River facility, also known as the Mount Bundy Road site, could not be undertaken by the Allied Works Council due to a shortage of skilled Australian labour. Because COMSOUWESPAC allocated a high priority to this facility and required it to be operational as soon as possible, the required work was undertaken by a USN Construction Battalion.

The planned expansion of naval direction finding facilities co-incided with the arrival of new and updated equipment. This allowed the older, but still useable, interception and direction finding equipment to be reallocated to other sites. In November 1943 Commander Newman proposed to relocate the HF/DF receiver in Darwin to a new station in either New Guinea or

New Britain to improve coverage, and accuracy.33 Such a station would allow for an Exmouth

33 Reports of D/F fixes were sent in a self evident code which did not require re-encyphering. Because of the

inherent inaccuracies of D/F fixes a grading was applied to provide some indication as to the accuracy of

the fix. In 1944 these grading were:

50 miles radius – ABLE

100 miles radius – NAN

250 mile radius – VICTOR

500 mile radius – LOVE

over 500 mile radius – UNCLE

See NAA, MP1049/5, 1997/7/862.

308

Gulf-Darwin-New Guinea (or New Britain) base line.34 This proposal was endorsed on 26

November. Following an examination of possible sites it was recommended that the new HF/DF

station be built at Port Moresby near the Brant W/T station. This site would allow for rapid

communications with Harman and was close to existing power, maintenance and other facilities.

The other site considered was Crob W/T station at Milne Bay. This was rejected however on technical grounds.35

These proposals and investigations eventually came to nought as it was decided that the

USN would operate New Guinea area direction finding stations and that due to the institution of

the ‘flash organisation’36 the additional receiver would be required in Darwin.37 Initially it was recommended, by Lieutenant O. M. Moriarty RANR, that the new equipment be sited near an area known as Knuckley’s Lagoon.38 The decision to retain the older equipment at Darwin was

34 NAA, MP1049/5, 2037/3/174, DSC minute dated 19 November 1943.

35 NAA, MP1049/5, 2037/3/174, NOICNG minute dated 14 December 1943.

36 The Flash Organistion was a method whereby Net Control Centres could alert D/F stations to monitor

specific frequencies. These flash messages were transmitted utilising the D/F station’s dedicated tactical

communications network on one of the following frequencies:

4005 KHtz designated Able,

8010 KHtz designated Baker,

12015 KHtz designated Charlie, and

16020 KHtz designated Dog.

The Mid-Pacific Strategic Direction Finder Net Tracking Instructions, dated 15 September 1944.

37 NAA, MP1049/5, 2037/3/174, DSC minute dated 31 December 1943.

38 NAA, MP1049/5, 2037/3/174, Report by LEUT Moriarty dated 18 December 1943.

309

further vindicated by a Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet summary of direction finding activity

which showed that the Coonawarra direction finding station was the busiest and most accurate

station in the Pacific Net.39 Approval to commence work on the new direction finding site was

given by the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board on 8 January 1944. Notwithstanding

formal approval, there were to be further setbacks affecting the Darwin station. When the new

DFG24 receiver arrived it was found that the packing was sodden with water. Rust had set in on

the metal components and fungus growth had commenced. Apparently the boxes containing the

equipment had become immersed in water somewhere between Adelaide and Darwin. This

might not have been a problem if the original packaging had been properly resealed after the

equipment was inspected upon arrival in Australia.40 The other setback related to the site

selected. The OIC Coonawarra W/T Station advised that the RAAF had objected to the facility

on the grounds that it impinged on the expansion of RAAF storage areas.41 In addition it was subsequently found that the site might not have been the best on technical grounds. A new site

was identified some 800 metres from the existing direction finding station. With the expansion of

direction finding sites in Darwin and New Guinea additional high speed communications

facilities between FRUMEL and these stations were required.

A USN type TBC-4 W/T transmitter was sent to Melbourne to be used by FRUMEL for

direct communications with Washington. Washington would then forward to London any

information which was assessed as being of either strategic or tactical interest to the British. The

39 NAA, MP1049/5, 2037/3/174, DC minute dated 4 January 1944.

40 NAA, MP1049/5, 2027/3/174, NOIC Darwin letter 19 February 1944.

41 NAA, MP1049, 2037/3/174, OIC HMAS Coonawarra W/T Station minute dated 14 February 1944.

310

decision as to what and when information is of interest to the British is a very important one. The

possible deployment of Japanese naval forces to Singapore might not be seen as being important

to the USN. But to the British it could assume major significance. The perspective of a USN

officer might not always be the same as that of a RN officer.

In order to reduce the expenditure associated with installing this transmitter it was

proposed to install it at the Post-Master General’s site at Shepparton rather than at a new site

closer to FRUMEL.42 The Post-Master General’s Office was later advised that as well as this

transmitter, additional requirements could soon exist for facilities to handle special purpose

traffic. The destinations for these messages would be Hawaii, Noumea and Port Moresby.43

Further changes to the supporting communications system occurred during January and February

1944. Originally USN authorities were to provide the Melbourne-Colombo communications link but advised in early 1944 that they could not do so.44 As an interim solution, arrangements were

made to use AWA transmitters at Pennant Hills to broadcast to Colombo. Transmission of

similar traffic to and from Honolulu was also effected by AWA. A shortage of trained AWA

staff required the RAN to take over part of the operations. This equipment would then be

operated either manually or automatically from the Monterey Flats.45

42 NAA, MP1049/5, 2037/3/144, DSC minute dated 22 August 43.

43 NAA, MP1049/5, 2037/3/144, letter SEC NB dated 17 November 1943.

44 NAA, MP1049/5, 2037/3/187, Signal from Washington dated 9 January 1944.

45 NAA, MP1049/5, 2037/2/1797, Signal from Admiralty 1145A/11 February 1944.

311

With the proposed construction of additional USN direction finding stations in the New

Guinea area came the need for the erection of a high speed direct link between FRUMEL and

Allied Naval Headquarters at Port Moresby. This requirement was to be satisfied by the erection of a rhombic aerial beamed at Port Moresby.46 The transmitter was to be placed at Sydenham

with the corresponding receiver at Werribee. The Post-Master General’s Department raised

concerns about interference with other W/T services. In order to resolve the issue the matter was

considered by the Defence Committee and it agreed, on 15 May, that the proposed installation

should proceed.47 Due to the time taken to resolve these issues however, and the availability of

US Army communications circuits, the project to erect these transmitters was cancelled.48

The concentration on the expansion of direction finding facilities during 1943 was based,

in part, on the operational requirement to combat the Japanese submarine threat off the

Australian coast. During 1942 and 1943 the IJN waged a submarine war off Australia’s east

coast sinking approximately 20 Australian or Allied ships. By the end of this campaign the RAN

could only lay claim to two confirmed submarine kills.49 Neither submarine appears to have been sunk as a consequence of the use of signals intelligence. Direction finding stations in Australia and New Zealand did detect the presence of Japanese submarines and messages were intercepted providing broad operational details of their mission, yet this information could not be turned into

46 NAA, MP1049/5, 2037/3/187, Commander Seventh Fleet minute dated 19 January 1944.

47 NAA, MP1049/5, 2037/3/187, Letter Secretary to the Naval Board dated 27 January 1944.

48 NAA, MP1049/5, 2037/3/187, Minute OIC Fleet Radio Unit to Commander Seventh Fleet dated 18 June

1944.

49 On the other hand RAAF aircrew laid claim to a significant number of submarine kills. See Stevens, p.208.

312

operational success.50 In part the reason lay in the nature and number of the anti-submarine forces and the level of training of the anti-submarine operators. This does not mean that the information was of no operational use. Information on the location of Japanese submarines would have been factored into convoy routes and sailing times in order to avoid these areas as much as possible. Direction finding and traffic analysis was however able to provide intelligence on the withdrawal of Japanese submarines to the waters north of Australia.51

The few successes Japanese submarines had operating off Australia’s east coast paled into insignificance when compared with the successes of USN submarines against the Japanese merchant marine. American submarines aided by signals intelligence maintained an ever- tightening blockade of the Japanese home islands. Messages detailing the movements of both

Japanese naval vessels and merchant ships were intercepted and translated and the information passed on to the submarines.52 With sufficient warning the submarines could position themselves

50 These fixes were reproduced in the monthly ACB 0233/43 South-West Pacific Anti-Submarine Report

published by the Anti-Submarine Warfare Division in Navy Office during the war. Copies of some of these

are held by the RAN’s Naval Historical Section.

