THE REVELSTOKE DAM: A CASE STUDY OF THE SELECTION, LICENSING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A LARGE SCALE HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT IN BRITISH COLUMBIA
By
HEIDI ERIKA MISSLER
B.A., The University of British Columbia, 1984
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
i n
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
(Department of Geography)
We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard
THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
September 1988
QHeidi Erika Missler, 1988 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced
degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it
freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive
copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my
department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or
publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written
permission.
Department
The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3
Date
DE-6G/81) ABSTRACT
Procedures for the selection, licensing and implementation of large scale energy projects must evolve with the escalating complexity of such projects and. the changing public value system. Government appeared unresponsive to rapidly changing conditions in the 1960s and 1970s. Consequently, approval of major hydroelectric development projects in British Columbia under the Water
Act became increasingly more contentious. This led, in 1980, to the introduction of new procedures—the Energy Project Review Process (EPRP)— under the B.C. Utilities Commission Act.
This study documents and evaluates the selection, licensing and implementation of the Revelstoke Hydroelectric Dam under the Water Act and assesses to what extent the current EPRP selection and licensing procedure overcame the shortcomings of the Revelstoke experience. The methodological approach used is that of a post-development analysis.
The Revelstoke Project case study revealed that the Water Act only addressed project design, safety, and impacts, but not selection and justification. Project implementation proceeded under a conditional water licence. The two-part administrative framework, established under the licence and by B.C. Hydro, lacked integration and failed to provide effective management. A strong commitment to the preservation of environmental quality was lacking. The licensee's monitoring of construction practices in general and of compliance with environmental guidelines, a set of nonspecific commonly accepted construction activities, were inadequate. Governmental surveillance and enforcement were rendered unsatisfactory by staff shortages and a laissez faire attitude. The case study concluded with a post-development environmental analysis, which determined the effectiveness of the
Environmental Impact Statement in predicting impacts to be only twenty-five percent. Evaluation of the EPRP and its application in the Site C Dam proposal demonstrated that it is a significant improvement over its predecessor. If applied efficiently and in its entirety, it would provide an adequate structure and procedural sequence for project selection and licensing.
However, some of the inadequacies noted in the Revelstoke case study, such the lack of provisions for early public and government participation, an adequate data base, an administrative structure, and a post-development analysis, have not been or only partially corrected. To conclude, this thesis offers some recommendations to further improve this continually evolving process. iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS iv
LIST OF TABLES vi
LIST OF FIGURES vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS viii
GLOSSARY ix
CHAPTER 1. THE SELECTION AND LICENSING OF LARGE SCALE ENERGY PROJECTS 1
1.1 Hydroelectric Development in B.C. 4 1.1.1 B.C. Hydro's Role and Operations 4 1.1.2 The Revelstoke Project 8 1.2 Objectives and Methodology of the Study 11 1.3 Outline of the Study 12
CHAPTER 2. SELECTION AND LICENSING OF THE REVELSTOKE PROJECT 17
2.1 Prevailing Policies and Procedures 17 2.2 Project Justification and Selection 21 2.3 The Water Licence Application 23 2.3.1 Criticisms of the Water Licence Application Process 27 2.3.1.1 The Hearing Process 27 2.3.1.2 Mandate and Expertise of the Water Management Branch 29 2.3.1.3 Project Justification 30 2.4 The Water Licence 31 2.4.1 The Water Licence Appeal 36 2.4.2 The Amended Water Licence 38
CHAPTER 3. THE ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK 42
3.1 The Unofficial Program 43 3.1.1 The Components of the Program 44 3.1.2 The Operation of the Program 47 3.1.3 Interaction of the Components 50 3.2 The Official Program 51 3.2.1 The Components of the Program 51 3.2.2 The Operation of the Program 58 3.2.2.1 The Community Impact Committee 59 3.2.2.2 The Revelstoke Project Coordinating Committee 67 3.2.2.3 The Claims Officer 78 3.2.2.4 The Site Biologists 80 3.2.3 Interaction of the Components 83 3.3 The Relations between the Two Programs 83 3.4 Major Shortcomings of the. Administrative Framework 87 V
CHAPTER 4. THE ENVIRONMENT - GUIDELINES AND CONSTRUCTION IMPACTS 94
4.1 Contractual Requirements and Environmental Guidelines 95 4.1.1 Compliance Monitoring of Requirements and Guidelines 100 4.2 Construction Activities and Environmental Impacts 102
CHAPTER 5. ENVIRONMENTAL PREDICTIONS AND OUTCOMES 121
5.1 The Aquatic Environment and Fish Resource 122 5.1.1 Physical Limnological System 122 5.1.1.1 Reservoir 125 5.1.1.2 Downstream of the Dam 127 5.1.2 Chemical and Biological Systems 128 5.1.2.1 Reservoir 130 5.1.2.2 Downstream of the Dam 132 5.2 The Terrestrial Environment and Wildlife Resource 134 5.2.1 The Land Surface 134 5.2.2 The Wildlife Resource 135 5.3 The Atmospheric Environment 143 5.4 Conclusion 144
CHAPTER 6. THE CURRENT ENERGY PROJECT REVIEW PROCESS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA..148
6.1 The Energy Project Review Process 150 6.2 The Site C Experience 157 6.2.1 The Hearing Process 158 6.2.2 Mandate and Expertise of the BCUC Review Panel 160 6.2.3 Project Selection 161 6.2.3 Project Justification 162 6.2.5 The Proposed Monitoring Program ; 164
CHAPTER 7. THE REVELSTOKE EXPERIENCE AND THE CURRENT ENERGY PROJECT REVIEW PROCESS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA 168
7.1 Review of the Revelstoke Experience... 168 7.1.1 Pre-Application .168 7.1.2 Application 169 7.1.3 Licence 170 7.1.4 Environmental Guidelines 174 7.1.5 Compliance Monitoring 175 7.1.6 Post-Development Environmental Analysis 176 7.2 Assessment of the Energy Project Review Process in Light of the Revelstoke Exper ience 177 7.3 Further Development of the Energy Project Review Process 184
BIBLIOGRAPHY 188
APPENDIX 199 vi
LIST OF TABLES
1.1 Operating Schedule of the Revelstoke Dam 10
2.1 B.C. Legislation, Agencies and Procedures in Relationship to the Licensing of Selected Hydroelectric Projects 19
2.2 Studies for Project Selection 22
2.3 Intervenors at the Revelstoke Public Hearing 26
2.4 Summary of Content of Selected Clauses in Water Licence 33
3.1 Water Licence Clauses Administered by the RPCC 55
3.2 Sussex Study - Assessment of Outstanding Issues 64
3.3 B.C. Hydro Funding of Some of the Administrative Framework of the Revelstoke Project 88
4.1 Summary of Selected Contract Requirements and Guidelines 97
4.2 Construction Activities Monitored and Environmental Impacts Reported by Site Biologists ..104
4.3 Construction Activities Monitored by Site Fisheries Biologist in 1978 106
5.1 Comparison of Predicted and Actual Impacts on the Aquatic Environment and Fish Resource • ..123
5.2 Comparison of Predicted and Actual Impacts on the Wildlife Resource ....137
5.3 Post-Development Environmental Analysis Results 146 vii
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 The Columbia River Treaty Dams and Other Dams of the Area 5
2.1 B.C. Hydro's Perception of the Procedure and Schedule for
Project Licensing 24
3.1 The Unofficial Program 45
3.2 The Official Program 52 3.3 The Regional District of Columbia-Shuswap - Local Communities Affected by the Revelstoke Project 61
3.4 Administrative Framework for the Revelstoke Project: Relationship to Public, Industrial and Governmental Sectors...... 85
6.1 The B.C. Energy Project Review Process: Certification Procedures 151
6.2 The Energy Project Review Process: Pre-Application and Application Phases 152
6.3 The Energy Project Coordinating Committee and its Three Working Committees.. 154
6.4 General Framework for Managing Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts 156 viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Very special thanks go to my supervisor, Dr. J. D. Chapman, for his guidance and enthusiastic support, and to Mrs. M. E. North for her constructive advice and review of this study.
I would like to express ray appreciation to the many people at the various Branches of the Ministry of Environment in Victoria and Nelson, in particular to Dr. J. O'Riordan, Mr. G. F. Cox, Mr. R. Round, Mr. J. H. Walker, Dr. R. Nordin, and Mr. G. Woods. For their kind help I thank also Dr. R. Bradley, Mr. H. Smith, Mr. R. Roddick, and many other employees of B.C. Hydro and Power Authority.
Finally, thanks to my family who never lost faith in my ability to finish this thesis. ix
GLOSSARY adjunct committees - part of the unofficial administrative framework for the Revelstoke Project - a set of five committees concerned with problems arising from the construction of the Project.
BCUC - British Columbia Utilities Commission - regulatory body for public utilities in B.C.
CIC - Revelstoke Community Impact Committee - part of the official administrative program for the Revelstoke Project.
Claims Officer - part of the official administrative program for the Revelstoke Project - responsible for the resolution of claims <$10,000 arising from the Revelstoke Project.
EARP - Environmental Assessment and Review Process - responsible for the assessment of federal development projects. effects monitoring - the repeated measurement of environmental variables to determine what environmental change has resulted from the implementation and operation of a development project.
EIA - environmental impact assessment - process that attempts to identify, predict and assess the potential impacts of proposed development projects, and to recommend mitigative measures for adverse impacts.
EIS - environmental impact statement - report that describes the pre- development state of the environment and the potential impacts (environmental, social, and economic) of a development on that environment.
ELUC - Environment and Land Use Committee - a B.C. Cabinet committee established under the Environment and Land Use Act (1971).
EPCC - Energy Project Coordinating Committee - coordinates the review of regulated projects and advises the Minister of Energy, Mines, and Petroleum Resources and the Minister of Environment at various stages in the Energy Project Review Process. Members are: Director of Project Analysis Branch, Ministry of Energy, Mines, and Petroleum Resources, Director of Assessment Branch, Ministry of Environment and a representative of the B.C. Utilities Commission staff.
EPRP - Energy Project Review Process - process for the review and certification of energy projects of 20 MW or more, established under the B.C. Utilities Act (1980).
FEARO - Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Office - responsible to the Minister of the Environment for the administration of EARP.
FWB - Fish and Wildlife Branch - an agency of the B.C. Ministry of Environment, whose mandate is the management of fish and wildlife resources. X
Impact Monitor - part of the unofficial administrative program of the Revelstoke Project - responsible for monitoring social and economic impacts on the City of Revelstoke and neighboring communities.
IMC - Impact Monitoring Committee - set up by Regional District of Colurabia- Shuswap to supervise and give support to the Impact Monitor.
Local Impact Committee - part of the unofficial administrative framework- responsible for processing claims at the local level in Revelstoke.
Minister of EMPR - Minister of Energy, Mines, and Petroleum Resources.
Ministry of EMPR - Ministry of Energy, Mines, and Petroleum Resources. official program - the administrative framework for the Revelstoke Project set up under the water licence. It consisted of the Community Impact Committee, the Revelstoke Coordinating Committee, the Claims Officer, and two site biologists, all under the jurisdiction of the Comptroller of Water Rights.
RPCC - Revelstoke Project Coordinating Committee - part of the official program. study area - the area that was monitored for environmental impacts arising from the Revelstoke Project. It is the Columbia River drainage basin between Mica Dam and the City of Revelstoke (5400 km^, see Figure 1.1.). unofficial program - the administrative framework for the Revelstoke Project set up by B.C. Hydro. It consisted of the Local Impact Committee, the Impact Monitor and the Adjunct Committees. 1
CHAPTER 1
THE SELECTION AND LICENSING OF
LARGE SCALE ENERGY PROJECTS
The selection and licensing (approval) of large scale resource based
development projects has become increasingly complex, time consuming, and
contentious. In Canada, the late 1950s and early 1960s saw the introduction
of cost-benefit analysis as a major approach to the evaluation and selection
of resource development projects (Sewell et al., 1962). Later In the 1960s
and in the early 1970s, concerns about environmental impact led to the
introduction of environmental impact assessment procedures and, quickly
thereafter, to social impact assessment. These procedural innovations
reflected the increased pace and scale of resource developments, changing
societal values and, in turn, evolving public policy expressed in a growing
body of legislation and regulatory requirements, at both the federal and
provincial levels of government.
Nevertheless, in the 1970s public policies and the review and approval
procedures for resource development had grown largely out of phase with the
public's quickly changing value system. The environmental movement caused a
rapid change in the public's attitude toward the environment and natural
resource sectors (Heberlein, 1976). The environment itself was perceived as a
natural resource, fundamental in maintaining the stability necessary for human
survival. Concerns about environmental disturbance were accompanied by the
serious questioning of the growth ethic. However, legislative and procedural
changes were slow to develop and the implementation of large scale development
projects led to numerous conflicts. In particular, projects were approved without their need having been justified within the broad policy context.
Project review and approval procedures were limited to environmental and
social impact assessment of the specific single, proposed project, the issue
of project justification being outside the narrow mandate of the approving 2 agency. The need to identify the objectives of the three major participant groups—the developer, the government, and society at large—and to find ways of accommodating their differences was not addressed. Furthermore, direct public input into resource development was generally only a perfunctory exercise with little or no effect on the actual decisions made (Grima, 1985).
Large scale development projects were implicitly sanctioned by government, rather than explicitly approved within the public forum.
From these conflicts arose the public's demand for a change in the decision-making process itself: from a representative to a more participatory democracy. A stronger and more meaningful public participation at the policy• making, program or project approval, and implementation level was perceived to render the selection and approval of large scale development projects fairer and more credible (Case et al., 1983) by leading to government accountability and to better informed decisions that would be in the public's interest
(Burch, 1976; Lucas, 1976; Grima, 1985). Additionally, the experience with environmental impact assessment (EIA) to date had clearly shown that it, too, must be improved in order to become an effective and integrative assessment tool of development projects (Beanlands and Duinker, 1983; Henshaw, 1984;
Larkin, 1984). In the face of these persistent demands for change, government could not help but respond and the 1980s saw the evolution of public policies and the accompanying introduction of new selection, approval, and implementation procedures for large scale development projects.
The geographer's interest in resource development has grown up within the man-land tradition of the discipline. This growth has been enriched by interactions with those in the environmental, behavioral, management, and policy sciences and tested by geographers who are professionally engaged in resource management (O'Riordan, J., 1981). In the 1960s Canadian geographers were already writing about techniques of project assessment (Sewell et al., 3
1962) and the institutional arrangements required for the development of international river basins (Chapman, 1963). By the early 1970s major general works on resource and environmental management had been published (Burton and
Kates, 1965; White, 1971; O'Riordan, T., 1971; MacNeil, 1971) and by the end of that decade the emphasis on the general theme was giving way to more focussed lines of enquiry often in the context of water resources.
As early as 1971, and reflecting the influence of the behavioral approach, the role of perceptions and attitudes in resource management was documented (Sewell and Burton, 1971). This was quickly followed by some of the first writings by geographers on public participation in resource management decisions (Draper, 1975), a sub-theme which has evolved rapidly ever since (Owen, 1985; Grima, 1985). Also in the mid-1970s geographers began to focus upon environmental quality (Berry et al., 1974) and the character and role of environmental impact assessment techniques (Mitchell, 1976; Mitchell and Turkheim, 1977), another sub-theme which has developed into a major area of geographical enquiry (Maclaren and Whitney, 1985). Writing on the policy, institutional and administrative aspects of resource management also started in the mid-1970s (Mitchell, 1975; Jackson, 1976; Mitchell, 1977), matured in the early 1980s (O'Riordan, T. and Sewell, 1981b; Mitchell and Sewell, 1981) and now constitutes another established sub-theme for geographers in the more general context of resource management.
In this thesis several of the sub-themes noted above have been combined in a study of one major project, the Revelstoke Dam, the planning, licensing, and construction of which extended over thirteen years (1971-1983). This hindsight or post-development type of analysis reflects the work of Mitchell
(1971), draws upon the methodology more recently developed by Munro et al.
(1986) and benefits from the conceptual framework developed by O'Riordan, T, and Sewell (1981a) and Sadler (1983). 4
1.1 HYDROELECTRIC DEVELOPMENT IN B.C.
Hydroelectric development in B.C. started at the turn of the century,
when two small generating plants were built to serve Victoria on Vancouver
Island (1898) and Vancouver on the Mainland (1903) (B.C. Hydro, 1963-1987).
Development proceeded slowly and on a small scale up until the early 1960s,
when the provincial government embarked on a policy of hydro-industrialization
(Sewell, 1987), which led to the megaprojects built on the Columbia and Peace
Rivers. Also in the light of this policy in 1962, the Government formed B.C.
Hydro and Power Authority (B.C. Hydro) by amalgamating two public utilities,
the B.C. Electric Company (formerly a private utility expropriated in 1961)
and the B.C. Power Commission.
1.1.1 B.C. HYDRO'S ROLE AND OPERATION
The mandate of B.C. Hydro is typical for a public utility: to produce
and market energy as needed and subject to government policies. But the
corporate economic goal "to achieve financial stability and selfsufficiency while supplying power to consumers at lowest possible costs" (B.C. Hydro,
1975, p. 16) also governs B.C. Hydro's operation. The Corporation's
priorities then are to meet all expected energy demands as they forecast them
and to establish a healthy credit rating in order to remain a financially
independent corporation. Consequently, and facilitated by the government's
hydro-industrialization policy, the Public Utility has consistently
overplanned since the beginning of the 1970's.
B.C. Hydro built the first three megaprojects in the Columbia River watershed in southeastern B.C. (Figure 1.1) as called for by the Columbia
River Treaty, signed by Canada and the U.S.A. in 1964.1 The Duncan Dam,
finished in 1967, the Keenleyside Dam, completed a year later, and the Mica
Dam, operational in 1973, provided flood control storage. The latter was also 5
Figure 1.1 The Columbia River Treaty Dams and Other Dams of the Area (B.C. Hydro, undated) 6
a power dam with 1736 megawatt (MW) of installed capacity by 1976.
The hydroelectric potential of the Columbia watershed was further developed by B.C. Hydro with Kootenay Canal in 1976 (592.7 MW), Seven Mile in
1980 (607.5 MW) and the Revelstoke Project (1800 MW) in 1984. Studies were initiated in 1980 for the development of Murphy Creek (300 MW), the diversion of the Kootenay River into the Columbia River at Canal Flats (possible in 1984 under the Columbia River Treaty) and the use of the Keenleyside Dam (210 MW) for electric energy generation (B.C. Hydro, 1963-1987).
Even prior to the development of the Columbia system, B.C. Hydro had embarked on a program on the Peace River in northeastern B.C. The G.M. Shrum hydroelectric generating plant (Site One) became operational in 1968, reaching its ultimate generating capacity of 2416 MW in 1979, and the Peace
Canyon facility came into service in 1981 with 700 MW. In the mid-1970s, studies were commenced for another generating station on the Peace River, the
Site C project (900 MW). Approval was sought for this project in 1980 but refused by the government in 1983. Additional developments planned for the
Peace River basin were the Site E generating plant (750 MW) and the diversion of the McGregor River.
Over the last two decades, B.C. Hydro had also evaluated the potential of other major river basins, such as the Stikine-Iskut (3025 MW)2 and the Skeena
(1080 MW) in northwestern B.C., the Liard (3800 MW) at the B.C./Yukon border, the Homathko (1410 MW) in the southern Coast Mountains, and various developments on the Fraser River (8200 MW) (B.C. Hydro, 1975). Furthermore, plans were underway for a major thermal-electric project at Hat Creek (5000
MW) in the interior of southern B.C. and the possible use of East Kootenay coal deposits (1800 MW). During this time the transmission line grid had been strengthened overall and especially by the addition of a line connecting the Peace and Columbia River generating systems, a line to the 7
Alberta border, and another to transmit electric power from the Mainland to
Vancouver Island (B.C. Hydro, 1963-1987).
Conditions governing B.C. Hydro's operation have changed considerably since the Corporation's formation in 1962. Public concerns about environmental and socio-economic impacts of B.C. Hydro's projects escalated and opposing interest groups became better organized. Though response by B.C.
Hydro and government lagged public concerns, changes in project assessment, and approval procedures have been significant over the last twenty-five years.
Whereas the lead time for the construction of a megaproject was a matter of a few years for the Columbia River Treaty Dams in the 1960s, by the time of the Revelstoke Project in the mid-1970s, B.C. Hydro called it "distressingly long—approaching ten years" (B.C. Hydro, 1975, p. 6 of introductory letter).
More time was needed for the assessment of impacts of proposed projects. The
Seven Mile Dam was the first dam for which an environmental impact statement
(EIS) had been prepared. For the Revelstoke Project the EIS included an assessment of socio-economic impacts and of impacts arising from ancillary works, as well a more extensive cost-benefit analysis had been conducted
(O'Riordan, J., 1981).
Also the project approval procedure became more time consuming. The establishment of a new regulatory body, the B.C. Utilities Commission (BCUC), under the B.C. Utilities Act in 1980, placed B.C. Hydro's operation under strict regulation and introduced the Energy Project Review Process (EPRP).
Whereas approval for the Revelstoke Project under the Water Act (1960) took
less than a year and construction was allowed to proceed while an appeal was
considered, the Site C Dam was rejected in 1983 following a three year review under the EPRP.
The government's rejection of the Site C project was based on the much reduced electric energy growth demands resulting from an economic recession. 8
The decision also signified a change in hydroelectric development policy. In future, if warranted by load growth forecasts, medium sized projects, such as the proposed generating plants at Murphy Creek and Keenleyside Dam, were to be built. The government planned to encourage the construction of small private projects needed for industrial development in remote areas outside the
B.C. Hydro grid system. Furthermore, the electric energy export policy was no longer limited to the sale of interruptible, short term surplus power but also included that of firm, long term surplus electric energy (Ministry of Energy,
Mines and Petroleum Resources, 1983b). However, exports to the U.S.A. depended on access to the U.S. transmission lines. This was restricted by the
Bonneville Power Administration in the mid-1980s.
The economic recession also affected B.C. Hydro's planning policies.
Higher interest rates greatly increased the servicing of the large debt arising from the capital expenditures of recently built megaprojects.
Emphasis on project construction was reduced and the Hat Creek thermal- electric development was indefinitely postponed (B.C. Hydro, 1963-1987).
However, the former was short-lived. From 1986 on, actual electric energy demand exceeded that forecast by B.C. Hydro and negotiations with Bonneville
Power Administration were reopened in 1987. Consequently, in mid-1988 B.C.
Hydro predicted that Site C would be needed by the year 2001 and Keenleyside by 2004 (Vancouver Sun, 1987, 1988). However, as of 1988, the Revelstoke
Project remains the last hydroelectric megaproject built in B.C.
1.1.2 THE REVELSTOKE PROJECT
Based on the extremely high annual electric energy demand increase in the
1960s (average >14%), B.C. Hydro perceived the need for another major project late in the 1960s and by mid-1970 stated that the Revelstoke Dam was the only project far enough advanced in its planning stage to meet their energy demand 9 forecast (B.C. Hydro, 1976a, 1976b). The Revelstoke Project was planned to have a capacity of 2700 MW which would constitute more than half of B.C.
Hydro's total electric generating capacity of 5080 MW, and 300 MW more than the capacity of the G.M. Shrum plant on the Peace River.^ Both the planning and construction phases of the Project were anticipated to take six years each
(1971 to 1982). Approval for the Project was being sought by September 1976, with a projected earliest in-service date of September 1982. Total project costs were to be $1.2 billion (Vancouver Sun, 1976b).
The Revelstoke dam site is 5 km north of the City of Revelstoke (Figure
1.1). The Project was to consist of a concrete dam, an earthfill dam and a spillway with a power house designed to hold six electric power generators of
405 MW each. The reservoir would stretch 130 km north in a narrow, forested valley to the Mica Dam with a surface area of 11,534 hectares. Two thirds of the reservoir water would come from the Mica Dam and the other third from
tributaries south of Mica Dam.
The Project also provided for the relocation of Highway 23 North between the Revelstoke Dam and Mica Dam. Auxiliary developments included borrow pits for building material, work areas, a construction camp for up to 3000 single workers and a transmission line to the substation in Revelstoke (B.C. Hydro,
1976b).
The proposed operating schedule of the Project is outlined in Table 1.1.
Water release criteria were dependent on the obligations for discharge from
Mica Dam and storage requirements in the Arrow Lakes under the Columbia
River Treaty. In the short term,, however, the Revelstoke Project could be run
independently of the other two dams. The Project was to be a predominantly
run-of-the-river plant, insofar as it would only be used for flood control in
times of extreme flood danger. Thus reservoir peak water level (573 m) and
use of the spillway would be rare. By the fall of 1988 four turbines had been 10
Table 1.1 Operating Schedule for the Revelstoke Dam
RELEASE CRITERIA
Because the Revelstoke Dam is located between two Columbia River Treaty Dams, its overall operation must reflect Treaty obligations for releases from Mica Dam and any storage transfers between Kinbasket Lake and the Arrow Lakes. However, in the short term the Revelstoke Dam may be operated independently of the other two dams, provided sufficient inflow and storage are available.
OPERATING SCHEDULE
full supply level 573 m elevation a.s.l. Drawdown: - option regulation I. 5 m - winter peak load conditions < 4.6 m to El. 568.4 m - system emergency conditions 15.2 m - surcharge maximum up to 1.5 m total flooded area II, 534 ha total volume of impoundment 5.3 x 109 m3
Spillway and Outlet Gates: - combined discharge volume
at elevation 574.6 m 7108 m3/s at elevation 573 m 6503 m3/s - discharge of _>6503 m-Vs extremely rare event - elevation at which operation possible spillway 556.3-574.6 m outlet gates 518.2-574.6 m
Turbine Discharge: - 4 turbines combined about 1700 m^/s - when required release from Project exceeds that volume or there is lack of load, the excess water will be released through the outlet gates or spillway
Source: B.C. Hydro, 1976b, 1983 11 installed with a capacity of 1800 MW.
1.2 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
The objectives of this study are threefold. First, the study is to serve as a documented case history of the Revelstoke Hydroelectric Dam requiring the compilation of available data from a number of different sources. The second aim is to evaluate the effectiveness of the approval procedure, the administrative framework, the environmental guidelines, compliance monitoring and environmental impact predictions of the Revelstoke Project. The third goal is to assess the extent to which current selection and licensing procedures for large scale energy projects overcome the shortcomings of the
Revelstoke experience.
The main body of the thesis is in the form of a post-development analysis. The term is used here as a collective one; it signifies any type of analysis of any parts (selection, licensing, implementation) of a project conducted at some time after project construction has been completed. This format was chosen as most suitable for meeting the stated objectives and despite the many methodological problems noted to be common to post- development analyses, especially for projects that have undergone early environmental impact assessment (Bissett, 1980, 1984; Hecky et al., 1984;
PADC, 1983; Munro et al., 1986; Sadler, 1985). Mitchell (1977, p. 180) sees the value of such studies in the identification of the shortcomings of the programs or procedures being studied and in the constructive recommendations for their resolution.
Despite the difficulties in developing an accepted methodology for post- development analyses, that proposed by Munro et al. (1986) proved a useful guide. Five steps were followed for this thesis. First, the literature pertaining to project approval in general and specifically environmental 12 impacts in relation to hydroelectric dams and post-development analysis was reviewed. Second, an assessment of the feasibility of conducting a post- development analysis of the Revelstoke Project was carried out. Preliminary interviews established liaison and data availability at government offices and at B.C. Hydro. A review of the environmental impact statement (EIS) identified the environmental Impact predictions and proposed administrative framework for the Project.
Third, data needs were identified on the basis of the feasibility assessment. Data were then obtained from three main information sources: the
Water Management Branch and the Fish and Wildlife Branch (FWB) of the
Ministry of Environment, and B.C. Hydro, the project proponent. In-depth interviews held with staff of these agencies and with other persons, who had been working on the project site or lived In Revelstoke, provided the writer with a general feeling for the Revelstoke Project and an understanding of the data and concerns of the main participants. The two final steps in the methodology were the analysis and interpretation of the data, and the reporting of the results of the post-development analysis. The results of the
Revelstoke case study were then applied to a review of the evolution of the selection and licensing procedures for large scale energy development projects in B.C. in order to assess the improvements in the more recent legislation and the implementation of these procedures.
1.3 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY
The study consists of two parts: the Revelstoke Project case study and
the assessment of the current selection and licensing procedures for large
scale energy developments in the light of the Revelstoke experience. The case
study is presented in four sections: (1) the selection and licensing of the
Project; (2) the administrative framework for environmental impact management; 13
(3) the environmental guidelines and construction impacts; and (4) environmental predictions and their outcomes.
Chapter 2 deals with the selection and licensing of the Revelstoke
Project. It opens with a discussion of the policies and. procedures for the selection and licensing of large scale electric energy developments prevailing in B.C. at the time of the Revelstoke Project. This furnishes the context in which these two phases of the Revelstoke Project took place. Then follows a brief description of the selection of the Revelstoke Project by B.C. Hydro.
The licensing of the Project proceeded under the Water Act. It started with
B.C. Hydro's application for a water licence, followed by a public hearing and the issuance of the water licence. These steps are described and critically evaluated, The chapter concludes with an assessment of the appeal to the water licence and the resulting amended licence. The latter provides the necessary basis for the analysis of the administrative framework in the next
chapter.
In Chapter 3 the administrative framework established for the Revelstoke
Project is described and its effectiveness evaluated. The administrative framework consisted of two parts: the "unofficial" program set up by B.C.
Hydro and the "official" program called for under the water licence. An overview of the components, operation and interaction within each of these programs is provided. Then follows a discussion of the relations between the unofficial and official programs. In the final part of the chapter the major
shortcomings of the administrative framework are examined. The evaluation of
the administrative structure contributes to the understanding of the issues discussed in Chapter 4.
Chapter 4 focuses on environmental issues. As a requirement of the water
licence B.C. Hydro developed environmental guidelines for the Project. An
examination of their format and content is followed by an assessment of the 14 manner in which they were administered. The environmental impacts arising from construction activities are then documented and reviewed.
Environmental issues are further examined in Chapter 5, which deals with environmental impact predictions and outcomes. The impacts predicted by the environmental impact statement (EIS) are compared with the impacts that occurred. They are grouped according to the parts of the ecosystem affected: aquatic environment and fish resource, terrestrial environment and wildlife resource, and atmospheric environment. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the effectiveness of the EIS in the prediction of environmental impacts.
In Chapter 6 the focus changes from the Revelstoke Project to the Energy
Project Review Process, which was introduced in 1980 and significantly changed
the procedures for the selection and licensing of energy projects in B.C.
This chapter describes both the process and its application. First, the procedures and options for dealing with an energy project application and a proposed administrative framework for the implementation of such a project are reviewed. Then follows a discussion of the manner in which the energy project review process was applied in the case of the Site C Hydroelectric Project.
The topics addressed are: the hearing process, mandate and expertise of the review panel, project selection and justification, and the proposed monitoring program. These are critically evaluated in the next chapter.
The seventh and final chapter undertakes a synthesis of the Revelstoke
case study and the Site C experience to determine to what extent the Energy
Project Review Process is an improvement over the selection and licensing process it replaced. For this purpose the shortcomings of the Revelstoke
Project are summarized under the following headings: pre-appiication,
application, licence, environmental guidelines, compliance monitoring, and
post-development environmental analysis. In the light of the shortcomings of 15 the Revelstoke experience the processing of the Site C Dam application is reviewed. This evaluation leads to some recommendations for the further modification of the Energy Project Review Process. 16
Notes
1 The Columbia River Treaty provided for flood control storage and electric power generation in both countries. B.C. received a total of $341.8 million (Canadian) for flood control and the sale of Its share (50%) of the additional power generated in the U.S.A. for the first 30 years of the 60-year Treaty (Sewell, 1964).
2 These figures are the anticipated generating capacity as quoted by B.C. Hydro in a 1975 Task Force Report which evaluated several alternative development plans (B.C. Hydro, 1975).
3 In 1974 the electric power consumption in B.C. was 18% of the total energy used in the Province. B.C. Hydro, the major public utility, supplied 66%, 78% of which was hydroelectric and 22% was thermal-electric power. The Corporation's total generating capacity was 5080 megawatts (MW). The integrated grid system accounted for 97% (4916 MW). Of this nearly 50% came from the large G.M Shrum plant on the Peace River and 31% (1531 MW) from 21 smaller hydroelectric plants, the rest being thermal-electric power. Only 3% (155.4 MW) were generated by the isolated plants. 17
CHAPTER 2
SELECTION AND LICENSING OF THE REVELSTOKE PROJECT
The selection and licensing of the Revelstoke Project took about seven and a half years to complete. The project selection phase started in 1971 with B.C. Hydro conducting feasibility studies on two proposals, which by early 1976 had been extended to cover four additional proposals. However, by this time, design and plans for the Revelstoke Project had been finalized and
B.C. Hydro applied to the Water Management Branch for the approval of the
Project in the form of a water licence. Following a public hearing in the fall of 1976, the Water Management Branch issued the water licence In December of that year, whereupon construction of the dam was started immediately in
January 1977.
Initial project licensing by the Water Management Branch took less than a year. However, the process was extended by an appeal to Cabinet to revoke the water licence. The appointed appeal tribunal made two recommendations
(September 1977, June 1978) to amend the conditions of the licence and a consolidated water licence was issued by the Water Management Branch in August
1978, thus completing the licensing phase of the Project.
The objective of this chapter is to describe and evaluate these two phases of the Revelstoke Project. A discussion of the policies and procedures for the selection and licensing of large scale hydroelectric energy projects prevailing in B.C. at that time provides the contextual setting.
2.1 PREVAILING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
The 1960s were notable in B.C. for the largest dam-building program in
its history (Duncan, Keenleyside, Peace River 1 and Mica) and for the
emergence of strong public concern about both the environmental consequences
of such large resource development proposals and direct participation in their
selection. These and other public concerns led, in the 1970s, to a change of 18 government for several years and the introduction of major legislation intended to establish more government control over resource development. The
Revelstoke proposal took shape during the transition between these two decades and was licenced under an "old" piece of legislation (the Water Act, 1960) even though new legislation (Environment and Land Use Act, 1971; B.C. Energy
Act, 1973) was in place (Table 2.1).
The Water Act (1960), administered by the Water Management Branch, had been used to licence the dams built in the 1960s. Under this Act the approval procedure was concerned mainly with engineering and safety issues, and only site-specific environmental matters were considered. Regulation stipulated
that the applicant furnish such information as the descriptions of the land,
the water to be diverted, the purpose and the project specification. The Act did not require a review of the justification of the project or the preparation of an environmental impact statement but gave the Comptroller of
Water Rights the authority to request such other information as he considered relevant. Individuals or groups could file objections to development proposals and the Act provided for public hearings to be held at the discretion of the Comptroller (Bankes and Thompson, 1981). At such a public hearing the Comptroller could adjudicate any matter brought before him that was related to the proposed project, as well as being within his mandate as outlined in the Water Act. Upon approval of a development the Comptroller
could include any conditions with the water licence that he considered necessary to the implementation and operation of the project. Of note, however, is that though B.C. Hydro had always complied with the Comptroller's
orders, by law (Sect ion 53A of the B.C. Hydro Act (1964)) the Corporation was
exempt from having to comply with any provincial statute or statutory
provision. The public had the right to appeal the issuance of the water licence under the Water Act. If the appeal was accepted, Cabinet would pass 19
Table 2.1 B.C. Legislation, Agencies and Procedures in Relationship to the Licensing of Selected Hydroelectric Projects
B.C. LEGISLATION, AGENCIES, PROCEDURES B.C. HYDRO DAMS
WATER ACT I960
1961
B.C. HYDRO 1962
1963
COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY 196A B.C. HYDRO ACT
1965 LICENSING
CONSTRUCTION FOREST ACT 1966
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT 1967 [ DUNCAN COMPLETED ]
1968 - I KEENLEYSIDE COMPLETED : - [ PEACE RIVER I
COAL MINES REGULATION ACT 1969
LAND ACT 1970
ENVIRONMENT AND LAND USE ACT 1971 £ FEASIBILITY STUDIES ELUC1 ELUC COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT 1972
B.C. ENERGY ACT 1973 B.C. ENERGY COMMISSION OPERATION
197*1 Preliminary EIS
1975 I 2 Feb: WATER LICENCE APPLICATION DEPT. OF ENERGY, TRANSPOR• 9 1 May: EIS; BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS TATION AND COMMUNICATION 1976 7 * Sept: PUBLIC HEARINGS .GUIDELINES FOR COAL DEVELOPMENT 6 J Dec: WATER LICENCE ISSUED GUIDELINES FOR BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 1977 1 i Jan: START OF CONSTRUCTION 'GUIDELINES FOR LINEAR DEVELOPMENT 9 2 Feb: CABINET APPEAL COMMITTEE MINISTRY OF ENERGY, MINES, 1973 7 2 Sept: AMENDED WATER LICENCE PETROLEUM RESOURCES
1979
^ENVIRON, t SOCIAL IMPACT COMPENSATION/ 'MITIGATION GUIDELINES ^ 1980
BCUC ACT2 - BCUC COMMISSION DISBANDED3 + ENERGY PROJECT CERTIFICATE APPLICATION + ENERGY PROJECT REVIEW 1981 ENVIRONMENTAL PROCESS ^ S MANAGEMENT ACT + SITE C COMMISSION I 1982 DISBANDED + PUBLIC T WASTE MANAGEMENT ACT t HEARINGS E 1983 + COMMISSION'S REPORT TO CABINET C J CABINET REJECTS SITE C APPLICATION + \S8k +++++++ £ ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ J OPERATION 1985
1. Env i ronment £ Land Use . 3. Some functions to B.C. Utilities Commission and to Ministry of Energy, 2. B.C. Utilities Act. Mines and Petroleum Resources. U. Replaced Pollution Control Act (1967). 20 the final decision for upholding, amending or revoking the licence. In 1971 the B.C. government introduced the Environment and Land Use Act under which an
Environment and Land Use Committee (ELUC, consisting of senior representatives of resource ministries) and a secretariat where established.
