CTC Sentinel Objective

september 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 9

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents American Perceptions of

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 American Perceptions of Terrorism Terrorism in the Post-9/11 in the Post-9/11 Decade By Paul R. Pillar Decade Reports By Paul R. Pillar 3 The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria By David Cook 5 Religious Allegiances among Pro-Iranian Special Groups in Iraq By Reidar Visser 8 AQIM Returns in Force in Northern Algeria By Andrew Lebovich 12 Violence Escalates in China’s Xinjiang Province By Jacob Zenn 15 The UK’s Efforts to Disrupt Jihadist Activity Online By Raffaello Pantucci

17 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 20 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

he tenth anniversary of the yearning for an explanation that would 9/11 attacks has become an be too simple to be an accurate analysis occasion for reevaluating the of what has determined the amount of terrorism threat to the United terrorism directed against the United TStates. Three key questions have been States during the past decade. raised. What is the status and current strength of al-Qa`ida, the group that 9/11 was one of the most traumatic perpetrated 9/11? Have measures taken events in U.S. history. It powerfully since 9/11 made Americans any safer shaped perceptions and emotions of the About the CTC Sentinel today? Why has the United States not American public to a degree that few other The Combating Terrorism Center is an been attacked again—at least in the sense events have. It is not an exaggeration to independent educational and research of being attacked on a scale approaching say that the thoughts of most Americans institution based in the Department of Social 9/11? These are worthwhile questions, about terrorism and counterterrorism Sciences at the United States Military Academy, although they each involve a restricted revolve almost entirely around 9/11. West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses perspective toward terrorism and Most Americans believe a “war on terror” the Center’s global network of scholars and counterterrorism. The first is inherently began with 9/11, notwithstanding all the practitioners to understand and confront limited by being focused on only a terrorism and efforts to counter it before contemporary threats posed by terrorism and single variety of terrorism or even just a that one event. Trauma and emotion other forms of political violence. single group. The second usually omits are not generally conducive to good reference to any standard of success understanding of any topic, terrorism and failure in securing Americans from included. It should not be surprising that The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, terrorism or to the costs and trade-offs Americans’ trauma-driven attitudes and the Department of the Army, or any other agency entailed in obtaining a given degree of beliefs about terrorism are misplaced or of the U.S. Government. safety. The third question is usually a inaccurate in important respects.

1 september 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 9

Therefore, this article examines another Like spikes of attention following The equation of counterterrorism with set of questions, which are at least as earlier terrorist attacks, the one after a fight against al-Qaìda has pervaded useful as those posed above. How has 9/11 is subject to fading over time until much of the public discourse as well 9/11 molded American attitudes about another attack occurs. The spike after as the framing of public policy in the terrorism during the subsequent decade? 9/11, however, was so high that any fade decade since 9/11. Analysis of almost To what extent do popular attitudes will persist longer before returning to any terrorist incident or terrorist- and perceptions conform with, or differ the level of public interest in terrorism related discovery or individual is from, actual threats of terrorism today? before 9/11. Terrorism is still a major couched in terms of whether or not the Have counterterrorism policies been public worry. In a Gallup poll taken in subject of attention is “linked” to al- driven more by public perceptions than 2010, Americans ranked it alongside by the terrorist reality? government debt at the top of their list of “The broader phenomenon dangers to the well-being of the United Inconsistent Interest in Counterterrorism States.1 To the extent the American of Sunni jihadist terrorism The enormous public reaction to a public’s enthusiasm for vigorous to which the label al-Qaìda single event points to one important counterterrorist measures has lessened respect in which public perception at all since the first couple of years after is commonly applied is not diverges from reality. Public concern 9/11, the lessening has little to do with weaker. Instead, it is even about terrorism and support for efforts an objective assessment of the status and to counter it tends to spike upward strength of any foreign terrorist group. more widespread than it immediately after terrorist attacks and It instead is a function of—in addition to was 10 years ago.” to subside gradually downward as time the usual pattern of interest fading over passes without another attack. Interest time—the competition for attention from in counterterrorism thus produces economic and other national problems a sawtooth pattern, and the policy and a backlash against some measures Qaìda—the implication being that one priority and resources devoted to it taken in the name of counterterrorism should worry more if it is and less if it tend to follow that pattern. Yet terrorist (especially involving compromises is not. A highly disproportionate share attacks are only the aperiodic outward of privacy and treatment of detained of U.S. resources expended in the name manifestations of an underlying threat suspects) that have come to be seen as of counterterrorism have been directed that does not vary with sudden upward excesses. against this one group. This particularly spikes in a way that corresponds to includes military operations in changing public attitudes. The American View of Foreign Threats South Asia, especially a 10-year-old Another attribute of public perceptions counterinsurgency in Afghanistan The off-the-chart spike in Americans’ about terrorism in the decade since 9/11 where the chief rationale has been to concern about terrorism in response stems from a habitual American way of prevent al-Qaìda from re-establishing to 9/11 was another instance of the perceiving any foreign security threat a safe haven in the country. same phenomenon, albeit one greatly in terms of specific, named countries or amplified by the salience and physical groups or the leaders of those countries The persistence of the equation of impact of the attack. The U.S. public or groups. In that respect, the notion counterterrorism with a fight against and political response would lead one of a “war on terror”—terrorism being a al-Qaìda is clearly illustrated by the to believe that the terrorist threat to tactic rather than a specific foe—always “National Strategy for Counterterrorism” the United States was far greater on was, on the face of it, an unnatural fit that the Barack Obama administration September 12, 2001 than it had been on with the American way of thinking about published in June 2011.2 The document September 10. This was not the case, security threats as well as with logic. (As would have been more aptly titled the however. Public (and by implication, Zbigniew Brzezinski once observed, a “National Strategy for the War on al- political) attention to terrorism was “war on terror” is no more logical than a Qaìda,” because that is the strategy’s probably too low before 9/11. With the “war on blitzkrieg.”) Yet the term “war” primary focus. All other terrorist acts or overwhelming preoccupation the subject was used given the popular demand for threats of terrorism in the world are noted became after the attack, it was too high. a strong, forceful response to the horror and set aside in a few paragraphs. The greatly augmented priority and of 9/11. Americans made the concept of resources devoted to counterterrorism a “war on terror” fit more comfortably If counterterrorism, as a subject of since 2001 have assuredly mitigated with their usual way of perceiving public discussion and governmental threats, through responses ranging from foreign threats by equating the war with policy, were conceived as a result defensive security measures at home a struggle against al-Qaìda, the group of a zero-based review conducted in to offensive actions against individual that had perpetrated 9/11, and to some 2011—unencumbered by the emotions terrorists abroad. But it is still fair to degree with the group’s leader, Usama from the disaster that struck on 9/11— ask whether, by any reasonable measure bin Ladin. the commentary and policies would look of how terrorism compares with other and sound much different. They would threats to U.S. security and of how recognize that radical Sunni terrorism of resources can be efficiently utilized, the augmentation was an overreaction. 2 “National Strategy for Counterterrorism,” U.S. White 1 Lydia Saad, “Federal Debt, Terrorism, Considered Top House, June 2011, available at www.whitehouse.gov/ Threats to U.S.,” Gallup, June 4, 2010. sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf.

2 september 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 9 the sort exemplified most recognizably These two observations together imply by al-Qaìda is only one manifestation that the equation of counterterrorism The Rise of Boko Haram in of international terrorism. There would with a fight against any single group is at Nigeria be further recognition that even within least as misleading as at any time in the the radical Sunni variety of terrorism, past 10 years. That equation obscures By David Cook al-Qaìda is only one element. Bin Ladin from where most of the initiative for himself recognized that al-Qaìda would terrorist operations is coming, which is on august 26, 2011, a suicide bomber only be a part of the picture, even if the at the periphery and not from a center detonated an explosives-laden vehicle at picture is narrowed to include only those in South Asia. This is true not only a United Nations compound in Nigeria’s radical Sunnis with a transnational of groups in Asia and Africa (some, capital, Abuja, killing at least 21 people. bent. The group he established is called, but not all, of which have adopted the Boko Haram, a militant group based in in English, “The Base”—one he never al-Qaìda name), but also would-be Nigeria’s northwestern states of Yobe intended would do everything itself but jihadist terrorists in the United States and Borno, claimed responsibility. Boko instead would be the base from which whose cases have come to light during Haram is the popular title for a group larger efforts would be inspired and the past few years. that calls itself Jamaàt ahl al-sunna li- grow. da`wa wa-l-qital, and it has operated in The death of Bin Ladin in a U.S. raid in Nigeria since 2002-2003. Its popular A present-day, zero-based review Pakistan in May 2011 has little direct name connotes “[Western] education is also would avoid the terminological effect on these patterns. As the materials forbidden” as a result of the perception confusion in the way the name “al- confiscated in the raid confirmed, Bin that the group stood against any form Qaìda” has come to be used. Sometimes Ladin had already been reduced in of non-Islamic education. It has gained it refers to the group that Bin Ladin led— recent years to exhortation much more recent notoriety because of its transition the one that executed 9/11, the bombing than direction. Bin Ladin’s role as an from being a local radical Salafist of the USS Cole, and the bombings of U.S. operational commander had become group, which until 2009 had a largely embassies in Africa. Often it is used much negligible, and his role as an inspiration quietist nature, to a Salafi-jihadi group more loosely to refer to transnational and source of ideology, which was still that has demonstrated the capacity to Sunni terrorism in general. Sometimes substantial, will continue even with his carry out major operations, including it refers to some subset of that brand of death. suicide attacks in central Nigeria. It terrorism, vaguely defined in terms of a is in Boko Haram that one can see the group’s own adoption of the al-Qaìda The far greater effect of the raid is on possibility of a homegrown Salafi-jihadi brand name or some other “links” to perceptions back in the United States. group that could destabilize Nigeria the al-Qaìda of Bin Ladin. Besides It is too soon to gauge the full effect. for the foreseeable future (not unlike the overall confusion regarding what Bin Ladin’s passing may provide some the more tribal and local nationalistic is being discussed, this broad use of a beneficial corrective to the overly groups operating in the Niger Delta to single name misleadingly implies more narrow focus on this one man, but the south). structure and central direction of a it may also lead to a mistaken and phenomenon that is far more diffuse detrimental belief that his departure has This article chronicles the rise of Boko and decentralized. significantly reduced terrorist threats Haram, identifying the two phases in to the United States. which the group has passed. It also Real Trends suggests how the group may proceed in Al-Qaìda’s actual history in the past Paul R. Pillar is Visiting Professor and the future. decade has made the discrepancy Director of Studies of the Security Studies between popular perception and Program at Georgetown University. He is a Boko Haram in Context reality even greater than it was in former deputy chief of the Counterterrorist The roots of Boko Haram lie in the the first years after 9/11. At the risk Center at the Central Intelligence Agency. Islamic history of northern Nigeria, of oversimplification, that history can His latest book is Intelligence and in which for some 800 years powerful be summarized in two observations. U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and sultanates centered around the Hausa First, al-Qaìda narrowly defined— Misguided Reform (Columbia University cities close to Kano and the sultanate that is, the group that was led by Bin Press, 2011). of Borno (roughly the region of the Ladin and is now headed by Ayman al- states of Borno and Yobe together Zawahiri—is weaker and less capable with parts of Chad) constituted high of major operations than it was at Muslim civilizations. These sultanates the time of 9/11. That weakening has were challenged by the jihad of Shehu several causes, including U.S. kinetic Usuman Dan Fodio (that lasted from operations in South Asia. Second, the 1802-1812), who created a unified broader phenomenon of Sunni jihadist caliphate stretching across northern terrorism to which the label al-Qaìda Nigeria into the neighboring countries.1 is commonly applied is not weaker. Dan Fodio’s legacy of jihad is one that Instead, it is even more widespread than it was 10 years ago. It has taken 1 Mervyn Hiskett, The Sword of Truth: The Life and Times the form of a variety of individuals, of Shehu Ùthman Dan Fodio (Evanston, Il.: Northwestern cells, and groups on several continents. University Press, 1994).

