60048 Federal Register / Vol

60048 Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 186 / Thursday, September 24, 2020 / Rules and Regulations

appointed for 15-year terms as part of a Hostages, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Life locality-based comparability payment temporary expansion provision. insurance, Retirement. under 5 U.S.C. 5304; and (iii) Any special pay supplement for Regulatory Procedures Office of Personnel Management. a defined subcategory of employees that Alexys Stanley, OPM has examined the impact of this is equivalent to a special rate rule as required by Executive Order Regulatory Affairs Analyst. supplement under 5 U.S.C. 5305. 12866 and Executive Order 13563, For the reasons stated in the (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) (1) which directs agencies to assess all costs preamble, the Office of Personnel of this section, annual basic pay does and benefits of available regulatory Management amends 5 CFR part 870 as not include the following: alternatives and, if regulation is follows: (i) Bonuses, allowances, overtime pay, necessary, to select regulatory military pay, or any other pay to a approaches that maximize net benefits PART 870—FEDERAL EMPLOYEES’ covered civilian employee given in (including potential economic, GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM addition to the base pay of the position, environmental, public, health, and ■ except as otherwise provided by specific safety effects, distributive impacts, and 1. The authority citation for part 870 provision of law or OPM regulation. equity). This rule is not a significant continues to read: (ii) Physicians comparability regulatory action under Section 3(f) of Authority: 5 U.S.C. 8716; Subpart J also allowances under 5 U.S.C. 5948. Executive Order 12866 and was not issued under section 599C of Pub. L. 101– * * * * * reviewed by OMB. 513, 104 Stat. 2064, as amended; Sec. 870.302(a)(3)(ii) also issued under section ■ 4. Amend § 870.703 by revising Reducing Regulation and Controlling 153 of Pub. L. 104–134, 110 Stat. 1321; Sec. paragraph (e)(1) introductory text and Regulatory Costs 870.302(a)(3) also issued under sections adding paragraph (e)(1)(vii) to read as 11202(f), 11232(e), and 11246(b) and (c) of follows: This final rule is not subject to the Pub. L. 105–33, 111 Stat. 251, and section requirements of E.O. 13771 (82 FR 9339, 7(e) of Pub. L. 105–274, 112 Stat. 2419; Sec. § 870.703 Election of Basic insurance. February 2, 2017) because this final rule 870.302(a)(3) also issued under section 145 of * * * * * is not significant under Executive Order Pub. L. 106–522, 114 Stat. 2472; Secs. (e)(1) For purposes of this part, a 12866. 870.302(b)(8), 870.601(a), and 870.602(b) also judge who retires under paragraphs issued under Pub. L. 110–279, 122 Stat. 2604; (e)(1)(i) through (vii) of this section is Regulatory Flexibility Act Subpart E also issued under 5 U.S.C. 8702(c); Sec. 870.601(d)(3) also issued under 5 U.S.C. considered to be an employee after The Office of Personnel Management retirement: certifies that this regulation will not 8706(d); Sec. 870.703(e)(1) also issued under have a significant economic impact on section 502 of Pub. L. 110–177, 121 Stat. * * * * * Start Printed Page 773662542; Sec. 870.705 a substantial number of small entities (vii) 38 U.S.C. 7296; also issued under 5 U.S.C. 8714b(c) and * * * * * because the regulation only affects a 8714c(c); Public Law 104–106, 110 Stat. 521. small number of Federal employees and [FR Doc. 2020–18042 Filed 9–23–20; 8:45 am] ■ annuitants. 2. Amend § 870.101 by revising BILLING CODE 6325–38–P paragraph (4) in the definition of Federalism Employing Office, to read as follows: We have examined this rule in § 870.101 Definitions. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION accordance with Executive Order 13132, Federalism, and have determined that * * * * * Federal Aviation Administration this rule will not have any negative Employing Office *** impact on the rights, roles and (4) The United States Court of 14 CFR Part 39 Appeals for Veterans Claims is the responsibilities of State, local, or tribal [Docket No. FAA–2016–6139; Product governments. employing office for judges of the United States Court of Appeals for Identifier 2015–NM–061–AD; Amendment 39–21234; AD 2020–18–13] Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 Veterans Claims. U.S.C. Chapter 35) * * * * * RIN 2120–AA64 The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 ■ 3. Amend § 870.204 by revising Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing (44 U.S.C. chapter 3507(d); see 5 CFR paragraph (a) to read as follows: Company Airplanes part 1320) requires that the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) § 870.204 Annual rates of pay. AGENCY: Federal Aviation approve all collections of information (a)(1) An employee’s annual pay is the Administration (FAA), DOT. by a Federal agency from the public annual basic pay of the position as fixed ACTION: Final rule. before they can be implemented. by law or regulation, except as Respondents are not required to respond otherwise provided by specific SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new to any collection of information unless provision of law or OPM regulation. airworthiness directive (AD) for certain it displays a current valid OMB control Annual pay for this purpose includes The Boeing Company Model 737–600, number. OPM has determined this rule the following: –700, –700C, –800, –900, and –900ER does not impose additional reporting or (i) Any pay of a type that is treated as series airplanes. This AD was prompted recordkeeping requirements under the basic pay for purposes of the retirement by the FAA’s analysis of the Model 737 Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 systems established under 5 U.S.C. fuel system reviews conducted by the outside of an already approved existing chapters 83 and 84, consistent with 5 manufacturer. This AD requires collection under OMB Control No: U.S.C. 8331(3), and pay that is annual modifying the fuel quantity indicating 3206–0230, Life Insurance Election. pay for purposes of the FEGLI Program system (FQIS) to prevent development as provided in Federal law and of an ignition source inside the center List of Subjects in 5 CFR Part 870 regulation; fuel tank due to electrical fault Administrative practice and (ii) Any geographic-based pay conditions. This AD also provides procedure, Government employees, supplement that is equivalent to a alternative actions for cargo airplanes.

