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15 March 2012 Issue 2 15 MARCH 2012 ISSUE 2 A»bimonthly»bulletin»by» the»Global»Centre»for»the» Responsibility»to»Protect T h e Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is R2P Monitor»applies»the» R2P Monitor: a global norm, unanimously adopted by Responsibility»to»Protect»lens» heads of state and government at the » Provides background on populations 2005 UN World Summit, aimed at to»the»following»situations» at risk of mass atrocity crimes, with preventing and halting Genocide, War of»concern: particular emphasis on key events and Crimes, Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes actors and their connection to the threat, or commission, of genocide, Against Humanity. R2P stipulates that: CURRENT CRISIS war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes Mass atrocity crimes are occurring and Every State has the Responsibility against humanity. » urgent action is needed. to Protect its populations from the » O f f e r s analysis of the country’s past four mass atrocity crimes (Pillar I). IMMINENT RISK history in relation to mass atrocity » The wider international community The situation is reaching a critical crimes; the factors that have enabled has the responsibility to encourage and threshold and the risk of mass atrocity their possible commission, or that assist individual States in meeting crimes occurring in the immediate future prevent their resolution; and the receptivity of the situation to positive that responsibility (Pillar II). is very high if effective preventive action is not taken. influences that would assist in » If a State is manifestly failing to protect preventing further crimes. its populations, the international SERIOUS CONCERN » T r a c k s t h e international response community must be prepared to take There is a significant risk of occurrence, to the situation with a particular appropriate collective action, in a timely or recurrence, of mass atrocity crimes emphasis upon the actions of the and decisive manner and in accordance within the foreseeable future if United Nations (UN), key regional with the UN Charter (Pillar III). effective action is not taken. actors and the International Criminal Court (ICC). » Suggests necessary action to prevent or halt the commission of mass atrocity crimes. Syria {p. 2} South Sudan {p. 6} Central Africa/LRA {p. 9} Sudan {p. 4} DR Congo {p. 7} Burma/Myanmar {p. 10} Libya {p. 11} Kenya * Somalia * Yemen * globalr2p.org * Not covered in this issue 15 March 2012 Current Mass atrocity crimes are C risis occurring and urgent action is needed. government, having “manifestly failed in its responsibility to protect its people,” has committed crimes against humanity. Attempts to pass a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution condemning violence perpetrated by the Syrian government have been thwarted by vetoes from Russia and China. On 13 February the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, said the failure of the UNSC to agree on collective action emboldened the Syrian government “to plan an all-out assault in an effort to crush resistance with overwhelming force.” The second UNSC veto on 4 February coincided with the siege and bombardment of the Baba Amr residential district of Homs. As a result of sustained artillery, rocket SYRIA and mortar fire from government security forces, the humanitarian situation reached the level of acute crisis Populations in Syria continue to face crimes against humanity with a desperate need for “medical assistance, food and perpetrated by the state security forces. basic supplies” according to UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Valerie Amos. BACKGROUND Over the past twelve months President Bashar al-Assad Recent reports suggest that pro-government “shabiha” has sanctioned the Syrian security forces’ use of tanks, militia may have carried out massacres against groups artillery and other heavy weapons against centers of anti- of women and children in the Karm el-Zeitoun and Jobar government protest. Violence against civilians has included districts of Homs, after the Syrian military regained control the mass deployment of troops, the use of snipers and the of the area. Following the government’s assault on Homs, indiscriminate firing of live ammunition to disperse and the Syrian military launched a similar attack on Idlib at terrorize protesters. the same time that President Assad was meeting with UN-Arab League Special Envoy Kofi Annan. Since March 2011 widespread killings of civilians have taken place in Damascus, Daraa, Hama, Rastan, Jisr al-Shughour, ANALYSIS Latakia, Idlib, Douma and Homs. On 28 February 2012 the Tensions within Syria remain extremely high and the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, B. Lynn violence shows no sign of abating. The government appears Pascoe, declared that “well over 7,500 people” have been determined to pursue a military solution to its crisis of killed in the conflict. The Office of the UN High Commissioner legitimacy. for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that 200,000 Syrians are currently internally displaced by the violence, and that Despite promises of reform by President Assad, there 30,000 have fled to neighboring countries. has been little attempt to seriously address the concerns of the protest movement. Though a referendum on Despite the Syrian government’s agreement to a League constitutional reform took place on 26 February 2012, the of Arab States’ (Arab League) peace plan in November security forces have intensified military operations, with and its public claim to be fulfilling its Responsibility to attacks increasing in frequency and scale. Protect, mass atrocity crimes continue. February saw the worst violence to date with the government targeting Armed resistance and sectarian tensions are also residential areas regarded as opposition strongholds in increasing. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) and other armed Homs. Indiscriminate shelling resulted in approximately 700 groups are actively fighting government forces in Homs civilian deaths between 3 February and 2 March according and elsewhere. Meanwhile the most prominent opposition to Human Rights Watch and local sources. group, the Syrian National Council (SNC), remains divided over issues of leadership and strategy. An updated 22 February report from the UN Human Rights Council (HRC)-mandated independent international A deepening rift between the predominately Sunni Commission of Inquiry identified a “widespread and opposition and mainly pro-government Alawites may further systematic pattern of gross violations committed by State fracture the country along sectarian lines and threatens forces” against the Syrian population and asserted that the to complicate the prospects for a peaceful resolution to 2» R2P Monitor | globalr2p.org SAUDI ARABIA 15 March 2012 the conflict. There are growing fears for the safety and The UN General Assembly (UNGA) has also considered security of Alawites, Kurds, Christians and other minorities. two resolutions. The first, passed on 19 December and co-sponsored by 61 states (including 6 Arab countries), External political influence upon the Syrian government condemned the violence in Syria and supported the Arab via the UN and regional actors, including the Arab League League’s plan. The resolution received 133 affirmative votes, and Turkey, remains weak. Syria’s key regional ally, Iran, 11 against and 43 abstentions. The UNGA passed a second appears steadfast in its defense of the Assad regime. similar resolution on 16 February with 137 votes for, 12 Russia continues to provide the government with arms against and 17 abstentions. and crucial political support. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have expressed a desire to arm the opposition. There is a growing On 23 February UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon possibility of a full scale civil war that would put populations announced the appointment of Kofi Annan as the UN-Arab at even greater risk of further mass atrocities. League Special Envoy to Syria, with a mandate to promote a peaceful political solution to the crisis. The government of Syria has not only failed to uphold its Responsibility to Protect, it bears primary responsibility The “Friends of Syria” group of countries met in Tunis on 24 for the ongoing commission of crimes against humanity. February to consider options for collective international action. The outcome declaration demanded an immediate INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE ceasefire to allow humanitarian relief operations and Following the outbreak of violence in March 2011, the recognized the SNC as a legitimate representative of the international community responded by censuring the regime Syrian people. for its widespread violations of human rights. [See GCR2P’s Timeline of International Response to the Situation in Syria.] On 29 February the HRC adopted a resolution condemning the “widespread and systematic violations of human rights” On 2 November 2011 the Syrian government accepted an in Syria. The UNSC issued a Press Statement on 1 March Arab League peace plan in which it committed to withdraw calling upon the Syrian government to “allow immediate, its military forces from civilian areas, negotiate with the full and unimpeded access of humanitarian personnel to opposition and release political prisoners. Despite the all populations in need of assistance, in accordance with agreement, the government launched a major military international law.” offensive in Homs and Hama, resulting in further mass atrocity crimes. On 12 November the Arab League voted to NECESSARY ACTION suspend Syria from the organization and imposed sanctions. The UNSC should demand an immediate ceasefire
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