The University of Texas at Austin Government 388K (39090) Study of International Relations Fall 2014, T Th 2-3.30, CAL 323

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The University of Texas at Austin Government 388K (39090) Study of International Relations Fall 2014, T Th 2-3.30, CAL 323 The University of Texas at Austin Government 388K (39090) Study of International Relations Fall 2014, T Th 2-3.30, CAL 323 Patrick J. McDonald BAT 4.136 512.232.1747 [email protected] Office hours: T 9.30-10.30, 3.30-4.00; Th 1-2, 3.30-4.00 DESCRIPTION This graduate course on the study of international relations will survey some of the most prominent contributions to the field during the past thirty years. It is designed to help you prepare to take the Ph.D. preliminary exams for the IR subfield in the Government Department and to help you prepare to execute your own original research projects. To these ends, the course will provide a broad theoretical overview of the field of international relations. The substance of the course is conceptually organized around the question of how social order is constructed and sustained in the international system. Our discussions of theory will focus on the following sources of order: balance of power, hegemony, technology, ideas, norms, international organizations, globalization, and domestic regime type. COURSE REQUIREMENTS There will be four key requirements for this course. First, you will be expected to attend class, keep up with the assigned readings, and participate in our discussions. Second, you will write a series (about 12) of short weekly papers. Third, designed to set up a future research paper, you will write a review of some body of IR literature of your choice. Fourth, during the final exam period, you will turn in an extended “brainstorming” paper that revises one of your weekly writing assignments. Your final grade will be tabulated as follows: Class participation 20% Weekly writing assignments 40% Literature review 20% Brainstorming paper 20% 1 READING MATERIALS The reading material for this course will be made available through two primary formats. First, most of the articles can be found online through the library’s electronic journal subscriptions (http://lib.utexas.edu). I will post any readings not available through the library’s web site to our Canvas page. Second, the following books can be ordered through such online sites as amazon.com. At least one (the Tooze book) must be ordered as an electronic book as it is unavailable in print in the United States. Kenneth Waltz. 2001[1959]. Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press. Kenneth N. Waltz. 1979. Theory of International Politics. McGraw-Hill. Alexander Wendt. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University Press. R. Harrison Wagner. 2007. War and the State: The Theory of International Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. G. John Ikenberry. 2011. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order. Princeton University Press. Francis J. Gavin. 2012. Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Christian Reus-Smit. 2013. Individual Rights and the Making of the International System. New York: Cambridge University Press. James D. Morrow. 2014. Order Within Anarchy: The Laws of War as an International Institution. New York: Cambridge University Press. Adam Tooze. 2014. The Deluge: The Great War, America, and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916-1931. London: Viking. (must purchase electronic version) COURSE ASSIGNMENTS Course readings. This syllabus represents an acknowledgment that there simply is not enough time in a semester to provide sufficient breadth of coverage of prominent theoretical work in the field of IR. Consequently, I have chosen instead to cover fewer readings in greater depth during our class sessions while encouraging you to broaden your familiarity with the field outside of class. Consequently, the course readings are separated into two parts. The first group will be comprised of required readings for the class session under which they are listed. You are 2 expected to read them sufficiently well before the class meets so that you understand them and are prepared to offer your reactions. The second group of readings are those that you are expected to have read at some point before taking preliminary exams. In short, these readings could motivate questions on your exams. Moreover, they also comprise a list of readings that should generally just be known by practicing scholars and teachers of international relations. I would recommend working on this list during the summers following your first and second years of the program. Short writing assignments. Your principal assignment for the semester will be to write a series of short commentaries (500 to 1000 words) about the readings that generate an argument. With one exception (Tuesday, November 25), these papers will be due on Thursdays. Sometimes, writing prompts will be distributed on