~~K, .Iw ,, 5Wean Longuenesse and St Ower/Pt

I S,,^.s at: S [. SM

A. WDIVE-BCMBING"

No praise can be too high for the amazing versatality of

the pilots of the VIII Fighter Command, which has excited the

notice and commendation of the masters of war flying in the

R.A.F. as well as in our own Forces; other groups, however,

took it up very soon after the initial attempts and it became

a very popular form of outdoor sport for most of our fighter

groups long before D-Day. It was the 353rd Fighter Group

which pioneered this activity in the 8 Air Force. Dive-bombing their had been done by the Germans in Spain as far back as 1936;

"Stuka" was as vicious in looks as in performance. Used again

in Poland, Norway, the Lowlands, France and the Battle of Bri-

tain, it was of tremendous importance as a morale-destroying

factor no less than for its destructiveness. But never before

had high altitude fighters been used as dive-bombers. Col.

Loren McCollum and his Air Executive Col. Glenn E. Duncan of

the 353rd pioneered in this adaptation. It is the irony of

fate that on Thanksgiving morning, November 25, 1943, while

leading the first of these missions with P-47's, Col McCollum

received an unlucky direct hit by flak, his Thunderbolt was

stripped of its outer surface and, at the date of writing, his

fate is uncertain. They were bombing the fields at St. Omer-

(*1 - See Page 278) 277 --.

W ~~k, .iW ,, 5WEAn Longuenesse and St Ower/Pt. Rouge; tho famous ZenkeB3 56th

Group was on Gilze-Rijen and Leeuwarden doing a level-bombing attack from 24,000'. The 78th &nd 356th Groups were in support.

56th let their bombs go when they saw the B-24 which was leading release its load.

Col. Duncan, (Col. McCollum's successor as C.0. of the group,) had his plane damaged by flak and was forced to belly- land in North Central Germany on July 7, 1944, but he left the following notes on dive-bombing which will serve as advice for

future generations of dive-bombers.

"A lot of bombing has been done with many types of fighter

aircraft in othor theaters but until recently bombing with

(** - The following note from Lt. Col. William H. Harkness provides added interesting data on the early origins of dive- bombing. "The special group led by Col. Duncan and formed from pilot3 of 4 different groups were specialists in this but I think the history should point out very clearly that other groups went in for it also. Ln connection with fght.er-bombing, I think it is interesting that it was thoup--,: of and ~leneral Hunter wanted to t-y it back in A_;j.it or September 1942 before the Groups then under this Co-:inand were lost to XII Fighter Comrand. Unfortunately t!ere 1c no documentary evidence to support th- s, te- menrt, One day durinm this period Col. Ordway, w. w'i3 then A-2 ,if VIII Fi7inter Coanand, sent word to me that Gereral Hunter wanted us to select 3ome suit',ble t&rget3 for fi,-hter-bcr'iber attacks. Our tarxet .material vi a all de- rived from the R.A.?. Fi:'.ter Ci.mnd aI.d wa', comnI.r. tively meagre, but we were prepared to examine it witn th..t -nd ir viI-. I asked for a little mnre specif4-.c deta-Il as t just what wag wanted, but bofore we coiuld 7et it, w7,rd was sent down t us that the idea of undert-'kinr t ia i-r. of opr. tion was vetoed by higher headquartere.;

- 278 -

----- high altitude fighters was only a matter of possibility

and not much of a probability. The problem was put up

to the 353rd Fighter Group by higher headquarters to

test the possibilities of low altitude dive-bombing and

high altitude dive-bombing.

"To run the first tests with the P-47, three pilots with

previous P-40 bombing experience were selected. 2 These

pilots and crews were sent to LLanbedr Airdrome in Wales

where they could be close to a small barren island off

shore. This island was about 50 feet by 150 feet in size

and was to be used as the target.

"The P-47's were equipped with a B-7 type bomb shackle,

(the belly tank release mechanism). No other sighting

device was used except the 100 mile reflector gun sight.

No lines were drawn on the canopy to give angle of dive

as this is not practical and of no great help. The 100

pound practice bomb was used.

"The tiree pilots found that accuracy could be attained

in direct proportion to the amount of practice. For low

(e2 - Capt. Walter z. Beckham (now Major and M.I.A.) 1st Lt. Leslie P. Clep and 1st Lt. Francis P. Walsh. 1st Lt. Walter L. Angelo substituted for Capt. Beckham. All were of the famous 353rd Group from the records of which this data has been obtained - Authorj

- 279 - dive-bombing 6 they began their dives about , tQp0 ft and released at about 4 The gagle of dive Was on an average of about 30 degrees. The accuracy was fair to good with a preponderance of shortages. The only trouble was the characteristics of the P-47 to attain such high speeds in a dive, making low pull-outs undesirable. It is logi- cal however, that greater accuracy is obtained by getting down closer to the target. Not having dive brakes causes the P-47's to accelerate rapidly. This high speed makes it necessary to start the pull out at higher altitudes than would be possible at lower speeds. There is a happy medium between angle of dive and altitude, to obtain the greatest amount of accuracy. This so-called happy medium was found to be about a 60 degree dive from 10,000 feet with pull- out at about 4,000 feet. Also 60 to 70 degree dives were made from 20,000 to 22,000 feet with pull-out at about

16,000 feet when a fair amount of accuracy was obtained. "During the ten day period of experimentation fifty seven

100-pound practice bombs were dropped and the greatest miss was about 150 yards. These xperiments definitely showed that the airplane could be used, if necessary, for dive bombing.

"First there come the problems of the initial training of

- 280 -

- roux~~~I:lfi - K- '* ' - t Xx fl j

A.,.. {.~ E ", Fi ;

a,lz: n"' - pilots to dive-bomb. If the pilot has never dropped a bomb from any type airplane, a water target should be arranged. Load up a 100-pound practice bomb and instruct the pilot to climb to about 12,000 feet, approach the target straight and level. Fly close enough to the target so that it will pass out of sight under the Wing at about the position of the guns. After the target has passed from view under the wing for approximately ten seconds, roll into a 90 degree turn and point the nose slightly under the target. (It is very essential that the pilot learn how to turn the ship and trim it up so that the ship will be in a straight dive and not skidding.) Then align the vertical line of the sight through the target.

By this time an average pilot will be down to about 7,000 feet so he should begin to pull the nose of the ship through the target. After the target has passed from view for about the count of two seconds, pull the bomb release. Then reef the ship up and turn over on your side and see where it hits. Make a mental note, "over or short".

Now the next time attempt to use the same altitude and same distance away from the target (thus the same dive).

Then try to achieve the opposite from the first results.

From then on, after the pilot has a general idea of what

- 281 -

{KnL. :P *i4 the basic mechanics are, he can become very proficient at

higher altitude" varying angles of dives.

"To go into further detail we will take, by steps, the

various stages of becoming proficient after the prelimin-

ary stages.

'There are two locations which can be used as targets,

namely, water and land.

1. Water Targets.

"Frequently the sea is very rough and almost any type of

smoke or slick will not be seen. In this case, you can

always use one of the shoals off the Wash. Where the sea

washes over the sand bars, a great deal of white foam is

left and a sizeable target can be selected. Of course,

this is not a target to give a precise measure of accur-

acy, but is very good to practice on, when nothing else

is available. Second, if a slick type target is used,

we have found thpt the regular aluminum or gold powder

slick is not too good. Therefore, we have devised our

own by taking a 100-pound practice bomb case, emptying

the sand. In the nose, either cut a hole and cover it

with heavy paper, or indent the metal so that it will

open on impact with the water. Fill the bomb with waste

oil and aluminum po'.der and weld the nose back in place.

- 282 - This can be attached on a ship a dropped and the bomb-

ing squadron can practice bombing on it. This type of

slick could be seen in a fairly rough sea. Thirdly, there

are various issue smoke-bombs, flare-bombs, slick-bombs,

etc., but we have never had any great success with them.

Sometimes they work, but in most cases they do not. You can use whatever method you choose for your target.

2. Land targets.

"The land target is best of all on which to do your practice, that is, after you find that you can hit relatively close to the designated target. By close, I mean three or four hundred yards. By now you ought to be able to hit within a hundred yards. The land target should have a circle or triangle or some form to aim at, and the whole target area can be - say, about the size of the normal fighter airdrome. The target should be about 40 feet on the sides or in diameter. A system should be set up so as to give the exact location of each bomb dropped and a record kept of each pilot's results.

'I believe that the general idea should have been obtained by now, so we will go on to the actual use of the newly gained art. In this, let's explain the practice and

- 283 - procedure to be used for inik da biombing or bonbing

by flights. Of course, thw ! ' hat you will bomb an ,

actual target will be up to the leader or C.O.

Precision Dive-Bombing.

"First, bombing with each pilot doing his own sighting and

dropping. This type should be used where a small target

is to be knocked out, or in other words, precision bombing.

There are many ways in which to accomplish the precision

type bombing, but I will only attempt to cover two ways:

1. Low AnaLe Dives.

"By approaching the target from the side, by flights, or

sections in echelon or Vee. As the leader comes into

position, he peels off attempting to gain a steady normal

dive of about 60 degrees, sights on the target and as he

reaches an altitude, at which he should pull out, pulls

the nose up through the target, releasing at the proper

time. Subsequently, each pilot has peeled off in rapid

succession, and all will be coming down almost simul-

taneously, but on slightly different courses. (Remember,

these boys have had a lot of practice and are good at hitt-

ing things by now). No need to worry about your accuracy;

it will work out, and you should only get overs and shorts,

no error in deflection. 'The recovery will usually be a

left or right turn away from the tat.. b Fould eass!y:; , V -284- ;";a~-r:l./ye?- . .*.',* ' ' * ' ?"?:.. -,l --_- A- -_-1.-A.4.& ~.-A DOt_ mauQe rOjnVJ.zIIO MaoU.

2. Vertioa Dive-Bombinr

"Dive bombing with P-47's from a vertical dive has proven

satisfactory in theory and in practice. It is superior

to dive-bombing from a lesser angle of dive because it

offers a much higher degree of acouracy with no accom-

panying disadvantages. Pear of the bomb striking- the

propeller is unfounded.

"Our technique is as follows: The dive bombing P-47 passes

over the edge of the target, keeping it in view along the

edge of the engine cowl. A few seconds after the target

disappears under the leading edge of the winT, the pilot

half-rolls. He releases his bomb from a vertical position

with the bead of the gunsight directly on the tarret. The

half-roll is then comipleted, the plane accelerating faster

then and pulling away from the bomb. Normal cruising

power is used.

"If desired, the altitude lost from highest to lowest part

of the manoeuver may be kept under 4,000 feet. This is

done by starting the roll at 190 mph. and pulling through

sharply. The speed may be kept as low as 270 mph. A

higher speed is deemed wise as an added de:ense from flak.

By pulling through more slowly, and aiiing carefully an

- 285 -

i~~tt7}f- A~~Nti ~S5,

1,V '. - 9~ i 1 I I'.- Ik4 I.A.S. (Indicated Air Speed), of3254to-350 is reached.

'It is felt that a starting altitude of about 20,000 is wise

in the case of a well-defended airfield being the target. Accuracy increases at lower altitudes. 7,000 feet is

considered the minimam starting altitude. Pilots in-

experienced in this type of mission should have a greater

starting altitude.

'The wind is the other source of inaccuracy. The velocity

of the mean wind times the period required for the bomb

to fall, gives the distance that must be compensated for

by the pilot. This is achieved by aiming at a point that

is the correct distance and direction from the target.

It may be done by *leading" the target a pre-determined

percentage of a ring of the gun sight.

"It is recommended that this type of mission be performed

by flights of four in string formation going in at thirty

seconds intervals with each pilot taking individual aim.

'Optional - With practice, it is estimated that over 90%

of the bombs could be dropped in a circle of 100 yards

diameter from a 20,000 feet starting altitude" (See

Appendix "U" for Col. Dunoan's Memo on Various Bomb Loads).

In the weeks preceeding and following D-Day this activity was extended to other groups until it became an ipo6rtant part *' .'

- 286 - of the tactical work in whichit ntributlon of this Command

was one of the major factors in the success of the Invasion.

The months since Thanksgiving Day, found many such missions

booked by the Command and when the heavies were not operating on long range targets owing to unfavorable weather. The groups were turned over to the Wing A-3 to arrange missions for dive- bombing on such targets as airfields and communication centers that were so effectively "clobbered", that as Invasion drew near, bridges and marshalling yards also were picked out for attention.

B. "BILL'S BUZZ BOYS" - STRAFING

One day in the winter of 1944, when 353rd Group had returned from an uneventful escort of our "heavies", the pall of boredom settled into the restless oul of Colonel Glenn E. Duncan, its C.O. The Hun fighters would no longer come up except on days when the weather was clear, which was seldom. Our B-17's, however, continued to hit enemy targets from above 10/10 ov-ercast ("undercast" to the airmen) by using their radar "blind bombing" technique. It was not paying off for our fighters. So he said to Major H.B. Bjorkmnan, his Group Intelligence Officer, "Hank, if the Hun won't come up and fight, then we'll have to go down and get him. Most of the Huns we see these days are on the ground. Pick out a - 287 - couple of German airdr ome d our way home from today's

e :otb, ~we'll drop down and pa~ 'em a visit". It was an

ol0doar I technique, but much more dangerous today with

the Hun's improved and vastly augmented flak.

So with one flight, after he had left his "Big Friends" to

be shepherded by later escorting fighters, he dove to tree top

level at 500 miles per hour, 8 guns flaming into a row of Ger-

man aircraft parked along the dispersal areas and near the run-

ways. Unfortunately, Major Walter E. Beckham, one of the four

dive-bombing pioneers, caught a signal not intended for him,

to follow through. He was, at the time, Anerica's leading

Thunderbolt ace in the ETO with 18 victories to his credit. He peeled off into a steep dive at the same target, followed by

his flight, opening up on everything in sight. The ground de-

fenses were already alerted; a stray shot from an unknown

gunner hit his motor. He called his flight over the R/T and

gave them his now famous last message, "Stay down: Take the

boys home, George, (Lt. George Perpente), I can't make it," pulled up to gain sufficient altitude, bailed out and was later reported a prisoner of war. *3

When they got back Col. Duncan felt that despite Beckhan's loss, their success justified a repeat performance. "Whtr don't

(*3 - Fighter Command "took a very dim view" of second passes at a target unless ground defenses were very weak.)

- 288 -

: l l - *i * ^ua K~- y.4 - - - ;1 k Nil ib,, specialistr f in the art of ground strafing?" They presented the idea to the "Old1itn",

~ M1ajor General William E. Kepner, "oai,wndinr the VIII Fighter

Command, and on March 1l, 1944 sixteen volunteers reported

to Colonel Duncan for tr.ining in the art of ground strafing.

In characteristic American disregard of awesome rink, they

dubbed themselves, "Bill's Buzz Boys". Life at '"etfield

became excitinT for tho.3e on the rcound; safety lay only in

a prostrate position on the field while they were pract!.-i.n-.

,Vin!T operation officers had planned originally to operate

such a squadron on a tactical mission, to attack enemy air-

craft while refuellinA prior to our bombers' withdrawal.

The following account of the specialist group was

supplied by the 353rd Group Intelligence Officers:

"During the -winter months of 1943-44 the reaction ,f the Luftwaffe to our heavy bomber raids fell off conjio1erably. Fighter 3veed:s and fighter bombing stirred up al.o(st n- reaction. The Germans kept their aircr'ft cn the .-round until they were forced to use them in defense o-' their cities deep in the homeland. For this reasjni plana for the annihilation of the G.A.F. had stru' a snag. Aa days went by it bec;:ie apparent that if tle .-.un .vouLi not come up and fig-ht, it .Tould be nece. ..' -y t, de.;tr y his aircraft on the ground by strafrLw.

