The Israeli Withdrawals from Southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip

83 2005. It begins g to withdraw in f the withdrawals ate of Netzarim [a ally left the security verturned decades of of decades verturned ed public pressure to s producing competing competing producing s s, examines the factors comes of the withdrawals withdrawals the of comes the territory in Lebanon rip. In southern Lebanon, Lebanon, southern In rip. tiations underway, Sharon Sharon underway, tiations y presence in the so-called so-called the in presence y iv,” i.e., leaving Gaza would would Gaza leaving i.e., iv,”

Rob Geist Pinfold

A Comparative Analysis A Comparative

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Southern Lebanon and the Gaza Southern Strip: Lebanon

In 2002, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon reject withdraw from the Gaza Strip, declaring thatAv “the f Tel as same the is Strip] Gaza the in settlement heartlands. cultural and commercial Israel’s abandoning to equivalent be nego Israeli-Palestinian no with later, years Three (IDF) Forces Defense Israel the of disengagement” “unilateral the ordered St Gaza the from civilians Israeli 8,000 nearly and militar Israeli the ended reversal policy similar a contained Lebanon southern Strip, Gaza the unlike though zone, security no Israeli civilian settlements. Israel controlled from 1985-2000, with successive governments pledgin the framework of a peace However, Israeltreaty. fin Barak’s Ehud Minister Prime on acting 2000, 24, May on unilaterally zone o withdrawals Both home.” boys the “bring to pledge observer with paradigms, policy Israeli established explanations of the logic underpinning them. from southern Lebanon in 2000 and the Gaza Strip in with a brief history of Israeli policy in both area outcomes. policy intended the maps and withdrawals, the to contributing It then assesses the implementation and aftermath o to determine whether the goals were achieved. The article contends that the withdrawals were neither the result of insufficient strategic foresight nor shortsighted political considerations. Israel Rather, withdrew due to at INSS. associate is a Neubauer research Rob Geist Pinfold S ND THENDGAZA STRIP h Syria, a state e to leave, officials officials leave, to e l its own territory. o some 1.4 o millionsome 1.4 re kilometers over tect 8,000 civilians expel the Palestine ity zone,” employing employing zone,” ity in southern Lebanon, Lebanon, southern in and over Hezbollah. ct was kept outside of of outside kept was ct rding the Gaza Strip. was straightforward, f foreign territory as a at failed to benefit the ate a more strategically strategically more a ate ing a desire to retain the the retain to desire a ing vil war in Lebanon – and and – Lebanon in war vil en Israeli-Lebanese talks talks Israeli-Lebanese en nd of Israel and therefore therefore and Israel of nd nd before the withdrawal withdrawal the before nd urity zone was its longevity: its was zone urity ne remained decidedly static. static. decidedly remained ne By virtue of this clause, the IDF did not did IDF the clause, this of virtue By 1 This was not to be the case. From 1985 until the until 1985 From case. the be to not was This 2 | THE ISRAELI| WITHDRAWALS FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON A While successive Israeli governments voiced a desir a voiced governments Israeli successive While presence Israeli the defined concerns security While OBGEIST PINFOLD

