Principles of Systematic Zoology, 2Nd Edition. Review Author[S]
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Principles of Systematic Zoology, 2nd Edition. STOR Review Author[s]: Kevin de Queiroz Systematic Biology, Volume 41, Issue 2 (Jun., 1992), 264-266. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1063-5157%28199206%2941%3A2%3C264%3A%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR' s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of ajournai or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. Systematic Biology is published by Society of Systematic Biologists. Please contact the publisher for further permissions regarding the use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/joumals/ssbiol.html. Systematic Biology ©1992 Society of Systematic Biologists JSTOR and the JSTOR logo are trademarks of JSTOR, and are Registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. For more information on JSTOR [email protected]. ©2002 JSTOR http://www.j stor.org/ Mon Mar 11 14:09:12 2002 Reviews Syst. Biol. 41(2):264-266, 1992 Principles of Systematic Zoology, 2nd edition.•Ernst ing species concepts (p. xix), but that does not excuse Mayr and Peter D. Ashlock. 1991. McGraw-Hill, their failure to mention one concept that has received New York, xx + 475 pp. $39.95 (cloth). considerable attention in the recent systematic liter- ature, namely, the phylogenetic species concept (e.g., In 1969, Mayr's Principles of Systematic Zoology was Cracraft, 1987; Mishler and Brandon, 1987; Nixon and probably the best systematic text and reference book Wheeler, 1990). If nothing else, phylogenetic per- available (Michener, 1969), and it retained a promi- spectives on the species problem have drawn atten- nent place among such works for years after its pub- tion to the fact that interbreeding is not the only lication. When first published, it was current, au- interesting phenomenon that occurs at the microtax- thoritative, and comprehensive, and even more than onomic level (de Queiroz and Donoghue, 1988). 20 years after its heyday I continue to use my copy Mayr and Ashlock also dismiss too hastily Pater- frequently. Although several excellent books on the son's (e.g., 1985) critique of the biological species con- subject have been published subsequently, only Wi- cept. Paterson called for replacement of what he views ley's (1981) Phylogenetics serves as many different pur- as the traditional version of that concept, which he poses. But a lot has happened since 1969. No book calls the isolation concept, with an alternative that about systematics published that long ago is current emphasizes mate recognition instead of reproductive today. Consequently, the publication of a revised edi- isolation. He has attempted to discredit the biological tion of Principles of Systematic Zoology raises hopes of species concept because of a supposed tie to the con- a new standard for the field. cept of reinforcement, the idea that characters re- The new edition has been reorganized and, com- sponsible for the absence of interbreeding between pared with its predecessor, places greater emphasis the organisms of different species ("isolating mech- on concepts and theory. It consists of 14 chapters, the anisms") have evolved as a result of selection against first of which is an introduction to the science of hybrids. In Mayr and Ashlock's defense, even if Pater- taxonomy, including a brief history and a discussion son is correct in concluding that reinforcement is un- of the role of taxonomy in biology. The remaining 13 important in the evolution of intrinsic reproductive chapters are divided among three major sections. The barriers, the biological species concept need not be first two of these sections, which were devoted to replaced. Regardless of historical associations be- principles and methods in the first edition, are now tween the concepts of biological species and rein- devoted to "Microtaxonomy," dealing with species forcement, the two are not tied logically to one an- and infraspecific categories, and "Macrotaxonomy," other. As a general species concept based on dealing with higher taxa. The last major section, titled interbreeding, the biological species concept can be "Methodological Issues," covers issues relating to sys- adopted regardless of whether intrinsic reproductive tematic collections, taxonomic publications, and the barriers result from reinforcement or, as Paterson be- rules of zoological nomenclature. Also included are lieves, they are by-products of the adaptation of mate a glossary, a bibliography, and a combined subject recognition systems to different environments. and author index. The volume is reasonably well pro- Nevertheless, other aspects of Paterson's critique duced, with only a moderate number of typographical deserve consideration. For example, according to Mayr errors, and its size is comfortable in the hand. and Ashlock, the term "species is a relational term like The section on microtaxonomy covers a diversity the word brother" (p. 39). This proposition implies of topics, including species concepts, the ontology of that it is nonsensical to speak, even hypothetically, species, infraspecific categories, population structure, of the existence of only a single species. In contrast, different kinds of variation within species, methods Paterson's emphasis on recognition, rather than iso- for comparing population samples, and speciation. lation, led him to reject the idea that the term "spe- Given Mayr's prior writings on species, it is not sur- cies" is relational (e.g., Paterson, 1984). Paterson's po- prising to find strong advocacy for the biological spe- sition is more congruent with the view, endorsed by cies concept. I was, however, surprised to find logical Mayr and Ashlock themselves (p. 40), that species are inconsistencies reflecting incomplete acceptance of "individuals" (composite wholes). Organisms form that concept. For example, Mayr and Ashlock seem composite wholes called populations as a result of unable to decide whether asexual organisms form interbreeding with one another, not as a result of species (p. 32), and at one point they suggest that avoiding interbreeding with the organisms of other reproductively separate entities that are not distinct populations. in other respects should not be recognized as separate The section on macrotaxonomy consists of chapters species (p. 93). The authors admit their bias concern- devoted to general principles, taxonomic characters. 264 1992 REVIEWS 265 phenetics, cladistics, evolutionary classification, and names) were seen to be composite wholes•albeit of numerical methods of phylogeny inference. Mayr and different kinds (populations and clades)•rather than Ashlock favor evolutionary classification over phe- classes based on shared organismal characters. And netics and cladistics, which is to be expected, but their in each case, the new concept of taxa brought a new bias becomes too great when they define certain gen- theoretical context to comparative biology (popula- eral terms, such as "biological classification" and "tax- tion thinking and tree thinking) (O'Hara, 1988). From on," in a way that precludes the alternative approach- the viewpoint of developing a phylogenetic system es. In any case, the chapters devoted to alternative of taxonomy, the changes involving the higher taxa macrotaxonomic approaches reveal much, both stated are particularly important in that they grant the con- and unstated, about how Mayr and Ashlock perceive cept of evolution a more important role in taxonomy. the alternatives. The chapters on phenetics and cla- No longer are taxa based on shared characters and distics are largely critiques. Unfortunately, Mayr and only interpreted after the fact as having been pro- Ashlock's characterizations of those approaches are duced by evolution; evolution is now fundamental inaccurate or outdated. For example, they attribute to to the very concept of taxa (de Queiroz, 1988). pheneticists the claim that grouping according to sim- Although Mayr and Ashlock have made the con- ilarity will automatically produce a phylogenetic clas- ceptual shift with regard to species, they have not yet sification, and they continue to characterize the cla- done so for higher taxa. For example, they continue distic approach to classification as being concerned to view higher taxa explicitly as classes (p. 113). They only with the branching component of phylogeny. view the entire endeavor of macrotaxonomy as a Regardless of these problems, the discussion of phe- problem of how best to classify organisms "according netics receives only 11 pages, whereas cladistics gets to their similarities" (p. 115), rather than a question of 36. Furthermore, the chapter on evolutionary classi- inferring which organisms or species are descended fication (32 pages) is devoted in a large part to con- from a particular common ancestor. For Mayr and tinuing the argument against cladistics. Mayr and Ashlock, macrotaxonomy is a two-step process (p. 243). Ashlock apparently perceive cladistics as posing a In the first step, species are sorted into relatively ho- serious threat to their preferred approach. mogeneous groups that reflect their overall similarity.