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The FAA is issuing this AD to address (NATCA) supported the intent of the with 14 CFR part 25 regulatory the unsafe condition on these products. NPRM. Additional comments from requirements. A4A/CAA referred to the DATES: This AD is effective October 29, NATCA are addressed below. phrase ‘‘regardless of probability’’ associated with single failures. A4A/ 2020. Request To Withdraw NPRM: CAA acknowledged that the term is ADDRESSES: Unjustified by Risk used with single failures in FAA Examining the AD Docket Airlines for America and the Cargo Advisory Circular (AC) 25.981–1C,1 Airline Association, in consolidated You may examine the AD docket on ‘‘Fuel Tank Ignition Source Prevention comments (A4A/CAA), and KLM Royal the internet at https:// Guidelines,’’ but since that term does Dutch Airlines (KLM) requested that the www.regulations.gov by searching for not appear in 14 CFR 25.981(a)(3), the FAA withdraw the NPRM. A4A/CAA and locating Docket No. FAA–2016– commenter considered its use arbitrary, cited comments submitted by Boeing to 6139; or in person at Docket Operations possibly introducing additional Docket No. FAA–2012–0187 in which between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday requirements not included in that Boeing stated that the risk is ‘‘less than through Friday, except Federal holidays. section. A4A/CAA stated that the extremely improbable’’ and that Boeing The AD docket contains this final rule, ‘‘worst reasonably anticipated flight’’ is does not believe that an unsafe any comments received, and other a flight with a latent FQIS failure and a condition exists. A4A/CAA noted that high-flammability tank, and this ‘‘latent information. The address for Docket they consider the Boeing comments to Operations is U.S. Department of plus one’’ failure—regardless of be applicable to the airplane models in probability of a single failure—is not Transportation, Docket Operations, M– the NPRM. KLM stated that the NPRM 30, West Building Ground Floor, Room consistent with 14 CFR 25.981(a)(3). does not clarify the necessity of The FAA disagrees with the W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, additional actions beyond current commenter’s request. The FAA notes Washington, DC 20590. requirements. KLM added that it that the commenter’s assertion about the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jon understands that Boeing is not able to intent of 14 CFR 25.981(a)(3) is incorrect Regimbal, Aerospace Engineer, explain or substantiate the rationale based on both the language of the rule Propulsion Section, FAA, Seattle ACO behind the NPRM. and on the published rulemaking Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des The FAA disagrees with the documents. The absence of a Moines, WA 98198; phone and fax: 206– commenters’ request. The FAA notes probabilistic qualifier in both the ‘‘from 231–3557; email: [email protected]. that Boeing’s comments were addressed each single failure’’ clause and in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: in the supplemental NPRM (SNPRM) for ‘‘from each single failure in combination Docket No. FAA 2012–0187 (80 FR with each latent failure not shown to be Discussion 9400, February 23, 2015) in the extremely remote’’ clause in 14 CFR The FAA issued a notice of proposed comment response for ‘‘Request To 25.981(a)(3) in fact means just that— rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 12506, March there is no probabilistic qualifier part 39 by adding an AD that would 1, 2012): Unjustified by Risk.’’ As intended by the regulation. The intent apply to certain The Boeing Company explained in that comment response, in for single failures in these two scenarios Model 737–600, –700, –700C, –800, addition to examining average risk and to be considered regardless of –900, and –900ER series airplanes. The total fleet risk, the FAA examines the probability of the single failure was NPRM published in the Federal individual flight risk on the worst explicitly stated in the NPRM for 14 Register on May 3, 2016 (81 FR 26485). reasonably anticipated flights. In CFR 25.981, as amended by amendment The NPRM was prompted by the FAA’s general, the FAA issues ADs in cases 25–102 (66 FR 23085, May 7, 2001) analysis of the Model 737 fuel system where reasonably anticipated flights (‘‘amendment 25–102’’). That NPRM reviews conducted by the manufacturer. with preexisting failures (either due to stated, in pertinent part, that it would The NPRM proposed to require latent failure conditions or allowable also add a new paragraph (a)(3) to modifying the FQIS to prevent dispatch configurations) are vulnerable require that a safety analysis be development of an ignition source to a catastrophic event due to an performed to demonstrate that the inside the center fuel tank due to additional foreseeable single failure presence of an ignition source in the electrical fault conditions. The NPRM condition. This is because the FAA fuel tank system could not result from also proposed to provide alternative considers operation of flights vulnerable ‘‘any single failure, from any single actions for cargo airplanes. to a potentially catastrophic single failure in combination with any latent The FAA is issuing this AD to address failure condition to be an excessive failure condition not shown to be ignition sources inside the center fuel safety risk to the passengers on those extremely remote, or from any tank, which, in combination with flights. The FAA has determined that combination of failures not shown to be flammable fuel vapors, could result in a the current requirements, including extremely improbable.’’ These new fuel tank explosion and consequent loss airworthiness limitations and critical requirements would define three of the airplane. design configuration control limitations scenarios that must be addressed in (CDCCLs) do not adequately address the order to show compliance with the Comments unsafe condition identified in this AD proposed paragraph (a)(3). ‘‘The first The FAA gave the public the and therefore it is necessary to issue this scenario is that any single failure, opportunity to participate in developing final rule. The FAA has not changed regardless of the probability of this final rule. The following presents this AD regarding this issue. occurrence of the failure, must not cause the comments received on the NPRM Request To Withdraw NPRM: an ignition source. The second scenario and the FAA’s response to each is that any single failure, regardless of comment. Probability Analysis Inconsistent With Regulatory Requirements the probability occurrence, in Support for the NPRM combination with any latent failure A4A/CAA requested that the FAA condition not shown to be at least The Air Line Pilots Association, withdraw the NPRM. A4A/CAA stated International (ALPA) and National Air that the assumption of a single failure 1 https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/ Traffic Controllers Association regardless of probability is inconsistent Advisory_Circular/AC_25.981-1C.pdf.