the prior Tuesday. Generally, you will be free to address the readings as you think best. Given their short length, please keep the summary of the readings to an absolute minimum in your papers. These assignments are designed to push you to take more time to think about the arguments, underlying assumptions, and implications of the arguments in the readings; and most importantly, to figure out what you think about them. Ultimately, I want these papers to serve as vehicles or springboards for your own research in which you can take a hunch or idea, work through its logic on a preliminary basis, and then get some feedback on it from me and your classmates. Consequently, these papers will serve as the basis for discussion for our Thursday classes. Be prepared to offer comments on the papers of your colleagues and to respond to their comments on yours. To ensure that everyone has had a chance to read the papers before class, please post them to our Canvas course site by 11 a.m. on the day they are due. Note: please let me know ASAP if you have class during the entire 11 a.m. to 2 p.m. slot on Thursdays so I can adjust the time at which papers are due. If you are ever stuck when deciding what to write for these short papers, you might think about answering one or two of the following questions: What is an interesting theoretical extension of these claims? Are there any logical inconsistencies in the construction of the key hypotheses? What are the key theoretical influences on this work? To what literatures is the author attempting to address? Is the challenge/revision effective? What new work has this research helped generate? Evaluate the concepts that are missing from the analysis. How might they change theoretical expectations? What hidden or unstated assumptions does the author make? How do they shape the analysis? How would you characterize the author’s world view or ontology? Do you agree with the conclusions? Why or why not? Evaluate the quality of the empirical work. Are the tests appropriate for the hypotheses? 3 What other empirical implications of the theory did the author fail to test? Do you think they are likely to generate similar conclusions about the theory? Could you design an alternative (better) way to the primary hypotheses? What other issues areas could the theory be applied to? Class discussion. As already noted, please make sure you have already spent a significant amount of time thinking about the readings before coming to class. Please do not finish the readings five minutes before class and do not just read to finish them. Much of our class time will be devoted to exploring the very general questions that I suggested you could address in your short writing assignments. Most importantly, our class time will be devoted to pushing you to develop your own theoretical worldview. Expect to have your claims challenged and expect your own ideas to evolve throughout the semester. Literature review. You will also write a review of some well-developed literature in IR during the semester. The paper (9-12 pages) will be due at midnight on Friday, December 12 (our assigned final exam day). This assignment is designed to help you identify an interesting research question that could ultimately motivate a research paper. It will be due in multiple parts. The first, due on Friday, October 17, will include the identification of the literature topic (e.g. democratic peace, human rights, epistemic communities, offense-defense theory, unipolarity) and a list of readings that comprise this literature. The second, due on Friday, November 21, will be comprised of a series of “journal” entries for each reading. These entries should summarize the reading and offer a brief (2-3 sentences) reaction to it. The third portion will be the final literature review paper due on Friday, December 12. You should think about this paper as providing the transition between the introduction and theory sections in a future research paper. If you are not sure what I mean by this, please just read through a number of recent research papers in a notable IR journal like International Organization. The summary of the literature in this paper should be kept to minimum. It should organize the literature on a number of relevant dimensions and develop a series of critiques of this literature as a whole. These organizing dimensions and critiques should demonstrate the importance of your research question in the context of the literature and set up the scholarly merit of your alternative theory and/or empirical approach. Final brainstorming paper. This assignment (4 to 8 pages) will also be due at midnight on Friday, December 12 (our assigned final exam day). This assignment asks you to revise one of your weekly writing papers in light of my comments, the reaction of your colleagues, and what you learned throughout the semester. Again, this assignment is designed to help you begin to formulate an idea that could eventually serve as a research paper or your dissertation.
