sign in sign up
<<
Home , Teleology

THE DIALECTIC OF LABOR: BEYOND AND TELEOLOGY* by Georg Lukdcs

Marx says the following concerning the of labor: "We presuppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in . At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realises a purpose of its own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his ."1 This expresses the central ontological category of labor: through labor, a teleological goal becomes realized in material reality, thereby forming a new objectivity. Thus, labor becomes in one respect the model of all social praxis. In the final analysis, labor always materially realizes teleological projects - even if it does so through the broadest mediations. Of course, utilization of labor as a model, guiding man's social activities, cannot be stretched too far. A consideration of the most important differences points especially to this essentially ontological relationship, precisely because they reveal that labor can serve as the model for understanding other social and teleological projects, since labor constitutes essentially their basic form. A basic in the everyday of all people is the bare fact that labor is the realization of a goal. It explains why it is an ineradicable aspect of all thinking, from everyday conversations to economics and . Therefore, the problem that emerges here is not whether or not labor is teleological. Rather, problem lies in giving a truly critical and ontological analysis of the almost unlimited generalization of the elemental fact - from everyday life to myths, and philosophy. Thus, it is not at all surprising that great thinkers, such as and Hegel, who dealt extensively with social and who most clearly understood the teleological of labor, require only minor additions rather than decisive corrections in order to retain the validity of their structural analyses even today. The actual ontological problem emerges because particular teleological projects such as Aristotle's and Hegel's are not restricted to labor and, broadly speaking, they are not even restricted to human praxis as such.

*This is part of a recently completed work by Lukacs which will appear in German sometime next year. It has been translated into English by Adolph W. Gucinski. xKarl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, Moore and Aveling trans. (Moscow, n.d.), p. 178. Dialectics of Labor 163 Instead, teleology is elevated into a general, cosmological category which develops an insoluble antinomy and opposition found throughout the history of philosophy between causality and teleology. It is known that biology and medicine deeply influenced Aristotle's . In fact, greatly fascinated by the overwhelming effective purposefulness of organic life, he assigned a decisive role to objective teleology. Likewise, Hegel, who depicted the teleological nature of labor more concretely and dialectically than Aristotle, made teleology the moving force of history and thus of his total world view. Such a contrast permeates the history of religion and thought, from the beginnings of philosophy to Leibniz's pre-established . In considering teleology as an objective, ontological category, we must emphasize religious thought. While causality is a self-based of self-movement which maintains this character even if a causal chain begins with a c&nscious act, teleology is essentially a projected category: every teleological process maintains a goal-orientation through a goal-oriented . Thus, in this context, to project is not the same as becoming conscious, as is the case with other categories, such as causality. Rather, consciousness begins by projecting a real process, i.e., a teleological process. Thus, projecting here has an irreducible ontological character. The teleological apprehension of nature and history does not refer only to its purposefulness or its orientation toward a goal. It also means that its and both its partial and its total movement as a process, must have a conscious initiator. The need implicit in such a world view — and not only in the philistine writers of eightennth-century theleogy but also in detached and great thinkers like Aristotle and Hegel — is fundamentally human: it is the need to make existence meaningful, from the course of the universe to the events of individual life. This primitive and fundamental need obtains in the and feelings of everyday life — even after the development of destroyed the religious in which the teleological principle could eosmically live an unrestrained and full life. Here we are not just thinking of the atheist Niels Lyhne, who, at the sick-bed of his dying child, attempted to influence the teleological course directed by God with prayer. This attitude certainly belongs to the fundamental, psychically moving forces of the everyday world. Hartmann correctly formulates this attitude in his analysis of teleological thought: "There is a tendency to ask at every opportunity just 'for what purpose' (wozu) it had come to be that way. 'For what purpose' did that have to happen to me? or, 'for what purpose' must I go through such suffering? 