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extremely remote (i.e., not shown to be airworthiness standard for the Request To Withdraw NPRM: NPRM extremely remote or extremely flammability of fuel tanks. The FAA Arbitrary and Inconsistently Applied improbable), must not cause an ignition notes that the FTFR rule was never A4A/CAA requested that the FAA source. The third scenario is that any intended to be a replacement for the withdraw the NPRM. A4A/CAA noted combination of failures not shown to be issuance of ADs to address identified that airplanes with FRM are not extremely improbable must not cause an unsafe conditions. An unsafe condition included in the applicability, and the ignition source.’’ due to the identified FQIS latent-plus- NPRM would therefore not fully address The preamble to the final rule for single failure issue in high-flammability the unsafe condition. A4A/CAA added amendment 25–102 made a nearly fuel tanks was determined to exist that the distinction between high- and identical statement, including the same during the Special Federal Aviation low-flammability exposure time fuel uses of the phrase ‘‘regardless of Regulation (SFAR) 88 AD Board held by tanks as used in the NPRM is arbitrary. probability.’’ The FAA has determined the FAA in 2003 using the guidance in A4A/CAA stated that an arbitrary that it is necessary to proceed with FAA Policy Memorandum ANM100– differentiation of high- versus low- issuance of this final rule as proposed. 2003–112–15, ‘‘SFAR 88—Mandatory flammability as decisional criteria for Further details and a description of the Action Decision Criteria,’’ dated the need for corrective action does not FAA’s risk assessment can be found in 2 February 25, 2003, for high- take into account the actual probability responses to similar comments in a flammability fuel tanks, including the related SNPRM that addressed the same of the impact of the difference in center fuel tank on Model 737–600, flammability on the potential of unsafe condition for Model 757 –700, –700C, –800, –900, and –900ER airplanes, in Docket No. FAA–2012– catastrophic failure. A4A/CAA also series airplanes. That same issue was stated that allowing the proposed 0187, and in the subsequently issued not considered to be an unsafe final rule, AD 2016–07–07, amendment alternative actions for cargo airplanes condition in low-flammability wing fuel does not fully address the unsafe 39–18452 (81 FR 19472, April 5, 2016) tanks based on that same policy (‘‘AD 2016–07–07’’). No change to this condition in the NPRM. A4A/CAA memorandum. The FAA has not referenced the FAA’s response to AD was made in response to these changed this AD regarding this issue. comments. comments in AD 2016–07–07 regarding Request To Withdraw NPRM: Arbitrary this issue. The commenter summarized Request To Withdraw NPRM: No New and Inconsistent Wire Separation numerical analysis showing no Data Since Fuel Tank Flammability Standards significant difference in risk between Reduction (FTFR) Rulemaking high- and low-flammability fuel tanks. A4A/CAA requested that the FAA A4A/CAA requested that the FAA A4A/CAA concluded that the FAA’s withdraw the NPRM based on a lack of risk analysis is arbitrary and an unsafe withdraw the NPRM based on a lack of consistent design standards for FQIS new data since the issuance of the FTFR condition does not exist. wire separation. A4A/CAA assumed rule (73 FR 42444, July 21, 2008). A4A/ The FAA disagrees with the assertion that the approved standard for the CAA referred to the FTFR rule and that the NPRM is arbitrary and retrofit is a 2-inch wire separation decision to not require flammability inconsistent. The NPRM follows defined minimum, which the commenter reductions means (FRM) for all-cargo policy in FAA Policy Memorandum considered arbitrary and inconsistently airplanes, and the FAA’s intent to gather ANM100–2003–112–15, and applied. A4A/CAA reported that the additional data and consideration of consistently applies the policy to amount of wiring capable of meeting further rulemaking if flammability of several airplane models with similar that separation standard varies widely these airplanes is excessive. A4A/CAA unsafe conditions, similar to AD 2016– among airplane models. A4A/CAA also stated that since the FTFR rule, no 07–07. The FAA defined the difference additional data has been publicly acknowledged that other separation between low- and high-flammability introduced that would support or justify methods were used in areas not meeting exposure time fuel tanks based on the applicability of this rulemaking to the 2-inch wire separation requirement. recommendations from the Aviation all-cargo aircraft. A4A/CAA also The FAA does not agree with the Rulemaking Advisory Committee Fuel referred to the FAA’s response to commenter’s request. The degree of Tank Harmonization Working Group comments in the preamble to the physical isolation of FQIS wiring from (FTHWG). The preamble to the final SNPRM for Docket No. FAA–2012– other wiring, whether provided by rule for amendment 25–102, which 0187, which documented the FAA’s physical distance or barrier methods, amended 14 CFR 25.981, defined this decision on applicability of FRM and that is necessary to eliminate the difference as based upon comparison of cost estimates. A4A/CAA stated that the potential for hot shorts due to wiring ‘‘the safety record of center wing fuel FAA response was misleading and not faults is dependent on the materials tanks that, in certain airplanes, are factual since manufacturers did not used, the wire securing methods, and heated by equipment located under the begin detailed designs to address the the possible types of wiring faults. The tank, and unheated fuel tanks located in proposed unsafe condition until after FAA relied on the manufacturer to the wing.’’ The FTHWG concluded that the FTFR rule was published. A4A/CAA assess the details of the design and to the safety record of fuel tanks located in added that the FAA did not discuss propose the appropriate isolation the wings was adequate and that if the other changes to the FQIS system in the measures. While 2 inches of physical same level could be achieved in center FTFR rule. separation may appear to be an arbitrary wing fuel tanks, the overall safety The FAA disagrees with the number, it was the distance proposed by objective would be achieved. commenter’s request. The FAA notes the manufacturer as appropriate for In the response to comments in the that the FTFR rule and FQIS ADs are their design based on analysis of the preamble to the final rule for AD 2016– two different issues with separate FAA design details. The FAA has not 07–07 referenced by the commenter, the actions. The intent of the FTFR rule was changed this AD regarding this issue. FAA described why FRM or alternative to provide an order of magnitude actions for cargo airplanes provide an 2 _ _ _ http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory and Guidance acceptable level of safety, even if they reduction in the rate of fuel tank Library/rgPolicy.nsf/0/ explosions for the airplanes affected by dc94c3a46396950386256d5e006aed11/$FILE/ do not completely eliminate the non- that rule through adding a new Feb2503.pdf. compliance with 14 CFR 25.981(a)(3).

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The fuel tank explosion history for flammable conditions. The numerical airplanes could therefore legitimately be turbojet/turbofan powered transport analysis provided by the commenter classified as a low-flammability fuel airplanes fueled with kerosene type does not account for these significant tank. In addition, the FAA considers the fuels, outside of maintenance activity, factors. The difference in likelihood of unsafe condition determination has consisted of explosions of tanks that a failure that results in repeated ignition described in the SNPRM for Docket No. (1) are not conventional aluminum wing source events causing a tank explosion FAA–2012–0187, in the response to tanks and (2) spend a considerable is not simply proportional to difference comments section under, ‘‘Request To amount of their operating time empty. in the fleet average flammability of the Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 12506, March The service history of conventional tank for the reasons stated above. The 1, 2012): Unjustified by Risk,’’ to be aluminum wing tanks has been FAA has not changed this AD regarding applicable to these Model 737 airplanes. acceptable. The intent of the difference this issue. Request To Remove Certain Business in decision criteria in FAA Policy Request To Withdraw NPRM: Jets From the Applicability Memorandum ANM100–2003–112–15 Overestimate of Fleet Average was intended to give credit for this AMES Continuing Airworthiness Flammability Exposure for All-Cargo satisfactory service experience, and to Management Organization (AMES Fleet in Alaska differentiate between tanks with a level CAMO) requested that the proposed AD of flammability similar to that of a A4A/CAA requested that the FAA be revised to exclude Boeing Business conventional wing tank and those with withdraw the NPRM. The commenter Jets operated under 14 CFR part 91. a significantly higher level of stated that the FAA did not properly AMES CAMO noted that the proposed flammability. analyze the fleet average flammability AD excludes airplanes modified by the The numerical analysis provided by for the center wing tank on Model 737– nitrogen generation system (NGS) the commenter is inconsistent with the 700 airplanes. The commenter stated system, but the NGS is mandated only fuel tank explosion service history. that the known U.S. registered 737–700 on commercial airplanes operating There are at least three identifiable all-cargo fleet without FRM installed under 14 CFR part 121. AMES CAMO physics-based reasons for that will be operated almost solely in the suggested the proposed AD should only inconsistency. First, low-flammability state of Alaska for the foreseeable future. apply to airplanes operating under 14 tanks on most types of airplanes are A4A/CAA noted that the mean average CFR part 121. main tanks that are the last tanks used. ambient temperature in Alaska is much The FAA disagrees with the During a large portion of their operating lower than that used in the FAA’s commenter’s request. Policy time, the systems and structural features analysis. The commenter added that the Memorandum ANM100–2003–112–15 is that have the potential to be ignition air conditioning packs in an all-cargo applicable to large transport airplanes sources in the event of a failure configuration generate significantly less except those specifically excluded by condition are covered with liquid fuel, heat transfer to the center wing tank the Special Federal Aviation Regulation and an ignition source, if it occurs, is during normal operations than during (SFAR) No. 88 regulation (in 14 CFR likely to be submerged. When a the normal operations assumed by the part 21). The FAA did not exclude non- potential ignition source in a main tank FAA’s analysis. A4A/CAA concluded air-carrier large transport airplanes from is uncovered, it is likely to be later in that these factors reduce the fleet the other ADs determined to be the flight when the tank is cool and no average flammability exposure for the necessary as a result of SFAR 88, and longer flammable. The commenter’s all-cargo Model 737–700 airplanes to included non-air-carrier large transport analysis does not account for this the level of the main wing tanks, and airplanes in the FRM retrofit significant effect. Second, the numerical therefore, the unsafe condition does not requirements added to 14 CFR part 125 analysis used by the commenter exist. in 2008. The unsafe condition addressed assumes that any given ignition source The FAA does not agree to withdraw by this AD is applicable to Model 737 has a random occurrence in time at the the NPRM. More than 1,100 Model 737– airplanes operated as business jets, estimated probability, and that, in order 700 airplanes have been produced. The except as specified in paragraph (c) of for an explosion to occur, that random FAA foresees that, as these airplanes are this AD. The FAA has not changed this occurrence of an ignition source needs replaced in passenger service by newer AD regarding this issue. to coincide with the tank being in a airplanes, a significant portion of them Request To Require Cargo Airplane flammable state. In fact, many of the will be converted to all-cargo service Option for All Airplanes identified ignition threats do not simply and will eventually fly throughout the occur briefly and then go away. Instead, U.S. and the world. Multiple cargo- Boeing and All Nippon Airways a fault occurs that, until it is discovered conversion designs for these airplanes (ANA) requested that the NPRM be and corrected, repeatedly creates an have been approved, and other revised to make the alternative actions ignition source, and repeatedly tests conversion designs are in the approval for cargo airplanes specified in whether flammable conditions exist. process. The FAA does not agree to base paragraph (h) of the proposed AD Third, the flammability of low- its decision about whether an AD is applicable to all airplanes. Boeing asked flammability fuel tanks is typically necessary for these airplanes on a that the FAA provide a technical dependent on weather, and a low- flammability analysis based solely on justification why the actions in flammability fuel tank may operate for the initial cargo conversions currently paragraph (h) of the proposed AD apply months without ever becoming being largely operated in Alaska. only to cargo airplanes. ANA asked that flammable. This is not true of most The FAA also does not agree that a the actions in paragraph (h) of the high-flammability fuel tanks, which new analysis considering operation of proposed AD be allowed for passenger typically have significant on-airplane only the initial cargo-converted airplanes not subject to the FTFR rule, heat sources driving their temperature. airplanes would result in a suggesting this would provide more This factor can mean that, on some determination that the center fuel tank choices regarding how to comply with airplanes, an in-tank latent failure can of those airplanes has a level of the proposed AD. occur and, after some period of time, be flammability comparable to a wing tank The FAA disagrees with the detected and corrected without the low- of conventional aluminum construction, commenters’ requests. As discussed in flammability tank ever having and that the center fuel tank on those the comment response in the SNPRM