"With this purpose in mind General !epner i.-sied rder- 1 during the latter oart of !.arch 194 t or-' rn z: . urt.-t, which became known as "Bill's Buzz B-ys". '.his :nit - .; made up of volunteer pilots from vtriou3 Gro; ..*ru '-h-

- 289 -

Wt%X.ll.g fc^'i':i^' t€ 5 11 I 1 out the VIII Fighter Comnand, and was based with the 353rd Fighter Group at Metfield. A list of the members appears below.

Col. Glenn E. Duncan 353rd PG Commanding 1st Lt. Kenneth Chetwood 1st Lt. Charles 0. Durant " 1st Lt. Francis Edwards " 1st Lt. John A. Sullivan "

Capt. Charles Attleson 359th PG 1st Lt. Clifford E. Carter " 1st Lt. Robert L. Thacker " 2nd Lt. John N. Oliphant

1st Lt. Eugene W. Kinnard 361st PG 1st Lt. Martin H. Johnson " \lst Lt. Joseph Kelly 2nd Lt. Johnny C. Wright "

Capt. Albert B. Starr 355th PG 1st Lt. Norman J. Portier " 1st Lt. Kenneth R. Williams " 2nd Lt. Gilbert S. Wright "

"The purpose of this Group was solely to strafe enemy airdromes within a 300 mile radius of home base. 1'he lessons learned and the tactics subsequently devised from this experience, were to be the basis upon which all Groups of Fighter Command would launch similar attacks of their own whenever the opportunity arose.

"'Bill's Buzz Boys' operated against many enemy airdromes. In view of the fact that enemy airdromes are the most dangerous types of targets a fighter pilot can attack (since they are so heavily defended), it is surprising that losses were held to the barest minimum. The tactics developed by Col. Duncan and his subordinates were directly responsible for this amazing record. The group cmn be justly proud, therefore, that it played such a vital part in the organization, supply, and operation of this pioneer unit, whose outstanding work served as an

- 290 - example in the many brilliant strafing attacks carried subsequently by the VIII Pighter Commnand as a while. Their work done, the unit was dissolved on April 12, 1944 add received, as it so rightly deserved, the commendation of General Kepner himself, which follows:

OIMFL OISFWV OrVTH V OISAS NR 23/12 OF ? FRCM OISAS 1100B , TO OIMFL INFO OISFW OrIWTH BT OISAS P22E

UPON COMPLETION OF TODAY'S MISSION THE FLYING UNIT KNOWN AS BILL'S BUZZ BOYS WILL BE DISSOLVED AND PILOTS AND PLANES RETURNED TO THEIR PROPER STATION. THE COMMANDING GENERAL EXPMESSES HIS SINCERE APPRECIATION TO EACH PILOT AND TO THOSE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTING TO THE SUCCE;SFUL DEVELOPMENT OF NEWN FIGHTER TACTICS." Date: April 12, 1944.

The summary of their activities gives an idea of the wide swathe of destruction they cut in enemy territory.

COMPOSITE MISSION SLUMlARY REPORT

From March 26, 1944 thru April 12, 1944 - 8 Missions (as bomber escort, which means 6 missions of strafing)

A. 353rd "C" Fighter Group (Bill's Buzz Boys), Col. Glenn E. Duncan leading. B. (Aircraft) 89 P-47's up. C. (Early Returns) 5. D. gField Orderj Ref. VIII PC FO's 281 thru 296. E. (Losses) 3 P-47's lost (1 pilot saved by Air Sea Rescue) F. (Damaged) 10 P-47's Cat. "A" Flak 3 P-47's Cat. "AC" Flak G. (Missing) 1st Lt. Clifford E. Carter (359th Group) MIA. 1st Lt. Kenneth R. Williams (355th GP) NYR, until returned from occupied France to the U.K. H. (Claims) 3/E Air 0-1-0 S/E Ground 1-0-4 T/E Ground 12-5-5 U/I Ground 0-1-.5 Total 13-7-14 Locomotives 18-15-3 -291- Other Ground targets listed in J. I. (Summary) Col. Duncan led group on first three mission. Capt. Ettlesen led twice, Capt.,; Starrrtkice. Group flew as Action Squadron in ma'in353^ Group on one occasion,. , . :. ri ' Types of Mi&s'asns flown: .A/D strafing -- 6, penetration support - 1, withdrawal support - 1 A/b Targets Strafed: Chartres, Chateaudun, Anet, St. Andre D'Lure, Beauvais/Tille, Quackenbruck, Vechta, Bohmte, Hesepe, Rheine, Twente/Enschede, Gutersloh, and Villaroche. J. (Destroyed)

(Ground) Probably Destroyed (Air) Damaged Dround, 1 FW 190 1 ME 109 3 FIV 190 4 JU 88 Probably Destroyed Grnd) 1 ME 109 1 JU 188 2 JU 88 2 ME 210 2 ME 110 2 ME 210 1 ME 1ll 2 ME 410 1 T/E 1 IE 110 3 T/E 1 U/I 5 U/I 1 T/E

Additional Ground Target Strafing Results: 5 Barges (1 set on fire) Many 4/D Bulidings straf- 30-ft Tug destroyed ed on several occasions 60-ft Power Launch set on fire 7 soldiers, plus others Hangars 0-2-6 (one of these explo

The following Memorandum by Colonel John B. Henry of the

359th Fighter Group serves the same purpose of advice for neophytes on "Strafing' as that by Colonel Duncan provides on

"Dive-Bombing". It is based on the very rich experience of one of the youngest and keenest groups in the Command, one of whose Squadrons (505) set up an amazing record of achievement

in the days since Invasion.

-_ F_ 144 - 292 -. _- ,'I HE AD QUU ARP fl^ AAP STATION F-378,' U. S. ARMY

"DOWN TO EARTH"

based Ground strafing tactics of this organization are principle that maximt damage to ground installations on the time, be accomplished during the shortest possible must flak. during which our airplanes are within the range of light aircraft to Because of the extreme vulnerability of the P-51 pilots kind of damage, it is considered by most of our any unless that attacks on ground targets are not worth the risk vul- those targets are poorly defended and are extremely nerable to .50 calibre fire. targets of Most of our ground strafing objectives are the opportunity and tactics are varied somewhat to suit of the attack. It is considered that good air circumstances of and solid understanding of the basic principles discipline our light strafing are the most importance explanations of losses while "on the deck". at While searching for the targets we prefer to cruise from 12,000 to 14,000 feet with all flights line abreast. When a desirable target is called in a squadron splits into other two sections. One section conducts the attack while the is provides the air cover. The first pass across the target is made at a speed of about 400 miles per hour, if there reason to suppose that ground fire will be encountered.

Flights makng the attack are spread astern at inter- to vals of 3,000 feet or more. This interval is large enough allow each man in the flight to pick out his target and study it before opening fire. The interval is also large enough to to prevent damage to preceeding flights by ricochets and allow breaking off the attack at any moment. Men flying astern them always cover the flights which have imnediately preceeded when across the target in an effort to reduce the ground fire it is encountered, but flights not already committed to attack, break away as soon as Rround flak is called in and the order has been Dassed out by the souadron leader.

-2)f3 . : l Most of our ground strafing has been don by individual *qaadrons acting i enepeadenty wever, when two or more squadrons are acting together, one squadron is always left for top cover.

Plights in trail, with individual airplanes flying several hundred feet apart, is the preferred formation for ground strafing. However, when the target does not have sufficient hori- zontal length, we often break off into two ship elements. For dive-bombing we usually use a string formation of individual airplanes. Zaoh pilot must be allowed to give his entire effort toward gaining the utmost accuraoy, whether it is in firing the guns or dropping a bomb. The interval between airplanee is large enough so that no attention need be given to avoiding a collision.

Prom the moment the first airplane crosses the target every effort is made to keep waves of lights on the target without interruption, until satisfactory damage has been done, flak has been called in, or until all but a reserve of amunition has been expended. On asme targets the top cover has been called in to make a few attacks and the flights that are low on amun4i- tion, replace them.

A very strong effort has been made to get pilots "accuracy conscious' in ground strafing. Motion pictures showed the typical burst starting a few hundred feet in front of the target and crossing through the target to a few hundred feet in front of the target and crossing through the target to a few hundred feet on the other side, without a pause. At present we usually try to fire one or two "sighting-in" bursts at long range. so that at 1200 feet or so the pilot can be' all set to open up with the long burst, down to 500 or 600 feet without a break. Pilots were told to apply slight forward pressure to the stick during the entire pass to correct for bullet drop and to cease firing the moment their sights went off the target. The advice worked so well that recently one squadron of 14 airplanes set fire to 16 e/a on a field, destroyed two gliders and most of the ships had a small reserve of aiummition to come home on. Even on this job a lot of ammunition was wasted by firing into airplanes already burning and by making multiple passes on the gliders. Some of this waste could just as well have been expended in the fixed installations of the field. Un- manned gun positions were sighted and called in, but by keeping airplanes on the attack at all times, these positions were

- 294- always covered. Top cover of this attack was a flight of four and two stragglers from another group. They patrolled the outskirts of the field. .asseawere made on the field. the

It is all good and well to say that one pass is enough for any airfield but we find that 400 miles per hour is too fast for much damage in one pass so, unless ground fire has been encountered, before the last flight passes, we have the first flight in position for another attack. After the first pass the flights start coming in from different directions but always remain in mutual support of each other. The pattern is at a very low altitude.

After a long lull, when no opposition has been encountered from the Luftwaffe in the air, a couple of missions of ground strafing, despite the risk, does a lot for the morale of the pilots. Just to fire their guns and to know they are back to the job of doing some damage, boosts their spirits and tides them over until the next batch of Huns come to meet us in the air.

By flying past a ground target after it has been called in we usually are able to position ourselves for the attack, either out of the sun or downwind. In the late afternoon, when the sun is low on the horizon, we prefer the "out-of- sun' attack if the ground defenses are unknown. However, for the moat part, we try to attack downwind so the smoke from the target will not obstruct the vision of the pilots following. Crosswind targets are avoided when possible because of the excessive drift which sets in during the long burst. Incidently, these long bursts are almost a "must" since most of our airplanes have only four guns and usually at least one or two of them are Jammed and'useless. One of our "pet peeves" against this airplane is it's lack of fire power in combat models prior to the "D" series.

Briefing for ground strafing missions has been of very little value. Information on the nature of the target and it's defenses have never proven correct for us. When ordered on a ground strafing mission it would be of great value to know the location of light flak positions and heavy flak positions, within a radius of 50 miles. By knowing heavy flak positions in the area we could ascertain the best course to

- 295

'*t AX . take in oljmbingba up to a safe altitude. AA it is, we usually lea area, then climb in a series of turns to avoid oitiea, for 'dring the attack the aquadrom leader pulls about 40 inches of manifold pressure and main- tains the highest possible airspeed. After the first pass across the target 250 to 300 miles per hour is considered desirable and for climbing back to altitude about 200 miles per hour.

In summary the following points are considered of chief importance in keeping losses low, with a maximum amount of damage to ground targets:

1. Dependable air discipline. 2. Accuracy of fire to make every bullet count. 3. Keeping the target (especially airdromesl covered at all time so that gun positions cannot be manned, or if they are, they can be fired upon immediately. 4. Mutual support among all flights at all times. 5. Minimum altitude at all times and a safe alley of retreat for climbing back to altitude after the attack is completed.

/s/ John B. Henry, Jr. /t/ JOHN B. HENRY, JR. Colonel, Air Corps. Ccmmanding.

"(.SUI'TS

Among the most useful scientific developmants in the Air

Poroes was the study of the effects of gravity and pressure on the pilot's body, and the discovery of means to overcome its effect, especially in long steep dives and sharp turns at high speeds. The following letter from Lt. Kenneth E. Penrod to the author, is therefore of very great interest:-

: : ! 14 t . * :.--*" . -' - ' ' t 29S;6-'Xg e 0f; ,, EIGHTH AIR POR( 1st Central Medical Est I APO 634

SUBJECT: Berger Anti-G Suits

TO : Headquarters, 66th Fighter Wing, Sawston Hall. Attn: Col. W.H. Heinrioks.

1. As a result of numerous requests by test pilots in the U.S.A. for some sort of protection against high "G" encountered in fighter pilots, work was begun on the project in the United States as far back as 1938. The original development consisted of an inflated wide abdominal belt, fashioned somewhat after the common motorcycle belt. The evolution of the project was in the direction of a pair of trousers giving pressure in the legs as well as the abdomen. The theory behind the development was that if external pressure could be applied on the skin, and hence around the blood vessels, the excessive pooling of the blood in the lower extremities due to the pull of gravity, which in turn results in pulling blood away from the brain, causing a dimming of vision and "blackout', could be avoided. Late in 1943 a suit had been perfected and was ready for field use.

2. Acting on the suggestion of Lt. Col. J. J. Smith of the 8th Air Force Central Medical Establishment, who had viewed developments in the U.S.A. on his brief visit to the Zone of the Interior in September 1943, a request was submitted for some anti-G suits for test, to be accompanied by a qualified demonstrator. Accordingly, in December 1943, Capt. Geo. L. Maison of the Materiel Command Aero-Medical Laboratory arrived in the ETO, together with 100 anti-G suits.

3. Meanwhile, development had been going on in the R.A.F. of an anti-G suit based on a principle of water, rather than air pressure. Comparative testa were conducted throughout January and February of 1944 and it was determined that, so far as protection from high G's was concerned, there was

- 297 -

N little to choose from betwee the two suits. So, since prooure- oft the R.A.. water suit' be t f r, the th Air Force ighter Command Surgeo, ol. M lnay, suggested ioediate proourment of quantities of the R.A.. water suit- (also known gs the Prank suit}. A small operinntal order for the U.S. air suit (Berger suit) was placed at the same tieo.

4. Subsequent developments, however, acted against neo water suits. the It was soon found that, although it did do its presented job, i.e., protect the man against high 0, the advantages, dis- such as weight, bulk, heat, comfort, eto., out- weighed the advantages. As a Oonsequence, the project was abandoned for the time being.

5 . In the meantime the 9th Air Force, which had originally ordered the U.S. Berger suit, was receiving delivery and by end the of June 1944 had all pilots and planes (exoept for a few groups of P-51's) outfitted with anti-0 suits. The first U.S. anti-G auits and modification kits for P-51 aircraft were aooordingly releaased by the 9th Air Foroe to the 8th Air Porce Pighter Command and by 3 June 1944 one group, the 339th, oon- manded by Col. Henry, was equipped and ready to use the suits. British type aooelerometers were installed and, following three hours of training flight during which all the planes took off and racked" the planes around, diving, pulling out, dogfighting, eto., to get the feel of the new equipment, the group became operational again wearing the U.S. Berger air suits. The subsequent history of this group has been that they have worn the suit 100% on all missions since that day and the oomments of the pilots have been highly favorable. Many pilots have not hesitated to state that the suit has helped them to maneuver their plane through tighter turns than ever before and has resulted in the shooting down of sowe German planes.

6. Following the pioneer work of the above group, other groups have been equipped as the material became available. The second group to be so equipped was the 4th, where, it so happens, many of the original comparative teasts were run. This group had also been conditioned against the use of a G-suit by virtue of having worn the R.A.F. water suit and having abandoned it. At present this group is wearing the U.S. Berger suit and is finding it to offer them the ease advantages as were previously mentioned with the 339th Group, i.e., more

- 298 - maneuverability of the airplane.

/a/ !Knneth E. Penrod /t/ IETH E. PaOD lst Lt., Air Corps Asat in Psychology.

*CHATTANDOGAS" AMD 'JACKOTS?

The "Duzs Boys" ideas were carried into effect by the able staf of tacticians at General K.Ener's Headquarters, over 100 miles away, General Griswold, Colonels Burns, James, du Pour,

Callahan, and the combat 'opa" officers, in close consultation with the Group C.O.'s (See Chapter on Planning the Mission).