The Committee's mandate was:
"to ensure that . . . the . . . preservation and maintenance of the natural environment are fully considered in the administration of land use and resource development . . . [for] ... a maximum beneficial land use, and [to] minimise and prevent waste of such resources, and despoliation of the environment occasioned thereby." (Marr, 1976, p. 41)
Furthermore, an order by Cabinet under the Environment and Land Use Act could override any other power in the Province. ELUC undertook to devise the framework needed for the approval procedure of certain types of large scale developments and guidelines for writing environmental impact statements. In
1976 the Committee published the Guidelines for Coal Development, followed in
1977 by those for Linear Developments and for Benefit-Cost Analysis and in
1980, for Environmental and Social Impact Compensation and Mitigation.
In 1973, the B.C. Energy Act was passed with the Intention that it should be used to regulate energy utilities. The Act was to be administered by a new agency, the B.C. Energy Commission, whose responsibilities were both advisory and regulatory: (1) to advise the government on energy resource management pertaining to such matters as energy supply, demand, load growth forecasts, discovery, conservation, export, and revenues to the government; (2) to regulate the petroleum industry; and (3) to regulate energy utilities. With respect to the latter, the Commission was concerned with the issuance of certificates of public convenience and necessity, the regulation of energy rates, tariffs and securities as well as with the approval of the construction of major facilities. It is remarkable that the Commission's mandate did not extend to B.C. Hydro—the major producer of electric energy in the Province. 21
In 1976, B.C. Hydro supplied 93.6% of the total electric energy produced by public utilities, so that the exclusion of B.C. Hydro left very little of the electricity industry to be regulated (B.C. Energy Commission, 1976b; Public
Service Commission, 1979).1
2.2 PROJECT JUSTIFICATION AND SELECTION
In November 1973, the newly created B.C. Energy Commission was directed to prepare an annual review of energy resources and requirements, the first of which was published in 1974 (B.C. Energy Commission, 1974). Prior to this,
B.C. Hydro (and its forerunner, B.C. Electric Company) had played the lead role in the preparation of provincial energy demand forecasts, limiting its attention to the demand for electricity. The Corporation continued to see itself in this role even after the Energy Commission prepared annual forecasts of total energy requirements, including electricity. Consequently in 1975,
B.C. Hydro produced a three-scenario electricity load forecast which built on those that had been prepared previously (B.C. Hydro, 1975). B.C. Hydro's 1975
forecast identified three load growth curves of 7%, 8.6%, and 10.2% annual increase to the year 1990, respectively. In spite of the Energy Commission's forecast of only 5.5% annual increase from 1974-1982, B.C. Hydro justified
its need for a large increment in system capacity on the basis of its own
forecast.
Hydro had been convinced of this need since the late 1960s and, by 1971
appeared to be favouring the Revelstoke site (Table 2.2). Preliminary design
for Revelstoke was authorized in 1974 even before cost-benefit comparisons of
six other potential projects (including three variants of the Revelstoke
proposal) were completed (Reid, 1976; ELUC, 1977). By late 1975 and after
engineering, financial and environmental (predominantly concerned with
potential dangers of the Downie Slide area) factors had been weighed, B.C. Table 2.2 Studies for Project Selection
STUDIES CONTENT RESULTS
Feasibi1ity Studies Two alternatives examined: j Alternative (1) more economical: 1971 - January 1973 (1) high Revelstoke dam at 573 m lower capital costs (2) combination of two dams: higher Installed capacity Revelstoke Dam at 51 *• m higher electric production Downie Creek Dam at 573 m
Downie S1ide Study Panel of experts examined safety concern Slide does not impose any limitations July 1973 " April 197^ over Oownie Slide - massive bedrock slide, on either of the alternatives (1) and (2) 10,000 years ago, 65 km north of Revelstoke
Pre 1imi nary E1S Preliminary EIS on alternatives (I) and (2) Essentially no difference between environmental Jan. 1973 " Oct. 197A conducted by private consultant firm impacts on fish, wildlife, recreation, agriculture 6 mineral resources for the two alternatives
Preliminary Project Design B.C. Hydro chose alternative (I) and June 197^» - early 1976 proceeded with Its preliminary design
Cost-Benefit Analysis Six alternatives assessed: On basis of provincial income, the environment and 1976 (1) and (2) as above, (3) low Revelstoke effect on region, alternative (1) most cost-effective Dam at 51 *• m, CO Downie Creek Dam at 51 m, but some undetermined mitigation expenditures not (5) Peace-McGregor hydroelectric project included (6) Hat Creek therma1-electric project
Environmental Impact Preview B.C. Hydro issued a very short preview February 1976 on alternative (1)
Final EIS B.C. Hydro rewrote 2 reports by private Private consultants' view: B.C. Hydro EIS not Incorrect, Aug. 1975 - May 1976 consultant firms, combining environmental but they would have described the situation differently^ social and economic impacts in one EIS^
I'. Elevation figures signify the full reservoir water operating level above sea level. 2. B.C. Hydro, 1976b 3. Anthony, 1979
K> ;> 23
Hydro was committed to building the Revelstoke Project.
The determination of the need for a large addition to system capacity and
the selection of the Revelstoke Project had been made without any public
participation and in the face of growing criticism of the need from the B.C.
Energy Commission. B.C. Hydro had determined and evaluated the possible
alternatives and chosen the Revelstoke Project.
2.3 THE WATER LICENCE APPLICATION
The application for the water licence was filed with the Water Management
Branch in February 1976. An environmental impact statement (EIS) was not
available at that time. Though the Water Act did not require an EIS, B.C.
Hydro had commissioned two environmental impact studies to meet their in-house
terras of reference. These two documents were then combined into one EIS by
B.C. Hydro (B.C. Hydro, 1976b) and made available to the public in May 1976.
However, in February 1976 only an Environmental Impact Preview Report (B.C.
Hydro, 1976a) was published. Simultaneously, B.C. Hydro initiated discussions with the public. Reference to the public in Figure 2.1 suggests that B.C.
Hydro intended to run a pre-planned public information program. In fact, it was "... rather an ad hoc response to public enquiry and interest which may
result in a series of meetings, public presentations and discussions as need
dictates" (B.C. Hydro 1976b, p. V). This is surprising as the proponent also wrote in the EIS that "local people want as much information on the project as
soon as possible to fully understand the implications to this community" (B.C.
Hydro, 1976b, p. 15-29).
B.C. Hydro stated that the purpose of the EIS was to inform decision
makers and the general public (B.C. Hydro, 1976b). But neither B.C. Hydro nor
the Water Management Branch saw the need for consulting with the government
agencies or the public in the initial stages of the approval process. The 2k
Figure 2.1 B.C. Hydro's Perception of Procedure and Schedule for Project Licensing (B.C. Hydro, 1976b)
GENERAL PROCEDURE FOR PROJECT APPROVAL
Engineering Design Environmental, Social and Economic Studies
APPROXIMATE SCHEDULE
Preview Report Issued to Water Licence Environmental Impact the Public, February 1976 ApplicatIon Review Water Licence Application Posted February 1976
B.C. Hydro Public Information Program Discuss ions and Dialogue with February - May 1976 the Community
Made Available to Environmental Impact Government Agencies Statement (EIS) and Public, May 1976
Review by Government Agencies and Public
Late June 1976 Water Licence Hearing [rescheduled for Sept. 13]
B.C. Hydro Receipt of B.C. Hydro Receipt of Water Licence Other Necessary (if issued) Approvals [water 1 icence i ssued Dec. 1 ]
B.C. Hydro Decision to Construct Project and September 1976 Commencement of [started Jan. 1977] Major Work 25 opportunity for meaningful public participation in the approval process only arose at the public hearing stage.
On the basis of the many objectors' briefs, the Water Comptroller decided to hold a public hearing. It was scheduled to start on June 21, 1976, the date requested by B.C. Hydro. However, the public had not been consulted about the date and in the face of a public outcry it was postponed until
September 13th. Even this longer time span was still perceived by many intervenors to be insufficient for a thorough evaluation of the EIS (made available only in May 1976) and other technical reports which were not all readily available from B.C. Hydro (Water Management Branch, 1976-1988).
The Comptroller of Water Rights conducted the public hearing in
Revelstoke over 21 days, September 13 to October 8, 1976. Most sessions were held during the daytime; however a few proceeded in the evening to accommodate intervenors. It was a quasi-judicial hearing allowing for cross-examination except of the advisors to the Comptroller. A B.C. Hydro commentator felt the hearing did not intimidate participants as it was conducted in an "unimposing relaxed manner" (Waite, 1979, p. 55).
The 44 intervenors who filed and presented briefs are classified in Table
2.3. All but three objected to or raised concerns about the Project. The
Provincial Parks Branch did not object because it was negotiating a $1 million compensation settlement with B.C. Hydro. Two labour groups also had no objections as the Project would require a very large labour force. Of the 41 objectors only nine were individuals. However, many of the concerns of individuals were represented by the various interest groups which intervened.
The main issues raised were adverse environmental, social and economic impacts; lack of environmental baseline data resulting in the inability to devise mitigation and compensation measures; public safety with regard to the
Downie Slide; and project justification (Water Management Branch, 1976-1988). table 2.3 Intervenors at the Revelstoke Public Hearing
INTERVENOR TOTAL OBJECTORS
Conservationist groups 11 11
Municipal groups 8 8
Commercial groups 9 9
Provincial government 4 3l agencies
Labour groups 2 0
Local press 1 1
Individuals 9 9
Total 44 41
Provincial Parks Branch did not object.
Source: Water Management Branch, 1976-1988 27
B.C. Hydro presented its testimony in four sections: (1) the technical description; (2) the Downie Slide; (3) environmental impacts; and (4) socio• economic impacts on the City of Revelstoke and the region, and economic impacts on the forest resources. Testimony and cross-examination of B.C.
Hydro lasted 13 days. Of the 32 B.C. Hydro witnesses, 22 were specialist consultants to the proponent. Questioning of all the evidence presented possibly took up to two thirds of the hearing (Water Management Branch, 1976-
1988). The proceedings of the public hearing were published in 28 volumes
(Water Comptroller, 1976b).
2.3.1 CRITICISMS OF THE WATER LICENCE APPLICATION PROCESS
Criticisms of the water licence application process centred around three major topics: the hearing process itself, the mandate and expertise of the
Water Management Branch and project justification.
2.3.1.1 The Hearing Process
Some aspects of the procedures of the Revelstoke public hearing have been
criticised by Anthony (1979). The time and format of the public hearing was
determined without conferring with the intervenors. In general the proponent
seemed to control the time schedule. According to Figure 2.1, B.C. Hydro had
allotted less than two months for the government and public to prepare for the
public hearing and just over two months for the public hearing and the
decision by the Water Comptroller, before the planned start of construction In
September 1976.
The Water Comptroller required all relevant material to be submitted by
the participants prior to the hearing. While all objectors complied by filing
their submissions, B.C. Hydro did not. Furthermore, intervenors were at a
disadvantage compared to B.C. Hydro, because they lacked funding for efficient 28 participation. The counsel to the Water Comptroller did not actively participate in obtaining or questioning evidence at the hearing.
The most serious criticism of the public hearing was that its primary function turned out to be the gathering of information rather than the assessment of information (Anthony, 1979). The major source of environmental data prior to the hearing was the EIS prepared by B.C. Hydro (B.C. Hydro,
1976b). Deficiencies in the available baseline data were blatant which was hardly surprising since the EIS had only been commissioned in August of the previous year. Thus environmental protection and mitigation measures, as well as compensation for fish and wildlife losses, could not be determined and had to be deferred and dealt with under the conditions of the water licence.
Another shortcoming arose from the public's view of the role of the public hearing. From B.C. Hydro's public information "program" the public perceived that the major decisions had already been made. In the eyes of many, B.C. Hydro had established both that the Revelstoke Project was necessary in order to avoid electric energy shortages by 1982, and that the
Project had been adequately assessed so "that the public hearing was really a matter of fine tuning" (Anthony, 1979, p. 61). The Environmental Preview
Report (B.C. Hydro, 1976a) left no doubt that the Revelstoke Project was the only possible alternative, and the EIS stated that "... decision makers . .
. through the public hearing process will determine the final form and extent of the development" (B.C. Hydro, 1976b, p. V). If this were not enough, B.C.
Hydro declared at the beginning of the public hearing that it had already awarded construction contracts for the dam, subject to the approval of the
Project.
In the light of these issues it is no wonder that the public saw the hearing as a futile exercise that discouraged rather than encouraged their participation. B.C. Hydro was seen to be firmly in control of the course of 29 events and the Water Comptroller's role was to rubber stamp the decision that had been made long before the hearing. Not only did the public's perception of B.C. Hydro's influence over the approval process raise doubts about the integrity of the forthcoming approval, but the appropriateness of the approval procedure under the Water Act was also questioned.
2.3.1.2 Mandate and Expertise of the Water Management Branch
A fundamental question which arose at the public hearing centred on whether the Comptroller of Water Rights had the mandate and expertise to assess a project of such complexity (Anthony, 1979; Waite, 1979; Bank.es and
Thompson, 1981).
The Water Act authorized the Water Comptroller to rule on the use and withdrawal of water from the Province's water bodies. Thus he could determine the engineering and some environmental conditions for a project at the public hearing. O'Riordan, J. (1981) writes that the Comptroller cannot decide on matters pertaining to energy and resource policies or to project alternatives. Nevertheless, at the Revelstoke hearing, the Comptroller allowed discussions of these issues to take place as much as he possibly could. Anthony (1979) states that wildlife management schemes and the determination of social impacts were not within the Comptroller's mandate as provided by the Water Act. In fact, he believed that the only reason why the proponent did not challenge the Water Comptroller's mandate in these matters was that they needed the water licence to proceed. Hence it seems that project justification and the assessment of broad environmental matters and socio-economic impacts were outside the Water Comptroller's jurisdiction.
Whereas the Water Comptroller neither examined nor passed any decision on project justification, though he allowed discussion of this matter, he did
rule on environmental and social issues. 30
The Comptroller's expertise and that of his staff were questioned in such areas as the social and broad range of environmental impacts of the Project and the implementation of the terms of the water licence conditions upon project approval. The Water Management Branch staff consisted mainly of engineers, who lacked the qualifications to assess social and environmental matters.^ Although this deficiency was to have been remedied by a number of experts who advised the Water Comptroller during the hearing, it was an inadequate provision. The advisors did not ask many questions and were inaccessible to questions from the floor. Furthermore, they were perceived as biased by the public because they were employees of government agencies. In
this capacity they had dealt with B.C. Hydro in the past - probably even with respect to the Revelstoke Project - and would continue in this relationship
following project approval. Their advice to the Comptroller should have been made public, so that intervenors could have questioned or challenged it
(Anthony, 1979).
2.3.1.3 Project Justification
Project justification was however not allowed to rest just because it was outside the Water Comptroller's mandate. It was a most contentious matter and
of major concern to numerous intervenors who raised it time and time again at
the public hearing.
An essential justification issue was that the Revelstoke Project was not
related to the provincial context. The B.C. Energy Commission and other
intervenors disapproved of assessing each of B.C. Hydro's projects in
isolation. They called for a demonstration of the need for the increased
generating capacity in the wider, overall provincial context of total energy
growth, alternative sources of electric energy, conservation of energy, price
schedules, export policy, and present and future hydro- and thermal-electric 31 developments.
Most controversial was the assessment of various electric energy demand forecasts. Some discussion of this did take place at the hearing despite the fact that the B.C. Energy Commission claimed it was their mandate.3 Although
B.C. Hydro conceded at the hearing to using their medium forecast annual growth rate of 8.6%, it was still well above their low prediction (7%) and that of the B.C. Energy Commission (5.5%). The latter commented that differences in growth rate were possible, but that this one was remarkable.4
B.C. Hydro gave the following as the main reasons for the large divergence in energy forecasts:
"the assumptions regarding future growth of the provincial population and economy, the methodology of the projections themselves, and particularly In the assumed share of total energy consumption to be provided in the form of electricity." (B.C. Hydro, 1976b, pp. 2-10)
In short, not only were the underlying assumptions different, but also the methodology. Thus it is not surprising that the forecasts conflicted.
The question of the conflicting electric energy growth forecasts, to the intervenors of quintessential importance in the approval process of the
Revelstoke Project, was neither analyzed comprehensively nor resolved at the public hearing. Neither was it possible for the approving agency to grant the objectors' demands for an examination of the project justification. Both matters were beyond the Water Comptroller's mandate. B.C. Hydro had established the need for the Revelstoke Project, the provincial government had implicitly approved it, and the Water Comptroller dutifully issued the water licence on December 1, 1976.
2.4 THE HATER LICENCE
The Water licence allowed B.C. Hydro to proceed with the construction and operation of the Revelstoke Project under twenty three conditions (see 32
Appendix). The form of twelve of the conditions (a to j, n, w) was common to water licenses in general, the other eleven were specific to the Revelstoke
Project. The latter covered four broad topics as shown in Table 2.4 (clauses dated December 1976): (1) site preparation and facilities, clauses (k), (1),
(m), and (o); (2) environmental protection, clauses (p), (q), and (r); (3) mitigation of impacts on the local community, clause (s); and (4) claims arising from the Project, clauses (t), (u), and (v).
Close examination of these project-specific clauses reveals several serious shortcomings. Whereas the enforcement of the clauses was of course the responsibility of the Comptroller of Water Rights, there were no provisions for the delegation of tasks and few for the input from ministries and agencies concerned. The direction or approval of nine of the eleven conditions (except claim settlement clauses (t) and (u)) was the responsibility of the Comptroller. Of these, all but clause (1) required environmental expertise and clauses (s) and (v) also socio-economic knowledge, both well beyond that of the Water Comptroller and his staff. However, notwithstanding this lack of expertise, only four clauses (m, o, p, r) called for the Comptroller to consult with the Deputy Minister (DM) of Recreation and
Conservation and also with other regulatory agencies for clause (r). B.C.
Hydro only had to liaise with government agencies under clause (q) and local public agencies under clause (s). Furthermore, the administrative framework for the implementation of the Project, other than the settlement of claims, was closed to the public.
Little consideration seems to have been given to the manner in which (p),
(r), (s), and (t) were to have been implemented. Clauses (p) and (s) contained no directives as to who was responsible for designing and carrying out the programs. Additionally, clause (s) seemed to refer only to the mitigation of the impacts on one community, presumably Revelstoke, and not to Table l.k Summary of Content of Selected Clauses in Water Licence
TOPIC WATER LICENCE B.C. HYDRO REQUIREMENTS ROLE OF COMPTROLLER OF CONSULTATION AND PERSONNEL AND COMMITTEES CLAUSE - DATE WATER RIGHTS (CWR) LIAISON RESPONSIBILITIES MEMBERS
SITE PREPARATION AND FACILITIES
- land clearance (k) Dec. 1976 clear reservoir area direct extent and manner
- remedial work (1) Dec. 1976 limit level of water direct level of water Downie SIide behind dam until remedial work complete
- release water (m) Dec. 1976 release water at times 6 dlrect CWR with Hydro in quantities specified £ DM of Recreation and Conservation
recreat i onaI (o) Dec. 1976 construct facilities in d i rect CWR with Hydro Fac i)i tles vicinity of reservoir 6 DM of Recreation and Conservation
(o) Sept. 1977 as above di rect
log transfer (z) June 1978 provide 6 operate (or direct ass i st wi th) fac iIi t ies for log transfer around dam
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
- programs 6 studies to (p) Dec. 1976 not specified in water d i rect CWR with Hydro 6 protect, enhance and I icence' DM of Recreation mitigate loss of fish and Conservation £ wlldli fe habi tat
(p) Sept. 1977 carry out programs d i rect and studies
f i sh and wi1dIi fe (q) Dec. 1976 employ a fisheries £ determine period for biologists with Hydro monltor 6 gather aspects of Project a wildlife biologist information gathering staff, contractors 6 informatIon dur• (site biologists) government agencies ing £ after as required construct ion
envi ronmentai (q) Dec. 1976 as above as above as above assist 1 n draft- gu ide1i nes ing guidelines
(r) Dec. 1976 prepare guidelines for approve CWR with DM of Recrea• construction related tion 6 Conservation, activi ties Director of Pollution Control £ other regulatory agencies
(r) Sept.1977 as above and adhere d i rect to guidelines Table l.h Continued
TOPIC WATER LICENCE B.C. HYDRO REQUIREMENTS ROLE OF COMPTROLLER OF CONSULTATION AND PERSONNEL AND COMMITTEES CLAUSE - DATE WATER RIGHTS (CWR) LIAISON RESPONSIBILITIES MEMBERS
MITIGATION
- impacts on local (s) Dec. 1976 prepare budgets for approve Hydro wi th local commun i ty mi t igation publIc agencies
(s) Sept. 1977 carry out programs d i rect as above of mitigation in accordance with approved budgets
CLAIMS
- arising from con- (t) Dec. 1976 fund engineer as Claims struction, maintenance, Officer (CO) use or operation of L i censee's works
(t) June 1978 pay any claims £$10,000 appoint CO, submit claims accepted by CO and fund *$10,000 to CO, establish CO procedures for making and hearing claims
(u) Dec. I976 pay any sum determined by CO
(u) June 1978 pay claims over $10,000 determined in court, submit to arbitration specify conditions of upon claimant's choice a rbltrat ion
(v) Dec. 1976 provide security to meet direct amounts £ terms costs of complying with clauses o, p, s, u
COMMITTEES
- Revelstoke Project (x) Sept. 1977 pay for RPCC's expenses appoint members S chairman, Hydro £ si te biolo• recommend to CWR represen- Coordinating attend on invitation, give public notice of gists with RPCC re re orders £ appro• tatives of Committee (RPCC) report and consult RPCC's recommendations 6 of matters of clauses vals for clauses Ministries with RPCC CWR's orders £ approvals 1, n, o, p, r, s, v 1 , n, o, p, r, s, v £ Agencies concerned
Community Impact (y) Sept. 1977 pay for CIC's expenses, appoint members £ chairman, Hydro with CIC re monitor consul tat ions represen- Committee (CIC) attend on invitation, give public notice of matters of in clause s, assist tatives of report and consult CIC's recommendations £ of clause s Hydro on matters Ministries with CIC CWR's orders £ approvals arising, recommend to £ Agencies CWR re orders 6 ap- concerned provals for clause s
I. Explanatory notes (CWR, 1976e) accompanying the water licence call for the Fish and Wildlife Branch (FWB) to prepare and cost programs for studies and works, and to implement them with the assistance of the B.C. Hydro site biologists (clause q) if available. The payment for the programs was to be approved by B.C. Hydro, following the programs approval/amendment by the CWR. 35 several other close by communities. There were no provisions for the surveillance of compliance with the environmental guidelines (clause (r)), nor for the monitoring of impacts in general. The latter could have been included in one of the environmental protection clauses (p, q, r) for environmental impacts and in clause (s) for socio-economic effects. The procedures for the making and settling of claims arising from the Project (clause (t)) and the amount and terms of the securities to be given by B.C. Hydro (clause (v)) were not specified. Though the Comptroller provided some explanatory notes
(Comptroller of Water Rights, 1976e) with the licence (see footnote 1, Table
2.4), most of these matters remained ill defined and all, except the settling of claims, were dependent on the directives or approval of the Comptroller.
Of interest is the Water Comptroller's rationalization of the issuance of the water licence (Comptroller of Water Rights, 1976d). He stated that there were three main concerns at the public hearing:
"(1) The safety of the project particularly in view of the very large slide area on the valley slopes in the vicinity of Downie Creek.
(2) The possibility of adverse effects on fish and wildlife habitat and productivity and on the environment in general.
(3) The possibility of adverse effects on the community and the economy in the area in both the short and long terms."
(Comptroller of Water Rights, 1976d)
The Comptroller was satisfied that the Downie Slide could be stabilized by remedial work and the raising of the earthfill dam by 1.5 m (clause (1)).
With respect to the other two concerns, the Water Comptroller did not come to any conclusions and deferred these to the implementation stage of the Project \ under licence clauses (m), (p), (q), and (r) for the second concern, and conditions (s), (t), and (u) for the third one.
The Comptroller did not include project justification in the list of major concerns. He only commented that his decision did not depend on B.C. 36
Hydro's load growth forecast, because ideally the proponent should obtain the water licence well in advance of the intended start of construction. The licence did not bind the proponent to a schedule for project implementation, other than the in-service date of 31 December 1990 (clause (i)). The Water
Comptroller concluded that "the evidence is convincing that the Revelstoke
Project is economically attractive for B.C. Hydro and the Province with the
proposed in-service date" (Comptroller of Water Rights, 1976d).
2.4.1 THE WATER LICENCE APPEAL
The conditional water licence was appealed under the Water Act (1960) by
four intervenors: the Scientific Pollution and Environmental Control Society
(SPEC), the B.C. Wildlife Federation, the West Kootenay Outdoorsmen
(conservationist groups), and the Canadian Cellulose Company (CANCEL). The
appeals were based on several objections. All appellants, except the West
Kootenay Outdoorsmen, objected because B.C. Hydro had not established that the
project was needed nor that it was in the interest of the public. CANCEL'S
objection was that the Columbia River was rendered unnavigable by the
Revelstoke Dam and logs could no longer be floated downriver. The conditions
of the water licence did not adequately cover these special interests.
The three conservationist groups raised objections to the handling of
environmental matters. Of major concern were the lack of adequate provisions
for the protection of the environment and for firm mitigation and compensation
programs and their secure financing by B.C. Hydro. The water licence (clauses
(n, p, q, r)) gave B.C. Hydro too much control over environmental issues, while other government agencies, like the Fish and Wildlife Branch (FWB), had
too little. Whereas the Water Comptroller retained jurisdiction over these
matters, there were no provisions for notifying objectors of his decisions and
for rights of appeal. SPEC objected to the proposed Claims Officer being an 37 engineer (clause (t)) rather than a professional with environmental and socio• economic training. The B.C. Wildlife Federation thought the Claims Officer to be beyond the mandate of the Comptroller. The essence of the appeals was the demand for at least a delay in and preferably the cancellation of the water licence.
A five member Cabinet Appeal Committee^ was set up by the provincial government in February 1977 to hear the appeal and make recommendations to
Cabinet. They had three options: (1) to accept all appeals and cancel the water licence; (2) to deny all appeals and confirm it; and (3) to allow some appeals entirely or in part, and amend the water licence accordingly (Cabinet
Appeal Committee, 1977). The Committee chose the latter.
In their report to Cabinet the Committee noted that there were no appeals on the basis of two of the major concerns raised at the public hearing, namely
the safety of the Downie Slide and adverse socio-economic impacts. They
concluded that the conditions of the water licence must have covered these
aspects adequately. Whereas the Committee concurred that the Project was needed at some time in the future, they did not determine when because of two
reasons: the decision was "perhaps" outside their terms of reference and the
evidence was not at all complete. However, the report stated that some
Committee members thought a later in-service date would allow for additional
time to study the financial implications and the consequences of the borrowing
requirements, the Revelstoke labour requirements in relation to those of
future projects, and environmental, social and economic concerns. The
Committee asked Cabinet to make the final decision with respect to the
starting and in-service dates of the Project, but in so doing to consider the
Committee's report.
The Appeal Committee came to three conclusions with respect to issues not
specific to the Revelstoke Project. First, the Committee concluded that the 38
Water Comptroller was required to decide on matters well outside the sphere of
the Water Act when approving such projects as B.C. Hydro's. In particular, an
organization not connected with the proponent should forecast the electricity
demand growth rate in future.
Second, the Committee recognized the deficiencies of the Water Act in
regard to environmental, social, and economic aspects. Furthermore, there was
only a limited staff available in the Water Management Branch for the
enforcement of water licence conditions. The latter was seen as particularly
crucial when dealing with the long-terra commitments and varied aspects of
large scale developments. Consequently, it was recommended that the Minister
of Environment and member Ministries of ELUC should develop new legislation
beyond the Water Act to provide the necessary framework for licensing such
projects as Revelstoke.
The third conclusion was that B.C. Hydro's right not to have to comply with the Water Act should be revoked.6 This exemption corroborated the
perception that B.C. Hydro was largely beyond the government's control and
that the Water Comptroller might have been unable to enforce the orders he
issued to B.C. Hydro.
2.4.2 THE AMENDED WATER LICENCE
Not withstanding the appeal, construction of the Revelstoke Project had
been allowed to start in January 1977. It was in full swing by September of
that year when Cabinet decided not to delay or cancel the Project—a
possibility that had been favoured by some members of the Appeal Committee.
On the recommendations of the Appeal Committee, Cabinet amended the water
licence twice (Table 2.4, Appendix). The first amendment, in September 1977,
changed licence clauses (o), (p), (r), and (s) and added clauses (x) and (y).
In June 1978, the appeal by CANCEL was settled by changes to conditions (t) 39 and (u) and the addition of clause (z).
These amendments answered some of the objections raised in the appeal and
in this study (Section 2.4.1). A very important change was the attempt to provide an administrative framework for project implementation. Clauses (x) and (y) called for two administrative committees, the Revelstoke Project
Coordinating Committee (RPCC) and the Community Impact Committee (CIC), and
clauses (t) and (u) provided a much improved claims procedure.
The two Committees provided for liaison and consultation between the
appropriate provincial ministries and agencies. This not only made up for the
deletion of the provisions for consultation in clauses (p), (o), and (r), but
also should have provided the environmental and socio-economic expertise
needed for ensuring environmental protection and for determining the mitigation and compensation of impacts.
The direction and approval function of the Water Comptroller was extended
to embrace all project-specific clauses. However, decisions with respect to half of these clauses (1, o, p, r, s, v) were now based on the recommendations
of the two Committees J The Comptroller was required to give reasonable
public notice of the Committees" recommendations for clauses (1), (n), (o),
(p), (r), (s), and (v) as well as for his orders and approvals for these.
This provision allowed for some limited public input. For the six clauses
outside the realm of the two Committees (k, m, q, t, u, z), the Comptroller was required to consult with a government ministry only for one (clause (m)).
Added responsibilities were the giving of directives for the claims procedure
(clauses (t), (u)) and for the transfer of logs around the dam (clause (z)).
The amended water licence gave some more explicit directives for clauses
(p), (r), and (s). In particular, it called for B.C. Hydro to carry out the
programs under clause (p) and (s) and to adhere to the environmental
guidelines to be developed under clause (r). But the amendments fell short in 40 respect to two matters: they did not assign anyone to the task of designing the programs for clauses (p) and (s) and, rather than addressing the objection raised in the appeal that B.C. Hydro was given excessive control over environmental matters, the Corporation's control was increased (clause
(p)). B.C. Hydro also remained responsible for employing the site biologists
(clause (q)) and writing the environmental guidelines (clause (r)). The implications of some of these amendments will be evaluated in the following chapter. 41
NOTES
1 Public utility systems within municipal boundaries were also excluded from the mandate of the Energy Commission.
2 Sewell (1971) states that professional training inclines professionals to narrow interpretations of complex issues. An example is an engineer being faced with problems of environmental quality management. See also Netboy (1986) for a similar opinion in reference to dams.
3 The B.C. Energy Commission announced that they would hold a hearing In this regard, but it had not yet taken place in 1979 when the construction of the dam had been underway for nearly two years (Anthony, 1979).
^ The B.C. Energy Commission in 1975 recommended that B.C. Hydro use a 7% annual growth rate for the 20 year planning period. The ELUC Secretariat, however, had the Department of Economic Development evaluate the two conflicting forecasts of the B.C. Energy Commission and B.C. Hydro. They concluded that a 7% rate was the most likely demand increase for the period 1974/75-1985/86, but that for planning purposes it might be necessary to allow for the uncertainty in forecasting and costs of over- or underplanning (B.C. Hydro, 1976b).
-> The members of the Cabinet Appeal Committee were the following Ministers: A. V. Fraser, Highways and Public Works; K. H. Mair, Consumer and Corporate Affairs; H. McClelland, Health; E. M. Wolfe, Finance and the chairman; L. A. Williams, Labour.
Cabinet did not act on this recommendation. The Hydro and Power Authority Act 1979, RSBC, c 188, s 52(1) reads "Notwithstanding any specific provisions in any Act to the contrary except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, the authority is not bound by any statute or statutory provision of the Province." The Act is still in effect, thus to date B.C. Hydro has retained the same power.
^ Also clause (n), but it is not included here because it is not a project- specific clause. 42
CHAPTER 3
THE ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK
Large scale resource projects consist of many specialized segments (e.g. engineering, financial, legal, environmental) the character and importance of which change as each stage of the project is reached. They also involve three major participants: (1) the government in its role as licensor and regulator;
(2) the proponent which may be a private or public sector organization, and
(3) the public both in the immediate vicinity of the project and in the wider constituency of the province or country.
In order to carry out a large undertaking such as the Revelstoke Project many skilled individuals have to be assembled in design teams, construction consortia and planning work groups in order to deal with the special segments of the project as it progresses. In addition to these task-specific individuals and groups there must also be a broader organizational and administrative framework which is designed to establish clear lines of authority, to integrate the activities of the three major participatory groups and the specialists, to coordinate the role of the multiplicity of agencies within each, to monitor all aspects of the project and to both inform the public as well as provide for its participation in decision making.
The architects of the Revelstoke Project did not appear to recognize the need for an holistic approach to the establishment of an administrative program. As a result, two sets of arrangements emerged, referred to here as the "unofficial" and "official programs". The former was set up - and already partially implemented - before the water licence hearing and continued into the construction period. The official program emerged in three phases represented by conditions in the December 1976, September 1977, and June 1978 versions of the water licence. This chapter will describe and assess the structure and operations of each program and the relations between them. The environmental management undertaken by the official program is dealt with in 43 greater detail than other facets of the two programs. An overview assessment concludes this chapter.
3.1 THE UNOFFICIAL PROGRAM
Internally B.C. Hydro had developed an organizational structure which permitted it to plan, design, licence, build, and operate the Duncan,
Keenleyside, Mica and Peace River dams and in so-doing establish a reputation as an effective electric utility with a comprehensive range of capabilities.
Despite being a Crown Corporation, it also developed the reputation of being remarkably independent of government and appeared to regard itself as the lead and expert agency of electricity development. In keeping with this reputation, on the Revelstoke Project, B.C. Hydro preceded apace with project justification and selection (Chapter 2) and even let some construction contracts before the water licence hearing. However, the Revelstoke Project was taking place at a time when government recognition of the public's concern for environmental Impact and for information about the project and participation in the licensing process was increasing and becoming formalized.
B.C. Hydro recognized these changed circumstances and, before the water licence hearing commenced, started to put together an organizational and administrative program to address these new conditions.
Apparently starting in January 1976, B.C. Hydro held meetings "... with various levels of government to address and resolve a wide range of project impacts" (Waite, 1979, p. 53). An outcome of these meetings was the formation of several committees ". . . to develop appropriate mitigation and compensation measures for project impacts" (Waite, 1979, p. 53).
Furthermore, on the basis of some EIS recommendations that B.C. Hydro had pledged to implement at the public hearings, the Corporation set up an impact monitoring office and a project impact committee (B.C. Hydro, 1976b).1 44
3.1.1 THE COMPONENTS OF THE PROGRAM
The total internal administrative program that B.C. Hydro developed, both
before and after the licence hearing, consisted of three elements shown in
Figure 3.1. The various parts were: The Revelstoke Project Impact Committee,
"Local Impact Committee" for short, the Impact Monitor and the five Adjunct
Committees, which were the City of Revelstoke Committee, the School District
#19 Negotiating Team, the Revelstoke Social Services Council, the Revelstoke
Forestry Committee and the Technical Planning Committee of the Regional
District.