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for Docket No. FAA–2012–0187, under design. The FAA has not changed this policy memorandum is not applicable. the heading ‘‘Requests To Withdraw AD regarding this issue. Therefore, this AD affects only the NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012) identified Boeing airplanes with high- Request To Clarify Certification Basis Based on Applicability’’ the FAA does flammability exposure time fuel tanks, for Modification Requirements not consider the alternative action for as specified in paragraph (c) of this AD. cargo airplanes allowed by this AD to NATCA recommended that the FAA The FAA provided a detailed response provide an adequate level of safety for revise paragraph (g) of the proposed AD to similar comments in the preamble of passenger airplanes. The FAA is willing to clearly state that the required FQIS the final rule for AD 2016–07–07. The to accept a higher level of individual design changes must comply with the FAA has not changed this final rule flight risk exposure for cargo flights that fail-safe requirements of 14 CFR regarding this issue. are not fail-safe due to the absence of 25.901(c), as amended by amendment Request To Require Modification on All passengers and the resulting significant 25–46 (43 FR 50597, October 30, 1978); Production Airplanes reduction in occupant exposure on a and 14 CFR 25.981(a) and (b), as cargo airplane versus a passenger amended by amendment 25–102; NATCA recommended that the FAA airplane, and due to relatively low NATCA added that these provisions are require designs that comply with 14 estimated individual flight risk that required by SFAR 88. CFR 25.901(c) and 25.981(a)(3) on all would exist on a cargo airplane after the The FAA does not agree to change newly produced transport airplanes. corrective actions are taken. The FAA paragraph (g) of this AD. While the FAA NATCA stated that continuing to grant has not changed this AD regarding this agrees that modifications to comply exemptions to 14 CFR 25.901(c), as issue. with paragraph (g) of this AD should be amended by amendment 25–40 (42 FR required to comply with the referenced 15042, March 17, 1977); and 14 CFR Request To Exclude Certain Airplanes regulations, that requirement already 25.981(a)(3), as amended by amendment United Airlines (UAL) noted that the exists in 14 CFR part 21. No change to 25–102; has allowed continued FRM required by 14 CFR 121.1117 will this AD is necessary. production of thousands of airplanes have been installed on all affected Request To Address Unsafe Condition with this known unsafe condition. The FAA disagrees with the airplanes in passenger configuration by on All Fuel Tanks December 26, 2018. The FAA infers commenter’s request. The UAL is requesting that the FAA revise NATCA recommended that the FAA recommendation to require production the proposed AD to exclude airplanes require design changes that eliminate airplanes to fully comply with 14 CFR that are affected by 14 CFR 121.1117. In unsafe FQIS failure conditions on all 25.901(c) and 14 CFR 25.981(a)(3) is addition, UAL suggested that the FAA fuel tanks on the affected models, outside the scope of this rulemaking. In either delete paragraph (g) of the regardless of fuel tank location or the addition, the FAA has implemented proposed AD or make paragraph (g) of percentage of time the fuel tank is requirements for all large transport the proposed AD applicable only to flammable. NATCA referred to four fuel airplanes produced after September airplanes in a cargo configuration that tank explosions in low-flammability 2010 to include flammability reduction do not have an FRM installed and non- exposure time fuel tanks identified by methods for tanks that would otherwise U.S.-registered airplanes that do not the FAA during FTFR rulemaking. be high-flammability fuel tanks. Boeing have to comply with FRM requirements. NATCA stated that neither FRM nor incorporated this change into the Model The FAA disagrees with the alternative actions for cargo airplanes 737 series airplanes that are still in commenter’s request. There are other (e.g., BITE checks (checks of built-in test production and the FAA has excluded passenger-carrying airplanes operated equipment) followed by applicable those models from the applicability of under 14 CFR part 91 that are not repairs before further flight and this AD. The FAA has not changed this required to install FRM. (The modification of the center fuel tank final rule regarding this issue. requirement to install FRM on all FQIS wiring within 60 months) would passenger-carrying airplanes operated bring the airplane into full regulatory Request To State That an Exemption is by air carriers is in 14 CFR 121.1117.) compliance. NATCA added that the Required The FAA notes that foreign air carriers combination of failures described in the Boeing requested that paragraph (h) of may not have to comply with that NPRM meets the criteria for ‘‘known the proposed AD be revised to state that requirement or similar requirements of combinations’’ of failures that require an exemption is required to accomplish their own civil aviation authority. The corrective action in FAA Policy the specified actions. Boeing stated that European Union Aviation Safety Agency Memorandum ANM100–2003–112–15. the FAA has identified that the BITE (EASA), for example, has chosen not to The FAA disagrees with the procedure and wire separation design require FRM to be retrofitted to in- commenter’s request. The FAA has changes specified in the proposed AD service airplanes. This AD is intended determined that according to Policy are not sufficient for compliance to 14 to require any Model 737–600, –700, Memorandum ANM100–2003–112–15, CFR 25.981(a) at the FQIS level. Boeing –700C, –800, –900, and –900ER series the failure condition for the airplanes stated that an exemption is therefore passenger airplane that does not have affected by this AD should not be needed prior to approval of the related FRM, regardless of the rules under classified as a ‘‘known combination.’’ design change. which it is operated, to address the While the FQIS design architecture is The FAA agrees to clarify. The BITE FQIS latent-plus-one unsafe condition similar to that of the early Boeing Model check is not a type design change or with a corrective action that fully 747 configuration that is suspected of alteration, so no exemption from the complies with the FAA’s airworthiness contributing to the TWA Flight 800 fuel airworthiness standards is required for standards. This requirement fulfills the tank explosion, significant differences that action. The design data approval of FAA’s International Civil Aviation exist in the design of FQIS components any partial wire separation modification Organization to address unsafe and wire installations between the would require an exemption. That conditions on all of the aircraft affected Boeing models and the early exemption would be obtained by the manufactured by the state of design, not Model 747 airplanes such that the intent party seeking approval of the alteration just those aircraft whose operation is of the ‘‘known combinations’’ provision data, and no further exemption would under the jurisdiction of the state of for low-flammability fuel tanks in the be required for the party using that data