They laboured and gave birth to the now famous "Chattanooga Choo-ohoo A & B" plans. Unlik Gaul, all Germany proper vwa divided up into but two parts, coposed of a fairly regular series of rectangleos, the Norther Series was for "A", and the Southern for "B" plan. Every group had its own area, with the

P-51*' assieged to areas farthest from base, the next most distant were assigned to P-38 groups, and areas within the shorter ranges, to the P-47's. when the field order called for a 'Chattanooga "A", railways, locomotives, marshalling yards, and stations in Northern Germany were the primary targets. The same oodeword with "B" sent 1,000 fighters roaming Southern

Germany. It was aimed to paralyse transport. The first

- 299 - ? -. - - ;

~'I ~~ "Chattanooga" mission ,May 21, 1944. It effects in

Germany were devastating and nothing that moved was spared.

The same grid plan was used for "Jackpot A & Br with the same groups operating in the same areas, only under this code- word, the targets were airfields. 'Jackpot" filed orders had been in use earlier, but by this plan, organized widespread strafing now assumed a strategic pattern. It was like dropping a regiment carrying 400 - .50 calibre machine guns onto a specific area and hitting 15 such target areas simultaneously, in each of which were located anywhere from 3 to 10 airfields.

The scores graphed on Plates X and XXV tell the story of its value in destroying the Luftwaffe "in being". Losses there were, in far greater proportion per mission, than on escort missions which the Nazis by now were leaving severely alone.

On the other hand, the dividends were much higher and victory scores mounted for every group. General Kepner had been able to come back to his predecessor's policy of "Knocking down Huns", but only because the escorts were a proven success and the bombers rendered relatively inmmm to enemy attack. The "Jack- pots" would make the Boche, in the future, still less able to justi- bounce the bombers. It was a tactical effort now fully

fied for the 8th Fighters by virtue of the fact that they had

achieved the strategical objective of getting the bombers through

- 300 - to their targets. Douhet c had been justified in practice:

Two "first time" incidents of great interest occurred on

August 18, 1944 to further illustrate the versatility of Fight- ers of the 8th. The spectacualr success of the R.A.F. Rocket- projectile-equipped Typhoons, on strafing missions prompted the irrepressible 78th Group to emulate their tactics. Colonel fPrd Gray, the C.O., and one other pilot went out with 6 R/P attached to their planes, three under each wing. It was a first attempt and purely an experiment. Six were aimed at a marshalling yard, two at a railroad control tower and three at

stationary trucks, all of which missed. On the way out, Colonel

Gray, still with one rocket projectile unfired, aimed at the

hulk of a small direlict ship off the beachhead and swore,

when he thought he saw it miss. "Well, that makes it 100 "'

Much to his surprise the rocket, describing a beautiful para-

bolic arc, went nearer and nearer the target and then, wham.'

A perfect hit - the only one of the day' Probably it wa3

sufficient encouragement for another trial.

The other attempt finally had a chance to be tried out

for the first time, after it had been discussed very often

before, on flying fields. It was the problem of how to rescue

a squadron pal who had been forced to bail out unhurt due to

- 301 -

WJ,t cIH%^ ^aJif rf®»~~~0 engine failure over enemy territory. When Col. Duncan went down his boys were about to try it, but the marshy land prevented, On August 18, 1944 about 20 miles west of Soissons, the 355th Fighter Group (on P.O. 523) was dive-bombing and strafing when Captain Bert W. Marshall, leading 354th Squadron, was forced to

bail out due to a flak hit in his motor. He landed in a field on which there was only one German truck and its driver.

While his wing man covered the truck driver and sprayed him every time he tried to move, 2nd Lt. Royce W. Priest landed, picked up Captain Marshall, on whose lap he sat; they discarded their parachutes and dinghies, pulled over the canopy and took off and brought the C.O. safely back. Priest, who is the direct antithesis of such 'types", was jokingly accused by his squadron mates of "bucking for a promotion with his C.O.' He quickly answered that if that were the case it would have been better to have left the Captain, thus creating a T.O. (Table of Organization) vacancy' A great feat by irrepressible and unbeatable pilots.

On that same day, August 18, Colonel Hubert Zemke, whose former outfit the 56th Group has become the best known fighter group in the world, went out with his new assignment the 479th. Certainly one of the most successful, if not the record, mission of VIII Fighter Coumand was the penetration, target and withdrawal escort (P.O. 522) conducted and led by Colonel Hubert

- 302 - Zemke's 479th Fighter Group soon after he had left his famous

56th Group to assume command of the youngest outfit of the

VIIIth, on August 18, 1944. The official teletyped mission report was as follows:

A. 479TH FIGHTER GP. COL. ZE2C2 LEADING. B. 50 P-38'S (17-434, 17-435, 16-436) UP 1218 DOWN 1915. C. 2 P-38'S RETURNED EARLY. G. 1 NYR. 2ND LT. PHILLIP '. 1, iNING, 434TH SQ (BELIVEED TO BE CAUSED BY FLAK) H. GROUND CLAIMS: 51-0-52 TWIN EIGINE 8-C-1 S INGLG -1;GIrE 1-0-0 UNDE::TIFD 60-0-53 TOTAL

I. RENDEZVOUS AND LANDFALL IN 1341 ON COAST N OF BAYEUX 16,000 FT. '/ITH 2ND DIV B-24'S IN GOOD FORMIATION. AFTER NANCY/ESSfY AILDRO tLRECEIVED EXCELIrNT BOMEB HITS L; N E AND S PARTS Or' FIELD, TWO SQDNS STRAFED FIELD TO COMPLETE JOB, WHILE OTHER SQDN CONTINUED WITH BONTBERS. TOTAL OF 6-7 PASSE'S lAlDE. LIGHT MEAGER FLAK E~1COUNTERED ON FIRST PAJS ONLY. AT 100 FT. PLANE PILOTED BY LT. MWlING SHOWED JOCKPIT :FLASH, ROLLED OVER, CRASHED AND EXPLODED IN MAIN STREET OF NANCY. SQUADRON ESCORTING BCMB2S BROK0A'AY N OF LE )fANS 18,000 AT 1705, LANDFALL OUT N O' BAY-AUX 1731 18,000 FT. OTH.E!? SQDNS LANDFALL OUT AREA CALAIS 9 AND 18,000 FT. APPROX 1725.

It is important to mention also a new dive-bombing technique for P-38's. On 14 July 1944, the 55th Fighter Group sent

two planes (one "Droopsnoot" 3 and one escort) to the Foret de

Boulogne where two gasoline bombs and one N76 200-pound hicen-

diary were dropped against an ammunition dump. The borbs were

dropped at an indicated air speed of 200 miles per hour on a

(*3 - "Droopsnoot" was a P-38 carrying bombardier and bomb sight in front of the pilot.) - 303 - heading of N. NE. Hits were-not-observed but a fire was seen to be blowing a few minutes later when the target area was observed from Nest of Boulo-ne at 10,000. The target was hit at 2010, hours.

This action wbas the first taken by the 55th Group follow- in practice in the Bradwell Bay area of using belly tanks equipped with tail fins from 1000- and 2000- pound bombs.

Tests were carried out with a P-38 ' droopanoot" and were usually conducted at 5000 feet with 210 m.p.h. indicated.

For trial settings, tables for 500-pound bombs were used. A tank equipped with a 2000-pound bomb fin worked more satis- factorily. The pilot has noted a slight flutter in the

elevator control on the take-off which might be attributed

to the fact that tanks were not clinched up as tight in the

shackle as they might have been. Other flight character-

istics were normal. Take-off was normal and comparable with

aircraft equipped with two full belly tanks.

FLAK

An interesting sidelight on both these types of "buzzing'

was the added attention we had to pay to flak. By force of

the circumstances, on the high altitude escorts, heavy flak

was an enemy weapon about which our fighters could do nothing

but take evasive action or disregard it, and the medium and

- 304 - light flak because ofits range was a matter of no concern.

But down "on the deck", the small arms and medium flak became objects of prime attention and "Flak Officers" of the A.A.A. attached to the Air Corps, came into new prominence from their former obscurity and seeming uselessness. Flak maps even down to a 1/10,000 scale for all enemy occupied Europe marking the position of every gun, became the obsession of the Command

Liaison Officer, until D-Day put an end to that form of keeping G.I.'s busy and ruining their eyesight.'

Such then were the varied and devastating activities of the VIII Fighter Command which called forth the following praise in a memorandum to the Historian of USSTAF, Dr. Bruce

Hopper, from Wing Commander Nigel Tengye of the R.A.F., one

of the best qualified observers and ablest writers on war fly-

ing in Great Britain.' --

June 29th. 1944.

Dear Professor,

I mentioned to Capt. Stackpole the other day a slant on certain pre-and-post invasion air activity which I think should not be allowed to pass unrecorded.

It seems to me that one of the many remarable achievements of the Air Forces - indeed, one of the most remarkable - during the last few months up to and beyond "D-Day". has been the flex- ibility of the VIII Fighter Command. On one day they were asked to carry out a seven hour escort mission into Germany, and on the next, general strafing missions in support of the armies.

I can think of no other Command - R.A.F. or U.S.A.ASF - who

- 305 - has ever been asked to mix the strategic with the tactical in such precise terms. Certainly, the heavy bombers have been asked to bomb strategic taagets one day and taotioalhtargets on the next, but the change has involved-little orin differenee to the technique employed by the airorews. ference The primary function of VIII Fighter Command is the escort of long range bombing. Presumably, unless General Kepner and his staff had not been imbued with a desire to extract the last drop of use from his squadrons, they would have remained capable only of escorting bombers efficiently; and if, on 'D' Day, they had been called upon suddenly to assume the same functions as the 9th Air Force squadrons, they could have only done so as ducks out of water. But for weeks past 8th Air Force fighter pilots have practiced low level attack on the way home from their escort missions, with the result that on 'D' Day the Allies could call on them and receive from them the same support as from specialists.

But in fact the VIII Fighter Conmand did more than this. They patrolled at high levels an arc with a radius of up to 100 miles from the beaches to prevent the Hun approaching, thus helping materially to provide a sanctuary within which was the beach head. And having completed this aspect of their mission, they then came down to strafe, Other missions were solely strafing missions both with cannon and bombs - note, bombs!

No doubt you have already noted all this, in which case forgive me for bothering you. But in case you have not, you may agree that there is material here worth a lot of elabora- tion.

Dr. B. C. Hopper U.3.S.T.A.P. Nigel Tangye, W/Comdr., R.A.P.

- 306 -

,i& la CHAP2 XI

'D-DAY -

The invasion of Europe tion of the Allied General Staffs from December 7, 1941 on, for it was fully realised that an area as vast and complex aa the one Germany would hold when it reached its maximum expansion in the fall of 1942, could not be subdued by aerial bombardment alone. Surely when Douhet advocated his total war, he hardly conceived of areas larger than the national status then in existence. Certainly few ould dream of an air conquest of a continent without the eaployment of ground forces. That the strategical bombardment of German occupied territory had gone a long way toward weakening the enemy's power to continue the struggle, was realized by all, and by none more than by Germany herself. Hence her titanic efforts to halt the bombing of her cities at all cost.

Stalin had called for the invasion from the West as earls as the fall of 1941, when the devastating advances of the Ger- man "Blitzkrijeg swept to the gates of Leningrad, Moscow and

Rostov and Bussia emerged as the major bulwark of defense against the Nazi menance of world domination. During 1942, while heroic Stalingrad held, the Japs were halted in the far

- 307-

SI!" Pacific, and Rommel almost at the Nile Delta, the high tide of

Facist expansion was reached, then slowly it began to ebb. We were wise in refusing to be rushed into a premature invasion of

Europe, and, as has been recounted, the Teheran Conference of the Big Three came to agreement on the grand strategy of the

Allied Powers, a general settlement of the dates and the full agreement on the part to be played by each of the participants.

The Allied Strategical Bombardment program, through May, 1944, a sine gA non of the invasion, has been portrayed in the pre- ceding chapters, over the broad background of the entire war.

False rumors, faked German reports, used by the enemy to feel us out, or to trick us into revealing the time and place

of the invasion, various amateur conjectures, countless mess-

hall and barracks' rooms "bull-sessions", all focused on the

great question of "when and where will it take place?" Only

a very limited number of Allied officers were included in the

group, known by the code word 'bigot", which had been briefed

on the full details of the invasion plans, and they, only for

that part of it for .which they were responsible. "The time,

place and complete plan", as one irreverent airman put it,

"were known only to God and Ike". Though probably a gross overstatement, it certainly evidenced the ideal sought after

by the Allies; at the final moment it would appear that the

-308-

~, ( :- -4 ; 4 , -.

S' " , 4 ultimate decision to say "go" was on the shoulders ofenea3 co- Eisenhower alone. That he had to do so without too good operation on the part of the elements, was fully evidenced by the fact that, in the first half of June, Normandy endured the filthiest weather that it had suffered in twelve years. Preparations at the airfields involved the repainting of thousands of aircraft with the new battle colors; the work was conducted under the most stringent regulations of secrecy. This was done to prevent the wily Hun from imitating the mark- ings on captured aircraft and "bouncing" on our unsuspecting airmen while appearing to be friendly. Broad white stripes across the wings of the fighters and wide bands around the fuselage, growing narrower toward the tail, gave a zebra effect to Allied aircraft. The vicinity of all our airfields was

blocked off from civilian traffic, prior to D-Day, but so numerous were the air stations in England that diversion from one, forced traffic past another. This 'tight little isle" was like a vast unsinkable aircraft carrier anchored in the ocean off the shores of Hitler's "Festung Europa". The intense activity on the airfields, the miles of passing convoys, all newly marked with the big U.S. Air Forces' star in a circle. (They figured Allied airmen would be able to quickly identify that

- 309 -

U r ,, 8.. ~v2

i ; -,_ I , t "; Sa a_ familiar emblem.) the cessation of all civilian traffic on the railways, with the limitation of train schedules, the furtive departure of troops from concentration arsas, under cover of darkness, the cancellation of all military passes, set the stage for the curtain to go up on the vastest and most pre- carious undertaking in all military history; - the invasion of

Europe on June 6, 1944.

Over 500 P-38'a from all of our American Fighter Groups of the 8th and 9th Air Forces took off at 1400 hours on D-Day minus 1 to provide tne cover over the 6,483 vessels which trans- ported the assault troops. The "trigger happy boys" in "bell-

bottomed trousers and coats of navy blue" could tell the long,

slim, twin-tailed "Lightnings" with the bulges halfway down

the fuselages, when they weren't so sure of the other single-

engine fighters. Our airmen in fact make a lot of sport out

of the recognition training given to our "ack-ack" (A.A.) and

naval personnel. Some Allied pilots who have encountered

friendly "ack-ack" make a Joke of the airmen's claims that

more friendly aircraft than enemy have been shot down by our

own guns. Too often the fault lies entirely with our own air-

men who do not pay enough attention to the regulations in

S.D. 158 ( See Chapter IV, page 94). In all events, the choice

of the P-38's for that escort job was a wise one despite the

hours and hours of tedious, uneventful patrols over the - 310 - Channel convoys; theirs was a task of the greatest importance and hundreds of thousands of Allied soldiers and sailors will bless the boys of the "Lightnings" for their presence overhead, which, for 20 hours of each day for the first four days, prevented the intrusion of a single enem aircraft' It was an incredibly valuable contribution. The Intelligence Officer

(Poet Laureate) of the 55th (P-38's) Group, Major Tom Welch,

in one of his Mission Summary Reports, sent this rhyme, which

we pass on to posterity, from the obscurity of Wing Files, not

so much for its literary value, as for the expression of the

overwhelming ennue which possessed the convoys' overhead

patrols:

Patrolled area East of Isle of Wight Hun may have bombed last night. Boats still plying shipping lane, As yet haven't seen an enemy plane.