The Impact Monitor was appointed in August 1977 by the Regional District
of Columbia-Shuswap in consultation with B.C. Hydro. The latter also funded
the Monitor and his travelling expenses, but provided no support staff. The
Monitor was responsible for the monitoring of the social- and economic impacts
of the Project on the City of Revelstoke and the neighbouring communities.
This information was not only to provide a record of the impacts but was also
to be the basis for the settling of claims arising from the Project.
Additionally if time permitted, he was to research claims for the Local Impact
Committee. Terms of reference were developed by B.C. Hydro and approved by
the Regional District to whom the Monitor was responsible. The nature of
these terras of reference (not available to author) is somewhat controversial.
Whereas in a consultant's report to the official program, they were described
as "very detailed, specifying the indicators and methods to be used" (DPA
Group, 1986), the Monitor called them "an imprecise, rambling set of
instructions" from which he could best infer what to do (Kopas, 1988).
The formation of the Local Impact Committee was called for in the EIS, which cautioned that the Committee should be well planned ". . .if potential
misunderstandings and charges of tokenism are to be avoided and the maximum
effectiveness of the committee is to be reached" (B.C. Hydro, 1976b, p. 19- Figure 3-1 The Unofficial Program
fund i ng van ous various levels- -levels of - of interaction fundi ng/member interaction
LOCAL IMPACT ADJUNCT COMMITTEES COMMITTEE REGIONAL DISTRICT TECHNICAL PLANNING COMMITTEE CITY OF REVELSTOKE COMMITTEE SCHOOL DISTRICT #19 NEGOTIATING TEAM REVELSTOKE SOCIAL SERVICES COUNCIL REVELSTOKE FORESTRY COMMITTEE
'IMPACT MONITORING COMMITTEE O< > DECISION MAKER I I COMPONENT OF UNOFFICIAL PROGRAM ^ 46
53), however, how this was to be accomplished was not stated. The Local
Impact Committee was set up early in 1977 by a steering committee consisting of a representative from each of B.C. Hydro, the Regional District and the
City of Revelstoke (Water Management Branch, 1976-1988). B.C. Hydro funded the Committee and its secretarial help. It could not be established when the
Committee was resolved.
Altogether there were five Adjunct Committees which existed during the implementation phase of the Revelstoke Project.2 Two of these, the City of
Revelstoke Committee and the Revelstoke Forestry Committee, were set up early in 1976, prior to the public hearing. Whereas at that time their objective was the identification of problems (Banks and Thompson, 1980, 1981), during project implementation it changed to the mitigation and compensation of
impacts. The City of Revelstoke Committee consisted of members of the City
Council, the City Administrator, and B.C. Hydro personnel, including the
Construction Manager, and representatives of the B.C. Forest Service and the
local forest industry. Its objective was to mitigate and compensate the
impacts on the local forest industry3 (Water Management Branch, 1976-1988).
The formation of the School District #19 Negotiating Team arose from a recommendation in the EIS (B.C. Hydro, 1976b). It could not be established who belonged to this Committee. It was responsible for keeping the school
taxes in the same proportion to the pre-project provincial average, by having
B.C. Hydro reimburse the Province for the costs arising from the influx of
families (B.C. Hydro, 1978a).
The Revelstoke Social Services Council, composed of local citizens and
representatives of public agencies, such as the Public Health and Justice
Council, acted as a forum for solving social problems, devising a program for
community improvements, and liaising between agencies, as well as between
itself and B.C. Hydro. Two senior B.C. Hydro staff members provided support 47 to the Council for resolving problems of social service needs arising from the
Project (B.C. Hydro, 1978a).
The Technical Planning Committee of the Regional District took on the task of dealing with project impacts, such as housing requirements. B.C.
Hydro was represented by either the Construction Manager or the on-site manager for environmental and socio-economic affairs (B.C. Hydro, 1978a).
3.1.2 THE OPERATION OF THE PROGRAM
The unofficial program was intended to provide a structure for the monitoring, mitigation, and compensation of the impacts of the Revelstoke
Project. The monitoring function was to be fulfilled by the Impact Monitor.
His studies were to inform the local communities of socio-economic impacts, help the CIC to design mitigation and compensation measures, test the predictions of the impact assessment, provide information for the wind-down of the local economy following project completion and serve as a learn-by- doing experience for future large scale development projects (Kopas, 1980).
In view of the potential usefulness and magnitude of the task, it is surprising that B.C. Hydro did not provide the Monitor'with support staff.
The Regional District and the Impact Monitor were questioning the apparent duplication in the administrative structure between the Impact
Monitor's Office the Local Impact Committee and the Community Impact Committee
(CIC) of the official program, when the latter was appointed in the fall of
1977. However, the Water Comptroller anticipated little duplication as the
Local Impact Committee could address problems and represent interests not directly the responsibility of any government agency; and that the Impact
Monitor could provide current information on local problems as well as being a
"most valuable liaison" between the Local Impact Committee and the CIC (Water
Management Branch, 1976-1988). 48
In effect, the Office of the Impact Monitor was an ineffective part of the administrative structure. Initially, the Monitor was responsible to the
Regional Board, but later the Board set up a subcommittee, the Impact
Monitoring Committee (IMC, see Figure 3.1) consisting of three Board members, who were to supervise and support the Monitor (Vancouver Express, 1979).
However, the IMC complicated matters as they met irregularly and had little or no background in the issues relevant to the monitoring of socio-economic impacts (Kopas, 1988). Without the necessary directives and guidance, the work undertaken was on an ad hoc basis (DPA Group, 1986). This and the lack of explicit terms of reference and underlying philosophy led to a crucial problem (Kopas, 1988; Davidson, 1984; Banks and Thompson, 1980, 1981). The very different interpretations of the Office by the two successive Impact
Monitors brought about both their resignations.^ While the first Impact
Monitor left because of conflicts with the Project Construction Manager over the content of his reports and claimed that B.C. Hydro was emasculating the position (Vancouver Express, 1979), the second Monitor, though enjoying a good working relationship with B.C. Hydro, experienced difficulties with his superiors, the Impact Monitoring Committee.
After having run for only two and a half years, from August 1977 to April
1980, B.C. Hydro decided to terminate the position altogether. The reasons for this are not clear. There is no doubt that a definite need existed for the kind of information that could have been generated by the Office of the
Impact Monitor in the long terra. The data could have been useful to the CIC, the Local Impact Committee, the City of Revelstoke and B.C. Hydro, but least useful to the Regional District, who as a whole was little affected by the
Project, but employed the Monitor. Furthermore, the Comptroller of Water
Rights thought the Office valuable, though it was outside his jurisdiction.
Whereas B.C. Hydro intended to run the Office for only three years and then on 49 a retainer basis, the City of Revelstoke and the Monitor were under the impression that it would extend into the wind-down phase of the Project.
There is no question that the Office needed to be redesigned with clear terms of reference, a different accountability structure and adequate support staff. Subsequently some of the work was carried out by B.C. Hydro^ and, in the end, the Water Comptroller under the water licence commissioned two studies in 1984 to be done by consultant firms (Sussex, 1985; DPA Group,
1986) (see Section 3.2.2.1).
The settling of claims arising from the Project was handled by the Local
Impact Committee. It evaluated the claims brought before it and, together with its recommendations, forwarded them to B.C. Hydro for settlement. If claims remained unresolved at this level, they were passed to the Community
Impact Committee (CIC) of the official program, who advised the Water
Comptroller. He in turn could impose a binding decision.
Several factors rendered this claims procedure both inadequate and frustrating. The Committee was unable to evaluate claims effectively as it was severely hampered by underfunding and understaffing. B.C. Hydro only paid for its secretarial help and travelling expenses. Until 1980, the Committee depended on the Impact Monitor as a resource person. However, he experienced the same shortages and thus could offer little direct help. Financial and staff limitations also prevented the Local Impact Committee from undertaking the Monitor's work as called for in its second terms of reference. The monitoring of socio-economic impacts might have been useful for the identification of issues in the community and consequently for the settling of claims. The claims procedure was frustrating for the claimants because they could only argue their case in front of the Local Impact Committee as the public was virtually excluded from the CIC. Most importantly though, the
Committee had no authoritative power, it was only advisory to both B.C. Hydro 50 and the CIC.
The Local Impact Committee was however not the only avenue for the resolution of claims. Claimants with more clout, like the forest industry or government agencies, could bypass the Local Impact Committee by directly approaching the management of B.C. Hydro, thus getting fast remedial action
(Banks and Thompson, 1980, 1981). Conflicts could also be settled through some of the Adjunct Committees, in particular the Revelstoke Forestry
Committee and the City of Revelstoke Committee.
Not much could be found out about the operation and, hence, the effectiveness of the Adjunct Committees. It appears that they were a means for the identification and, if possible, the prevention of impacts and provided a forum for the negotiation of mitigation and compensation measures.
Many of the issues that the Local Impact Committee and the CIC dealt with (see
Table 3.2, Section 3.2.2.1) appear to be the kind of concerns that the Adjunct
Committees could have addressed and, if they did, must have been unable to resolve, and referred them to the Local Impact Committee.
3.1.3 INTERACTION OF THE COMPONENTS
The limited data available on the unofficial program revealed that B.C.
Hydro had not prescribed any lines of communication or reporting between the various parts of this structure. Any interaction seems to have been on an ad hoc basis.
Although the Water Comptroller had envisaged one of the functions of the
Impact Monitor to be that of the "most valuable liaison", this was not so.
Because the Monitor worked under the Regional District, he was a rather detached part of the administrative structure and appeared not to have become the valuable resource person that he might have been to the Local Impact
Committee (DPA Group, 1986). 51
In conclusion, it can be said that B.C. Hydro, in devising the unofficial program, appears to have given little consideration to the adequate staffing, clear directives, and enforcement powers needed for the effective operation of each part of the program and the liaison required for the integrated functioning of the program as a whole.
3.2 THE OFFICIAL PROGRAM
The official program was established in three stages. The first stage proceeded under the original water licence, issued by the Water Comptroller on the basis of the public hearing. Despite the deferral of major concerns, this licence made little provision for an administrative structure other than the consultation with specified governmental bodies and B.C. Hydro and the appointment of a claims officer (see Appendix and Table 2.4). Hence the implementation of the Revelstoke Project was initially administered by an ad hoc committee, that was chaired by a senior member of the Water Comptroller's staff. It brought together the government agencies concerned and B.C. Hydro in order to address the issues of the various water licence clauses, such as the development of reservoir clearing standards, environmental guidelines and mitigation and compensation measures. From January to August 1977, seven meetings were held, six in Victoria and one in Revelstoke. The second stage of the official program ushered in by the amended water licence, established two administrative committees. Later in June 1978, upon a second amendment to the water licence, stage three provided a much improved claims procedure.
3.2.1. THE COMPONENTS OF THE PROGRAM
As shown in Figure 3.2, the official program consisted of the following:
(1) the Community Impact Committee (CIC) established by water licence clause
(y); (2) the Revelstoke Project Coordinating Committee (RPCC) set up by Figure 3-2 The Official Program
SUBCOMMITTEES
-Revelstoke Project 0 Decision Maker Coordinating Committee Components of Official Program 1 \ Non-Decision Maker 53 licence clause (x); (3) the Claims Officer provided for by clause (t); the claims procedure of clause (u); and (4) one fisheries and one wildlife biologist (site biologists) to be employed by B.C. Hydro, required by clause
(q). As the need arose, the two administrative committees were empowered to set up small subcommittees to address specific issues.
The whole structure was under the jurisdiction of the Water Comptroller and funded by B.C. Hydro. In the fall of 1977, the Water Comptroller appointed the chairman and members of the CIC (water licence clause (y)) consisting of representatives of provincial government ministries, who were concerned about the impacts of the Project on the nearby communities. Over the years, membership varied depending on the Issues dealt with, but many members came from the social service ministries. B.C. Hydro attended meetings by invitation. CIC meetings were open to the Impact Monitor and representatives of the Local Impact Committee.
It was the objective of the CIC to monitor the consultations held between
B.C. Hydro and local public agencies with respect to the mitigation of adverse impacts on the local community (water licence clause (s)). Furthermore, the
CIC was to assist the Licensee and the local agencies in any matters arising from those consultations and making recommendations for approvals and orders to be issued by the Water Comptroller under water licence clause (s). As the water licence neither defined "impact" nor "local" it is assumed, on the basis of the available data, that clause (s) covered all three kinds of impacts— environmental, social, and economic, and that local meant the City of
Revelstoke and neighbouring communities, such as Malakwa, Armstrong, and
Sicamous, all within the Regional District.
The Water Comptroller also appointed the members and chairman of the RPCC
(water licence clause (x)), the latter being the same senior staff member of the Water Management Branch who had chaired the ad hoc committee, the 54 forerunner of the RPCC. The RPCC members represented the resource and social service ministries and agencies affected by the Project.6 The ministries most involved were the following: Environment, Lands, Parks and Outdoor
Recreation, Highways, Forests. B.C. Hydro and the site biologists had to attend as requested by the RPCC.
The objectives of the RPCC were outlined in clause (x) of the water licence, which served as the Committee's terms of reference. The RPCC was to consider and make recommendations to the Water Comptroller "in respect of the orders and approvals to be given by him with respect to those matters set out in clauses (k), (1), (n), (o), (p), (r), (s), and (v)" of the water licence
(Comptroller of Water Rights, 1977). As outlined in Table 3.1, the tasks of the RPCC were varied and far-reaching. Clause (s) had been assigned to both the RPCC and the CIC, but by mutual agreement between the two, it was delegated to the latter. Clause (1) concerned the dam's safety and clause (v) the secure financing of clauses (o), (p), (s), and (u). Of the five remaining conditions, clause (n), the location of auxiliary facilities and clause (o), the construction of recreational facilities were related indirectly to environmental matters. However, clause (k) reservoir clearing, clause (p) the protection, enhancement and compensation^ of fish and wildlife habitat, and clause (r) the preparation and adherence to environmental guidelines pertained directly to the environment.
In the light of the terms of reference and the structure of the
Committee, one can conclude that the RPCC's duties were twofold. Clause (x) stated that the RPCC's purpose was "considering and making recommendations", which is basically the solving of problems pertaining to the various licence conditions, and advising the Water Comptroller accordingly. But the structure of the Committee with its numerous members and their often interrelated concerns led to its second function—that of liaison. Table 3.1 Water Licence Clauses Administered by the RPCC
Clause Purpose Water Comptroller's Direction Approval
k reservoir clearing X
1 level of water in reservoir X not to exceed 563-9 m until remedial work to Downie Slide is completed
n location of construction camps, work areas site offices, borrow pits and similar works
o construction of recreational facilities in vicinity of reservoir
p programs for the protection and enhancement of fish and wi1d1ife habitat and for the mitigation of losses of habitat, X studies thereto to be carried out by Licensee X
r preparation by Licensee of environmental guidelines for all construction-related act i v i t ies adherence by Licensee to environmental gu i deli nes
s» Licensee to carry out programs for the mitigation of adverse impacts on the local community in accordance with annual budgets prepared in consultation with appropriate local public agencies
v Licensee to give security to ensure compli• ance with clause (o) , (p) , (s) , (u)
-'•the responsibility of the CIC by an intercommi ttee agreement
Source: Comptroller of Water Rights, 1978 56
The part of the official program that was most poorly defined was the initial claims procedure, which called for an engineer to be appointed as the
Claims Officer pursuant to the Water Act, and for B.C. Hydro to pay his salary and expenses (clause (t)) as well as "any sum" that he determined "to be owing to any claimant under Section 18 of the Water Act" (clause (u)) (Comptroller of Water Rights, 1976c, 1977b).
However, the amendments to the water licence of June 1978 were more detailed and provided an improved framework. In particular, the Claims
Officer was to be appointed by the Water Comptroller, who also was to determine the procedure for making claims and hearings, and could submit claims himself. Clause (t) now limited the Claims Officer to claims not exceeding $10,000, and his decision was to be final and binding. Claims exceeding $10,000 were covered by clause (u). It allowed a claimant a choice of action to either sue B.C. Hydro or submit his claim for arbitration pursuant to the B.C. Arbitration Act ". . . except as may be otherwise specified by the Comptroller from time to time" (Comptroller of Water Rights,
1978).
The last component of the official program consisted of the two site biologists. This provision was based on a commitment B.C. Hydro had made at the public hearing (B.C. Hydro, 1977a). There had been considerable differences of opinion on who should employ the site biologists—B.C. Hydro or the Fish and Wildlife Branch (FWB). Environmentalists thought they would be little more than apologists for B.C. Hydro's actions if they were responsible to the Crown Corporation. However, the Water Comptroller believed that experienced professionals would uphold their integrity and credibility
(Comptroller of Water Rights, 1976b).
Under clause (q) of the water licence, B.C. Hydro was to hire a fisheries and a wildlife biologist within three months of the issuance of the licence, 57 for the length of the construction period and thereafter for as long as the
Comptroller thought necessary. Their duties were outlined as follows: to help in writing the environmental guidelines for construction activities, to monitor fish and wildlife aspects of the Project, to collect additional data as needed during construction, and to maintain liaison with the staff of B.C.
Hydro or its contractors and with government agencies as required (Comptroller of Water Rights, 1976a, 1978).
Terms of reference and a list of duties had been written up by the B.C.
Hydro head office biologists because the tasks were only broadly outlined in clause (q), and the first two seemed to be duplicated in clauses (r) and (p), respectively. However, these terms of reference could not be implemented as the site biologists were not placed under the supervision of the Environmental
Division at the head office in Vancouver, but rather under that of the
Construction Division at Revelstoke, so as to be bound by a non-strike union agreement (Bradley, 1988).
In August 1977 there were still problems with the terms of reference.
The attitude of the Construction Manager, undoubtedly reflecting his paramount objective "to build the dam as quickly and efficiently as possible",8 Branch, 1977-1985). It appears that terms of reference were eventually written up and in effect for about a year and a half, after which time the site wildlife biologist devised his own terms of reference (Bonar, 1987).9 The site fisheries biologist, who filled the position from 1979 to 1983 after the first biologist had left, stated that there were no formal terms of reference (Mason, 1988). Both site biologists determined what was important and, following approval by their superiors (Construction Manager and on-site manager of environmental and socio-economic affairs), implemented their 58 programs. 3.2.2 THE OPERATION OF THE PROGRAM The official program was responsible for the implementation of eleven of the twenty-six water licence clauses, and for advising the Comptroller on eight of the eleven conditions. This task called for a substantial knowledge of and judgment in environmental, social, and economic matters as well as the necessary technical expertise to monitor a large, complex construction project both of which were almost completely beyond the realm of the staff of the Water Management Branch. However, the staff consisted only of engineers accustomed to dealing with technical matters of water resource management, such as the approval of engineering plans, licensing and inspection of hydroelectric and water supply projects, and the two senior consultants, retained to advise the Comptroller, were also experts on the engineering aspects of the Project. Thus neither the in-house staff nor the consultants were competent to address environmental, social, and economic matters and the capability of the official administrative program was seriously handicapped right from the beginning. The two administrative committees' main functions—the solving of problems and the maintaining liaison between its numerous members—required a decisive leadership; but the first especially depended on a thorough understanding of the issues and timely negotiations and decision making. However, the two Committees had to rely on the advice and judgment of their members and B.C. Hydro, which were guided by the interests of the bodies they represented. The Water Comptroller faced the same lack of expertise in regard to the two site biologists (clause (q)) and the Claims Officer (clause (t)). 59 3.2.2.1 The Community Impact Committee The CIC got off to a slow start, meeting infrequently until 1979, an average of four times per year up to 1985, and once in each of 1985 and 1986. The Committee was disbanded by the Comptroller in 1988. Initially, local agencies ignored the Committee. They preferred to deal with B.C. Hydro directly or through the Adjunct Committees. Only when the negotiations with B.C. Hydro failed to resolve the issues was the CIC approached (Cox 1988a). The underlying causes might have been that the CIC did not have a liaison person in Revelstoke, had no prescribed procedure for public input, and held most meetings in Victoria which limited the attendance of both the representatives of the Local Impact Committee and that of the Impact Monitor. Communication was only with the Local Impact Committee when it referred unresolved matters to the CIC, the number of which seemed to increase as the Project progressed. One major issue that the CIC addressed was the development of an alternate water supply system for the Big Eddy Water District, an unincorporated community just outside of the City of Revelstoke. Big Eddy's existing water supply system was fed by Dolan Creek. But the quality of the water would be unsafe once B.C. Hydro started to log the area for the transmission line from the Revelstoke Reservoir to the Illecillewaet substation south of Revelstoke. On the recommendation of the CIC, the Water Comptroller had ordered B.C. Hydro to fund an alternate water supply system for Big Eddy. There was, however, some question as to who was responsible for the operating costs, which much exceeded those of the Dolan Creek system. Big Eddy appealed the Water Comptroller's order under the Water Act (1979) and the claim was settled by arbitration by the provincial Environmental Appeal Board, which awarded the community an additional $12,000. The total cost to B.C. Hydro was approximately $1.1 million (see also Section 4.2). 60 Other matters handled by the CIC were the increased need for police and court services in Revelstoke, additional expenses incurred by the Revelstoke School District No. 19, high rates charged by a mobile home park in Revelstoke, compensation payments for lost time and wages due to road closures claimed by the B.C. Interior Logging Association, and demands to expand the Sicamous water system. In 1984 the CIC took an important step. Through the Ministry of Environment two private consultation firms were commissioned to assess the effects of the Revelstoke Project on the local communities (DPA Group, 1986; Sussex, 1985). The studies were undertaken for two reasons (1) to enable the CIC and the Water Comptroller to resolve outstanding mitigation and compensation Issues; and (2) to take advantage of an important learn-by-doing opportunity, as the Revelstoke Project was the first large scale development project in B.C. for which an EIS on both environmental and socio-economic impacts had been prepared. The DPA study (DPA Group, 1986) covered the Project's wind-down phase— the last months of construction from May to December 1984, and the first year of operation from January to December 1985. Figure 3.3 shows the extent of the DPA study area; of primary interest was the City of Revelstoke and Electoral Area E. The study evaluated, amongst other things, the effectiveness of mitigation and compensation measures using the guidelines developed by ELUC (1977, 1980). Four issues identified as important to local communities were examined. First, local residents did not get a fair share of Project jobs. This was determined to be true as more skilled non-resident workers were preferred to residents with fewer job skills. Second, the study found that the high expectations of local businesses, which remained unfulfilled, were not caused by the Project but were self-induced. Third, whereas the community Fraser Fort George Primary Study Area Communities closest to Project Secondary Study Area Columbia-Shuswap Regional District A Census Subdivision 20 NORTH Thompsoh-N i col a J L_ J I km r East Kootenay Salmon Arm Kootenay Figure 3.3 The Regional District of Columbia-Shuswap - Local Communities Affected by the Revelstoke Project (DPA Group, 1986) 62 of Sicamous felt that it had not been fairly compensated by B.C. Hydro, the study revealed that net negative socio-economic impacts were not significant. The perceived unfairness had resulted from the generous compensation given the City of Revelstoke, which had been part of the initial negotiations for compensation at the public hearing. The CIC commented that the real cause of the problem was that Sicamous, an unincorporated community, lacked organized effective representation (CIC, 1986). Finally, related to the previous concern was the dissatisfaction of Sicamous' residents with B.C. Hydro's community relations efforts. To mitigate this, the study proposed that B.C. Hydro undertake a consultation program during the project wind-down phase. Further findings were that B.C. Hydro should have mitigated several other adverse impacts, such as that of price inflation on disadvantaged groups, the lack of adequate medical and dental services, and the fear of a possible dam failure. It was recommended that B.C. Hydro address the latter by distributing more information about dam safety to local residents. The study also assessed the monitoring system and concluded that the water licence provisions for mitigation and compensation matters had been inadequate. The criticisms raised were that the monitoring program was unsuccessful and ineffective. The Impact Monitor and Local Impact Committee (not part of the official program) had no authoritative powers, and the CIC lacked full local support. As to the CIC's recommendations to the Water Comptroller, the DPA study stated that "most of the decisions . . . were based on ad hoc studies or political lobbying, and not on comprehensive on-going monitoring efforts" DPA Group, 1986, p. 153). With adequate monitoring the interests of all sectors of the local communities, not only the better organized and articulate, would have been attended to and mitigation/compensation decisions on the whole would have been fairer. On the basis of the DPA study the CIC made the following three 63 recommendations: (1) not to institute a consultation program as this was counter-productive; (2) to advise the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and the Regional District of the remaining concerns in Sicamous, and to consider incorporation; and (3) provincial agencies were to consider representation of significant, unincorporated rural settlements prior to the approval of future projects (CIC, 1986)) The second study (Sussex, 1985), undertaken for the Ministry of Environment, evaluated the impacts of the Revelstoke Project on local government services and finances. It consists of three volumes. The first describes the compensation and mitigation criteria for assessing the impacts. Although based on the ELUC guidelines (1977, 1980), they were adapted to include more specific compensation criteria. The second volume covers the engineering component of the study with respect to Revelstoke's roads, water, storm sewer and sanitary sewer. Impacts on the compensation for the City of Revelstoke, the Regional District of Columbia Shuswap and the Sicamous Waterworks District (Sicamous) are detailed in the final volume. A brief summary of the findings of this volume follows. The objective of the report was to assess the impacts, to present the commitments and payments made so far by B.C. Hydro, and to give a general view that might be used for comparing the compensation and impacts. The results of the Sussex study are briefly summarized in Table 3.2 There were three outstanding claims for compensation from the Regional District of Columbia Shuswap. They were all rejected as unfounded for the reasons indicated in Table 3.2 The Sicamous Waterworks District had filed two claims, which were also rejected. The Sussex study corroborated the DPA study's finding that Sicamous felt unfairly treated in comparison to the City of Revelstoke. The relative population increase in that community was the same as that In Revelstoke. The study concluded that if there were a problem Table 3-2 Sussex Study - Assessment of Outstanding Issues 1. City of Revelstoke - Short Term Impacts A. Accepted Claims 1. Golf course river bank erosion ^ - about 1000 m of Columbia River bank are eroding - not certain if impact attributable to Revelstoke Reservoir or Arrow Lakes Reservoir - requires action - determine rate of erosion through monitoring CIC: take no further action 2. Victoria Road damage: - increased heavy load truck travel due to Revelstoke Project - impact difficult to assess, estimated cost $32,000 (1985 dollars) - up to provincial government to decide if valid claim, and if it will compensate. B.C. Hydro paid taxes for trucking service in general CIC: no further compensation to be paid for 'use' of Victoria Road 3. Water- system: - water supply improvements needed to serve the influx of people due to the Project, cost of $2,006 million - compensation adequate, B.C. Hydro paid $3-311 million for improvements CIC: no further compensation will be paid h. Fire protection: - increased costs for fire protection during and following construction and increased training costs of fire fighters - 1976-1985 costs $29,000; B.C. Hydro paid $132,000 for fire truck - compensation is adequate CIC: no action required 5. Recreation crowding: - extra crowding of community facilities - cost virtually impossible to quantify - B.C. Hydro paid $1,417,000 for new community center and $157,000 for various smaller recreation projects CIC: no action required 6. Relative operating costs: - annual operating expenses by City that might reasonably be attributed - costs difficult to determine: general costs, building inspection, road transport: $432,000 less; fire protection, garbage, recreation: $127,000 more - more than offset by gains from relative property taxes and B.C. Hydro grants in 1ieu CIC: no further compensation will be paid 7. Relative Property taxes: - effect on property va1ues affect municipal tax base - no action necessary CIC: outside the terms of reference of the Water Comptroller, refer to Ministries of Finance and Municipal Affairs to resolve issue of municipal taxation of B.C. Hydro facilities 65 Table 3.2 Continued B. Unclear Claim 1. 111eci11ewaet ground water: - B.C. Hydro removed 111eci11ewaet Dam based on commitment at public hearing. This caused winter basement flooding and some ground water contaminat ion - cost of removal $416,000, cost of downstream dyking and channeling work $578,000 paid by B.C. Hydro - the issue is not clear, it is currently being reviewed CtC: advise Rivers Section of the Ministry of Environment to look into this C. Rejected Claims 1. New community cost savings: - B.C. Hydro was saved cost of building a new community because Revelstoke was nearby - economic efficiency grounds and equity grounds: no redistribution of income, therefore reject claim CIC: outside terms of reference of Comptroller of Water Rights, refer to Ministries of Finance and Municipal Affairs to determine if B.C. Hydro's facilities have to pay municipal taxes 2. Ski hi 11 climate: - changed microclimate in Mt. McKenzie ski hill, warmer temperatures and reduced snow fall, ski lift facilities had to be moved uphill - little evidence, need years of data collection not a municipal enterprise, equity grounds: offset by lower heating costs, snow removal costs, etc., no double counting CIC: no significant evidence of climatic change presented - close issue 3. Sewer systems: - City's sewage plant at time unable to cope with sewage flows, needs separation of storm and sanitary sewers - B.C. Hydro paid $171,000 compensation - no significant contribution by the Revelstoke Project on existing problem CIC: no further compensation will be paid 4. Garbage collection: - reduced capacity due to B.C. Hydro's use of the dump necessitates new fac i1i ty ear 1ier - dump is owned by the Regional District - not a cost to the City CIC: no action required 5. General administration: - costs associated with the dam's construction - hard to quantify due to City's accounting system (perhaps $100,000) - costs are for a function that is expected of a local government paying costs for making claims may lead to continuous, unwarranted cl a ims City has had lower administrative costs since 1976 - suggests extra costs more than offset by savings. Virtually impossible to identify net cost increases, but must be quite small CIC: no further compensation will be paid 66 Table 3-2 Continued II. Impacts on Regional District Columbia Shuswap A. Rejected Claims 1. Garbage disposal: - present garbage dump's life shortened by B.C. Hydro's use during construc• tion of the dam - impact is not clear, but probably relatively small - no compensation because City of Revelstoke will pay S0% of cost of new facility, cost to District if offset by benefits to District, B.C. Hydro paid $82,000 grant for services received and no taxes paid CIC: no action required 2. Sicamous District Recreation Centre: - B.C. Hydro played a significant role in the building, but not the financing of the recreation centre - the claim is rejected - causal link is not clearly established CIC: no action required 3. Loss of tax base: - due to the flooding of the reservoir area - this is a resource cost to the owner not to the taxing authority the District can shift the tax rate on remaining properties accordingly CIC: no action required III. Impacts on Sicamous Waterworks District A. Rejected Claims 1. Water system improvements: - the need for improvements was advanced by population growths due to the Revelstoke Project - the problem was essentially not changed by population increase new residents paid user fees CIC: no action required 2. Fi re protect ion: - a new fire hall was built in 1978, a new fire truck acquired in 1984 B.C. Hydro should compensate because of population increase - tax payments by new residents offset fire protection costs a new fire hall was most likely needed irrespective of population increase CIC: no action required The first statement describes the claim, the second one usually describes magnitude of the claim and compensation already paid, and the third statement gives the reason either for acceptance or rejection of a claim by Sussex Consultants. For some of the claims the second statement is missing. The final statement is the CIC's recommendation to the Water Compt rol1er Source: Sussex, 1985; CIC, 1986 67 of equity distribution, then the provincial government could choose to alleviate it. The City of Revelstoke had thirteen unresolved issues. Of these, seven were accepted as valid, one as unclear, and five were found to be invalid. Of the seven valid claims three had been adequately compensated, one was more than offset by other benefits, one required no further action, one needed to be monitored and another was the responsibility of the provincial government rather than B.C. Hydro's. The study concluded that over the long term, the City of Revelstoke has benefitted from the Revelstoke Project. The response of the CIC to each of the thirteen issues is shown in Table 3.2. In December 1987, after having obtained the views of B.C. Hydro and the City of Revelstoke in regard to these recommendations, the Water Comptroller issued an order for them to take effect. The only issue to be addressed in the future, if need be, was the golf course erosion; all other claims had been properly settled. The City of Revelstoke appealed the order under Section 38 of the Water Act (1979). The grounds for the appeal were that B.C. Hydro's compensation to the City was inadequate under clause (s) of the water licence. Impacts not adequately compensated were: the golf course erosion, the climatic change, the community costs, such as the Victoria Road damage, the water system and sewerage system. The appeal hearing was to have been heard in July 1988 by the Environmental Appeal Board, however, the City of Revelstoke and B.C. Hydro negotiated a $35,000 settlement (Cox 1988b). 