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to alter an aircraft. Obtaining such an nondispatchable fault code pertaining to at that time to develop service exemption would be part of the the center wing tank is recorded (as information only for the Model 747– certification process for such a change, opposed to any nondispatchable fault 400, 757, and 767 airplanes because at so, the FAA does not find it necessary code being recorded). Boeing stated that that time only those airplanes had to include such information in all FQIS wire separation changes in the affected cargo configuration for which paragraph (h) of this AD. In addition, proposed AD are limited to the center Boeing was the design approval holder. some parties may choose to comply wing tank, therefore only built-in test The FAA agreed at that time to not with the AD using a design change that equipment (BITE) check messages require Boeing to develop a BITE check fully complies with the airworthiness pertaining to the center wing tank are service bulletin for the Model 737 standards. The FAA also notes that the applicable to the proposed AD. In airplanes because Boeing had not yet commenter appears to misunderstand addition, Boeing stated that a final rule developed a cargo conversion service why an exemption is needed for the should be postponed until the FAA bulletin or supplemental type certificate required modification. The exemption is develops a list of ‘‘nondispatchable fault (STC) for the Model 737 airplanes. The needed because, even with the codes’’ in conjunction with Boeing. FAA also considered that, because the modification, the FQIS does not comply The FAA agrees that the unsafe BITE check instructions already existed with 14 CFR 25.901(c) and 14 CFR condition addressed by this AD is in the Model 737 AMM, a BITE check 25.981(a). The exemption does not limited to the center wing tank. service bulletin could be developed authorize evaluation of a partial system However, the FAA does not agree that quickly at a later date if needed. In for compliance with the system level the AD should be changed as proposed addition, the process for obtaining FAA requirement. The FAA has not changed by Boeing. It is not clear to the FAA agreement on a list of nondispatchable this AD regarding this issue. whether there may be FQIS BITE fault fault codes for the models Boeing chose codes that are not clearly identified as to support took less than 30 days. If any Request To Exclude Airplanes That related to the center wing tank but that service information is developed to Have Installed an Ignition Mitigation may impact center tank circuits. support compliance with paragraph (h) Means (IMM) or Flammability Impact Therefore, the FAA has determined that of this AD it will be evaluated for Mitigation Means (FIMM) all nondispatchable fault codes recorded approval using the AMOC process AerSale stated that the Costs of prior to the BITE check or as a result of specified in paragraph (i) of this AD. Compliance section of the NPRM only the BITE check required by paragraph cites the requirements in 14 CFR (h)(1) of this AD must be addressed. Request To Clarify Required 121.1117 to install FRM, but 14 CFR Operators or Boeing may request an Modification 121.1117 paragraph (d)(1) states that alternative method of compliance ANA and Thomson Airways IMM, FRM, or FIMM may be installed. (AMOC) under the provisions of requested that the FAA provide AerSale suggested that all IMM, FRM, or paragraph (i) of this AD if they can clarification regarding how to FIMM installations with the approval of provide sufficient data that a particular accomplish the modification specified the FAA Oversight Office would meet fault code does not pertain to the unsafe in paragraph (g) of the proposed AD. the requirements of 14 CFR 121.1117. condition addressed by this AD. ANA noted that paragraph (h) of the The FAA infers AerSale is requesting Regarding the requirement to record proposed AD provides clear alternative that the proposed AD be revised to and address fault codes read actions for cargo airplanes. ANA stated exclude airplanes on which IMM or immediately prior to running the BITE that it could not identify how to modify FIMM has been installed. check procedure, the FAA notes that the the FQIS in passenger airplanes not The FAA partially agrees with the normal Boeing procedure for performing subject to the FTFR rule. ANA noted commenter’s request. The FAA agrees an FQIS BITE check is to first erase all that it contacted Boeing for clarification that IMM provides a level of risk of the existing fault codes, then perform and Boeing stated that the FRM (which reduction at least as great as that the BITE check and troubleshoot any Boeing calls NGS) retrofit is the method provided by FRM. The FAA does not resulting new fault codes. For this AD, of compliance for these airplanes. ANA agree that airplanes should be excluded the FAA did not want any already asked that the FAA either clarify how to from paragraph (c) of this AD based on stored fault codes to be potentially modify the FQIS system or accept an the installation of FIMM alone. FIMM is ignored due to erasure at the first step FRM retrofit as terminating action. applicable to design changes only, and because some of the failures of concern Thomson Airways asked if the intent of is intended to ensure that, if a fuel tank can be intermittent. This AD therefore the proposed AD is to install an NGS on design change would otherwise have requires operators to record the existing affected airplanes. Thomson Airways increased the flammability of a fuel codes before doing the BITE check, then also asked for clarification regarding the tank, the associated FIMM would ensure do the BITE check and record the new FQIS modification, stating that the that the flammability of that tank is not codes that result from that BITE check, proposed AD does not provide detail increased by the design change. and then do the appropriate regarding modifying the FQIS itself, Therefore, FIMM itself does not address troubleshooting and corrective action only the FQIS wiring. the need for FRM for the original tank for both sets of codes per the The FAA agrees to clarify. As noted design. The FAA has revised paragraph manufacturer’s guidance. The FAA has in paragraph (c) of this AD, airplanes on (c) of this AD to clarify that airplanes not changed this AD regarding this which FRM or IMM that meets certain with an IMM approved by the FAA as issue. FAA airworthiness standards is compliant with certain regulations are Finally, the FAA does not agree to installed are excluded from this AD. excluded from this AD. This revision delay the final rule while Boeing Paragraph (g) of this AD requires includes adding paragraphs (c)(1) and proposes and obtains FAA agreement on modification of the FQIS on passenger (2) of this AD. a list of nondispatchable fault codes. airplanes to prevent development of an The FAA requested service information ignition source inside the center fuel Request To Record Only Certain Codes from Boeing in 2016 to support the tank due to electrical fault conditions. Boeing requested that paragraph (h)(1) option for all-cargo airplanes on all of The specifics of this modification may of the proposed AD be revised to only the Boeing models for which similar vary as long as the modification require corrective actions if a FQIS ADs were planned. Boeing chose addresses the unsafe condition