3 september 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 9 is seen as normative by most northern absolutely certain that all of these Boko Haram: Phase II Nigerian Muslims. The caliphate still groups are the same. There is no doubt that the suppression ruled by his descendants (together with operation of 2009, and the killing numerous smaller sultanates), however, What can be stated with certainty is that of Muhammad Yusuf by Nigerian was conquered by the British in 1905, the charismatic figure of Muhammad security forces in July of that year, and in 1960 Muslim northern Nigeria Yusuf, who was killed in July 2009, was a turning point for Boko Haram. was federated with largely Christian was the one who initiated Boko Haram’s The group was frequently said at this southern Nigeria. first phase. This phase was mainly time to be defunct.6 In September 2010 focused first upon withdrawal from (coinciding with Ramadan), however, Since independence until 1999, Nigeria society—following the example of Dan Boko Haram carried out a prison was ruled largely by military rulers, Fodio—and establishing small camps break (said to have released some a number of whom were northern and schools in the remoter regions of 700 prisoners),7 and the group began Muslims (although the longest ruling of operations again. Its major operations them, Yakubu Gwon, was a Christian). since that time can be divided into the During this period, Nigerian Islam was “Yet Boko Haram has following attack categories: 1) military riven with doctrinal debates between definitely been able to tap (three operations); 2) police (at least 16 the Sufis and the Salafists (led by the operations); 3) teachers/university (five charismatic Abu Bakar Gumi until his into discontent among operations); 4) banks and markets (two death in 1992), oblivious to the fact that northern Muslims, who operations); 5) carrying out al-amr bi-l- Christians were heavily proselytizing ma`ruf attacks on beer drinkers, card- throughout the country, especially have not been satisfied players, etc. (at least five operations); in the region of the Middle Belt. The with the imposition of 6) attacks on Christian preachers and growth of Christianity was reflected in churches (at least three operations); the 1999 election of Olusegun Obasanjo Sharià during the years and 7) targeted assassinations (at least (re-elected in 2003), and the continued since 2000.” five major operations). While the major southern Christian domination of methodologies of drive-by shootings and Goodluck Jonathan (successor to the bombings from motorcycles have not brief Muslim presidency of Umaru Musa changed, the group has demonstrated Yar’Adua in 2010). Borno and Yobe states during the years in its second incarnation a considerable 2002-2005. As police pressure against range, carrying out operations in The Muslim response to the Christian these smaller jamaàt groups began to Adumawa, Katsina and a number of political ascendency was the move grow toward the end of that period, the times in Abuja. during the period of 2000-2003 to group morphed into more of an urban impose Sharià in 12 of the northern phenomenon practicing al-amr bi-l-ma`ruf The targeted assassinations are the states in which they predominated.2 wa-l-nahy àn al-munkar (enjoining the good most revealing, involving political For the most part, imposition of Sharià and forbidding the evil). From such figures, such as Abba Anas bin Ùmar brought the previously feuding Muslim operations, usually against consumption (killed in May 2011), the brother of the groups together, and there was no of alcohol and other non-Islamic Shehu of Borno, and secular opposition further use of takfir (accusations of being practices, the group began to shape its figures (Modu Fannami Godio, killed in non-Muslim).3 While the imposition identity.5 Again, the entire methodology January 2011), but also prominent clerics of Sharià did satisfy the official is very much according to the example such as Bashir Kashara, a well-known manifestations of Islam in the north of Dan Fodio. What made Boko Haram Wahhabi figure (killed in October (both Sufi and Salafi), it is clear that stand out among other Nigerian radical 2010), Ibrahim Ahmad Abdullahi, a radicals who were takfiris doctrinally— groups were its operations against the non-violent preacher (killed in March such as members of Boko Haram—were police that began in 2004. 2011), and Ibrahim Birkuti, a well- left outside. known popular preacher who challenged The last period of Boko Haram, phase Boko Haram (killed in June 2011). The Boko Haram: Phase I I, was direct confrontation with the shootings of these prominent clerics Relations between Boko Haram and Nigerian police and military, which seem to be in accord with Boko Haram’s other Nigerian radical groups are culminated in the Nigerian military purificationist agenda with regard unclear. Although most observers assault upon Muhammad Yusuf’s to Islam. It is interesting also that in state that the group’s name is actually compound, associated mosques, and his Boko Haram’s second incarnation there Jamaàt ahl al-sunna li-da`wa wa-l- judicial murder, videotaped by soldiers. has been no figure who has replaced qital, and that it is the descendent of Hundreds of members of the group were Muhammad Yusuf as the charismatic the group that in 2002 was referred killed with him, and it is clear that one leader. to as the Nigerian Taliban,4 it is not of the lessons learned by Boko Haram for its second phase was to avoid having an obvious base. 2 Ruud Peters, Islamic Criminal Law in Nigeria (Abuja: Spectrum, 2003). 6 Passing through Maiduguri in 2009, one did not sense 3 Personal interview, Ismail Ja`far of the Sharià Board, Sect,” BBC, January 14, 2004. much fear of the group. Kano, Nigeria, May 12, 2005. 5 Murray Last, “Who and What are the Boko Haram,” 7 “‘Boko Haram Attack’ Frees Hundreds of Prisoners,” 4 Anna Borzello, “Tracking Down Nigeria’s ‘Taleban’ Royal African Society, July 14, 2011. BBC, September 8, 2010.

4 september 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 9

Most dramatic has been the transition of solution). There are reports that Religious Allegiances Boko Haram toward the use of suicide even northern Muslim soldiers sent attacks, starting with the attack on the to infiltrate the group have joined it. among Pro-Iranian Special police General Headquarters in Abuja Opposition from major Muslim religious Groups in Iraq on June 16, 2011 and then culminating figures in the north suggests that Boko with the attack on the UN headquarters, Haram has local opposition that it needs By Reidar Visser also in Abuja, on August 26, 2011.8 Other to silence to maintain its control. than al-Shabab in Somalia and to some pro-iranian “special groups” are once extent al-Qaìda in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram’s transition into the use of more the focus of attention in Iraq. As no other African radical Muslim group suicide attacks suggests that the group the United States prepares to withdraw has used suicide attacks. Indeed, there might have connections to other major its forces from Iraq at the end of 2011, the were reports that al-Shabab had trained Salafi-jihadi organizations. The release U.S. military has highlighted increasing at least one of the attackers against the of a martyrdom video in September paramilitary activity by the Special UN building.9 While the attack on the 2011, a media event not associated Groups, supported with weapons and police General Headquarters can be with regional radical Islamic groups, explosives from Iran, as a potential seen as a continuation of Boko Haram’s suggests connections with either AQIM threat to political stability in the years fixation upon the Nigerian police and or al-Shabab, both of whom use this ahead. Yet it is not accurate to suggest army, the United Nations attack is methodology. It is interesting, however, that all Special Groups share the same much more in line with other globalist that no major ideological statement can be relationship with the regime in Tehran. takfiri organizations, and is strongly associated with Boko Haram that states reminiscent of the suicide attack in the group’s objectives or program.10 This article explores the religious Baghdad against the United Nations The group, as its name implies, is only allegiances of pro-Iranian Special in August 2003, which was one of the defined by what it stands against rather Groups in Iraq. The links between opening blows of the Iraqi insurgency. than what it stands for. It is interesting, militant groups and religious authorities however, that its targets have been very are investigated for four such groups: Overall, Boko Haram is demonstrating specific, and that in contradistinction to Kataib Hizb Allah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the paradigm of a jamaàt group, such other Muslim groups Boko Haram has the Promised Day Brigades and the as Jemaah Islamiya in Southeast Asia, only rarely attacked Christians. The Badr Organization. It is concluded that which had a quietist stage of local amr vast majority of its targets have been Kataib Hizb Allah and Asaib Ahl al- bi-l-ma`ruf and then transitioned into an either obviously official or in line with a Haq are most closely integrated into the activist stage as the result of outside purificationist agenda toward Muslims. tradition of the Iranian revolution, influence. The assassination of the but also that an exclusive focus on charismatic Muhammad Yusuf seems Dr. David Cook is associate professor the Special Groups and their ties to to have been such a catalyst, and now of religious studies at Rice University the Iranian clergy involves missing released from its previous strictures specializing in Islam. He completed his the wood for the trees. With signs of the group is able to expand its field of undergraduate degrees at Hebrew University increasingly close ties between the operations. in Jerusalem, and received his Ph.D. from the Da`wa Party of Prime Minister Nuri University of Chicago in 2001. His areas of al-Maliki and the Iranian clergy, the Connections and Prospects specialization include early Islamic history study of the activities of the Special Boko Haram has been able to project and development, Muslim apocalyptic Groups in isolation from the broader power over the northeastern section of literature and movements (classical and Iranian strategy in Iraq is somewhat Nigeria, where the police and army have contemporary), radical Islam, historical myopic. effectively lost control. They have not, astronomy and Judeo-Arabic literature. His however, succeeded in going beyond first book, Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic, Special Groups and Iranian Religious their ability to impose terror upon the was published by Darwin Press in the series Leaderships capital of Borno State, Maiduguri, into Studies in Late Antiquity and Early Islam. Much of the literature on Special actually attempting to assume power. Two further books, Understanding Jihad Groups in Iraq only focuses on the Yet Boko Haram has definitely been able and Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic following three organizations: Kataib to tap into discontent among northern Literature were published during 2005, Hizb Allah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Muslims, who have not been satisfied and Martyrdom in Islam as well as Promised Day Brigades. This article, with the imposition of Sharià during Understanding and Addressing Suicide however, also examines a fourth Special the years since 2000 (people expected Attacks (with Olivia Allison) have been Group: the Badr Organization, formerly that the draconian punishments would completed recently. known as the Badr militia.1 This is curtail corruption and crime; Boko necessary for two reasons. First, it has Haram offers a more direct and violent never been documented convincingly that the militant elements of the Badr 8 There are claims that the June 2011 suicide attack was Organization have been fully disarmed. actually a botched bombing. See “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamists ‘Bombed Abuja Police HQ,’” BBC, June 17, 10 The so-called “manifesto” from the internet is clearly 2011. false. For details, see www.islamizationwatch.blogspot. 1 For prior literature on Special Groups in Iraq, see Mi- 9 “Nigeria UN Bomb: ‘Al-Qaeda-Linked’ Man Named as com/2009/07/nigerian-taliban-boko-haram-manifesto. chael Knights, “The Evolution of Iran’s Special Groups in Suspect,” BBC, August 31, 2011. html. Iraq,” CTC Sentinel 3:11-12 (2010).