3.2.2.2 The Revelstoke Project Coordinating Committee The RPCC held meetings as the need arose, being more frequent at first (five times per year) and decreasing at the end of the construction period (two in 1984), the last meeting was early in 1985. One meting per year was held in Revelstoke to tour the Project and facilitate input from members 68 involved locally with the Project, but most meetings took place in Victoria and Vancouver. Although B.C. Hydro could attend by invitation only, it was well represented at all meetings. The meetings were closed to the public. The question that needs to be answered is: How adequately and efficiently did the RPCC fulfill its mandate? It is beyond the confines of this thesis to answer this question with respect to all the water licence clauses that were the responsibility of the RPCC.10 However, the available material allowed a detailed examination of the manner in which environmental management was handled. The aspects of the Revelstoke Project to be addressed by the RPCC were only broadly defined in the water licence clauses. A more detailed definition in the form of a plan that identified and established the priority of issues and concerns of individual participants and related them to the phases of the construction of the Project was not developed by the RPCC. The Committee chose to deal with matters in an almost ad hoc manner, dictated largely by the interests of individual participants with respect to the conditions of the water licence. As far as environmental matters were concerned the two major actors, the Fish and Wildlife Branch (FWB) and B.C. Hydro, set a contentious scene from the very start. Initially in January 1977, the conflict arose over the supervision and terms of reference for the biologists to be hired by B.C. Hydro under clause (q). When the chairman of the ad hoc committee conducted a meeting between B.C. Hydro and the FWP to resolve the issue, it became obvious that the root of the contention went much deeper: it was the struggle for the mandate to design, implement and manage the programs under clause (p) for the fish and wildlife resources affected by the Project, and the determination of the ultimate financial settlement for the losses of these resources. Whereas it was the statutory mandate of the FWB to manage the fish and wildlife 69 resources of the Province, B.C. Hydro had made the following commitments at the public hearing in regard to the mitigation and compensation for wildlife losses: "Costs of exploring and assessing alternative compensatory measures, land acquisition, works design and construction, as well as maintenance and management should be the responsibility of B.C. Hydro." (B.C. Hydro, 1977b, p. 4-33) B.C. Hydro was undoubtedly in conflict with the FWB mandate. With respect to the biologists, clause (q) clearly states that the licensee shall employ the biologists, but there is no decisive statement in condition (p) of the first water licence as to who shall carry out the programs. However in the explanatory notes accompanying the licence, the Water Comptroller appeared to assign the preparation, costing, and implementation of the programs to the FWB. The B.C. Hydro site biologists, if available, were to assist the FWB In the implementation. Thus it seems that B.C. Hydro was not to play a decisive role. The amended water licence of 12 September 1977 (Comptroller of Water Rights, 1977b) changed this. It specifically assigned to B.C. Hydro the task of carrying out the programs and studies as directed by the Water ComptrollerHowever, there was no mention of who was to design them. B.C. Hydro and the FWB came to an agreement to divide the studies that were to be the basis for determining fish and wildlife losses and compensation measures. The valley wildlife species (black bear, deer, beaver, waterfowl) and the aquatic system upriver of the dam were to be studied by B.C. Hydro, and the mountain species (caribou, grizzly bear) and the aquatic system downstream of the dam by the FWB. Moose were to be the joint responsibility of the two. But differences in biological, compensatory, and administrative concepts soon arose with respect to clause (p). By March 1978, after a year of indecision by the RPCC, the FWB voiced its strong concerns to the Comptroller 70 because B.C. Hydro did not disclose their expenditures for environmental programs under condition (p). In effect, this practice of B.C. Hydro not only excluded the FWB from the decision-making process, but also used up funds available for compensation, thus jeopardizing the scale of the final compensation settlement. In the spring of 1979, when the issue was no closer to being resolved, the FWB again approached the Water Comptroller, requesting that he make B.C. Hydro disclose their expenditures. His answer was that he had not received any recommendations from the RPCC. Furthermore, whereas he could request B.C. Hydro to pay only under condition (p), neither he nor any other government agency had any absolute control over B.C. Hydro's expenditures. The final compensation settlement would be very much a political matter and that B.C. Hydro could then present its own expenditures irrespective of other ministries. But the Comptroller also requested B.C. Hydro to advise the FWB in advance of its expenditures so that the FWB mandate to manage the provincial fish and wildlife resources would be met, and that the programs would yield a maximum return for their costs. He advised the FWB to raise the matter at the next RPCC meeting, which they did. In May 1979, the RPCC decided to form a subcommittee to look into the issue. The mitigation and compensation subcommittee consisted of two economists, a park planner, and a biologist. It was chaired by the RPCC chairman. The two protagonists, B.C. Hydro and the FWB, attended as requested. The objectives of the subcommittee were to review the programs proposed by the FWB and B.C. Hydro to fulfill condition (p), and to make recommendations to the RPCC. Altogether the subcommittee met only three times, between June 1979 to January 1980, without resolving the conflict. B.C. Hydro's expenditures were still not disclosed to the FWB and the quantification of fish and wildlife 71 impacts was just as contentious as three years earlier. B.C. Hydro and the FWB then decided to bypass the subcommittee and start direct negotiations. An agreement seemed at hand in the fall of 1980 only to come to an impasse in December, when the FWB wanted to review the whole matter. Finally in April 1982, after five years of frustrating bargaining, a $6.2 million compensation agreement for the fish and wildlife losses was concluded. Ironically, the compensation payment initially requested by the FWB at the public hearing had been $6.4 million (Vancouver Sun, 1976a). The causes of this procrastination and frustration were threefold. First, losses had to be identified in detail through ongoing inventory and habitat studies, and second, B.C. Hydro and the FWB disagreed on biological and compensatory principles, the very basis for quantifying the losses. The essential question was: Is the compensation to be paid for the losses of the existing fish and wildlife resources as sustained under present management or for the maximum potential value under an intensive management program in perpetuity? B.C. Hydro advocated the former principle. They reasoned that present management levels reflected the value placed on the resource by politicians and the public at the time. Hence the present value of the lost resources could be assessed by a cost-benefit analysis. The FWB was of the opinion that compensation of habitat should be based on the principle to replace "like with like".12 Some 21,000 hectares of valley bottom wildlife habitat and an estimated total of about 2843 hectares of fish habitat on the Columbia River and its tributaries were to be lost. The opportunity returns of the fish and wildlife resources from this habitat were to be foregone in perpetuity. Therefore, this habitat must be replaced with one of the same potential carrying capacity, notwithstanding the present management level. The Agency procrastinated because they intended to establish a precedent 72 for the settling of compensation for anticipated future developments. Thus the Revelstoke settlement would have to be based on the principle "like-for- like". However, the FWB's position appeared solidly entrenched and little understood by the RPCC. In the end the FWB failed to accomplish their objective. The third reason is the lack of leadership displayed by the RPCC and the compensation subcommittee. It is true that the changed clause (p) of the revised water licence (Comptroller of Water Rights, 1977b) placed the RPCC in a most difficult position. This condition, by calling for B.C. Hydro to carry out the programs, was in direct conflict with the FWB's statutory mandate to manage the fish and wildlife resources of the Province. When the RPCC found themselves in an unworkable situation imposed by the Cabinet decision, why was this not clarified with the Water Comptroller? Also more decisive steps surely could have been taken initially to have B.C. Hydro disclose the expenditures, and rule on the validity of their programs. Furthermore, it is incomprehensible that such an important issue was relegated to a subcommittee of junior-level agency staff, and that independent environmental experts were not retained. The RPCC had been unable to change the climate of confrontation to a more meaningful process of negotiation. Whereas the Water Comptroller concluded that the RPCC had helped in a major way to settle the compensation agreement, the FWB saw the committee as unwieldy and indecisive. In view of the preceding description, the press release from the Ministry of Environment is very ironic: ". . .in cooperation with B.C. Hydro, we have improved and refined [emphasis added] the procedure by which such compensation programs can be conceived and implemented in the future . . . during the negotiations on the agreement, there was considerable discussion between Ministry staff and local public interest groups in the Kootenays regarding the types of compensation programs that would be appropriate . . . all those involved in this agreement, including local residents, may take pride in a complex job well done." (Ministry of Environment, 6 April 1982) 73 This quote is interesting also for another reason. It is the public notice of the Water Comptroller's approval of clause (p) after the decision had been reached. Because the compensation agreement had been negotiated outside the RPCC, the date for signing it had been set without the Committee making a recommendation to the Comptroller. However, he had been notified a month and a half earlier by the FWB of an impending settlement. On very short notice, he thus was faced with the predicament of either postponing the signing of the agreement in order to give reasonable public notice as required by the water licence, or to sanction the signing so that programs could commence. After having satisfied himself, that indeed public interest groups and the City of Revelstoke had been aware of the issues and that in this way the intent of the water licence condition (x) had been met, he opted for the former alternative. In reality, the City of Revelstoke did not at all understand the compensatory equity and relevance of the programs to the Revelstoke Project in general and to the City's residents in particular, and asked the Minister of the Environment for an explanation. The agreement, however, was not binding yet. It called for the written direction of the Water Comptroller affirming that Clause (p) had been satisfied with this agreement. The Comptroller's approval, based on the recommendation of the RPCC, was given almost three months after the signing. The view of the Comptroller was that this whole problem could have been avoided with better communication. Another issue resulted from the manner in which the RPCC handled the compensation question. At a RPCC meeting in May 1979, the FWB questioned the function that the RPCC was fulfilling: Was the Committee only to hear reports or to solve problems also? The chairman's response was given in the meeting notes: ". . . the committee's problem solving role . . . was recognized, but that the exchange of information was very 74 important, particularly as it facilitated the coordination of activities before they gave rise to conflicts." (Water Management Branch, 1977-1985) The FWB's perception, that the RPCC was largely a clearing-house for the time-consuming exchange of reports with little action, led to a hiatus in their attendance at the RPCC meetings from early 1981 to the summer of 1982. Late in 1981, B.C. Hydro lodged a complaint with the RPCC that there was insufficient input and guidance for the fish and wildlife studies under clause (p) from the biologists of the FWB. The RPCC concluded that the FWB attendance at their meetings was important as the Water Comptroller "relies on such guidance to enable him to make proper and timely directions under the terms of the licence" (Water Management Branch, 1977-1985). In the spring of 1982, the Comptroller requested that a senior staff member of the FWB attend meetings from then on. Although the FWB complied, it did not alter its view of the RPCC. Even in 1988 the question remains with the FWB: Did the RPCC not have the authority to act, or was the Committee unable to come to decisions? It is of interest to examine how clause (r) of the conditional licence was addressed by the RPCC. This condition called for environmental guidelines for all construction related activities to be prepared by B.C. Hydro for approval by the Water Comptroller, and the adherence to the guidelines by the licensee as directed by the Comptroller. Clause (q) required that the site biologist help in the drafting of the guidelines. In reality, this was done by the B.C. Hydro staff biologists before the site biologists were employed. After consulting with government agencies involved and amending the guidelines accordingly, the Water Comptroller approved them in June 1977, with the understanding that they would undergo "a continuing review and updating in the light of experience on the project" (Comptroller of Water Rights, 1977a). As the guidelines were in the form of provisions to be included by B.C. 75 Hydro in various construction contracts, to be administered by B.C. Hydro's chief engineer, it did not seem possible to change or update them once the contracts had been awarded. Indeed, neither the meeting notes of the RPCC referred to any updating, nor could the site biologists recall any. The chairmen of the RPCC stated that updating occurred informally as a matter of good construction management. From the RPCC meeting notes it is not clear how often the Water Comptroller exercised his right to give directives to B.C. Hydro in regard to the adherence to the environmental guidelines. One persistent problem that was discussed by the RPCC, but not solved, was the improper disposal of garbage and the resulting bear problem. This was specifically covered in the environmental guidelines. An order from the Water Comptroller followed by surveillance should have solved this issue. Another example is furnished by the logging and clearing for the transmission line right-of-way through the Dolan Creek watershed (see Section 4.2). The environmental guidelines specifically developed for that area were never implemented by B.C. Hydro. The resulting damage to the watershed was not repaired for several years, although the Water Management Branch had called for prompt remedial action. Land reclamation of the Project site was also dealt with by the RPCC under condition (r) of the water licence. Although site reclamation was covered by Project permits from the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Resources, that Ministry exempted B.C. Hydro, because they thought it should be carried out under the authority of the Ministry of Lands, Parks, and Housing. However, to ensure the input from all concerned ministries, the latter referred the matter to the RPCC. In February 1982 the Ministry forwarded their critique of a B.C. Hydro draft restoration program and an outline of the essential elements to be contained in a reclamation program to the RPCC. In 76 October of the same year, B.C. Hydro, on its own accord, approached the Committee requesting a meeting with the concerned ministries to establish the requirements of a reclamation program. There was no specific reference to site reclamation in the water licence, but the explanatory notes to the licence claimed that clause (r) gave the Comptroller and government agencies the authority over the guidelines of future studies. Also Section 4.05 and 4.06 of the Environmental Guidelines (B.C. Hydro, 1977a) provided for the reclamation of borrow areas and temporary roads. The matter was first discussed at an RPCC meeting in November 1982, at which time B.C. Hydro was requested to supply to the Committee copies of a comprehensive reclamation plan for the distribution to all ministries involved. A discussion thereof was to follow early in 1983. The RPCC also formed a subcommittee chaired by a staff member of the Ministry of Lands, Parks, and Housing. Its objectives were to assess the potential use of Crown Land of the Revelstoke Project; to resolve allocation conflicts; and to review B.C. Hydro's reclamation program to ensure that it was adequate as well as compatible with the anticipated end use of the land and meet the requirements of the various provincial regulatory agencies. The needs of the concerned ministries as well as the requirements for a comprehensive land reclamation plan were passed on to B.C. Hydro, who promised the plan by June 1983. When in February 1984, a program had still not been received, the chairman gave B.C. . Hydro an ultimatum of four weeks and rebuked them for their procrastination in complying with the conditions of the water licence. The results were almost instant—B.C. Hydro furnished a site reclamation program in less than three weeks. The example of land reclamation illustrates four points. (1) Action on the site reclamation plan was not initiated by the RPCC. Though it was not a specific licence condition, it should have been anticipated as a necessary 77 activity. (2) The liaison function of the RPCC was perceived as a necessary activity. It fulfilled the important job of coordinating the needs of the various ministries and thus avoided conflicts of land use. (3) B.C. Hydro did respond to the decisive action of the administrative body. (4) The RPCC's decisive action should have come much sooner. To conclude, one more example of the manner in which the RPCC handled the environmental management of the Revelstoke Project is presented. The case of the water quality testing program illustrates three shortcomings: the lack of the identification and of establishing the priority of environmental concerns at the start of project implementation, the lack of independent advice in environmental matters, and the lack of decisive action by the RPCC. Although there was a water quality testing program in operation in the pre-impoundment period, there were no provisions for its continuation following reservoir filling. Indeed, the need for the continued study of water quality, was not identified until the fall of 1980. A staff member of the Environmental Division of the Water Management Branch and another from the Waste Management Branch jointly raised this shortcoming with the chairman of the RPCC, who in turn solicited the opinion of the FWB. The latter, while not directly opposing the program, did not support it, despite the fact that this data could be potentially useful in the management of the post-impoundment fisheries. As the FWB was then negotiating the compensation for fish and wildlife losses with B.C. Hydro, the Branch perceived that yet another demand on B.C. Hydro would jeopardize its successful resolution. But two years later, when the compensation agreement was already in effect, the FWB advocated the same view. They stated at a RPCC meeting that there was no value in continuing the water quality testing except for gas supersaturation. B.C. Hydro readily agreed, as did the Water Comptroller on the basis of the judgment by the FWB. 78 That water quality monitoring was continued, and that in the end an adequate post-impoundment water quality program was implemented, can only be accredited to the tenacious efforts of the above mentioned two individuals. One of them had designed the program early in 1983, but both had initiated the action and had insisted that B.C. Hydro were not to reduce it, either in comprehensiveness or in duration. The program was implemented just in the nick of time when reservoir filling started in the fall of 1983. Today B.C. Hydro perceives it as an invaluable learning experience of benefit not only to the management of the Revelstoke Reservoir, but also to future hydro-electric projects. The foregoing analysis has shown that the RPCC had faced two serious handicaps in fulfilling its responsibilities: the decision maker's lack of environmental expertise prerequisite for such a complex task, and the inadequate provision of some of the water licence conditions. As a consequence of the former, leadership was mostly indecisive and dependent on the judgment of its members, who were guided by the goals of the agencies they represented. The Committee followed an ad hoc approach to which B.C. Hydro responded with seemingly unchecked procrastination. The shortcomings of the water licence not only caused the RPCC great difficulties in the administration of some of the clauses but further complicated this task by the contentious scene it set between two main participants. On the whole, the framework established to administer the environmental management of the Project was neither adequate nor effective. 3.2.2.3 The Claims Officer and the Claims Procedure The Comptroller of Water Rights expected the majority of the claims to be solved directly by B.C. Hydro. The Claims Officer was to settle only the unresolved local claims resulting from the environmental, social, and economic 79 impacts of the Project (Water Management Branch, 1976-1988) . While most conflicts were anticipated to occur in the local logging industry, others concerning community services, property negotiations, and socio-economic disputes were also foreseen. Furthermore, the Claims Officer was to act as the local representative of the RPCC and the CIC, be their advisor on ongoing developments and settle unresolved local problems at the Victoria level (Water Management Branch, 1977-1985). However, half a year after the granting of the initial water licence, a Claims Officer had not yet been appointed. The Water Comptroller gave two reasons for this: the appeal to the water licence should first be adjudicated, and, there was no urgent need for a Claims Officer as conflicts were resolving themselves (Water Management Branch, 1977- 1985). The Cabinet Appeal Committee upheld clause (t) and (u) in September 1977, but the office of the Claims Officer remained vacant. Almost half a year later the chairman of the RPCC advised the Water Comptroller not to appoint a Claims Officer because there were no unsettled claims, and that the Government Agent in Revelstoke should act as a local representative instead (Water Management Branch, 1976-1988). The amendments to the water licence in June 1978 introduced a new claims procedure that clearly distinguished between the way minor and major claims were to be handled: the former by the Claims Officer and the latter by legal action or arbitration.13 rjid this procedure then eliminate the settlement of claims directly with B.C. Hydro as envisaged by the Comptroller in 1977? According to Banks and Thompson (1980, 1981) not entirely. They state that although claimants applying to the Project Construction Manager were normally referred to the Local Impact Committee, even if their claim was of major importance, "major interests such as forest companies or a government agency will tend to approach Hydro management directly" (Bankes and Thompson, 1981, p. 467). Of course a similar route open to claimants was through some of the 80 Adjunct Committees, especially the Forestry Committee. For minor claims, however, the unofficial program offered the only initial recourse because clause (t) of the water licence was never implemented—the Comptroller did not appoint a Claims Officer. Also the settling of major claims by clause (u) seemed never to have been used (Cox, 1988a). That the official claims procedure was not instituted is unfortunate, because it would have provided more local contact and also appeared to offer a more adequate method for claims resolution than the one actually used—and at no cost to the government. 3.2.2.4 The Site Biologists The Revelstoke Project was a first for B.C. Hydro because the biologists working on the construction site were employees of the company and not the FWB. B.C. Hydro employed both site biologists within the required time (March 1977). Although they had an immediate supervisor, it was the Construction Manager who largely determined their work under clause (q) of the water licence. Of the four requirements of clause (q) the biologists were unable to fulfill the first—to help draft environmental guidelines. Due to the urgent need for the guidelines, the B.C. Hydro head office biologists had already written them when the biologists were employed. On the basis of the site biologists' monthly reports one can conclude that their work did adhere to the second and third tasks of clause (q): to collect additional information as required during construction, and to monitor fish and wildlife aspects of the Project. However, this was only true insofar as the phrasing of the water licence was so indefinite. The task of collecting additional information was certainly done, although there was some ambiguity of whether to allocate it to clause (q) or (p). Additional 81 information required during construction (clause (q)) could also be needed in "programs for the protection, or enhancement of fish and wildlife habitat" or be "the studies related thereof" (clause (p)). Condition (p) only specified that the Licensee was to carry out the work. With respect to the monitoring of fish and wildlife aspects of the Project, it seems that this requirement was freely interpreted by B.C. Hydro. Whereas initially this work was carried out by the biologists, later on it was discontinued. The first fisheries biologist monitored construction activities on a regular basis and considered it as one of the two main duties of his job (Water Management Branch, 1977-1985). However, his successor, though trying to persevere with the monitoring, stated that the site biologists were rather discouraged than encouraged to do this type of work (Mason, 1988). This was confirmed by the wildlife biologist, who was told that it was not his job (Bonar, 1987). Also the site biologists' monthly reports bear witness to this. Initially construction activity monitoring was briefly mentioned but as of 1982 all reference to it stopped. The only reported testing, though only indirectly related to construction activities, was the water quality program (see also Section 3.2.2.2). The fourth requirement of clause (q) was that the biologists were to keep up liaison with the B.C. Hydro staff or the contractors and with government agencies as required. A major problem was the communication between the site biologists and those in the Vancouver head office. Though both viewed the open exchange of ideas and advice essential to the environmental work on the Project, in practice it was prevented by the prescribed line of communication. There was almost no direct contact because the site biologists were unable to leave Revelstoke. Telephone communication was found to be unsatisfactory due to the nature of the work and all correspondence came through the office of the Construction Manager, with only copies being passed to the site biologists 82 (Bonar, 1987). Annual reports written by the site biologists were held up for months in the Construction Manager's office. When they were finally received by the Vancouver biologists, they were too late to lead to meaningful discussions or changes in programs. Undoubtedly there was no in-depth review of the work possible, which rendered some work less useful (Bradley, 1988). The communication between the site biologists and the contractors of the Project was also very limited. This was a direct result of the site biologists' duties. As they did not engage in the implementation or any compliance monitoring of the environmental guidelines and clauses of the contracts, and little In the way of monitoring construction activities in general, there was not much call for their interaction. The site biologists maintained liaison with three government agencies: the B.C. Forest Service on forest clearing, the Water Management Branch on water and the FWB on fish and wildlife. With the first two communication was on an ad hoc basis, but with the FWB it was more regular. The FWB biologists and the site biologists saw each other frequently at the Project and cooperated with each other in the various facets of their work. The site biologists' monthly reports were forwarded to the FWB. Indeed, the good cooperation enjoyed by the two parties was commented on by both the FWB and the Construction Manager at meetings of the RPCC (Water Management Branch, 1977-1985). As to the RPCC, they wanted the site biologists to attend their meetings regularly (clause (x)). When after about a year their attendance stopped, the Committee requested it be continued. The Construction Manager, however, refused to comply due to the biologists' work load. The above evaluation leads to the conclusion, that the function the site biologists served was much less adequate and efficient than it should have been with respect to the following responsibilities: the monitoring of construction activities, implementation of environmental guidelines and 83 keeping up liaison with the staff of B.C. Hydro and its contractors. This can be attributed to the vague directives of the water licence clauses and the free hand allowed B.C. Hydro in interpreting and implementing them. 3.2.3. INTERACTION OF COMPONENTS The CIC and the RPCC made recommendations to the Water Comptroller for the orders and approvals to be passed by him in regard to the one and the seven water licence clauses that they administered, respectively. There was, however, limited interaction between the two Committees themselves because the CIC and the RPCC had essentially different responsibilities, the former dealing predominantly with the socio-economic matters, and the latter with environmental issues. Initially, the CIC and the RPCC decided on the delegation of the responsibility for clause (s) and later some interaction occurred with regard to the transfer of some issues from one Committee to the other. However, each Committee kept well informed of the undertakings of the other, because the chairman of each was also a member of the other Committee and as such attended meetings regularly (Cox, 1988b). Although it was not the RPCC's task to administer clause (q), it could request the attendance of the site biologists at its meetings. The biologists attended some meetings initially, but the RPCC's request for their continued attendance was refused by the Construction Manager on the grounds that their workload did not allow travelling to Victoria or Vancouver, where the Committee generally met. Other than determining their length of employment, the Comptroller had no dealings with the site biologists. 3.3 THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PROGRAMS The relationship between the unofficial and the official program, as well as that of the combined administrative framework to the larger context of the 84 Project is depicted in Figure 3.4. The design of the two programs had not been interfaced, each having been set up at various times and by different bodies, B.C. Hydro, and the Comptroller of Water Rights, and Cabinet, respectively. Whereas the unofficial program was set up first, it appears that little attempt had been made to integrate that program with the one later provided by the water licence. There were duplications in the responsibilities assigned to the various bodies and clear lines of communication between them had not been established. This introduced a dichotomy in the whole administrative structure that rendered the administration of the Project hard to coordinate and execute right from the start. Though the two programs had various spheres of responsibilities, considerable overlap between them as well as within each program existed. The official program addressed technical, environmental, social, and economic matters as outlined in the relevant clauses of the water licence. But the unofficial structure dealt with the same Issues except the technical ones and the management of environmental matters of the Project per se. Apart from the CIC, the geographical extent of the responsibilities of the groups established under the official program was not delimited. In contrast, that of the unofficial program appeared to be more local, including the City of Revelstoke and the communities in the vicinity of the Project in the District of Columbia-Shuswap. Both programs had provisions for resolving claims. Under the official program the claims procedure was not initially specified, beyond calling for the Claims officer to settle any claims. Later in June 1978, the water licence specified that minor claims were to be settled by the Claims Officer and major ones (exceeding $10,000, clause (u)), by arbitration or legal Figure 3.k Administrative Framework for the Revelstoke Project Re 1 at ionsh i p to Public, Industrial and Governmental Sectors r—— I ADJUNCT COMMITTEES Regional District Technical Planning Commi ttee City of Revel stoke Commi ttee School District #19 Negot iat i ng Team Revelstoke Social Services Council Revelstoke Forestry |j Committee |j Public Interests Clause (u) Claims >$10,000 Legal Proceedings or B.C. Arbi tration Act Sub- commi ttees CIC - Community Impact Committee ••••• Official Program \/ Decision Maker H - Hierarchy IMC - Impact Monitoring Committee — — Unofficial Program X Not Instituted 0 - Order RPCC - Revelstoke Project Coordinating Committee —^ Communication R - Recommendation 86 proceedings. The resolution of claims by the unofficial program was carried out by the Local Impact Committee and the Adjunct Committees, neither of which appeared to have a prescribed procedure and proceeded by ad hoc negotiations with B.C. Hydro. However in practice, because claims were settled by both the unofficial program and claimants' direct negotiations with B.C. Hydro, the Water Comptroller chose not to implement the Claims Officer, nor was clause (u) used. In effect, following the initial slow start, as of 1979, the CIC fulfilled the function of both in addressing the unresolved claims that the Local Impact Committee referred to it. The interaction between the CIC and the Local Impact Committee illustrates several other problems in the relation between the two administrative programs. The DPA consultants' study (DPA Group, 1986) states that the CIC neither always, shared the view of the Local Impact Committee on the seriousness of referred issues, nor always responded promptly to problems because a proper mechanism to do so did not exist. Furthermore, the Local Impact Committee's views were not altogether representative of those of the local population. The study suggests that issue identification, based on a true grassroots input, possibly could have given the Local Impact Committee's work a more solid backing and recognition in the decision-making process (DPA Group, 1986). Thus it seems that both Committees lacked local input. The CIC having no liaison person in Revelstoke also complicated communication between the two and, indeed, led to a complaint by the Local Committee which brought the Water Comptroller to Revelstoke (Water Management Branch, 1976-1988). Also affected by the lack of proper channels of communication was the Impact Monitor. A direct line of communication with the Committees of the official program did not exist. Hence the Monitor dealt only with the CIC on an ad hoc basis and hardly ever with the RPCC. There seemed to be no need for interaction between the Adjunct Committees and the official program and for 87 the biologists and the unofficial program. Two important differences existed between the programs. The official program was both advisory and authoritative, with the exception of the biologists, who had no power of enforcement. The RPCC and the CIC were advisory insofar as they made recommendations concerning the conditions of the water licence to the Water Comptroller, and authoritative because in the process of forming the recommendations they had the power to act. The unofficial program, however, was merely advisory (Figure 3.4). Furthermore, even though B.C. Hydro funded the whole administrative structure, the Impact Monitor and the Local Impact Committee suffered from a serious lack of funding and support staff (Table 3.3). Combined, these two factors rendered the unofficial program inadequate and inefficient. In conclusion it can be said that the almost side-by-side existence of the two programs was one of the serious shortcomings of the administrative structure. 3.4 MAJOR SHORTCOMINGS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK This chapter has shown that the administrative framework for the Revelstoke Project was far from adequate and effective. The main underlying reasons for this were: (1) the framework consisted of two programs, neither of which had been well thought out, nor had they been integrated with each other; (2) both structures lacked the expertise required for the efficient administration of such a complex development project, and (3) some of the problems encountered by the official program were inherent in the clauses of the water licence. The fact that the administrative framework was not based on one holistic planning approach, but rather on the separate and somewhat ad hoc successive efforts of the licensee and the regulators, resulted in major shortcomings in both the unofficial and the official programs. Duplication of 88 Table 3.3 B.C. Hydro Funding of Some of the Administrative Framework of the Revelstoke Project (DPA Group, 1986) To March 1984 Estimate to % of Total 30 Nov. 1984 B.C. Hydro Mitigation/ • Compensation Expenditures to 30 Nov. 1984 ($46.65 million) Unofficial Program Local Impact 15,000 15,000* 0.03 Committee Regional District** 196,000 381,0001 0.8 Official Program RPCC and CIC 313,000 360,000 0.8 * Based on Previous budgets submitted by the Committee ** As of 30 April 1980 the Regional District no longer directs the program *An Interview with the DPA Group (1988) could not establish what the increase of $185,000 over previous expenditures was. The Impact Monitor's Office was terminated in 1980. However, the cost of the two studies commissioned by the Community Impact Committee (DPA Group, 1986; Sussex, 1985) came to this total. 89 responsibilities existed not only within each program, but also between programs. As a consequence of the latter the potentially useful claims procedure of the official program was not instituted and thus the official program had no liaison person in Revelstoke—a significant shortcoming. There were no prescribed lines of communication between the two programs and most RPCC and CIC meetings were held in Victoria and Vancouver. This especially complicated the dealings between the Local Impact Committee and the CIC, between the site biologists and the RPCC and between the Impact Monitor and the official program. Another major shortcoming was that authority was vested in the two Committees of the official program with the Water Comptroller having only the ultimate power. Both the lack of authority and adequate support staff rendered the operation of the Local Impact Committee largely ineffective. Also the site biologists lacked the necessary power to enforce environmental preservation measures. Yet another shortfall was the absence of clear directives of the Office of the Impact Monitor and his accountability to the Regional District, which not only led successive Monitors to entirely different interpretations as to their responsibilities, but also to the termination of the Office itself after only two and a half years. A responsibility that should be addressed by such an administrative framework—the participation of the public—was not at all adequately provided for at Revelstoke. Whereas the unofficial program was open to the public, participation at this level was far from sufficient because that program was only advisory and not authoritative. With respect to the official program, the water licence provisions virtually excluded the public from the decision-making process. The public had no direct access to the RPCC and only a very limited one to the CIC; the main communication with the latter was indirect via the Local Impact Committee. However, for the eight water licence 90 clauses administered by the two committees, the Water Comptroller: "prior to the giving of approvals or the issuance of orders . . . [shall] give reasonable public notice of the receipt by him of recommendations from the Committee, and shall give reasonable public notice of any approval or order arising therefrom." (Comptroller of Water Rights, 1978) This provision was seen as essential by the government in order to administer the Project in a visible and creditable way (Water Management Branch, 1976-1988). In reality public input in response to the "reasonable public notice" by the Water Comptroller was at most reactive. It entered the decision-making process at the very end, thus precluding any meaningful participation as decisions had in fact been reached long before public notice was given. The second underlying reason for the inefficient operation of the administrative structure was the lack of the requisite expertise which resulted mainly from the licensing of the Project under the Water Act. Thus the administration of the Project became the responsibility of the Water Management Branch, whose staff lacked the essential environmental, social, and economic expertise for such a multi-faceted task. The operation of both official Committees was affected. Initially, the RPCC and the CIC should have prepared a plan of action that identified and established the priority of the issues to be addressed. Without such a plan of action the Committees were forced to follow an ad hoc approach. A result was the indecisive leadership of the RPCC which tolerated B.C. Hydro's procrastination and led to the very slow resolution of issues, or as in the case of the fish and wildlife compensation agreement, the settlement outside of the Committee. On the other hand, the CIC based its decisions on ad hoc studies or political lobbying (DPA Group, 1986). Furthermore, the work of the site biologists could have benefitted from consultation with experts in their field. Their isolated position in Revelstoke prevented meaningful 91 communication with B.C. Hydro head office biologists and the knowledgeable members of the RPCC. Lack of expertise also handicapped the operation of the unofficial program. B.C. Hydro had not provided the necessary support staff for the Local Impact Committee and the Impact Monitor. Finally, some shortfalls of the operation of the official program arose from the inadequate provisions of some of the water licence conditions. The RPCC experienced problems in the administration of clause (p). While this clause was to be the basis of a fish and wildlife compensation agreement, it was the cause of the contentious stance taken by the two main parties to this settlement. Additionally, some of the responsibilities under clause (p) and (q) were very similar. The RPCC had problems in assigning the site biologists' work to the fulfillment of these clauses, especially so because clause (q) which broadly outlined the work of the site biologists, was not a responsibility of the Committee. In fact, the only directive to be given for that clause was the length of the biologists' employment; in practice B.C. Hydro was given a free hand in all other matters pertaining to the work of the site biologists. Thus some of the work that should have been carried out, such as the monitoring of construction activities, was not at all properly addressed. This chapter has demonstrated that, as a whole, the administrative framework should have provided the essential components for the proper and efficient management of the Revelstoke Project. However, the design deficiencies of each separate component and the lack of Integration of the two programs did not allow this potential to be realized. 92 NOTES 1 B.C. Hydro, Environmental Impact Statement, (Vancouver: B.C. Hydro and Power Authority, 197^ Vol. 11^ Chapter 19, Recommendations 1, 13 and 15 as recommended by B.C. Hydro's socio-economic consultants, Canadian Resourcecon. See also Public Hearing, Exhibit No. 136: Review of Hydro's Position re Mitigation and Compensation - Chapter 19, the Environmental Impact Statement, September 23, 1976. 2 Waite (1979) mentions two more committees, however, it seems that they did not much extend, if at all, into the project implementation phase. They were: (1) the Revelstoke Highway Committee, which was to review proposals for relocating Highway 23 North along the reservoir and to address impacts on roads in the region and in the City of Revelstoke; and (2) the Revelstoke Environmental Committee which was to consider compensation opportunities for fish losses arising from the Project. 3 The forest industry was seriously impacted by the Revelstoke Project; it is a major employer in the area. ^ See Banks and Thompson (1980) for a description. B.C. Hydro carried out semi-annual labour force surveys; see also B.C. Hydro Review of Revelstoke Project Impacts on Social and Community Services, 1981. ^ List of ministries and agencies of the RPCC: Ministry of Environment— agencies: Water Management Branch, Aquatic Studies Branch, Kootenay Region, Habitat Protection, Fish and Wildlife Branch; Ministry of the Attorney General; Ministry of Industry and Small Business Development; Lands, Parks and Outdoor Recreation; ' Ministry of Municipal Affairs; Ministry of Highways; Ministry of Forests; Ministry of Human Resources. Some of the Ministries' names changed over the years. ^ The water licence wording is "mitigation of losses of habitat". The ELUC Secretariat defines mitigation as the "measures taken in the planning, construction, or operation of a project with the specific objective of avoiding or reducing adverse environmental or social Impacts". Compensation is defined by ELUC as the "payments (in cash or in kind) which are made by the developer (or party responsible for the impacts) with the objective of redressing or offsetting the losses which occur despite or in lieu of mitigation efforts . . . Very simply, mitigation tries to prevent; compensation attempts to redress" (ELUC, 1980). The terms "mitigation" and "compensation" are used as defined by ELUC throughout this thesis. 8 The attitude of the Construction Manager has been affirmed by all persons interviewed. 9 Both sets of terms of reference were not available to the author. 93 iU The RPCC meeting notes make few references to clause (n) and clause (v), thus they were not evaluated. Clause (1) presented no difficulties in implementation. The relocation of Highway 23, reservoir clearing clause (k) and the construction of recreational facilities clause (o) covered extensively by progress reports gave little indication as to whether problems were encountered. The former two are touched upon in Section 4.2. N.B.: This section is not referenced individually to facilitate the reading of it. It is based on the meeting notes of the RPCC and the correspondence files at the Water Management Branch, Victoria, B.C., as well as some personal communications to the author. Many of the interviewees are still working in the ministries and preferred not to be quoted directly. All information is on file with the author. H Of note is that the Cabinet Appeal Committee in their recommendations had not specified whose responsibility clause (p) was to be. They only stated that the work was to be carried out as directed by the Comptroller of Water Rights. It was therefore Cabinet's decision to assign the task to B.C. Hydro. 1 2 ELUC guidelines on compensation and mitigation for environmental and social impacts (1980) see the argument of "like for like" as invalid from the standpoint of the developer and government. If excessive and inefficient expenditures of funds are to be avoided then "compensation in kind or full replacement should only be undertaken when the value of what is produced exceeds the costs of producing it." (ELUC, 1980, p. 9). Thus compensation is to be based on a cost-benefit analysis. 13 Banks and Thompson (1980) write that "Hydro officials suggest that the Claims Officer was never intended to deal with the run of the mill claim ... [but] for solving disputes over such matters as road construction contracts." But they correctly observe that "the $10,000 limit seems inconsistent with such a role." The confusion perhaps arises from the change in water licence clauses (t) and (u). 94 CHAPTER 4 THE ENVIRONMENT - GUIDELINES AND CONSTRUCTION IMPACTS "It should be noted at the outset, however, that the Revelstoke Environmental Impact Statement is the first study of this type to be undertaken by B.C. Hydro. The methodology and analytical techniques that have been used are, therefore, comparatively new to both the agency and the provincial situation in general. This has resulted in some difficulty in adopting the full scope and purpose of the EIS as defined in the literature to the specific needs of B.C. Hydro's planning procedures. Suffice to say, that the future holds a challenge for B.C. Hydro in the development and application of new and better environmental impact assessment techniques given the experience gained with the Revelstoke Project." (B.C. Hydro, 1976b, pp. v-vi) The passage above, taken from the introduction to B.C. Hydro's Environmental Impact Statement published in May 1976, underlines the changing context with which the Crown Corporation was faced in developing the Revelstoke Project. To deal with this new situation the corporation engaged the services of environmental consultants In 1973 (H. Paish and Associates) and in .1975 (Environment Research Associates and Canadian Resourcecon) to prepare environmental and socio-economic Impact studies. In addition the provincial Fish and Wildlife Branch (FWB) undertook a fish tagging and recovery program in order to generate more information on Columbia River fish resources. Between September 1975 and May 1976 B.C. Hydro prepared its own Environmental Impact Statement which was "... intended to serve as the major information source for the public as well as a key document for the water licence hearing" (Waite, 1979, p. 52). The first version of the water licence (December, 1976) required B.C. Hydro to: a. carry out programmes to protect, enhance, and mitigate loss of fish and wildlife habitat (clause (p)) b. employ a fisheries and wildlife biologist (clause (q)) c. prepare environmental guidelines for construction related activities (clause (r)) (Comptroller of Water Rights, 1976c) 95 In response to these requirements B.C. Hydro prepared the "Revelstoke Project: Environmental Guidelines" which was published in April 1977. This chapter will first review the relevant contractual requirements and contextual guidelines and, so far as available information permits, assess the manner in which they were administered. Secondly, and again so far as available information permits, the environmental Impacts resulting from construction activities are reviewed. 