'Twas the 38th Squadron on Channel patrol, Not a German was seen, not even a soul. We searched the area for just the right time, The waters are rough, but the boats are all fine.

Made landfall at Selsey Bill, 1 Patrolled up and down area "Will" "Bogies" were reported in mouth of Seine, Nothing there, so we returned to the lane, Landfall out, at about the same place, And now they're all home, at their own little base.

Before dawn of the 6th of June, 1,002 Dakotas, with

(*1 - Code word for one of the areas assigned to 55th FG)

- 311 - "Albermarles" and Stirlings' had dropped four Allied parachute divisions behind the German lines: Close behind the crashing thunder of the greatest air assault in all history, caused by the 1,053 R.A.F. "heavies" unloading on the Normandy beachhead,

followed by the huge force of 1,077 8 Air Force bombers, which

together dropped 9,200 tons of H.E. on coastal installations,

came in close liaison the U.S. and XIX and II Tactical Air

Forces (RAF) beating up everything in sight. And a marvelous

job they all did on a plan perfected out of the experiences

gained by our leaders in Tunisia, Sicily, Salerno and Nettuno.

Never had anything on a comparable scale been seen in history.

The staggering total of the Allied air effort, of which

the VIII Fighter Command formed but a modest part, is seen

from the summary in the "Daily Telegraph" by Air Commodore E.L.

Howard Williams, who described the function and work of the

various types of planes in the commands and units which parti-

cipated. The article, as a summary of the work of the Air

Force, is the best available at this time and is to be found

in Appendix "R" (See Plate XXVI). They broke all previous re-

cords during that first week of the invasion, flying 5,600

sorties and dropping 42,000 tons of bombs in a week, equal to

any previous month's total of either the Bomber Command or

of the Eighth Air Force bombers. We lost a total of five

hundred fifty-four (554), planes in that pieriod, - :A D ^

-312- flown. The Luftwaffe lost

396, which must have been olose to 50% of the strength they had in that area. The effort made by the various comnands is

shown by the following tables:-

Tonas Sorties Victories Wgosse I^

RAF Bomber Command 17,000 6,000 36 108 8 US Air Force 16,000 16,000 106 162 9 US Air Force 7,000 15,500 67 155 2nd Tactical Trans- 2,000 12,000 106 107 port Airborne Forces AD.G.B. All Fight- 5,500 56 22 era.

Except for '.he figures of tonnage, wherein it nearly matched

the RAF "heavies", the 8th led them all. The total of enemy

aircraft destroyed to the end of August is hown on Plate

XXVII.

Deep behind the "beach combers", far above the overcast

and as far south as the Loire River, a veritable curtain of

ai :-raft had been drawn from the sub-stratosphere right down

to the deck, by the squadrons and groups of the VIII Fighter

Command. They had again been assigned, in much the same way

as in the 'Chatanooga" and "Jackpot" plans, areas for group

patrol, which formed a vast crescent from the Brest Peninsula

on the .test, to the Loire on the South, and up past the Pas-

de-Calais almost to the Dutch Islands (See Plate XXVI) This

interdiction of the air to the aerial wall made * t ?-a l3.,' - r R-' 313' It f -tt 0 - I - as`"I IU M, 1- 4 , 1-! %-% - possible the landing of 62,238 vehicles and 427,214 men, with

200,000 tons of stores and amnunition, in the first two weeks after D-Day, besides the preparation of a dozen landing strips for aircraft. The Tactical Air Forces occupied these emergency landing fields as soon as possible, thereby increasing their patrol time over the vital area by cutting out the 100 miles journey to and from Ehgland, that still remained necessary for the men of the VIII Righter Command.

June 6 to 8 recorded tremendous victories for the 8th's fighters as shown on Plate XXVIII. It also brought its losses for on one of the bitter days of combat following D-Day, 78th

Group lost five pilots. The next morning 78th was back again and broke all the rules regarding R/T silence. The leader was heard by the monitor at the 66th Wing to say, "Hello, Oilskin,

Hello, Oilskin: I'm orbiting over Dieppe. I am at 15,000 feet and flying East - and that goes for you German bastards too, just in case you're listening in. Come on up'" They didn't come up.

June 9, however, the weather became so bad over the Nor- mandy beach area, that all our aircraft were grounded. The

Nazis siezed this opportunity to rush up reinforcements by every available means. June 10 would therefore be extremely critical for the beachhead. If the Hun could throw us back

- 314 - ^

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-315 a- into the ocean, as he not only planne t e fidetially | expected and had even announced that he was able to do, the

setback would have been colossal, the boost to German morale,

inestimable.

June 10 then was the day that the 8th's fighters really did their stuff. Theyflew nearly 1,600 sorties (See Plate

XXIX). All Wings were nearly equal in their effort with the

66th slightly leading the 65th (See Plate XXX). They es-

ploited the skill they had learned on divo-bombing and straf-

ing missions. The bridges that bad been bombed out and their

connecting railways are shown on Plate XXXI. It made an island

of the area South of the Seine, North of the Loire and Fast

of the Brest Peninsula, for 55 bridges were out and 5 tunnels

were blocked. Some groups flew four patrols, and many pilots

clocked 9 hours in the air that day; an incredible feat of

endurance. In that single critical month from June 6 to July

6, they blew up 357 looomotives and damaged 256, destroyed

1,006 freight oars, and put bullets in 3,547 more, they burned

751 military vehioles and damaged 460 others. The German azWy'

reinforoeonts took to the hedges, they rode bicycles at night,

they tramped to their rendeovous on foot and were a week or

more too late in reaching the front.

"On 16 June 1944, the 357th Pighter Group together with

- 315 - _r . . x,. SMa. L: *=,-,- Am mA? , - , :1_4 ar e,, !, IWII,1-,-, , " -IS it-I 1, the 352nd Pighter Group was ordered to v - 1 f&V trains between Poitiers and Ancouleme. ore was no information available, as to position, direction, type, and contents of these trains. I called the 352nd Fighter Group and it was decided that I woud arrive ten minutes before the 352nd at Poitiers with each of us sweeping the area south.

"When the courses were drawn it was found necessary to carry auxiliary tanks although the 108 gallon tanks were far in excess, but still the only available tanks. I decided to fill the tanks and then briefed the pilots on using them as fire bombs. (*2) This all depended on our targets. On our way to the area we flew only 30 minutes on each of the tanks leaving them about 2/3 full or about 75 gallons in each tank.

"As far south as the Loire River there was a solid undercast around 2,000 - 5,000'. I found myself 5 minutes early and was unable to establish radio contact with the 352nd Group. The only break in this cloud was the area from Poitiers to Angouleme so I proceeded to search for trains. At the Mar- shalling Yard of Poitiers rail transportation was seen. My top cover squadron, the 363rd, heard the conversation over the R/T, and when I started to lead down thru a haze condition, they became separated and thought I was going down to attack. I was now leading the 364th and the 362nd Squadrons at 9,000' covering the railroad and main roads. Nothing was observed except a marshalling yard at St. Pierre or 30 miles south of Poitiers with 3 lines of goods cars with other stray cars totalling about 100 cars in all. About one mile north a train of 30 goods cars was rather neatly camouflaged by being parked between a cut of trees on a sharp bend. We flew south of Angouleme and observed congested traffic also at Angouleme, but I returned to St. Pierre as it looked like it was safe from flak.

"The attack was carried out as briefed: having two squadrons now seemed to work smoothly and not too congested. As I mentioned before, the 3rd squadron was raising hell at Poitiers at this time. Flying north on the sun side I left the 362nd at 9,000' as top cover. I made a diving turn slipping thru some cloud at 3,000' and ended up on the deck approaching the yard from the west or 90° to it. My flight of four was slightly ie staggered abreast and coming in at 400 mph all firing ahead.;~

(*2 - A phosphorous bomb with percussion cap i$ theiA nose wa another clever means of setting ti (frwhen t"y hit-Aaihor)

- 316 j Aa each one reached the oars he released his tanks which sprayed the gasoline around. The aeoond flight not far behind fired into the burated tanks setting many of the oars afire; and then in turn released their tanks as they passed over.

"My second section of 8 planes at this time splashed their tanks on the 30 cars one mile north. After setting them afire the cars began to blow up. We all made one pass strafing to increase damage and fire. Then we pulled up to cover the 362nd while they got in on the fun. This second squadron picked out sections of oars and buildings still not burning. There was no use in strafing any more as the fires spread quickly. It was now that the Germans could see what was happening and started two flak oars to fire, one on each side of the middle train. One element gave him two tanks while his wing men set the mesa afire.

"From above I observed several huge explosions in the yard. About every building, warehouse, and wooden goods cars were burning fiercely. Even some civilian housea immediately ad- jacent to the tracks were burning. The ammunition train to the north was still blowing up when we left. These cars when they exploded burst over 1,000' into the area. It was nice It was nice they parked this away from the yard so we could continue on our fun. Some of the cars looked like they were loaded with phosphorous bombs as they exploded. There was a great deal of small calibre and an stuff going off for a distance of 100 yards next to the train.

"The 363rd using the same tactics outside of Poitiers attacking a troop train and the marshalling yard. It was a much larger yard but when they left 4 huge fires were out of control and of the 100 odd oars many were strafed and small fires smouldering.

"Still don't know about the trains we were supposed to locate but we all had a hell of a lot of fun on what we found. The idea is certainly not new. We did it often against the Japs in New Ouinea to root them out of their fox holes and pill boxes. Only there we attached thermite sticks making the tanks incendiary bombs and filled the tanks half with oil to make them burn longer. The increased flak over here makes

- 317 - it more dangerous in this theater. I've always wanted to try it over here and this seemed like a good area and target to try it."

THOMAS L. HAYES, JR., Lt. Col., Air Corps, Pilot.

There are innumerable accounts from Prisoners-of-War which tell of fantastic difficulties in getting to the front. They had repeatedly to detrain, reentrain, and again entrain only

finally to have to march, not in the compact groups the Nazis

love so well, but in small detached elements. No train movement was permitted by our fighters within 100 miles of the

front. Movement by night was limited to the few hours of dark-

ness of the short mid-summer months in Northern Europe. Trucks

tied trees fore and aft and placed an aircraft spotter on the

roof, to warn the driver when to pull into a farmhouse or hedge.

They arrived at the battlefront exhausted, short of rations,

out of touch with their headquarters. The Wehrmacht was at a

virtual standstill.

Strategic Bombing was continued in between the tactical

work. The following account shows how 361st Group combined

tactical and strategic on the same mission.

- 318 - HEADQUARTERS 361ST FIGHTE GROUP APO 637 uS. irt

F.O. 422

A, Combat

B. 29-6-44

C. 374th Pighter Squadron D. 0935

E. A/O- Oschersleben

P. Light Haze 6,o000 ft - air to air visibility excellent, air to ground fair.

G. PW 190's - U/I T/E

H. 15 FW 190's Destroyed 1 U/I T/E Destroyed 8 FW 190's Damaged.

I. Lt. Col. Webb, Major Hopkins, Lt. Eckfeldt and Lt Richards were Noggin White Flight. We were flying escort to B-24's at 21,000 ft. when one of the flight, Lt. Eckfeldt, called and suggested that he thought he saw airplanes on Oscher- sleben Field. The Bombers immediately started bombing this field. The Leader, Lt. Col. Webb, called Noggin White Flight and started down to strafe this field immediately after the bombers finished bombing. White Flight went down through smoke and fire caused by the bombing. After passing over the field and not seeing any A/C Major Hopkins called and said there was a lot of truck traffic on the outside just south of the field and suggested that we go back and shoot it up. Lt. Richards immediately called afterwards and said that there were airplanes on the field-. We made our second pass from NW to SE firing at what airplanes we could see. We then started a gunnery pattern from east to west down a long line of app roimately 20 FW 190 airplanes and a total of 45 to 50 airplanes on the entire field. We were in string formation, \each man picking an individual target and - 319 - : : < . 1 N , '3-'.:'~~~~~7~

firing at it. Each of us made 8 passes at the field, shooting FW 190'a on all sides of the field. After 8 passes our amunition was running very short and we pulled off the field to rejoin the Bombers. On pulling off the field I (Lt. Col. Webb) looked back and in moderate terms estimated 15 to 20 airplanes burning on the ground. We went back and joined the Bombers and then proceeded on home.

I make the following claims which, in my opinion (Lt. Col. Webb) are definitely very conservative and more airplanes were destroyed or damaged.

Destroyed: 4 FW 190 Lt. Col. Roy A. Webb, Jr. 1 U/I /E Lt. Col. Roy A. Webb, Jr. 4 FW 190 Major Wallace E. Hopkins 4 FW 190 1st Lt. Robert T. Eokfeldt 3 PW 190 1st Lt. Vernon R. Richards Damaged: 1 FW 190 Lt. Col. Roy A. Webb, Jr. 1 FW 190 Major Wallace E. Hopkins 2 FW 190 1st Lt. Robert T. Eckfeldt 2 FW 190 1st Lt. Vernon R. Richards

1 FW 190 Shared Lt Vernon R. Richards Major Wallace E. Hopkins

1 FW 190 Shared Lt Vernon R. Richards Lt Robert T. Eckfeldt

J. P-51 B7W 44-13537 718 rounds of ammunition expended. P-51 B7H 42-106655 855 rounds of ammunition expended.

P-51 B7E 42-106839 571 rounds of ammunition expended.

P-51 B7M 42-106820 664 rounds of ammunition expended.

/s/ Roy A. Webb, i ROY A.lBB,JR. Lt. Col., A.C.

- 320 - The original cla: claimed on the destroyed list.\ The leader (Lt. Col. Webb), and the rest of the flight counted more planes burning than were claimed, so the leader evenly distributed the remaining destroyed aircraft to the members of the flight.

/s/ Roy A. Webb, Jr. ROY A. WEBB, JR. Lt. Col., Air Corps.

The following teletypes expressed to the groups, the views of the "brass hats" at the top, but could not at the time be publicized. History will record it as the crisis of the invasion:

"Estimate in yesterday's Field Order No. 379 that the enemy had seized upon Friday's bad weather to rush all possible armor, supply and reinforcement towards the beachhead, proved correct. The approach roads and rail- roads on the morning 10 June were heavy with traffic in several areas. The determined effort of this Command on Saturday disrupted much of this and inflicted very great damage. A large share of the credit for the fact that the enemy's front line strength has not been seriously augmented is given by high headquarters to the fighters of the VIII Fighter Comnand". - Callahan. "The following message from the Air Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, will be brought to the personal attention of all members of your command, 'I would much appreciate it if you would convey my heartiest congratulations to the VIII Fighter Command for the magnificent efforts they have made since the beginning of the battle. I am certain that they have made a great contribution in delaying the Germany Army, by their low flying attacks in the strategical area, especially in the area West of Paris and the Brest Peninsula. I wish to thank them for their magnificent response and wish them the best of luck in the future.' Signed - Leigh-Mallory. 'I am pleased to relay the above message and add my own appreciation for such superior performances' -Signed - Doolittle. - 321 -

0. 17A *~.^WX^M^^ 'i add my personal commendation and an extreme.ly -4r .-'id of every member of this Command for their tremendou.3 contribution to the invasion effort.' Signed-Kepner."

That the fighters of the 8th gave their enemiej of the Luftwaffe no rest, may be seen by the following excerpts from "USSTAP Air Intelligence Summary No. 36, 16 July 194-..