5 september 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 9

Second, since the Badr Organization in spiritual leader and their own members to indicate that the movement was many ways represents the Special Group acting as subordinate lieutenants. gravitating more toward the religious par excellence—it was designed by Iran For example, Qais al-Khazali3 is quite authorities of Najaf than to those of with the aim of maximizing its military consistently referred to as a lower-rank Iran. Al-Hakim’s moves in this respect, influence within the Iraqi opposition hujjatulislam, a field commander (qa’id al- however, were never completely in the 1980s—it must be included in an mujahid) or simply as secretary-general unequivocal, and with a renewed analysis of pro-Iranian paramilitary of the Asaib Ahl al-Haq party. As such, leadership struggle in ISCI after his forces in Iraq. he forms a closer parallel to Hassan death in 2009 and the emergence of his Nasrallah in the case of Lebanese Hizb young and inexperienced son Ammar Kataib Hizb Allah Allah than does the mainline Sadrist as ISCI’s new head, tensions between Among these four groups, Kataib Hizb movement.4 Badr and ISCI have once again become Allah may be the easiest to classify in more pronounced. With these tensions, terms of its religious allegiances. At Badr Organization the question of allegiances to Iranian least in the group’s publications and on When it comes to the Badr Organization and Iraqi religious leaderships has been its website, Kataib Hizb Allah indicates and the Promised Day Brigades, the propelled to the forefront. straightforward acknowledgment of the picture of their religious allegiances is basic governing principle of the Iranian murkier and more complicated. With A look at the Badr Organization’s revolution—wilayat al-faqih—and also respect to Badr, it began as an outfit media can provide an indication of the speaks of current Iranian leader Ali directly controlled by the leaders of problem. Most of the provincial Badr Khamenei as the “leader imam” (imam the Iranian revolution in the 1980s. websites are now defunct—possibly an al-qa’id). Kataib Hizb Allah’s website The main question surrounding it in indication of the disarray in which the uses a work by the Khomeinist scholar the post-2003 period has been to what organization currently finds itself. Yet Muhammad Momen Qommi to explain extent it has shed its revolutionary the Badr newspaper is still published, its political theory and in particular why and seems to offer some subtle hints it follows the wilayat al-faqih principle, “The religious allegiances about differences with ISCI. In which historically has met with greater particular, the current ISCI leader, skepticism in Iraq than in Iran. The of the Special Groups Ammar al-Hakim, does not seem to be pro-Iranian line is also reflected in the become a marginal offered as much space and attention website content more generally, with as one would expect. Even in relation many articles focusing more on U.S.- question since Iran instead to the annual commemorations of the Iranian relations—or even on the United would use its influence death of his father Abd al-Aziz and his States itself—than on the situation in uncle Muhammad Baqir, most comments Iraq.2 within the mainstream by Ammar are reported in the Badr Shià Islamist parties in newspaper alongside those of other Iraqi Asaib Ahl al-Haq politicians rather than as statements by Asaib Ahl al-Haq was once part of the Iraq, such as the Da`wa a person with a special and privileged Sadrist movement, but the group now Party, as the primary relationship to the Badr Organization. indicates that its spiritual leader is Only on a few occasions is Ammar Kazim al-Haeri, a Khomeinist scholar tool to promote its own himself highlighted. By way of contrast, of Iraqi origin who resides in Iran and interests.” in relation to the commemoration of is followed by some but not all mainline the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Sadrists. Several fatawa by al-Haeri are current Iranian leader Ali Khamenei is reproduced on the Asaib Ahl al-Haq referred to as “Imam Ali Khamenei” in website, with subjects ranging from baggage upon returning to Iraq. Further the Badr newspaper.5 True, at times at rejection of a continued U.S. military complicating the analysis is the question least there are references in the Badr presence in Iraq to the desirability of of the relationship between Badr and its media to the Najaf religious leadership keeping the Shià unified in a single supposed political affiliate, the Supreme as well, for example when Ahmad bloc during the government-formation Council for the Islamic Revolution in al-Safi, a representative of Grand process in August 2010. This suggests Iraq (SCIRI)—which was symbiotic in Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, is referred that the group is more closely aligned the 1980s but grew more strained after to as “representative of the highest with Iran. In an interview, Muhammad 2003 as a result of succession problems religious authority.”6 Yet the dualism al-Tabatabai, a cleric active in the Asaib in SCIRI after the death of Muhammad and ambiguity regarding political Ahl al-Haq network, explained that Baqir al-Hakim. In 2007, al-Hakim’s leadership in Badr circles is certainly he is currently finishing his top-level brother and successor, Abd al-Aziz al- sufficiently strong to raise questions Shià studies as a student of al-Haeri. Hakim, changed the name of SCIRI to about where they will turn—to Iraq or Unlike the Sadrists proper, Asaib Ahl the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq Iran—if the Grand Ayatollah Ali al- al-Haq seems to have established a (ISCI) and started a media campaign Sistani dies and there is a change in the reasonably straightforward Khomeinist Najaf religious leadership. relationship between al-Haeri as a 3 Al-Khazali was one of Moqtada al-Sadr’s rivals, and a protégé of al-Sadr’s father. 2 Kataib Hizb Allah’s website is accessible at www.katai- 4 Asaib Ahl al-Haq’s website is accessible at www.iraq- 5 Badr, June 5, 2011. bhizbollah.org. moqawama.com. 6 Badr, June 4, 2011.

6 september 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 9

Promised Day Brigades of Iraq than to Asaib Ahl al-Haq and as the supposedly “sleeping” or passive The Promised Day Brigades is a Kataib Hizb Allah, whose links to Iran force of Najaf). No one among the Shià successor organization to Moqtada al- in terms of religious leaderships seem Islamist parties, however, can afford to Sadr’s Mahdi Army. Determining its firmer.7 ignore al-Sistani entirely. religious allegiances inevitably touches on the whole set of questions connected It should be added that cross-pollination Al-Sistani heads a group of altogether with the Sadrist leader himself. Despite among these groups does occur and four clerics in Najaf—himself plus the al-Sadr’s assurances that he remains makes the exercise of performing a neat grand ayatollahs Fayyad, Najafi and nothing more than a hawza student, the classification of them more difficult. Muhammad Said al-Hakim—that is habit of his followers to refer to him with For example, the website of Kataib Hizb widely considered preeminent among terms such as “leader sayyid” (al-sayyid Allah contains links to both Asaib Ahl the clergy of the city and indeed of Iraq. al-qa’id)—and his own habit of issuing al-Haq and the Promised Day Brigades. One should not, however, confine the fatwa-like declarations, especially on Recently, a public pronouncement by discussion of possible successors to political questions—create ambiguities Moqtada al-Sadr dealt with a query al-Sistani to these four. It should be in terms of describing religious from a Kataib Hizb Allah member who observed that the three others in the alliances among his various followers. seemed to address him as a religious group lag considerably behind al-Sistani This is especially true because as a authority in a way that would be at in terms of popular followings. It is true mere student, Moqtada al-Sadr does variance of the image of the Kataib as that in the early 1990s, al-Sistani was not possess the formal qualifications an organization steeped in the tradition himself not a very prominent figure required to issue fatawa. Accordingly, of the Iranian revolution with its immediately following the death of when he does so, he is in fact implicitly emphasis on hierarchical rank in the Grand Ayatollah Abu al-Qasem al-Khoei challenging the hierarchical order of Shià world of learning. For their part, in August 1992, and other candidates for both traditional Shi’ism and the order of many Badr members today probably succeeding al-Khoei prevailed for some the Iranian revolution through methods oscillate between Khamenei and al- time. Nonetheless, it would be unwise that are perhaps best described as a Sistani in a parallel to what many Hizb to ignore the segment of somewhat form of neo-Akhbarism. Of course, the Allah members did in Lebanon in the younger, mostly Arab ulama in their 60s Iranian revolution has also established mid-1990s, when Muhammad Hussein and 70s who have emerged in Najaf in a habit of swiftly transforming aspiring Fadlallah openly challenged Khamenei. the post-2003 period. This motley crew clerics to the ranks of ayatollahs once involves people such as Ala al-Din al- they have proven their credentials as Relevant Recent Developments in the Najaf Ghurayfi, Qasem al-Taie, Saleh al- defenders of the interests of the Islamic Marjaiyya Taie, Muhammad Shubayr al-Khaqani, republic, but despite many rumors Ever since its emergence as a preeminent Hussein al-Sadr and Shamsudin al- about imminent ayatollah-hood, al- center of Shià learning in the early 20th Waezi, all of whom now call themselves Sadr still remains somewhat young century, Qom in Iran has been in a state grand ayatollah. Not all of these seem to perform this metamorphosis. For of tension vis-à-vis Najaf in Iraq, its equally fitted to challenge the established now, this means his followers must main competitor. These tensions have elite of Najaf, but they are old enough remain in a vacuum where they see him certainly persisted after the Iranian to repeat what Muhammad al-Yaqubi (a as their spiritual leader but where he revolution, and it would be unwise to spiritual source of inspiration for the enjoys no proper leadership status within ignore them in any analysis of religious Fadila Party) did with some success in traditional or indeed Khomeinist Shi’ism. leaderships among pro-Iranian groups 2003: use a diploma of ijtihad (the ability of Iraqi Shià. to interpret Islamic law and issue fatawa) As far as the Promised Day Brigades signed by a relatively obscure cleric to themselves are concerned, their After having fended off a challenge obtain a popular following and climb to website features pictures of the two from Iran’s leader, Ali Khamenei, in the a position of a certain influence on the canonized Sadrs—Muhammad Baqir early 1990s, the Grand Ayatollah Ali Iraqi scene. This in turn could produce and Muhammad Muhammad Sadiq— al-Sistani in Najaf today remains the a succession scenario after al-Sistani as an indication of the origin of dominant global figure within Shi’ism. in which several clerics strive for their allegiances. Many of the public This has forced some players, such as prominence before someone emerges in statements of Moqtada al-Sadr are SCIRI/ISCI, to tone down their ties a preeminent position. also reproduced, in particular when to the Iranian establishment (which they refer to political issues such as disagrees with al-Sistani on the key All of this suggests that the succession the question of the legitimacy of armed question of the extent to which the struggle after al-Sistani may be a messy resistance to the U.S. military presence clergy should be actively integrated affair, with implications for the Special in Iraq. Importantly, unlike both into state institutions). It has prompted Groups. When al-Sistani dies, leaders Kataib Hizb Allah and Asaib Ahl al- others to try to criticize al-Sistani on such as Moqtada al-Sadr and Qais Haq—and typical of the original Sadrist a more paradigmatic basis, as seen al-Khazali must once more consider movement—the Promised Day Brigades in the case of the Sadrists (who have their options. To some extent, this will website does not contain references to introduced a distinction between their be a choice between becoming Iraqi any living ulterior religious authority own “articulate” clergy and al-Sistani Nasrallahs or Fadlallahs: following the in Iran other than Moqtada al-Sadr pattern of Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon himself. This makes them more similar 7 The Promised Day Brigades website is accessible at and his Hizb Allah party, they could to the indigenous Sadrist movement www.almaoaod.com. tone down their clerical aspirations and

7 september 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 9 instead focus on politics and/or armed If this trend grows stronger, it would struggle based on complete loyalty to the create an ideological superstructure to AQIM Returns in Force in Iranian leadership; conversely, if there much of what the Da`wa Party has done Northern Algeria is no obvious successor to al-Sistani and in practical politics in Iraq since the a more level playing field emerges, there disappointing parliamentary election By Andrew Lebovich may also be room for ulama with limited result in March 2010. Returning to a scholarly credentials (like Moqtada al- sectarian definition of politics with on august 26, 2011, al-Qaìda in the Sadr) to try to copy what Fadlallah did open Iranian and tacit American Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) deployed with some success in Lebanon—namely, support, using dirty tricks in an attempt two suicide bombers to attack to become a regional marja (Shià source to manipulate the election result, and Algeria’s premier military academy, of emulation) with some distance from holding on to power through ever more the Académie Militaire Interarmes Iran. authoritarian means all seem more (AMIA) at Cherchell, killing 18 people, closely related to the kind of politics including at least three foreign military Conclusion practiced by the current Iranian regime officers.1 The dual bombing, which Prior to the death of Muhammad than what the Da`wa were trying to struck the officers’ mess hall just after Hussein Fadlallah in Lebanon in 2010, accomplish in Iraq in 2008-2010, the breaking of the Ramadan fast, made many members of Iraqi Prime Minister when they clearly tried to play a role major headlines in Algeria, and earned Nuri al-Maliki’s Da`wa Party emulated as Iraqi nationalists. In this kind of sharp condemnations from the United him as their marja. To some extent, scenario, the religious allegiances of States, the European Union, the African this was seen as a deliberate policy by the Special Groups become a marginal Union, France, Italy and the United the Da`wa since the 1980s aimed at question since Iran instead would use Kingdom.2 AQIM’s statement claiming signaling greater distance from Iran its influence within the mainstream credit for the attack called Cherchell “the and the Iranian concept of wilayat al-faqih Shià Islamist parties in Iraq, such as most important symbol of the Algerian than their competitors in SCIRI/ISCI. the Da`wa Party, as the primary tool to regime” and blamed the government for The Da`wa Party often stressed the promote its own interests. its “support of the regime of [Libyan choice of marja as an individual and not dictator Colonel Muàmmar] Qadhafi,”3 a party-controlled act. Dr. Reidar Visser is a Research Fellow at referring to charges made by Libyan the Norwegian Institute of International rebels and others of Algerian military Since the death of Fadlallah, however, Affairs in Oslo and editor of the Iraq website support to Qadhafi, as well as the alleged there has been an interesting growth in www.historiae.org as well as of the Iraq blog presence of Algerian “mercenaries” the number of news stories suggesting gulfanalysis.wordpress.com. His writings on fighting against the Libyan rebels.4 that Da`wa Party members could be the subject of federalism and regionalism in gravitating toward Mahmud Hashemi southern Iraq and Iraqi nationalism among The attack was alarming not just because Shahrudi—a member of the Iranian the Shi’ites include the monograph Basra, the of the important symbolic value of the guardian council of Iraqi origin—as their Failed Gulf State: Separatism and Nationalism Cherchell academy, but also because it new marja. To a certain extent, the media in Southern Iraq (Transaction Publishers, was the third successful suicide bombing presenting these stories are of the kind 2006), An Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones and fourth attempted suicide bombing that is in the habit of publishing slander of a Federal Democracy? (Edited with Gareth in Algeria in a two-month span, after about the Da`wa, and some of what Stansfield, Columbia University Press, the country had seen a steady decline in has been said about the matter should 2007), and A Responsible End? The United such attacks after August 2008.5 Yet the probably be taken lightly. Nonetheless, States and the Iraqi Transition, 2005–2010 sudden resurgence in suicide bombings it is interesting that several Shià (Just World Books, 2010). Dr. Visser studied in northern Algeria is not an anomaly; sources of a more neutral category seem history and comparative politics at the rather, it is part of a wider upward trend to corroborate these rumors. University of Bergen and received a Ph.D. in in terrorist violence in the area, one that Middle Eastern Studies from the University follows several years of decline. Any move from Fadlallah to Shahrudi of Oxford. by the Da`wa would be a giant leap of enormous political significance. Whereas Fadlallah was a critic of the 1 “18 Dead in Algeria Military School Bombing: Minis- monolithism of the Iranian revolution try,” Agence France-Presse, August 27, 2011. and a defender of a more pluralistic 2 “Washington, Londres, Paris, Rome, l’UE et l’UA con- vision of wilayat al-faqih, Shahrudi is a damnent, ‘Il n’y a aucune justification à cette violence,’” scholar of the Khomeinist tradition who Liberté, August 29, 2011. is seen as close to the current Iranian 3 Béatrice Khadige, “L’Algérie visée par Aqmi pour son leader, Ali Khamenei. Since Shahrudi soutien presume à Kadhafi,” Agence France-Presse, Au- takes a doctrinaire approach to wilayat gust 26, 2011. al-faqih, the whole point of “individual 4 Despite these charges, the rebel Transitional National choice” with respect to the marjaiyya Council (TNC) has produced no firm evidence of Alge- for Da`wa members would fast become rian support or the presence of Algerian fighters with somewhat academic since loyalty to Qadhafi’s forces. Shahrudi would automatically translate 5 Kamel Omar, “Le retour inquiètant des kamikazes,” El- into loyalty to the Iranian revolution. Watan, August 28, 2011.