51 For a detailed study of submarine operations off Australia see David Stevens, A Critical Vulnerability: The

Impact of the Submarine Threat on Australia’s Maritime Defence 1915–1954, Sea Power Centre-Australia,

Canberra, 2005.

52 An example of this is the sinking of the Toen Maru. British code breakers intercepted and decrypted a

message giving the movements of this ship. On 2 March it would be in position 3o 30’S and 117o 35’E at

0900Z/2 March 1943. Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet passed this information on to Commander-in-

Chief Pacific Fleet on 28 February 1943 (see NAA, MP1074/7, 16/2/43 to 28/2/43: Commander-in-Chief

Eastern Fleet message 0849Z/28 March 1943). The post-war JANAC report Japanese Naval and Merchant

313

to intercept these ships. Sometimes, as was the case of the damaged Zuikaku after the Coral Sea

battle, the submarines arrived at the designated point only to see their intended prey in the

distance and the range opening. Not only did such intelligence provide movement information; it

also detailed convoy escorts and the disposition of other Japanese anti-submarine forces and of

mine fields. Tactical information such as Japanese zig-zag systems was also obtained from these

intercepts.53 The damage and sinking of Japanese merchant ships had a multiple negative impact

on the Japanese war economy and effort. Shipping losses deprived Japan of their cargos and

reduced the overall carrying capacity of the merchant fleet as a whole. Damaged ships which

required extensive repair further reduced carrying capacity, as well as taking up valuable

dockyard resources. Ports became congested with cargo awaiting trans-shipment to overseas destinations. Without its merchant fleet Japan could increasingly not sustain its war effort, and the overall impact was not only dislocation of its economy but also an inability to support and reinforce Japanese forces in the outer islands, thus aiding the amphibious campaigns in the

Central and South-West Pacific.54

Shipping Losses During World War II By All Causes, lists, on page 39, the Toen Maru as having been sunk

on 2 March 1943 in position 3o 29’S and 117o 17’E by an American submarine.

53 NAA, MP1074/7, 16/1/43 to 31/1/43: Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet message 0805Z/28 March 1943.

54 See Mark P. Parillo, The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II, NIP, Annapolis, 1993 for details on

the destruction of the Japanese merchant fleet. For a more detailed analysis of the role of signals

intelligence and submarine warfare see SRH 011, The Role of Communications Intelligence in Submarine

Warfare in the Pacific (January 1943–October 1943).

314

The battles of the Coral Sea and Midway and the destruction of the Japanese merchant marine are the three finest examples of the use of signals intelligence during the Pacific War.

In October 1943, as these events were occurring, FRUMEL was visited by an unidentified British officer (possibly Commander M. G. Saunders RN).55 During the course of the visit this officer was provided with complete access to all areas of FRUMEL. Numerous meetings were held between the visitor and Commander Newman, the Deputy Officer-in-Charge

FRUMEL. The visit of a middle ranking naval officer would not normally be of particular note, what made this visit different was that prior to his arrival in Melbourne Saunders had a number of, negative, preconceived points of view concerning FRUMEL and its internal organisation and functioning. These views were the result of his previous visit to Melbourne almost twelve months before. At that time he made a very negative assessment on the organisation and its direction. Since that visit there had been a change of hierarchy at FRUMEL and firm policy direction from above.

As the War progressed, the Japanese found it harder and harder to replace completely, on a regular basis, the various codes and cyphers being used throughout the Empire and occupied territories. As a consequence they were forced to re-use some superseded codes. This breakdown

55 SRH-275, OP20G File on Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne – News Memorandum for Period Ending November

15, 1943. The officer’s name has been redacted from this document. However in TNA HW53/51, there is a

letter from Commander M. G. Saunders RN to A. G. Denniston, dated 2 November 1943, indicating that he

is in Melbourne and has visited various British personnel engaged in code breaking. He states he will leave

Melbourne during the course of the next week.

315

in cryptographic security not only made it easier for the Allied code breakers to read these particular messages, but also provided a means of breaking into the newer codes as the same message was being transmitted in multiple codes.56 One of the more unusual codes worked on by staff at FRUMEL, during May 1944, was JN-177. This was a Japanese diplomatic code used in the Japanese occupied territories. It became a naval target because it was transmitted using the

Japanese naval strategic communications systems as there were no other communications systems available on which to transmit these messages. As the results obtained had no naval value they were passed to the US Army for action as required.57

Refinement of the system of co-operation and co-ordination between the USN and the

Royal and Commonwealth Navies continued throughout the War. New Zealand, which had been providing Melbourne with direction finding bearings and raw intercepts was by 1944 being provided, from Melbourne, with raw JN-20 and JN-40 material to work on.58 The RNZN in turn forwarded all of its raw intercepts to Melbourne. Operational control of the RNZN direction finding and intercept stations was vested in Commander Newman, in his capacity as Director of

Signals and Communications, in Melbourne. He provided details as to which circuits and frequencies, especially in the Marshall Islands, were to be monitored. Minor changes to these

56 NAA, MP1074/7, 21 August 1943 to 30 August 1943: NZNB message 0301Z/22 August 1943 is an

example of this whereby it was observed that the Japanese were repeating the use of the WE Code which

had previously been in force from 21 July to 31 July 1943.

57 NARA, RG457, Box579, Miscellaneous Information on Japanese Diplomatic System JN177.

58 Of the 31 keys associated with JN-20. Melbourne broke 18, Washington 11 and Honolulu 2. See TNA,

HW50.

316

arrangements could be made locally with the details being advised to GC&CS by OP-20-G.59

Significant changes would need to be negotiated between OP-20-G and GC&CS.60 These

arrangements were in keeping with the general framework for the co-ordination of the

interception of Japanese signals. This co-ordination was conducted at the OP-20-G and GC&CS

level and invariably ignored Australia.61 Notwithstanding these operational arrangements the

New Zealand intercept and direction finding stations and organisation were, unlike their

Australian counterpart, still seen by the British as being part of the British network. The reason for this might be that even though New Zealand provided intercepts to Melbourne she was not specifically referred to during the course of the Holden Agreement negotiations. The small cryptographic organisation there did not include any USN personnel. Whereas the RAN’s cryptographic organisation and supporting facilities were seen as being part of the USN organisation.

As the American forces advanced towards Japan the American planners began to plan for the final assault on the Japanese home islands.62 One of the considerations was the organisation

and location of signals intelligence units. The Australian based interception and direction finding

59 TNA, HW8, 30, Co-ordination of New Zealand Effort by US from Melbourne, US Navy Department minute

dated 7 January 1944.

60 ibid.

61 TNA, HW8, 30, Procedure for Frequency Allocation etc, US Navy Department minute dated 7 January

1944.

62 See John Ray Skates, The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb, University of Sth Carolina Press,

Columbia, 1994 and Douglas J MacEachin, The Final Months of the War With Japan: Signals Intelligence,

US Invasion Planning and the A-Bomb Decision, CIA, Langley, 1998.

317

facilities were being supplemented and gradually replaced by similar American facilities

established on captured islands closer to the Japanese Home Islands. The future of FRUMEL

came under review. One possibility examined in early 1944, known as the Holtwick Proposal,

was to merge FRUMEL and the RN organisation at Colombo into a single organisation at Pearl

Harbor. This plan had been discussed with Australian, British and American naval officers and

was generally supported by the USN code breaking organisation in Hawaii, known as Fleet

Radio Unit Pacific (FRUPAC).63 This was one of the rare occasions on which the RAN appears

to have had an opportunity to comment on strategic issues associated with the evolution of

signals intelligence organisation in the Pacific before they were approved by the British and the

USN. The reason for the RAN’s inclusion in this case probably had more to do with the close

working relationship which had developed between Commander Newman and his USN

counterpart than on any sudden desire for inclusiveness by the USN at this stage. Unfortunately

this proposal was to come to nought and the status quo would remain for some time to come.

The possibility that USN personnel might be withdrawn from FRUMEL to support these

newer stations was not lost on the RAN hierarchy. In fact the USN had always viewed

FRUMEL, or at least the USN component of it, as a semi-mobile unit to be deployed forward

when need arose.64 The fact that the RAN might not have been formally advised of this concept was of no concern to the USN. In an attempt to ensure that adequate numbers of qualified personnel were available so that FRUMEL, or whatever organisation left in its place, could

63 TNA, HW50, 12, p.79.

64 NARA, RG38, Box 12, Outline of the Collaboration in Japanese Cryptanalysis Between the US Navy and

the British, p.14.