'For what purpose' did he have to die so early? We are urged to ask this question whenever an 'happens to us' in some particular way, even if it is only an expression of destitution and helplessness. One simply assumes that the event ought to serve some good. One seeks a or a justification in it, as if an arrangment existed which gives meaning to all events taking place." He also points out on the linguistic and expressive level of thought that "for what purpose" can change into 'why' without essentially reaching the 164 fundamental dominating interests.2 It is very understandable that because of the deep roots of such thoughts and feelings in everyday life, a radical break with the rule of teleology in nature, life, etc., is made very rarely. This religious need spontaneously and strongly influences realms lying beyond those of the immediate, individual life, and remains defiantly effective in everyday life. The dichotomy can clearly be seen in Kant. He ingeniously describes the ontological essence of the organic reality in his definition of organic life as "purposefulness without necessity". He destroys the superficial teleology of the theodicy of the predecessors with a critique that recognizes a transcendental teleology in the simple usefulness of one thing for another. By showing how it is possible that structures of can originate from only causally-necessary and thus, accidental inter-relationships, he opens the way toward the correct understanding of this realm of being. The internal movement, adaption, and reproduction of the individual species of these structures of being are recognized as lawful and are rightfully defined as objectively appropriate for the respective structures. However, Kant ends by obstructing the path leading from these conclusions to the real problem. As usual, he effects this obstruction methodologically by directly attempting to solve ontological problems by means of . Since his theory concerning objectively valid knowledge is exclusively directed toward mathematics and , he must reach the conclusion that his own ingenious is epistemologically irrelevant for the biological . Consequently, in one well-known passage he says: "... it is absurd for men to make any such attempt or to hope that another Newton will arise in the future who shall make comprehensible by us the production of a blade of grass according to natural laws which no design has ordered."3 The difficulty of this statement can be seen in its refutation already implicit in the first Darwinian formulation of the theory of less than a century later. After his lecture on Darwin, Engels wrote to Marx: 'Teleology remained in one respect undestroyed; this has now occured." Although expressing reservations about Darwin's method, Marx concludes that Darwin's work "contains the natural and historical foundations for our view."4 An even more significant consequence of the Kantian attempt to pose and answer ontological questions in epistemological terms is that the ontological problem remains ultimately unresolved by stopping thought by the "critically" determined limitation of its actual range without providing either a positive or a negative solution within the framework of objectivity. This leaves the door wide open for a final admission of the possibility of teleological solutions through transcendental speculation — particularly in terms of the critique of —

2Nicolai Hartmann, Teologische Denken (Berlin, 1951), p. 13. 3Immanuel Kant, , English translation by J.H. Bernard (New York, 1951), p. 248. 4Marx and Engels, Briefwechsel, vol. II, pp. 447 and 533. Dialectics of Labor 165 even if Kant failed to recognize them in the realm of science. We are thinking primarily of the conception, later decisively important for Schelling, of the intuitive intellectus archetypus. Although we human do not possess it, its existence indeed "entails no contradiction"5 for Kant, who for this could not have been in the position of resolving these problems. Thus, for us, the problem of causality and teleology appears also in the form of the unknowable thing in itself. No how often Kant may reject the demands of theology, the denial remains restricted to "our" cognition. That is, theology claims to be science. But, to the extent to which it wishes to be such, it remains to the authority of the critique of cognition. Nevertheless, causal and teleological types of explanations are mutually exclusive in the cognition of nature. And when Kant examines human praxis, he concerns himself exclusively with its highest, most subtle, and socially most general form: pure morality. The latter does not dialectically stem from life-activities (society), but stands in basic and unalterable opposition to them. Again, the real ontological problem remains unanswered. As with every genuinely ontological question, the correct answer immediately appears trivial: it is usually like Columbus' egg. Yet, one need only examine more closely the definitions resulting from the Marxian manner of dealing with the teleology of labor in order to appreciate its potential ability to resolve far reaching and false problems and to create decisive consequences. To anyone familiar with Marx's thought, it is obvious that his position on Darwin clearly reveals Marx's rejection of any teleological form of existence outside labor, i.e., human praxis. In fact, Marx's recognition of the teleology of labor far surpasses even the solutions of his great predecessors such as Aristotle and Hegel since he sees labor not as one of the many manifestations of teleology in general, but as the only point at which a teleological project can be ontologically demonstrated as an actual instance of material reality. This correct cognition of reality illuminates ontologically a number of problems. First, it gives a simple, real and obvious basis to the decisive and real characteristic of teleology, i.e., that it can be realized only through a project. We need not repeat the Marxian definition in order to comprehend the impossibility of all labor unless preceded by such a project which determines the labor-process in all its stages. Of course, this essential characteristic of labor has been clearly recognized by Aristotle and Hegel. However, since they also attempted to teleologically comprehend the organic world and the course of history, in each case they were forced to invent a subject for the required project, e.g., Hegel's world spirit, which inevitably transformed reality into a myth. But Marx's rigorous and exactly defined relegation of teleology to labor (to social praxis) eliminating it from all other forms of being, does not limit its scope. On the contrary, its significance grows through the insight that social being, the highest level Of being known to us, is