Recommended publications
  • Aggressive Behaviors Within Politics, 1948-1962: a Cross-National Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution 10, No.3 (September 1966): 249-270
    NOTES 1 INTRODUCTION: CONTENDING VIEWS-MILITARISM, MILITARIZATION AND WAR 1. Ivo Feierabend and Rosalind Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors within Politics, 1948-1962: A Cross-National Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution 10, no.3 (September 1966): 249-270. 2. Patrick Morgan, "Disarmament," in Joel Krieger, ed., The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993),246. 3. Stuart Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Mfecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no.2 (June 1992): 309-341,318,330; The remainder of Bremer's study has to do with the impact of military spending and not with variations caused by regime type. 4. Thomas Lindemann and Michel Louis Martin, "The Military and the Use of Force," in Giuseppe Caforio, ed., Handbook of the Sociology of the Military (New York: Kluwer, 2003),99-109,104-109. 5. Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy-The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations (New York: King Crown's Press, 1958), 3. The concept was subsequently applied by Herbert Spencer, Otto Hintze, and Karl Marx. See Volker Berghahn, Militarism: The History of an International Debate, 1861-1979 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 6. Herbert Spencer, Principles of Sociology, Stanislav Andreski, ed. (London: Macmillan, 1969): 499-571. 7. Felix Gilbert, ed., The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 199. 8. Karl Liebknecht, Militarism (Toronto: William Briggs, 1917); Berghahn, 18,23,25. 9. James Donovan, Militarism U.S.A. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970),25. 10. Berghahn, 19. 11. Dan Reiter and Allan Starn, "IdentifYing the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation," American Political Science Review 97, no.2 (May 2003): 333-337; see also R.
    [Show full text]
  • International Conflict PS 9450 114 Arts and Science R 6:00-8:30 Fall 2020 University of Missouri
    International Conflict PS 9450 114 Arts and Science R 6:00-8:30 Fall 2020 University of Missouri Syllabus Dr. Stephen L. Quackenbush Office: 305 Professional Building Phone: 882-2082 Office Hours: by appointment (zoom) Email: [email protected] Course Description and Objectives: The purpose of this graduate seminar is to analyze important theories regarding the causes of international conflict and war. This course will: (a) introduce students to a wide range of research on international conflict (focusing on quantitative and formal research) and (b) develop students’ ability to critically evaluate research, and consequently how to design and execute their own research projects. Books (available at University Bookstore): Required: Horowitz, Michael C., Allan C. Stam, and Cali M. Ellis. 2015. Why Leaders Fight. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Quackenbush, Stephen L. 2015. International Conflict: Logic and Evidence. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Sechser, Todd S., and Matthew Fuhrmann. 2017. Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weeks, Jessica L. P. 2014. Dictators at War and Peace. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Zagare, Frank C. 2011. The Games of July: Explaining the Great War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Recommended: Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, Paul F. Diehl, and James D. Morrow, ed. 2012. Guide to the Scientific Study of International Processes. West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. 1 Coursework and Grading: Participation: The quality of a graduate level seminar depends to
    [Show full text]
  • How Smart and Tough Are Democracies? Reassessing
    How Smart and Tough Are Democracies? How Smart and Tough Alexander B. Downes Are Democracies? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War The argument that de- mocracies are more likely than nondemocracies to win the wars they ªght— particularly the wars they start—has risen to the status of near-conventional wisdom in the last decade. First articulated by David Lake in his 1992 article “Powerful Paciªsts,” this thesis has become ªrmly associated with the work of Dan Reiter and Allan Stam. In their seminal 2002 book, Democracies at War, which builds on several previously published articles, Reiter and Stam found that democracies win nearly all of the wars they start, and about two-thirds of the wars in which they are targeted by other states, leading to an overall suc- cess rate of 76 percent. This record of democratic success is signiªcantly better than the performance of dictatorships and mixed regimes.1 Reiter and Stam offer two explanations for their ªndings. First, they argue that democracies win most of the wars they initiate because these states are systematically better at choosing wars they can win. Accountability to voters gives democratic leaders powerful incentives not to lose wars because defeat is likely to be punished by removal from ofªce. The robust marketplace of ideas in democracies also gives decisionmakers access to high-quality informa- tion regarding their adversaries, thus allowing leaders to make better deci- sions for war or peace. Second, Reiter and Stam argue that democracies are superior war ªghters, not because democracies outproduce their foes or overwhelm them with powerful coalitions, but because democratic culture produces soldiers who are more skilled and dedicated than soldiers from non- Alexander B.