8 september 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 9

This article seeks to explain and pattern of violence had gradually The months of May and June saw a move contextualize the attack trends, provide changed, as the organization became back toward the use of IEDs interspersed possible explanations for the bloody focused on lower-casualty attacks, often with armed assaults on police and army revival, and deal with the potential using remote-detonated Improvised posts (seven IED attacks, one ambush, political consequences for Algeria’s Explosive Devices (IEDs) and gun and two armed assaults, and a rifle assault). système, which manages to be both knife attacks (although the number of Of the 11 attacks in these two months, resilient and brittle more than a decade “high casualty” and suicide attacks also seven targeted the Algerian Armée after the country emerged from a increased during this period, Rogan Nationale Populaire (ANP), two targeted harrowing civil war. noted that overall violence was slightly police, and one each targeted a group of less than in previous years).9 While civilians and municipal guards. From Escalation of Violence in the North violence picked up again in 2009, by April to June, militants executed at Descended from the Salafist Group for 2010 both the number of bomb and gun least 17 attacks. Preaching and Combat (GSPC), AQIM attacks had dropped precipitously.10 has a long pedigree in northern Algeria, The months of July and August, especially the part of the Kabylie region In 2011, however, violence returned meanwhile, witnessed at least 23 that became known during the country’s rapidly to northern Algeria, with attacks, including 13 IEDs, six gun civil war as the “Triangle of Death,” more attacks and casualties than in attacks, and the four suicide bombing comprising the provinces of Bouira, Tizi previous years.11 Basic data gleaned attempts. Nearly half targeted ANP Ouzou and Boumerdes.6 Mountainous, from the Francophone journals El- convoys, patrols and bases, while police heavily forested, ethnically diverse, and Watan and Liberté, as well as consulting convoys and posts, gendarmerie patrols, difficult to control throughout both the Ennahar and Echorouk,12 reveals that and civilians were also targeted. colonial and post-colonial period, this attacks suddenly picked up in April of Additionally, this period saw two area has formed a key center of GSPC and this year, as a coordinated assault on attacks against local militia members then AQIM activity, and it is believed an army post at Azazga in Tizi Ouzou known as patriotes, who were first armed to shelter the group’s central command, Province killed 17 soldiers, while by the military during the civil war but including AQIM leader Abdelmalek ambushes and gun-battles against have been progressively disarmed in the Droukdel (also known as Abu Musàb gendarmes, soldiers and police officers in past few years.13 Àbd al-Wadud). Nominally divided Thénia (Boumerdes Province), Ammal into four zones encompassing northern (Boumerdes Province), and Bouderbala Yet of all these attacks, the rash of Algeria and the Sahel,7 the borders near Lakhdaria (Bouira Province) killed suicide bombings has caused the most between AQIM zones of activity have at least seven, while the use of IEDs disquiet in northern Algeria. The first increasingly become restricted to against municipal guard and police was a dual suicide attack on July 17 Kabylie in the north and a broad swath patrols killed at least eight. against the police station in the town of of territory touching Mauritania, Mali Bordj Menaïel, which killed two people, and Niger. followed by a failed attack disrupted outside of Algiers that resulted in While GSPC activity increased the deaths of three AQIM members throughout 2005 and into 2006,8 (including Abdelkahar Belhadj, the son it was the use of dramatic suicide of prominent and oft-jailed Islamist bombings, including two particularly leader Ali Belhadj), a suicide car deadly and prominent attacks in April 9 Hanna Rogan, “Violent Trends in Algeria Since 9/11,” bombing on a police headquarters in and December 2007, combined with CTC Sentinel 1:12 (2008). Tizi Ouzou that wounded 33 people on accelerated violence in Kabylie, Algiers 10 Jacques Roussellier, “Terrorism in North Africa and August 14, and finally the Cherchell and to the west of the city, that truly the Sahel: Al-Qa’ida’s Franchise or Freelance?” Middle attack on August 26. announced the group’s presence within East Institute, August 2011. al-Qaìda. Yet even by the latter part of 11 Djaffar Tamani, “Retour de la Peur en Kabylie,” El- These attacks are notable and 2008, as noted by Norwegian scholar Watan, April 19, 2011; “La Kabylie vit un de ses étés les concerning for several reasons. Hanna Rogan and others, the group’s plus chauds,” Le Temps d’Algérie, August 19, 2011; Hadjer First, they show that AQIM units, Guenanfa, “Août, le mois le plus meurtrier depuis le dé- or katibat, in the north still have 6 The region east of Algiers is considered the “Central but de l’année,” Tout Sur Algérie, August 31, 2011. access to willing suicide bombers as Zone” of AQIM activity, one of four such zones simplified 12 For the purposes of this survey, this author consid- well as the explosives needed to create from the nine zones of activity used by the GSPC as well ered attacks that included shootings, bomb attacks, mass carnage. Reports indicate that all as the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). See Camille Tawil, ambushes, and assaults on posts or security structures. three suicide bombings may have been “The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb: Ex- Rogan, however, used a somewhat more inclusive data committed by the Katibat al-Arkam, pansion in the Sahel and Challenges from Within Jihad- set, taking into account actions such as robberies, false while the failed Algiers bombers also 14 ist Circles,” The Jamestown Foundation, April 2010. roadblocks, raids on villages and more. This author’s es- are said to have belonged to al-Arkam. 7 The Sahel refers to the band of semi-arid land border- timates are not meant to be conclusive or comprehensive, ing the Sahara. and are certainly lower than the number of actual inci- 13 Tamani; Salima Tlemçani, “Le général à la retraite 8 Ayman al-Zawahiri announced the merger of the GSPC dents that could be attributed to AQIM or other violent Abdelkader Maïza ‘La recrudescence des attentats est and al-Qaìda in a video released September 11, 2006, groups. The data, however, does give a strong sense of due aux événements qui se sont succeed depuis 2006,” and the re-born AQIM released a video under its new both the trend in number of incidents, as well as the tar- El-Watan, September 4, 2011. name in January 2007. gets and tools chosen by militants. 14 M.T., “L’ANP frappée au Coeur,” Liberté, August 28,

9 september 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 9

Al-Arkam has historically been combined arms operations (known as Regardless, there seems to be general known, along with Katibat al-Nour, ratissages) with more subtle methods, agreement that the security situation for producing suicide bombers in the ranging from concentric circles of in northern Algeria has been more north,15 and al-Arkam was, according roadblocks around cities and sensitive permissive this year than in previous to some sources, responsible for both locations and even strict controls on years, potentially allowing AQIM the major suicide bombings in 2007. It has the distribution of fertilizer within breathing room to rebuild some of its shown that it can still engage in major villages.19 These methods were so arsenal and plan new attacks. attacks despite the death of its “brain,” successful, according to observers, Bourihane Kamel, in February 2011 in that by mid-2010 Algerian security Instability in Libya an ambush staged by Algerian security forces were “increasingly regarding the Since March 2011, Algerian and other forces.16 situation as a police problem, rather African leaders have struck an alarmist than a military problem,” in the words tone about the prospect of the unrest in Second, the outcomes of the attacks of Stephen Tankel, an expert on militant neighboring Libya—then in the throes could have been far worse. While the groups who has conducted field research of NATO bombardment and armed Cherchell bombing was the deadliest in Algeria.20 While it is unclear what rebellion—fueling instability in Algeria. single attack in several years in northern security practices on the ground may The arguments are two-fold. They argue Algeria, both the Bordj Menaïel and Tizi or may not have changed by 2011, the that the unstable situation and armed Ouzou bombings involved cars packed security services have faced charges of conflict in Libya will encourage jihadist with explosives that were stopped becoming lax in the aftermath of the action and the movement of people just short of reaching their intended most recent violence.21 In response to back and forth. They also suggest that targets.17 Moreover, in the case of the the recent attacks, Algerian forces have AQIM could gain possession of arms planned Algiers bombing, there is no again begun aggressively conducting stolen from Libyan stocks.23 Evidence telling if security forces would have sweeps in Tizi Ouzou, Boumerdes, and has since emerged that surface-to-air been able to stop the truck, again Bouira, reinstituted efforts to control missiles and other unspecified weapons packed with explosives, had one of the automobile routes, and increased have been looted from Libyan stores, bombers not thought better of the plan coverage of possible targets, all possible weapons that, according to European and tipped off the authorities. indications that the security forces had officials, have fallen into the hands of grown complacent, as some sources AQIM, although the concern has been Finally, these attacks show that the have alleged.22 focused on AQIM’s southern units organization can still attack outside obtaining weapons, rather than the of its Kabylie stronghold, while also Others, notably members of the northern ones.24 adopting new tactics, such as the use country’s military and journals like El- of motorcycles and explosive belts Watan that are known to be sympathetic Algerian press sources have argued in addition to car bombs in suicide to the security services, have rejected that the increased aggressiveness and attacks.18 accusations of lapses in behavior and deadliness of AQIM attacks have been enforcement in favor of critiques against due in part to the situation in Libya.25 Factors Explaining the Rise in Violence the way the government of Abdelaziz These comments from official sources, While any explanation for the rapid Bouteflika has dealt with terrorism. however, could have been motivated by increase in violence since April based Notably, these arguments have focused a desire by the Algerian government, on publicly-available information would on Bouteflika’s 2006 reconciliation who have pointedly opposed Western be at best informed speculation, it plan, which provides the possibility for intervention in Libya, to show that is possible to trace some of the most repentant terrorists to receive amnesty continued unrest leads to disorder in likely factors contributing to northern for their crimes. Some, such as the former the region. Algeria’s bloody spring and summer. commander of Algeria’s 1st Military Region, Abdelkader Maïza, have argued It is, however, impossible to dismiss Changes in Algerian Security Practices that the progressive dismantling and the possibility that some of the weapons After being surprised by the sudden disarming of local patriotes and militias leaking into the Sahel could have made virulence of AQIM attacks in 2007, known as the groupes de légitimes défense their way north, and AQIM attacks in Algerian security forces slowly chipped (GLD), who have faced sustained attack the north since April have certainly away at AQIM’s katibat, especially from militant groups since the 1990s, made use of high quantities of explosives in Kabylie, combining an increased has contributed to a security vacuum and arms, in a manner not seen for security force presence and aggressive in the area that has allowed violence to

increase. 23 “Le Tchadien Déby affirme qu’Aqmi s’est emparé de 2011; Mélanie Matarese, “Alger sous la ménace terror- missiles en Libye,” Agence France-Presse, March 25, iste,” Le Figaro, July 27, 2011. 2011; Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, “Does AQIM 15 Tawil. 19 Personal interview, Stephen Tankel, August 2011. Have Some Libyan Missiles?” CNN, March 30, 2011; 16 Neïla B., “Le dernier cerveau des attentats-suicides 20 Ibid. “Security Official: Al-Qaida Exploiting Libya Unrest to abattu à Bouira,” Liberté, February 6, 2011. 21 Tlemçani. Acquire Weapons,” Reuters, April 4, 2011. 17 “Droukdel tente briser l’étau resserré sur ses fiefs ter- 22 Ibid.; Walid Ramzi, “Algeria Responds to Ramadan 24 “Libya: al-Qaeda Acquires Weapons,” Telegraph, Sep- rorises,” El Khabar, July 17, 2011. Terror Wave,” Magharebia, September 2, 2011; M’hamed tember 5, 2011. 18 M.T., “Les terroristes algériens galvanizes par la Houaoura, “Pourquoi l’académie militaire était facile- 25 M.T., “Les terroristes algériens galvanizes par la guerre en Libye,” Liberté, August 29, 2011. ment ciblée,” El-Watan, September 2, 2011. guerre en Libye.”