5Kant, op. cit. 166 TELOS originally constituted through this actual teleological force active within it. It emerges from organic life, the level upon which it is based, by developing into a new and independent form of being. We can rationally speak of social being only if we comprehend that its genesis, its becoming distinct from its basis and the of its reliance upon labor, is a of the continuous realization of teleological projects. This first moment, however, has very far reaching philosophical consequences. The history of philosophy indicates the intellectual struggle between causality and teleology as the categorical foundation of reality and its movement. In order to spiritually harmonize their God with the and with the world of man, every theologically-oriented philosophy was forced to announce the superiority of teleology over causality. Such an hierarchy of creator and creation, and thus the priority of the teleological projects is unavoidable, even if God merely winds the clock to the system of causality into . On the other hand, every pre-Marxian that denied the transcendental constitution of the world was also forced to reject the possibility of a truly active teleology. We have already seen how even Kant, in his epistemological terminology, is forced to speak of the irreconcilability of causality and teleology. Yet, if along with Marx, we recognize teleology as an exclusive active category in labor, it necessarily follows a real as well as a necessary coexistence of causality and teleology. Of course, the opposition remains, but only within a real and uniform process whose movement is a result of the reciprocal action caused by the oppositon. In order to realize the reciprocal action, this opposition transforms even causality into projected reality without changing its essence. The process can be seen more clearly by examining Aristotle'sand Hegel's analyses of labor. Arsitotle distinguishes labor into two components: thought and product. The first projects the goal and explores the means of its realization; the latter realizes the projected goal.6 When Hartmann analytically divides the first component into two acts, i.e., into goal-projection and the exploration of its means, he correctly and instructively concretizes Aristotle's pioneering thought without directly altering its ontological essence in any significant way.7 This essence expresses itself in the fact that a design conceived in thought reaches material reality by adding to it something qualitatively and radically new. This can be very concretely illustrated by referring to Aristotole's example regarding the building of a house. The house is a material much like stone, timber, etc. Nevertheless, the teleological project gives rise to an objectivity which is totally different from these elements. No immament extension of its properties, of the natural laws and forces active in them, can lead to the "deduction" of the house from the mere properties of stone and timber. What is

6 Aristotle, Metaphysik vol. II (Berlin, 1960), ch. 7, p. 163. 7Hartmann, op. cit., p. 68. Dialectics of Labor 167 needed is the power of human will and thought to arrange these propertites materially and factually in an altogether new context. In this respect, Aristotle was the first to recognize the impossibilty of conceiving this ontological objectivity solely according to the "logic" of nature. (It is already evident that all idealistic or religious forms of natural teleology, of nature as the creation of God, constitute metaphysical projections of this actual model. It is very clear in the story of creation as given in the Old Testiment. Like the laboring human subject, God always examines what he has achieved. Again like the laboring human being, he allows himself a rest period after the job is done. In other myths of creation — even when they already appear directly in a philosophical form - it is likewise not at all difficult to recognize the worldly and human model of labor. We need only think again of the universal clock wound by God.) In view of this, we must not underestimate the of Hartmann's distinction. The separation of goal-projection from the exploration of means is very important for the understanding of the process of labor, especially in relation to the ontology.of social being. It reveals especially the inseparability of what, in the abstract, appear as mutually exclusive categories: causality and teleology. In other words, the exploration of the means required for the realization of the projected goal must include an objective recognition of the causes of those objectivities and processes whose activation will make it possible to realize the projected goal. Goal-projection and exploration of means by themselves can produce nothing new. The intrinsic reality of nature must remain what it is: a system of structures whose order remains totally indifferent to all human endeavors and thoughts. Therefore, the exploration has a double function. On the one hand, it uncovers how the respective entities operate intrinsically and independently of all conscioussness. On the other hand, it discovers in them new and functional possibilities which, put in motion, can realize the teleologically-projected goal. There is no whatsoever in the stone as such; nor does it even give a hint that it could be used as a knife or as an axe. It can become a tool only if its objectively present, intrinsic properties are combined in a certain way to make this possible. Ontologically, this is already clearly present at the most primitive level. When, for example, primeval man picks up a stone to use it as