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identified in this AD and the procedures airplanes because it would not provide relative to a fully compliant specified in paragraph (i) of this AD are significant savings to operators and NGS modification. used to approve the modification would provide a greater safety benefit. Request To Change Compliance Time method. Operators may choose to install The FAA agreed. an FRM or IMM that meets the criteria The FAA’s understanding is that A4A/CAA and Thomson Airways specified in paragraph (c), which would Boeing’s current position is the same, requested that the FAA extend the then remove that airplane from the and that they do not plan to develop a compliance time for the modifications applicability of this AD, negating the fully compliant FQIS modification for specified in paragraphs (g) and (h)(2) of need to do the modification specified in passenger airplanes to address the proposed AD to 72 months. A4A/ paragraph (g) of this AD. Otherwise, paragraph (g) of this AD. However, if CAA stated that the compliance time operators must obtain an AMOC as service information is developed, should match that of AD 2016–07–07 specified in paragraph (i) of this AD and approved, and available in the future, because the unsafe condition and modify their airplane accordingly. The operators may request approval under corrective actions are similar. A4A/CAA FAA has not changed this AD regarding the provisions of paragraph (i) of this stated that although service information this issue. AD to use approved service instructions was not yet available, the compliance as an AMOC for the requirements of this time should align with major Request To Provide a Detailed Cost- maintenance schedules, but should be Effective Method of Compliance AD, or the FAA may approve the service information as a global AMOC for this not less than 72 months after service Korean Air Lines (KAL), KLM, AMES AD. information is available. Thomson CAMO, and Duco Schiere requested that Airways noted that 72 months would the FAA provide a detailed and cost- Request To Clarify Intent of Different provide operators a better opportunity effective method of compliance for Requirements in Paragraphs (g) and (h) to work within existing maintenance passenger airplanes. KAL, AMES of the Proposed AD program schedules. CAMO, and Duco Schiere noted that the Conversely, NATCA recommended Boeing asked that the FAA clarify the proposed AD does not provide a clear that the FAA reject requests for a intent of the differences between the means of compliance for the compliance time longer than 5 years as requirements in paragraphs (g) and (h) modification, such as a Boeing service proposed in the NPRM. Assuming final of the proposed AD. Boeing stated that bulletin. AMES CAMO noted that rule issuance in 2016, NATCA it is unclear what change is expected for without a clear method of compliance, estimated that a 5-year compliance time compliance with paragraph (g) of the it is difficult to determine the extent of would result in required compliance by proposed AD versus paragraph (h) of the the required work. KAL and KLM noted 2021–25 years after the TWA Flight 800 proposed AD. Boeing suggested that one that the majority of non-FAA operators fuel tank explosion that led to the possibility is that paragraph (g) of the are not required to retrofit the NGS requirements in SFAR 88, and 20 years system. KLM stated that since 2008 the proposed AD is intended to cover after issuance of SFAR 88. level of fuel tank safety has been development of transient suppression, The FAA agrees with Thomson improved by the implementation of while paragraph (h) of the proposed AD Airways and A4A/CAA’s request to several costly SFAR 88 service bulletins, is intended to cover compliance via extend the compliance time, and implementation of airworthiness FQIS wire separation and BITE checks. disagrees with NATCA’s request. The limitations into the maintenance The FAA agrees to clarify. Paragraph FAA received similar requests to extend program and implementation of CDCCLs (g) of this AD is intended to require, for the compliance time from several into maintenance documents. KLM passenger airplanes that are subject to commenters regarding the NPRMs for mentioned that the modification would this AD, a modification to the FQIS that the FQIS modification on other require an airplane to be out of service makes it fully compliant with 14 CFR airplanes. The FAA disagrees with for a lengthy time. KLM added that the 25.981(a), as amended by amendment establishing a compliance time based on modification would add weight to the 25–102. A fully compliant FQIS issuance of any service information that airplane and require additional fuel modification might include wire is not yet approved or available. The usage. KAL and KLM requested that the separation or transient suppression FAA has determined that a 72-month FAA encourage Boeing to develop an devices, but due to the system design, compliance time is appropriate and will acceptable cost-effective method of either option would likely require provide operators adequate time to compliance that does not require changes to the FQIS processor. prepare for and perform the required installation of an NGS. Paragraph (h) of this AD is intended modifications without excessive The FAA agrees that the lack of to allow, as an optional method of disruption of operations. The FAA has service information for FQIS compliance for all-cargo airplanes only, determined that the requested moderate modifications makes it difficult to assess a change that isolates the center fuel increase in compliance time will the required work to modify the FQIS, tank circuit wiring between the FQIS continue to provide an acceptable level and acknowledges the high cost of NGS. processor and the fuel tanks from other of safety. The FAA has changed However, the FAA disagrees with the wiring that is connected to a sufficient paragraphs (g) and (h)(2) of this AD commenters’ requests. For passenger- power source to create an ignition accordingly. carrying airplanes, the cost per airplane source in the event of a hot short of providing a modification of the FQIS between the wiring. Such a change Request To Change Compliance Time that fully complies with the would not be fully compliant with the Relative to Receipt of Exemption airworthiness standards was estimated airworthiness regulations (hence the Boeing requested that the FAA revise by Boeing and their FQIS vendor requirement to obtain a partial the compliance time for the proposed (Goodrich) prior to the issuance of the exemption from 14 CFR 25.901(c) and AD to ‘‘60 months after an exemption NPRM to be comparable to the cost of 14 CFR 25.981(a) for any such design from [14 CFR 25.981(a)(3)] is FAA- installing NGS. Based on that cost change), but would provide a level of approved.’’ Boeing suggested that it estimate, Boeing proposed that they not risk reduction that the FAA considers would take 6 months to develop an be required to develop a fully compliant acceptable for all-cargo airplanes and exemption petition and 6 months for the FQIS modification for passenger would significantly reduce the costs FAA to approve that exemption. Boeing