4.1 CONTRACTUAL REQUIREMENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDELINES Early in 1977, B.C. Hydro submitted draft environmental guidelines to the Water Comptroller. In June 1977, following review by an ad hoc committee (forerunner of RPCC) and the incorporation of requested changes, the Comptroller accepted the guidelines with the understanding that they would be "subject to a continuing review and updating in the light of experience on the project" (Comptroller of Water Rights, 1976-1988). The objective of the environmental guidelines was to identify and control the main activities of the construction of the Project in order to minimize their impact on the environment. The guidelines were written up in two parts: (1) the contractual requirements, consisting of the various environmental protection clauses typical of B.C. Hydro's Revelstoke construction contracts, and (2) the actual environmental guidelines, which were to clarify the purpose and administration of the contractual clauses (B.C. Hydro, 1977a). The contractual requirements were the actual contract clauses of the first contract (Diversion Tunnel) awarded for the Project and were to be included in all the construction contracts.1 The second part of the guidelines added some brief explanatory details. Selected requirements of contracts and the corresponding contextual environmental guidelines are summarized in Table 4.1 under the following 96 categories: compliance with laws, preservation, pollution, waste disposal, and site restoration; for the last category, fish and wildlife protection, there were only environmental guidelines and no contractual requirements. The contractual requirements were of a very general nature. They referred contractors to some of the provincial Acts and regulations and described common construction practices. B.C. Hydro did not supply a complete list of Acts (#1, 4.01), nor detailed all regulations and standards to which contractors had to adhere (e.g. #4, 7.14, 7.15). However, the Crown Corporation's previous experience placed them in a better position than the contractors to obtain this information and then include it in the guidelines, thus they would have ensured the latter's awareness of these requirements. A contract clause giving the contractor the ultimate responsibility in this matter would have protected B.C. Hydro from any legal implication. With the requirements under (#2) preservation, It was B.C. Hydro's intent to preserve the natural and biological environment. Contract clause 4.54 illustrates one of the shortcomings of the environmental guidelines: the use of vague, undefined terms. The clause calls for no "unnecessary" destruction of vegetation and for the prevention of "unnecessary" disfigurement of the natural landscape. For the former, "unnecessary" is somewhat defined in the guidelines by limiting the destruction to specified areas (4.02), however, for the latter, no definition is offered. Illegal hunting and fishing are to be prevented by the prohibition of shooting at the site and the control of recreational fishing. The contractual clauses covering pollution (#3) are also rather vague, the main concerns are the prevention of water pollution and dust control. With respect to compliance with the Pollution Control Act, the environmental guidelines (4.07) call for waste water discharges to be as free as "practical" Table 4.1 Summary of Selected Contract Requirements and Guidelines REQUIREMENT CONTRACT2 GUIOLELINES3 1. CompIf ance *4.27 ~ Construction shall comply with all applicable laws 't.OI - specifically Identifies some provincial acts which must be with Iaws complled wi th - construction activities are subject to approval £ direction of Construction Manager, who ensures that contractual re• quirements of environmental preservation are met 2. Preservation It.5b - No unnecessary destruction of vegetation ^.02 - clearing only In specified areas £ shelter belts left - prevent illegal hunting and fishing 6.05/6.01 - prohibition of shooting at site/control recreational fishing - prevent unnecessary disfigurement of countryside 'I.O'I/'I.OS - stockpile removed soli, use for site restoration 7.07(f)mlnlmlze disturbance of natural landscape ^*.03 - shape surface areas to control runoff £ prevent erosion, restore £ plant native vegetation - smooth £ grade disturbed surfaces to conform to U.0U - stockpile removed soil, use for site restoration the natural landscape 7.11 - spoil £ rockflll piles not to Interfere with b.\2 - locate so that they do not Interfere with natural drainage natural drainage 3. Pollution 7-07(g)comply wlth Pollution Control Branch ^.07 - keep waste water discharges into watercourses as free as practicable from pollutants, biologists to monitor constantly to ensure provincial standards are met (Acts: Pollution - prevent solid matter, contaminants £ other objec• Control, Mines, Fisheries, Health, etc.) tionable pollutants from entering surface £ ground water - construct means to keep eroded material out of watercourses 4.U construct dewaterlng & drainage systems to prevent discharges of pollutants into watercourses & if any erosion is controlled - use turbidity control methods before discharging waste wiLhln acceptable limits waters Into watercourses (h)prevent dust pollution from becoming a nuisance In '(.06 - keep dust pollution on roads to minimum with water sprinkling work areas - do not use oil where It can reach watercourses - use of oil £ calcium chloride with biologists' consent h. Waste 7.1't - prohibited to discharge raw sewage or polluted water 't.08 - sewage £ waste water disposal to conform with provincial health Di sposal into watercourses or near camp, work areas, buildings £ other government requirements - drainage £ sewage Installations to conform with pro• - sewage treatment plants £ septic tanks for camps £ work areas to vincial health £ other standards meet Pollution Control Act requirements, disposal of waste from portable toilets to meet Dept. of Health recommendations 715 - collect refuse in metal, covered, fly-proof cans £ .09 - dispose garbage by sanitary fill garbage pit £ pay attention to dispose twice per week by incinerator or in pit £ drainage In £ out of pit cover as specified - periodically backfill pits to maintain sanitation £ - Implement refuse incineration If wildlife is attracted minimize attracting wildlife - Hydro to fund nuisance animal removal when requested by FWB -^1 - refuse disposal must be acceptable to provincial £ municipal requirements Table k.1 Continued CONTRACT GUIDELINES Site 7.07 - see above under #2 .03/11.01) see above under #2 Restoration 7-10 - stabilize borrow area slopes S reshape to GUIDELINES 6. Fish and wildlife 6.00 site biologists to monitor effectiveness 6 Implementation of guidelines to ensure protect Ion proper protection of fish and wildlife In Project area Hydro to cooperate with reasonable requests by FWB 6.01 preservation of watercourses - keep construction near watercourses to minimum - do not "walk" construction equipment through streams - remove temporary log crossings and culverts to restore natural drainage systems 6.02 * consideration of spawning cycles - when possible schedule construction of structures In streams outside of fish spawning cycles 6.0^ * preservation of wildlife trails - upon site wildlife biologist's request wildlife trails cut by construction activities to be restored to maintain traditional movement patterns 6.06 * protection from hazardous areas - upon site wildlife biologist's request fence hazardous contruction areas to keep wiIdlife out 6.07 * continuing environmental concern - site biologists to carry out fish and wildlife field studies - assist In establishing basis for environmental management program? to be Implemented at discretion of FWB following project completion 6.08 * provision for wildlife crossings - at request of site or FWB biologists provide log booms to facilitate wildlife crossings In reservoir area 1. Simplified from B.C. Hydro, 1977a. 2. Numbers refer to contractual requirements pages 2-15 In B.C. Hydro, 1977a. 3. Numbers refer to environmental guidelines pages 15-23 In B.C. Hydro, 1977a. 4. No corresponding contract clauses for these guidelines. FWB: Fish and Wildlife Branch 99 from pollutants and to be constantly monitored by the biologists (site biologists?) to meet "provincial standards". The requirements for the disposal of wastes (#4), such as sewage and refuse, were intended to prevent the pollution of watercourses and the attraction of wildlife, and specified that incineration was to replace disposal in pits if animals were attracted. Several contract clauses mentioned the restoration of sites, such as borrow areas and spoil and rockfill waste areas. Concerns were slope stability, drainage, erosion, and the blending of disturbed areas into the natural landscape. Environmental guideline 5.00 calls for a landscape architect to develop a landscaping program, however, it does not specify the area to which it will be applied. Of interest is that the environmental guidelines for the protection of fish and wildlife (#6) are not included in any contract clauses. These protection measures are somewhat more specific than the contractual ones and all, except 6.07 (biologists' studies) should have been included in the contracts. Though under requirement 6.00, the site biologists are to monitor the effectiveness and implementation of the guidelines, only three of the thirteen guideline sections, and none of the contractual ones call for the consultation with the biologists. The site biologists were assigned no authority. Most of the plan approvals and site-specific decisions called for in the contractual requirements were the responsibility of the Construction Manager (#1,. 4.01) Requirement 6.00 also states that B.C. Hydro would cooperate with any "reasonable" requests by the FWB. The guidelines did not cover reservoir clearing and filling activities. The environmental guidelines appear to be a set of rather common nonspecific construction practices lacking any detailed, site-specific requirements, which would have established a solid basis for the conservation 100 and protection of the environment during the construction period. 4.1.1 COMPLIANCE MONITORING OF REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES The water licence, though calling for B.C. Hydro to prepare and to adhere to the environmental guidelines, gave no directive as to who was to carry out the compliance monitoring. Some of the members of the ad hoc committee, who had reviewed the draft guidelines, requested this to be the responsibility of the site biologists. However, the guidelines that the Water Comptroller approved only called for the biologists to "participate in all decisions affecting the environment . . . and . . . contribute much to ensure that construction practices are followed which cause the least environmental impact . . . and ... to monitor the effectiveness and implementation of the guidelines as agreed to by the Comptroller of Water Rights" (B.C. Hydro, 1977a, pp. 16, 21). Instead Section 4.01 of the guidelines assigned this responsibility to B.C. Hydro's Chief Engineer, whose site representative was the Construction Manager. Thus the latter was to administer all contracts and ensure that contractors met the contractual requirements for the preservation of the environment (B.C. Hydro, 1977a, p. 16). In practice, B.C. Hydro assigned contract administrators to the compliance monitoring of construction contracts. Although the administrators were mainly engineers with no training in environmental work, they were required to deal with the many varied aspects of environmental protection shown in Table 4.1. Information from compliance monitoring carried out by the construction administrators was not available for an evaluation. But one of the site biologists observed that the principle concern of the administrators seemed to have been the contractors' adherence to the technical specification of the contracts. Environmental matters were perceived to be of minor importance and therefore treated superficially. The objective was to build 101 the dam economically and on time (Bonar, 1987). Initially construction monitoring in general was also undertaken by the two site biologists. They inspected the ongoing construction work about four to seven times a month. However, early in 1979 with a change in fisheries biologist, it became clear that B.C. Hydro discouraged this practice (see Section 3.2.2.4). It seems that from then on the amount of construction monitoring undertaken depended on the site biologists' attitude or "tenacity" (Mason, 1988). Indeed, the very brief mention of construction monitoring in the monthly reports of the site biologists was discontinued as of 1980 for wildlife matters and as of 1982 for fisheries aspects (B.C. Hydro 1977-1984). One of the site biologists summed up his activities as that of an informer (Mason, 1988). Incidents were reported to the Construction Manager and to the relevant government agency. The biologist had no enforcement power, he tried to mitigate wherever possible, but he was hamstrung by the low priority assigned to the environment at the Revelstoke site. Phillip and Langford (1985, p. 778) in an evaluation of the environmental management of twelve development projects In B.C., confirm that at the Revelstoke Project management did not delegate authority to the environmental supervisors (biologists). Enforcement was up to the Construction Manager and the responsible government agencies. The biologist felt that the Ministry of Environment, and in particular the FWB which was responsible for fish and wildlife resources, should have insisted on adequate monitoring of environmental impacts (Mason, 1988). The FWB's position however was, that following the agency's unsuccessful attempt to gain supervision over the site biologists, compliance monitoring was out of their hands and became the responsibility of B.C. Hydro (Lindsay, 1988). Furthermore, once approval for a project had been granted, environmental monitoring and mitigation are of a very low priority, no matter 102 who does the monitoring. Environmental monitoring at Revelstoke was "a joke" —a fact well illustrated by the Deadman Creek erosion (see Section 4.2) (Lindsay, 1988). The amount of compliance monitoring of contractual requirements and the guidelines undertaken by B.C. Hydro's contract administrators remains a moot point. The next section will describe and evaluate the results of the construction monitoring undertaken by the site biologists. 4.2 CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS The purpose of the analysis of construction activities and their environmental impacts is to document and evaluate the impacts and to gain some idea of compliance monitoring as a whole for the Revelstoke Project. The available data precludes an in-depth study. The causes are several: extensive monitoring of construction activities and their effect on the environment was not undertaken, there are no detailed records of the monitoring that was carried out and overall, construction proceeded relatively smoothly—major accidents, which could have caused long term environmental impacts did not occur. The data sources used for this study were the site biologists' monthly reports (B.C. Hydro, 1977-1984), their annual reports (Bonar, 1978, 1979; Teleki, 1979; Mason, 1982) and personal interviews with them (Bonar, 1987; Mason, 1988). Some information was obtained from the files and staff of B.C. Hydro, the Water Management Branch, the Waste Management Branch and from B.C. Conservation Officers. Although there was somewhat more data for the aquatic than the wildlife ecosystem, few references for either pertain to monitoring activities later than 1979. In general, the large area of the Project and the high flushing rate of watercourses rendered monitoring a difficult task. The latter led to the subjective assessment of most impacts on the quality of 103 water until 1981, when water quality testing was improved. The impacts on the environment that resulted from the various construction activities monitored by the site biologists and some of the mitigation and compensation measures are shown in Table 4.2. The period over which these activities were monitored was from May 1977 to December 1979 for all construction activities except #7, #8 (discharge of sewage effluent) and #10 (fishing pressure) which extended over the whole construction period, #12 (Deadman Creek diversion) for 1978 to 1984 and #13 (clearing In Dolan Creek watershed) from December 1980 to December 1983. Table 4.3 details the construction activities monitored by the site fisheries biologist in 1978. The initial statement is taken from Teleki (1979) and is followed by a bracketed statement that gives additional information culled from the biologists' monthly reports (B.C. Hydro, 1977-1984). The major environmental concerns arising from the construction activities were: (1) high suspended sediment loads in the Columbia River and its tributaries from reservoir logging, access roads, borrow areas, concrete production at the batch plant, relocation of Highway 23 and the washout of Deadman Creek; (2) chemical water pollution from fuel spills and illegal garbage disposal, (3) attraction of wildlife by illegal garbage disposal; (4) increased pressure on fishing by poaching, and (5) fish blockage by the diversion tunnel (Table 4.2). As the project progressed so did the severity of some impacts, notably that caused by logging in the reservoir area (activity #1), by the access roads and borrow pits located near watercourses (#3), and the batch plant (#5). Also different areas of ecosystem stress developed, as for example the Deadman Creek erosion. The reason for this are: the escalation of construction activities with the progression of the Project and differences in impacts per se. However, one cannot exclude other possible causes, such as Table k.2 Construction Activities Monitored and Environmental Impacts Reported by Site Biologists ACTIVITY IMPACT ON ENVIRONMENT MITIGATION/COMPENSATION MEASURES AND RESULTS 1. Reservoi r logging -increased runoff, initially increased suspended sediments -debris removal in streams -during 1979 high suspended sediments in tributaries -clearing contracts included guidelines to keep debris -considerable increase in stream bank erosion machinery out of streams - but not enforced -spawning areas disrupted by machinery -steep reservoir areas seeded in 1979-80 - solved -some upstream fish migration blocked some problems -wiId1i fe d i splaced 2. Burning in reservoir -minor impact from increased nutrient levels, -keep logging debris out of river minimal increases are beneficial 3. Access roads 6 borrow -initially little sediment introduction in watercourses & -borrow pits were kept away from watercourses pits near water• minimal interruption of fish movement courses -during 1979 increased sediment introduction & fish movement inhibited in some cases 1*. vehicle maintenance -minor spills scraped up 6 buried -oil & petrochemicals from yard recycled near yard & camp -small diesel fuel spills went into Columbia River -most petrochemicals burned or buried -most spills well away from river 5- batch plant for -initially ml nor seepage from sma11 set 11i ng pond Into Col umb la RI ver -settling ponds were constructed, but did not retain diversion tunnel -during 1979 high suspended sediment loads from batch plant particulate matter, to meet' standards in 1981 effluent into Columbia River 6. diversion tunnel -velocity barrier to fish: downstream migration possible, upstreamnot -kokanee compensation at Hi1 I/MacKenzie spawning channel -loss of upstream fish population about 500000 in 1981 -some Dolly Varden spawn in none-natal streams below diversion tunnel -possibility for compensation for Dolly Varden investigated 151000 eggs collected in 1980 -15000 rainbow trout eggs collected 7. sewage eflluent from -permitted discharge volumes often exceeded & fecal coliform -auxilllary aeration of sewage treatment plant man camp 6 offices frequently exceeded recommended standards -sludge waste removal to regional sanitation fill -no apparent nutrient increases downstream of Project -malodours at man camp 8. sewaye effluent -periodic discharges of raw sewage into Columbia River fromCity of Revelstoke 9. garbage disposal -bears attracted -Waste Management Branch informed -increased biological oxygen demand in tributaries -permits required to dump garbage -aesthetic degradation 10. Human ingress -increased fishing pressure as new locations open in reservoir area -angling closure signs posted downsteam of diversion O -fish accumulating downstream of diversion tunneI eas i I y poached tunnel outlet Table k.2 Cont i nued ACTIVITY IMPACT ON ENVIRONMENT MITIGATION/COMPENSATION MEASURES AND RESULTS II. Relocation of Highway •high concentrations of suspended sediments into tributaries -contractors informed of danger to fish in tributaries 23 North -site wildlife biologist suggested mitigative design 12. Di vers ion of -I4 million cubic yards of alluvial gravel and sand deposits -relocation and design changes of diversion Deadman Creek deposited in Columbia River -short term impacts: increased suspended solids, deposition of fines on nearshore river bottom slight filling in of river pools utilized by fish to 10 km downriver -undetermined increase in kokanee mortality rate - effect on total kokanee population probably not to be dangerously high 13. Clearing of trans• -constriction of Dolan Creek caused by dirt £ debris accumulation -guidelines specifically developed for clearing in this mission I i ne r i ght- at illegal Creek crossing area - not implemented of-way in Dolan -increased runoff from access road, log landing sites -prompt remedial work (revegetation, road drainage, Creek watershed -blockage of intermittent streams blockage £ debris removal) requested by Water Management Branch - took 2.5 years to complete Sources: Teleki (1978, 1979); Mason (1982, 1988); Bonar (1978, 1979, 1987); B.C. Hydro (1977"!98*0 ; Gorsline (1987); Gabrowski (1988) O 106 Table k.3 Construction Activities Monitored by Site Fisheries Biologist in 1978 DATE ACTIVITY 1 2 Feb. Batch plant wash pond location and configuration. (Plans were reviewed.) Feb. Diversion tunnel effluent. (Pumped from diversion tunnel back into the Columbia River.) March Deadman Creek erosion. (About 't million cubic yards material washed into Columbia River.) March Diversion tunnel intake road material into river. (No details available.) April Location and start up of asphalt plant. (No details available.) May Aggregate plant operation. (No details available.) May Placement and management of Acrow bridge. (Pontoon bridge across the Columbia River connecting Westside Access Road to Highway 23 North.) May Dust control by salting. (Liquefied calcium chloride was used on Westside Access Road for dust control where runoff was not directly into Columbia River. Map of new salt zones prepared. Specifications were adhered to. Salting was limited to 300 lbs per road mile in November 1978.) June Concrete curing water. (Discharged from concrete placement directly into Columbia River. Also waste concrete discharged directly at batch plant and highly turbid water drained directly into Columbia River. In future to be done at a rock piling site. Also washing out of concrete trucks directly onto road to be discontinued as it could cause damage if done closer to the river.) June Fuel spill from tanker truck in the river. (No details available.) July Waste disposal by Pitts-Atlas. (Machine shop and garage wastes dumped in Deadman Creek spoil fill area. Contractor did not comply immediately when ordered to clean up.) August Paving preparation. (Road oil-tar seal coat washed into Columbia River and Moses Creek during heavy precipitation.) Sept. Sediment from reservoir clearing. (Noted in October - a great deal of unnecessary scarring in many places, high sediment load in runoff to Columbia River. Stricter inspection by B.C. Forest Service.) Sept. Trees and brush in water from reservoir clearing. (Alarmingly high number of trees felled into the river 7 to 9 km upstream of pontoon bridge. More precise clearing instructions, more stringent inspections and stricter enforcement by B.C. Forest Service of contractors recommended.) Sept. Loram truck fuel spill on site. (October 1978 - more than 1000 gallons diesel-gasoline mixture spilled, dyked off and 'fired', no fuel reached the Columbia River.) October Downie Creek highway proposal. (II.'i km additional roadway. Impacts, such as salt runoff, increased fines in Creek and long-term site disruption as well as mitigation measures to prevent road runoff were discussed.) AH of 1978 Downie Slide bentonite clay in river. (No details available.) 1. Unbracketed statement from Teleki (1979) 2. Bracketed statements from site biologist's monthly reports (B.C. Hydro, 1977-1981)) 107 differences in monitoring and reporting by the successive fisheries site biologists, in consideration for the environment and in surveillance and enforcement of regulations by government agencies and of construction contract clauses by B.C. Hydro. Logging and clearing of the reservoir area (1) at first resulted in increased and then, in 1979, in high suspended sediments in the Columbia River and its tributaries. Causes were increased runoff from cleared surfaces, increased bank erosion, and debris, felled trees and machinery in streams. Some spawning areas were disrupted and upstream fish migration blocked. Water quality was tested, but results were not interpreted. Although reservoir clearing guidelines had been approved by the Water Comptroller (clause (k)) and included in clearing contracts, they were not enforced (Mason, 1982). The B.C. Forest Service was responsible for administering the clearing program. Clearing schedules and standards were reviewed by the site wildlife biologist with B.C. Forest Service staff. Of special concern was the deferred clearing of twelve wildlife habitat reserves. These were habitat areas of particular importance to moose, caribou, beaver, and waterfowl. The intent of this mitigation measure was to defer as long as possible the removal of critical wildlife habitat and the increased pressure it would generate on adjacent areas. Altogether the reserves encompassed approximately 604 hectares of flat riparian land, including some wetland. The EIS had identified six areas. Three were moose wintering ranges, and three were caribou river crossing sites. Other sites were added early in the construction period on the recommendation of the wildlife biologist. However, one area was inadvertently cleared in May 1978 and another was partially cleared half a year later due to a communication problem. The significance of these two incidents was not reported. The site wildlife biologist noted in 1980 that habitat reserves were very successful (Water Management Branch, 108 1977-1985). Moose crossed large areas of cleared land to reach these areas of preferred winter range. The habitat reserves were cleared in 1982, about one year prior to reservoir filling. B.C. Hydro environmental staff hoped that this gradual adjustment to changing habitat conditions would be less stressful for the wildlife. The FWB commented that this measure only delayed the inevitable. In general, the reserve habitat mitigation measure proposed in the EIS was heeded. Its ultimate value seems debatable (Bonar, 1987; B.C. Hydro, 1977-1984; Water Management Branch, 1977-1985). The burning of cleared material in the reservoir area (#2) only caused minor nutrient increases in the Columbia River, which were seen as beneficial. A mitigation measure was keeping logging debris out of the stream (Teleki, 1978; Mason, 1982). Runoff from access roads and borrow pits located near watercourses (#3) introduced little sediment in streams initially, but by 1979 this had increased. Fish movement was somewhat interrupted. Impacts from vehicle maintenance (#4) seems to have been minimal as the minor spills that did occur were promptly cleared up. Oil and petrochemicals from the maintenance yard were recycled (Teleki, 1979; Mason, 1982). Pollution of oil and grease could also have resulted—but did not—from vehicle wash water discharged to the ground (Waste Management Branch Permit PE 5544, for 9.3 m3 per day) Permit PA 4490 from the Waste Management Branch was for the discharge of exhaust gas from the intermittent operation of the diesel generating station. B.C. Hydro was allowed to burn fuel oil or natural gas. No problems were encountered with this permit (Waste Management Branch, 1988). The batch plant (#5) and the aggregate plant had permits from the Waste Management Branch for the use of 4550 m3 per day cooling water and for 9550 m3 per day aggregate wash water (Permit PE 5868). The main environmental concern was suspended solids. Unexpected silty clay seams in the aggregate borrow 109 pits resulted In an unusually high solids content in the wash water. The settling properties of these solids were extremely poor. Mason (1982) observed high suspended solids in the batch plant effluent discharge into the Columbia River. Furthermore, he noted that the settling pond was rather close to the Columbia River (Mason, 1988). Another permit (PE 5681) was for 4000 m^ per day typical gravel wash water. There was no direct discharge; the main concern was the adequacy of the freeboard of the settling pond (Waste Management Branch, 1988). Monthly inspections, mainly of the adequacy of the freeboard of the settling ponds and the retention time, were conducted by the Waste Management Branch for these permits (Waste Management Branch, 1988). About 1000 gallons of ammonia spilled from the cooling system of the batch plant into the settling pond and from there into the Columbia River. Water sampling to assess the impact was not carried out. However, it was estimated that long term effects were probably minimal because of the high flushing rate of the Columbia River (Mason, 1982). The diversion tunnel (#6) for the Columbia River caused major losses to the upstream fish population as fish could travel downstream, but not upstream. These were to be compensated by fish enhancement programs under the fish and wildlife compensation agreement (Mason, 1982). Gas supersaturation downstream of the diversion tunnel generally measured 105-107%, but reached a high of 118% in August, 1981 (115% is considered harmful to fish). Examination of several hundred Dolly Varden in 1980 and 1981 revealed no definite signs of gas bubble disease (Mason, 1982). From June, 1978 to December, 1984 B.C. Hydro operated a secondary sewage treatment plant (S.T.P.) for its camp wastes (#7). It consisted of a sewage aeration tank, a settling tank, and a chlorination tank from which the effluent was discharged underground Into the Columbia River. The permit was 110 for a discharge of 360 m3 domestic effluent per day. This limit was consistently exceeded during 1982 and 1983 (April through November), the highest discharge was 705 m3 per day. Flows were within limits in 1984 with the wind-down of the Project. Data for 1978-1980 were not available, and in 1981 flows in the peak employment season (April through November) were not measured due to a broken flow gauge (B.C. Hydro, various dates). The effluent was tested four times a year. Biochemical oxygen demand (B.O.D.) and total suspended solids (TSS) were the principal concerns. However impacts were expected to be minimal due to the high dilution ratio. Indeed they stayed well within the 100 mg/1 limit specified for each parameter. This level was lowered to 45 and 60 mg/1, respectively, for the times of zero and reduced discharge f rom the dam during reservoir filling. No data are available for this period, but both parameters previously had never exceeded these standards, besides the camp population was much reduced at this time. Whereas the Waste Management Branch does not mention fecal coliform of the effluent, this parameter frequently exceeded the Branch's objective for municipal type waste discharge. It reached a maximum reading of 1.3 x 106 MPN/100 ml in September 1982 (B.C. Hydro, various dates). Overall the operation of the sewage treatment plant was troublesome. The first winter all three tanks froze over. To prevent a reoccurrence the plant was completely closed in. Besides many equipment malfunctions and a plugged outflow pipe, adequate aeration of the sewage tank was a persistent and noticeably malodorous problem to the nearby camp. As the plant's capacity was exceeded, remedial measures were started in April 1981. They were the installation of an auxiliary compressed air supply for the sewage tank and sludge waste removal of 1600 gallons per day by tanker truck to the regional sanitation landfill. This mitigation however only partially solved the problem. Sludge waste removal was discontinued in December 1983 with a Ill reduction in the workforce. The plant was decommissioned in November 1984. The remaining sludge was left to aerate and settle until the following spring, when it was used as fertilizer for site seeding (B.C. Hydro, various dates; Grikis, 1988). Sewage was also somewhat of a problem in the City of Revelstoke (#8). The Waste Management Branch (1988) reported that during the construction period increased flows led to periodic sewage by-passes into the Columbia River due to overloading of the system. Garbage disposal (#9) appears to have been a problem most of the time. The EIS refers to two issues: the disposal of garbage from the camp and that from the equipment service area. The former was monitored by the wildlife site biologist, the latter was a concern of the fisheries site biologist. B.C. Hydro decided to use the Region's sanitary landfill for the disposal of the camp refuse, some construction waste and sewage sludge from the Revelstoke Project. Concerns during the construction period were insufficient coverage of garbage and refuse being left outside the locked gates. The wildlife site biologist reported in July 1978 that up to 10 black bears were using the landfill as a regular source of food. This was a potential hazard because of the proximity of the camp and could lead to the unnecessary destruction of nuisance bears (B.C. Hydro, 1977-1984). Nuisance bears had always been a problem at the garbage dump. But the Conservation Service Officer states that bears were also being spoiled at the camp by hand feeding (Gabrowski, 1988). Under the Regional Bear Management Plan nuisance black bears that wandered into Revelstoke (6.4 km from the dump) were destroyed and nuisance grizzly bears were relocated. While some black bears were destroyed because of the Revelstoke Project, it is not possible to quantify the impact (Gabrowski, 1988). The Waste Management Branch, the provincial government agency responsible for monitoring waste disposal, was aware of the noncompliance of the operator. They felt it was due to the amount of refuse 112 being disposed of, as well as to the time the operator devoted to the recycling of garbage. They admit that tighter control of hours of operation and types of material allowed would have alleviated the situation (Waste Management Branch, 1988). Of concern to the fisheries biologist was the disposal of waste by contractors. Infiltration and runoff of pollutants, such as fuels, chemicals, concrete, and garbage in general, into water courses posed a potential hazard to the aquatic ecosystem. Mason (1988) noted that garbage was illegally dumped upvalley from the dam site, when it should have been trucked out. The Waste Management Branch was aware that several contractors were using unauthorized refuse sites in the fall of 1979 and again a year later (B.C. Hydro, 1977-1984; Water Management Branch, 1977-1985). The agency was hopeful that its site inspections in 1981 would end this practice. One contractor disposed of garbage in the Deadman Creek fill area north of the Project office. The first infraction was noticed in June 1977, and cleaned up following notification. However, a year later machine shop and garage wastes (including oil) were dumped in the same area. Verbal requests by B.C. Hydro staff to remove the material only resulted in it being covered with earth. The contractor finally complied when a formal order was issued. Another impact on the fishery resource has been increased fishing pressure (#10) due to the large workforce Involved in the Project. Reservoir construction opened up many areas to fishing which had been inaccessible previously*. Poaching below the diversion tunnel was easy. The only mitigation measure was the posting of signs (Mason, 1982). Effective enforcement of regulations by the provincial Conservation Officer Service was not possible as the office was understaffed and underfunded. Additionally, the Conservation Officer responsible for the area was not stationed in 113 Revelstoke but further south in Nakusp (Krause, 1988). Fines imposed ($5.00) on poachers were no deterrent (Gabrowski, 1988). Another matter of concern was the relocation of Highway 23 North (#11). The wildlife biologist recommended mitigation measures to avoid habitat destruction and wildlife conflicts (Bonar, 1978), but there is no information on the specifics of the mitigation measures nor their results. High concentrations of suspended sediments were observed in tributaries and the contractors were made aware of the impacts on fish (Mason, 1982). The diversion of Deadman Creek (#12) was a construction activity that had not been included in the EIS. Deadman Creek drains a narrow mountain valley west of the Columbia River. As the creek's lower reach crossed the site of the proposed earthfill dam, it was to be dammed and then diverted into an existing dry creek bed and an excavated channel, lined with rock riprap, to discharge into the reservoir north of the earthfill dam. However, the original plans were changed to allow the use of a borrow area for construction material for the earthfill dam. The lower part of the diversion channel was rerouted to lead into an existing swamp and from there without a creek bed (67 m) to its confluence with the Columbia River. The diversion channel was lined with riprap to within 300 meters of the swamp. In March 1978 (exact date not given) a very rapid snowmelt and high runoff led to a massive erosion of unstable alluvial deposits alongside the unprotected section of the diversion channel. About four million cubic yards of eroded material (85% gravel and coarse sands) entered the Columbia River and was deposited about 2-3 km south of the confluence of Deadman Creek. The remainder, fine material (<78 microns), was suspended in the Columbia River as far downstream as the Upper Arrow Lake. Following the erosion, Deadman Creek below the diversion dam was diverted first through a rock-lined channel and then through culverts to the proposed 114 reservoir. More remedial work was scheduled for 1983, but another large washout in July 1983 cut these plans short and deposited a large fan of rock and gravel in the Columbia River. Emergency measures controlled the flow from the top of the diversion dam and prevented even further erosion along the creek below this dam (Teleki, 1978). In view of this second severe washout it was necessary to again revise the plans for the diversion dam and the permanent diversion channel. A study monitoring the effects of the first massive erosion on the biological aquatic system of the Columbia River was undertaken by the fisheries site biologist from March 23 to June 11, 1978 (Teleki, 1978). It is not clear how soon after the washout impact monitoring was initiated.2 The analysis of the impacts was based on water quality data, visual inspection of river pools and an examination of historical records to establish whether or not the aquatic system had experienced similar conditions in the past. The results of the sampling of shoreline bottom dwellers could not be used as they were "very poor and unreliable" due to synergistic effects of fluctuating water levels. Fish sampling was unsuccessful as no fish were caught. Teleki (1978), upon evaluating historical stream and fish-related data, concluded that the conditions for fish caused by this event were not unusual to the Columbia River prior to the operation of the Mica Dam in mid-1973. Data from the federal Department of Environment (from 1966 to mid-1973) showed that total suspended solids usually peaked in late April or early May (maximum 295 mg/1 in 1972), but the Deadman Creek washout occurred earlier in the year (sometime before March 23) and with somewhat higher total suspended solids (320 mg/1). In summary, Teleki (1978) reported that (1) physical impacts were a temporary increase in total suspended solids, a short-term deposition of fine materials on the near-shore river bottom, and a slight filling-in of river 115 pools (utilized by fish) for about 10 km downstream of Deadman Creek; (2) based on the literature, total suspended solids were too low to cause "abnormal behavioral responses ... to adult salraonids migrating in the river at the time"; (3) the populations of aquatic insects and near-shore bottom dwellers showed no ill-effects; but (4) young kokanee, on their seasonal migration downriver suffered an undetermined increase in mortality rate due to a change from normal river conditions of low flow and low total suspended solids; Teleki concluded that the impact "on the total kokanee population is unknown but probably not dangerously high" (Teleki, 1978). Three major concerns arise from the Deadman Creek erosion. The first is the need for the diversion of Deadman Creek was not even mentioned in the EIS. Thus it could not be scrutinized by the public, nor assessed at the public hearing.3 The second concern is that the rerouting of the diversion channel was not evaluated for its environmental impacts. It appears that the site biologists were not consulted. Third, the two washouts could have been prevented with better initial planning on the part of B.C. Hydro. The Water Comptroller (1978) stated that B.C. Hydro's engineers were responsible for having scheduled the work improperly to coincide with adverse weather conditions to be expected at that time of year. Indeed one has to ask, if the geological and hydrological conditions of the location had been evaluated adequately and if project design had been properly adapted to site conditions. A concerned citizen in a submission to the RPCC^ claimed that the potential for such an event was already evident in the fall of 1977, that mitigative measures could have been taken, and ended by calling the matter a "very serious engineering misjudgment ... by . . . B.C. Hydro" (Caywood, 1978). This opinion is confirmed by the site wildlife biologist, who warned in October 1977, that the diversion channel presented a potential erosion problem and wrote a report detailing the hazard (B.C. Hydro 1977-1984). The 116 financial costs of this engineering mistake must have been significant. Another problem with erosion resulted from the construction of the 230 kV transmission line connecting the Revelstoke Project to the Illecillewaet Substation just south of Revelstoke (#13). According to the EIS the transmission line was to be 10.5 km long and required a cleared right-of-way about 168 m wide (B.C. Hydro, 1976b, Chapters 18, 19). As the power line was to cross Dolan Creek, the water supply for the community of Big Eddy, the EIS emphasized that special care be taken during construction and maintenance to prevent siltation of the creek. Initially in 1976, strong concerns were voiced by the Big Eddy Waterworks District (Big Eddy) and the Ministry of Health. The latter barred B.C. Hydro from entering the Dolan Creek watershed until Big Eddy could be assured of a safe water supply. An engineering consultant firm to Big Eddy, who designed and installed the alternate water system ordered by the Water Comptroller,5 insisted that environmental guidelines be followed for the construction of the transmission line. Environmental guidelines were developed specifically for the Dolan Creek watershed work and approved by the Water Comptroller in the summer of 1980. Logging for the transmission line right-of-way started in December 1980. A field inspection by a member of each of the Nelson Water Management Branch, the Ministry of Forests and Big Eddy revealed that several construction practices contravened the environmental guidelines and that the potential for erosion, and, in turn, the siltation of Dolan Creek, existed. When transmission line clearing was complete another field inspection on 25 February 1981, confirmed that siltation problems arose from the access road on the south slope of Dolan Creek. Erosion resulted from inadequate road crossings of a number of intermittent streams and log handling facilities too close to intermittent streams and Dolan Creek. 