an axe, he must correctly recognize the relationship between the properties of the stone which often originate accidentally and its concrete utility. Only by doing this does he carry out the act of recognition as analyzed by Aristotle and Hartmann. This matter becomes more clear as labor develops further. Although Hegel caused much confusion by expanding teleology, he correctly recognized this essential feature of labor very early. In his Jena lectures of 1805-6, he claims "that the own activity of nature, the elasticity of the clock's mainspring, water and wind, are used to do something altogether different in their sensuous existence than was chosen by them, that their blind activity is changed into a purposeful one, in contradiction to themselves. .. ." and man "permits nature to wear on, watches unperturbed 168 TELOS and governs everything with very little effort."8 It is remarkable that the of the cunning of reason, which later becomes so important in the philosophy of nature, originates in the analysis of labor. Hegel correctly observes the two-sidedness of this process. On the one side, the teleological project exploits "only" the self-activity of nature, while on the other, the transformation of this activity turns it into its own opposite. This activity of nature thus transforms itself without altering the bases of natural ontology into projected ones. Thus, Hegel depicted an ontologically-decisive aspect of the role of the causality of nature in the labor-process: without undergoing any intrinsic changes, something altogether new develops out of natural objects and forces. The laboring human being can arrange their properties and the laws of their movement into altogether new patterns by assigning to them totally new applications and functions. Since this can take place only in the context of the ontological irrevocability of natural laws, the alteration of natural categories can ontologically consist only in their projection. Their projection is the mediation of their subordination to the determining teleological project whereby the projected interrelationship of causality and teleology becomes at the same a uniformly homogeneous object, process, etc. Nature and labor, means and goal, thus develop into something intrinsically homogeneous: the process of labor and, at its conclusion, the product of labor. However, the elimination of the heterogeneities by uniformity, has well-defined limitations. We are not referring to the obvious fact that this homogenization presupposes the correct recognition of actually heterogeneous causal relationship. Unless the process of exploration recognizes these causal relationships, they cannot, ontologically, be projected at all. They continue to function naturally, thus causing the self-nullification of the teleological project which is reduced to the level of the unrealizable object of consciousness, necessarily powerless with regard to nature. Here we have almost reached the difference between the ontological and the epistemological meaning of the project. A project that has failed the object remains epistemologically a project, even if a value-judgement considers it to be false or only incomplete. However, the ontological projection of causality within the structure of a teleological project must correctly apprehend its object or it is no project at all. We must dialectically qualify this conclusion in order to prevent it from suddenly changing into a falsehood by overextending it. Since every natural object and process is characterized by an infinity of properties, reciprocal relationships with the environment, etc., the afore-mentioned refers to only those aspects of the infinity which directly influence the teleological project. If labor required even an approximate recognition of the infinity, it could have never developed from primitive levels of natural observation — not to mention conscious recognition. This is remarkable: it entails the objective possibilty of the unlimited

8Hegel, Jeneser Realphilosophie (Leipzig, 1932), vol. II, pp. 198-199. Dialectics of Labor 169 development of labor and it clearly reveals that a correct projection can only succeed by adequately apprehending the causal moments necessary for the attainment of its concrete purpose. This is true even when general conceptions about natural objects, relationships and processes are still wholly inadequate as recognitions of nature in its totality. This dialectic between rigorous correctness within the boundaries of the teleological project and between the possibility of ultimate falsity in the cognition of nature as a whole, is very important for labor. We will return to it later. The previously-mentioned homogeneity of means and goals, however, must be dialectically restricted and thus further concretized from yet another viewpoint. Heterogeneity between means and goals is created by the double social character of goal-prjoection which originates from social needs, but must also satisfy them. At the same time, the natural character of the means immediately guides its realization, praxis, into a different context and activity, creating in principle a heterogeneity between purpose and means. As already indicated, its overcoming, through homogenization in the project, entails a significant problem. The simple subordination of means to purpose is not as simple as it may intially appear. One must never forget the simple fact that the success or failure of the projection of the goal depends simply on the extent to which the exploration of the means achieves the transformation of natural causality, ontologically speaking, into a projected one. The projection of goals originates in a social and human need. But if it is really to become a projection of goals, the exploration of means, i.e., the cognition of nature, must have reached a certain