ineffective methodologies of territorial control th cre and costs, mounting minimize interest, national beneficial outlook. and the Gaza Background Historical Southern Strip: Lebanon On June 6, 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon, seeking to Lebanese the of impotence the exploited which – Organization Liberation ci the of outbreak the following government central Wh Lebanon. southern in control of zone a establish to 1985 in voted cabinet Israeli the withdrawal, negotiated secure to failed “guarantee to freedom IDF the permitting while Lebanon, from withdraw residents.” northern of safety the withdraw completely, insteadsqua controlling 1,100 “secur the as known became what in years 15 another from allies local 2,500 and troops IDF 1,500 approximately time one any at to home area, the control to (SLA) Army Lebanon South Christian-led the 200,000 Lebanese citizens. doubted the Lebanese government’s ability to contro Withdrawal was made conditional on an agreement wit exercising extensive political influence in Lebanon Overall, the underlying logic of the security zone encapsulating classic Israeli doctrine on the use o confli violent that ensure to mechanism, containment sec the of pitfall The territory. sovereign Israeli IDF’s the “be would 1985 that claimed Peres Shimon Minister then-Prime Lebanon.” in winter final zo security the vis-à-vis policy Israel 1990s, late a complex interplay of factors affected policy rega June in kilometers square 360 of enclave coastal Gaza the captured Israel Gaza the of control Lebanon, in case the was As War. Day Six the in 1967 Strip was deemed justified to prevent attacks within sovereign Israel. In La historic the within lies Gaza however, addition, Reflect Israelis. many among ideologically resonates a established, were settlements civilian territory, some 3,000 IDF troops were stationed in Gaza to pro and guard the border. In 2005, Gaza was also home t R

nexation nexation sometimes sometimes ND THENDGAZA STRIP t Netanyahu in in Netanyahu t hat Gaza would , while leaving the her than increased y demonstrates the ation of the security ercent of the territory the of ercent h and the IDF shared a shared IDF the and h d withdrawal. As Head Head As withdrawal. d twelve IDF commandos commandos IDF twelve the Labor Party pledged pledged Party Labor the r Moshe Arens admitted admitted Arens Moshe r ted in 2000 with violence violence with 2000 in ted accident precipitated the the precipitated accident thern Lebanon had been been had Lebanon thern concept enjoyed majority majority enjoyed concept 8 r the Oslo Accords, Rabin Rabin Accords, Oslo the r greater Hezbollah casualties casualties Hezbollah greater Prime Minister Sharon initially initially Sharon Minister Prime 1997, however, constituted 1997, an 5 6 reflecting Israeli decision makers’ difficulty with 4 | THE ISRAELI| WITHDRAWALS FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON A : on February 4, 73 soldiers were killed en route to southern southern to route en killed were soldiers 73 4, February on : That IDF fatalities then declined in 1999-2000 is is 1999-2000 in declined then fatalities IDF That 7 this asymmetry was cited as an argument against an against argument an as cited was asymmetry this 3 Subsequently, Labor leader Barak, competing agains competing Barak, leader Labor Subsequently, 9 In 1992, In then-Prime 1992, Minister Rabin expressed hope t In early polls 1999, registered the first majority support for unilateral

OBGEIST PINFOLD R Palestinians; hostile population. because of the difficulty absorbing such a large “sink into the sea,” unde Eventually, territory. the for plans strategic ordered withdrawal from 80 percent of the territory erup which intifada, second The intact. settlements new sparked lives, Palestinian 3,000 and Israeli 1,000 than more cost that p 20 remaining the from withdrawal on deliberations campaign, election 2001 the During Israel. by held agreement. an without even Gaza, leave to the implementing subsequently himself before – withdrawal any rejected disengagement. Perhaps most of all, this incongruit need to assess the strategic underpinnings of withdrawal. Gaza and Lebanon Withdrawal: of Logic The zone security the Lebanon, southern of case the In support within Israel from 1985 to 1996. horribilis annus The helicopters. IDF two of collision a by Lebanon pro-withdrawal Mothers Movement, an influential formation of the Four 1997, 5, September on addition, In group. advocacy sou in casualties Israeli ambush. an in killed were Hezbolla 1997, by but annually, 20-30 approximately of trend previous the reversing rate, fatality 1:1 3:1. of rate a at losses declining However, effectiveness. zone’s security the to attributed primarily resulted from incremental withdrawal, rat Ministe Defense 1999 April in effectiveness: policy that 80 percent of IDF positions had been turned over to the SLA, while saw the security zone contract in size. May 1999 suggested Netanyahu Benjamin Minister Prime response, In withdrawal. going before down backed but retrenchment, territorial unilateral partial, public. of year a within withdraw to pledged elections, ministerial prime 1999 the negotiate for preference a expressing office, taking of Military Intelligence, Barak had opposed the cre