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continue to remain operationally effective, the RAN approached the RCN for support. The

Canadian signals intelligence effort had mainly been focused on the naval war against

Germany.65 As this effort was rapidly coming to an end the RCN began to reorient its efforts

towards the War against Japan. In March 1944 Lieutenant Moriarty visited Canada and discussed

amongst other subjects the possibility of the loan of qualified RCN personnel to the RAN for

signals intelligence work. The Canadians responded that they would be happy to provide

whatever assistance they could and proposed that Captain J. De Marbois RCN should visit

Australia to discuss issues of mutual interest in relation to Japanese signals intelligence.66 In planning for the mission to Australia the Canadians asked the USN for permission to visit USN signals intelligence organisations in Australia. Much to their surprise the Canadians were told quite bluntly by the Americans that there was no Australian signals intelligence organisation and that all Australians were under USN “jurisdiction”. Furthermore the Canadians were advised that there was no need to go to Australia as the whole issue of signals intelligence would be dealt with at a conference planned to be held in Hawaii in July 1944.67 Clearly the American

perspective on how the RAN fitted into the overall signals intelligence picture was different from

that of the RAN which appeared to view itself as having some independence.

65 The Canadians had maintained a small unit working on Japanese cryptographic systems in conjunction with

the USN.

66 NAA, MP1074, NSHQ signal 2021Z/29 May 1944.

67 NAC, RG24, Vol. 3806, 1008/75/20, Notes on the History of Operational Intelligence Centre In

Canada.

319

As these discussions, on the future organisational make up of signals intelligence, were

underway events of a more current and operational nature began to attract the attention of the

British and Australian naval and military authorities. Direction finding and traffic analysis had

revealed that a large proportion of the Japanese surface fleet had been deployed to Singapore.68

British analysts determined that the Japanese intention was to strike into the Indian Ocean, as in

1942, in order to destroy British naval forces before they were ready to deploy to the Pacific and possibly attack Fremantle. This assessment gained credence in the eyes of the British because

Fremantle was the only major port on Australia’s west coast and a major USN submarine operating base.69 At this time the only defences available along the west coast were the fixed

defences around Fremantle harbour, some Darwin-based aircraft, and the few available

submarines.70

As a precaution against a possible Japanese strike, aircraft were relocated from Darwin to

Perth and Potshot.71 Others were then flown to Darwin as replacements for those moved south.

The Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet announced his intention to position his main force to the

west of the Maldives Islands should the Japanese move through either the Malacca or Sunda

68 The force was initially assessed as consisting of five battleships, one aircraft carrier, four heavy cruisers

and 12 destroyers. However the possibility was noted that the force could expand to seven battleships and

two aircraft carriers. See NAA, A5954, 535/4, Japanese Fleet Movements and Intentions 2/3/1944–

12/4/1944.

69 See David Creed, Operations of the Fremantle Submarine Base 1942-1945, Naval Historical Society of

Australia, Garden Island, 2000 for a brief history of submarine operations out of Fremantle.

70 NAA, MP1074/7, 1/3/1944 to 10/3/1944: SO(I) Fremantle message 0856Z/7 March 1944.

71 Potshot was the name utilized to identify North West Cape in Western Australia.

320

Straits.72 This plan was based on his assessment that the Japanese intention was to strike at either

Ceylon or against the Indian Ocean sea lanes.73 The proposed deployment stands in sharp

contrast to that with Admiral Fletcher and the US carriers at the Battles of the Coral Sea and

Midway, when US ships were in a position to intercept and strike Japanese forces. The

deployment chosen by the Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet would make it almost impossible

for him to engage the enemy forces should they strike at Fremantle and difficult if they struck at

Ceylon. His intention was to maintain ‘a fleet in being’ rather than to ‘engage the enemy more

closely’. Notwithstanding this criticism of his plans, it should be noted that at Midway the USN

was well aware of the Japanese plans and intentions. In the case of the Japanese force at

Singapore the British had knowledge of neither and so were attempting to make operational

plans based on gaps in intelligence and what was of importance to them.

On 8 March it appeared that the Australians’ worst fears had been realized when an

American submarine reported a Japanese task force of two battleships, one aircraft carrier, two

cruisers and destroyers proceeding south through the Lombok Strait.74 The Fremantle-based

submarines were ordered to sea to provide a defensive screening patrol off the port. The feared

attack did not eventuate however as Allied analysts working only with information derived from

traffic analysis had reached the wrong conclusions concerning the Japanese intent. The Japanese force was at Singapore not in preparation for a strike against either Indian Ocean targets or

72 NAA, MP1185/8, 2026/5/316, Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet message 1106Z/23 February 1944.

73 NAA, MP1185/8, 2026/5/316, Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet message 1301Z/22 February 1944.

74 NAA, A5954, 535/4, Secretary Department of Defence minute dated 8 March 1944.

321

Australia, but in order to be close to their main source of fuel in preparation for further operations against the Americans in the Pacific and around the Philippines.75

These operational diversions did not however distract the various navies from their organisational concerns. Notwithstanding the planned mid-year signals intelligence conference, the USN issued new instructions for co-ordinating the interception of Japanese naval traffic. In essence it organised coverage around four net control centres. These were Melbourne, Honolulu,

Washington state and Ceylon. These centres would control the various intercept stations assigned to them. In the case of Melbourne these stations were Nairnville (NZ), Suva, Harman,

Townsville, Cooktown and Adelaide River. Coupled with these organisational changes they continued their discussions with the Canadians on the possible future employment of RCN Y

Operators. The RAN, unaware of the USN-RCN discussions still anticipated support from the

RCN.

In June 1944, prior to the planned mid-year signals intelligence conference, Commander

J. S. Holtwick USN and Commander J. M. Lietwiler USN were transferred from FRUMEL to

Washington and FRUPAC. Commander Newman subsequently assumed command of FRUMEL.

Newman continued to follow the USN practice of rendering regular reports of activities to

Washington and FRUPAC. By this method he managed to ensure a degree of organisational visibility. This would now become more bureaucratically important given the reduction in product and, to a large degree, the approaching irrelevance of FRUMEL to overall USN

75 Admiralty, War With Japan Vol VI, HMSO, London, 1995, p.7.

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operations in the Pacific. With the departure of the two senior USN officers it is not surprising to

note that Commander Newman did not attend the subsequent signals intelligence conference.

This was to be yet another strategic planning conference at which the RAN was not present.

At the July conference, held at Fleet Radio Unit Advanced (FRUAD) in Guam and

attended by Captain J. N. Wegner USN, it was decided that all unique raw intercepted material

held by RAN and USN intercept stations would be passed to FRUPAC and OP20G. Once this

transfer had occurred all USN personnel, except those required for the Adelaide River, intercept

station and a few needed to assist the RAN cryptographers with work on minor codes, would be

redeployed to FRUAD. The USN intercept station at Moorabbin would be closed, on 30

November 1944, but there would be some increase in capability for the Adelaide River site. The

RAN’s intercept stations at Harman and Townsville would operate unchanged. The USN would

provide personnel and equipment to pass raw material to FRUPAC and OP20G and the RAN

would do likewise for the passing of raw material to Ceylon, now designated Fleet Radio Unit

Eastern Fleet (FRUEF). In preparation for these changes FRUMEL was split into two

organisations, FRUAD (Melbourne) and FRUMEL. The former consisted of all the USN

personnel who would soon move forward to Guam. Half of the JN-25 personnel and all those

working on Japanese weather codes were to be withdrawn immediately. Other personnel were to

be withdrawn as the new procedures for handling raw material came into force.76 By 6

November 1944 work on JN-25 had stopped in Melbourne as the last of the USN personnel were withdrawn. On the 28 November FRUAD (Melbourne) had reverted to USN control with

76 TNA, HW50/12, p.79.

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FRUMEL to become, in March 1945, an Imperial station commanded by Commander

Newman.77 Although there was some provision for raw material and intelligence relating to

Australia to be passed to Melbourne, these new working arrangements would see Australia

limited to working minor Japanese systems and traffic analysis. On the surface it appeared that

the RAN was still contributing to the Allied signals intelligence effort its relevance, however, would decrease as the strategic centre of gravity of the Pacific conflict shifted north towards the

Japanese home islands and the Japanese used fewer and fewer codes.