117 Although a bridge across Dolan Creek had not been planned, the logging contractor had constructed a temporary one to gain access to the north side of the creek. This caused dirt and debris from the disturbed creek banks to form a constriction of the creek channel. The erosion potential from the clearing of the north slope was not severe. In order to reduce the erosion potential the Regional Manager of the Water Management Branch in Nelson called for prompt remedial work, such as provisions for proper road drainage, revegetation of slopes and disturbed areas, removal of the blockage of intermittent streams and the Dolan Creek bridge and debris. Whereas some remedial work seems to have been carried out, much was not yet done two and a half years later. In August 1983, the appeal decision determining the final compensation by B.C. Hydro to Big Eddy (see Section 3.2.2.1) recommended that the remedial work was to be expedited by the responsible parties and annual inspections of the watershed were to determine any environmental disturbance or damage. By December of that year, remedial work funded ($50,000) and directed by B.C. Hydro was completed and a fence across the transmission line, barring public access, had been erected. It could not be established when Big Eddy started using the Dolan Creek water supply again. Of int erest is that the B.C. Forest Service did not seem to be aware of the environmental guidelines for the Dolan Creek watershed (Gorsline, 1987). The timber sales licence authorizing the logging of the transmission line right-of-way did not mention the environmental guidelines for the transmission line construction of the Dolan Creek watershed. Neither was the contractor aware of the provisions and regulations of the Water Act, as required in the Environmental Guidelines (B.C. Hydro, 1977) and that the transmission tower on the north side of Dolan Creek was to be set by helicopter to prevent damage to Dolan Creek, and that a bridge was therefore not needed. Although there 118 seems to have been a definite problem of communication, the responsibility for adhering to water licence clause (r) was B.C. Hydro's. The foregoing documentation leads to several major conclusions. It has clearly demonstrated one of the shortcomings of the water licence: that no provision was made for a compliance monitoring program or for a program to monitor environmental impacts arising from construction activities. At the least, the licence should have given directives as to who was to monitor compliance with the environmental guidelines (clause (r)). Instead, the Water Comptroller approved the environmental guidelines prepared by the proponent, which assigned this task to B.C. Hydro's Construction Manager, thus ignoring the role that the site biologists might have played. Furthermore, the RPCC, which was to have administered clause (r), appears to have neither monitored B.C. Hydro's adherence to the guidelines nor updated them as stipulated by the Water Comptroller. It is questionable how effective the latter could have been, because of the rigidities imposed by having to work within the specifics of a construction contract. One can also draw the conclusion that the implementation of environmental guidelines and the monitoring of compliance with them should be carried out by environmental professionals. This is especially important when the guidelines are as nonspecific and call for as many environmental decisions as did the Revelstoke ones. Notwithstanding the assertion in the guidelines that the site biologists would be consulted in environmental decisions, In the case of the Deadman Creek diversion and the locating of the batch plant settling pond this was not done. The employment of such professionals in this capacity would also have led to a more responsive approach to both environmental emergency and non-emergency situations. That adherence to the environmental and the reservoir and transmission line clearance guidelines was not strictly enforced is illustrated by the 119 illegal disposal of garbage and the impacts of clearing in the reservoir and Dolan Creek watershed, respectively. The latter example also underlines the importance of B.C. Hydro developing a list of relevant provincial Acts and statutory requirements for contractors. The analysis has indicated that surveillance and enforcement by government agencies was not adequate as a result of a shortage of funds and staff to deal with such a large project as Revelstoke and the somewhat lax attitude shown by some agencies. Opinions about the adequacy of environmental surveillance and enforcement varied between agencies. The FWB noted that, once approval for such a project was given, environmental monitoring and mitigation took on a low priority. One of the site biologists thought, that the Waste Management Branch performance was less than satisfactory (Mason, 1982). The cooperation of B.C. Hydro and other permit holders was assessed as sufficient by the Waste Management Branch, who appeared relieved because no major spill of fuel or chemical or a massive failure of the batch plant settling pond had occurred. They concluded that the overall environmental impact of the Project was minimal relative to the Project's magnitude (Waste Management Branch, 1988). In summary it can be said, that the provisions for the monitoring of compliance with the environmental guidelines and of construction activities for the Revelstoke Project provided for by the water licence and B.C. Hydro were inadequate, as was enforcement by government agencies. The preservation of environmental quality during construction appears to have been relegated to a minor role. That no major accident or long terra effects had occurred was more a matter of good fortune than effective environmental management. 120 NOTES 1 A check of the contract for the earthfill dam, awarded in November 1978, revealed that the environmental protection clauses were the same as those in the environmental guidelines 2 A large slide at the intake of the diversion tunnel had occurred on March 10, 1978 and one cannot help but wonder if the Deadman Creek erosion took place at the same time. 3 An application for the diversion had been filed with the Water Rights Branch shortly before the hearing. However, it was not acted upon; the work was included in the plans for the Revelstoke Project which were approved by the Water Comptroller subsequent to the Issuance of the water licence. ^ The RPCC meetings were closed to the public. The Environmental Guidelines (B.C. Hydro, 1977a, p. 8) exempted B.C. Hydro from building mitigative measures "to prevent muddy waters and eroded materials from entering rivers, streams or water courses or damaging permanent installations" during the construction of the Deadman Creek diversion. ^ Big Eddy's Dolan Creek water system was too small to provide adequate fire protection to the community and to accommodate the expected influx of B.C. Hydro workers. B.C. Hydro provided a chlorinator for the Dolan Creek water supply as well as an alternate water system consisting of two wells and a reservoir. The cost to B.C. Hydro was approximately $1.1 million. 121 CHAPTER 5 ENVIRONMENTAL PREDICTIONS AND OUTCOMES The complexity of ecological systems has limited our knowledge of a system's reaction to change whether induced by natural events or human actions. Increasing public concern over unexpected and often far-reaching environmental impacts of large scale development projects and programs led to the introduction of an impact assessment tool—the environmental impact statement (EIS). Since the beginning of the 1970s, the EIS has been used for predicting the potential impacts of proposed development projects and the state of the changed "post-project" ecological system. Early EISs followed a "catalogue" approach. They described all components of the "pre-project" system and predicted all possible impacts. However, Rolling (1978, p. 35) states that rather than measuring everything, EIS has to provide an understanding of the structure and dynamics of the ecological system. Certain key parameters are observed and a system's response to stress and its thresholds determined. Though the EIS stops with the prediction of impacts, environmental impact assessment should continue throughout project implementation. The monitoring of the key parameters during project implementation documents the project's effect on the environment and allows a comparison of predicted and actual impacts (post- development environmental analysis). The latter not only establishes the effectiveness of the EIS in predicting impacts, but also serves to improve that of future EISs. In the mid-1970s, when B.C. Hydro undertook the environmental impact assessment of the Revelstoke Project, the catalogue approach to EIS still prevailed. Additionally, impact monitoring during project construction did not follow a well planned monitoring program that concentrated on key variables. Post-development environmental analyses were practically unheard of at that time. 122 It is the purpose of this chapter to undertake such an analysis for the Revelstoke Project. The focus is first on the aquatic environment and fish resource then on the terrestrial environment and wildlife resource and finally on the atmospheric environment. 5.1 THE AQUATIC ENVIRONMENT AND FISH RESOURCE The conversion of a river to a reservoir has far-reaching environmental effects as impoundment destroys the riverine ecosystem and initiates the development of a new, lake-like aquatic ecosystem. Unlike lakes, reservoirs have controlled inflows and outflows which not only affect the developing ecosystem in the reservoir, but in turn also introduce marked changes in the riverine environment downstream of the dam. The newly created environment of the reservoir goes through an aging process, often extending over several decades, before the ecosystem reaches a mature stage. The common changes of this development sequence have been documented and combined into a "reservoir paradigm" (Rzoska, 1966), however, site-specific factors must not be ignored in predicting impacts for a specific development.! This section presents a comparison of the impacts predicted by the B.C. Hydro EIS (1976b) and the actual impacts on the Revelstoke Reservoir and downstream environment. A summary of the results of this post-development analysis is shown in Table 5.1, part A shows the impacts on the physical limnological system and part B those on the chemical and biological systems. The impacts are further subdivided as to their occurrence in the reservoir or downstream of the dam. 5.1.1. PHYSICAL LIMNOLOGICAL SYSTEM The physical limnology of reservoirs is distinct from that of natural lakes. Reservoirs have been called "half lakes" because their longitudinal Table 5.1 Comparison of Predicted and Actual Impacts on the Aquatic Environment and Fish Resource PARAMETER PREDICTED IMPACT ACTUAL IMPACT/VERIFICATION COMMENT A. PHYSICAL LIMNOLOGICAL SYSTEM RESERVOIR: erosion F, wave action and fluctuating water level some erosion/partially correct monitored, but records not examined; slough i ng to cause erosion of silty, sandy should be minimal due to paucity of material during first few years erodable material 2 potential Increase by factor of 3.6 not monitored/not verifiable considered negligible In relation to mean evaporat ion annual flow at the dam differences In density may Induce not monitored/probably correct likely occurring as inflow from Klnbasket 3 density dens Ity currents Lake Is probably interflow below epilimnion mean velocities are likely to be ex• not monitored/not correct flushing rate appears to be about U flow tremely small, normal maximum flood 12 times per year conditions Increased by factor of approx. 5 times; reservoir flushing rate 5 times per year DOWNSTREAM OF DAM: 5 erosion Increased due to higher sediment carry• not monitored/not verifiable ing capacity of water released from dam 6 water turbidity increased photosynthet ic act i vl ty due not monitored/not verifiable photosynthetIc activity is also dependent to decreased turbidity on available nutrients 7a water temperature possible decrease in summer and In mixing of hypolimnetlc and epi- crease in wl nter as power d i scharges limnetlc water occurs/not correct are a imos t certa i n I y hypolimnetlc 7b tailwater temperature Increase by surface reservoir water discharged magnitude of impact depends on magnitude spillway releases in summer markedly warmer In summer/correct & frequency of spillway releases 8 flow regime neglible /not verifiable 'negligible' not defined; also time periods of flow not specified - diurnal 6 seasonal variations may differ markedly from natural river flow regime 9 inflow to Upper likely to be affected over 3 months during 17 days no water released much shorter than predicted, long interruption would Arrow Lake during reservoir filling from dam/not correct have been too detrimental to downstream ecosystem B. CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS RESERVOIR: retention time of water in reservoir is shorter than 10 dissolved oxygen expected to be high due to short re• levels at or close to saturation/ predicted; reservoir was cleared of organic material tention time 6 little organic matter correct sllqht upsurge for 2.5 years little orqanic material left, nutrients leached from 11 nutrients upsurge first few years /partlally correct soil; no corresponding upsurge in activity occurred ultra-oligotronhlc/needs long ho 12 trophic level oligotrophic term ver i fI cat Ion Table 5.1 Cont inued PARAMETER PREDICTED IMPACT ACTUAL IMPACT/VERIFICATION COMMENT 13a fish habitat Columbia River (7000 acres) lost to river habitat changed to lake-like river fish habltat/correct 13b .lower reaches of tributaries lost habitat loss underestimated by 5$/ prediction Included compensatory habitat (21) acres) not correct development which was not undertaken |l)a fi sh d I s tr I but Ion resident fish in Columbia River E not monitored/not verifiable fished appeared to have stayed In reservoir tributaries below 573 m lost lltb considerable numbers of fry R finger- no definite data available/ blockage by diversion tunnel and dam lings lost between river diversion correct S reservoi r fi11ing 15a fish composition expected to support same species /correct lo date but needs long term ver i fIcatIon 15b decrease in Dolly Varden (rainbow increase relative to decrease in mountain whitefish decreased from 963; to 81$ trout could lead to increase in mountain whItefish/needs long term of total fish population Columbia sguawfish ver i f icat ion 16a fish production Increase during first 5-10 years did not take place/not correct upsurge In nutrients did not take place 16b sustained yield will drop to lower /needs long term verification levels; fishery will be qualita• tively different DOWNSTREAM OF QAM: 17 nitrogen nitrogen supersaturatI on due to spill• minimal fish losses/not verifiable cannot be verified because prediction was based on way discharge could lead to signifi• specific spillway design which was changed cant fish losses 18 dissolved oxygen may be affected with temperature not monitored/prediction too appears most unlikely as reservoir water is at changes of water discharged from dam vague, excluded from study saturation level 19 fish habitat Columbia River S Its tributaries /correct blocked by dam lost to migrating fish from Arrow Lakes; no recrultement from up• stream populations 20 fish composition to remain unchanged, upstream losses /needs long term verification of migrating fish (Dolly Varden, ko- kanee, rainbow trout) could result In increase of other fish species 21a fish production - estimated losses: 20-30$ kokanee, /cannot be verified due to lack no estimates possible for mountain whitefish, rain• |l|l(0 Dol ly Varden of data bow trout (especially trophy species), 6whlte sturgeon 21b - significant losses of Arrow Lake /needs long term verification Dolly Varden, kokanee, rainbow trout; quality of fishery (particularly rainbow trout) probably endangered Sources: Fleming, 1988; B.C. Hydro, 1976b; Smith, 1986, 1987, 1988; Watson, I985 125 profiles are different, being deeper at the outflow than in the middle. Often their shape is elongated rather than round. Shoreline stabilization following impoundment takes place at a rate determined by the erodibility of the new banks and the formation of new tributary deltas at higher elevations as well as on the fluctuating water levels caused by the operation of the reservoir. Circulation in reservoirs is more strongly influenced by inflows and outflows than are natural lakes. Consequently there is often a greater activity of circulatory mechanisms such as density, backward and vertical currents (Baxter, 1977; Baxter and Claude, 1980). Downstream effects arise from the quality, volume, discharge rate, and timing of the outflows from the dam. These effects are often the reverse of those in the dam, because the reservoir acts as a heat, nutrient, and sediment sink. The clear outflow water has a greater sediment carrying capacity and thus can lead to increased erosion. Natural temperature and flow regimes are changed as water is usually discharged from a considerable depth or from the reservoir surface via the spillway and the rate of discharge is determined by electricity demands and flood control requirements. The Revelstoke Reservoir serves predominantly for the generation of electricity. However, the source of two-thirds of its inflow, the Mica Reservoir, is used for flood control and this inflow determines some of the properties of the Revelstoke Reservoir. 5.1.1.1 Reservoir The EIS predicted four impacts on the reservoir environment (Table 5.1 #1-4). Firstly, wave action and continuously fluctuating water levels were expected to result in erosion of sandy and silty materials and sloughing of banks, especially in the Downie Creek area, during the first few years following inundation (#1). Although bank erosion was monitored weekly during the first year of impoundment and annually thereafter, time constraints of 126 this study did not permit an examination of these records. However, a consultant to B.C. Hydro reports that some sloughing has occurred in the Downie Creek area, but is partially caused by the creek itself. He also noted that erosion of reservoir banks should be minimal due to the paucity of erodible material (Fleming, 1988). Secondly, it was predicted that the total potential evaporation would increase by a factor of 3.6 (from 16,500 to 59,000 acre-feet per year) because the water surface area was to increase from the 7000 acres of the Columbia River to some 28,500 acres of the reservoir (#2). This impact was considered to be negligible in relation to the mean annual flow at the dam (21.9 million acre-feet); it was not monitored. Thirdly, the prediction, that differences In density of inflowing water from the Mica Reservoir (Kinbasket Lake) could induce density currents which would be superimposed on the thermal reservoir stratification arising from atmospheric conditions (#3), is thought likely to be true by B.C. Hydro's fisheries biologist (Smith, 1988). Inflow from Kinbasket Lake probably passes through the reservoir as an interflow current below the surface water layer (epilimnion). Lastly, the EIS expected mean velocities to be extremely small except at the upper end of the reservoir (about 2 ft/s) and to increase by a factor of about five under normal maximum flood conditions (#4). This parameter was not monitored, but it can be inferred that the prediction is incorrect. Whereas the EIS foresaw a reservoir flushing rate of five times per year, the actual rate appears to be twelve times that (Fleming, 1988) and thus velocities would be considerably faster than predicted. 127 5.1.1.2 Downstream of the Dam The physical character of the downstream environment was predicted to be affected in five ways (Table 5.1, #5-8). In relation to the natural flow of the Columbia River, the outflow from the reservoir was expected to have a higher sediment carrying capacity which possibly could increase erosion (#5). Downstream erosion was not monitored. Whereas this impact is theoretically correct, it has to be assessed in conjunction with the rate of discharge from the dam. If the volume discharge is less than the river carried previously, then it can accommodate the less turbid flow without increasing erosion (Smith, 1988). The decrease in sediment load carried by the water discharge from the dam was expected to result in "local" (not defined) decreased turbidity (#6), this in turn would allow a greater light penetration and hence increase photosynthetic activity. Turbidity was not monitored, but Smith believes that a slight decrease is possible as a third of the reservoir inflow is from tributaries which carry sediments. The inflow from Kinbasket Lake would not carry much sediment as It is deposited in that reservoir (Smith, 1988). The EIS predicted that powerflows might decrease the downstream water temperatures in summer and increase them in winter because water to be discharged from the dam at 30 m would almost certainly be from a lower layer of the thermally stratified water (hypolimnion) (#7a). Water temperatures of this layer were thought to be in the region of 12°C in summer and fall, and at least 5°C less during winter and spring. Monitoring of water temperatures revealed that a weak thermocline develops in the reservoir outflow (forebay) in late summer. Mixing of the hypolimnetlc and the upper warmer water occurs in the forebay. Outflow temperatures ranged from 5.5°C in May and June to 15°C in July in 1984 (Smith, 1987).2 No data was available for fall and winter temperatures. 128 On the other hand, spillway flow was expected to raise temperatures of the receiving water directly below the dam (tailwater) in summer (#7b). The marked warming of the surface reservoir water reported in summer (maximum 19°G in July) would render this prediction correct. However, spillway use was anticipated to occur only once every ten years under extreme flood conditions. To date the spillway has been used twice during reservoir filling and for a test run (Smith, 1988; Mahovich, 1988). A "negligible" effect on the downstream flow regime was predicted (#8). The Revelstoke Dam was to be operated for power generation mainly and for flood control only if that provided by Mica Dam was inadequate. However, the prediction cannot be verified as neither "negligible" was defined nor were the time periods of flow specified. When assessing flow regime one has to take into account the variations in specific time periods. Depending on energy demand, it seems possible that both the diurnal and the seasonal flow regimes could be changed. It was the intention to stop flow releases from the dam for three months during reservoir filling. Following the initial four to six weeks, this was predicted to likely affect the inflow into Upper Arrow Lake (#9). However, in response to the strong objections of the Fish and Wildlife Branch (FWB), who anticipated extensive damage to the aquatic ecosystem downstream of the dam the "no-flow" time was cut to 17 days. 5.1.2 CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS These two systems have been grouped together as their complex interactions make it hard to separate them (Langford, 1983). The initial development stage of both systems is largely determined by the amount of organic material and soils flooded and the conditions that govern their decomposition. Little organic matter and a short retention time would result 129 in a smaller release of nutrients. During the first few years following impoundment a nutrient (trophic) upsurge takes place as nutrients are released by the decomposition of flooded organic material and inorganic substances are leached from the soil. This can lead to deoxygenation of the reservoir water. With the depletion of the organic material and available nutrients the reservoir goes through a trophic depression that can extend up to twenty-five years. In the final stage of the aging process, nutrient levels slowly increase until the reservoir reaches a stable level. Stability results from either the equilibration of the mineralization process or form the sealing of the degradation layer by sediment deposits. The biological activity varies with the fluctuating trophic levels. The initial increase of available nutrients results in increased primary production (phytoplankton, littoral algae) and secondary production (fish). Oxygen depletion (anaerobic conditions) in the hypolimnion can displace or kill bottom dwellers (benthos). The flooding of previously dry ground can lead to the release of toxic substances, such as mercury, which through bioaccumulation, can reach high levels of concentration in fish. Biological production decreases during the trophic depression and eventually stabilizes with the nutrient levels of the mature reservoir. Changes in fish composition often occur over the long term. Downstream of the dam there may be increased primary production due to the higher transparency of the less turbid water and from the leached nutrients in the reservoir outflow. The productivity will also vary with changes of the temperature regime imposed by the water discharges. Nitrogen supersaturation of power flow and especially spillway flow can lead to fish losses due to gas bubble disease (similar to bends in divers). Of course one of the most serious impacts is the dam's blockage of fish movement. Significant to the aging process of the Revelstoke reservoir is that the 130 vegetative cover from the reservoir area was almost completely removed and much of the small amount of remaining organic material was mobilized during impoundment and removed as floating debris. Also it is still too early to verify some of the impacts predicted by the EIS, as the reservoir is still young. 5.1.2.1 Reservoir The EIS predicted that dissolved oxygen levels in the reservoir were to be high due to the short retention time of each of the alternate reservoir systems and the virtual absence of organic waste discharge into the reservoir (#10). The scant amount of organic matter in the reservoir and the shorter than predicted retention time of the water in the reservoir led to dissolved oxygen levels that were at or close to saturation throughout the water column, even in the hypolimnion of the forebay (Smith, 1987). In the first few years following impoundment a nutrient upsurge was to occur (#1). The trophic level was to be small (oligotrophic) and support a moderate number of fish (#12). A slight trophic upsurge did take place, but arose mainly from the leaching of nutrients from the flooded soils. To date the reservoir has been found to be ultra-oligotrophic (Watson, 1985; Smith, 1988). Fish are still "healthy", but it is too early to predict the long term outcome, which is not only dependent on reservoir productivity (Smith, 1988). Of course all of the 7000 acres of mainstem Columbia River was lost as habitat for river fish because it was inundated (#13a). However, the net loss of the lower reaches of the tributaries (24 acres, or 17% of the total tributary habitat)3 was underestimated by 5% as the prediction included compensatory habitat development which was not realized (#13b). The fish population was affected already by the diversion of the Columbia River through the tunnel. Considerable numbers of fry and fingerlings were expected to be 131 lost to the upstream system between the time of diversion and reservoir filling (//14b). No data are available other than that upstream migration was definitely blocked by the tunnel. With reservoir filling, it was anticipated that most of the resident fish in the mainstem Columbia River and the tributary reaches below 573 m would be lost (#14a). Resident fish would be displaced to tributary habitats, which would not be able to support this influx, especially that of the large fish from the River mainstem. Again there were no data, but Smith (1988) notes that fish appeared to have stayed in the reservoir and were not lost. On the basis of the experience with the Arrow Lakes reservoirs, the Revelstoke reservoir was predicted to be able to support the same species of fish as the Columbia River did prior to impoundment (#15a). However, a decrease in the abundance of Dolly Varden and rainbow trout could result in an increase in Columbia squawfish (#15b). Monitoring of fish populations from the start of the diversion tunnel construction (November 1978) to reservoir filling (October 1983) showed no change in resident fish: mountain whitefish 96%, and rainbow trout, Dolly Varden and 14 other species accounted for the other 4%. Species composition was slightly different during the first year after reservoir filling. Mountain whitefish had decreased to 81% of the total population; rainbow trout and Dolly Varden showed a relative increase and other species (longnose and large-scale suckers, burbot, and peamouth) made up 4.5%. Kokanees were not captured by gillnett in 1985 (Smith, 1986), but the 1987 creel study and fish derby result (now being analyzed by B.C. Hydro) show that kokanee are present in the reservoir (Smith, 1988). The age of the fish indicate that they were generally pre-impoundment populations (Smith, 1986). Notwithstanding the fact that the reservoir to date has supported the same species of fish and that the change in percentage composition of the species is different from the one predicted, no definite conclusion can be drawn about 132 the long term outlook, of these two factors. In response to the higher overall productivity resulting from the expected nutrient upsurge, the fish populations were anticipated to increase over the first few years (5-10) after construction (#16a). But following this initial burst of fish production, the sustained yields were expected to drop to lower levels over the long term: maximum 10,000 to 15,000 pounds of fish, but could be as low as 3,600 pounds and even this might not be sustainable. Furthermore, the fishery was to be qualitatively different (//16b). Although there was a slight upsurge of nutrients for two and a half years, overall productivity did not increase, thus ruling out an increase in fish production. In the long run, reservoir productivity in general was predicted to be higher than in the Columbia River, but at best only low to moderate. The limiting factors are the low nutrient content, the relatively cold waters, the relatively high flushing rate, and paucity of littoral development. The sustained yield has to be verified in the long term. 5.1.2.2 Downstream of the Dam Despite the flipbucket design of the spillway which was to lower nitrogen supersaturation, the EIS predicted that fish losses due to gas bubble disease could be caused by spillway discharges (#17). This parameter was monitored and Watson (1985) reported that it did not exceed 115% (>115% harmful to fish), but was observed as far as 10 km downstream of the dam. At a later date, however, it reached 120% once and adverse effects were observed in less than a dozen fish (Smith, 1988). The spillway flipbucket design was changed and the plunge pool was deepened considerably to prevent possible erosion downstream at a park and the Revelstoke golf course which border the Columbia River. These design changes were undertaken without consultation of the site biologists. While nitrogen supersaturation and minimal fish losses have been 133 observed, this prediction cannot be verified because of the project design changes Although the EIS mentioned that downstream dissolved oxygen levels can be affected according to temperature variations of water being discharged from the dam (#18), this prediction was excluded. It appears more like a general observation and does not give the effect on the system.^ Furthermore, Smith (1988) observes that deoxygenation due to increased water temperatures from dam discharges appears most unlikely as the reservoir waters are at the oxygen saturation level. Spawning habitats upstream of the dam were to be lost to migratory fish (Dolly Varden, rainbow trout, kokanee, mountain whitefish, possibly white sturgeon) from the Arrow Lakes with the use of the diversion tunnel and any possible recruitment from upstream populations to the Arrow Lakes would stop with reservoir filling (#19). The fish species composition (percentage) of Arrow Lakes was expected to remain the same, but upstream losses of migrating fish (Dolly Varden, kokanee, rainbow trout) could lead to increases of other fish species (presumably those already present) (#20). To date the evidence is inconclusive and long term monitoring is necessary. Initial fish losses were estimated for kokanee as 20-30%, and for Dolly Varden as 1440 fish (percentage loss not given) (#21a). Kokanee losses were significant because 20% of their spawning habitat had been lost with the creation of the Arrow Lakes reservoir. In the long term, some changes in Arrow Lakes productivity were anticipated due to changes in the temperature of water release from the Revelstoke Dam. Significant losses to the Arrow Lakes Fishery for Dolly Varden, rainbow trout and kokanee were expected and the quality of the fishery, particularly for trophy fish, was thought to be endangered (#21b). Changes in the productivity and quality of the fisheries need to be evaluated over the long term. 134 5.2 THE TERRESTRIAL ENVIRONMENT AND WILDLIFE RESOURCE The EIS assessed the geology, landforms, soils, and slope stability of the reservoir area, but other than for the latter raised no concerns. Although the slope stability of two areas was monitored, they were considered safe and no impacts were anticipated. Initial sloughing and erosion of reservoir banks following impoundment was considered part of the aquatic environment in the EIS (see section 5.1.1.1). However, erosion of the Revelstoke golf course, an unpredicted impact, is evaluated here as a terrestrial impact, though its cause originates in changes to the aquatic environment. The comparison of the predicted impacts on wildlife resources and their outcome forms the main topic of this section, however, it is limited by the paucity of monitoring data. 5.2.1 THE LAND SURFACE The City of Revelstoke filed a claim for mitigation and compensation with the CIC because parts of the city-owned golf course situated on the east bank of the Columbia River downstream of the Revelstoke Dam were eroding (Sussex, 1985). The City's concern was that full operation of the dam, once all four turbines were in service, would increase the rate of erosion. The Rivers Section of the Water Management Branch investigated this claim in the fall of 1984 (Water Management Branch, 1984). The findings confirmed that three sections of the golf course of a total length of 1000 m were eroding at a slow rate. Comparison of 1977 and 1980 air photos showed that no land had been lost during those years. A monitoring program of 2000 m of the river bank was proposed to establish the rate of erosion and the effect of full dam operation. Ameliorative work in the form of broken rock riprap erosion protection was estimated to cost $425,000. This problem and other claims by local government were further assessed 135 in a consultant's study commissioned under the water licence (Sussex, 1985). However, it could not clearly establish whether the erosion was caused by the operation of the Arrow Lake or the Revelstoke Reservoir. The greatest potential for erosion was a low Arrow Lake level and peak power generation at the Revelstoke Dam. In order to clarify the City's claim, the proposed monitoring program should have been implemented, and, if warranted, a hydrological study undertaken to establish the cause of the erosion. The claim was settled by B.C. Hydro and the City in the summer of 1988 without any monitoring having taken place. 5.2.2 THE WILDLIFE RESOURCE The climatic and topographic conditions in the Revelstoke Project Study area are harsh for wildlife and determine both the species and their distribution. Moose, caribou, and grizzly are better able to survive in the area, but deer are limited to the southern part with less inclement weather. As part of the Pacific Flyway, the area is utilized by migratory birds, but also by many resident birds. Despite the long lists cataloguing the many mammals and birds of the study area, the EIS predictions refer only to waterfowl, deer, moose, and caribou. AH predicted impacts are qualitative and extremely vague, because little was known about the species' population size, habitat, habitat utilization, and seasonal movements. Seven very general areas of wildlife resource concerns are outlined in the EIS. One of these, the change of wildlife use pattern, could not be analyzed because of lack of data. Evaluation of the six remaining potential impacts is based on data gathered under an agreement between B.C. Hydro and the FWB. The former monitored the valley species such as deer, beaver, and waterfowl, and the latter upland species such as caribou and grizzly bear. Whereas the FWB's work has been 136 published, B.C. Hydro's remains in the form of field notes which are now being analyzed by the permanent staff of the Corporation. This task is most difficult because the field notes resemble "hieroglyphics" and some of the field research methodologies employed limit the usefulness of the material. The comparison of predicted and actual impacts, summarized in Table 5.2, distinguishes between pre- and post-impoundment data, i.e. actual impacts are those that happened after impoundment. However, the impact arising from illegal garbage disposal relates to the construction period. The impacts are grouped under six main concerns given in the EIS and further subdivided according to species as shown in the table. The wildlife resource was expected to be most severely impacted by the disturbance and removal of habitat in the areas of the reservoir (21,500 acres), the highway right-of-way (about 900 acres), the transmission line and the ancillary facilities. This would force animals to relocate in adjacent areas, where increased animal densities and pressure on food sources would result in animal die-offs in critical times of the year, usually winter (Table 5.2, #1). Whereas the whole study area was affected, some parts, like the highway and transmission line right-of-ways and borrow pits, were altered but vegetation was expected to reestablish itself. Preliminary data (Bonar, 1979) suggest that about 20,000 birds use the wetlands in the reservoir area and the lower reaches of the tributaries as staging areas during their migration along the Pacific Flyway. However, this route had been impacted previously by the Arrow and Mica projects which flooded many known waterfowl staging areas. The impact of the Revelstoke Project cannot be established as the necessary data are lacking. Also no conclusion can be drawn with respect to the effect on the deer population. The deep snow in the northern part of the Project area restricts them to the southern portion. Whereas initially sightings of deer had been Table 5.2 Comparison of Predicted and Actual Impacts on the Wildlife Resource PARAMETER PREDICTED IMPACT -ACTUAL IMPACT/VERIFICATION COMMENT I. disturbance S removal reduced animal numbers a: waterfowl/no data -area Is part of Pacific Region Flyway, previously affected by of habitat Mica and Arrow Lakes Reservoirs b: deer/no data -mainly are in southern area, limiting factor Is snow; appear to Increase due to mild winters in recent years I c: moose/1nconclus Ive' -samolinq procedures limit usefulness of data; long term effect will be manifested following a severe winter d: caribou Inconclusive -1980 to 198^: possible population increase; trend possibly reversed since reservoir filling, needs more data 2. Illegal garbage removal S the des• some removed, some destroyed bears were a probjcm at sites of Illegal garbage disposal in disposal troying of nuisance the reservoir area and at the regional s 3. reservoir surface ungulate drownlnqs; a: deer/no data debrIs could affect caribou b: moose-none reported''/Inaccurate -recorded reservoir crossings: 3, no fatalities populatIon c: .carIbou-none/inaccurate -recorded reservoir crossings: 6 pre- and 8 post-Impoundment to 1985, no fatali ties 'i. barriers to movement: possibly result In - reservoir fatal I ties a: car I bou-none reported/i naccura te -problems due to flooded landmarks did not occur - transmission lines b: carlbou/no data c: waterfowl/no data -largest hazard line from Mica Dam crossing reservoir 5. reservoir drawdown ungulate drownings a: deer-some reported/accurate the impact on ungulates was not closely monitored, some during Ice formation b: moose/some reported/accurate fatalities reported due to ungulates unable to climb out c: car Ibou-none reported of reservoir over ice sheets /Inaccurate -cross In fall £ April when danqer Is much reduced 6. an I ma 1 -vehlcle collisions ungulate fatalities a: deer-some reported/accurate a minimum of ^9 ungulates were killed In 1983/8't to 1986/87 mainly on Highway b: moose-some reported/accurate inclusive; this impact was not closely monitored, highway 23 North c: caribou-some reported/accurate signs warning of hazard have had minimal effect 1. Long term effects may possibly be determined with more data. 2. None reported - does not exclude the possibility that the species were affected. Sources: Bonar, 1978, 1979, 1987; B.C. Hydro, 1977-19814; Bradley, I986, 1987; Gabrowski 1988; Krause, 1988; Mahovich, I988; Simpson, 1987; Simpson e_t a]_, 1987 ; Sommerville, 1987. 138 few (B.C. Hydro, 1976b; Bonar, 1979), they appear to have increase because winters have been mild (Sommerville, 1987; Simpson, 1987). No other data are available. The impact of habitat removal on moose is inconclusive. A preliminary report (Bradley, 1986) estimates the pre- and post- impoundment populations at 163 and 117 (95% confidence limits). But this difference cannot be interpreted as a decline because the field sampling methods allow for a post- impoundment population range of 126 to 362 animals. The effect of the removal of moose winter range (below 914 m) was also assessed. Reservoir impoundment removed all habitat lower than 573 m, thus leading to a density increase from 0.125 moose/km2 to 0.30 moose/km2. In comparison to the density of moose in the Peace River region (0.6 moose/km2) and that in the sub-boreal spruce zone in B.C. (0.4 moose/km2), that in the Revelstoke area (Interior Cedar-Hemlock Zone) is not high. However, this information does not allow a long term prognosis of the moose population. It will be the first severe winter with a deep snow accumulation which will be critical in determining the impact of the Revelstoke Project on the moose papulation (Bradley, 1987). Caribou are the only migratory ungulates in the Revelstoke area. Unlike northern caribou, which migrate north-south, southern caribou are seasonal elevational migrants. Ease of mobility and food availability determine the preferred habitats. Critical habitats of southern caribou were known to be the low elevation old growth forest used for early winter range and the high elevation subalpine forest utilized for late winter range. But according to a consultant to the FWB (Simpson et al., 1987), in the Revelstoke study area, the spring range in the valley bottoms of the Interior Cedar Hemlock Zone is equally as important. Predator avoidance, based on ease of sighting and mobility, rather than food availability, appears to be the prime factor in the choice of spring habitat. 139 Pre-impoundraent the caribou used the reservoir area only in spring. More than 80% of the riparian meadows and cleared habitat within the range of radio-collared caribou was in the reservoir area. Use in the post—impoundment period continued in the few remaining valley bottom meadows in spring, but was mainly confined to the cedar-hemlock forest and Englemann spruce subalpine fir forest. Whereas use of clear-cut areas adjacent to the reservoir was lower than expected by the biologist, that of avalanche paths increased somewhat (Simpson, 1987). Calf survival and census data suggest that the caribou population increased from 1980 to 1984, due to the cleared reservoir area which was secure from predators and offered abundant food (Simpson, 1987). With the flooding of the reservoir in the fall of 1984, the traditionally used riparian meadows and recently available cleared reservoir areas were lost to the caribou. Potentially, this could result in an immediate lowering of the calf survival rate. The March 1985 census suggests that the increasing population trend was reversed in the winter of 1984/1985. More census data is needed to determine whether the caribou population is decreasing, and if so, whether the cause is the loss of spring range in the reservoir area. Grizzly bears, though not included in the EIS predictions, might also be affected by the Project. They used the reservoir area primarily in spring following their emergence from winter dens in April (Simpson, 1987). The location of good feeding sites predominantly determined their movements during this time. The principal feeding habitats were avalanche paths of side drainages of the Columbia River. The food abundance in cleared reservoir areas however was comparable to the naturally disturbed habitats and attracted some grizzlies. While so far the loss of reservoir habitat has not affected the grizzly population, it could if snow-melt were late, forcing the bears to look for 140 areas of earlier spring green-up at lower elevations than the avalanche paths. Following reservoir flooding, grizzlies were observed to shift from the low risk reservoir habitat to the high risk margins of the relocated Highway 23 North and the right-of-way of the transmission line. This made them more vulnerable to hunting and traffic collisions. The increased secrecy and night-time activity of the grizzly bears in this particular habitat partially offsets this danger (Simpson, 1987). Of concern was also the removal or the destruction of bears which were predicted to become a nuisance by frequenting illegal garbage disposal sites (Table 5.2, #2). This issue was discussed at some length in Section 4.2. Whereas nuisance bears were a problem in the reservoir area and at the regional sanitation fill, it could only be established that "some" were removed and "some" were destroyed. The reservoir itself and its operation were predicted to be the cause of ungulate fatalities (Table 5.2, #3-5). The EIS stated that even small amounts of reservoir surface debris present problems to swimming moose, caribou and presumably other ungulates, and accumulation of any significance usually result in drowning (Table 5.2, #3). Critical reservoir crossing sites and times for caribou and moose were identified in the EIS. Duration of the impact was predicted to be relatively short; as little as two years depending on the debris clean-up program. Surface debris was not a big problem because the reservoir had been totally cleared and shoreline debris had been removed, too. Indeed, the reservoir mainstream was navigable within one year of flooding and the five year clean-up program should be complete in 1988 (Mahovich, 1988). Whereas there was no information of deer crossing the reservoir, two moose cows, one accompanied by a young calf, crossed four times without problems (Bradley, 1987). The potential for severely affecting caribou existed. These animals 141 travel in herds and the drowning of one herd could significantly affect the relatively small population of the study area. However, the eight reported crossings by radio-collared caribou were trouble-free (Simpson, 1987). An additional hazard to migrating caribou could have arisen from the obliteration of landmarks by the flooding of the reservoir and the construction of the transmission line. It was anticipated that animals might be confused and abandon their traditional migration routes, and that this possibly could result in fatalities (Table 5.2, #4a, 4b). As noted, the reservoir does not appear to be a barrier to caribou movement but no data are available on the effect of the transmission line. The transmission line also presented a hazard to migrating birds (Table 5.2, #4c), which are known to collide with transmission lines and towers, especially during night migration. Collisions are usually fatal. The greatest potential for collisions is the Mica transmission line, which crosses the reservoir at Downie Creek. The potential impact of the Revelstoke transmission line from the Dam to the substation just south of Revelstoke is not known. It depends on the migration patterns and routs of the birds. The actual impact on the waterfowl could not be assessed due to lack of information. The operation of the reservoir in winter was expected to cause ungulate fatalities due to drowning (Table 5.2, #5). Reservoir drawdowns during periods of ice accumulation result in two dangerous situations: an ice sheet that forms during reservoir drawdown slopes inward into the reservoir, and, when drawdown occurs after ice has formed at the reservoir edge, it is left as a shelf above the water. In both cases ungulates can slide or fall into the reservoir and then have great difficulties in climbing out over the ice. The magnitude of this impact depends largely on the operation of the reservoir and climatic conditions. Since impoundment (October 1983), ice formation has been 142 spotty in all years except 1985/86. The Conservation Officer for the area reports that ungulate fatalities caused by the reservoir ice are not monitored closely (Krause, 1988). In 1983/84 five ungulates drowned (B.C. Hydro, 1977-1984). Whereas Simpson (1987) noted that in the winter of 1984/85 six deer and one moose drowned after falling through the ice, Krause (1988) reports a total of nine deer killed by the ice cover. On the basis of the tracks on the ice many moose, deer and coyotes crossed the ice in February and March of that year. There are no known caribou fatalities resulting from the ice cover. They mainly crossed the reservoir in late fall or April, when the danger of the ice cover is much reduced (Simpson, 1987). The total reported number of ungulate fatalities in the first two winters following impoundment is fifteen, of which nine were identified as deer, and one as moose. No data are available for the past three winters (1985-1988). A correlation with dam operation and climatic conditions was not attempted. The EIS predicted ungulate fatalities from animal-vehicle collisions especially along the relocated Highway 23 North (Table 5.2, #6). Moose could be involved any time of the year, caribou in early spring and late fall, and deer at all times. As with fatalities from reservoir ice, road kills have not been monitored closely (Krause, 1988). For the first year following impoundment there is no other record than that of the site wildlife biologist, who reported winter road kills of five deer and four moose (B.C. Hydro, 1977- 1984). He also notes that highway signs warning drivers of the presence of animals in the most problematic areas, have had minimal effects. The Conservation Officer reports the following known winter road kills: twenty moose in 1984/85; probably more than ten animals in each of 1985/86 and 1986/87; and two caribou since 1985/86 (Krause, 1988). Excluding the two caribou to avoid double counting, a minimum of fourty-nine animals were killed 143 in the four years; many of the fatalities occurred between Carnes Creek and Goldstream River. In the opinion of the Conservation Officers, the loss of valley wintering habitat is forcing ungulates to winter close to the Highway, hence more animals are on the road than prior to reservoir flooding (Krause, 1988; Gabrowski, 1988). Figures for other seasons and for pre-impoundraent years are not available, so one does not know whether all these numbers are significant or not. 5.3 THE ATMOSPHERIC ENVIRONMENT Extensive research on reservoir-induced climatic changes in general has not taken place, because the large scale weather regime is not affected (Bandler, 1986). Climatic impacts are considered to be proportional to reservoir size (Baxter, 1977), localized and site-specific (Bandler, 1986), which makes the choice of control monitoring sites problematic (PADC, 1983). Altogether eight climatic impacts affecting temperature, humidity, and wind regimes of the reservoir and its immediate vicinity were predicted in the EIS. All effects were classified as irreversible, localized, of minor significance, and ambivalent because their end effect (positive or negative) was not clear as they could affect various interests differently. The magnitude of the impacts was likely to be minimal as the surface area of the reservoir is small, especially in relation to the adjacent Kinbasket Lake and Upper Arrow Lake (B.C. Hydro, 1976b). One component of the potential atmospheric impacts of the Revelstoke Reservoir achieved prominence because of a compensation claim filed with the Community Impact Committee. The City of Revelstoke claimed that the Mt. McKenzie ski hill, located south of the City, was adversely affected by the generally warmer temperature caused by the reservoir. The operator, a non• profit society of local citizens, had to relocate the ski lift further uphill 144 at considerable costs. The EIS had predicted that extreme diurnal air temperatures would likely be moderated by raising the minimum daily temperature approximately 0.5°C and decreasing the maximum daily temperature about 0.3 fe, for a total diurnal range decrease of 0.8°C, thus there could be a consequential small increase in the number of frost-free days in the region of the reservoir shore. As temperature effects of the reservoir have not been monitored, instrumental checking of the predictions are not possible. The EIS predicted the decrease of frost-free days to occur only at the shore of the reservoir. The range of the ElS-predicted diurnal temperature range was based on actual temperature changes recorded right at Mica Dam following impoundment of that reservoir. Bandler (1986) quotes an Australian source which states that temperature changes do not extend beyond 1 km of a reservoir. The Mt. McKenzie ski hill is about 9 km south of the Revelstoke Dam and roughly 32 km north of Upper Arrow Lake. According to the limited evidence of the literature examined, the compensation claim appears invalid. 