10 september 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 9 some time before. Yet this explanation northern AQIM commanders reached out Yet the same factors that create is predicated both on the availability of and “demanded a growing contribution apprehension also limit the possible Libyan arms in the Sahel and the ability from their Saharan affiliates,” according reach and opportunism of members of (and willingness) of AQIM’s southern to AQIM expert and scholar Jean-Pierre Algeria’s politico-military elite that may units to move weapons north. Filiu.31 This has occurred in a period want to capitalize on the violence for when AQIM in the south was becoming other gain. The military and other forces Support from Sahelian AQIM Units more involved in kidnappings and have already come under harsh criticism Any weapons that have come into enmeshed in criminal networks.32 for being unable to contain the violence AQIM’s possession have likely either despite already having a strong security traveled through southern Tunisia In short, whether the increase in presence in Kabylie, while suspicions (where suspected AQIM fighters have violence in northern Algeria is due to and accusations of the manipulation of clashed with local security forces an influx of weapons from the south, militant groups dating back to the civil multiple times)26 or through Sahelian or a regeneration in capabilities based war—rumors that, though unverifiable, countries such as Niger.27 Yet while on reduced pressure from security persist to this day—have also caused analysts generally perceive AQIM’s forces and more freedom of movement, opposition political members and others southern and northern factions as being it is likely that AQIM’s units in the to question a possible military role in divided,28 the separation of north and Sahel have played a contributing role the violence, despite a lack of evidence south is not necessarily absolute. in the north’s resurgence as a supplier to support the claims.35 Memories of of arms and other assistance. At this what happened the last time the country AQIM’s southern units, led most stage, however, it is difficult to say was under military rule make it unlikely prominently by Abdelhamid Abu whether the increase in violence is that senior officers would be able to Zeid, Yahya Djouadi, and Mokhtar due to a sudden flow of aid from the make much headway, at least publicly, Belmokhtar, as well as a host of other south, or if it is simply another cyclical in wresting greater authority away from small unit commanders, are known most violent outburst in the north after a the civilian government.36 often for their criminal enterprises, period of rebuilding, again potentially including various trafficking activities with Sahelian assistance. As with much Regardless of what emerges from the and high-profile kidnappings of pertaining to the Sahel and the internal infighting and tension in Algeria’s ruling Westerners for ransom. Yet Abu Zeid dynamics of individual AQIM units classes, it seems likely that AQIM’s and Djouadi are both regarded as being and leaders, however, the information violence will continue to increase in close to Droukdel, and as one specialist at hand does not allow for a definitive the north. While the organization’s told the author, northern and southern judgment. new activity does not approach its AQIM “may not get along and they may influence during its prime years, this be on different or personal agendas, Terrorism within Algeria’s Political Context new push may nonetheless force the however they all have proven that For many in the north, the surge Algerian government to reconsider they can work together.” He added, in bloodshed has brought back bad how it confronts the group, and cause “Belmokhtar and others continue to memories not just of the last decade, the wider community of observers to contribute to the northern commanders. but also the civil war. Indeed, the rethink how they view an organization That is indisputable.”29 violence and the outspoken positions long thought to be on the ropes in against Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s security Algeria’s mountainous north. Moreover, an ebb and flow of violence policies by some former officers brought in the north combined with increased whispers about the possible return of Andrew Lebovich is a policy analyst with the activity in the east and south fits a the “éradicateurs,” members of the security National Security Studies Program at the historical pattern that began with the services who argued against any type of New America Foundation, and co-edits the GSPC. As the GSPC struggled in the amnesty or reconciliation agreement blog al-Wasat. north after the turn of the century, it with terrorists.33 This nervousness was the mass kidnapping and ransoming is compounded by the tenuous and of more than 30 European tourists in limited reform process being pursued 2003 that helped breathe new life into by Algeria’s aging (and rumored to be the group.30 The same pattern emerged ailing) leader at a time when Algeria’s in 2008 and 2009 when increasingly nascent protest movement has been geographically and financially isolated suppressed by a number of factors, including a lingering memory of the 34 26 “Tunisie: 2 membres présumés d’Aqmi arrêtés avec instability of the civil war. une ceinture d’explosives,” Agence France-Presse, May Spring,” Washington Post, April 9, 2011. 15, 2011. 31 Jean-Pierre Filiu, “Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb: 35 Bensaada; Claire Spencer, “Algeria: North Africa’s 27 “Niger: Aqmi traquée, success pour les nouvelles au- A Case Study in the Opportunism of Global Jihad,” CTC Exception?” Chatham House Expert Comment, August torités,” Radio France Internationale, June 18, 2011. Sentinel 3:4 (2010). 30, 2011. 28 Rogan. 32 Ibid. 36 The Algerian political system is of course more com- 29 Personal interview, Andrew Black, September 2011. 33 Mohamed Tahar Bensaada, “Algérie: La recrudes- plicated than this, and should be thought of more as 30 Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, “The cence des attentats terroristes annonce-t-elle le retour des competing influence networks or “clans” rather than a Many Faces of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Ge- ‘éradicateurs’?” Le Quotidien d’Algérie, August 29, 2011. specific civilian/military divide. Yet historically one can neva Centre for Security Policy, May 2011. 34 Anthony Faiola, “In Algeria, a Chill in the Arab speak of periods of “civilian” and “military” rule.

11 september 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 9

blamed the violence on Chinese only other terrorist attack in Xinjiang Violence Escalates in authorities forcefully breaking up a between July 2009 and July 2011 was China’s Xinjiang Province “peaceful demonstration.”4 in August 2010 when three Uighur men drove an explosive-laden tricycle By Jacob Zenn As for the Kashgar attack, both into a patrol of police officers in Aksu, sides disagreed over whether it was killing seven.8 Second, China’s naming in july 2011, two violent incidents in terrorism. China alleged that Pakistani- of Pakistan is the first time it has cited a Hotan and Kashgar of China’s Xinjiang trained Uighur terrorists from the East specific country as a source of terrorism Province highlighted the combustible Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)5 in Xinjiang.9 In the past, China blamed relationship between Uighurs1 were responsible, while the World Xinjiang’s violence on ETIM, Hizb and Han Chinese. A comparison of Uighur Congress argued that if the al-Tahrir (HT), and World Uighur the two incidents also shows why attacks were conducted by Uighurs, then Congress leader Rebia Kadeer, but China assessing terrorist acts in Xinjiang it was only because they were brought never implicated other countries, and requires a nuanced understanding of to despair by “years of repression by especially not its “all weather friend.”10 the security threat in the province. the Chinese government” and without A number of violent incidents in any other peaceful way to oppose the Most violent incidents involving Xinjiang are homegrown and related to government.6 Uighurs attacking Han Chinese or Uighur grievances about the Chinese Chinese institutions reflect varying government’s policies, while other acts The two incidents, which show no degrees of both the government’s and of violence show a stronger relationship relationship to each other besides the pro-Uighur groups’ claims and often between the attackers and jihadist fact that they took place in the same fall somewhere in the middle. As China ideology and operational tactics from month, are significant for two reasons. develops Xinjiang as a Central Asian abroad. First, they represent the first extended economic, trade and transportation hub outbreak of violence in Xinjiang since while maintaining travel restrictions on The Chinese government almost always the Urumqi riots in July 2009.7 The Uighurs and assimilatory in-migration, attributes attacks in Xinjiang to jihadist language and cultural policies, local and ideology and foreign-linked terrorist external factors—including influences groups, while pro-Uighur organizations 4 “Uighurs to Stage Demonstration in Vienna to Protest from Pakistan and Afghanistan, which almost always explain violence in Hotan Incident,” press release, World Uighur Congress, border Xinjiang—will play a part in Xinjiang as a local byproduct of the July 28, 2011. Uighur militancy. government’s policies. For example, the 5 The East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) was Chinese government called the Hotan founded in 1993 by ethnic Uighurs, and its earliest mem- Hotan: A Protest Gone Wrong incident a “severe terrorist attack,”2 bers are believed to have received protection and train- If what happened in Hotan on July 18 while the World Uighur Congress3 ing with the Taliban and al-Qa`ida in Afghanistan. The was an act of terrorism, the attackers ETIM is also believed to have been responsible for sev- chose a new target and strategy. In 1 The Uighurs are a Sunni Muslim and ethnic Turkic eral small-scale attacks within China in the late 1990s contrast to the Kashgar attacks on people whose language is similar to Uzbek. Since 1949, and early 2000s, including the bombing of a bus in July 30-31, which involved multiple the unprecedented rate of Han Chinese migration to the Beijing in 1997. The ETIM was designated as a terrorist explosions and coordinated attacks on Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region has altered the de- organization by the U.S. Department of State in 2002 pedestrians at dining areas frequented mographic balance of the province in favor of the Han, for plotting an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek, by Han Chinese, the Hotan incident 11 such that any future independent Uighur state in Xinji- Kyrgyzstan. After its leader Abdul Haq al-Turkistani took place at a police station —although ang will be virtually impossible to achieve. Despite the was killed by a suspected CIA drone strike in Miranshah some sources suggest it was at a local 12 province’s economic boom since the 1990s, the loss of the of Waziristan in Pakistan in 2003, the ETIM may have neighborhood affairs office. Uighur and Sunni Muslim character of the region and faded into extinction since no terrorist has claimed an at- the relative prosperity of the province’s Han compared to tack under the name of ETIM since al-Turkistani’s death. the less wealthy Uighurs has caused some Uighurs—per- The ETIM, however, may have reemerged in 2008 under and China responded with a heavy crackdown on Ui- haps influenced by the Taliban, Islamic Movement of Uz- the new banner of the Turkistan Islamic Party, a group ghurs involved in the riots, detaining hundreds, issuing bekistan (IMU), al-Qai`da, and other jihadist groups—to which has the same goals for the “liberation” of Xinjiang long-term prison sentences, and sentencing more than 10 embrace terrorism as a means to expel the Chinese from from Chinese control and has claimed attacks in China Uighurs to death. China also cut off internet access, mo- Xinjiang. and issued propaganda videos starting in 2008. bile phone messaging services, and international phone 2 Shao Wei, “Attack on Police Station was Long- 6 “Uighur Leader: Hotan Incident Was Not a Terrorist calls in Urumqi for nearly one year after the riots. Planned,” China Daily, July 21, 2011. Attack,” World Uighur Congress, July 21, 2011. 8 “Xinjiang Continues to Face Threats of Terrorism,” 3 The Munich-based World Uighur Congress (WUC) 7 On July 5, 2009, hundreds of Uighurs protested at the China Daily, September 11, 2010. was formed in 2004 from a collection of various Uighur Grand Bazaar in Urumqi against the beating to death 9 “China Blames ‘Friend’ Pak for Terror Attack,” Times groups in exile, including the Uighur American Associa- of two Uighur laborers in Guangdong by Han Chinese of India, August 2, 2011. tion (UAA). Its leader since 2006 has been Rebia Kadeer, co-workers. The incident was recorded on an attacker’s 10 Ibid. a prominent businesswoman from Xinjiang. China la- mobile phone and later disseminated among Xinjiang’s 11 “Hotan and Kashgar Terrorist Attacks,” Sina.com, bels the organization as “splittist” and accuses it of being Uighurs. The protestors clashed with Chinese riot police, August 16, 2011. linked to terrorist groups with aims in Xinjiang, while who the Uighurs accused of using excessive force, and 12 In fact, in a city like Hotan, a police office generally the WUC maintains it is dedicated to promoting peace- for nearly a week violence spread to Han and Uighur ci- contains a banshichu, which is responsible for registra- ful, non-violent, and democratic means to determine the vilians in Urumqi who took up arms against each other. tion of identity cards, residence permits, and passports. political future of East Turkistan. Approximately 200 people died as a result of the fighting See “Understanding the Khotan Incident in Local Con-

