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Cosmic Teleology: a Reading of Metaphysics Λ 10 and Politics I 2

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Cosmic Teleology: a Reading of Metaphysics Λ 10 and Politics I 2 Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Dissertations (1934 -) Projects Cosmic City - Cosmic Teleology: A Reading of Metaphysics Λ 10 and Politics I 2 Brandon Henrigillis Marquette University Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Henrigillis, Brandon, "Cosmic City - Cosmic Teleology: A Reading of Metaphysics Λ 10 and Politics I 2" (2020). Dissertations (1934 -). 1050. https://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/1050 COSMIC CITY - COSMIC TELEOLOGY: A READING OF METAPHYSICS Λ 10 AND POLITICS I 2 by Brandon Henrigillis A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Milwaukee, Wisconsin December 2020 ABSTRACT COSMIC CITY - COSMIC TELEOLOGY: A READING OF METAPHYSICS Λ 10 AND POLITICS I 2 Brandon Henrigillis Marquette University, 2020 The goal of my project is to provide a reading of Metaphysics Λ 10. Λ 10 states that there is an order in the cosmos, or a cosmic nature. The problem for the interpreter of Aristotle is how to make sense of this claim given Aristotle’s arguments elsewhere regarding nature/substance and the priority of substances over the parts of a substance. To explain what Aristotle means when he states that there is a cosmic nature and arrangement, I first examine the army and household analogies offered by Aristotle in Λ 10. I contend that the household analogy in particular provides the reader with a way to explain Aristotle’s concept of a cosmic nature, since it leads us to Aristotle’s account of the naturalness and priority of the polis. It is then through understanding Aristotle’s concept of the naturalness and priority of the polis, found in Politics I 2, that one can understand the naturalness and priority of the cosmic order defended in Λ 10. The naturalness of the polis is found in the fact that it is a part of the natural process of practical reasoning in which all human beings participate. The polis is prior because outside of the polis it is impossible to live the fully human life, and thus one largely ceases to exist outside of the polis. I will conclude by arguing that this reading of Politics I 2 allows us to see that the cosmic ordering or arrangment in Λ 10 is natural in so far as it arises out of the teleologically ordered motions of the individual entities within the cosmos, and it is prior in so far as no entity can carry out its essential functions outside of the cosmic arrangement and structure. This reading allows us to understand Λ 10 and Aristotle’s conception of the cosmos in a way that does not conflict with other claims that are basic to Aristotle’s conception of reality. i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Brandon Henrigillis I would like to thank first my father Joseph Henrigillis, who died in February of this year. Without his love, encouragement, support, and his unique approach to the world I would not have been able to accomplish this project nor would I have pursued philosophy at all. I wish above all that you could be here at the end of all this, and I love you. I am thankful for the support of my wife, Dr. Jennifer Henrigillis, whose support, dedication, and sacrifice were invaluable. I love you, Jenn. I am also thankful to my siblings, Lindsay Nejedlo and Leland Nejedlo. Lindsay’s encouragement is what pushed me to pursue philosophy in Grad school at the beginning. And I would like to thank my Mom, Lori Nejedlo, for being there with love and support whenever I needed it. I am thankful for the support of my advisor and dissertation director Owen Goldin, whose patience and hard work allowed me to accomplish my goal. I would like to thank the rest of my committee Sara Brill, Darrell Dobbs, and Richard Taylor for their contributions as well. Finally, I would like to thank above all God. Ad maiorem Dei gloriam. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………………...i CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………..1 II. TWO INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES TO ARISTOTLE’S ACCOUNT OF TELEOLOGY IN PHYSICS II 8……………………………...12 III. THE ANALOGIES OF Λ 10………………………………………………..64 IV. THE NATURALNESS OF THE POLIS…………………………………..111 V. THE PRIORITY OF THE POLIS…………………………………………..154 VI. COSMIC TELEOLOGY…………………………………………………...192 BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………225 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION In this dissertation I set out to provide an interpretation of Metaphysics Λ 10 and Politics I 2 for the purposes of providing a new reading of Aristotle’s teleology, which is famously difficult to understand.1 Does Aristotle believe that teleology in nature is solely and exclusively a matter of appealing to the purpose of a specific kind in order to explain the motion or development of an entity that belongs to this kind? Or does Aristotle