"From D-Day onwards the entire system of the %.A.P. defenses that might threaten Allied operations on the Western Front was subjected to air attacks of such scope that the Luftwaffe was unable to concentrate its fighter strength over France. The 8 Air Force directed its main effort in support of invasion to area offensives, radiating from Paris, against airfields, operational bases, supply depots, and landing grounds. From Bordeaux to the Belgian interior, close-support and then more remote airfields were rendered non-operational. "As a result, German fighter strength was denied efficient employment. G.A.F. units, rushed to Prance from Reich bases, found facilities destroyed, landing grounds cratered and dispersal areas harassed by a foe who was capable of attacking an entire complex of alternate airfields simultaneously, returning to inflict fresh dawna.e, area by area, on successive days. Enemy fighters reaction to these operations, largely concentrated into 19 days, were negligible, indicative of the Luftwaffe's decline as a defensive force. "Other 8 Air Force attacks were directed against G.A.F. bases in the Reich, and the 15 Air Force continued to strike airfields in Austria, Italy and the Balkans."

From "USSTAF Air Intelligence Surmnary No. 32, 18 June 1944:

"The German Air Force: The Allied Air Forces succeeded brilliantly in neutralizing the Luftwaffe before, during and after.D-Day. In fact, it can be stated flatly that the G.A.F. failed to carry out a single function of air force in countering such an operation -- either in providing adequate reconnaissance to enable the German High Command to estimate our strength and intentions, the

- 322 - time and place of our landings; in crippling our sea- borne traffic before it could get under way; or in offer- ing any effective opposition to our landings and the subsequent operations. This can definitely be attributed not only to the immediate tactical air campaign, but to the long-term strategic campaign which has reduced its strength, serviceability and fighting value.' 'For months the G.A.F. had prepared for an Invasion. Some reinforcements moved into France prior to D-Day, and plans were ready -- and have since been carried out -- to move other units in once the invasion was under way. But actually, the G.A.F. was caught napping on D-Day, and its first aerial reinforcements did not arrive over the beachheads until D plus 1. (June 7). This in itself is a sad enough reflection on the quality of its reconnaissance, which had not only failed to show it hundreds of ships shoking the harbors of England for weeks in advance, but actually did not inform it of the movements of the vessels, many of which began hours in advance of the main operation. Had these been detected by the Luftwaffe and understood, the entire German defense system might have been alerted, and the G.A.F. itself been on hand in full strength from the beginning of operations.' 'ruring the landings and since, the G.A.F. has played only a minor role in enemy defense. Against shipping, it has operated htrdly at all during daylight, and even in hours of twiliTht and darkness its activity, while on an increased scale, has produced only negligible results. Likewise, it has been ineffective in the battle areas irland. 'Disreo in- the implic-tions of the strategic air campaign -which has brouoht the Luftwaffe to the point where the Allied Air Forces enjoy almost unrestricted superiority, it is qui-e obvious that the tactical air campai-ni hlS also succeeded in it3 mission. Constant and continu- in'- attacks on eneuy airfields in France before and since !T-Day o.ve made operations extremely difficult for German aircraft. Bombing by heavies, mediums and fighter-bombers t o-ether with strafing attacks by fighters, h-.ve kept serviceability of plane and fields at a very low point. German aircraft returning from missions often find the

- 323 - fields from which they took off beaten up in their absence, or, while on the ground, are liable to be destroyed by bombs or cannon fire. In the air, Allied patrols in great strength have prevented the G.A.FI. from carrying out effective attacks by daylight, and night fighters and intruders darin': darkness have made the enemy bombing force incapable of achieving any important results, though it has been more in evidence by night than by day. Allied fighters deserve a major share of credit for this situation, at least during the first week after D-Day, when weather which limited the effectiveness of heavy and medium bombers efforts left the fighters to carry the burden of the activity." (The last sentence above refers to the work of the VIII Fighters only).

To record this month's work of the VIII Fighter Command, it may not be inappropriate to summarize its work up to D-Day plus 23 (June 29). They had flown 20,000 sorties, destroyed

261 enemy aircraft in the air, and destroyed or damaged over

100 on the ground. They lost, in that time, 199 planes, and chalked up 76,000 operational hours. As fighter/bombers, they drooped over 1,500 tons of bombs, more than their "Big Friends' of the 8th had dropped in any one of the first nine months of their operations in 1942. The "Little Friends" had become

pretty big boys'

Rivalry between the three 'Nin-s was very keen, thou:gh in

the groups it was more on a *,roup basis, for the groups had

paid little attention to the VingT administration, save for the

service of the A-2 and A-3 section.i. But the 66th Win<7 led in

- 324 - that first terrific week, with 38% of the sorties, and 48% of the victories. The 67th Wfingj had flown 31.5% of the sorties for 13'. of the victories and the 65th had flown 30.5, of the sorties and got 39. of the victories.

Of the planes destroyed on the ground, again the 66th

W'ing contained the pioneers of the activity in their 353rd

Group, so they led the Command again with 48% of the total, with the 65th recording 28%; and the 67th, 24%. Losses were highest in the 65th .Ving with 36~., 66th with 35% and for the

67th, 29i. (See Plate C-X)

The records of the month of June 6 to July 6 indicate a total of 24,118 sorties flown by the 8th with its 15 groups, whereas the IX Pighter Cormmand composed of the IX ASC and the

XIX ASC, with 18 groups, flew 23,453 sorties. The 8th fighters therefore, with 17j', les:. planes than the IX, flew more sorties and they. scored times as many v.ictorie, 3r as t]eur rival.

Let it be said in justice to the IX, however, that the tacticil job of the I:' was primarily ground-str-'f in- aid thet of the VIII to k:3ep the Luftwaffe from off their tailj. But in a larger sense, the entire "Bridgehead Operation" was a tactical job, which was not the nature- function of the VIII, though they did it superbly as /ling Commander Tangye hes pointeI out in his letter, referred to in the next chapter. vSee Plates XCIM

- 325 - and XXXIII) 11 i

That one outstanding mission flown by the 357th Crouop '.i!. provide a thrilling episode with which to cnclude the report of "D-Day Plus". It serves as further evidence of the versatility and i4ngenuity of these fijhters, not only as -entlemanly and chivalrous escorts, but also as fearless killers, even pyrn- maniacs. Even as this chapter was being written, the follo-wing editorial from the "New York Times" arrived (undated) in a letter from a friend, who added, "this seems to be written primarily about the VIII Fighter Command.' It is the purpose of this record to justify that impartial and voluntary tribute:

"Allied Air Power. From the fighting now in progress on the coast of France, in the most fateful invasion in history, the pattern of airpower begins to emerge. Thus far our superiority in the air clearly amounts to absolute dominance. It cannot fail to account in great measure for the comparatively light casualties suffered in breach- ing the "Atlantic Wall", the establishment of beachheads and the holding off of Nazi counter-measures during the all-important first days of our attack. "A mounting tempo of enemy air opposition against our troops ashore is reported, but it is still on such a small scale as strongly to support the view that the Luftwaffe, whittled down in the air and deprived of replacement by the long months of our strategic bombing, has not availed itself of the golden opportunities presented by our amphibious landings simply because it could not. There is doubtless merit to the argument that air reserves are being held back for the defense of interior lines and of Germany itself, but the failure of the Luft- waffe to carry out Goering's orders that the landings must be prevented at all cost can only be interpreted as a sign of weakness.

- 326 - "lMeantime, with mastery and the R.A.F. are emp] HP skill. Almost every dispatch bears testimony to the brilliant success of our air-borne operations. Of similar importance, however, has been the impenetrable screen of fighter cover over the initial amphibious operations and over the continuing shuttle service of supply across the Channel, as well as the protection of the expanding beachheads themselves from air attack. Further more, the bombers have continuously maintained their part in both tactical and strategic employment. Planes as big as Lancasters have been used to bomb tactical targets such as refueling points where German troops and trans- ports were concentrated. They have also flown protecting arc which has dropped a bomb curtain some fifty miles inland from the point of deepest Allied penetration. At the same time large forces of Allied bombers have continued strategic bombing of the Reich, with a particularly heavy attack at Cologne cutting rail traffic to a minimum at that important junction, and forcing long and costly detours. 'The long investment of courage, persistence and orderly planning by our own air leaders in Britain and by their brothers in arms of the R.A.F. are indeed paying rich dividends today. In the invasion to date, honors in full measure have been earned by every service; naval, ground and air. As our land armied grow, armor and infantry will play roles of ever-increasing importance. But there are strong indications already that the vast power of the air arm and the skillful use of its versatility may prove to be the critical element in making possible their event- ual triumphs." - "N. Y. Times".

-s^..IN:

__WiX III WS CHAPTER XII

JULY - AUGUST. 1944

Resuming the story of the Strategic offensive at the point where we left off in May, 1944, in order to describe the tactical work of the VIII Fighter Command, there remains only tq recount the phase done in the months of July and August, in which the tactical and strategical overlapped both in time and space. One day there would be a deep escort into Germany with the bombers, the next a strafing mission to central France.

Sometimes part of the Command was assigned to one, while the rest would go on the other on the same day. Occasionally, as in mid-August, some groups even did both strategical and tactical missions on the same day; the pilots ..;re worked t the limit during this good break in the weather, which again, as in June, made the Air Foi :es such an invaluable asset to the ground opera' ,ns. The Air Forces were largely instrument-' in knoel4 I out .s 7th and 15th German armi,. 3 by early v em- ber. VIII Fighter Comnand's three Wings were notified that they would be assigned one each to thu three Bomb Divisions or three Air Task Forces, and "Ajax" was schedule to cease functioning as an operational Headquarters. The very great difficulties of operating missions without a central Fighter

- 328 - control Headquartera caused the reconsideration of the plan of reorganization.

A. STRATEGICAL MISSIONS

The oil refineries and aircraft manufacturing plants again received the attention of the 8 Air Force as soon as it could be spared from the tactical missions connected with the establishmentcf the bridgehead, - a diversion from its primary purpose which was amply justified, not only by the needs of the ground forces, but by the enormous air supremacy which the allies had by then established. In fact, this switching of the VIII and even R.A.F. Bomber Command back and forth between strategical and tactical missions served a most useful purpose since it tended to divide the enem. - -+t ts, which the Huns attempted to deploy over too great an area thus weakening them as an effective defensive weapon. In military terms, the effect was to force the weaker G.A.F. to operate on what was, in effect, exterior lines and placed it at a great dis- advantage. The Allies could then strike at any place and at any time and in any strength they chose. The outcome of the attacks was that a considerable part of the chief centers of oil and aircraft production were out of action, for part or all of July. Of the synthetic plants

- 329 - Politz, Ruhland, Gelsenkirchen, Nordstern, Magdeburg, and

Zeitz had been completely neutralized, and needed no further attacks. It was not so at Bohlen and Lutzkendorf, which were showing signs of renewed life and so were again attacked.

Schoven, Homburg and Weaseling got their first visitations and were heavily damaged as were Brux and Zeitz. (See Plate XXXIV)

G.A.F. ACTIVITY

The net result of these attacks taken with the effects of the complete Allied air supremacy in Normandy, was that the

German army was deprived of anything approaching adequate support from the Luftwaffe and the Allied breakthrough assumed startling speed and proportions. The G.A.F. never mounted more than 250 sorties daily until September 1, and that only on three occasions. The Nazi counter-attack at Avranches on

August 7, which sought to cut off the American armored thrust to the South, had no air support, and got into a very critical situation. Serviceability of aircraft was away down, rapid transfers to other fields became necessary and Paris, 130 miles from the battlefield, became theri operational center until further advances to the outskirts of the French capital by our

Armored Forces drove the Huns back to the Nancy-Toul area, whence they were unable to cover the trapped forces between the

Seine and Loire, especially those attempting to cross the former.

- 330 - The G.A.F. was forced for the first time to resort to the use of night-fighters in the daytime in the battle area, and in the Pas-de-Calais.

The German fighter pilots had lost their old aggresive- ness and seemed anxious to preserve both themselves and their aircraft. Our heavy bombers over Germany never encountered more than 150 enemy aircraft on a mission during the great advance from Cherbourg to the Marne and the fighter escorts were more than adequate to take care of them.

G.A.F. MoRALE

A new phenomenon began to appear clearly in the period following D-Day, with all its symtoms of a rapidly declining morale in the Luftwaffe. Probably the first indication of it was seen, with a great deal of incredulity, as early as Feb- ruary 21, 1944, when Capt. J.W. Wilkinson, of the 82nd Squa- dron, 78th Group, dove on an ME 109; when the P-47 was still

800 yards away, the Hun pilot opened his canopy and bailed out.

But on May 19, 1944, another Nazi did the same thing for 1st

Lt. Paul C. Holden, 83rd Squadron, 78th Group, when he dove on the enemy, following an attack on our bombers by 20 single- engine fighters, an attack which the 78th Group broke up. In view of the still presentable G.A.F. aircraft status it Would seem reasonable to suppose that the Hun was finally suffering

- 331 - , .; j6 Vi iR -.1 -. 7 `7 -( from a chronic shortage of properly traine

After these first two incidents many noted, no less than 10 were noted in May, and 5 more in June.

The suspicion became almost a certainty when on July 20, the

report of a most unusual circumstance came by teletype as follows:

OISFW OISAS OIWTH V OIAJX NR 12/21 OP OISFPW OISAS OIWTH T US LIST SFC FR(2M OIAJX 1030B TO US LIST 8FC BT

SECRET SEND IN CLEAR - CALLAHAN INT.

1015 R.A.F. 83 GROUP SITED 35 ELERtLY AIRCRAFT 20 JULY CLAIMS 10 DESTROYED. 9TH TACTICAL AIR COMMAND SITED ONE FLIGHT OF 4 FW 190'S AND ONE OF 6 STOP. TWO N.-109'S LANDED AT MANSTON 20 JULY ONE WITH WHEELS UP AND ONE WITH WHEELS DOWN NO REASONABLE QUELTION OP MISTAKEN GEOGRAPHY ONE PILOT SURRENDERED AND OTHER SAT AND WAITED. (=t) AJAX JUL 21 1944 11.18

And it wasn't only with Americans that this happened for

.on August 9, 1944, when four Spitfires were still 1,000

yards off, well out of range, and }EE 109 pilot bailed

(*1 - Though the above incident caused much speculation at the time, coming as it did on the day of the attempt on Hitler's life, subsequent data indicates that one of the Hun pilots had chased a Lancaster over the Channel and ran out of gas. It is hard to say whether this was accidental or deliberate, because of the date. - Author) .

- 332 - out over Normandy.

B. THE SHUTTLE RAIDS TO RUSSIA

The first shuttle raid took place June 21-29, 1944

(P.O. 406). Months before the raid came off, ground crews of a veteran B-17 Bomb Group were sent to prepare fields in Russia, at Poltava, irgorod and Piryatin to receive our "shuttle bombers". At 0728 hours on June 21, Colonel Donald J. Blakeslee of the 4th Group, reinforced by 486 Squadron of 352 Group, led a formation of 70 P-51's (17 from 334 Squadron, 17 of 335, 18 from

336, and 18 from 486) in escort of 3 combat winegs of 144 B-17's from the 3rd Division. This was all part of the 12th and largest American raid over Berlin (up to that time), executed by

1,374 B-17's and B-24's covered by 26 fighter groups of the

8th and 9th. The 4th Group crossed the enemy coast north of

Overflakke Island at 20,000 feet over a 10/10 overcast and made rendezvous with the bombers at Leszno, Poland, four hours later

(at 11133 at which point they dropped their belly tanks. An hour and a half later (1240 hours) 20-25 black-nosed and yellow wing-tipped ME 109's attacked near Siedice, Poland, but broke down through our formation, after the Mustangs destroyed 6 and damaged 3, for a loss of one. They crossed the Russian lines

at 1350, having- escorted the bombers for 580 miles, broke off

escort and landed at the Eastern Command base at 1450 hours,

- 333 - ON TIME' They had been in the air seven and one half hours.