appropriate level. Otherwise, the projection of goals remains merely a Utopian project — a kind of dream somewhat similar to the dream of human flight which lasted from Icarus to Leonardo da Vinci and much longer. Thus, in terms of social ontology, the point which links labor with the origin of scientific thought and its development, is precisely the realm defined as the exploration of the means. We have already mentioned the principle of the new (Prinzip des Neuen) found even in the most primitive teleology of labor. We can now add that the uninterrupted production of the new, which produces the category of the social in the realm of labor, as it were, clearly distinguishes it from every merely natural aspect of this origin as well as this development of labor. Consequently, the goal controls and regulates the means in every single labor-process. But if we consider the labor-process in terms of its historical continuity and development within the structure of society, we notice a certain reversal of this hierarchical relationship which, although not absolute and total, is nevertheless very important for the development of society and mankind. Since, in terms of labor, the indispensible exploration of nature concentrates primarily upon the of the means, they are the main social guarantee that the results of the labor-processes will be assessed, that there is continuity in the labor experience and especially that it develops further. Even this more appropriate social recognition based upon the means is often more important 170 TELOS than the momentary satisfaction of needs (the projection of goals). Hegel correctly recognized this relationship. He writes about it in the Logic: "But the means is the external middle term of the syllogism which is the realization of the end; in the means, therefore, the in it manifests itself as such by maintaining itself in this external other, and precisely through this externality. To this extent the means is superior to the finite ends of external purposiveness: the plough is more honorable than are immediately the enjoyments procured by it and which are ends. The tool lasts, while the immediate enjoyments pass away and are forgotten. In his tools man possesses power over external nature, even though in respect of its ends he is, on the contrary, subject to it."9 Firstly, here Hegel is justifiably emphasizing the greater of the means over immediate goals and fulfillments. Of course, Hegel depicts this contrast much more bluntly than it actually is. For the individual, "immediate enjoyments" do indeed pass away and are forgotten. Yet, considered as a whole, the satisfaction of needs in society also reveals duration and continuity. If we recall the reciprocal relationship of production and consumption depicted by Marx in Kapital, it will be clear that this relationship does not merely maintain and reproduce itself. Rather, it also exerts a certain influence upon the means. Of course, as we have seen production (presently referred to as the means in the teleological project) constitutes the dominant factor in the reciprocal relationship. To a certain extent, however, Hegel's comparison falls short of its true social significance because of its excessively blunt contraposition. Secondly, the moment of domination of the means "over external nature" is rightly emphasized by means of the equally correct dialectical qualification that man remains subordinated even while projecting his purpose. Here we must concretize Hegel's description to the extent to which this suboridination is directly related to nature. As already indicated, man can only project those goals whose means of realization he in fact controls. But in the final analysis, this realization is actually a matter of social development pertaining to the structure which Marx defined as man's metamorphosis, i.e., of society with nature whereby the social factor obviously must assume the predominant role. This definition emphasizes the superiority of the means even more strongly than does Hegel's. Thirdly, the means consequently become the key for an understanding of those stages in the development of mankind about which no documents exist. This epistemological problem, however, hides as usual an ontological one. Tools that are brought to light by excavation, often almost the only documents of a totally lost period, reveal much more about the concrete life of their users than would seem initially possible. This is because tools, correctly analyzed, reveal not merely their own history of development, but they permit us to gain a deep insight into the

9Hegel, Science of Logic trans, by A.V. Miller (London and New York, 1969), p. 747. Dialectics of Labor 171 life-style or even the world view, etc., of its users. We will concentrate on these problems in what follows. We only wish to note the socially very general problem concerning the retreat of natural limits, which is accurately described by Gordon Childe in his analysis of pottery of the period that he describes as the neolithic revolution. His central point concerns the difference between the labor-process in pottery and in the production of tools made from stone and bones. He writes that: "In making a tool of stone [man] was always limited by the shape and size of the original material; he could only take bits away from it. No such limitations restrict the activity of the potter. She can form her lump as she wishes; she can go on adding to it without any doubts as to the solidity of the joins." This reveals clearly how two epochs differ in one important aspect. That is, it indicates the direction of man's self-liberation from the dependence upon originally utilized material, i.e., he bestows upon his commodities precisely those qualities that originate in his social needs. Gordon Childe also notes that the process