    [Show full text]
  • STILL LOOKING for AUDIENCE COSTS Erik Gartzke and Yonatan
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of Essex Research Repository STILL LOOKING FOR AUDIENCE COSTS Erik Gartzke and Yonatan Lupu Eighteen years after publication of James Fearon’s article stressing the importance of domestic audience costs in international crisis bargaining, we continue to look for clear evidence to support or falsify his argument. 1 Notwithstanding the absence of a compelling empirical case for or against audience costs, much of the discipline has grown fond of Fearon’s basic framework. A key reason for the importance of Fearon’s claims has been the volume of theories that build on the hypothesis that leaders subject to popular rule are better able to generate audience costs. Scholars have relied on this logic, for example, to argue that democracies are more likely to win the wars they fight, 2 that democracies are more reliable allies, 3 and as an explanation for the democratic peace. 4 A pair of recent studies, motivated largely by limitations in the research designs of previous projects, offers evidence the authors interpret as contradicting audience cost theory. 5 Although we share the authors’ ambivalence about audience costs, we are not convinced by their evidence. What one seeks in looking for audience costs is evidence of a causal mechanism, not just of a causal effect. Historical case studies can be better suited to detecting causal mechanisms Erik Gartzke is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego.Yonatan Lupu is a Postdoctoral Research Associate at Princeton University.
    [Show full text]
  • Theories of War and Peace
    1 THEORIES OF WAR AND PEACE POLI SCI 631 Rutgers University Fall 2018 Jack S. Levy [email protected] http://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/levy/ Office Hours: Hickman Hall #304, Tuesday after class and by appointment "War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied." Sun Tzu, The Art of War In this seminar we undertake a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical literature on interstate war, focusing primarily on the causes of war and the conditions of peace but giving some attention to the conduct and termination of war. We emphasize research in political science but include some coverage of work in other disciplines. We examine the leading theories, their key causal variables, the paths or mechanisms through which those variables lead to war or to peace, and the degree of empirical support for various theories. Our survey includes research utilizing a variety of methodological approaches: qualitative, quantitative, experimental, formal, and experimental. Our primary focus, however, is on the logical coherence and analytic limitations of the theories and the kinds of research designs that might be useful in testing them. The seminar is designed primarily for graduate students who want to understand – and ultimately contribute to – the theoretical and empirical literature in political science on war, peace, and security. Students with different interests and students from other departments can also benefit from the seminar and are also welcome. Ideally, members of the seminar will have some familiarity with basic issues in international relations theory, philosophy of science, research design, and statistical methods.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Science 617 Topics and Debates in International Relations
    Political Science 617 Topics and Debates in International Relations Professor Alex Weisiger Monday 4-7 Office: 215 Stiteler Hall Seminar Room: Meyerson Hall B6 Email: [email protected] Office Hours: MW 2:30-3:30 This course is designed to introduce students to current topics and debates in the study of international relations, focusing primarily on international security. It thus is intended to com- plement PSCI 600, the IR field seminar, which is designed to introduce students to foundational works in international relations but which generally does not cover current debates in any depth. Although PSCI 600 is not a formal prerequisite for this course, reading assignments and discus- sions will generally assume that students are already familiar with that material; thus, students who have not taken 600 will be at a significant disadvantage. Course Requirements Students are expected to come to class each week ready to discuss the assigned readings. In addition, for two weeks of the course you will be responsible for writing and circulating a short (2-4 page) memo that briefly outlines the key questions and arguments in the week, presents questions for discussion, and suggests ways in which outstanding questions might be answered (e.g. novel hypotheses for testing, potential new data sources, or ways to apply existing data in novel ways to distinguish among competing arguments). Each week, one student will also be responsible for a short (no more than 10 minute) presentation on an existing dataset in international relations. See below for details. The final assignment for the course is a substantial publishable-quality research paper.
