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“Schlaglicht Israel”!

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“Schlaglicht Israel”! Schlaglicht Israel Nr. 6/18 Aktuelles aus israelischen Tageszeitungen 16.-31. März Die Themen dieser Ausgabe 1. Zensur aufgehoben ......................................................................................................................................................... 1 2. „Marsch der Rückkehr“................................................................................................................................................... 3 3. Pessach ............................................................................................................................................................................ 5 4. Medienquerschnitt ........................................................................................................................................................... 7 1. Zensur aufgehoben carried out in recent years. Another disconcerting les- Gut zehn Jahre nach dem Angriff bestätigte Israel, son from this affair is the fact that Israel is alone in die Bombardierung des noch im Bau befindlichen the fight. The United States is perhaps our greatest Atomreaktors im Norden Syriens. Acht Kampfflug- friend in the world, but in the moment of truth it left us zeuge hätten am 6. September 2007 in einer streng on our own. (…) The process in its entirety was man- geheimen Aktion die Anlage 450 Kilometer nordöst- aged perfectly, both diplomatically and militarily. lich von Damaskus zerstört, erklärte das Militär. Dass Proper judgment was applied throughout and the Israel hinter dem Angriff stand, galt seit langem als risks taken were calculated. Most of the credit must sicher, obwohl sich das Land bislang nie öffentlich go to then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who never re- dazu geäußert hat. Anlass für Spekulationen gab der ceived even a fraction of what he is due. (…) Israel's Zeitpunkt der Zensuraufhebung. Denkbar ist, dass es current and future political and military leaders would eine Warnung an den Iran sein sollte. Hintergrund do well to study this course – its weak and strong könnte aber auch die Veröffentlichung der Memoiren points, and mainly how to manage complex situa- von Ehud Olmert sein, der als damaliger Regierungs- tions. (…) chef das Kommando zum Angriff gab. Yoav Limor, IHY, 21.03.18 Israel must always think 'outside the box' Reactor and Reactions The bottom line of the operation to destroy the nu- (…) It was fascinating – and definitely out of the box. clear reactor in Syria is a positive one. (…). Assad's Piece by piece, snippet by snippet, Israel’s various reactor was mere months away from becoming oper- intelligence bodies had figured out what Bashar As- ational, and had it not been for a grave lapse in field sad was quietly planning. What, where and how. (…) security by his atomic agency chief (…) it's likely that the Syrian dictator did not boast of his nuclear plans. Israel would have detected the project too late. This Given that only Assad’s absolutely closest circle intelligence failure turned into a success with the dis- knew of the reactor, obtaining the details was an in- covery of the reactor, the ensuing efforts to gather telligence success of the type that makes you think of more intelligence, the formulation of the attack plan, “intelligence” in both senses of the word. (…) Had Is- and the approach to avoid a war in the wake of the rael in September 2007 openly claimed responsibility attack. (…) The operation to destroy the Syrian nu- for the operation (…) it could have forced Assad to clear reactor (…) gave birth to the hundreds of intelli- react and set the whole region on the path to war. (…) gence-gathering and covert operations Israel has Israelis – and the sane world – should be doubly 1 grateful that the country did not hand the Golan to the them? (…) once Bush informed Olmert that he would butcher from Damascus. (…) And if there’s one thing not be attacking, an Israeli strike became the only op- worse than someone like Assad getting his blood- tion. It was a continuation of what is known in Israel stained hands on nuclear weapons, it’s the nightmare as the “Begin Doctrine” (…). The doctrine holds that of jihadist terrorists obtaining nonconventional weap- Israel will not allow its enemies to obtain weapons ons (…) There is no doubt that Israel’s publication of that could pose an existential threat to the Jewish the operation sends a powerful message. (…) Assad state. This has now worked twice: Iraq in 1981, and realizes that Israel has certain redlines and (…) is se- Syria in 2007. But what about Iran? Will Israel con- rious about them not being crossed. It sends a mes- tinue to stand by the Begin Doctrine, or is Iran a chal- sage to Iran, where the regime continues to call for lenge that even mighty Israel cannot take on alone? wiping Israel off the map and threatens non- Shi’ite (…) It is true that Olmert will go down in history as the populations. It is also a warning to North Korea, which first prime minister to go to jail: He was convicted of actively helped Syria with the