12 By The 10 14 o promoted ND THENDGAZA STRIP nd 1996, ended ern Command, ve Hezbollah of thod of choice: in would have more nfined to the Strip atoon defended an ditions about what a reduction in active active in reduction a rcraft. Longer range y airstrikes on August August on airstrikes y ons, or access roads. e Israeli-Gaza borders. borders. Israeli-Gaza e lored to prevent hostile hostile prevent to lored ons in foreign territory. territory. foreign in ons mpared to 21 in 1990. In In 1990. in 21 to mpared 1980s, was less relevant relevant less was 1980s, inst Israeli occupation. Israeli inst security zone constrained constrained zone security egal occupier of Lebanese Lebanese of occupier egal lanning Division suggested suggested Division lanning tempted to infiltrate Israel, Israel, infiltrate to tempted Employing coercive ordnance in in ordnance coercive Employing 13 Barak proposed reversing this dynamic, dynamic, this reversing proposed Barak 11 | THE ISRAELI| WITHDRAWALS FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON A Military campaigns to suppress Hezbollah, in 1993 a Macro-level changes to IDF operational doctrine als As in Lebanon, increased violence undermined the logic of territorial OBGEIST PINFOLD

control in the Gaza Strip. From the beginning of the second intifada until intifada second the of beginning the From Strip. Gaza the in control the disengagement, attacks from the Gaza Strip killed Israelis. 162 zone in but 1985, was overruled by the political-military consensus. tai was which zone, security the however, mid-2000, the of threat predominant the infiltrations, border at rarely Hezbollah 1990s, late the By security. to instead inflicting losses on the IDF in the security zone, while also firing rockets into Israel. the of illegitimacy international The prematurely. ill an as seen Israel with freedom, operational IDF land. Yitzhak Mordechai, then-head of the IDF North recalled that “there were all sorts of American con plants, water attacking no army, Lebanese the attacking no off-limits: was plants.” electricity infrastructure, hoping withdrawal the would and swamp” “drain depri aga movement” “resistance a as legitimacy political If Hezbollah continued to employ violence, the IDF legitimacy to respond, because any attack would be on sovereign Israeli territory. of system elaborate an constructed Israel 1999, in Beginning withdrawal. th and Israeli-Lebanon the along sensors and fences advances Technological in precision-targeted ordnance benefited Israel, while Hezbollah lacked the ability to shoot down ai ordnance delivery became the military bargaining me co Lebanon, on airstrikes 150 launched Israel 1998, b answered were attacks Palestinian Strip, Gaza the 2003. 1, September and 30, 28, 26, 24, 21, while objectives some advance could border the sealing with conjunction operati infantry protracted for need the minimizing Gaza border fence ensured attacks were primarily co itself, around Israeli settlements, military positi national the harming as perceived be to began settlements Consequently, interest: an entire infantry company and armored pl P Strategic IDF The families. 26 of hamlet isolated allow could settlements Gaza-based abandoning that (

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) Russia, the It was hoped However, the However, ND THENDGAZA STRIP 15 16 et publicly with sonnel refused to to refused sonnel tatus quo, and the t the Roadmap for was backed by 40 luding the Geneva nited States, under inians and mitigate eterrence by denial: for negotiations, and and negotiations, for reformer) seemed to to seemed reformer) ordnance responses. responses. ordnance er heads of the Shin Bet Bet Shin the of heads er e Sharon’s chief of staff, staff, of chief Sharon’s e ation of the demographic demographic the of ation and the 2002 Arab Peace Peace Arab 2002 the and points damaged Sharon’s Sharon’s damaged points s, withdrawal was framed framed was withdrawal s, were therefore inﬂuenced inﬂuenced therefore were lations with the Arab world world Arab the with lations educing contact points, and and points, contact educing Sharon’s perception of Palestinian President President Palestinian of perception Sharon’s 19 Less than two weeks before Sharon announced the 17 | THE ISRAELI| WITHDRAWALS FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON A an initiative proposed by the Quartet, comprising 18 The intifada also precipitated a collective appreci collective a precipitated also intifada The per IDF 600 announced, was disengagement the Before