One P-51 landed by mistake at an airfield near Kiev, one B-17

sent down near Siedice, and another landed safely in Russia,

but that night German bombers destroyed nearly half of the

B-17's, in a sudden surprise raid which never should have been

allowed to succeed. The Russians had no adequate early warning

system and German reconnaissance, which spotted our bombers,

flew too high for Russian anti-aircraft guns.

The second leg was flown on June 26, in five hours, to

'Lucrera near Foggia, Italy. They made rendezvous at Brodye

near Lwow, Poland, at 1607 hours at 2,000 feet, saw no enemies,

bombed the oil refinery at Drohobycz (Poland), broke off escort

at the Yugoslav coast and dispersed to three of the Fogsia

satellites, San Severo, Lesina and Madna.

On July 2, 3, 5, and 6, the shuttle raid escorts accompan-

ied various missions of the 15th Air Force; on the 6th the P-51's

brought the 8th's B-17's back to Prance where the 4th Group was

relieved by other fighters. Of the 64 which started out 5 of

the 8 spares returned and 3 went on as replacements as soon as

it was seen that they would not be needed; 7 were lost, but 52

got back to England safely.

The entire storyF-is to be found in the 4th Group report

entitled "Mission to Russia" by Colonel Don. R. Blakeslee,

- 334 - their intrepid leader. The Payoff oame when the 3 pilots returning by A.T.O. (02) landed at Prestwiok, England, and a

"shave-tail" came up and asked them for two copies of their orders'

THE SECOND RAID TO RUSSIA - AUGUST 6. 1944 (P.O. 486)

Colonel Donald W. Graham of 357th Group led the second

raid to Russia with 64 P-51's in addition to 8 spares which

aocompanied them as far as Germany. They took off at 0930

hours, made rendezvous at the Leva See at 25,000 feet, es-

corted the bombers through their Danzig targets to 10 miles

east of Kiev, where they left the bombers at 1630 hours and

landed at their own base at 1700 hours, again a J7 hour trip. Combats took place over the Gulf of Danzig and intermittently

to north of Brest-Litvosk resulting in claims of two Me 109's

destroyed and 2 damaged for no losses. They followed the same

general plan, landed at Poggia, Italy, escorted a 15 Air Force

bombing mission to Toulouse and landed, on August 10, at their

home base in East Anglia. (See Plate XXI)

TiH RAD OF JUNE 29. 1944

On June 29, 1944 the 8th Fighters accomplished what

General Kepner called "the most outstanding escort job ever performed". The targets were oil refineries at Bohlen, aero-

engine works at Leipzig, an aircraft assembly plant at Kothen, ball-bearing works at Magdeburg, the airfields at Pallersleben

- 335 - and the marshalling yards at Oschersleben, Bernburg, and Ascher- sleben, "quite a mixed bag', as the Ehglish sportsman would say!

There were 559 B-17's, 591 B-24's to be covered by 8 Groups of

P-51's, 6 of P-47's and 5 of P-38's (4 of the 19 being supplied by the 9th). About 135 enemy aircraft attacked. Only 7 B-17's and 10 B-24's were lost (about 1.5%) and 3 P-51's. Our fighters destroyed 34 enemy fighters in the air (27 single-engine,

7 twin-engine) and 16 on the ground (12 single-engine and 4 twin-engine) besides one locomotive destroyed and 1 damaged.

Intops Summary No. 60 of June 30 said:

"There were only two enemy air attacks on the large forces of heavy bombers engaged in the day's (June 29) attack on targets in Central Germany. However, the enemy did make a stron though poorly coordinated effort to attack with fairly strong forces of SE and TE A/C still available for the defense of the Inner Reich. Unusually poor control of E/A and aggressive long-range fighter escort resulted in a heavy score against the enemy rather than in his favor. Considering the number of sorties flown and the depth of the penetration, the defensive effort of the G.A.F. appears to be one of the most inefficient thus far directed against major attack on German targets."

General Kepner sent two outstanding groups the following congratulatory telegram:

"I WISH TO COMZEND ALL GPS AND PARTICULARLY 357 AND 361 GPS FOR THE MOST OUTSTAIDING ESCORT JOB EVER PERFORMED ON 29 JUNE 1944. NO BO.SER' W'RE LOST DUE TO EELMY AIRCRAFT.

((*2) - A.T.C. - Air Transport Conmmand.) C "

'Sy -~0_ IN PROVIDING PROTZCTION Y m DYg3)D8 HUNS DD4i AGED OTHERS. YOU MADE T| PAYS DEARLY FOR HIS ATTEPT TO INTERCEPT OUR BOMBERS. *3 SINE FOR PiFECTION AND J : ON YESTMjRDAYS MISSION YOU MADIE TH CLOSEST APPROACH TO IT UNDER DIFFICULT CONDITIONS EVER RECORDED. I AM PROUD TO BE "THE OLD M]AN" OF YOU .'HO CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE HUN 'WHREVER YOU FIND HRi." - KEPNER

On August 6, 1944, the 55th Group flew the entire round trip escort mission to Gydnia, Poland and back, a course of

1,595 miles to establish a new record. The following day Major

George E. Preddy of the 352 Group in his P-51 shot down, during the lucky 13th daylight raid over Berlin, 6 German 'planes in

rapid succession to bring his score to 24k in the air and 6 on

the ground, thus becoming our leading ace, at least for a time.

Lt. Benjamin Rader, also in a P-51, "shot" down a German into

a lake near Berlin without firing a shot. He literally must

have "scared him to death"'

To visualize the tremendous increase in fighter escort

range a study of Plates XXXV and XXXVI will prove of value.

The latter indicates the increase in number of missions and

the increased number of targets per mission.

For the strategic and tactical bombing in June the 8 Air

Force flew 25,600 bomber sorties and 23,920 fighter sorties,

during which the "heavies" dropped 51,000 tons of high ex-

plosives and incendiaries; the fighters, acting as bombers,

laid 1,560 tons of"eggs" which, as has previously been noted

- 337 - .` a' J- L-, is a greater monthly achieved in any one of their first eight months of work. Isee

Plate XXXVII)

C. TUfTtAL. wC O THE VII FIGHTBRS. Summarizing the work done after D-Day in June 1944, by the

8th, USSTAF wrote: (V3)

'Fighter Offensive Missions; Operating on all but six days of the month, 8th Air Force fighters bombed and strafed enemy targets in France, Belgium, Holland and Germany, both as wide-ranging bomber escort and as independent offensive missions. Targets included all types of rail and water transportation facilities, airfields, ground defenses, personnel and equipment. "Too much stress cannot be placed upon the effectiveness of the 8th Air Force and AEAF fighters upon enemy transport in France, particularly west of Paris and south of the Seine. Constant fighter strafing and bombing of trains, road convoys and bridges have brought Wehrmacht traffic to a virtual standstill during daylight. Typical of the work of fighters done in the month after D-Day, is a mission of 30 June carried out by 305 aircraft in which fair to excellent bombing results were claimed on five Seine River bridges and strafing claims included 50-75 flat cars, 20 locomotives, 10 trucks and three tank cars destroyed and the following items damaged: 175 freight cars, 25 passenger cars, 21 tank cars, seven flak towers, five barges, five ammunition cars, an oil storage depot, a canal lock, and a power station. (See Plate XXXI) "Tribute has been paid by all branches of the Allied armies to the fighters which have operated so effectively against enemy transport, materiel and personnel concentrations, and military installations of all kinds. Numerous prisoner- of-war reports have given first place to fighter strafing as the most feared form of air attack. "15th Air Force fighters similarly supported the Allied advance in Italy." ~n~

:*3 - USSAFE, Air uvm Ego, 36", 16 July, 1944.) A 3 , .H.-S TRANSPORTATION ; - kdg

In the first wreek after hee fightershad immobilized 900 locomotives, destroyed 1,500 rail coaches, and dmaged 6,200 more, burned 525 oil carrying trucks and damaged 355 others (presumably eopties or they would have burned.) and 'blew up 187 sau0nition trucks. They mashed up

175 trains trying to reach the front, 420 lorries were shot up and' 40 canal barges. Our fighters were by now carrying loads as great as 2,000 pounds of bombs ov various types and sizes, according to the targets to be mashed. The Thunder- bolts taking off from surfaced runways on their home fields, performed the incredible feat of taking off as a group, each plane carrying one ton of bombs in addition to their 165 gallon belly tanks. These, the "Daily Telegraph" of June 15, 1944

(speaking of the 8th fighters) for aircraft "designed primarily for close escort and support duties, were remarkable successes". (A characteristic English understatement, such as they make about even their own performances.)

The effect on the enemy's transportation as seen in the article which follows, was catastrophic: ('4)

(4 - USSAFE, Air Intelligence Stmmnary No. 39, Week ending . . 6 August 1944.) - - . :¥'

339 - - TRANSPORT SOP (*51: Some idea of the enemy's road movement procedure has been obtained from several prisoners. The chief points are:

1. In most areas side roads are used exclusively, and one prisoner says the use of main roads is expressly for- bidden. A Major alleges that the use of secondary roads and country lanes has prevented the complete breakdown of supplies which would have resulted had any attempt been made to continue the use of the main roads. Side-road traffic, he believes, is satisfactory where the time factor is not critical.

2. The interval between vehicles is 100 to 200 yards, sometimes more in daytime and less at night.

3. Movements are almost exclusively carried out at night because of the comparative freedom from air attack.

4. The side roads to be used are scouted by a small party on the day before the night of the projected move and the route is laid accordingly.

5. Air look-outs are posted fore, aft, and, if possible, on the flanks of convoys and troop columns. These look-outs are equipped with portable radio.

6. When the watches report an attack as imminent an attempt is made to draw vehicles into the side, but there is seldom time for this and personnel usually scatter immediately on receipt of the warning, leaving their vehicles standing.

7. Hours of movement have recently been from 2100 till o630 hours, and an endeavor is usually made to halt in a wood where the convoy can be camouflaged.

8. There are no fixed time of halt and rest.

On August 18th, 3,000 German vehicles were destroyed by the

British Tactical Air Force and on the following day, August 19th,

1700 more. Concerning this achievement, the Daily Telegraph

(*5 - SOP - Standard Operational Procedure) - 340 - wrote the following on August 21st, 1944:

"A striking story of the confusion into which the enemy has been thrown was told by a Canadian officer who has Just escaped. He was lent by the Canadians to the British Army. 'Describing a journey he had to make through the pocket after being captured he said that "all hell broke loose" through our air attacks. Because of petrol shortage all heavy vehicles, including tanks, had to tow others. "On each lorry an air sentry stood on the mudguard and when our aircraft approached his duty was to give the warning. Thereupon the Germans rushed madly for their lives. There was complete chaos, and roads were lined by blazing vehicles dead Germans and dead horses. "Pilots report today that the enemy, in trying to get away, has taken his transport to the fields in widespread attempts at dispersal, but at some points this is impossible, and t there have been many big targets. "There have been occasions on which our aircraft have cally practi- had to queue up in their attakcs. Spitfires following Typhoons in rapid succession... "The following message of congratulations has been sent by our forward troops to all wings of the R.A.F. concerned Friday's in non-stop pounding of the retreating German transport and armour, "A million congratulations to all concerned for their stupendous work." "In the forward moves that are now taking place elaborate plans have been made for the construction of new airfields. Sites still in enemy territory have already been selected.

"Air reconnaissance has failed to reveal the existence any of important enemy defence line, but there is definite evidence of an increase in the German fighter strength. Yesterday the enemy flew more than 300 sorties in the Paris area, but all his attempts to break through our were thwarted. air defences

- 341 - "It is estimated that the Luftwaffe is able to muster in single-engined fighters a strength equivalent to that he | f' displayed on invasion day - between 400 and 500 machines. But I am assured that the quality of the piloting is poor.

"An almost total absence of enemy transport between Bernay and the Seine was reported by Mustang pilots who were over the area yesterday. All one squadron could find after an intensive search of the area were two staff oars, both of which were left smoking.

CAMOUFLAGE

On August 13th, the 353 Group saw ten wheel trucks marked with Red Crosses moving into the battle area. They must have

been carrying a lot of brass: It was remarkable that a convoy

of 30 horse drawn vehicles were seen on the road, for by that

time oil and gas had to be requisitioned on vouchers, by the

litre(quart). They even saw a flak tower that was built into

the framework of a windmill and four Tiger tanks camouflaged

as haystacks near Chartres.

The 78th Group began to suspect these Red Cross vehicles,

when two were hit (by mistake) in a convoy of other vehicles

and blew up with a display like that of an exploding ammuni-

tion truck' Railway cars near Paris were marked with "P.W."

(Prisoner of War). The 356 Group saw a 50 vehicle convoy

heading east, between Evreux and Nantes-Gassicourt (which is

not unusual), but the leading staff car and a staff car be-

tween every third vehicle, was unusual, in that they all

carried Red Cross Flags. "More than 12 ambulances were pull-

- 342 - ing a trailer marked with white orosaos, towards Paris,"

pour-eua t-e 4thrUroup. Rather an Single locomotives were hidden in as close to trees as possible.

BRIDGES

By the middle of August, most of the Marne Canal and nearby railway bridges and 4 bridges at Tenmonde, 3 at Nogent with dozens of others, (both railway and highway) were destroyed or badly damaged, in addition to the results which had pre- vioubly been obtained and are indicated on the R.R. Communi- cations map (Plate XXXI)

R.A.F. BOMBER COMLAND

August 8, 1944, was a notable day. R.A.P. heavies in a one hour's saturation raid, bombed the "hinge" of the German line just south of Caen, the first time that R.A.F. heavies had operated in close tactical support of ground troops at night. This required new marking technique in order accurately drop their 6000 tons, the heaviest of any one raid in history'

The crews were unanimous in their opinion that bombing was particularly accurate, and said, "The scene below was just like a pin table full of winking lights and flashes".

VIII ESCORTS R.A,.F, HAVIES.

That was amazing enough, but on August 15th with the __ *w.1r 1,

-343- 1 2 v ':/ ^' Germans safely inside the noose flung around them by the swift

thrust of our armored divisions, P.O. 516 came out giving the 78th, 353rd and 339th Groups of the VIII Fighter Command,

orders to escort nine waves, each composed of 100 Lancasters

and Halifaxes of R.A.F. Bomber Command, over 'Buzz Bomb sites"

in a daylight raid from 15,000 feet. Meanwhile the other groups

took 11 Combat Wings of 36 B-17's each, of the 2nd Air Task

Force to other tactical targets while 4 Combat Wings of 72

B-24's each, composing the 3rd Air Task Force, went to further

tactical targets. A 4th Air Task Force of 8 Combat Wings of

B-18's from the 3rd Division, flying in trail, bombed the pilotless aircraft launching sites from 25,000 feet down to

17,000. There was a 5th Air Task Force that day of 72 B-24's

also on "Noball" (Buzz-bomb) targets. All the escort for these five forces was provided by VIII Fighter Command. The teletype for the Field Order was 10 feet long! (See Plates

XXXVIII)

RECONIAISSANCE

The latest development of the VIII Fighter Command versa-

tility was the very useful reconnaissance work done by means

of the R-25 camera installed in our planes. The two following letters from A.1.3. of the Air Ministry are high enough praise without any further comment, for the valuable work thus accomplished, developed more or less as a by-product, almost acci-

dentally: - - 344 - A.I.3 (U.S.A.) SECRET ll353H44 For attention of Col. Douglass.

PHOTOGRAPHS - VIII Fighter Command

We would like to express our appreciation of the oblique photographs of airfields which we are receiving from H.Q. VIII Fighter Command, and to congratulate the pilots concerned on the useful bits of information they often convey.

2. Many items have been included in our daily INTREP signal, such as statements on serviceability, activity and dispersal. We have mentioned that certain details have been obtained from oblique photographs on one or two occasions, expressly as an acknowledgement of the skill and initiative shown in obtaining them. We cannot make this a rule, as VIII Fighter Command will be happy to learn we should have to do so several times in nearly every signal we send out.