12 september 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 9

While police stations are generally stormed the police station immediately The attack began on the evening of July considered terrorist targets anywhere, to gain the element of surprise. 30 when a car bomb detonated on a street this would be the first time terrorists lined with pedestrians and food stalls in Xinjiang have made a police station Regardless of the identity and goals of frequented by Han Chinese. Shortly the main target in an attack. In the past, the Uighur protestors, who are believed after, two Uighur men hijacked a truck, attacks have only targeted police in to have been from out of town based killed its driver, and then steered the the field, such as in Aksu in 2010 and on their accents,16 the choice to protest truck onto the sidewalk and into the food Kashgar in 2008. The attack is also at or attack the police station hints of stalls and then stabbed people at random. unusual because—as both the Chinese local concerns, rather than an attack government and pro-Uighur groups orchestrated in the name of Uighur On July 31, another attack occurred agree—it began as a protest, with the independence or with backing from on a popular dining and shopping World Uighur Congress alleging that foreign jihadist organizations. This street for Han Chinese. After two the protestors were calling for the incident also resembles the two-day blasts at one restaurant, as many release of Uighurs who were already demonstrations in Hotan on March as 10 Uighur men shot and stabbed detained at the police station.13 The 23-24, 2008 that China blamed on people indiscriminately, including the protest then evolved into a drawn-out the “Three Evil Forces (terrorism, firefighters who came to the rescue. hostage crisis in which as many as 14 separatism, and extremism)”17 and Overall, more than 10 civilians and eight of the Uighur protestors and two Han Hizb al-Tahrir (HT),18 but that were attackers were killed and more than 40 Chinese hostages, one security officer, largely about local concerns, such as others wounded in the two days. and one policeman were killed.14 government campaigns to abolish the wearing of headscarves and the arrest The attacks coincided with the two Rarely does a protest spiral into a and killing of a prominent Uighur days prior to the start of Ramadan and hostage-taking incident without some man.19 are strikingly similar to an attack in prior planning and coordination. The Kashgar in August 2008. In that attack, presence of an alleged group of 14 The Hotan incident should be two Uighur men from Kashgar armed protestors, however, does not match a viewed in perspective. While the with explosives, machetes, and a gun typical terrorist operation considering protestors may have been influenced rammed a dump truck into a line of 70 the chief of the police station’s account or even inspired by foreign jihadist Chinese police officers jogging near a organizations, any associations were police compound and then attacked the probably indirect. This incident is best officers with machetes.21 The two men “In fact, targeting seen as somewhere between criminal were arrested during the fight after civilians—instead of violence stemming from a protest over killing 16 officers.22 rational concerns and “an organized police—for the first time and planned violent terrorist attack In the 2008 attack, China did not lay may be the result of more aimed at a police station,” as Xinjiang’s blame on anyone but the two men from chairperson asserted in the media.20 Kashgar and only mentioned that it extreme elements from had received intelligence reports about Pakistan influencing Kashgar: “Crying Wolf” No More potential ETIM attacks in the lead up The attacks in Kashgar on July 30-31, to the Olympics.23 After the July 2011 terrorist operations in 2011 have the signature of previous attack, however, China stated clearly China.” terrorist attacks in Xinjiang, notably that terrorists trained in ETIM camps in Kashgar in 2008 and Aksu in 2010. in Pakistan were responsible24 and that While the details of the latest attack in the attackers adhered to “extremist Kashgar are hard to corroborate, what is ideology” and advocated “jihad.”25 of the incident. He said that he “shouted clear is that the attackers chose a purely in Uighur, asking the rioters to stop… civilian target: Han Chinese diners and Based on China’s prior allegations of and to settle their dispute peacefully… pedestrians. HT’s connections to Hotan protests But they kept throwing home-made in 2008 and that Rebia Kadeer Molotov cocktails and rocks at us.”15 masterminded the July 2009 riots in This implies that there was indeed a 16 “14 Rioters Shot Dead in Hotan Attack,” China Daily, dispute before the attack, after which July 20, 2011. 21 “Xinjiang Police Informed About the Latest Violent the situation became violent. In normal 17 “Official Confirms a Separatist Disturbance Incident in Attacks in Kashgar, Xinjiang,” Xinhua, August 5, 2008. terrorist attacks, the terrorists would March in Hotan, Xinjiang,” China News, April 4, 2008. 22 Andrew Jacobs, “Ambush in China Raises Concerns not have engaged the police in a dispute 18 “According to the Law Hotan City To Stop ‘Hizb al- as Olympics Near,” New York Times, August 5, 2008. before the attack, and would have Tahrir’s’ Planned Illegal Demonstrations,” Tianshan. 23 “16 Police Killed in China Border Attack,” CBS News, net, April 4, 2008. February 11, 2009. text,” Xinjiang Review, July 25, 2011. 19 “Muslim ‘Extremists’ Attempt Uprising in Western 24 “Tensions High After Unrest in China,” Dawn, Au- 13 “Four Dead in Police Station Clash in China’s Xinji- China: Govt,” Sinodaily.com, April 2, 2008. gust 2, 2011; “Terrorist Plot Suspected in Violent Attack ang,” Agence France-Presse, July 18, 2011. 20 “Details of the Incident in Hotan, Xinjiang: Vio- on Police in West China’s Xinjiang,” Xinhua, August 4, 14 Xi Tianran and Liu Linlin, “14 Uighur Terrorists lent Demonstrators Held Up the Flag of Separation,” 2008. Killed in Hotan,” Global Times, July 21, 2011. July 19, 2011, available at http://mil.huanqiu.com/chi- 25 “China Blames Deadly Xinjiang Attack on Separat- 15 Ibid. na/2011-07/1830770.html. ists,” BBC, August 1, 2011.

13 september 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 9

Urumqi—which were actually sparked out a spate of bombings in China in the about terrorism and foreign links by a mobile phone video that showed run up to the Olympics, including on are probably correct with regards to two Uighur men being beaten to death buses in Kunming and Shanghai and a the July 2011 Kashgar attacks, not all by Han Chinese men in a Guangdong toy building in Wenzhou.29 A Chinese man, acts of violence by Uighurs should be factory—China’s claims about training however, confessed to the Kunming considered terrorism or linked to the camps in Pakistan cannot be taken at bombings,30 the Shanghai bombings TIP, ETIM, and other Pakistan-based face value.26 Yet this time the benefit were reportedly caused by a passenger’s groups. As the July 2011 Hotan protest- of the doubt swings in China’s favor. inflammable goods,31 and the Wenzhou turned-hostage-taking and the earlier The timing of the attacks on the eve attack was reported to have taken March 2008 Hotan protest show, of Ramadan; the “ramming” method, place at the site of a gambling ring and Uighurs frustrated by China’s policies which is typical of attacks in Xinjiang; carried out by a man angry over his will organize and protest, sometimes the civilian targets; and especially a gambling debt.32 While the previous peacefully and sometimes violently. corroborative post-attack video from the TIP claims may have been true and Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP)27 point to the Chinese cover-up brilliant, the TIP It may be impossible to know whether a terrorist attack and the likelihood of a still provided no concrete evidence of it in Hotan the protestors were provoked connection to Pakistan-based militants. carrying out the attacks. The video with by authorities to violence, intent on the In fact, targeting civilians—instead Tiliwaldi, however, provides a high hostage-taking from the start of the of police—for the first time may be level of certainty of TIP involvement protest, or whether they were affiliated the result of more extreme elements that is unmatched by prior videos. with domestic or foreign-based terrorist from Pakistan influencing terrorist groups, but one way to assess violent operations in China. There is further evidence that ETIM or incidents in Xinjiang is to look at the the TIP is actively plotting attacks like target location and victims, the method The video, which was released by the the one in Kashgar. A string of plots of attack, the timing, the attackers’ TIP in late August, shows one of the uncovered in 2010 include: a three- identities, and whether any group Kashgar attackers, Memtieli Tiliwaldi, person ETIM cell with one Uighur man issued a credible statement claiming in a Pakistani training camp wrestling that was broken up in Norway; two responsibility. In Hotan, the evidence is with other fighters. Tiliwaldi was killed Uighurs who were sentenced to 10-years not definitive that the protestors were by Xinjiang police in a corn field days imprisonment in the United Arab intent on a terrorist hostage-taking. after the attack.28 This is the most Emirates for plotting to blow up a dragon The Kashgar attack, however, has all concrete evidence ever introduced that statue outside of a Chinese-owned retail the hallmarks of a terrorist act. links attacks in Xinjiang to the ETIM or shopping complex in Dubai in 2008;33 TIP in Pakistan. and Chinese authorities reported that Jacob Zenn is an international security they arrested 10 members of an ETIM consultant and graduate of Georgetown In the past, TIP videos were largely an cell in Xinjiang that was responsible University Law Center’s Global Law Scholars attempt to establish a pedigree for the for the 2008 Kashgar attack, as well as Program and the Johns Hopkins-Nanjing group, which may have been incapable attacks in Aksu, Kucha, and Hotan.34 University Center for Chinese and American of actually carrying out attacks in China. Studies. He has also studied Uighur at In 2008, a TIP commander, Seyfullah, Conclusion Xinjiang University in Urumqi and was claimed in a video that the TIP carried The similarities between the terrorist based in Kashgar at the time of writing this attacks in Kashgar in 2008, Aksu in article. 26 “Urumqi Riots Force Hu Jintao to Cancel G-8 Trip,” 2010, and Kashgar in July 2011 show Rediff.com, July 8, 2009. that the attacks were probably not 27 Although there are no direct links between the isolated incidents, and the TIP video Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) and the East Turkistan Is- suggests that the most recent attack lamic Movement (ETIM), the TIP seems to have formed was likely connected to TIP or ETIM as a successor group to the now defunct ETIM, or the TIP cells in Pakistan. While China’s claims has at least taken up the cause that the now defunct ETIM has given up. While China and international media still 29 “Turkistan Islamic Party Releases Olympic Threat commonly refer to the TIP as the ETIM, since 2008 only Video,” LiveLeak.com, August 7, 2008. the TIP has issued propaganda videos and claims of at- 30 “Young Man Dies in Suicide Bombing, Claims to tacks. The TIP has produced nine editions of an elaborate Have Been Responsible for the Kunming Bus Explosion,” magazine, Islamic Turkistan, as well as numerous propa- Sohu.com, December 25, 2008. ganda videos alleging its role in attacks leading up to the 31 “Young Man Who Set Off a Coffee Shop Explosion Beijing Olympics, condemnations of Chinese policy in Admits He Caused the Kunming Bus Explosion,” Sohu. Xinjiang, and threats of future attacks in China. The TIP com, December 25, 2008. is believed to be based in Pakistan’s tribal areas and to 32 “Fatal Explosion Linked to Gambling Debt in South- maintain links with the other jihadist groups active along ern China,” China Daily, May 18, 2008. the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, particularly the Paki- 33 Raffaello Pantucci, “Uighurs Convicted in East stani Taliban (TTP), the Islamic Movement of Uzbeki- Turkestan Islamic Movement Plot in Dubai,” Terrorism stan (IMU), and al-Qa`ida. Monitor 8:29 (2010). 28 “Video Shows Terrorists in China Got Training in 34 “Police Dismantling Terror Group in Xinjiang: Minis- Pak Bases,” Times of India, September 8, 2011. try,” People’s Daily, June 25, 2010.