construction of its plu- a crime and he paid the price. But we also shouldn’t tonium project at al-Kibar and continues to be Iran’s forget operations that he oversaw as the country’s nuclear partner. It might also be sending a signal to leader. Over a decade later, he is finally getting the the US: With or without you, Israel will not – cannot – credit he deserves. tolerate hostile countries with nuclear capabilities. Yaakov Katz, JPO, 23.03.18 (…) Liat Collins, JPO, 22.03.18 Why was Israel´s attack on Syria´s reactor sud- denly cleared for publication? Don't leave anything to luck (…) The first time we tried to challenge the military (…) Israel calculated its steps properly and where it censor’s office over the story of the attack on the Syr- relied on luck – something that cannot be trusted ian nuclear reactor, Ehud Olmert was still prime min- should another incident of this kind take place. (…) ister. (…) Was it possible that there were ulterior mo- Even though there were those in Military Intelligence tives involved in the decision to bar publication? To who suspected that Syria was pursuing a military nu- protect the boss, Barak? (…) A few years later, we clear program, the reactor in Deir ez-Zor was discov- (…) came equipped with an entire film that included ered in the 11th hour. This cannot happen in a coun- four interviews with Israeli decision makers and three try like Israel, which engages in constant intelligence senior American officials and, most notably, acknowl- gathering. (…) decision-makers, led by then-Prime edgements on the part of Israeli representatives re- Minister Ehud Olmert, pursued the right course of ac- garding Israeli attacks in Syria in general and this at- tion, including when making the decision to keep tack in particular. (…) If the secret is so great and the mum after the nuclear reactor was destroyed, so as danger to state security so major, did anyone ask to make it easier for Assad to contain the incident. those interviewed in the film not to speak further with The IAF's mission was also a resounding success, anyone? No, acknowledged the state’s representa- but here, too, we must keep things in proportion. tives. (…) Over the past several years, a conspiracy Given Syria's proximity to Israel, bombing the Deir ez- theory circulated that the military censor was not al- Zor reactor was easier than the 1981 strike on the lowing the disclosure because Prime Minister Benja- Iraqi nuclear reactor south of Baghdad, and it was ex- min Netanyahu didn’t want to see any glory given to ponentially less complex and dangerous than any po- Olmert. (…) and then all of a sudden the disclosure tential strike Israel may have to consider in the future was allowed in a twisted, faulty process in which ulti- on the nuclear facilities in Iran. mately it was not a Channel 10 reporter who spoke Yaakov Amidror, IHY, 22.03.18 about it or even a former prime minister, but rather the current army chief of staff, air force commander and Imagine a world in which Syria still had its nuclear defense minister. (…) From a view that even a quasi- reactor today official admission of the bombing of the reactor would (…) Had Israel not learned of the existence of Syria’s bring major risks to national security, we have now reactor, what would the Middle East look like today? reached the point where official acknowledgement Israel could have found itself living under an unimag- does no harm at all. Allowing the disclosure was jus- inable threat, and ISIS could have come into posses- tified years ago. The view that it is better not to know sion of a nightmarish capability. (…) What about As- is appropriate for dictatorships where the belief is that sad’s own people? He has used gas against them. the most critical issues should be considered by a Would he have used nuclear weapons, too, if he had handful of people, and that the public should never be 2 able to judge their actions. If that’s the case, this en- 2. „Marsch der Rückkehr“ tire process leaves a bitter taste of ulterior motives, 18 Tote und über Tausend Verletzte waren die Bilanz both when the report was barred and when it was des ersten Tages der auf sechs Wochen angelegten cleared for publication. palästinensischen Protestaktion „Marsch der Rück- Raviv Drucker, HAA, 27.03.18 kehr“. Rund 30.000 Palästinenser waren dem Aufruf der Hamas gefolgt und zogen bis dicht an die Grenz- Gatekeepers should protect our secrets anlagen. Die Soldaten reagierten mit Tränengas und Despite there being an Israeli Military Censor's Of- Gewehrschüssen auf die Demonstranten, wenn sie fice, the truth of the matter is that it is powerless. (…) dem Zaun zu nahe kamen. Die Palästinenser wollen The censors proudly claim that they managed to pre- mit den Kundgebungen in der Grenzregion an das vent the publication of most of the sensitive details on Schicksal der vor genau 70 Jahren aus dem damals the operation. But the bad news is that even if those gegründeten Israel Geflüchteten und Vertriebenen details are still classified, they are now on the various erinnern, die nun das Recht auf ihre Rückkehr in die reporters' laptops exposed to various hackers.
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