The RAN signals intelligence capability was not the only section of Australia’s military contribution to the War against Japan that was becoming progressively irrelevant during the final phase of the Pacific War. The majority of Australia’s ground and air forces were to be assigned operations well to the rear which would cost numerous lives but ultimately have no bearing on the final outcome of the War. Ships of the RAN, assigned to the Seventh Fleet, would support

US landings on the Philippine Islands and then operated in support of the AIF in these final campaigns. Ships assigned to the British Pacific Fleet would become involved in the landings at

Okinawa and bombardments of the Japanese Home Islands. The only non-naval component to serve in the Philippines would be the Australian contribution to Central Bureau.

Further discussions on the organisation of Japanese naval signals intelligence work were held in August and September 1944 when Admiral J. Redman USN visited the Pacific. He proposed a closer linkage between the British cryptographers at Colombo and the USN

77 TNA, HW50/20, p.17A.

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organisations in the Pacific. The subject of how FRUMEL and the RAN fitted into this proposed

new organisation does not appear to have been raised. In making his offer Redman bypassed the

established lines of communication between the US and GC&CS. Redman’s proposal appeared

to have provided HMS Anderson with everything it wanted, cryptographically speaking, it was viewed with suspicion by the authorities in London who felt this was another attempt by the

USN to prevent the British from working on Japanese naval signals intelligence.78 Given that

Redman did not discuss his proposals with the British at Bletchley Park and forbade OP20G

from doing likewise the negative and suspicious view of the British is understandable. By late

October a new agreement had been reached between the USN and GC&CS on work on Japanese

cryptographic systems.79 During the course of all of these discussions and associated visits there

were however no RAN presence or involvement. Once more the RAN was reliant on the goodwill of its senior partners to look after its interests.

The withdrawal of the USN component of FRUMEL allowed the RAN the opportunity to acquire some of the equipment that the Americans had been using. To this end the Australian

Commonwealth Naval Board advised the Australian Naval Attaché in Washington that the Navy

Department had been asked to act as the RAN’s agent in arranging for the lease of IBM

equipment in Australia80. Having seen how important these machines were in modern code

breaking the RAN had no intention of relinquishing them. The withdrawal of USN personnel

also necessitated a number of changes at FRUMEL. Some operational and research tasks which

78 TNA, HW50, 12, Remarks on Redman’s Action, circa September 1944.

79 TNA, HW50/12, An Agreement Between GC&CS and NEGAT on Jap Crypt-analytic Tasks, p.116.

80 NAA MP1074/1, Naval Board signal 0219Z/20 December 1944.

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were being undertaken and were now considered minor were eliminated, and other tasks were worked on a part time basis. Circuits covered by FRUMEL were reduced to those which

produced the most intelligence. The main systems which FUMEL continued to work on were

JN-11, JN-40 and JN-147. Other work undertaken included call sign recovery and traffic

analysis.81 Increasingly WRANS began to take over many of the jobs previously done by USN

personnel. Other previously separate functions such as USN and RAN code rooms for incoming

and outgoing messages were merged into a single organisation.

In addition to acquiring surplus USN equipment the RAN also increased the intelligence

collection capabilities at Coonawarra with the installation, during December 1944, of radio

finger printing equipment.82

In November 1944 the Admiralty raised the possibility of combining the Australian and

New Zealand cryptographic organisations into a single signals intelligence organisation for the

SWPA.83 Notwithstanding the intended withdrawal of USN personnel from FRUMEL the prospect of a combined RAN/RNZN, and possibly RN, cryptographic organisation was not viewed positively by the USN. They saw this proposal as an attempt by the British to “rescind

81 As well as working on these codes the Australians were covering some 66 circuits, of which 40 were

designated secondary circuits. Of the 26 primary circuits 12 were not very productive but had to be covered

as they were not being received elsewhere. See TNA, HW50/20.

82 NAA MP1074/1, Naval Board signal 2139Z/13 December 1944.

83 NAA, MP1074, DNI Admiralty message 1735A/15 December 1944.

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the basic agreement”.84 The USN referred to the Holden Agreement as ‘the Basic Agreement’

and the subsequent agreement of 25 July 1943 as the ‘Extension Agreement’. It is not clear

whether or not the British proposal included the Australian component of Central Bureau, it is

possible, however, that this British suggestion was made against the background of the creation

of the British Pacific Fleet and consideration of its future operating areas. One option examined for the use of this force was to expand the British area of responsibility to include parts of the

SWPA. If this were to be the case then US forces would operate in the northern Pacific, including against Japan proper, with the British being left to conduct mopping up operations in the various lost colonial regions in the south. Notwithstanding the reasons for this suggestion, the

USN’s reaction clearly showed that they did not want the British to assume a larger signals

intelligence role in the Pacific than was already the case, even though they would soon relinquish

control of FRUMEL.

During the early part of 1945 FRUMEL was visited by Sir Edward Travis, Director

GC&CS. Sir Edward was accompanied by a Mr F. H. Hinsley, the future British Official

Historian. Following this visit the GC&CS requested that copies of FRUMEL’s regular News

Memorandum be forwarded to GC&CS and FRUEF. As the War was coming to a close and the

prospect of large scale British naval operations in the Pacific loomed closer, the British were

once again interested in Australian naval code breaking activities and assets.

84 NARA, RG38, Box 12, Outline of the Collaboration in Japanese Cryptanalysis Between the US Navy and

the British, p.26.

327

During its meeting on 27 January 1945 the Pacific Steering Committee decided to

establish an exchange of Japanese air/ground cryptographic information. The initial exchange

was to be between Guam and FRUEF with Central Bureau Brisbane being included later.

Because FRUMEL did not handle this type of material they were not included in these

arrangements.85 The role of the RAN in Japanese cryptography was further reduced by an

agreement between the USN, FRUEF and Central Bureau to exchange information on Imperial

Japanese Navy and Army air/ground codes. As US Naval forces pushed north they increasingly

came under the operating umbrella of Japanese land based aircraft and the need to obtain

accurate and rapid intelligence on the operations of these aircraft became paramount. This was

especially so when it came to providing early warning of potential kamikaze attacks. The

exclusion of FRUMEL meant that it could not develop the necessary expertise in these

operational codes and so remain a relevant cryptographic organisation for the remainder of the

conflict. Also mitigating against the RAN was (now Lieutenant Colonel) Sandford’s desire to

exclude FRUMEL altogether and have the interchange take place between Colombo, Guam,

Washington and Central Bureau.86 Since there was no RAN representation at these meetings there was no way that FRUMEL could counter any proposal by Sandford. Whether Sandford saw this as an opportunity to get even with Newman following the latter’s terse correspondence shortly after the establishment of Central Bureau is not clear. But if this was the case it was a very short sighted position given that it was clear the War would not last much beyond 1945.

85 NARA, RG457, Box 581, Minutes of the Pacific Steering Committee.

86 NAA, A6923, 16/6/289, Top Secret and Personal Letter dated 26 January 1945.

328

As the USN moved more and more of its cryptographic operations north Sandford sought

to have Lieutenant Colonel Treweek, one of the original Sydney University cryptographers,

withdrawn from FRUMEL and transferred to Central Bureau. No consideration appears to have

been given to approaching the Navy with a view to including RAN personnel in an enlarged

Australian component of Central Bureau. The spirit of co-operation which saw the RAN and

Army combine to establish the Special Intelligence Bureau before the War however was no

longer present. The earlier approach to the Canadians appears to have borne fruit,

notwithstanding USN attempts to prevent it.87 The Canadians responded to the Australian

approach advising that the majority of trained personnel were on loan to the RN. Furthermore

Captain de Marbois advised Commander Newman that he had been previously advised by the

USN that there was no requirement for RCN Y personnel for service in the Pacific.

Notwithstanding this, the Canadians did offer to provide whatever personnel were available.88 In the meantime the Admiralty, acting on the understanding that there were RCN personnel available, also approached the RCN for these personnel.89 The Canadians having made a

commitment to the RAN decided to keep it and advised Commander Newman that

approximately 40 Y personnel would be available for loan to the RAN after 31 August. The

87 NARA, RG38, Box 12, Outline of the Collaboration in Japanese Cryptanalysis Between the US Navy and

the British, p.25.

88 NDHQ, Notes on the History of Operational Intelligence Centre In Canada, c1945.

89 ibid.