3. To summarize - The photographs are of undoubted value (i) for identification purposes. (ii) for checking serviceability of airfields. (iii) for showing up "bomb craters" as camouflage. Dummies are often cleverly painted by the Germans and difficult to detect. Oblique give the game away. (iv) for detecting activity in the openings of hangars or A/C shelters, and under trees.

4. The Mission Camera Reports, submitted with the photos, are very helpful, and save us much time in research.

5. A small point worth mentioning. The photographs are marked "confidential" on the front. They are also stamped "Confidential" in red on the back, but very often the red stamping is wet and spoils the face of another photograph, obliterating useful detail. It is suggested that the red stamping be discontinued. /s/ Walter H.G. Heath A.I.2(b) W/Cd. 14.7.44 - 345 - CONIIDfLTIAL B?1275/P44

A.I.3 (U.S.A.) Attn. Col. Douglas

Obliaue Photographs - Airfields

I would like to express our appreciation once again of the oblique photographs from VIII Fighter Command, particularly those taken by Colonel Zemke which are nearly always useful and interesting. By accident or design some pictures have been taken lately which make stero pairs, and those have been even more helpful. Two photographs taken in rapid succession achieve this result.

Some fascinating photographs of an attack on VOLKEL airfield were taken by Col. Tukey of 356th Fighter Group on August 15th.

Please convey our best thanks.

/s/ Walter G.H. Heath, Wing Commander. A.I.2 (B) 21.8.44

The cirCle had come round the full 360 degrees' Night bombers were doing daylight raids, fighters were doing bombing,

strafing and escort' interchangeably. The American fighters were escorting R.A.F. heavies in daylight raids. The 8th was bombing tactical targets for the B-26's of the 9th. The

R.A.F. had sent some of their pilots to seven of our Groups

to learn the art of Long-Range Escort, which, a year before,

the older ally had called "impossible" (See Plate XCCIX).

- 346 - And the American pilots of one Group liked the Britishers so much that they selected some to lead their flights on several ocoasions. It was the peak of versatile adaptability for all

Allied airmen.

On August 4th, the 353rd Group which started the airdrome strafing business, reached a new height of perfection which brought forth from Generals Spaatz, Doolittle and Griswold, the new Comaander of the VIII Fighter Command, the following telegram, and from the irrepressible 55th this "corney" poem which expressed such fine fellowship.

"PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FRELI CG USSTAP TO THE GROUP CMJMANDER CONCERNED: WISH TO COMMEND THE FINE PERFORtANCE OF THE 353RD FIGHTER GROUP ON AUGUST 4th IN THEIR ATTACKS ON ENEMY AIRDROMES. THESE PINE ATTACKS VOLUNTARILY PLANNED WITH DETERAINATION, COURAGE, AND THE WILL TO DESTROY THE EMnIY IS INDICATIVE AND EXEMPLARY OP THE HIGHEST MORALE EXISTING AMONGST THE AIR FORCES. SIGNED SPAA'iZ "TO THIS SPLENDID C.MMENDATION, I WISH TO ADD MY OWN CONGRATULATIONS FOR THE INITIATIVE AND HIGH DEGREE OF SKILL DISPLAYED IN CARRYING OUT THESE ATTACKS. SIGNED DOOLITTLE. "THE ABOVE COXENDATION IS HIGHLY DESERVED AND IS TRANS- MITTED WITH GREAT PLEASURE AND IZY PERSONAL PRAISE FOR A GOOD SHOW. SIGNED GRIS'&ALD."

55 to 35 The Heinie market has gone sky high, When yesterday, you whipped the supply, We think ole Jerry will enter a plea To stay out of range of THREi FIVE THREE Plantlune Huns should all take a pass, Cause your whole gang are "prangers" first class.

- 347 -

, -o XS - ~~~W-

Up II Fighter Command had put were classed as sorties. They had destroyed 4,280 aircraft, probably destroyed 322 more, and damaged 2,365. For this terrific toll they had lost 1,275 pilots, killed or mission in action, but some of these are sure to have become prisoners of war, thoug-h it may be many weeks, even months, before the final facts are known. As all our fighters were single-seaters the number of aircraft lost (1,277) closely corresponds with the number of pilots :IA or KIA. It speaks volumes for the skill of our pilots that 268 'planes were classed as Category E, (irreparably damaged); but they did get back. So as our narrative ends we can put up a grand total score of better than 6 for every loss. It is appropriate to have the conclusion drawn by Air Chief-Marshal Sir Trafford Leih-M.allory, Colmnander-in-chief of the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces who sang the praises of Allied airmen, thus:-

"Should the German Army decide to try to retreat and get out of its present positions, I hope and feel that we have an air instrument that can turn any retreat into a complete rout which will end in the destruction of the German Army."...

%E 7'12-,', - -S-1, . , - *g 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~

'5_ 40 ,.- I "From the word 'go' we have enjoyed complete air superiority, which it was said before the battle must happen.. If air forces on both sides had been completely the wiped out invasion would not have been on. The the Germans, with magnificent commmications of Northern have Europe would been able to build up their forces in area at the lodgement a speed which would have made it impossible us to embark for on the operation with any hope of success. "Towards the end of the last war there was a tremendous decline in the morale of the German pilots. I feel now we have thu that same cycle. They hrve good equipment good machines, but and they have not got the leaders and fighting in the air is a matter I think deterioration of first-class leadership. generally has gone too far for the German Air Force to stage a come-back. Talking own pilots I find to my that they describe the enemy as just 'chicken feed'.

"We are enjoying not only air superiority but air supremacy. If I could take you on a flight over jour beachhead and behind the enemy's lines on our side of see the the lines you would roads congested with mi litary traffic, the villages, the benches, the fields full of stores and equipment, tents, and huts. Behind the enemy's lines you would see nothing - roads deserted, not a sign of movement on or railway. road TMe strength and constancy of our have driven air attacks the enemy to disperse his troops and to forsake the supplies, railways and main roads, and to move on by-roads at night... only

"In July, the A..A... . destroyed 400 day, when the Americans German tanks, in one broko through at Coutances, Allied fighter-bombers destroyed 147 enemy tanks. In July also the fighter-bombers destroyed over transport 3,000 German motor vehicles, when the enemy was already short of transport seriously and fuel. Since Invasion Day enemy over 1800 aircraft had been destroyed in the battle area. In the three months before the invasion Allied air forces operatirn from the United Kingdom destroyed German planes over 2,600 in air combat alone. In these tactical

- 349 - operations we have been able to do in the air pretty vell what we like. In the months before the assault all the 3outh Coast ports and up as far as the Humber were cramied with shipping. %ll the towns and fields alon7 the coast were full of our troops and their equipment. In the six weeks before the invasion the Germans made only 129 reconnaissance flights, most of them fleeting appearances in mid-Channel. Only 11 oenetrated to the LInlish coast. We were constantly on the watch over the Channel, and the moment they appeared we went after them and chased them back.

"In heavy bomber precision attacks in support of the -round troops the Allies now had a new weapon of tremendous power which the Germans did not posses because they hod neither the accuracy nor the forces. It would take a week for artillery to put down the concentration n;' fire in a small, hi-hly-defended area like the Germn: p)iton south of Caen, which can be put doibn by our he.vt bombers in 15 or 20 minutes. Our troops made numerou.; atte:iptd to break throuTh these positions without succorjn. /'e used the heavy bombers, and we have broken throu-,h.

"The lon- and careful air prepanration for t.1he invasion .r,-n p-:ring tremendous dividends. I had oers :nall: discuiia.e! nd agreed "rith Gen. Montgomery that the esiential prelimin- aries to the battle, as far as the Air :Force was concerned were:

1. That we must have absolute air superiority, with, a view not only to protecting our own forceo *frcim enemvy .ttack but also to enable our own Air Force t-' hlve frtedom ' action aogainst the enemy.

2. Th.t we should deal with th.. ene:ny's c 'imuniic tion in so effective a manner as to jinp ae .Treat del';:, ii ',is build up in the lodgement area.

3. A long-term p-licy of hombin- the =-ener. l f-r 'r.nji-rotaon of the enemy railways rt-t',er th;.; -he h r-..:'-. n - hittin, bridges and sin.le lnltsj wa- de'id'Jd .lI:s le n the most effective way of en3':ri:-i 'that en: v reini'irce- ment of the invaded are-, '.,-,ilib3 s .v:-l,' :. r ed.

- . x _ "We have compelled him to detrain far from the battle, to expend his petrol and shorten the life of his tanks by travelling long distances by road, to throw his divisions into the battle piecemeal, short of tanks, ammunition, guns and all kinds of supplies. The enemy had 80 main railway repair and servicing centers. By Invasion Day, 51 of these were completely out of action and 25 were seriously damaged. To do this 66,000 tons of explosives were dropped.

"A fortnight before Invasion Day the Allied air forces turned to the task of 'Bridge busting' and all the bridges over the Seine south of Paris had been knocked down by Invasion Day with the exception of three, which were destroyed after the invasion. Today all the Loire bridges are down and all the Seine bridges except two, which had been knocked down by us and rebuilt by the Germans several times. 'Attacks on oommunications are still going on. German divisions are known to have detrained as far east as Mulhouse, Nancy and Bar-le-Duo, 250 and 300 miles from the battle, and have made the journey to Normandy by road. Divisions from Brittany and the Loire have had to cover the whole distance by bicycle or on foot. Divisions from the South of France have taken 10 to 14 days on a journey that should have taken three or four days. The result has been that in eight weeks of fighting the Germans have been unable to mount any large-scale counter-attacks, still less any regular counter-offensive.

"During the last week or two the battle has become more fluid, which had offered magnificent opportunities to our fighter-bombers. The fighter-bomber is a splendid weapon for exploiting a victory, and when the enemy begins to fall back all along the line it is a weapon we intend to use to the utmost. We shall give him no rest, and will see to it that he finds it fully as hard to withdraw his troops from Normandy as he did to get them there.

"We look forward with confidence to forthcoming events of the battle to afford us still more effective opportunities for the use of our air superiority to hasten forward the retreat and destruction of the enemy forces. Because the Allied air forces had smashed all the enemy's coastal

.- 351 -. radio location stations before the invasion, it was one o'clock on the morning of Inva3ion Daty before the Germans realized that the invasion had begun, although the colossal fleet had been steaming from the Enh-lish coast since six o'clock on the morning of the previous day. The Germans lost 10 or 12 hours in which they could have moved up local divisions to meet the invaders. The radar stations were taken on by Typhoons. The first real warning the Germans had of Invasion Day was when the parachutists dropped. If radar had not been out of the battle completely I do not think we could possibly have effected the surprise wb did."

On August 14th General zaisenhower broadcast his urgent appeal to the Allied fighting men. It marked the climax of the Battle of Normandy and the peak of the work of the VIII

Fighter Commiand.

"Allied soldiers, sailors and airmen, through your combined skill, valour and fortitude you have created in France a fleeting but definite opportunity for a major Allied victory, one whose realization will mean notable progress towards the final downfall of our enemy.

"In the past I have, in moments of unusual significance, made special appeals to the Allied forces it has been my honor to command.

"Without exception, the response has been unstinted and the result beyond my expectations.

"Because the victory we can now achieve is infinitely greater than any it has so fer been possible-to accomplish in the '/est and because this opportunity may be grasped only through the utmost zeal, determination and speedy action, I make my present appeal to you more urgent than ever before.

"I request every airman to make it his direct responsi- bility that the enemy is blasted unceasingly by day and by night, and is denied safety either in fighter or in flight.

- 352 - "I request every sailor to make sure that rpo parit -of the hostile forces can either escape or be reinforcid by sea and that our comrades on the land want no th'im4that fns -: and ships and ships' companies can bring tbd; them.m:

"I request every soldier to go forward to his assigned objective with the determination that the ene:xy can survive only through surrender. Let no foot of (ground once gained be relinquished nor a single German escape through a line once established.

"With all of us resolutely performing our special tasks, we can make this week a momentous one in the history of war -- a brilliant and fruitful week for us, a fateful one for the ambitions of the Nazi tyrants." 19-21 Following another bad streak of weather, from August to draw out 1944, thait grand organization expected gradually most of the picture and pass into history, the largest, versatile, most savage and most efficient bunch of iir-killers will take in the ,reatest air war in history. Their record some beating.

The battle of Normandy was very swift in its development. battle calls tGeneral Montmomery had given one of his stijmulating following on August 11th. Ten days later he could publish the

report. (Au.gust 21, "Daily Telegraph".) Allied "On ;Auguot 11 I spoke to officers and men of the off' armies in Northwest France. I said we must 'write much the powerful German force that was causing us so and so trouble; we must finish with it once and for all later, hasten the end of the war. And to-day, 10 days it has been done. a "The German armies in Northwest France have suffered

- 353 - d personnel and a mandy pocket' h n. Any enemy U in a fit con- d re still many surprises in store for the fleeing, remnants.

"Victory has been definite, complete and decisive. I doubt if ever in the history of war, air forces have had such. opportunities or have taken such good advantage of them. The brave and brilliant work of the pilots has aroused our greatest admiration. /ithout their support we soldiers could have achieved no success. there -11 have done so well, it is difficult to single out :ny for special praise.

"As a British general I can speak for all soldierJ rf1 the Empire, and I can express our high admiration f :,rthe brave fighting qualities of the American armies in the opening stages of the 'Break-in' battle of July 21), and the following days. And we followed with tre ,iendous enthusiasm their great achievements durin- the wheel of the riht flank almost to the .rates of ?ari3.-'.e never want to fight alongside better soldiers.

"As an AlLied commander and over.ll coirm:nder of the. l.-d forces under Gen. Eisenhower, I can praise the fihtin, qualities and tenacity in battle of the Briti3h, ': nadian and Polish troops on the easterr fl';nk. They fou-ht the enemy relentlessly and took a heavy toll of him during the whole of this great battle. But jurely it-irmatters little who did this or that. All that miAtters is that it was well and truly done by the whole .*llied team. The proper motto for the Allies shonuli be 'one for all and all for one'. iAnd that is our motto. I want to th.ank you all for the way you responded to the call. 'irle victory in Northwest Prance, south oi' tiee Jeinu, mar':s the beginning of the end of the German military doiiin, tion of France. Much still retnains t,, be d., ,^ but it will be done more easily. , At

"And what next? n.'K^brurkt; .hst3ert7tJe 3erman forces in N^^ !,rf:~c ,aa'.t tz,/ >oriuLJ .e the destructi , 'f ; ce.a',ci .-e :itill available

-"34

-,Moody-.

*up to be destroyed. After knowing what has happened to their armies in Northwest Prance, it is unlikely that these forces will now come to us, so we will go to them. 'The Lord mighty in battle has given us the victory.' The news is very good from all war fronts all over the world. The end of the war is in sight; let us finish off the business in record time." Mr. Churchill was not quite so optimistic, certainly he lacked the soldier's directness, for from the Italian front, at the same time that Montgomery spoke, he said:-

"I cannot predict an early endto the war. But I can give no guarantee that it will not end sooner than we have so far allowed ourselves to hope."

- 355 - *"H ARICAN FIGHTER PILOTS

" Arma Virumce Cano "

A qparter of a century and more ago there stood on the

Prench airfield at Tours one August Day, a small group of

American pilots - the first contingent from the first ground schools in America. They had just been awarded their brevets and wings as "Pilotes Aviateur Militaire Frano&ise". The

French CmOnandant, a Captain Levy, had had them pushed through their training in record timo; twelve to fifteen hours prelim- inary and dual control, 10 more hours of aerobatics and aerial gunnery and they were ready for the front. He said among other things, "theseboo Americans are Pilotes Excellent". Among them was one who passes that tribute on to their successors, who are today far more worthy of such a "rating"; the fighter pilots of the VIII Fighter Comnand. Let's have a look at them.