of the retreat of natural limits is gradual. Indeed, the new form is no longer limited by the available material, yet it originiates from similar pre-conditions: "... the earliest pots are obvious imitations of familiar vessels made from other materials - from gourds, bladders, membranes, and skins, from basketry and wickerwork, or even from human skulls."10 Fourthly, it must still be emphasized that the exploration of natural objects and processes preceeding the projection of causality and the creation of the means consists essentially of actual cognitive acts, even if this is not consciously recognized for a long period. Therefore, they objectively contain the beginning and the genesis of science. Here Marx's insight is also valid: 'They do not know, but they do it." Only a tentative reference shall presently be made to the fact that every experience and ultilization of causal relationships, indeed, every projection of an actual causality, always acts in labor as the means for a single goal. But it objectively contains the attribute of applicability to other matters as well - even to whole heterogeneous ones. Although for a long time only practical matters may have gained consciousness, correct abstractions are actually carried out, every time a successful application is made in a new area. In their objective, internal structure, these abstractions already contain significant indications of scientific thought. Although it rarely poses this problem in a totally conscious manner, the history of science already reveals how extremely abstract and general laws often originated from an exploration of pratical needs and from a search for the best method to satisfy these needs, i.e., from an exploration of the best means of labor. Apart from this, history offers various instances of labor-achievements which, further generalized — we have just noted that this generalization necessarily originates in the labor-process - lay the foundations for a purely scientific contemplation of nature. For example, it is generally known that the genesis of geometry is of such a nature. It is presently

10V. Gordon Childe, Man Makes Himself (New York, 1951), p. 79. 172 TELOS not appropriate to pay closer attention to this problem area. It is sufficient to mention the interesting case based on Needham's specialized research and cited by Bernal, concerning ancient Chinese astronomy. He says that it became possible to imitate accurately the circular motion of the heavens around the poles only after the invention of the wheel. Apparently, Chinese astronomy began with this of rotation. The celestial world was previously considered to be like the one beneath it.11 Thus, scientific thought and, later, the various natural sciences, emerged from the intrinsic tendency toward the independence of the exploration of the means in the preparation and execution of the labor-process. Of course, such a process does not deal with the specific genesis of a new field of activity from another one, but this genesis of course repeats itself in extremely different forms during the entire history of science to the present. The model- which constitute the basis of cosmic and physical, etc., hypotheses are partly determined, most often unconsciously, by ontological concepts of the paticular everyday life situation. In turn, these are closely associated at the time with the actual , methods and results of labor. Some great turning points in science developed their roots slowly, but appear on a certain level as something radically and qualitatively new in the world-view of everyday life (of labor). The present situation of differentiated and extensively organized sciences already providing the preparatory work for industry, hides this evidence from many, but the ontological factuality is essentially unchanged. Actually, it would be interesting to observe the influences of the preparatory mechanism upon science ontologically and critically more closely. Although certainly not complete, the previous description of labor already indicates that, in comparison with the preceding inorganic and organic forms of being, a qualitatively new category originates with labor in the ontology of social being. Such an innovation must be assessed in terms of the realization of the pre-concieved, desired, as well as adequate results of the teleological project. In nature there are only realities; an uniterrupted mutation of its momentary concrete forms, and a continual otherness. Thus, Marxian theory of labor as the only existing form of a ideologically created being is the first to establish the unique character of social being. If the various idealistic or religious theories concerning teleology in general were correct, this difference would ultimately not exist. Every stone, every fly would likewise then be the realization of the "labor" performed by God, the world-spirit, etc., as the afore-mentioned realization of man's teleological projects. Consequently, the decisive ontological difference between society and nature would have to disappear. If the idealist philosophers strive nevertheless toward a dualism, they primarily distinguish the (apparently) purely spiritual from material reality, the (apparently) totally removed function of man's consciousness from the world of mere material being. Hence, it is not surprising that the domain of man's actual activity, of his