329

Canadian contingent never arrived however as Japan surrendered on 15 August and the

requirement ceased to exist.90

As British strategic thinking began to focus on the operations of the British Pacific Fleet

and the final campaign against Japan, requirements for intelligence support attracted close

attention. To this end Captain A. H. Hillgarth RN undertook an extensive tour of the Pacific to

discuss, primarily with the USN, this intelligence support. Again, notwithstanding the role of the

RAN in the pre-war Pacific Naval Intelligence Organisation and more recent discussions as to

the future of FRUMEL within the broader British signals intelligence organisation, the RAN did

not figure prominently in these discussions or plans.91 Notwithstanding the fact that FRUMEL

was once again viewed, by the Americans, as a British station the RN appears to have been on

the horns of a dilemma, seeking how to utilise the Australians within their own organisation but

at the same time not wanting to create issues with the USN with respect to the original Holden

Agreement and the subsequent Extension Agreement on cryptographic co-operation. The other

90 Although little detail is provided a British document contains a cryptic comment against the date 8 June

1945:

“Question of reinforcing FRUMEL with Canadian Personnel: FRUMEL’s activities must be

known to at least one political department in Canberra which the Australian Navy Board is

anxious to avoid, can rely on ANB to prevent further spread.” See TNA, HW50/20.

This is possibly a reference to the leakage of highly classified information from the Department of External

Affairs to the Russians. See Desmond Ball and David Horner, Breaking the Codes–Australia’s KGB

Network 1944–1950, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1998.

91 TNA, ADM223/496, 53820, Report on Visit to US Intelligence Centres in Pacific, 30 July 1945. The

Appendix to this report is annotated “Not to DNI Melbourne”. (Emphasis in original).

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issue complicating possible command arrangements was that the majority of the RAN’s

Australian based assets, including Commander Long’s Naval Intelligence organisation, were still

assigned to SWPA command with naval code breaking activities controlled by the OP20G.

Notwithstanding the almost complete withdrawal of USN personnel the RAN attempted

to maintain the operational relevance of FRUMEL during the closing stages of the Pacific War.

This included the utilisation of the ex-USN IBM machines. But even at this stage of the War,

there were difficulties in ensuring a reliable delivery of equipment from the United States.

Consignments rarely arrived intact or on time. By way of example a large consignment of spare

parts, modification kits and other ancillary equipment required to properly operate FRUMEL’s

IBM equipment arrived in Melbourne two days after VP day. This equipment had been missing

for months.

The shortage of trained personnel at FRUMEL was further exacerbated by the general

requirement to release service personnel to work in industry and on the land in order to support

the war effort. After six years of war Australia’s economy was reaching breaking point. The

RAN searched far and wide to find the additional personnel needed to continue operations. As

recently as June 1945 it had approached the Admiralty seeking to have over 150 personnel of

varying specialisations made available to support the operations of FRUMEL.92 By the time the

War ended FRUMEL was staffed by personnel from the RAN, RANR, RANVR, WRANS,

RNZNR, USN, USNR, RNVR, WRNS and AIF.

92 NAA, MP1074/7, 21/6/1945 to 30/6/1945: ACNB message 0350Z/25 June 1945.

331

With the surrender of Japan came the restructuring of the RAN’s cryptographic and

direction finding organisation, the rapid de-mobilising of large numbers of personnel and the

associated disposal of surplus facilities and equipment. The direction finding station at Jandakot

was deemed surplus to requirements and the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board issued

NOIC Fremantle with instructions to close the station pending a decision on its ultimate future.

This helped to release some personnel for duties elsewhere. With the exception of a Petty Officer

Telegraphist, retained at Jandakot for destruction of secret documents, and of placing the direction finding station in a state of preserve, all the staff were made available for leave and subsequent posting to Harman. As there was also no longer an operational requirement for it the

Adelaide River intercept station was also closed.93 The two original stations at Harman and

Coonawarra were retained in operational service and became and remained important

operational assets in yet another signals intelligence war – that against the Soviet Union and its

Communist allies.

A final postscript to the RAN’s contribution to the signals intelligence War against Japan occurred in 1947, when a letter of commendation from the United States Secretary of the Navy was forwarded to the Australian Government. This letter commended the Australian personnel, who were part of FRUMEL during the Pacific War, for their dedication and professionalism.94

Unfortunately, it is highly unlikely that these dedicated men and women, who rose above many

93 NAA, 2037/3/187, NOIC DARWIN message 0138Z/07 October 1945.

94 NAA A1068 IC47/35/1/5, Department of External Affairs letter dated 23 April 1947.

332

of the political and inter-service issues and concerns which seemed to plague their superiors, were ever aware of the recognition their valuable and dedicated work received.

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Chapter 10

Conclusion

The importance of naval signals intelligence was clearly recognised at the end of the

First World War. The lessons learnt and benefits received by the RN in the use of direction finding to hunt down German submarines resulted in the fitting of direction finding equipment to RAN cruisers as part of their trade protection role. But there was no perceived immediate strategic requirement for Australia to maintain any cryptographic skills or to develop extensive land-based facilities. This attitude was clearly evident in the Jellicoe Report, which recommended the establishment of direction finding and intercept stations upon the outbreak of a future (Japanese) war but made no provision for training personnel or ensuring that the equipment would actually be available when needed.1 As a consequence of this lack of perceived strategic requirement for a cryptographic capability, the limited skills that had been developed during the First World War lapsed and there was no significant ongoing investment in facilities. These circumstances began to change in the early 1920s when

Britain’s alliance with Japan was terminated and there was an increasing concern over

Japan’s future actions in the region. The RAN’s faltering steps, starting in the 1920s, towards developing a signals intelligence capability were so, not because there was suddenly a uniquely Australian strategic requirement for such a capability but, because

Australia was a member of a collective security organisation, the British Empire. In

1 Report of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, GCB, OM, GCVO on Naval

Mission to the Commonwealth of Australia (May–August 1919) Vol. III, p.210. Copy held

RAN Naval Historical Section.

334

doing so the RAN assumed a role that was strategically relevant to Australian and

Imperial defence.

Many of the senior officers involved in the decision making processes associated with the development of the RAN’s signals intelligence capability were RN officers, either on exchange or loan to the RAN. The presence of these officers naturally raises the question as to whose interests they were serving when they made the decisions they did concerning the resources allocated to signals intelligence. Were they acting in the interests of their host country or their parent country? The Australian

Chief of Naval Staff at the time, Vice Admiral Sir Ragnar Colvin, was concerned about the viability of Singapore in a war with Japan and so saw advantages for both the RAN and RN in establishing an Australian signals intelligence capability.

Additionally, given the context of the times and the close association between the two services, it is difficult to see how RAN officers would have made decisions which were very much different than those actually made. In fact after the Second World

War this is exactly what they did.

The role of individuals in a small but potentially significant organisation such as the RAN’s fledgling signals intelligence organisation is of paramount importance.

In the pre-War years the work of people such as Newman, Nave and Barnes helped to establish a capability which could of provide a valuable contribution to the British

Imperial network. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the arrival of the

USN contingent, under Fabian, in Melbourne, problems began to emerge with regard to co-operation between the RAN and USN organisations. The problems were such that the viability of the RAN organisation was being questioned. With the transfer of

335

both Nave and Fabian to other organisations and roles and the command functions at

FRUMEL being assumed by Holtwick and Newman, an atmosphere of co-operation and mutual support developed which resulted in the organisation fighting the Japanese rather than itself.

The internal conflicts which developed, both within FRUMEL and the wider

Allied intelligence organisation, were not unique to the Pacific Theatre or the Second

World War. Similar conflicts occurred at various stages during the Battle of the

Atlantic. Often what lay at their core were single-minded individuals operating under very stressful conditions. The solution lay in the services being able to harness the strengths of these individuals to help achieve the desired goals. Unfortunately, the study of organisational behaviour and emotional intelligence had yet to emerge.

Over the course of 25 years the RAN provided both personnel and facilities for use by, initially, the Royal Navy and then the United States Navy. For a small service suffering personnel and financial constraints this was a significant contribution.

Unfortunately, on the surface it would appear that the RAN had little to show for its quarter century of investment in signals intelligence. This is not to say that nothing was achieved. The difficulty in assessing the achievement, and contributions, of the

RAN during the course of the signals intelligence war with Japan lies in the very nature of the task. Signals intelligence was from the very start, and still is today, an extremely sensitive and highly classified area of intelligence collection. As such its successes, and failures, were rarely reflected on the front pages of the newspapers.

Where a major victory occurred it was often attributed to ‘brilliant’ generalship or sometimes luck in order to protect the source.