They are just typical young Americans, usually not over

25 years of age and most of them several years younger than that, who come from Texas, Vermont, California and all of the other 45 states. All of them have had a high school education and a good portion are college graduates. Many of them are married and a large proportion of these are fathers who have

- 3 - been prevented, as yet, by he war, from seeing their babies.

Physically, they are all well above average or they would

never have been accepted by the Army Air Forces. Those who

develop physical or mental faults are soon grounded, trans-

ferred into non-flying jobs, or, in the few cases where it was necessary, released from the service.

The groups are uniformly good in spirit and ability and

if one closed one's eyes and walked at random into a pilot's

ready room, it would be impossible from their conversation,

their appearance or the horseplay to identify one group from

another. Forty-five squadrons and one as good as another'

Every squadron and group commander will frankly confess,

without fear of contradiction, that his is the best outfit

in the ETO. Some groups have been more lucky than others in finding the enemy and have piled up amazingly high scores with

incredibly low losses; while others have carried out assign- ments in an equally efficient manner that provided less chance

of excitement. For example, the dull job of covering shipping

convoys on D-Day was delegated the P-38 groups who searched

diligently day after day without sighting an enemy plane.

The victory totals of the groups may vary, but nevertheless each pilot will staunchly back his unit commander in the statement that "this is the best damn outfit in the ETO". They are a Corps d'Elite.

- 357 - Oonsider, for a Moent, his equipment and try to imagine

yourself in the pilot'sa position with all of his important,

but buly a*ppurtenances. He is clothed in the usual Air Corps

uniform over uhich he sippers a furlined flying suit to combat

the extreme temperatures at 30,000 feet and above. He wears

a special shoe with a detachable furlined top that is removed

in the event of a bail-out over enemy territory. Ordinary GI

shobs would stand out like a Neon sign on Broadway and almost

shout aloud that the wearer is an Amorican; but once the pilot

remove the top from his special shoes, his footwear is similar

to that of the average continental. Over these special shoes

is a pair of gargantuan furlined, zippered boots. On his hands are his favorite combination of gloves; silk next to the

skin, then chamois, then wool; or silk, wool and leather, or maybe just plain furlined gloves. The fighter pilot's trade- mark, a chamois-lined, black leather helmet is found perched on his head with the goggles pushed back. Fastened to both sides of the helmet and covering all of his face but the eyes, is his high altitude "lung", the oxygen mask.. Electric cords dangling from his helmet and oxygen mask connect his earphones and microphone with the R/T set. Like his wife's little tea apron, his yellow 'Mae West" life vest is hung around his neck

358 -

-NN .....W and fastened around his waist 4 nposition to be inflated in ; event he is forced to land in torparachute over the water. To complete this dainty ensemble a cumbersome harness that carries his parachute and dinghy is strapped over all of his other equipment. This harness fits very tightly and forms a seat that is anything but the lap of luxury.

Once in the cockpit, he straps himself securely in place with the shoulder harness and safety belt across his hips, that will prevent him from catapulting himself into space during violent combat maneuvers or will hod his shoulders in place and avoid smashing his head into the instrument panel in the event of a crash on takeoff or landing. In front of him are the numerous instruments that are the pulse of the 1500

or more horses that pull his powerful fighter through the air. Reflected on the windshield is the luminous gun sight ring and dot which he uses to aim his six to eight .50 caliber guns or

to judge his release point for the one to two thousand pounds

of high explosive bombs which are hung on the bomb shackles under the wings for fighter/bomber missions.

Now, as he pulls the canopy over his head, he is soon to be in a world of infinite space, iine !except for the important but seldom used, channel off i contact.

YOU

Reader, just for an experiment, strap yourself tightly

- 359 - into any comfortable chair within the warmth and security of your own rooaq las into place; then twist your heHi se lt at all times see what is the 180 degrees are directly behind you. Keep this up for 15 minutes, and your neck will be sore in the morning' Then imagine what it would be like if the temperature in your room dropped to 30 degrees below zero and you knew that you must remain in that state of restricted motion for a period of from three to seven and a half hours.

Then add to that the knowledge that you must take off a heavily loaded fighter into a sodden mist that hangs just a few feet from the ground and extends perhaps thousands of feet upward.

Remember that during that seven and a half hours you are to be sitting on top of hundreds of gallons of high octane gas that the enemy would delight in touching off with his constantly probing machine guns, cannons, rockets and flak! All of this time you are a member of a unit and must maintain your assigned position in relation to the other 15 planes in your squadron, in addition to keeping your eyes on the osition of the other two squadrons i(qr op ad a in your mind* eye the loca tbi other groups tn the same area as you. T to picture your intense concentration of flying, maintaiuing your position, searohing the sky around

-360- you, and at the same time following your position on your map to a point 500 to 600 miles from base here- you must meet the bombers at an appointed minute. It doesn't help that you have been over a solid overcast since leaving England and you haven't seen the ground for hours, does it? It doesn't simplify your other gymnastics to throw in the mental calculations necessary to navigation by dead reckoning, does it? Remember you are still alone. No one else is near enough to talk to, no co- pilot, no navigator, no gunner to carry part of your burden, just you and your thoughts; and interwoven in the thread of your concentration is the realization that at any moment you may be engaged in a life and death struggle at 30,000 feet with a vicious, ruthless and unscrupulous enemy who is trying to attack your "Big Friends". All of this equipment has been designed, all of this discomfort has been endured, for just this moment - when the enemy attacks the "Big Friends". For hours you have been strapped in this tiny space, unable to move two inches out of your seat, to bring yourself into position td break up this attack, even at the cost of your own life. The rest depends on your own courage, skill and aggressiveness.

YOU read about it in ten minutes; HE does it 20 days out of 30 every month until his tour of duty, or his life, is ended. There is a man! America can well be proud of him; - 361 - but what is more important, and far more likely to be the case with this aggressive fighter of the Corps D'Elite, he can look within biuself and be proud of what he sees' To these men of the VIII iAghter Caomand, with whom it was my privelege to be associated, I humbly dedicate this volume.

- 362 - Activated: 12 Septembe 1942, at VIII Piterh ]

Arrived in FLT.O Tranaferred frao R.A.F. 12 September 1942. 1942 Comanding Offioers: Col. zdward W. Anderson - 12 Sept. to 20 August 1943. Col. Chebley Peterson - 21 August 1943 to 31 December 1943. Col. Donald J. Ba lee - January 1, 1944.

20th FIGHTER OUP

Activated November 15, 1930 at Mather Field, Sacramento, California.

Arrived in BLT.O. August 26, 1943 Coamanding Officers: Major Clarence L. Tinker (1930-1932) Major Millard P. Harman (1932-1937) Lt. Col. Rosas G. Hoyt (1937-1941 Col. Ira C. Eaker (January - September 1941) Major Jease Auton (September - 1941 to January 1942) Major Homer A. Boushey (January-March 1942) Lt. Col. Mark E. Hubbard (March 2-17,1944) Col. Harold J. aun (17 March 1944)

Fqip.mnt: P-12-B (January 1931), P-26-A (May 1933) P-36 (October 1938), P-39 (September 1942i P-38 (January 1943) P-51 (July 1944). 28, 1943. Missions: First against Europe - December First over Berlin - March 8, 1944

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'w", Biggest day - April 8, 1944 Pirst fighter-bomber mission, April 10, 1944. * Deepeat penetration - Qrunberg (51° 55- N - 15° 30" E), 1270 miles - May 29, 1944. Coat of Arm&: (December 10, 1934) Shield: Per fess azure and gules, a foes robule or. Creat: On a wreath of the colors (or and azure) a aun in splendor proper, radiating from the center thereof, 13 darts of gules. Motto: Victory by Valor.

Record: Aircraft destroyed 120-5-50 Losses 92.

5TH PIGHTER GWOUP

Activated 15 January 1941, Hamilton Field, Califor- nia.

Arrived in E.T.0. 16 September 1943.

Commanding Officers: Colonel Frank B. James (May 1943 to February 1944) Colonel Jack S. Jenkins (MIA) February 1944 - April 1944. Colonel George T. Crowell (April 1944 .)

Equipment: P-38's (January-1942 - July 1944) P-51's (July 1944- ....-...... ) Missions: 184 miasions, 7449 sorties. First "Droop- snoot" (High altitude precision firghter/ bomber)

Record: 98-26-53 Lossaeas - 83 56TH FIGHTER GROUP

Activated: 14 January 1941, Savannah, Georgia.

Arrived in E.T.O. 12 January 1943.

Comnanding Officers: Major Younger A. Titts (Acting) (January 1941 - March 1941) Capt. Charles Stark (Acting) (April 1941 - May 1941) Maj. David C. Graves (June 1 1941 - 28 June 1942) Col. John C. Trosthwarte (28 June 1942 - 15 September'42) Maj. Hubert Zmsik (16 September 1942 - 29 October 1943) Col. Robert C. Landry (30 October 1943 - 18 January 1944) Col. Hubert Zemke (19 January 1944 - 11 August 1944 ) Lt. Col. David C. Schilling (12 Aug 44 .,)

Equipment: P-39, P-36, AT-14, BT-17 (July 1941 - December 1941) P-35, P-40, P-36, P-39 (December 1941 - April 1942) P-38, P-40, (April 1942 - June 1943) P-47 (July 1943 -..... )

78TH FIGHTIR GROUP

Activated: January 26, 1942 at Mitchel Field, N.Y. Arrive in E.T.O. Novembe 30, 1942 Conmanding Offioers: Col. Armand D. Peterson Lt. Col. Marvin F. MoNickle Col. James J. Stone, Jr. Col. Frederic C. Gray.

Equipment: P-38's (January 1942 - February 1943) P-47's (February 1943...) - 365 - Missions: First mission - April 13, 1943 : First bomber escort mission - May 4, 1943 First victory, Major Stone - May 14, 1943 First belly-tank mission - July 30, 1943 First triple victory, Major Roberts, July 30, 1943 First U.S. Ace, Capt. London - Jul 30, 43. First U.S. strafing mission, Lt Quince Brown - July 30, 1943. First U.S. escort of B-26's, October 24,43. First to use double groups - A & B - November 5, 1943. First fighter-bomber mission - January 25, 1944. First group strafing mission - February 6, 1944. First "droopsnoot" (P-38 bomber) escort.- May 24, 1944. Worst day - 10 losses - June 10, 1944.

Biggest Day: July 19, 1944 - 20 on ground at Fenden- stadt, Germany.

Record: 199 air, 75 ground. Losses 78.

33qTH FIGHTER GROUP

Activated: August 10, 1943 (originally as 339th Bombardment Group)

Arrived in E.T.O. April 5, 1944.

Commanding Officers: Lt. Col. Martin S. Zipp (February 1943) Maj. Harry L. Galushe (February 1943 - August 1943) Col. John B. Henry (August 1943 ...)

Equipment: A-24' s, A-25's (March 1943-June 1943) P-39' a (June 1943-Pebruary 1944) P-51's (April 1944)

Missions: Deepest penetration - May 29, 1944 to B Baltic Port near Stettin, 1420 miles Record: 100-3-8 Losses: 27 - 366 - Activated: 30 Sep 1942, MUtoie ?

Arrived in E.T.O. 5 July 1943

Conmanding Offioers: Lt. Col. Edwin M. Rsmage (November 1942 - May 1943) Col. Joe L. Mason - (May 1943 -..... ) Equipment: P-47 (September 1942 - February 1944i P-51 (Maroh 1944- ...... ) Missions: Heavies airdrome strafing 11 Maroh 1944. Deepest penetration to Spremberg (51 25 N 14 20 E) 1250 miles, 11 April 1944.

39D PIGHTE GROUP Activated: 1 October 1942, Byrd Field, Richmond, W.Va. Arrived E.T.O. 6 June 1943.

Comnanding Officers: Lt. Col. Joseph A. Morris (October 1943 - August 1943) Lt. Col. Loren G. McCollum (August 1943 - November 1943) Col. Glenn E. Duncan (November l9 0411 , July i94 ai Lt. Cl. Ben E. imerm (Ju 4.) Missions: First fighter-bomber mission in E.T.O. (25 Nov 43); first mission for "Bill's Buzz Boys" (26 Mar 44); first mission to Berlin (21 June 44). Led VIII Fighter Command in enemy aircraft destroyed from 6 June (D-Day) to 31 Aug (100 plus). Deepest penetration (May 1944) 523N - 120OE - 1036 miles. Equipment: P-47 ' s

-367- 355TH FIGHTER GROUP

Activated: November 12, 1942 at Orlando, Florida. Arrived in E.T.O. Comnanding Officers: Equipment: 1

356TH FIGHTER GROUP Activated: December 18, 1942 Arrived in E.T.O. August 16, 1943

Comnanding Officers: Lt. Col. Harold J. Rau (July - Nov. 1943) Col. Einer A. Malmatrom (November 1943 - March 1944) Lt. Col. Philip E. Tuoey (April 1944...) Equipment: P-478a.

In- Ti VCVft iV VII'A11_ 0 qt,r % 116 , Vf4., ? e -.ggvQ~ 357TH FIGHTR GROUP

Activated: December l,, 1942 at Hamilton Field, Calif. Arrived in E.T.. November 29, 1943 Commanding Officers: Maj. Loring L. Stetson, Jr. (December '42 July '43) Lt. Col. Edwin S. Chickering (July '43 - February '44) Col. Henry R. Spicer (MIA) (February '44 - March '44) Col. Donald W. Graham (March 1944 ....

Equipment: P-39's (January 1942) P-51's (November 19431

Missions: First escort to Berlin and first big combat - March 6, 1944. First strafing missions by P-51's - March 6 and 8, 1944. Scored 20-1-7 no losses. Deepest penetration - May 13 and 29, 1944 to Posen, 1470 miles.

Record: 299*12-69 Losses 67 Averaged 50 per month.

395TH FIGHTER GROUP

Activated: 15 January 1943 at Westover Field, Mass. Arrived in E.T.O. 19 October 1943. Commanding. Officers: Lt. Col. Avelin P. Tacon, Jr.

Equipment: P-47's (9 April 1943) P-51'3 (15 May 1944 - ,,.)

.- 369 -. 36iat PIGHTER GROUP

Aotivated: 10: 1ibond, iebruary Va.

Arrived in E.T.. 29 November 1943

Commanding Officers: Colonel Thomas J.J. Christian, Jr. Equipment: P-47's (To 30 April 1944) P-51's (May 15, 1944....)

Missions: First combat (30 January 1944) 4-2-2 for loss of 1. First strafing (22 February 1944, Chartres airdrome) Biggest day on P-47's (8 April 19441 9-2-2 in air. Biggest day on P-51's (29 May 1944) 20 for loss of 0. Hardest day (6 June 1944) 6 missions. Outstanding escort (29 June 1944) Deepest Penetration - (5230N - 1550E) 29 May 1944, 1372 miles.

Record: Destroyed 146, probables 9, damaged 84.

364th FIGHTES GROUP

Activated: June 8, 1943 at Army Airdrome, Glendale, California.

Arrived in E.T.O. February 10, 1944.

Commanding Officers: Lt. Col. F.C. Grambo (June 43 - Feb 44) Col. Roy W. Osborn (Feb 44 ...... )

rt I`

- 370 - 479TH PIGHeR gOUP.. . Activated: . October 2 8 43 Mae hto ield, al ( Arrived In E.T.O. May 15, 1944. - - - Comanding Officers: Lt. Col. Leo P. Dasard (28 Oct 43 - 13 Novem. 43) Maj. Pranois F. Pope (14 Nov 43 - 25 Dec 43) Lt. Col. Tom L. Riddle (26 Dec 43 - 10 Aug 44) Col. Hubert Zome (11 Aug 44...... ) Equipment: P-38'a

- 371 -