14 september 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 9

The UK’s Efforts to Disrupt NATO base in the former Yugoslavia. and “cyber attack.”7 The last of these, The men were in fact part of a much “cyber attack,” was identified as being Jihadist Activity Online wider network that stretched across of “low” probability, with the document the United Kingdom, and had links identifying an incident in 2010 as the By Raffaello Pantucci in Canada, Denmark, Sweden and the “first recorded incident of a terrorist United States. Key cells in the United ‘cyber’ attack on corporate computer the desire to find ways to moderate Kingdom were using the internet to draw systems.”8 In that incident, a computer the internet as a tool for the spread of in recruits and provide connections worm called “here you have” spread violence and radical ideas is not new to extremist camps in Pakistan, while a virus that crashed computers and or unique to the United Kingdom. also acting as an online media center provided its creators with backdoor This fight, however, is becoming more for al-Qaìda in Iraq.5 This network access to infected systems.9 While important as networks involved in particularly alarmed British security security planners continue to watch terrorist activity increasingly turn to planners who had never seen anything this threat and expect it to grow “as the the internet as a vehicle through which like it before, with then-Metropolitan tools and techniques needed for cyber to conduct planning, operations and Police counterterrorism head Peter attack become more widely available,” radicalization.1 Clarke saying “it was the first virtual it is largely the other ideological and conspiracy to murder that we had operational aspects of support that the This article maps out this fight within a seen.”6 internet provides that British planners British context to shed light on how the are targeting.10 problematic nexus of the internet and Yet the larger menace seems to be the radical ideas is evolving, as well as how way that the internet is able to act as a According to the annual report by the its importance has grown as traditional catalyst for information dissemination parliamentary committee with oversight al-Qaìda networks find themselves to extremists who have then gone of Britain’s intelligence agencies, under even heavier pressure. on to conduct terrorist attacks. Two the Government Communications specific cases stand out as particularly Headquarters (GCHQ, the United Historical Roots worrying. First, Roshonara Choudhry, Kingdom’s version of the American The United Kingdom has long been a hub the seemingly well-integrated East National Security Agency) spent a of online jihadist activity.2 One of the London woman who self-radicalized third of its efforts during the past two earliest networks was the www.azzam. online listening to Anwar al-Àwlaqi cycles on counterterrorism. The “bulk com family of sites that from 1994 to and then tried to kill a Member of of this effort” was spent in “Pursue… early 2002 provided interested people Parliament for voting in support of namely, to stop terrorist attacks.” As with a way of reaching out to jihadist the Iraq war. Second, Nicky Reilly, the with much of the British intelligence groups fighting in Afghanistan, Bosnia mentally challenged young man who was community, the focus shifted from and Chechnya.3 Its believed webmaster, persuaded by extremists he encountered solely “British Pakistani operations” a British Pakistani named Babar Ahmad online to attempt a suicide attack in an to growing threats in Yemen and East who has admitted to engaging in militant Exeter chain restaurant; diners were Africa. The report also mentions that activities in Bosnia, is currently in a only saved by the fact that the bomb GCHQ’s work helped disrupt al-Qaìda British prison fighting extradition to blew up in his face as he attempted to in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) the United States.4 assemble it in the restaurant’s toilet. plans in the previous year as well as specific “hostage-taking plans” by an A couple of years after Ahmad was The United Kingdom’s Reaction anonymous group.11 arrested, police in London disrupted a In the face of this threat, the United group of three young men who appeared Kingdom has launched a string of In a particularly notable incident to be involved with a cell of Bosnian counter operations that seek to address from mid-2010, British government- extremists planning an attack on a the problem of terrorists using the supported hackers penetrated AQAP internet from upstream disruption, systems and were able to insert a 1 “Contest: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Coun- to downstream arrests and trying garbled code into the first edition of tering Terrorism,” HM Government, July 2011, to develop a strategy that is able to Inspire magazine, delaying its release by 12 available at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/ focus on this problem in a new way. a few weeks. In the operation, which counter-terrorism/counter-terrorism-strategy/contest- In the recently refreshed Contest was apparently separately considered summary?view=Binary. counterterrorism strategy, the British 2 For an excellent early primer on British Muslim iden- government identified that terrorists 7 “Contest: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Counter- tity online that includes a discussion on the more extreme used the internet for “propaganda,” ing Terrorism,” p. 73. elements, see Gary R. Bunt, “[email protected]: ‘British “radicalization and recruitment,” 8 Ibid., p. 34. Muslim’ Identities in Cyberspace,” Islam and Christian- “communication,” “attack planning” 9 “Cyber Jihad Group Linked to ‘Here You Have’ Worm,” Muslim Relations 10:3 (1999). IDG News Service, September 10, 2010. 3 For information on azzam.com’s illegal activities, see 10 “Contest: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Coun- U.S.A. v. Babar Ahmad, “Affadavit in Support of Request 5 Raffaello Pantucci, “Operation Praline: The Realization tering Terrorism,” p. 74. for Extradition of Babar Ahmad,” District Court of Con- of al-Suri’s Nizam, la Tanzim?” Perspectives on Terrorism 11 “Annual Report 2010-2011,” UK Intelligence and Se- necticut, 2004. 2:12 (2008). curity Committee, July 2011. 4 “Terror Suspect Babar Ahmad is ‘No al Qaeda Ram- 6 “The World’s Most Wanted Cyber-Jihadist,” BBC, 12 “MI6 Attacks al Qaeda in ‘Operation Cupcake,’” Tele- bo,’” BBC, May 9, 2011. January 16, 2008. graph, June 2, 2011.

15 september 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 9 by Pentagon planners but rejected by the While police and prosecutors were the plight in Gaza and demonstrating Central Intelligence Agency,13 British unable to ascertain exactly what Lusha how to make IEDs. While it took two intelligence operatives inserted a code was planning, they concluded that he attempts to convict him (the first jury later revealed to be a list of cupcake was likely a “lone wolf” that they had was unable to reach a verdict), he was recipes.14 In a separate AQAP linked happened to catch early.19 His only in the end jailed for five years in a case operation earlier in the year, British connections to extremists came from that was described by a senior officer officers had arrested a Bangladeshi his online contacts—similar in many as being “one of the first successful national named Rajib Karim who was ways to Nicky Reilly, the young man prosecutions relating to disseminating working in information technology at who attempted to detonate a bomb in an terrorist publications via the internet.”21 British Airways while in direct contact Exeter restaurant in May 2008. Unlike many of the cases listed in this with AQAP ideologue Anwar al-Àwlaqi. article that involved the internet as the It is unclear how Karim was first picked This sort of approach was again seen main plank of the prosecution’s case up, but his electronic communications in November 2010, when about a to show the individual’s involvement with al-Àwlaqi were one of the main week after Roshonara Choudhry was in terrorism, Gul did not plead guilty. planks of the prosecution’s case against convicted of attempting to kill a Member His successful conviction is likely to him—showing as they did his intent to of Parliament, police in Wolverhampton be followed by a further set of cases help the group launch attacks against arrested Bilal Zaheer Ahmad for posting as police and prosecutors now see it is aviation.15 inflammatory comments on a variety possible to convict individuals on such of English-language forums praising charges. In January 2008, British officers launched a more traditional operation in “The United Kingdom has On the other end of the scale, there the wake of a posting on the al-ekhlaas. has been an effort by British security com forum proclaiming the creation also created a number of services to find ways of countering of an al-Qaìda branch in the United organizations that try to the spread of radical ideas using the Kingdom.16 After investigation, MI5 internet. This has been met with mixed identified the source as a Blackburn help counter the spread success. In one instance, the Foreign and native named Ishaq Kanmi, who local of radical ideas online Commonwealth Office (FCO) sponsored officers were able to video as he openly the production of a short film that was downloaded information off extremist by either providing a to be released online that was intended forums at the local library.17 Connected counternarrative through to provide a dissuading narrative for to Kanmi was a pair of local brothers young people drawn toward jihadist convicted on other charges and Krenar the Research, Information ideas. Called Wish You Waziristan, the film Lusha, an Albanian immigrant who was and Communications Unit told the story of two young British- identified from online chats he had been Pakistanis who end up in a training having with Kanmi. The conversations (RICU), or through trying camp in Waziristan.22 Independently were enough to alarm officers who to get the public to help produced with £33,000 of government investigated further. When they burst funds, clips from the animated short into his home in August 2008, they alert them to extremist were released onto YouTube in April- found large amounts of radical material material they find online.” May 2011 with endings telling people to (including documents about how to come back on May 29 to see the entire build bombs and detonators), 71 liters story. When a British Sunday newspaper of petrol, two kilograms of potassium discovered the provenance of the film’s nitrate and 14 mobile telephones.18 Choudhry and calling for others to funding, however, the FCO suddenly emulate her. A long-time extremist, became concerned and instead put the Ahmad went so far as to post lists of 23 13 “List of Cyber-Weapons Developed by Pentagon to film’s release on hiatus. In a separate other MPs who had voted for the war, Streamline Computer Warfare,” Washington Post, June case, the FCO funded British online as well as providing their contact 1, 2011. activists to go into jihadist forums such information and a link to buying knives 14 “Al Qaeda Magazine is a Cupcake Recipe Book,” Pub- as al-Shamouk and challenge radical at Tesco (a British retailer). He pled 24 licIntelligence.net, July 12, 2010. messages. guilty and was jailed for 12 years.20 15 “Rajib Karim: The Terrorist Inside British Airways,” BBC, February 28, 2011. For more on what Karim was More significant in many ways, actually plotting, it is instructive to read his e-mails with however, was the case against al-Àwlaqi, available at www.thenorthernecho.co.uk/ 21 “Man Jailed for Creating Extremist Videos and Up- Mohammed Gul, a London-based news/8880903.Excerpts_from_Rajib_Karim_terror_plot_ loading Them to the Internet,” Metropolitan Police Press student who was active on extremist messages/?ref=rss. Release, February 25, 2011. forums and created videos that he 16 “Skepticism Greets ‘Al Qaeda in Britain’ Founding,” 22 The film’s website is available at www.wishyouwa- published on YouTube celebrating the Reuters, January 16, 2008. ziristan.com, although it remains devoid of much con- deaths of U.S. soldiers, highlighting 17 “Man Jailed for Urging Blair and Brown Assassina- tent. tions,” Press Association, June 24, 2010. 23 “Foreign Office Faces Flak over Axed Counter-Ter- 18 “Would-be Terrorist who had Positively Reveled in 19 Ibid. rorism Video,” Guardian, May 30, 2011. Violence, Death and Destruction,” Derby Evening Tele- 20 “Blogger Who Encouraged Murder of MPs Jailed,” 24 Personal interview, British activist, London, Septem- graph, December 16, 2009. BBC, July 29, 2011. ber 2011.

16 september 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 9

The United Kingdom has also created question that remains is whether these a number of organizations that try two trends are linked—and whether al- Recent Highlights in to help counter the spread of radical Qaìda and affiliated groups are trying Terrorist Activity ideas online by either providing a to increasingly turn to an online jihad as counternarrative through the Research, they see their efforts offline continuing August 1, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A Information and Communications Unit to be disrupted. suspected U.S. aerial drone killed at (RICU), or through trying to get the least four alleged militants near Wana public to help alert them to extremist Supporting the notion of the shift online in South Waziristan Agency of the material they find online through the being the product of increasing entropy Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Counterterrorism Internet Referral among al-Qaìda and affiliated groups According to Voice of America, the Unit (CTIRU), a specialist police unit. is the fact that the British government drone strike “was the first reported in Success, however, has been mixed, is increasingly willing to expend its Pakistan’s tribal region since July 12.” with Contest branding the four year old scarce counterterrorism resources on – Voice of America, August 1 RICU’s work “not…as successful as we individuals like Mohammed Gul. While want.”25 Only created in 2010, CTIRU it was later revealed that Gul was in August 2, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A remains a young organization, although contact with more dangerous extremists suicide bomber in a vehicle detonated it has removed unidentified material in Germany, his case would unlikely his explosives outside a small residential from the internet on 165 occasions have received any particular attention if hotel popular with foreigners in Kunduz between July 2010-July 2011.26 security forces had large-scale plots to city. Two other militants then entered focus on instead. Consequently, while the hotel and fought Afghan police in Conclusion it would be unwise to conclude that a gunfight that lasted two hours. Four Britain’s cyber-spooks and cyber-cops Britain’s jihad has been wrapped up (and Afghan building guards were killed in are highly adaptive and active in trying recent arrests in Birmingham indicate the initial suicide blast. – AP, August 2 to counter the threat from Islamist it remains a live concern), it does seem radicalization online.27 In doing so, they clear that it has moved into a new phase August 2, 2011 (IRAQ): A car bomb have conducted disruption operations, that is going to be characterized by exploded outside a Christian church in helped U.S. authorities (most notably plots with a strong online presence like Kirkuk, wounding at least 23 people. with the case of Najibullah Zazi where many of those listed in this article. It is – Voice of America, August 2 it is understood that British intelligence safe to conclude that Britain’s jihad is agencies provided the key first hint of increasingly shifting online. August 3, 2011 (NIGERIA): A British danger to New York authorities), and man and an Italian who were kidnapped have now started to arrest some of the Raffaello Pantucci is an Associate Fellow in May in northern Nigeria’s Kebbi State many online extremists that live in at the International Center for the Study of appeared in a hostage video, saying the United Kingdom. The successful Radicalisation (ICSR) and the author of the that their captors are from al-Qaìda. prosecution of Mohammed Gul is forthcoming We Love Death As You Love According to Agence France-Presse, instructive in this regard as it carves a Life: Britain’s Suburban Mujahedeen “The engineers work for the B. Stabilini path that British authorities are likely to (C.Hurst & Co.). construction company, founded by increasingly use in the future to counter Italians but based in Nigeria. They this threat. were kidnapped on May 12 by gunmen who stormed their apartment in Birnin The larger significance of this increasing Kebbi, capital of Kebbi state. Police said focus on the online threat is two-fold. at the time that a German colleague On the one hand, it demonstrates the managed to escape by scaling a fence, growing level of concern about online while a Nigerian engineer was shot and extremists. As President Barack Obama wounded.” – AFP, August 3 and others have said, it is increasingly the threat of “lone wolf” extremists August 4, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A that concern them most—individuals Taliban bomb attack killed an Afghan who tend to be spurred to violence by intelligence agent in Kunduz. – AFP, material they find online rather than August 3 by traditional terrorist recruitment networks. Yet this is taking place as the August 4, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Three general assessment about the capacity Pakistani naval officers are facing a of traditional violent Islamist terrorist court martial on charges of negligence groups is going down. The open related to an attack on a naval base in Karachi on May 22. According to the 25 “Contest: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Coun- New York Times, “The court martial, tering Terrorism,” p. 64. a highly unusual disciplinary action 26 Ibid., p. 76. for any Pakistan military officer, 27 Additionally, this article does not touch on the United appeared to reflect the sense of outrage Kingdom’s ongoing fight against online right-wing ex- and embarrassment in the Pakistani tremists. armed forces over the attack, which