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The second difficulty in assessing the achievements of the RAN during this period is the lack of a coherent and systematic set of records relating to the development and use of signals intelligence. This absence of records reflects in part the lack of political strategic direction and the subsequent ‘on again – off again’ approach to the development of naval signals intelligence in the early years. Those records that have survived the years of culling and destruction provide glimpses or snapshots of what was undertaken and achieved.2 As a consequence it is difficult to identify if RAN code breakers made a particular breakthrough prior to a similar break by an Allied group or one which significantly aided in an Allied breakthrough. The incomplete nature of the surviving records might also be misleading because so much of the earlier war-time results were transmitted over the naval communications network using the signal address ACNB, or something similar, as the originator of the message. This causes the identity of those who did the actual work to be obscured.

Furthermore, as the war progressed, the interception of messages and research into and breaking of codes became a truly collaborative effort. Partial breaks or solutions would be shared between the various cryptographic research centres around the world.3

Finally, prior but erroneous historical claims which have gained popular acceptance are difficult, if not impossible, to dislodge. An example of this is the support provided by the RN in providing information on the movements of Japanese merchant ships.

This information was subsequently used by USN submarines to attack and sink this

2 The most significant of these are the Navy Office Signal Packs located in the NAA at

MP1074. This series has been drawn on heavily for this thesis.

3 This is also the perspective of E. S. L. Goodwin when writing to Roger Pineau in the early

1980s. Correspondence reproduced in NVCA Cryptolog Vol. 14, (Spring 1993).

337

shipping. US authors make no mention of this and imply that the successes were due solely to the efforts of USN code breakers. The realities of an organisation’s importance or performance can often be obscured by nationalistic viewpoints. The publication of The Emperor’s Codes4 in 2000 resulted in a series of claims and counter-claims as to whether certain breakthroughs were initially made by either the

British or Americans.5 A recent Australian history concerning the Japanese midget submarine attack on Sydney states that “Australian Naval Intelligence built a formidable reputation for itself in World War I”.6 The RAN’s intelligence organisation did achieve some notable successes in the First World War, such as the capture of

German code books, they were not, however, of such magnitude as to provide the organisation with a “formidable reputation”, especially in a region where there was little operational activity after 1915.

Notwithstanding these constraints some RAN achievements can be identified.

The first was the capture and breaking of the German HVB code during the First

World War. The information obtained from this source indicated clearly that Admiral von Spee was intent upon leaving the Pacific. Unfortunately this intelligence was not acted upon by the British. In the context of inter-war intelligence collection the monitoring of the Japanese Mandated Islands by the RAN showed that there was only limited Japanese naval and military activity there as the vast majority of messages

4 M. Smith, The Emperor’s Codes: Bletchley Park and the Breaking of Japan’s Secret Ciphers,

Bantam Press, London, 2000.

5 See discussion threads on www.intelforum.org

6 Peter Grose, A Very Rude Awakening – The Night the Japanese Midget subs came to Sydney,

Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2007, p.271.

338

intercepted were either commercial or private in nature. This provided some indication that the Japanese were not secretly fortifying the Islands. The breaking of Japanese shipping company house codes by Nave and the SIB allowed the FECB to monitor the movements of and instructions to these ships. The withdrawal of these ships to

Japanese waters was an early indicator of possible Japanese action. During the early

War years the RAN was able to provide sorely needed infrastructure and interception coverage of areas such as South America. The work by RAN cryptographers on minor codes not only allowed the USN to devote additional resources to the operationally more important JN-25 but was also complementary to their work.

The RAN’s involvement in signals intelligence in an era of Imperial defence highlights the benefits and pitfalls of being the junior partner in a collective security arrangement. When the RN commenced signals intelligence operations in the Far East it was able to draw on the resources of the Dominion navies. These navies provided facilities, some trained personnel and information. All such assets were generally in short supply and had to compete with other requirements for scarce funding and personnel. The geographical dispersion of the Dominion facilities provided the Royal

Navy with a degree of coverage and security that it might not have otherwise had. In return the RAN was able to access a range of strategic and operational information which might otherwise have been denied it. This included the FECB’s Far East

Weekly and intelligence derived from Y sources.7 This ability to draw on foreign intelligence sources to complement limited national assets is just as important today as

7 NAA, MP1074, 21/8/1940 to 7/9/1940: COIS message 0427/21 August 1940. This message

advises that the Admiralty had approved the distribution of signals intelligence to Australia,

New Zealand and Canada.

339

it was to the RAN in the 1940s. The other advantages such co-operation had for the

RAN was that the RAN gained exposure and experience to the latest organisational, doctrinal and technical developments associated with not only signals intelligence but also intelligence in general. In general Imperial co-operation helped the navies improve their strategic and operational situational awareness.8

The down-side of this Imperial co-operation for the Dominions was that often their own requirements became secondary considerations in the overall British scheme. The Admiralty, and British authorities generally, were not enthused at the prospect of Dominions developing independent collection and analysis capabilities – knowledge is power. Their preference was to retain such capabilities solely under their direct control. Prior to the War, Australia was seen as an integral element of the

British cryptographic effort against Japan with the SIB considered as an independent

RAN organisation. Scarce funds and resources were devoted to this function by the

RAN. But during the course of the War the status, in British eyes, of the RAN signals intelligence organisation changed to suit circumstances. After the Japanese attack and when negotiating with the Americans it became a British organisation. This certainly did not provide the British with any advantage in these initial negotiations with the

USN. Following the establishment of FRUMEL, British lists of direction finding and

8 A good example of this was that the withdrawal of Japanese merchant ships from trade was

noticed in advance of aggressive action by Japan. Unfortunately, this information was not

turned into a strategic advantage. For the importance of situational awareness in the

application of sea power see Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century,

Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2004, pp. 242-243 and 250-252.

340

W/T intercept stations failed to mention the Australian facilities.9 These organisational and command changes resulted in a drifting apart of the RAN and British organisations. So much so, that as the War progressed the British were unable to make an assessment as to the Australian Government’s attitude towards a proposal to establish major British military signals intelligence facilities in Australia.10

Although the RAN’s overall contribution was quantitatively small, it was nonetheless important. In the area of cryptography the niche capability developed by the RAN allowed the US, and subsequently British, code breakers to concentrate on other higher level codes. The development of a niche capability is a valuable way for a small to medium power to gain entrée and relevance in the context of a larger power struggle. But if the niche capability is not seen to be of sufficient value or use to the small power itself, then it may not be given a sufficiently high priority, with respect to equipment, funding and manpower, in order to allow a complete development. This was the case with signals intelligence in the RAN during the period from 1920 to

1945. The RAN’s signals intelligence capability was seen as being more important for the RN than the RAN, and as such a complete interception, analysis and exploitation capability was not developed. One result was that when the Japanese struck in 1941 the RAN had no reserve capability to take over from or even to effectively support the

RN.

9 TNA, HW8/98, contains a listing of British direction finding facilities around the world

cAugust 1945. No mention is made of the Australian or New Zealand facilities.

10 TNA, HW67/17, Japanese Main Line Interception – Interim Report, p.7.

341

The development of niche capabilities might help to make a medium power important to its larger allies. But this also means that when these niche capabilities are no longer required the small to medium power begins to lose its relevance. In the case of the RAN, as the Pacific War moved further north and the USN rebuilt and expanded the signals intelligence infrastructure lost to the Japanese in the early years of the War the support and use of limited Australian facilities became less important. Eventually, in 1944, when the USN decided to withdraw its personnel from FRUMEL it did not require the RAN personnel and so the RAN cryptographic organisation was left looking for a real role to perform.