5.4 CONCLUSION It has been well documented that post-development environmental analyses are difficult to carry out, especially for projects which have undergone early environmental impact assessment (EIA) (PADC, 1983; Bissett; 1984). The Revelstoke Project analysis has been no exception. The EIS was found to be very difficult to work with. The large environmental impact matrix and the two long tables summarizing the impacts on the fish and wildlife resources were useless because they were so nonspecific. Instead impacts had to be extracted from the EIS text. Predictions generally were imprecise, qualitative, and not in the form of testable hypotheses. Statements concerning the probability of occurrence, magnitude, temporal, and 145 spatial extent, and the significance of the potential impacts were generally vague, or absent. Ecosystem linkages were often not considered. But problems were also encountered with determining the actual impacts. A few reports were more descriptive than interpretive, while others were specialized and had to be interpreted with the help of professional biologists. The results of the post-development analysis for the aquatic environment and fish resources and for wildlife resources are shown in Table 5.3. Both the impact predictions on the terrestrial environment (golf course erosion) and that on the atmospheric environment (ski hill climate change) are excluded, because a definite link with the Project could not be established. The overall effectiveness of the EIS as a predictive tool was rather low. Only 25.6 (11) of the forty-three impacts were accurately predicted. This figure could be raised to 27.9% by including the one fish habitat prediction (#13b) which was essentially correct, but had to be classified as incorrect because it depended on a compensation measure, which was not carried out. Taking wildlife alone, the rate improves to 35.3%. Probably this results from the vagueness of the predictions—the less specific a prediction the more likely it will appear accurate. It is also interesting, that of the 19.2% (5) predictions found accurate for the aquatic environment and fish resource, four (7b, 13a, 14b, 19) were "no-miss" predictions. 7% (3) of the predictions were verified as partially correct. The EIS did not correctly predict 20.9% (9) of all predictions; the difference between the two categories, aquatic environment and fish resource and wildlife predictions, is unremarkable (4.3%). Verification in the long terra is possible for 18.6% (8) of all predictions, three quarters of which pertain to the aquatic environment and fish resource. Fish composition and sustained yield both up- and downstream of the dam and the trophic level of the reservoir are expected to stabilize as the reservoir ages. The impact of habitat loss on moose will only become Table 5.3 Post-Development Environmental Analysis Results Predictions Aquatic Environment Wildlife Resource Combined & Fish Resource No. % No. % No. % accurate 5 19.2 35.3 11 25.6 partially accurate^ 3 11.4 3 7.0 inaccurate 5 19.2 23.5 9 20.9 verifiable in long term & inconclusive 6 23.1 11.8 8 18.6 not verifiable 7 26.9 29.4 12 27.9 (no data, not monitored, etc.) Total: 26 17 43 1. Includes one prediction "probably correct". 147 apparent following the first severe winter after impoundment. The critical factor for caribou is the loss of spring habitat, the effect of this is still being monitored. For lack of data, verification could not be undertaken for 27.9% (12) of the predictions. The difference between the two categories was not appreciable (2.5%). All in all for 53.5% of all predictions a verification was possible: 25.6% accurate, 7% partially accurate and 20.6% inaccurate. This might be improved in the long terra with more monitoring for 18.9% of the predictions. But for 27.9% verification is not possible. A final observation concerns the reservoir paradigm. Researchers have to be careful to apply it: it must not preclude the possibility of other potential impacts and it must consider site-specific conditions. An example of the latter is furnished by the Revelstoke Project, where the usual trophic upsurge was slight and of short duration, and a response in productivity did not result. This was attributed to the removal of all vegetative matter in the reservoir area. 148 NOTES 1 Though the reservoir paradigm is widely accepted, Hecky et al. (1984) caution that it is applicable only in impoundments of the same type of environment as that of the original paradigm. The difference in just one environmental factor can result in a wrong or missed impact prediction. Marmorek et al. (1986) examined eleven Canadian hydroelectric developments (including Revelstoke) located in diverse environmental settings. From the results of these post-development analyses they derived a set of "generic impact hypotheses and diagrams". These hypotheses, in combination with some further recommendations, are to make EIS predictions more accurate and testable for future development. Duchnisky (1987) used the reservoir paradigm to evaluate the EIS predictions for the proposed Site C dam in B.C. He gives a detailed description of the paradigm. Marmorek et al. (1986) report this prediction as correct. They state that the "Revelstoke reservoir is acting as a heat trap and discharged water is above historical mean values in winter and below them in summer (based on Watson, 1985)." The discharge is not entirely from the hypolimnion, but rather mixed with upper, warmer waters in summer. Temperature data reported by Smith (1987) make this prediction incorrect. Another problem is the basis of the prediction: was it Columbia River water pre-Mica or post? The EIS does not specify this. Mason (1982) reports post-Mica Dam water temperatures for the Columbia River at Revelstoke as: summer maximum 9-12° C, winter temperatures Q-3CC. These temperatures are caused by the hypolimnetic discharges from the Mica Dam, thus raising the temperature in winter and lowering it in summer as compared to the pre-Mica Columbia River temperature regime. Discharge from Mica Dam is generally below 4*C in winter (Smith, 1988). 3 Note Marmorek et al. (1986) give;, a figure of 77%, but the EIS does state 17%. Clark et al. (1985) exclude EIS predictions that are based on mitigation measures. However, the enhancement or creation of new fish habitat is a compensation measure. As such it should not have been included in the EIS prediction. ^ Clark et al. (1985) altogether exclude EIS predictions based on mitigation measures from the post-development analysis. This is correct as it is impossible to know what value the parameter would have without the mitigative measure. However, in the case of nitrogen supersaturation a standard exists (115%) against which to evaluate the impact on the aquatic system. Therefore, nitrogen supersaturation is evaluated. 5 Clark et al. (1985, p. 527) define an impact prediction as "a probabilistic statement concerning a change or changes in environmental parameter or parameters arising from a project action (also, no 'change')." It is not sufficient to state the concentration of a pollutant, but one must go further and either give the ambient concentration or predict the effect on the system. 149 CHAPTER 6 THE CURRENT ENERGY PROJECT REVIEW PROCESS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA In the decade 1964-1974, two large scale power dams (Peace River 1 and Mica) and two storage dams (Keenleyside and Duncan) were licensed and built following the procedures identified in the Water Act (1960) and, in the case of those on the Columbia River system, within the framework of the Columbia River Treaty with the U.S.A. The experience of this period of large scale energy projects coupled with broader social forces led to widespread public concern about their economic and environmental impacts. Consequently as early as 1971, the B.C. government started to introduce legislation and identify and mitigate their environmental impact and provide for public information about or participation in the licensing and operation of such projects (see Table 2.1). Even though the ELUC Act (1971) and the B.C. Energy Act (1973) were in place before B.C. Hydro applied for a licence to build the Revelstoke Dam, the governments of the day were pre-occupied with the Northeast Coal Project and the construction of a large scale electrical transmission system. The Revelstoke Project was therefore permitted to procede under the procedures of the Water Act of 1960. This study has demonstrated that the provisions of this Act were inadequate to deal with the changed value system of the public and the very real complexities of such projects as the Revelstoke Dam. In reaction to the Revelstoke experience and with the prospect of large scale energy projects (both hydrocarbon and electrical) in the 1980's the government introduced the B.C. Utilities Commission Act (1980) which provided greatly changed procedures for the selection and licensing of "regulated" energy projects. This chapter reviews the components of this Act and their application to B.C. Hydro's Site "C" proposal, as a preliminary to the concluding chapter which assesses the extent to which the current system overcomes the shortcomings of the process used for the Revelstoke Dam. 150 6.1 THE ENERGY PROJECT REVIEW PROCESS The contentious nature of the selection and licensing of large scale energy projects, such as the Seven-Mile (1973-1975) and Revelstoke Dams and the Cheekeye-Dunsmuir Transmission Line to Vancouver Island (1978) in the 1970s, was instrumental in prompting the government to introduce the Energy Project Review Process (EPRP) in 1980 (O'Riordan, J., 1988). To date the only hydroelectric development proposal reviewed by this procedure is that for the Site C Hydroelectric Dam on the Peace River. This will serve as a test for determining to what extent the EPRP addresses the issues raised by the Revelstoke Case Study. The EPRP was introduced under the B.C. Utilities Commission Act (1980). It provided a changed and improved procedure for the selection and licensing of "Regulated" energy projects.1 These are defined as major new energy projects or additions to existing ones like pipelines, transmission lines (>500 kV), energy storage and use facilities, and hydro- and thermal-electric plants (>20 MW). The administration of the EPRP is the responsibility of the Minister of Energy Mines and Petroleum Resources (Minister of EMPR). However, some decisions are made jointly with the Minister of Environment. The B.C. Utilities Commission (BCUC), set up under the Utilities Commission Act, and the Energy Project Coordinating Committee (EPCC) assist the Minister of EMPR in the review of project proposals. In order to proceed with a proposed project, the proponent must follow the procedures prescribed by the EPRP to obtain an Energy Project certificate for its construction and an energy operating certificate for its operation.2 The EPRP consists of the application procedure and the review procedure shown in Figure 6.1. The application procedure is divided into the pre- application and the application phases, which are outlined in Figure 6.2. The pre-application phase is not a requirement of the EPRP, but it is useful 151 Figure 6.1 The B.C. Energy Project Review Process: Certification Procedures (Ministry of EMPR, 1982) PRELIMINARIES TO APPLICATION Prospectus WATER LICENCE/POLLUTION Preliminary Planning Report CONTROL PERMIT APPLICATION APPLICATION FOR As appropriate AN ENERGY PROJECT CERTIFICATE Reviewed for compliance with regulations t MINISTER(S) Disposition decision 19 (1) (a) 19 (1) (b) ENERGY PROJECT CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CERTIFICATE CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY 19 (1) (c) EXEMPTION ORDER Regulated energy projects Public utility projects reviewed in public hearing by regulated by B.C.U.C. B.C.U.C. TERMS OF REFERENCE TO B.C.U.C. UNDER PART 3 CONSTRUCTION ISSUED FOR PUBLIC OF THE ACT AND OPERATION HEARING The Commission may convene T Subject to conditions and other a hearing on the application for statutory requirements B.C.U.C. a Certificate of Public HEARING Convenience and Necessity If approved, must satisfy other B.C.U.C. statutory requirements RECOMMENDATIONS TO CABINET T CABINET DECISION on Energy Project Certificate and approvals, licences, or permits of Water Act and Pollution Control Act CONSTRUCTION CABINET DECISION on Energy Operation Certificate OPERATION 152 Figure 6.2 The Energy Project Review Process: Pre-Application and Application Phases (Ministry of EMPR, 1982) PRE-APPLICATION PHASE k PROSPECTUS (1) General project description and schedule. (2) Project rationale. (3) Description of proposed preliminary studies. • ~ Review by Energy Project Coordinating Committee and Working Committees; consultation with proponent PRELIMINARY PLANNING REPORT (1) Identification and assessment of feasible alternative locations. (2) Analysis of alternative locations and identification of preferences. (3) Preliminary Procurement Plan. (4) Terms of reference for proposed environmental/socio-economic impact studies. (5) Terms of reference for proposed project justification studies. (6) Description of public consultation program. (7) Preliminary list of approvals, licences, and permits required. Review by Energy Project Coordinating Committee and Working Committees; consultation with proponent in developing Application APPLICATION PHASE : i APPLICATION (1) Description of applicant as per Regulation. (2) Project description: (a) purpose, costs, and ancillary facilities. (b) timetable for construction, operation, abandonment, reclamation, with critical dates. (c) public works, undertakings, or infrastructure entailed with costs and schedule. (3) Environmental and socio-economic impact assessment and proposals for minimizing negative impacts and maximizing positive impacts. (4) Project justification: energy supply/demand, technical feasibility, financial feasibility, procure• ment, benefit-cost data. (5) Ancillary applications: approvals, permits, licences required under Pollution Control Act, Water Act, and other pertinent statutes. (6) Public consultation program description and summary of response. (7) Other information as required. 1 Review by Energy Project Coordinating Committee and Working Committees; consultation with applicant as necessary } APPLICATION DISPOSITION BY MINISTER(S) [Section 19(1) of Utilities Commission Act] 153 in the preparation and review of an application (Ministry of EMPR, 1982). The applicant's prospectus and preliminary report are reviewed by the EPCC and its three Working Committees (Figure 6.3). This identifies the concerns of the various government agencies, and the requirements for other licences, permits and for project planning under the Utilities Commission Act. The project proponent then prepares an application for an energy project certificate which, as required by Regulation 388/80 of the Utilities Commission Act, must contain the information shown in Figure 6.2. The application is submitted to the Minister of EMPR and is reviewed by the EPCC and its Working Committees in consultation with the proponent to identify and correct information deficiencies. The EPCC reports to and advises the Minister of EMPR, who then decides on the disposition of the application. Four options are open to the Minister of EMPR: the rejection of the application and the three review procedures shown in Figure 6.1 (19(1)(a),(b) and (c)). Firstly, the Minister of EMPR can reject the application outright. Secondly, he may, with the concurrence of the Minister of Environment, exempt the application from any provision of the Act (19(l)(c)). Construction and operation of the project may proceed subject to any conditions and statutory requirements imposed. Thirdly, in the case of an application by a public utility, the Minister of EMPR may order it to be dealt with by the BCUC as an application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity (19(l)(b)). The BCUC determines whether or not to convene a public hearing, and, following the review of the application, decides whether to approve or reject the application. Upon approval, the proponent must obtain the necessary statutory permits and licences before commencing construction. This step is facilitated by the EPCC. However, the Minister of EMPR, together with the Minister of Environment, may exempt the project during implementation and operation from Figure 6.3 The Energy Project Coordinating Committee and Its Three Working Committees (Ministry of EMPR, 1982) ENERGY PROJECT COORDINATING COMMITTEE Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources (Project Analysis Branch) Ministry of Environment (Assessment Branch) British Columbia Utilities Commission (Staff Member) ENVIRONMENT/RESOURCE/ WORKING COMMITTEE SOCIAL/ECONOMIC LAND USE ENERGY/ECONOMICS/FINANCE Regional and Community Energy Policy AREA OF GENERAL Resource Management Development Planning Industrial Strategy INTEREST Land Use Planning Social Service Policies Taxation/Financial Policy Environmental Impact Analysis Impact Analysis Energy Policy FUNCTION REGARDING Benefit/Cost Analysis Social services Demand/Supply Forecasting APPLICATION AND Mitigation/Compensation Mitigation/Compensation Economic/Financial Feasibility PROJECT Permitting Permitting Benefit/Cost Analysis Coordinated by Socio/Economic Coordinating Committee (SECC) Environment* Forests Review Agencies Include: Agriculture and Food Transportation and Highways Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources* MEMBER AGENCIES Municipal Affairs* Lands, Parks and Housing Health/Education Finance Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources Lands, Parks and Housing Industry and Small Business Development Provincial Secretary and Attorney General/Labour Government Services Transportation and Highways Provincial Secretary and Government Services Industry and Small Business Development 'Currently chairs working committee. 155 any of the provisions of the Act. The fourth choice open to the Minister of EMPR is to refer an application for a detailed review to the BCUC, which then must hold a public hearing (19(l)(a)). The terms of reference for the hearing are determined by the two Ministers on the basis of the recommendations of the EPCC. Following the public hearing the BCUC submits a report and recommendations concerning the approval or rejection of the application and the conditions of the energy project certificate to Cabinet, which then makes the final decision to approve or reject the project proposal. With the energy project certificate Cabinet can impose any conditions, and include any approval, licence or permit of the Water Act (1979) and Waste Management Act (1980). The proponent must acquire the necessary licences and permits to satisfy other statutory requirements. Following construction and the proponent's "substantial compliance" with the terms of the energy project certificate, Cabinet issues an energy operating certificate, in which any conditions necessary for the operation of the project can be specified. Whereas a Cabinet decision with respect to an energy project certificate cannot be appealed, that by the BCUC for a certificate of public convenience and necessity can be (Ministry of EMPR, 1982a; Andrews and Higham 1986; Thompson et al., 1981). No provisions are provided for an administrative structure for the management of environmental and socio-economic impacts during construction. The Ministry of EMPR in a Technical Discussion Paper (1983a) proposes the general framework shown in Figure 6.4, which can be adapted according to the specific requirements of individual energy projects. The structure relies mainly on existing government agencies, especially local branches, and to some degree on the proponent's staff. A ministerial or cabinet order sets up a steering committee and two impact management bodies whose responsibility is the field implementation of a project in accordance with approvals and policy 156 Figure 6.4 General Framework for Managing tnvironmental and Socio-Economic Impacts (Ministry of EMPR, 1983a) Cabinet/Ministerial Order • Energy Project Coordinating Committee • Provincial Ministry Headquarters and Regional Staff • British Columbia Utilities Commission • Staff of federal, regional, and other governments • Proponent and Contractors St. Functions Environmental Impact Management Socio-Economic Impact Management Compliance with Approvals Provincial and other government Monitoring of Impacts Provincial and federal government staff surveillance staff Management of Impacts Regional/local government staff Proponent environmental supervision staff Compensation of Impacts Proponent community liaison staff Environmental Monitoring Social Monitoring Information Mechanism Information Mechanism Public and .Advisory Groups 157 directions. Site-specific problems are to be resolved in a coordinated and cooperative approach. Unresolved issues will be referred to senior headquarter officials. The procedure for large compensation claims and those requiring arbitration should be specified in the certificate or order; the two impact management bodies possibly could resolve minor ones. Public input is envisaged to range from "informal contact to advisory committees" with clearly defined terms of reference and relationships to the two impact management bodies. A more detailed administrative structure and procedures for the implementation of the conditions of approved regulated energy projects will be developed by the Ministry of EMPR as it gains experience in applying the EPRP to future projects (Ministry of EMPR, 1983a). 6.2 THE SITE C EXPERIENCE Immediately following the introduction of the EPRP in September 1980, B.C. Hydro applied for an energy project certificate for the Site C Hydroelectric Dam on the Peace River in northeastern B.C. In the spring of 1981 the Ministries of EMPR and Environment referred the application to the BCUC for a review (Figure 6.1, 19(1)). The Commission appointed a panel of five commissioners and issued the terms of reference for a public hearing. Following lengthy public hearings (24 November 1981 to 2 November 1982), the Panel submitted its report and recommendations to Cabinet (BCUC, 1983a,b,c). The eighty recommendations covered all issues pertaining to the terms of reference, conditions of the energy project certificate, review of northern river development, and electricity export and industrial development policies. The commissioners concluded that whereas Site C was technically feasible and impacts could be mitigated and compensated, neither the need nor the choice of that particular energy project had been justified by B.C. Hydro. This led four commissioners to recommend the deferral of the issuance of the energy 158 project certificate until such time that the project could be justified; the other commissioner recommended the rejection of the application (BCUC, 1983a). Cabinet decided to "shelve . . . Site C . . . for at least another 10 years . . . at that time it may be preferable to build smaller projects instead" (Ministry of EMPR, 1983b).3 Because Site C was not implemented, only the evaluation of that part of the EPRP which leads up to Cabinet's decision to approve or reject an energy project proposal, can be based on experience. The assessment of the administrative structure pertains to the Panel's recommendations for a monitoring program for the implementation of the conditions of the energy project certificate, if this were to be issued. 6.2.1 THE HEARING PROCESS The hearing process took a year and a half, half a year for pre-hearing activities and a year for the hearings. The BCUC Panel reviewed the application, retained legal Counsel and technical consultants, and visited the area of the proposed project. Two pre-hearing meetings were held in Fort St. John (near Site C): an informal meeting to explain the review procedures and receive the public's suggestions, and a formal one to hear submissions on and establish the procedures for the hearing. Intervenors filed their submissions with the Panel and reviewed the application. The Panel coordinated their requests for additional information and B.C. Hydro's response. B.C. Hydro also answered data deficiencies, noted by the Panel itself, in a two volume report. Government input was found to be inadequate; various ministries were asked to file "blue papers" outlining their concerns. This delayed the start of the hearings three weeks. Duplication of data and effort were to be minimized. Hence most of the formal hearings were to proceed in six phases each addressing different 159 aspects of the application: (1) electric energy demand; (2) electric energy supply; (3) project cost and adequacy of design; (4) environmental, land use, social and economic impacts, and economic benefit-cost evaluation; (5) financial impacts on B.C. Hydro and on electricity users; and (6) final arguments. Reports on each of these issues were prepared by private consultants to the Panel and distributed to all parties. If possible, intervenors were to coordinate their activities. Funding for intervenors was not provided by the BCUC. However, at the end of each of the hearing stages, the Panel awarded costs to be paid by B.C. Hydro. These were based on the intervenors' need and contribution to the understanding of the issues. The hearings were conducted in four formats: phased and unphased hearings with formal presentation and cross-examination of evidence, less formal community meetings, and special informal meetings requested by the Indi ans Tribal Counsel. Intervenors were heard in order of government levels, organizations, individuals, applicant, Commission Counsel and Commission. Most meetings were held in Fort St. John and the nearby communities. Problems were experienced with respect to the presentation and adequacy of data. As already mentioned, the lack of early governmental input resulted in an initial delay of the formal hearings. Data deficiencies in the application were only formally identified by some Ministries when they filed their submissions just before the start of the hearings. Some of the information, filed before the hearing, was outdated. Thus delays were caused when up-dates or new data were filed during the hearing and had to be studied by participants. More than 70% of the formal hearings were spent on cross- examination to better identify the issues and clarify evidence. Many of the impacts on resources and the social services could not be evaluated at the hearings for lack of data. Hence forestry losses under transmission lines were to be evaluated before the issuance of an energy project certificate, and 160 the determination of fisheries and recreational fishing losses were to be undertaken by the monitoring program. The identification of a number of socio-economic impacts on the local communities, regional districts, and native population, as well as the determination of appropriate mitigation and compensation measures had to be deferred. They too were to be dealt with by the monitoring program recommended by the Panel.^ 6.2.2 MANDATE AND EXPERTISE OF THE BCUC REVIEW PANEL The BCUC review Panel was given a very broad mandate for the public hearing for Site C. In the context of B.C.'s energy policy (Ministry of EMPR, 1980), they were to examine project justification; design; environmental, land use, social and economic impacts; and other matters. The particular concerns to be addressed under each of these topics were briefly outlined. Those for project justification are described in Section 6.2.4 of this thesis. Under project design, the Panel was to review such items as the adequacy and technical feasibility of the project, public works, and ancillary undertakings. The design, safety and schedule for construction and operation were to be examined. The Panel was directed to assess the environmental, land use, social and economic impacts in the short and long terms, as well as proposals for their mitigation and compensation, and the means for the implementation of these measures. The review of environmental and land use impacts was to cover the local climate, hydrology, terrain resources, agriculture, outdoor recreation, forestry, wildlife, and fisheries. Social and economic issues to be evaluated were: heritage sites; present and future land alienation; regional and provincial labour markets; community and regional settlement, land use, infrastructure, and stability; and regional and local economies. Other matters to be included in the review were the awarding of approvals, licence or permits under certain sections of the Water and Waste 161 Management Acts. Of note is that the Panel was free to address any other matter relevant to the review of the Site C application. However, the Panel's mandate did not specifically cover the review of northern developments in general and cumulative impacts of all Peace River development projects. Although these issues were of concern to some of the intervenors, the Panel did riot address them. Development of the Peace River had progressed too far to take an aggregate approach for its review, thus only an incremental review could be undertaken of the Site C proposal. Futherraore, the Panel thought evaluation of Site C in the northern development context to be beyond their .mandate. The terms of reference also directed the Commissioners to submit to Cabinet a report and recommendations, including the supporting rationale, on the refusal or issuance of the energy project certificate; any conditions to be included in the energy project and energy operation certificates; and the giving of approvals, licences, or permits, with any necessary terras or conditions, under the Water and Waste Management Acts. The expertise of the BCUC Review Panel was mainly in the engineering sector, however, work experience of the commissioners ranged from senior positions in water resource conservation and development, forestry and land survey, to school trustee and city manager. One of the five commissioners was a Peace River businessman and Regional District Director. As described in the previous section, legal counsel was retained in the prehearing and hearing stages of the review; private consultant firms assisted the Panel in technical, environmental, and socio-economic matters. 6.2.3 PROJECT SELECTION Under the EPRP the issue of project selection can first be considered in the voluntary pre-planning stage. The preliminary planning report calls for 162 the comparison of alternative sites, and the identification of the preferred alternative(s) on the basis of a preliminary environmental and socio-economic impact assessment. A clear outline of the criteria and methodology for the evaluation of alternatives as well as of proposals for detailed studies of the preferred sites should be included. Only in the application phase of the EPRP does project selection become a compulsory requirement, to be included in the environmental and socio-economic impact assessment. Major environmental and socio-economic impacts are to be identified for all alternatives and a preferred location selected on the basis of technical engineering, environmental, socio-economic, and cost criteria (Ministry of EMPR, 1982a). In the Site C public review by the BCUC Panel, project selection was examined together with project justification. B.C. Hydro had evaluated only one alternative to Site C—the Hat Creek thermal-electric generating plant. The Panel ruled out Hat Creek as a viable alternative because a much reduced electric energy growth forecast had rendered the benefit-cost comparison with Site C inappropriate. A consideration of a wide range of conventional and nonconventional alternatives by the Panel led to the conclusion that the latter were not feasible, but that smaller hydroelectric generating plants were probably a better choice than Site C. B.C. Hydro had failed to demonstrate that Site C was the only possible source to be developed next and that it was preferable to all other sources. 6.2.4 PROJECT JUSTIFICATION The EPRP is not designed as a two-stage approval procedure. There are no provisions for the separate, consecutive assessment of project need in the broad policy context leading to an approval-in-principle and of project design, resulting in a conditional licence, should a project be approved. 163 Whereas the project proponent may. address project justification in both the prospectus and the preliminary planning report of the voluntary pre- application phase of the EPRP, he is required to do so only in the application for an energy project certificate (Figure 6.2). The prospectus is to broadly define the project's purpose, implications of supply and demand, benefits to the Province, and known issues and constraints. Terms of reference for proposed project justification studies are worked out in consultation with the EPCC's Working Committees and outlined in the preliminary report. The project justification studies must be included in the application for the energy project certificate. Topics to be covered are the economic and financial viability of the project, the overall benefits and costs to the Province and the potential effects on energy resources and energy use. Data requirements may vary depending on the type of project, the potential for externalities, and government subsidies (Ministry of EMPR, 1982a). There is, however, no indication of how project justification is to be dealt with in the public review of the project by the BCUC. Hence the procedure followed for Site C is instructive. B.C. Hydro bypassed the pre-application phase for the Site C project, and filed the application for an energy project right away. Project justification was reviewed at the public hearing held by the BCUC under a very broad mandate. The Panel was to review the following issues: "electricity demand forecasts relative to supply in a total energy context, and industrial development opportunities made available in the Province, the project's financial impacts on the Applicant and electricity users; and the project's overall impact on the Province, specifically its social benefit-cost, including environmental, land use, social and economic impacts." (BCUC, 1983b, p. 6) Furthermore, ELUC's Environmental and Social Impact Compensation/Mitigation Guidelines (1980) and Guidelines for Benefit-Cost Analysis (1977) were to serve as a reference for review. In consideration of the provincial energy 164 policy and their mandate, the Panel concluded that their objective was to determine whether the Site C project was in the interest of the Province as a whole. An exhaustive public review was then undertaken, in which some attempt was made by the Panel to separate the review of project justification and design in the six phases of the formal hearings. Several of the Panel's findings are most relevant. A basic difference was noted between the criteria used by B.C. Hydro for the selection and evaluation of projects and those proposed by the government. Whereas B.C. Hydro's private corporate criteria had established the need for Site C, the government's social benefit-cost criteria, which took into consideration all foregone resource uses and the social worth of capital and labour, showed that the project was not in the public interest. The Panel also found that, the financing of Site C was feasible, but if it were to be built prematurely and/or exogenous factors (e.g. interest rates, electricity export markets) changed, the impact on customers' rates could be significant. Its final recommendation to Cabinet was not to approve Site C and for the BCUC to hold a review in 1984 of B.C. Hydro's system plan to establish whether Site C was needed then, and if so, to determine from a comparison of alternative system plans, whether Site C was the best choice (BCUC, 1983a). 6.2.5 THE PROPOSED MONITORING PROGRAM The need for a monitoring program for project impacts and claims arising form these, was identified by the applicant and intervenors. Whereas the municipalities of the region wanted an open-ended program that included all areas and impacts, the Panel recommended a limited program to deal with unresolved and unanticipated impacts, and to monitor compliance with the conditions of the energy project certificate. The unresolved issues referred to the monitoring program were (1) the 165 identification and determination of mitigation and compensation for socio• economic impacts on some of the local communities, the region, and native people; (2) the identification and determination of compensation for wildlife impacts caused by highway relocation and transmission line development; and (3) the determination of compensation for the impact on fisheries based on studies recommended by the Panel and to be carried out by B.C. Hydro.^ The monitoring program was to deal with unanticipated impacts as they were brought to its attention by affected parties. The monitoring of long term effects of flooding was not to be undertaken by the program for two reasons. The Water Comptroller was responsible for many of the impacts related to the reservoir, and the Panel had generally determined the compensation for such impacts. Of note is also that other Panel recommendations were designed so as to prevent conflicts with the mandate of government agencies by clearly specifying who was to design and implement environmental studies and compensatory enhancement and management programs. As an energy project certificate was not issued, it is not possible to ascertain the scope of the monitoring of the compliance with the conditions of such a certificate. However, the Panel's Report to Cabinet (BCUC, 1983a) gives some indication, mainly in the form of recommendations. These refer to the handling of the above mentioned unresolved impacts, and environmental conservation and mitigation measures to be implemented during the construction of the project. Inspections0 were not to be undertaken by the program, they were to be the responsibility of the relevant ministries or local government. But the program was to resolve any disputes if they were of a public nature. Private conflicts were to be settled with B.C. Hydro directly. Three factors guided the Panel in devising the structure of the monitoring program: (1) the public and local provincial ministries and agencies should have ready access to the program; who thus would be better 166 informed; (2) the program should not be impeded by bureaucracy; and (3) to operate quickly and efficiently, the lines of communication and authority should be clearly defined. The program was to consist of a monitoring commissioner, appointed by Cabinet, and a small office staff both to be located in Fort St. John. The commissioner's function was to be adjudicative only. Private consultants, hired as needed, were to support the monitor in technical matters. Whenever possible, the monitoring program was to make use of the resources of existing government ministries and agencies. Liaison persons were to be appointed from these as well as from local government and B.C. Hydro. After having advised local communities and government of his presence, the Commissioner was to resolve the concerns and disputes referred to him. This leads one to infer that it was not his duty to initiate action himself. The commissioner was to have authoritative power over B.C. Hydro to enforce his decisions. These were to be based on the same principles for mitigation and compensation used for determining the conditions of the energy project certificate. The commissioner was to advise government ministries of his decisions and of any required action arising therefrom. An appeal procedure was to be instituted. That under the Utilities Commission Act would be applicable if the monitoring commissioner were a member of the BCUC. Furthermore, upon a request by B.C. Hydro, Cabinet could direct a BCUC review of any of the commissioner's decisions. The costs arising form a claim were to be paid by the claimant, unless the commissioner decided differently. B.C. Hydro was to fund the monitoring program. The program was to terminate with the completion of the construction of the project. 167 NOTES 1 The B.C. Utilities Commission Act also regulates public utilities, including B.C. Hydro, and reviews and certifies the export of energy from B.C. 2 The description of these procedures is kept very brief. For more details the reader is referred to the three sources used here: Ministry of EMPR, 1982a; Andrews and Higham, 1986; and Thompson et al., 1981. 3 Simultaneously, the government announced a new electricity export policy, which advocated the sale to the U.S.A. of firm, long terra surplus electricity rather than interruptible short term power. The Ministry of EMPR gave the following reasons "the severe recession has thrown all demand forecasts out the window, the Revelstoke Dam is coming on stream, and we are facing a surplus considerably larger than anticipated" (Ministry of EMPR, 1983b). However, these sales to the U.S.A. could not be realized as the U.S.A. transmission lines were later virtually closed to the transmission of electricity from B.C. ^ Of course, some impacts can only be properly identified during the implementation of a project. -* In contrast to the Revelstoke Project, the costs of these studies were not counted as compensation payments. The studies were to determine the compensation payments and, therefore, should have been completed before the application for any energy project certificate was filed. Thus B.C. Hydro should bear the costs. 