hold that there is a broader teleology found somehow in the arrangement of the whole cosmos, as is seemingly expressed in Λ 10? And if it is the latter, how can this broader teleology be natural for Aristotle? In particular, I propose to take seriously the brief hint of a broader teleology which Aristotle provides in Metaphysics Λ 10; and I provide a reading of this passage that understands Aristotle as arguing that there is a cosmic teleology, in the sense that there is a broader teleological ordering which arises from the teleological movements of the various natural kinds within the cosmos. In addition to proposing this reading of Λ 10, I show just how it is that we can make sense of a broader teleological ordering without thereby undermining other important claims that Aristotle makes within his corpus. To accomplish this, I argue that Politics I.2 actually provides us the best account for just how this broader teleological ordering can be considered natural. In analyzing Politics I.2, I claim that Aristotle’s conception of the polis involves an entity which is natural but which is not a substance, which is prior to the individual but which does not 1 To avoid repeating citations and ruining the flow of the presentation, all references will have a citation somewhere in the body of the dissertation rather than in the introduction itself. 2 make the individual merely a part of a larger teleological whole, and which is emergent from human action but which is not a product of intentional productive action. I believe that this understanding of the polis is the key to how Aristotle understands the naturalness of the cosmic teleology that Aristotle is defending in Λ 10. In other words, Aristotle’s account of the polis allows us to see just how the broader teleology can be natural without thereby committing him to various inconsistences that would inevitably arise otherwise. The goal of this project is to provide a new reading of these two passages which is consistent with the rest of what Aristotle has to say regarding teleology, nature, and priority but which at the same time does not dismiss the overt claims of these two passages or force a reading which does not fit with what Aristotle explicitly states. This reading, I argue, provides a new way of understanding the interrelationships which exist between entities that could be the subject of further explorations in future projects in Aristotle scholarship. This latter point is especially relevant when one considers the possibility of constructing an Aristotelian view of ecosystems, biomes, and other structured orders which clearly manifest themselves between living entities. My project also provides a foundation for future research into the ontological foundations of the cosmic order mentioned in Λ 10. I proceed as follows. The second chapter primarily lays the groundwork for arguments in following chapters, and accomplishes three goals. The first goal is focused on Aristotle’s account of a natural object and natural explanation. Providing this account will supply the rest of the dissertation with the context necessary for understanding the interpretive moves and arguments that will be discussed. This part will also discuss the standard conception of Aristotle’s account of a natural object and natural explanation so 3 that the problems with the claims that are made in Λ 10 and Politics I 2 become more apparent. Specifically, given Aristotle’s account of what is a natural thing and how we explain something acting teleologically, how it is possible for Aristotle to claim that the cosmos as a whole possesses a nature, and that there is a good found in the arrangement of the whole. The second goal of the second chapter is to introduce and discuss two interpretive camps which concern one’s understanding of Aristotle’s teleology in relation to the rather difficult passages of Physics II 8, Politics I 8, and Metaphysics Λ 10. The first is the internalist camp, which argues that Aristotelian teleology should be understood as restricted to the teleological actions of individual entities. This camp holds that it is wrong to interpret Aristotle as arguing that there is a broader teleology being defended in the corpus. They accordingly interpret the three passages mentioned through this lens and argue that there is nothing in these passages which argues for taking Aristotle’s teleology in any other way than the restricted sense that they defend. The second camp, the externalist camp, holds the opposing position that these passages clearly defend a broader, hierarchical and perhaps even an anthropocentric teleology. I will argue that the latter camp is correct in their interpretation of these passages, albeit in a restricted sense. I do not believe that these passages in any way support the position that Aristotle’s teleology is anthropocentric, and I will argue that Politics I 8 does not really express anything about Aristotle’s conception of teleology in nature.
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