11 J.D. Bernal, Science in History (London, 1957), p. 86. Dialectics of Labor 173 metabolism with nature whence he originates and which he increasingly controls primarily through his labor, his praxis, is cut short. Thus, for idealist philosophers the only genuine apprehended human activity falls out of the sky ontologically complete, and it is depicted as "eternal" or "a-temporal": as the world of ought as opposed to the world of being. The contradictions of this conception regarding the ontological results of modern science are so obvious that they do not require further elaboration. One merely attempts to bring the dejectedness {Geworfenheit) of ontologically into harmony with the science of man's origin. By contrast, realization produces the genetic relationship as well as the ontologically essential contrast and difference. Man's activity as natural being permits, on the basis of the organic being, and by originating from it, the coming about of a uniquely new, more complex and complete level of existence, i.e., social existence. (That in antiquity individual and important thinkers already reflected upon the uniqueness of praxis and the realization of the new executed within it, and keenly recognized some of its consequences, does not basically change the total situation.) Realization as the category of the new form of being reveals at the same time an important consequence. Regarding ontological being, man's consciousness ceases to be an epiphenomenon with labor. The consciousness of animals, especially higher ones, appears to be an undeniable fact. Yet, it is only one operating factor in the biologically rooted reproductive process which runs its course according to biological laws. This is not just true of phylogenetic reproduction. Although it adheres to laws yet to be scientifically apprehended, thus permitting its recognition only as an ontological fact, reproduction undoubtedly occurs unconsciously. But this is also the case with the ontogenetic process of reproduction which is better understood as we begin to grasp animal consciousness as the product of biological differentiation and of the growing complexity of organisms. The reciprocal relationship between primitive organisms and their enviornment takes place primarily according to biophysical and biochemical laws. As the constitution of animal organisms becomes more complex, it requires more sensitive and differentiated organs in order to survive within this reciprocal relationship with its environment, and to reporduce itself. Even a rough outline of this development is inapproriate here. (Futhermore, the writer does not feel competent to do so.) It must be pointed out, however, that the gradual development of animal consciousness from biophysical and biochemical types of reactions and through stimuli and reflexes mediated by the nervous system always remains restricted within the framework of biological reproduction up to the highest level. Of course, it reveals a steadily growing flexibility in its reactions to the environment and the changes which the latter can undergo. This can be readily seen in the case of certain domestic animals and in experiments, with monkeys. Yet as indicated, we must riot overlook the fact that these experiments create a condition of security for the animals which is normally never exists. Furthermore, initiative, guidance, the provision of 174 TELOS "tools", etc., always emanate from man and never from the animals themselves. In fact, animal consciousness never develops beyond reproduction and toward a more advantageous utilization of biological existence. As such, ontologically speaking, it is an epiphenomenon of organic being. In labor, with the projection of the goal and its means, through a self-guided act, i.e., through teleological projection, consciousness sets out to surpass the mere adaption to the environment (to the latter belong also those animal-activities which however unintentionally, objectively change nature) by effecting changes in nature which could not originate in nature. When realization becomes a transforming and innovating principle of nature, in contributing impulse and direction, consciousness can no longer exist as an epiphenomenon. This conclusion reveals the distinction between dialectical and mechanical materialism. The latter recognizes only nature as such as objective reality. Marx very decisively separates the new materialism from the old, the dialectic from the mechanical, in his familiar Theses on Feuerbach: 'The chief defect of all materialism up to now (including Feuerbach's) is, that the object, reality, what we apprehend through our senses, is understood only in the form of the object or contemplation; but not as sensuous human activity, as practice; not subjectivity. Hence in opposition to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by — which of course does not know real sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinguished from the objects of thought: but he does not understand human activity itself as objective activity." Furthermore, he clearly indicates that the reality of thought, i.e., that consciousness has ceased to be epiphenomenal, can be located and shown only in praxis. "The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question."12 Our present depiction of labor as the archetype of praxis is in full accord with the spirit of the conclusions by Marx. Indeed many decades later Engels recognized that the decisive force for man's becoming was to be found directly in labor. Naturally, our claim has so far not been much more than a declaration. Of course, it is a declaration which already contains and even clarifies some decisive definitions of the objective structure by merely stating it correctly. Only through this structure, of course, can this be ascertained, established, and become explicit to the greatest possible degree of completeness. Realizations (the result of human praxis in labor) enter into the real world as new forms of objectivity. Although they are not deducible from nature, they are nevertheless (and especially as such) as much a part of reality as are the products of nature. This simple fact already supports the correctness of our claim even at this early stage.

12Marx and Engels, The German (New York, 1947), p. 197.