0 The Panel did not specify what these inspections were. One can assume that they referred to the surveillance inspections of compliance with approvals, licences, and permits to be issued to B.C. Hydro. In a general information bulletin the Ministry of EMPR (1982b, p. 6) wrote that "the ongoing inspection of construction and operation is the responsibility of the developer, with appropriate supervision by government agencies." 168 CHAPTER 7 THE REVELSTOKE EXPERIENCE AND THE CURRENT ENERGY PROJECT REVIEW PROCESS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA The main body of this thesis (Chapters 2-5) provides a description, analysis and critique of the licensing and construction of the last large energy project to be built in B.C., the Revelstoke Dam. The immediately preceding chapter (Chapter 6) reviews the Energy Project Review Process (EPRP) which is now in place in British Columbia. This concluding chapter summarizes the shortcomings of the Revelstoke experience, assesses the extent to which the current EPRP deals with those shortcomings and offers some suggestions for further modification of the process. 7.1 REVIEW OF THE REVELSTOKE PROJECT EXPERIENCE For the purpose of this review it is convenient to group the perceived shortcomings of practices and procedures used in the Revelstoke Project underj a sequential set of headings starting with pre-application (7.1.1) and going onto the licence application process (7.1.2), the conditions of the licence itself (7.1.3), the effectiveness of the environmental guidelines (7.1.4) and compliance monitoring (7.1.5), and finally the predictive capability of the Environmental Impact Statement (7.1.6). 7.1.1 PRE-APPLICATION Public concern about the lack of project justification and selection during the dam building of the 1960s led to the introduction of legislation. The ELUC Act (1971) and the B.C. Energy Act (1973) to some extent dealt with these Issues, but when B.C. Hydro indicated the need for another large scale development in the early 1970s operational procedures were not in place. Consequently, for the Revelstoke Dam, selection and justification was carried out by the project proponent in the absence of an explicit provincial energy 169 plan and without consideration of the public policy context and the participation of government ministries and the public. B.C. Hydro justified the need for a new project solely on its own electric energy demand forecast and the selection of the Revelstoke Project on a somewhat superficial assessment of several alternative development proposals. Furthermore, an environmental impact statement (EIS) was not required for the proposals of either the alternative developments or the selected project. Although B.C. Hydro prepared an EIS for the Revelstoke Project, the Company did not have to meet any guidelines for its preparation, but was free to set its own terms of reference. The exclusion of two of the three main parties, the government and the public, limited the identification of concerns and the establishment of their priorities to those perceived as important by B.C. Hydro. Thus data deficiencies were not corrected before the Project entered the next phase. 7.1.2 APPLICATION The evaluation of the procedure followed in dealing with the application for the Revelstoke Project raised several major criticisms pertaining to the public hearing and the provisions of the Water Act. Initially, B.C. Hydro seemed to be in control of the schedule of events. The Water Comptroller set the hearing date as requested by the Public Utility, allowing intervenors too little time for the examination of all documents; this necessitated a rescheduling of the hearing. When the hearing did get underway, it was devoted largely to the gathering of information rather than to the assessment of it. Data deficiencies led to the deferral of the resolution of important issues (e.g. the compensation agreement for fish and wildlife resources) to the project implementation phase. The provisions for public participation were not satisfactory. 170 Intervenors had insufficient funds and received no financial aid. More significant, though, was the public's perception that the public hearing was a sham. This arose from the narrow mandate assigned to the Water Comptroller under the Water Act, which excluded the assessment of project selection and justification. Consequently, neither of these two fundamental matters could be adequately addressed at the hearing. The conflict between the electric energy growth forecasts by B.C. Hydro and by the B.C. Energy Commission was not resolved and it was not established that a large scale development project and, in particular the Revelstoke Project, was in the interest of the Province. On the other hand, the Water Comptroller appeared to exceed his mandate by ruling on the broad range of environmental, social, and economic concerns of the Project. As these issues were also beyond his expertise and that of his staff, technical consultants from provincial ministries were retained for the public hearing. However, this provision was inadequate because the consultants were inaccessible to the public, who also perceived them as biased due to their past and anticipated future dealings with B.C. Hydro. The appeal to the issuance of the water licence reflected the deficiencies of the Water Act as well as of the licensing procedure: the Project's need had not been established and the water licence provisions precluded the efficient handling of environmental matters and public participation in the implementation of the Project. Cabinet neither granted the moratorium nor the cancellation of the licence called for by the appellants. However, it amended the licence as recommended by the Appeal Committee. 7.1.3 LICENCE The amended water licence set the conditions under which the Revelstoke Project was to be implemented and administrated. The shortcomings of this document however, seriously hampered the efficient execution of these tasks. First, the lines of responsibility and authority were not well designed. While the Water Comptroller held the ultimate authority and was responsible for ensuring the adherence by B.C. Hydro to all licence clauses, the roles of B.C. Hydro, the Fish and Wildlife Branch (FWB) and the site biologists were not clearly established. This ambivalence arose from three licence conditions (p, q, r) which pertained to environmental studies, impact monitoring, and environmental guidelines. The water licence did not specify who was to design the programs for the protection and enhancement of and compensation for fish and wildlife habitat (clause (p)), but assigned the implementation of these programs to B.C. Hydro, thereby impinging on the mandate of the FWB and causing a prolonged confrontation between the two. Hence the Revelstoke Project Coordinating Committee's (RPCC) task of integrating environmental effects monitoring and negotiating a compensation agreement for fish and wildlife losses was rendered most difficult. The work of the site biologists was defined in very general terms in clause (q). It was one of the few licence conditions that was neither administered by the RPCC nor subject to the Water Comptroller's direction, other than his determining the length of the site biologists' employment. Consequently, B.C. Hydro was free to interpret clause (q) as they liked and placed the site biologists under the authority of the Construction Manager, who did not appear to perceive their role as important. Furthermore, the water licence had not given the site biologists any enforcement power and the Water Comptroller had assigned the surveillance of B.C. Hydro's adherence to the environmental guidelines (clause (r)) to the Construction Manager, who then delegated it to the engineering staff. The site biologists were unable to adequately monitor construction activities and establish liaison with the 172 contractors, the RPCC and B.C. Hydro's head office biologists. Additionally, problems were encountered in determining which parts of the site biologists' work were to fulfill clause (q) and which clause (p). Second, severe shortcomings were noted in the administrative framework for the Revelstoke Project. This framework was not holistically conceived but rather evolved over the span of two and a half years as the unofficial program under B.C. Hydro and the official program under the terms of the conditional water licence. Neither of these programs was well thought out and no provisions were made in the water licence to integrate them. Authoritative power was vested only in the two Committees of the official program, the site biologists and unofficial program having none. Despite this distinct division, clear lines of authority were not established. The environmental management of the Project by the RPCC was characterized by indecisive leadership. In resolving problems the Committee took an ad hoc approach and condoned the procrastination with which B.C. Hydro responded to its requests. The lack of environmental training of the Water Management Branch staff was also a contributing factor. The RPCC's chairman was dependent on the advice of the Committee members and that of B.C. Hydro, who were each governed by distinct goals. Due to the lack of water licence provisions, B.C. Hydro was able to relegate the site biologists to a minor role. Instead, environmental management at the site seemed to be largely under the control of B.C. Hydro's engineering staff. Confusion prevailed in the claims procedure. Some claimants negotiated with B.C. Hydro directly, while others approached some of the Adjunct Committees and the Local Impact Committee of the unofficial program. The latter, however, was unable to resolve many of the claims because it lacked the necessary support staff and authority. Unresolved claims were referred to the Community Impact Committee (CIC). Initially, this Committee had been 173 ignored by claimants as it had no local representative. It is questionable if the CIC had been intended to fulfill this function as the official program provided for a claims procedure with the Claims Officer and clause (u) of the water licence. However, these were not instituted by the Water Comptroller as claims seemed to be settled by other bodies of the administrative framework. The CIC dealt with claims in an ad hoc manner as they were referred by the Local Impact Committee. It appears that the CIC's decisions were based on ad hoc reports and political lobbying (DPA Group, 1986) prior to the commissioning of the two reports (DPA Group, 1986; Sussex, 1985) in 1984, which evaluated the socio-economic impacts of the Project on the local communities. The Office of the Impact Monitor was also seriously handicapped by the lack of definite lines of authority—as well as by the lack of support staff. B.C. Hydro placed the Monitor under the supervision of the Regional Board, but seems to have had some continuing influence on the operation of the Office. The Monitor's accountability to the Regional Board turned out to be an ill- suited choice because the Region as a whole was little affected by the Project. The Board's inability to provide the necessary directives and knowledgeable supervision resulted in the limited usefulness of the Impact Monitor's work and in the termination of the Office after only two and a half years. The water licence had no provisions for meaningful public participation; the RPCC was closed to It, and the CIC did not encourage it. The public could only respond to the recommendations of the two Committees and the Water Comptroller's approvals and orders, which had to be published. However, this kind of participation was reactive rather than proactive. Furthermore, without the Claims Officer the official program lacked direct local contact. Meaningful public participation through the unofficial program was not 174 possible as the bodies of that program were only advisory. In conclusion it can be said that the formation and operation of the administrative framework were characterized by an ad hoc approach. This was exacerbated by the inadequacies of the water licence and the lack of requisite professional training which led to indecisive leadership. The water licence failed to establish distinct lines of responsibility and authority and to provide an adequate, integrated administrative framework that was able to function efficiently. 7.1.4 ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDELINES As called for in the water licence, B.C. Hydro prepared the environmental guidelines for the Project. Following review by the Ministry of Environment, the Water Comptroller approved them with the proviso that they be updated as the Project progressed. This study has shown that both the format (contractual requirements and actual environmental guidelines) and the content of the guidelines were inadequate. The main body of the guidelines, the B.C. Hydro construction contract clauses (contractual requirements), only outlined general construction practices commonly accepted for the conservation and protection of the environment. Site-specific details were not addressed, but referred to the Construction Manager. Almost no provisions were made for consultation with the site biologists, who were thus relegated to a minor role. Additionally, the wording of contract clauses was vague and reference to the relevant government regulations and Acts was incomplete. The actual environmental guidelines contributed little. They, too, lacked detail and failed to clarify the purpose and administration of the contractual requirements. The section of fish and wildlife protection was more detailed, but these provisions were not part of the contract clauses. 175 The guidelines neither covered reservoir filling nor mentioned the separate sets of clearing standards developed for the reservoir area and transmission lines. Review and updating of the environmental guidelines was not undertaken. Indeed, this would have been difficult as construction contracts were binding. Overall, the environmental guidelines did not provide the necessary guidance for the conservation and protection of the environment. 7.1.5 COMPLIANCE MONITORING A monitoring program to ensure compliance with and enforcement of environmental guidelines, government regulations and Acts, and to integrate the activities of the various regulatory agencies was not provided for the Revelstoke Project. The water licence only called for the employment of two site biologists to monitor fish and wildlife aspects and for B.C. Hydro to prepare and adhere to environmental guidelines. The Water Comptroller did not assign compliance monitoring and enforcement to the site biologists, but to the Construction Manager and the site engineering staff, who lacked the requisite environmental training. The site biologists could not adequately and continuously monitor the implementation and effectiveness of the guidelines. Contrary to the guidelines, the Construction Manager did not perceive this as their duty. The available information leads to the conclusion that compliance monitoring was insufficient. Assessment of impacts tended to be qualitative and sometimes subjective. The site biologists kept few records; some of the data were only recorded and not analyzed. The monitoring that was carried out was often not instrumental in soliciting enforcement. Insufficient staff and a laissez faire attitude rendered surveillance and enforcement by government agencies inadequate. A strong commitment to the preservation of environmental quality was lacking. 176 To summarize, there were no provisions for a compliance monitoring program, nor was a program developed. Although major environmental accidents of long term effects had not occurred, the general disregard for the environment caused many minor incidents to go unchecked. The most significant observation was succinctly expressed by the site wildlife biologist: "B.C. Hydro had built the Project without any major environmental problems more by luck than foresight—a major accident would have been a mess" (Bonar, 1987). 7.1.6 POST-DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS The objective of the post-development environmental analysis was to determine the effectiveness of the EIS as a predictive tool. However, the analysis serves also as a record, though incomplete, of the actual impacts caused by the Revelstoke Project. Three major difficulties limited the extent of the analysis: (1) the EIS predictions were generally non-specific and not in the form of testable hypotheses; (2) many variables were not monitored because effects monitoring had not been designed for the purpose of post- development analysis; and (3) much of the data had not been interpreted or written up. Overall the EIS was found to be an ineffective tool for predicting impacts. Just over a quarter of all predictions were accurate. Significant is that the lack of baseline data limited the specificity of predictions for the wildlife resource and appeared to result in a higher predictive capacity (35%) than for the aquatic environment and fish resource (19%). Furthermore, eighty percent of the predictions for the aquatic environment and fish resource were "no-miss" predictions. While twenty-one percent of all predictions were inaccurate and twenty-eight percent were not verifiable for lack of data, nineteen percent may possibly be verified in the long term. This might, of course, change the predictive capacity of the EIS, which to 177 date is unsatisfactory. 7.2 ASSESSMENT OF THE ENERGY PROJECT REVIEW PROCESS IN LIGHT OF THE REVELSTOKE EXPERIENCE The Energy Project Review Process (EPRP) has efficiently dealt with some of the issues raised by the Revelstoke Case Study while leaving others partially or entirely unaddressed. As the focus on the Revelstoke experience has shown improvements and shortcomings arise from both the design and application of the EPRP. In sharp contrast to the Water Act, the Energy Act with the EPRP prescribes a definite structure and procedural sequence for the selection and licensing of large scale energy projects. The pre-application and application phases provide for the orderly screening and assessment of the proposed project and its alternatives in the public policy context. Early public and government participation is to lead to the identification of concerns, issues, and information needs. Review of the application by the Energy Project Coordinating Committee (EPCC) and its Working Committees is to ensure that all relevant issues and information requirements have been adequately addressed. Two Cabinet Ministers then decide on one of four possible dispositions of the application: rejection; approval exempt from a review; review by the BCUC, which may call a public hearing, and makes the final decision; and review by the BCUC, which must convene a public hearing, but the final decision is made by Cabinet. If a project is approved under the latter procedure, the EPRP requires the applicant to obtain an energy project operating certificate. The EPRP, however, does not detail all licensing procedures and lacks provisions for some of the major procedures of project implementation and operation. While it is important to retain flexibility in the licensing procedures in order to address project-specific circumstances, there should be 178 some indication of what general format and mandate the BCUC public hearings are to take. The EPRP does not address either. The adverse effects of too narrow a mandate were noted in the Revelstoke Case Study (Chapter 2). Whereas the BCUC is responsible for ensuring compliance with the certificate of public convenience and necessity (Figure 6.1, 19(l)(b)), no such provisions are made for the implementation of projects under the energy project certificate. There is no mention of which agency is to be responsible for the monitoring of compliance with and enforcement of the conditions of that certificate. But "substantial compliance"—a term not defined—is a requisite for obtaining an energy operating certificate under the EPRP. The need for adequate monitoring and enforcement was also demonstrated in the analysis of the Revelstoke Project (Chapter 4), as was the importance of a well designed administrative framework for environmental and socio-economic impact management (Chapter 3). The latter issue has only been tentatively addressed by the EPRP; definite provisions have not been prescribed. An energy operating certificate is necessary for the operation of a regulated energy project, but procedures for obtaining it are not outlined (Ministry of EMPR, 1982). Furthermore, the EPRP should incorporate post- development environmental and socio-economic analyses as a requirement either in the energy project certificate or the energy operating certificate. The shortcomings resulting from the total lack as well as the lack of early planning of post-development analyses were noted in the Revelstoke Case Study (Chapters 5 and 3 respectively). Evaluation of the implementation of the pre-application and application phases of the EPRP in general and with respect to Site C provides an additional perspective. A most significant shortcoming is that the pre- application phase is not compulsory. By-passing it would, in effect, eliminate early participation by both government and the public. Whereas 179 later input by government is assured in the application phase, that of the public is not if a public hearing is not called and if Thompson et al. (1983, p. 23) are correct in stating that a public consultation program is not a necessary requirement of the application.1 In the case of Site C, B.C. Hydro's by-passing the preapplication phase severely impeded the public hearings. Significant data deficiencies, especially in the EIS (based on B.C. Hydro's terms of reference) and inadequate government input were only noted just prior to and throughout the hearings. As in the case of the Revelstoke Project, the Site C hearings served largely as an information gathering and issue clarification function that was costly in time and money. Many data deficiencies could not be made up and major decisions had to be deferred to the implementation of the project. The Panel concluded that early consultation in the EPRP by government, applicant, and interested parties would result in a more efficient review process. Issues would be identified and their priority established before the hearings. Up-to-date information should be submitted two months before the hearings and, should new data be required during the hearings, to allow two to four weeks before its cross-examination. Thus the quality of all evidence would be improved. For Site C, however, the EPRP had not dealt with one of the serious shortcomings of the Revelstoke Project review procedure. In contrast to the Revelstoke experience, some procedural aspects of the public hearings were significantly improved in the review of Site C. Timing and format of the hearings were set by the Site C Panel in consideration of the needs of all participants. Intervenors were allowed sufficient time and ready access to all data to adequately prepare for the hearings. Unlike at Revelstoke, B.C. Hydro was responsible for some funding of intervenors. While the Panel thought the method of funding (partially based on the value of participation at the hearings) satisfactory, Roberts (1982) states that the 180 late reimbursement imposed limitations, especially with respect to the retention of expert witnesses. The format of the hearings was tailored for the orderly examination of issues (formal phased hearings) and to facilitate the participation of all segments of the public (formal unphased and informal community hearings), including the native Indian population (special hearings)—a need that did not arise at Revelstoke. The Panel observed that the hearings also served as an outlet for built-up frustrations from inadequate public participation in the decision making process of other major energy projects. Whereas holding most hearings in the Peace River area established local confidence in the hearing process, it proved too costly and interruptive to other parties. For future projects the Panel recommended to review only matters of local concern in the area of a proposed project, and technical and justification issues in larger cities, such as Vancouver. Overall and in contrast to the Revelstoke hearing, public participation in the Site C review process had been meaningful. Another shortcoming raised in the analysis of the Revelstoke Project was properly addressed in the review of the Site C application. Adequate legal counsel and technical consultants had been retained prior to the hearings to advise the Panel and actively partake in the hearings. Notwithstanding their wide range of professional work experience, the Commissioners recommended that frequent briefings by Commission counsel and consultants before and during the hearings "on the progress and direction of the hearings" should be held to enable the review panels to better understand "the thrust of the evidence and cross-examination" (BCUC, 1983c, p. 14). An outstanding improvement over the Revelstoke Project review process was the wide mandate developed by the Ministers of EMPR and Environment for the Site C hearings. It not only included project selection and justification in the public policy context, which had been excluded at Revelstoke, but also 181 allowed the Panel to examine any other relevant matters. Project selection and justification were extensively addressed at the Site C hearings. The Panel rejected B.C. Hydro's only alternative project proposal as no longer applicable and proceeded to evaluate other conventional and nonconventional alternatives. They determined that smaller hydroelectric projects rather than Site C would be in the interest of the Province. However, the need for such projects would have to be established first by the electric energy growth forecast. While it was found that the methodology employed by B.C. Hydro for these forecasts had been considerably improved since Revelstoke, considerations of total energy context and conservation, and the use of econometric techniques were still inadequate. In future, data inputs and references were to be standardized to facilitate the comparison of B.C. Hydro's forecasts with those of the industry of EMPR. A persistent conflict was also noted between the selection and justification criteria used by B.C. Hydro and the government. Whereas the former based its judgments on private corporate criteria, the government's decisions were guided by social cost-benefit concerns. The Panel recommended that government advise B.C. Hydro of the evaluation criteria to be adopted. Similar to the review of the Revelstoke Project, that for Site C, too, was troubled by an apparent lack either of a policy of resource interests or of an overt statement of such a policy (Roberts, 1982). Both projects were not related to the regional and river basin contexts. The Panel reviewed the Site C proposal in the provincial context, but ruled that evaluation in the context of northern development was beyond their mandate. Neither did the Panel assess cumulative impacts of developments on the Peace River, including Site C, because they felt that development had already progressed too far. These issues had not been specifically included in the terms of reference but could have been discussed under "any other matters". Two recommendations were 182 made by the Panel. First, the government was to clarify its industrial development policy and reevaluate the electricity export policy so that future planning and review of energy projects would proceed in a definite policy context. Second, northern river developments were to be assessed for the cumulative impact of all proposed projects in each separate basin. Despite the limitations imposed by the noted shortcomings, the Panel's assessment of project selection and justification represents a significant improvement of the Revelstoke Project review. A further improvement was the EPRP provision for making the final decision with respect to an energy project application. In contrast to the Revelstoke Project, which had been approved by a senior bureaucrat and then appealed to Cabinet while the Project was already being constructed, the Site C Panel submitted their recommendations and rationale to Cabinet, which then made a final and binding decision and subsequently released the BCUC Panel Report (BCUC, 1983a,b,c,). Whereas the Revelstoke Project review had been perceived a sham, the Site C review clearly demonstrated the integrity of the EPRP. Yet a final difference was noted between the two review procedures. Unlike the Revelstoke review, under the Water Act, the format of the EPRP facilitated the Panel's use of the Site C review as a learning experience. In their report to Cabinet (BCUC, 1983a,b,c) the Panel made recommendations for the implementation of Site C, if approved, as well as for the improvement of the EPRP. In addition to those recommendations already discussed, two others are particularly relevant to this study. Firstly, the Panel proposed an administrative structure (monitoring program, Section 6.2.5 of this study) for Site C and recommended that this be implemented upon approval of the project. On hand of the Revelstoke experience, it appears that this program would not have provided the 183 integrated management of either environmental or socio-economic matters needed for such a complex development. The fact that the commissioner does not appear to have to take an active part in initiating monitoring precludes the establishment of a plan of action, and implies that matters are to be dealt with on an ad hoc basis. The assignment of responsibilities and lines of communication are not well thought out, however, the commissioner has authority to enforce his orders. Provisions are not made for effects monitoring and post-development analyses.2 A more appropriate administrative framework for regulated energy projects in general was proposed by the Ministry of EMPR early in 1983 (Ministry of EMPR, 1983a) (Section 6.1 this study). It seems to answer the criticisms raised in the Revelstoke Case Study. However, since Site C was not implemented, the question of whether the EPRP offers an improvement over the administrative framework of the Revelstoke Project cannot be answered. Secondly, the Panel recommended a significant change in the EPRP. While the Site C experience had demonstrated that the one-stage EPRP was capable of assessing both project need in the policy context, and project design and impacts, it had also shown that this process was rather inefficient. The Panel, therefore, recommended that a two-stage review process be adopted in which the need for a new energy project would be identified and the task of the BCUC hearing panel limited to the assessment of the particular project chosen to meet that need. Thus, for the following year (1984), the Panel proposed a major review of the need for Site C and a comparison of alternative system plans, addressing such issues as load forecasting, sequence and timing of new generating plants, and nonstructural alternatives. This was to determine whether Site C would be the best choice, should a new energy project be needed (BCUC, 1983a). Subsequent annual reviews of B.C. Hydro's up-dated system plans were to be undertaken by the BCUC under the Utilities Commission 184 Act.^ The Site C Panel concluded that this two-stage approval process would lead to a better assessment of the whole system plan and the justification of each project, and a more efficient and speedy evaluation of each specific project proposal (BCUC, 1983c). The evaluation of the EPRP and its application in the Site C project proposal lead to several conclusions. The current EPRP provide a structure and procedural sequence for the review of the selection and approval of large scale energy projects. If the EPRP were applied efficiently in its entirety and with such broad terms of reference as issued for the Site C review, then meaningful public and governmental participation would be assured; the lack of establishing issue priorities and data problems, that persist to bog down the public hearings, would be overcome; project justification would be assessed in the policy context; and the design and impacts of the specific project proposal would be examined. Regrettably, the implementation and operational procedures for large scale energy projects remain a moot point in the EPRP. 7.3 FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENERGY PROJECT REVIEW PROCESS The foregoing assessment of the review of the Site C application has demonstrated that, while many of the shortcomings of the Revelstoke review process were corrected, others persisted and rendered the process difficult and costly, both financially and in time. In view of the conclusions reached in this study the following recommendations for the improvement of the current EPRP are proposed: (1) The pre-application phase of the EPRP should be made compulsory. (2) All information requirements of the application should be made compulsory. (3) Sufficient time should be allowed for an efficient and adequate review of the application by the EPCC 185 Particular attention should be paid to the identification of major issues, the possibility of resolving minor issues before the hearing, and the correction of data problems, such as outdated and insufficient data. (4) An administrative structure for the management of environmental and socio-economic impacts should be worked out in detail and included in the EPRP. A structure similar to that proposed by the Ministry of EMPR seems appropriate. However, an evaluation of the experience at other major projects should be carried out. Such an administrative structure, possibly reduced in size, could also be extended to the operational phase of a project. (5) A post-development analysis should be made a compulsory requirement of the EPRP, either in the energy project certificate or the energy operating certificate. The type and scope of the post-development analysis could be worked out by the administrative management of a project. Based on this learning experience, all facets of the review and implementation of large scale energy projects could be evaluated and, if so indicated, improved. (6) The EPRP should be changed to the two-stage review process recommended by the Site C Review Panel. The first stage should assess project need in the contex of provincial and regional policies, and river basin development, while the second stage should review project particulars such as design, safety and impacts. If the EPRP were changed to a two-stage review process then the requirements of the pre-application and application phases would have to be adapted accordingly. The analysis of the procedures in place at the time of the Revelstoke Project have pointed to inadequacies which were only partially corrected by the current Energy Project Review Process. The recommendations given in conclusion of this thesis are made to further improve this continually evolving review process. The implementations of these recommendations would give B.C. an adequate and efficient review process for large scale energy projects. 186 NOTES Whereas it appears from Figure 6.2 that the proponent is required to submit a description of a public information and consultation program, Thompson et al. 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Vancouver: Environment Canada. 199 APPENDIX The Province of Ministry of British Columbia Envi ronment WATER ACT CONDITIONAL WATER LICENCE ( ) issued I December 1976 ( •)* amendments and additions 12 September 1977 ( )** amendments and additions 23 June 1978 British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority of 970 Burrard Street, Vancouver, British Columbia, V6Z 1X3, is hereby authorized to divert, use and store water as follows:- (a) The source of the water-supply Is Columbia River and the reservoir is the Columbia River Valley and such areas adjacent thereto as may be flooded by the works authorized under clause (h) hereof. (b) The point of diversion and storage is located approximately as shown on the attached plan. (c) The date from which this licence shall have precedence is the 16th February, 1976. (d) The purposes for which the water is to be used are power and storage. (e) The maximum quantity of water which may be diverted is 90,000 cubic feet per second and live storage authorized is 1,500,000 acre feet per annum and such additional quantity as the Engineer may from time to time determine should be allowed for losses. (f) The period of the year during which the water may be used and stored is the whole year. (g) This licence is appurtenant to the undertaking of the Licensee. (h) The works authorized to be constructed are dam, power plant, reservoir and auxiliary works, including access roads thereto. (i) The construction of the said works shall be completed and the water beneficially used on or before the 31st day of December, 1990 or such other date as the Comptroller of Water Rights may order. (j) Construction of the works authorized under clause (h) hereof shall not be commenced until plans of same have been approved in writing by the Comptroller of Water Rights. (k) The reservoir area shall be cleared to such extent and in such manner as may be directed by the Comptroller of Water Rights. (1) The level of water retained by the dam shall at all times be subject to the direction of the Compt• roller of Water Rights and shall not exceed elevation 1850 feet until remedial work with respect to the Downie SIIde has been completed to the satisfaction of the Comptroller. (m) The Licensee shall release water at such times and in such quantities as may be directed by the Comptroller of Water Rights. (n) The location of construction camps, work areas, site offices, borrow pits and similar works shall be subject to the approval of the Comptroller of Water Rights. (o) The Licensee shall cause to be constructed in the vicinity of the reservoir recreational facilities as directed by the Comptroller of Water Rights after consultation with the Licensee and the Deputy Minister of Recreation and Conservation. (o)* The Licensee shall cause to be constructed in the vicinity of the reservoir, recreational facilities as directed by the Comptroller of Water Rights. (p) Programmes for the protection, or enhancement, of fish and wildlife habitat and for the mitigation of losses of habitat and studies related thereto shall be carried out as directed by Che Comptroller of Water Rights after consultation with the Licensee and the Deputy Minister of Recreation and Conserva• tion. (p)* Programmes for the protection, or enhancement, of fish and wildlife habitat and for the mitigation of losses of habitat, and studies related thereto shall be carried out by the Licensee as directed by the Comptroller of Water Rights. (q) The Licensee shall employ, within three months of issuance of this licence, one fisheries biologist and one wildlife biologist to assist in drafting environmental guidelines for construction activities, to monitor fisheries and wildlife aspects of the project and to gather additional information as re• quired during construction and for such period as the Comptroller of Water Rights deems necessary. These biologists shall maintain liaison with staff of the Licensee or its contractors and with govern• ment agencies as required. (r) The Licensee shall prepare environmental guidelines for all construction-related activities, for approval of the Comptroller of Water Rights in consultation with the Oeputy Minister of Recreation and Conservation, the Oirector of Pollution Control and other appropriate regulatory agencies. (r)* The Licensee shall prepare environmental guidelines for all construction-related activities, for the approval of the Comptroller of Water Rights, and shall, in the course of such activities, adhere to environmental guidelines as directed by the Comptroller of Water Rights. 2011 (s) The Licensee shall have approved by the Comptroller of Water Rights annual budgets prepared in con• sultation with appropriate local public agencies for the mitigation of adverse impacts on the local commun i ty. (s)* The Licensee shall carry out programmes for the mitigation of adverse impacts on the local community as directed by the Comptroller of Water Rights in accordance with annual budgets prepared in con• sultation with appropriate local public agencies and approved by the Comptroller of Water Rights. (t) The Licensee shall reimburse the Minister of Finance for the salary and expenses of an Engineer to be appointed pursuant to the Water Act and to be known as the Claims Officer. (t)** The Comptroller of Water Rights shall submit to a Claims Officer, appointed by him from time to time, any claim for loss or damage arising out of the construction, maintenance, use or operation of the Licensee's works, and such Claims Officer shall have jurisdiction to consider and settle such claim, provided the amount involved for any matter does not exceed in the aggregate the sum of $10,000.00. Any person suffering such loss or damage may apply to the Claims Officer for settlement of his claim whereupon the Claims Officer shall hear and determine the claim and the Licensee shall pay to every claimant any sum decided from time to. time by the Claims Officer to fully compensate the claimant for damage or loss up to but not exceeding $10,000.00 for a claim resulting from the construction, main• tenance, use or operation of the Licensee's works. The procedure for making such claims and govern• ing the hearings by the Claims Officer shall be as specified by the Comptroller from time to time. The decision of the Claims Officer shall be final and there sha11 be no appeal therefrom. The Licen• see shall reimburse the Minister of Finance for the remuneration and expenses of the Claims Officer appointed pursuant hereto. (u) The Licensee shall pay any sum determined by the Claims Officer to be owing to any claimant under Section 18 of the Water Act. (u)** Any claimant having a claim recoverable at law against the Licensee for an amount exceeding S10.000.00, may elect either to commence legal proceedings against the Licensee for recovery of the same, or may notify the Licensee in writing that he wishes to submit his claim for arbitration pur• suant to the Arbitration Act of British Columbia and the Licensee as a condition of this Licence shall submit to such arbitration. The arbitration shall be governed by the provisions of the Arbi- • tration Act of the Province of British Columbia, except as may be otherwise specified by the Compt• roller of Water Rights. (v) The Licensee shall give security in such amount and under such terms as the Comptroller of Water Rights may from time to time direct to ensure compliance with clauses (o), (p), (s) and (u) of this 1icence. (w). The rights granted under this licence shall be deemed to be subsequent ,in precedence to any rights granted under any licence or licences which may be issued at any time for the consumptive use of water. (x)* The Licensee shall reimburse the Minister of Finance for the costs and expenses of the PROJECT COORDINATING COMMITTEE, to be appointed by the Comptroller of Water Rights, for the purpose of con• sidering and making recommendations to the Comptroller in respect of the orders and approvals to be given by him with respect to those matters set out in clause (k) , (1), (n), (o), (p), (r) , (s) and (v) of this Licence. The members of the Project Co-ordinating Committee shall be representative of those Ministries and Agencies of the Province concerned with the matters to be dealt with by the Committee, and the Chair• man shall be appointed by the Comptroller of Water Rights. It shall be the responsibility of the Licensee, and the biologists appointed under clause (q) of the Licence, to attend at the invitation of the Committee, and to report to and consult with the Com• mittee on matters before it. The Comptroller of Water Rights shall, prior to the giving of approvals or the issuance of orders under the several clauses of this Licence referred to in this clause, give reasonable public notice of the receipt by him of recommendations from the "ommittee, and shall give reasonable P'jbl ic not ice of any approval or order arising therefrom. (y)- The Licensee shall reimburse the Minister of Finance for the costs and expenses of a COMMUNITY IMPACT COMMITTEE to be appointed by the Comptroller of Water Rights for the purpose of monitoring the con• sultations carried out in accordance with clause (s) of this Licence, and of assisting the Licensee and the appropriate local public agencies on matters arising in the course of those consultations, and the Committee shall make recommendations to the Comptroller of Water Rights in respect of the approvals to be given and orders to be issued by him thereunder. The members of the Community Impact Committee shall be representative of those Ministries and Agen• cies of the Province concerned with the matters to be dealt with by the Committee, and the Chairman shall be appointed by the Comptroller of Water Rights. It shall be the responsibility of the Licensee and representatives of appropriate public agencies to attend at the invitation of the Committee and to report to and consult with the Committtee on matters coming before it. The Comptroller of Water Rights shall, prior to the giving of approvals or the issuance of orders under clause (s) of this Licence, give reasonable public notice of the receipt by him of recommen• dations from the Committee, and shall give reasonable public notice of any approval or order arising therefrom. (z)*" The Licensee shall provide or assist in the provision of such facilities over or around the Revel• stoke Dam as the Comptroller may require, and operate or assist in the operation of such facilities wholly or to such an extent, as the Comptroller shall, from time to time, direct for the transfer of logs or log bundles from the Revelstoke reservoir, and' i f the Comptroller so directs, into the Columbia River downstream of the Revelstoke Dam. Signed H. 0. DeBeck Comptroller of Water Rights