17 september 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 9 revealed incompetence and possibly August 10, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): people on the Mediterranean, and Rafah complicity with the insurgents by naval The U.S. military released a statement on the border with Gaza.” – CNN, August personnel inside the base.” – New York claiming that the insurgents responsible 12 Times, August 4 for downing a U.S. helicopter on August 6 have been killed in an airstrike. “The August 13, 2011 (LEBANON): Four August 6, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): strike killed Taliban leader Mullah Lebanese prisoners, reportedly Taliban insurgents shot down a U.S. Mohibullah and the insurgent who fired members of Fatah al-Islam, escaped helicopter in the Tangi Valley of the shot associated with the Aug. 6 from the Roumieh prison east of Beirut. Wardak Province, killing 30 U.S. downing of the CH-47 helicopter, which – AP, August 13 troops. More than 20 Navy SEALs resulted in the deaths of 38 Afghan were among the dead. Seven Afghan and coalition service members,” the August 13, 2011 (PAKISTAN): special forces and an interpreter were statement read. The insurgent leader Armed men kidnapped an American also reported to have been killed. The who was the target of the original development worker in Lahore. – Voice soldiers were reportedly on a mission August 6 operation, however, remains of America, August 13 to target a Taliban leader. – McClatchy at large. – Fox News, August 10; AFP, August Newspapers, August 6; Telegraph, August 7; AP, 10 August 14, 2011 (GLOBAL): Al-Qaìda August 8 leader Ayman al-Zawahiri released August 10, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. a new video message, calling on his August 6, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): drone strike killed at least 23 suspected followers to continue the fight against A roadside bomb killed 10 police in Taliban and al-Qaìda fighters in North the United States despite the death Kandahar Province. – AFP, August 7 Waziristan Agency of the Federally of Usama bin Ladin. “Chase America, Administered Tribal Areas. Arab and which killed the leader of the mujahidin August 6, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A suicide Uzbek nationals were reportedly among [Bin Ladin] and threw his body into the bomber detonated his explosives in the dead. – al-Jazira, August 10 sea,” al-Zawahiri said. “Go after it so Mohmand Agency of the Federally that history will say that God enabled Administered Tribal Areas. The bomber August 11, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A his worshippers to attack a criminal was the blast’s only casualty. – The female suicide bomber and a separate country which has spread corruption Nation, August 7 handcart bomb targeted Pakistani in the world.” He also said that the police in Peshawar, killing seven uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt have August 6, 2011 (SOMALIA): Press people. The Pakistani Taliban claimed provided opportunities for al-Qaìda to reports claimed that the al-Shabab responsibility. – AFP, August 10; Dawn, spread its message. – CBS News, August 15 insurgent and terrorist group August 11 abandoned its bases in Mogadishu after August 14, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): Six a series of clashes with pro-government August 11, 2011 (INDONESIA): Umar suicide bombers attacked the governor’s forces. Al-Shabab’s fighters retreated Patek, an al-Qaìda-linked Indonesian compound in Parwan Province, killing to Lower Shabelle and Middle Shabelle militant wanted in connection with the 22 people. – AFP, August 14 regions. – Daily Nation, August 6; Australian 2002 Bali bombings, was extradited Broadcasting Corporation, August 8 from Pakistan to Indonesia where he August 14, 2011 (ALGERIA): A suicide will stand trial. Pakistani authorities bomber in a pick-up truck attacked a August 8, 2011 (GLOBAL): A new audio captured Patek in Abbottabad on police station in Tizi Ouzou Province, message from al-Qaìda leader Ayman January 25, 2011. He is a senior member injuring 30 people. Al-Qaìda in al-Zawahiri appeared on Islamist web of Jemaah Islamiya. – AP, August 11 the Islamic Maghreb later claimed forums. In the message, al-Zawahiri responsibility. – AFP, August 14; Voice of accused the United States of hijacking August 12, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): America, August 14; Reuters, August 18 the Egyptian revolution to preserve Taliban fighters killed eight Afghan U.S. interests in the Middle East. security officials who were kidnapped August 14, 2011 (YEMEN): Fighting He urged Egyptians to establish an the previous day. According to the between Yemeni security forces and Islamic state in their country. – AP, National Post, “The five police and three militants in and around Zinjibar in August 9 officials from the National Directorate Abyan Province left at least 11 militants of Security (NDS) were kidnapped in and two soldiers dead. – Voice of America, August 8, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A Maidan Wardak.” – National Post, August August 14 remotely-detonated bomb wounded at 13 least 10 Pakistani soldiers in a military August 14, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A vehicle in South Waziristan Agency August 12, 2011 (EGYPT): Egyptian bomb exploded in a two-story hotel in of the Federally Administered Tribal security officials said that they are Baluchistan Province, killing at least 11 Areas. – AFP, August 8 preparing an operation against al-Qaìda people. There was no immediate claim cells that have recently established of responsibility. – Voice of America, August a presence in the Sinai Peninsula. 14 According to CNN, “The focus of their concern is the coastal area between el- Arish, a resort town of about 80,000

18 september 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 9

August 14-15, 2011 (PAKISTAN): August 17, 2011 (IRAQ): A suicide operatives who have been killed, Taliban militants attacked government bomber blew himself up in the home of because he was one of a new generation offices overnight in Ghazni Province, Tarmiya police chief Brigadier General of leaders that the network hoped killing a policeman. Four insurgents Tawfeeq Ahmed, killing two people. The would assume greater control after Bin were killed. – AFP, August 15 police chief was not home at the time of Laden’s death. Thousands of electronic the attack. – AFP, August 17 files recovered at Bin Laden’s compound August 15, 2011 (IRAQ): A series of in Abbottabad, Pakistan, revealed that coordinated nationwide bomb blasts August 18, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A Bin Laden communicated frequently ripped through Iraq, killing at least 66 roadside bomb killed 22 people, many with Mr. Rahman. They also showed people. – Telegraph, August 15 of them women and children, in Herat that Bin Laden relied on Mr. Rahman Province. – Los Angeles Times, August 19 to get messages to other Qaeda leaders August 15, 2011 (IRAQ): Gunmen and to ensure that Bin Laden’s recorded wearing Iraqi Army uniforms killed August 18, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): communications were broadcast four members of the government- A suicide bomber tried to detonate widely.” – New York Times, August 27 backed Sunni sahwa militia in Sayafiya a truck bomb near the entrance of a near Baghdad. Authorities blamed U.S.-operated base in Gardez, Paktia August 24, 2011 (IRAQ): A suicide the attack on the Islamic State of Iraq. Province, but did not make it through bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle – Guardian, August 16 the front gates. Two Afghan guards attacked a police checkpoint in Anbar were killed. – Fox News, August 18 Province, killing seven people. – New August 15, 2011 (NIGERIA): Nigerian York Times, August 24 police said they shot to death a would- August 19, 2011 (EGYPT): A suicide be suicide bomber as he attempted to bomber killed a number of Egyptian August 25, 2011 (IRAQ): A car bomb crash an explosives-laden vehicle into soldiers on the Egyptian side of the exploded at the Karma district police a police headquarters in Maiduguri, border with Israel. – Jerusalem Post, August station near Falluja, killing five police Borno State. Authorities blamed the 19 officers. – Washington Post, August 25 attack on Boko Haram. – AAP, August 16; Vanguard, August 16 August 19, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): August 26, 2011 (NIGERIA): A suicide Two suicide bombers attacked a British bomber in a vehicle rammed through the August 16, 2011 (UNITED STATES): compound in Kabul, killing at least gates of the United Nations headquarters According to Voice of America, “U.S. three people. – AP, August 19 in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria. At least President Barack Obama says a ‘lone 18 people were killed in the blast. Boko wolf’ terrorist, such as the gunman who August 19, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A Haram claimed responsibility. – Los killed 77 people in Norway last month, suspected suicide bomber killed at least Angeles Times, August 26 is a bigger concern than a large-scale 40 people at a mosque in Ghundi village terror attack.” – Voice of America, August 16 of Khyber Agency in the Federally August 26, 2011 (ALGERIA): A suicide Administered Tribal Areas. – BBC, August bomb attack on the Cherchell military August 16, 2011 (UNITED STATES): 19 academy in Algeria killed 18 people. Al- The U.S. Treasury Department placed Qaìda in the Islamic Maghreb claimed sanctions on three senior members of August 20, 2011 (IRAQ): According responsibility. – BBC, August 28; AFP, Jemaah Islamiya in Southeast Asia. The to the New York Times, al-Qaìda in August 27 members were identified as Umar Patek, Iraq warned “that it had launched a Abdul Rahim Ba’asyir and Muhammad 100-attack campaign to exact revenge August 27, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A Jibril Abdul Rahman. – Reuters, August 16 for the United States’ killing of Osama suicide bomber in a vehicle detonated bin Laden.” – New York Times, August 20 his explosives near a bank in Lashkar August 16, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A Gah, Helmand Province, killing four motorcycle bomb tore through a market August 21, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): people. Three children were among the in Uruzgan Province, killing seven Villagers stoned to death a local dead. – AFP, August 27 civilians. – AFP, August 16 Taliban commander and his bodyguard in Helmand Province. The villagers August 27, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A August 17, 2011 (SPAIN): Spanish police were angry at the militants for killing a suicide bomber in a vehicle targeted a arrested a 37-year-old Moroccan man, 60-year-old man accused of aiding the police checkpoint in Kandahar, killing Abdellatif Aoulad Chiba, on suspicion Afghan government. – New York Times, three civilians. – AFP, August 27 of being a member of al-Qaìda in the August 22 Islamic Maghreb. Authorities charge August 27, 2011 (YEMEN): According that he ran an internet website that August 22, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A CIA- to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, aimed to recruit members to conduct operated drone killed Atiyah Abd “Yemen’s Defense Ministry has said terrorist attacks. He also allegedly al-Rahman, identified as al-Qaìda’s the country’s navy sank a speed boat sought information on how to poison the second-in-command. According to suspected of carrying explosives as water supply at campsites and tourist the New York Times, “American officials the small vessel approached a Yemeni resorts. – Voice of America, August 17; Voice of described Mr. Rahman’s death as warship. Yemeni Naval Commander America, August 20 particularly significant as compared General Ruwais Mujawar said on the with other high-ranking Qaeda Defense Ministry website that the boat

19 september 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 9

ignored several warning shots late on CTC Sentinel Staff August 27 and that ‘naval forces then fired at the craft, which sank along with Editor-in-Chief it occupants.’” – RFE/RL, August 28 Erich Marquardt Senior Editor, CTC August 28, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A group of suicide bombers attacked a Editorial Board NATO reconstruction base in Qalat, COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. Zabul Province, but failed to breach the Department Head facility’s perimeters. – Voice of America, Department of Social Sciences (West Point) August 28

COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. August 28, 2011 (IRAQ): A suicide Deputy Department Head bomber disguised as an injured beggar Department of Social Sciences (West Point) killed 29 people at Baghdad’s largest Sunni mosque. The bomber reportedly LTC Liam Collins hid the explosives in fake casts on his Executive Director, CTC leg and arm. – AP, August 28; Washington Post, August 28

August 30, 2011 (RUSSIA): Twin suicide bomb attacks killed eight people in Grozny, the capital of Chechnya. – Reuters, August 30; New York Times, August 30 Contact Combating Terrorism Center August 31, 2011 (PAKISTAN): An U.S. Military Academy explosion tore through a crowd in 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall a parking lot near a Shi`a mosque West Point, NY 10996 in Quetta, killing at least 10 people. Phone: (845) 667-6383 Authorities believe that the explosion Email: [email protected] was from a suicide bomber in a vehicle. Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ – New York Times, August 31

* For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383

support The Combating Terrorism Center would like to express its gratitude to its financial supporters, for without their support and shared vision of the Center products like the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you are interested in learning more about how to support the Combating Terrorism Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association of Graduates at 845-446-1561.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.