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added that the FAA has previously the Costs of Compliance section be community in Alaska while still identified that the BITE checks revised to reflect the number of all-cargo providing an acceptable level of safety, procedure and wire separation design U.S.-registered airplanes. that operator can use the procedures in were not sufficient for compliance with The FAA agrees that there are paragraph (i) of this AD to explain those 14 CFR 25.981(a)(3). currently U.S.-registered Model 737–700 impacts and request approval of an The FAA disagrees with the all-cargo airplanes operating without extension of the compliance time. commenter’s request. An AD typically FRM installed. The FAA has revised the does not include a compliance time that Costs of Compliance section of this AD Request To Require Design Changes is based on an optional action that an to reflect these airplanes. From Manufacturers operator or manufacturer might choose NATCA recommended that the FAA Request To Acknowledge Impacts on to take. In addition, the FAA notes that follow the agency’s compliance and Intrastate Aviation in Alaska Boeing has already received exemptions enforcement policy to require for the Model 747–400, 757, and 767 A4A/CAA stated that the proposed manufacturers to develop the necessary airplanes, and could quickly petition for AD will interrupt aviation design changes soon enough to support and obtain approval of a similar transportation to remote Alaskan operators’ ability to comply with the exemption for the Model 737 airplanes communities not serviced by other proposed requirements. NATCA noted using an almost identical petition. The modes of transportation, contrary to the that SFAR 88 required manufacturers to FAA’s flow time to disposition such a statement that the proposed AD ‘‘will develop all design changes for unsafe petition would be approximately 90 not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska.’’ conditions identified by their SFAR 88 days, during which time Boeing could A4A/CAA noted that, beginning in design reviews by December 2002, or still proceed with development of the 2017, Model 737–700 airplanes in an within an additional 18 months if the modification. In addition, as noted all-cargo configuration and without FAA granted an extension. above, the compliance time for FRM installed will provide The FAA acknowledges the paragraph (h)(2) of this AD has been transportation to remote Alaskan commenter’s concerns. However, any extended to 72 months, giving communities. A4A/CAA added that enforcement action is outside the scope additional time for operators or these airplanes would be required to be of this rulemaking. The FAA has not manufacturers to obtain an exemption. removed from service for an extended changed this final rule regarding this time while accomplishing the proposed issue. Request To Extend Repetitive BITE modification, which the FAA estimates Check Interval would take 1,200 work-hours. Request To Clarify the Applicability Boeing requested that paragraph (h)(1) The FAA acknowledges that, since the Duco Schiere stated the NPRM is not of the proposed AD be revised to extend NPRM was issued, at least one major clear about which configurations the repetitive check interval for the operator began using converted Model (passenger/cargo, with/without NGS BITE checks. Boeing requested that the 737–700 cargo airplanes for intrastate installed) of Model 737 airplanes are repetitive interval be extended to 750 flights in Alaska. The few remote applicable to the AD. The FAA infers flight hours to match the repetitive communities in Alaska that have the commenter is requesting the FAA intervals specified in the service airports suitable for a Model 737–700 clarify the applicability. information for a related AD. are unlikely to be served solely by The FAA agrees to clarify. This AD The FAA agrees for the reason Model 737–700 airplanes. The FAA has applies to The Boeing Company Model provided, and because 750 flight hours considered the potential for impact to 737–600, –700, –700C, –800, –900, and better aligns with most operators’ these communities due to Model 737– –900ER series airplanes (including maintenance programs. The FAA 700 airplanes being temporarily out of passenger and cargo airplanes) except intended to propose a 750 flight hour service for the required modification for airplanes having configurations interval, but inadvertently specified 650 actions, and considers the safety identified in paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) of flight hour intervals in the proposed concern to outweigh those potential this AD. Airplanes with an installed AD. The FAA has revised paragraph impacts. This AD was developed with NGS that meets the criteria specified in (h)(1) of this AD to specify repetitive regard to minimizing the economic paragraph (c)(1) of this AD are excluded intervals of 750 flight hours. impact on operators to the extent from this AD. Airplanes with an possible, consistent with the safety installed IMM such as fuel tank Request To Revise Costs of Compliance objectives of this AD. In any event, the explosion suppression foam that meets Section To Account for Cargo Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR the criteria specified in paragraph (c)(2) Conversions part 39) require operators to correct an of this AD are also excluded from this A4A/CAA noted that the Costs of unsafe condition identified on an AD. Compliance section in the NPRM stated airplane to ensure operation of that all U.S.-registered airplanes are airplane in an airworthy condition. The Clarification of BITE Check Compliance currently operated as passenger FAA has determined in this case that Time airplanes and that ‘‘because of the the requirements are necessary and the The FAA has revised paragraph (h)(1) requirement in 14 CFR 121.1117 to indirect costs would be outweighed by of this AD to clarify the compliance install FRM on U.S. air-carrier passenger the safety benefits of the AD. The FAA time for the BITE check relative to the airplanes by the end of 2017, it is likely considers the 72 month compliance requirement to record the fault codes. that no U.S. airplanes would actually be adequate time for operators to schedule The FAA recognized that operators affected by this proposed AD.’’ A4A/ the required modifications without might interpret the proposed CAA noted that 14 CFR 121.1117 does excessive disruption of service to those requirements for alternative actions for not require FRM to be installed on all- communities. However, if an operator cargo airplanes as allowing additional cargo airplanes. The commenter stated considers that a moderate delay in the flights prior to performing the BITE that U.S.-registered Model 737–700 all- incorporation of the required check after first recording the fault cargo airplanes without FRM installed modification would significantly reduce codes. The FAA intended for operators will be operated by 2017. The FAA the impact on their operations or the to perform the BITE check immediately infers that A4A/CAA is requesting that impact on service to a remote after recording the fault codes to address

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both the fault codes that exist prior to public interest require adopting this currently operated as cargo airplanes. performing the BITE check and any new final rule with the changes described Beginning with line number 2620, codes that are identified during the previously and minor editorial changes. however, Boeing has delivered airplanes BITE check. The FAA has determined that these with FRM/NGS installed. The FAA minor changes: estimates that 831 affected airplanes on Clarification of Costs of Compliance • Are consistent with the intent that the U.S. Register were delivered without The FAA had previously determined, was proposed in the NPRM for FRM installed, but the agency does not as specified in the NPRM, that the work addressing the unsafe condition; and know the number of airplanes that have involved for the cargo airplane wire • Do not add any additional burden had FRM installed post-production. separation modification would take 230 upon the public than was already work-hours. Boeing has since provided proposed in the NPRM. Because of the requirement in 14 CFR an updated estimate of 74 work-hours The FAA also determined that these 121.1117 to install FRM on U.S. air- for the alternative modification for cargo changes will not increase the economic carrier passenger airplanes by the end of airplanes. The FAA has revised the cost burden on any operator or increase the 2017, it is likely that no U.S. passenger estimate for the modification scope of this final rule. airplanes would actually be affected by accordingly in this final rule. this AD. However, U.S.-registered cargo Costs of Compliance airplanes may be affected by this AD. Conclusion There are approximately 1,393 U.S.- For any affected airplane, the FAA The FAA reviewed the relevant data, registered Model 737–600, –700, –700C, estimates the following costs to comply considered the comments received, and –800, –900, and –900ER series airplanes with this AD: determined that air safety and the in service. Several of those airplanes are

ESTIMATED COSTS: REQUIRED ACTIONS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product

Modification ...... 1,200 work-hours × $85 per hour = $200,000 $302,000. $102,000.

ESTIMATED COSTS: ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product

BITE check ...... 1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 per $0 $85 per check (4 checks per year, $340 check. per year). Wire separation ...... 74 work-hours × $85 per hour = $6,290 10,000 16,290.

Authority for This Rulemaking government and the States, or on the Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. distribution of power and Title 49 of the United States Code § 39.13 [Amended] specifies the FAA’s authority to issue responsibilities among the various rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, levels of government. ■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding section 106, describes the authority of For the reasons discussed above, I the following new airworthiness the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: certify that this AD: directive (AD): (1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory Aviation Programs, describes in more 2020–18–13 The Boeing Company: detail the scope of the Agency’s action’’ under Executive Order 12866, (2) Will not affect intrastate aviation Amendment 39–21234; Docket No. authority. in Alaska, and FAA–2016–6139; Product Identifier The FAA is issuing this rulemaking 2015–NM–061–AD. under the authority described in (3) Will not have a significant (a) Effective Date Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section economic impact, positive or negative, 44701: General requirements. Under on a substantial number of small entities This AD is effective October 29, 2020. that section, Congress charges the FAA under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. (b) Affected ADs with promoting safe flight of civil None. aircraft in air commerce by prescribing List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 (c) Applicability regulations for practices, methods, and Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation procedures the Administrator finds safety, Incorporation by reference, This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 737–600, –700, –700C, –800, –900, necessary for safety in air commerce. Safety. This regulation is within the scope of and –900ER series airplanes, certificated in that authority because it addresses an Adoption of the Amendment any category, excluding airplanes identified in paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) of this AD. unsafe condition that is likely to exist or Accordingly, under the authority develop on products identified in this (1) Airplanes equipped with a flammability delegated to me by the Administrator, reduction means (FRM) approved by the FAA rulemaking action. the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as as compliant with the fuel tank flammability Regulatory Findings follows: reduction (FTFR) requirements of 14 CFR 25.981(b) or 26.33(c)(1). This AD will not have federalism PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS (2) Airplanes equipped with an ignition implications under Executive Order DIRECTIVES mitigation means (IMM) approved by the 13132. This AD will not have a FAA as compliant with the FTFR substantial direct effect on the States, on ■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 requirements of 14 CFR 25.981(c) or the relationship between the national continues to read as follows: 26.33(c)(2).