In any coalition a small to medium power is usually at a disadvantage, especially when it comes to decision making at the strategic level. The manner in which both the RN and USN dealt with the RAN over strategic issues associated with signals intelligence in the War against Japan shows clearly that unless the medium power is intimately involved in the decision making process its point of view or perspective will not be brought to the fore. The medium power could be consulted on various issues, but will ultimately have little or no say in the final outcomes and be required to adapt to the decisions already made. Herein lies a historical lesson for

Australia and other small to medium powers. When joining an alliance or coalition it is imperative to ensure that there is provision for their direct involvement in the strategic decision making processes. This point was reinforced by the Hon. Joel

Fitzgibbon, Minister for Defence, in July 2008 when he highlighted the exclusion of

Australia from NATO strategic planning in Afghanistan.11

11 Maitland Mercury, 7 July 2008, p4.

342

During the quarter of a century that the RAN was involved in the signals intelligence War against Japan there occurred a number of episodes demonstrating the strengths; such as advanced knowledge of Japanese operational and political plans, and weaknesses; such as losing the IJN aircraft carriers prior to the attack on Pearl

Harbor, of signals intelligence as a source of intelligence. These fall into four categories: counter-intelligence, political intelligence, economic intelligence and operational intelligence. Sometimes, as with the Japanese occupation of Amoy, the information obtained in one of these four areas overlapped or impacted upon another area. All helped however to provide an enhanced understanding of the enemy’s strategic intentions, strengths and weaknesses and thus to build a fuller picture upon which commanders could base their decisions. But signals intelligence was not an infallible source as it could not readily provide information about doctrine, intent or fighting abilities.12 Gaining a ‘knowledge edge’ over an adversary does not in itself win wars. Adequate capabilities and doctrine must be available in order to use this advantage. Unfortunately for the RAN, there was no national force structure or doctrine developed to make use of the potential advantages gained from signals intelligence.

12 One exception to this point did occur in 1929 when Eric Nave decrypted a Japanese message

detailing the Imperial Japanese Navy’s doctrine of attrition and decisive battle when dealing

with the US Navy. See Pfennigwerth, p.83. A paper written by Nave post World War II

indicates this was actually during the 1930 London Naval Conference.

343

Much signals intelligence was dependent upon being able to break the enemy’s codes and obtain usable information from the messages transmitted. But even without breaking the codes, useful intelligence could be obtained from signals intelligence.

Changes to transmitting frequencies, call signs and codebooks could all be indicators of an impending operation, especially if done out of regular sequence, as was the case with call sign changes made by the Japanese in December 1941. In order to ensure as much coverage as possible of the Japanese networks, the British required the addition of RAN intercept stations to monitor activities within the Japanese Mandated

Territories. Other changes to W/T routines, such as the linking of a particular Army unit with transport organisations and armament depots could foreshadow the movement of that unit from the home islands to the front lines.13 Furthermore, naval units appearing in different communications regions could also be seen as a precursor to a forthcoming operation, as could a sudden increase in wireless traffic in a certain area. Such information could all be gleaned from traffic analysis, and did not require the breaking of an enemy’s cipher systems. The ability to deduce much of this information was dependent upon developing a familiarity with an opponent’s

‘cryptographic culture’. Throughout their 20 years of listening to, studying and breaking Japanese naval codes prior to the Second World War, the British and

American navies developed an understanding of the Japanese cryptographic culture which greatly aided their early code breaking efforts.

13 NAA, MP1074/7, 26 March 1942 to 4 April 1942: NZNB message 1723M/27 March 1942

provides an example of such a linkage.

344

This was one of the first cryptographic lessons learnt from the Second World

War. In 1945, with the War drawing to a close, a review of Australia’s post-war intelligence requirements was undertaken, and it was proposed to establish a joint

Signals Intelligence Centre in Melbourne.14 At the same time that the Australian Joint

Intelligence Committee was examining this proposal, the British invited an Australian representative to attend a British Commonwealth Signals Intelligence Conference to be held in London during February/March 1946. Unlike the earlier decisions in favour of establishing a signals intelligence relationship with Britain, made in 1914 and in the inter-war years, this was in the full knowledge of and with the approval of the Prime

Minister, Mr Ben Chifley.15 At the London Conference the British proposed the establishment of a Commonwealth signals intelligence network with the Melbourne

Signals Intelligence Centre acting as the operational and co-ordinating hub for the

Pacific region. The Australian Cabinet approved the establishment and functions of the

Signals Intelligence Centre on 19 July 1946. In essence this new organisation, subsequently renamed the Defence Signals Directorate, would continue the signals intelligence functions pioneered in Australia by the RAN and FRUMEL during the previous 25 years.

14 NAA, A5954, 2364/3, Council of Defence Agendum – Joint Intelligence Organisation Post-

War, dated 5 April 1946.

15 NAA, A5954, 2363/2, Notes on History of Main Steps In Establishment of Joint Intelligence

Organisation.

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Appendix I:

Code Words and Terms Associated With World War II Signals Intelligence

Code Words

ANVIL Code word used to identify Japanese diplomatic cablegrams

intercepted at Sydney.

ARSENIC Special intelligence emanating from the Soviet Union.

CENTAUR Code indicator used on certain types of MOST SECRET traffic

for Central Bureau.

MAGIC US code word for Japanese diplomatic messages.

PEARL Intelligence resulting from solution of low grade codes and

cyphers.

PINUP World War II signals intelligence code word.

PURPLE US code word used to designate the Japanese Type B cypher

machine.

SIRDAR Special intelligence emanating from Delhi

346

SWELL Special intelligence emanating from Combined Bureau, Middle

East.

THUMB Traffic Analysis. Intelligence obtained from a study of radio

traffic and direction finding bearings.

ULTRA Intelligence, originating in UK, from solution of high grade codes

and cyphers.

ZYMOTIC Special intelligence emanating from Washington, Melbourne or

Kilindini.

Terms

Special Intelligence Intelligence derived from breaking certain high grade codes or

cyphers.

Y D/F Stations D/F stations employed in taking bearings of foreign transmissions

as opposed to those employed in navigation purposes.

Y Inference Intelligence obtained from a scrutiny of signal traffic read

(particularly as regards call signs, frequencies, traffic volume,

message indicators and D/F bearings). This was not code

breaking. 347

Y Intelligence Intelligence obtained from the breaking of low grade codes and

cyphers.

Y Operators W/T operators or linguists who read foreign transmissions or are

employed at Y D/F stations.

Y Organisation The whole organisation embracing Y stations, D/F stations,

operators and intelligence staff.

Y Raw material Intercepted foreign messages.

Y Service The branch of the Services which is responsible for the

interception, decoding, interpreting and dissemination of enemy,

or neutral, signals and the use of D/F equipment.

Y Stations W/T receiving stations at which foreign w/t and r/t signals are

intercepted.

348

Appendix 2

The Holden Agreement on Naval Signals Intelligence

MEMORANDUM FOR Op-20: Subject: Collaboration of U.S. and British Radio Intelligence Organizations on Japanese and German Projects.

1. After thorough discussion of U.S. and British radio intelligence problems in the Pacific and in the Atlantic, Commander Travis, R. N., has made the following proposals which, I understand, have the approval of the Admiralty:

JAPANESE (a) The British to abandon naval cryptanalysis at Kilindini and retain their only an exploitation unit which will read traffic from recoveries supplied by other units, and supply to these other units any code or other recoveries obtained in the course of this reading.

(b) The British to disband the British-Australian naval unit at Melbourne and turn over to the U.S. unit there such personnel as the U.S. may desire [underlined on original document], except Commander Nave, who is to be recalled. Requests from the U.S. for any particular individuals from Kilindini or Melbourne will be entertained by the British. The future status of the diplomatic party at Melbourne will depend on wishes of the Australian Government and the senior naval and military authorities in that area which the Admiralty will ascertain.

(c) Upon execution of the foregoing, OPNAV to assume responsibility for passing recoveries and pertinent information to the Admiralty (G.C. & C.S.) for transmittal to C.inC. Eastern Fleet and Kilindini.

(d) Pursuant to (c) above, OPNAV to pass to the Admiralty (G.C. & C.S.)

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(1) radio intelligence from Japanese communications, indicating major strategic moves in any area and any details bearing upon operations in the Indian Ocean Area;

(2) all Japanese code and cipher key recoveries.

(e) In addition to the foregoing, OPNAV to pass to G.C. & C.S. by pouch, as much Japanese intercepted raw traffic as practicable.

GERMAN (a) The British to abandon provide technical assistance, if desired, in the development of analytical machinery required.

(b) The British agree in principle to full collaboration upon the German submarine and naval cryptanalysis problems, including exchange of intercepted traffic, keys, menus, cribs, and such other pertinent technical information as may be necessary.

MISCELLANEOUS (a) The U.S. to undertake certain work on Italian naval systems; traffic, and such pertinent information as may be available, to be supplied by the British.

(b) The British to obtain certain items of special analytical equipment developed by the U.S.

(c) The British to send certain technical personnel to Op-20-G to obtain information concerning new U.S. high-speed analytical equipment and the technique employed in certain phases of U.S. work.

2. The result of the foregoing will be that the British will withdraw from active work in the Pacific Area and leave to the U.S. the general direction and control of the combined effort against the Japanese. They plan to maintain a research unit at G.C. & C.S. so as not to lose touch with the Japanese problem. They have acceded to U.S. desires with regard to work on the German submarine and naval problem but, in effect, will be the coordinating head in the Atlantic theatre as the U.S. will be in the Pacific.