    [Show full text]
  • ALEXANDER B. DOWNES the George Washington University
    ALEXANDER B. DOWNES The George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs Phone: (202) 994-7859 1957 E St. NW, #605B Fax: (202) 994-7761 Washington, DC 20052 Email: [email protected] ACADEMIC POSITIONS 2011- Associate Professor (with tenure), Department of Political Science and Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University 2004-11 Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Duke University 2007/08 Post-doctoral Fellowship, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University 2003/04 Post-doctoral Fellowship, Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University EDUCATION 2004 Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Chicago 1998 M.A. in International Relations (Honors), University of Chicago 1991 B.A. in Music (Magna cum laude), Brown University 1991-94 Graduate Work in Orchestral Double Bass Performance, Indiana University (School of Music) PUBLICATIONS Book Targeting Civilians in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008). • Winner of the Joseph Lepgold Book Prize, given by Georgetown University for best book on international relations published in 2008. Journal Articles & Book Chapters “No Business Like FIRC Business: Foreign-Imposed Regime Change and Bilateral Trade,” British Journal of Political Science (published online, August 3, 2015; with Paul Zachary and Kathleen Deloughery). “Correspondence: Reevaluating Foreign-Imposed Regime Change,” International Security 38, no. 3 (Winter 2013/14): 184-195 (with Jonathan Monten). “Forced to Be Free: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization,” International Security 37, no. 4 (Spring 2013): 90-131 (with Jonathan Monten). “The Illusion of Democratic Credibility,” International Organization 66, no. 3 (Summer 2012): 457-489 (with Todd S.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 PS 247A Quantitative Approaches to International Relations Fall Quarter 2004 SSB 104, Wednesday 5:00-7:50 PM Kristian Skrede G
    PS 247A Quantitative Approaches to International Relations Fall Quarter 2004 SSB 104, Wednesday 5:00-7:50 PM Kristian Skrede Gleditsch [email protected], SSB 383 Tel: (858) 822 0535 (Please note that I don’t use voice mail, email is much better) Office Hours: Tuesday 9.30-11.30 and by appointment This version: 20 September 2004 Course Description• This course introduces students to quantitative approaches to international relations, with particular emphasis on research on conflict and peace. Since the quantitative international relations literature is so extensive, the particular readings and issues that we cover in this must inevitably be a small and somewhat idiosyncratic sample. However, we will also focus on more general issues and generic skills in empirical analysis that have wider applicability in international relations research beyond the specific readings assigned. The course will also focus on how to go beyond consuming or evaluating the research of others to become active contributors and improve on existing research. There are two assignments for this class. First, you must submit two short (3-5 pp.) papers summarizing the readings for a particular week. These short papers should be distributed to the class ahead of the meeting time. Each student preparing a paper for given week – possibly in collaboration with other students – should prepare a short class presentation and be prepared to lead discussion. The goal of this exercise is not simply to summarize the assigned readings as others in the class already will be familiar with these. Rather, a good summary will discuss the broader issues, themes, and questions underlying the readings or identify problems with research design and potential flaws in the particular articles, and serve as a starting point for in-class discussion.
    [Show full text]
  • DAN REITER September 12, 2013
    DAN REITER September 12, 2013 Address office: Department of Political Science Emory University Atlanta, GA 30322 Tel: (404) 727-0111 fax: (404) 727-4586 email: [email protected] http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~dreiter/ Education 1994: University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Ph.D. in political science. Dissertation: "Learning, Realism, and Alliances: An Empirical Examination of the Causes of Alliances." Major, world politics; first minor, research methods; second minor, comparative politics. 1989: Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, B.A. with honors in political science. Professional Appointments 2007-2013: Chair, Department of Political Science, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia. Summer 2006: Visiting lecturer, Department of Government, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire. 2003-present: Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, Emory University. 2000-2003: Associate Professor and Winship Research Professor, Department of Political Science, Emory University. 1995-2000: Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science. Emory University. 1994-1995: John M. Olin Postdoctoral Fellow in National Security. Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Scholarly Awards 2010: Best Book Award, Conflict Processes, American Political Science Association, for How Wars End (Princeton, 2009). The award is given for “the best book making outstanding contributions to the study of any and all forms of political conflict, either within or between nation-states, published in the two calendar years prior to the year in which the award is given.” 2010: Outstanding Academic Title for How Wars End, Choice magazine (see January 2011 issue for citation). -1- 2010: Honorable Mention for How Wars End, Best Book Award in Security Studies, International Security Studies Section, International Studies Association. 2010: How Wars End shortlisted for Arthur Ross Book Award, Council on Foreign Relations.