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(d) Subject (i) Alternative Methods of Compliance proscribing any: Fraudulent or Air Transport Association (ATA) of (AMOCs) intentionally false statement on an America Code 28, Fuel. (1) The Manager, Seattle ACO Branch, application for a medical certificate or FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs (e) Unsafe Condition other document used to show for this AD, if requested using the procedures compliance with any requirement for a This AD was prompted by the FAA’s found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with medical certificate; reproduction of a analysis of the Model 737 fuel system 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your medical certificate for fraudulent reviews conducted by the manufacturer. The principal inspector or local Flight Standards FAA is issuing this AD to prevent ignition District Office, as appropriate. If sending purposes; or alteration of a medical sources inside the center fuel tank, which, in information directly to the manager of the certificate. The policy is expected to combination with flammable fuel vapors, certification office, send it to the attention of afford eligible individuals who hold an could result in a fuel tank explosion and the person identified in paragraph (j) of this airman or ground instructor certificate consequent loss of the airplane. AD. Information may be emailed to: 9-ANM- and who are the subject of such a legal (f) Compliance [email protected]. enforcement action the opportunity to (2) Before using any approved AMOC, apply for a new airman or ground Comply with this AD within the notify your appropriate principal inspector, compliance times specified, unless already instructor certificate sooner than in the or lacking a principal inspector, the manager absence of this policy. done. of the local flight standards district office/ DATES: (g) Modification certificate holding district office. This notification of enforcement (3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable policy is effective September 30, 2020. Within 72 months after the effective date level of safety may be used for any repair, of this AD, modify the fuel quantity FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: modification, or alteration required by this indicating system (FQIS) to prevent James Barry, Manager, Policy/Audit/ AD if it is approved by The Boeing Company development of an ignition source inside the Evaluation, Enforcement Division, Organization Designation Authorization center fuel tank due to electrical fault AGC–300, Federal Aviation (ODA) that has been authorized by the conditions, using a method approved in Manager, Seattle ACO Branch, FAA, to make Administration, 800 Independence accordance with the procedures specified in Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591; paragraph (i) of this AD. those findings. To be approved, the repair method, modification deviation, or alteration telephone (202) 267–8198; james.barry@ (h) Alternative Actions for Cargo Airplanes deviation must meet the certification basis of faa.gov; or Brandon Goldberg, Attorney, For airplanes used exclusively for cargo the airplane, and the approval must Enforcement Division, AGC–300, operations: As an alternative to the specifically refer to this AD. Federal Aviation Administration, 1701 requirements of paragraph (g) of this AD, do (j) Related Information Columbia Ave., College Park, GA 30337; the actions specified in paragraphs (h)(1) and telephone (404) 305–5230; (2) of this AD, using methods approved in For more information about this AD, [email protected]. contact Jon Regimbal, Aerospace Engineer, accordance with the procedures specified in SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: paragraph (i) of this AD. To exercise this Propulsion Section, FAA, Seattle ACO alternative, operators must perform the first Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, Background inspection required under paragraph (h)(1) of WA 98198; phone and fax: 206–231–3557; this AD within 6 months after the effective email: [email protected]. Under longstanding FAA policy, the revocation of airman, ground instructor, date of this AD. To exercise this alternative (k) Material Incorporated by Reference for airplanes returned to service after and medical certificates, and the conversion of the airplane from a passenger None. withdrawal of all special issuances or configuration to an all-cargo configuration Issued on August 26, 2020. SODAs, is the appropriate sanction for more than 6 months after the effective date Lance T. Gant, violations of 14 CFR 67.403(a)(1) of this AD, operators must perform the first through (4).1 The period between the inspection required under paragraph (h)(1) of Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft Certification Service. discovery of an apparent violation of 14 this AD prior to further flight after the CFR 67.403(a)(1) through (4) and, if conversion. [FR Doc. 2020–19809 Filed 9–23–20; 8:45 am] appropriate, the issuance of an order (1) Within 6 months after the effective date BILLING CODE 4910–13–P of this AD, record the existing fault codes revoking airman, medical, and ground stored in the FQIS processor and before instructor certificates can be lengthy, further flight thereafter do a BITE check DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION making the date on which an order of (check of built-in test equipment) of the revocation will be issued uncertain. FQIS. If any nondispatchable fault code is Federal Aviation Administration Investigative personnel compile an recorded prior to the BITE check or as a [Docket No.: FAA–2020–0809] result of the BITE check, before further flight, 1 Under 14 CFR 67.403(a)(1)–(4), a person is do all applicable repairs and repeat the BITE prohibited from making or causing to be made: A check until a successful test is performed 14 CFR Parts 61, 63, 65 and 67 fraudulent or intentionally false statement on any with no nondispatchable faults found, using application for a medical certificate or on a request a method approved in accordance with the Settlement Policy for Legal for any Authorization for Special Issuance of a procedures specified in paragraph (i) of this Enforcement Actions Involving Medical Medical Certificate (Authorization) or Statement of AD. Repeat these actions thereafter at Certificate-Related Fraud, Intentional Demonstrated Ability (SODA); a fraudulent or intervals not to exceed 750 flight hours. intentionally false entry in any logbook, record, or Falsification, Reproduction, or report that is kept, made, or used to show Modification as specified in paragraph (h)(2) Alteration compliance with any requirement for any medical of this AD does not terminate the repetitive certificate or for any Authorization or SODA; a BITE check requirement of this paragraph. AGENCY: Federal Aviation reproduction, for fraudulent purposes, of any (2) Within 72 months after the effective Administration (FAA), Department of medical certificate; or an alteration of any medical date of this AD, modify the airplane by Transportation (DOT). certificate. Under 14 CFR 67.403(b)(1)–(2), a separating FQIS wiring that runs between the violation of 14 CFR 67.403(a)(1)–(4) is a basis for: FQIS processor and the center tank wing spar ACTION: Notification of enforcement Suspending or revoking all airman, ground penetrations, including any circuits that policy. instructor, and medical certificates and ratings held by the violator and withdrawing all Authorizations might pass through a main fuel tank, from SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a policy or SODA’s held by the violator. See also FAA Order other airplane wiring that is not intrinsically 2150.3C, chap. 9, para. 8 (revocation is appropriate safe, using methods approved in accordance for the prompt settlement of legal for a violation of 14 CFR 67.403(a)(1)–(4) since such with the procedures specified in paragraph enforcement actions against individuals a violation demonstrates a lack of qualification to (i) of this AD. who have violated FAA regulations hold a certificate).

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