350

3. The foregoing appears to be the logical set-up for the reason that the U.S. has the primary facilities and experience in the Pacific and the traffic is much more accessible to the U.S. there; whereas, the British occupy the corresponding position in the Atlantic. While providing for the logical division of labor on this basis, this plan will, at the same time, provide the necessary back-up for the safety of each party concerned.

4. The primary concern of the British over U.S. entry into the German field is the question of security. The British treat German material on a far higher plane than any other which they handle. The situation with regard to German communications is quite different from that which is found in the Japanese, in that the ramifications of the major system used are very great, and any disclosures which are made will affect the entire effort in every field. It must be realized that since the outbreak of war the British success has literally been their life blood. Before going into the work, the U.S. must be prepared to accept their standards of security and do everything within its power to ensure compliance therewith. Not only will the safety of the British Empire be at stake but, as U.S. efforts in the European theatre become more active, the future of the U.S. may also be at stake.

5. In concluding the discussions it was pointed out to Commander Travis that any agreement made by the U.S. must be subject to change as circumstances and developments require in the interest of national safety.

Respectfully,

[Signed] J. N. Wenger 10/1/421 Seen by: DNC Capt. Zacharias Adm. Cooke J. N. W.

1 Note 10/1/42 is the American system of writing dates, i.e. 1 October 1942.

351

Appendix 3

Japanese Naval Cryptographic Systems1

Black Book: In October 1938 the Japanese replaced their four kana operational code with a new

system. This system was designated the Black Book by the Americans. The Black

Book remained in use for only a short time when it was superseded on 1 June 1939

by Navy Code Book D, designated JN25 by the USN.

Blue Book: USN cover name for the IJN four kana operational code introduced on 1 December

1930.

Flag Officers Code: Special code used for communications between IJN Flag Officers. Work on

this code was discontinued and the cryptographic effort transferred to JN-25.

JN-4: Used by coastal craft.

JN-11: Naval General Purpose Code and Auxiliary Fleet Code used for secret

communications between naval authorities and merchant ships, navigation stations,

Army merchant shipping headquarters, Greater East Asia Ministry, governments of

China and of the South Seas area. Also used for communications among these units.

1 List compiled from information contained in NAA B5554 and TNA, HW4/25, Appendix 3: Japanese

Naval Cyphers worked on by Special Department, FECB 1935-42. This is not an exhaustive list but

intended to illustrate the number and variety of codes and ciphers used by the Imperial Japanese Navy.

352

JN-14: Four digit code, in use from 1 September 1943, which provided information on the

movements of coastal shipping as well as major fleet units. The code was largely

replaced by JN-147 by 1944. Although the isolated garrison at Rota Island

continued to use it after that date.

JN-15: Code used by small auxiliaries and small detached units. Traffic was small and the

Melbourne unit worked on this code from 1 December 1941 through to its final

withdrawal in May 1943.

JN-16: This code was in use in November 1941.

JN-20: Minor all purpose code. Very little is known about this code. However it was noted

that there was a difference between messages sent in odd months and those

originated in even months. Usage recorded from 4 June 1940 to 30 April 1944.

JN-21: Small vessels contact code. This code was in the same book as JN-20 and was

assumed to change concurrently with that code. No research was undertaken at

FRUMEL on this code.

JN-22: Contact code for use by small ships and bases.

JN-23: Five digit recyphered code which provided information on new ship construction,

delays, launchings, sea trials and port visits. Three versions of this code were used

the last being introduced in late 1944.

JN-23A: This was a personnel code which generally contained promotion lists etc used from

1 October 1940–4 August 1943.

JN-25: Officially known by the Japanese as Navy Code Book D this was the main Imperial

Japanese Navy operational code during the war. Designated as the Five Figure Code

353

by the British. It was introduced on 1 June 1939 and remained in use throughout the

war.

JN-26: Merchant shipping code used by Commerce Protection Department from 1 April

1942–30 September 1942.

JN-27: Weather summaries.

JN-33: A substitution code, known as the “WE” code. Used in addresses and service

messages.

JN-36: Weather reports from shore stations.

JN-37: Weather summaries.

JN-38: This code was used mainly for D/F reporting and was probably enciphered. No

research was attempted on it by FRUMEL. Usage recorded from February 1938.

The last variant of this code was introduced on 15 October 1944.

JN-39: South Pacific Trading Companies systems.

JN-40: Merchant Navy liaison system. Usage identified from August 1942 through to

August 1945. Direction finding reports were also transmitted in some variants of

JN-40.

JN-44: A three numeral enciphered code used in the South Seas by Army and Navy. Used

from November 1944.

JN-48: A joint Army/Navy code used in Malaya, the East Indies and areas north-east of

Australia.

JN-54: Used by merchant ships under naval control. Usage recorded between February

1941 and November 1942.

JN-58: This was an Army code transmitted using naval circuits.

354

JN-69: Russian merchant ship reporting code use observed from 1 June 1944 to 11

November 1944.

JN-74: Navy/Army Liaison Code introduced in 1939.

JN-87: This system was only readable for 3 months from October 1944 to January 1945

when groups from a recovered JN-25 L code book replaced the underlying plain

language. Use observed from 1 July 1944 to 21 March 1945.

JN-103: Unencyphered bearings from lookout stations.

JN-105: Air base contact code.

JN-107: Used by Wake Island. No research of this code was attempted at FRUMEL.

JN-109: Air base code.

JN-147: A four Kana general purpose code which replaced JN-14. Usage observed from 3

November 1943 to 12 June 1944.

JN-149: Okinawa defence force cipher.

JN-150: Only a few messages were received in this code.

JN-151: This code replaced JN16 and was observed in use from April 1942 to 30 September

1942.

JN-152: Used for the transmission of general ship navigation warning messages of a

temporary nature, such as exercise firings. Usage observed March 1942 to July

1944.

JN-153: Yangtze special cipher. Usage was observed from 12 April 1943 to October 1944.

No research of this cipher was attempted at FRUMEL.

JN-154: Yangtze River hydrographic reports.

JN-157: This was a machine cipher used for general purpose and as a Y cipher.

355

JN-158: Kurile Islands small boat cipher.

JN-159: This code was mainly used by engineering units in the Kurile Islands area.

JN-160: Submarine contact code. Book captured and messages read in December 1942. No

research attempted. Used from August 1942.

JN-161: This code was used by Prize Crews from 10 August 1941 to 31 August 1942. No

research was attempted as the code was read from a captured book.

JN-163: Abbreviated contact code.

JN-165: Aircraft code.

JN-166: A four Kana air contact code. Usage recorded from 16 February 1943 to 21 August

1943. Not handled by FRUMEL.

JN-170: Patrol boat cipher.

JN-171: German liaison code.

JN-176: Weather reports from patrol vessels.

JN-177: Communications officer cipher.

JN-178: Special operational cipher.

JN-180: Honshu shipping control cipher.

JN-182: Indian Ocean weather summaries.

JN-183: Merchant ship control reports.

JN-184: Transport plane movement cipher.

JN-185: Aircraft code.

JN-186: Mandated Islands weather observers supply ciphers.

JN-188: 8th Base Force special code.

356

JN-196: Used by Special Base Force 32 and Guard Division 33 and attached lookout stations

from 12 July 1944.

JN-198: This code system was used in the Sumatra area from 15 May 1944.

JN-199A: This code was used by picket boats in the north eastern area 19 February 1944 to 30

January 1945.

JN-205A: Small craft code used in the Solomon Islands from 18 November 1944.

JN-206: Used by the Shanghai Area Force from 1 November 1944.

JN-207: A substitution code used in the Burma area.

Red Book: USN name for their photographed copy of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Secret

Operating Code (Version 1918). This was a three kana code.

British Designations:

43-Sign: Used during the 1930s by Naval Staff officers in China.

44-Sign: Naval General cipher.

45-Sign: Naval General cipher. This was replaced by JN-25 in 1939. After this date this

cipher was used as the Flag Officers Cypher.

357

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Websites

http://www.awm.gov.au

http://www.gchq.gov.uk/code breaking/history2.html

http://www.intelforum.org

http://localhistory.kingston.vic.gov.au/

Newspapers

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Maitland Mercury, 7 July 2008.

Melbourne Herald, January/February 1944.

Cryptolog.

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