    [Show full text]
  • H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable XII
    H-Diplo | ISSF Roundtable XII-11 issforum.org Jason Lyall. Divided Armies: Inequality and Battlefield Performance in Modern War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020. ISBN: 9780691192437 (hardcover, $99.95); 9780691192444 (paperback, $35.00). 14 May 2021 | https://issforum.org/to/ir12-11 Editor: Diane Labrosse | Commissioning Editor and Chair: Dan Reiter | Production Editor: George Fujii Contents Introduction by Dan Reiter, Emory University ....................................................................................... 2 Review by Alexander B. Downes, The George Washington University......................................... 7 Review by Kristen A. Harkness, University of St. Andrews............................................................... 15 Review by Michael C. Horowitz, University of Pennsylvania .......................................................... 19 Review by Yuri M. Zhukov, University of Michigan............................................................................ 22 Response by Jason Lyall, Dartmouth College ..................................................................................... 26 © 2019 The Authors | CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 US Page 1 of 33 H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable XII- Introduction by Dan Reiter, Emory University The oldest question in the study of international relations (IR) is: what helps armies win their battles? This is the IR question the ancients struggled over more than any other. The Old Testament, for example, is replete with discussions of armies fighting and trying to win battles,
    [Show full text]
  • Understanding Victory Dan Reiter and Allan C
    Understanding Victory Understanding Victory Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam Why Political Institutions Matter In our book, Democ- racies at War, we asked the question: Why do democracies tend to win the wars they ªght? We conªrmed this pattern, ªrst noted by David Lake in his “Power- ful Paciªsts” article, using statistical tests and numerous historical cases.1 No- tably, this phenomenon confounds the traditional realpolitik fear that democratic liberalism is a luxury that states may be unable to afford. Our basic answer to the question is that democracies tend to win because they put them- selves in a position to do so. The constraints that ºow from democratic politi- cal structures lead the executives of liberal democracies to hesitate before starting wars, particularly wars where victory on the battleªeld appears to be less than clear-cut. Democracies’ willingness to start wars only against relatively weaker states says nothing about the actual military efªciency or capacity of democratic states. Rather, it says that when they do start a ªght, they are more likely to pick on relatively weaker target states. We also ªnd, however, that in addition to this “selection effects” explanation of democratic success, democratic armies enjoy a small advantage on the battleªeld. Michael Desch, a prominent realist scholar, reviews these claims in his article “Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters.”2 His assertion that regime type is irrelevant to the probability of military victory is consistent with the broader realist agenda, which argues that domestic politics matters little in the formation of foreign policy or the interactions between states.
    [Show full text]
  • Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War Edward D
    Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder The centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s was the claim that promoting democracy would foster peace. Noting that no two democracies have ever fought a war against each other, President Bill Clinton argued that support for democratiza- tion would be an antidote to international war and civil strife.1 Yet the 1990s turned out to be a decade of both democratization and chronic nationalist conflict, both within and between some transitional states. While the world would probably be more peaceful if all states were mature democracies, Clinton’s conventional wisdom failed to anticipate the dangers of getting from here to there. Prominent critics have pointed out that newly democra- tizing states are often neither liberal nor peaceful.2 Since the French Revolution, the earliest phases of democratization have triggered some of the world’s bloodiest nationalist struggles. Similarly, during the 1990s, intense armed violence broke out in a number of regions that had just begun to experiment with electoral democracy and more pluralist public discourse. In some cases, such as the former Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, and Indonesia, transitions from dictatorship to more pluralistic political systems coincided with the rise of national independence movements, spurring separatist warfare that often spilled across international borders.3 In other For helpful comments on earlier versions of this article, we are grateful to Steve Chan, Peter Gourevitch, Joanne Gowa, Margaret Hermann, Robert Jervis, David Lake, Ned Lebow, Jack Levy, Anthony Mughan, John Oneal, Dan Reiter, William Thompson, Michael Ward, three anonymous reviewers, and seminar participants at Concordia University, Emory University, Ohio University, Princeton University, Stanford University, and the University of California at San Diego.
    [Show full text]