OBGEIST PINFOLD ( of extent the of because partly initiatives, the opposed government Israeli troop levels by one third without compromising security. that disengagement would allow Israel to practice d r by costs inflict to ability enemy’s the curtailing IDF the contrast, By violence. escalate to ability Palestinian the restricting impact high cost, low with provocations meet would threat to Jewish sovereignty posed by control of millions of Palestinians. Alternatives to the status quo were formulated, inc figures, Palestinian and Israeli by drafted Accord, re diplomatic full Israel offered which Initiative, solution agreed an and lines 1967 June the to withdrawal full for return in to the Palestinian refugee issue. The Geneva Accord to offered Katsav Moshe then-President and public, Israeli the of percent fly to Saudi Arabia to negotiate the Arab Initiative. Peace required Bank West withdrawals, with Sharon an Israeli claiming: “only plan will keep us from being dragged into [the] dangerous…Geneva and Saudi initiatives.” disengagement, US Secretary of State Colin Powell m supporters of the Geneva Accord. In addition, the U President George Bush, W. pressured Israel to accep Peace, Nations, to break the and the United States, the European Union, United impasse. Israeli-Palestinian form four and Strip, Gaza or Bank West the in serve stand These disaster. facing was Israel that warned onc Weisglass, Dov to according which ratings, poll him. affected personally also demand the preempted untrustworthy as Arafat Yasir Arafat’s action in September 2003 to force the resignation of Palestinian a as time the at (seen Abbas Mahmoud Minister Prime makers decision Israeli stance. Sharon’s vindicate by two competing elements: the need to change the s Thu existed. partner Palestinian no that perception as a unilateral move from to the “disengage” Palest the demographic and security threat, while alleviating international and domestic pressure.

22 ly y, y, routing the ND THENDGAZA STRIP nt Bill Clinton Minister Silvan forces with IDF ted by a majority zbollah followers ded the nation. On On nation. the ded hours, without any their opposition; in e, Sharon announced announced Sharon e, Barak reiterated his r Barak was presented presented was Barak r banon within one year, year, one within banon uary. Barak broke with with broke Barak uary. Danny Yatom, Barak’s Barak’s Yatom, Danny less than two months; two than less 20 IDF to plan for unilateral unilateral for plan to IDF Nevertheless, Barak overrode military opposition, opposition, military overrode Barak Nevertheless, 21 Shalom declared his opposition. In February 2004, February In opposition. his declared Shalom Sharon delineated that disengagement involved withdrawal from the 20 percent of the Gaza Strip approved cabinet The Israel. by controlled directly the measure in June 2004, followed by the Knesset in October 2004. several However, ministers were yet the settler community and many others were ﬁrm | THE ISRAELI| WITHDRAWALS FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON A 23 After failed eleventh-hour talks between US Preside divi disengagement Gaza the Lebanon, to contrast In OBGEIST PINFOLD

Decision Making and Implementation of Withdrawal Withdrawal Decision Making of and Implementation In his first speech as Prime Minister, in July 1999, Le from withdrawal negotiated a for pledge campaign within the framework of Israeli-Syrian peace. In January 2000, following the asked Barak negotiations, Israeli-Syrian failed Febr in policy the endorsed cabinet the withdrawal; protocol by declining to invite senior IDF figures to the cabinet meeting, plan. the to opposition military widespread to due Division] Research IDF the of “[then-head that: recalls chief, then-bureau Amos Gilad claimed Israeli citizens in the north would not even be able to put their noses out of their windows, or a sniper would shoot if them” place. took withdrawal including from IDF Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz. unilateral 2000, March in Geneva in al-Assad Hafez President Syrian and withdrawal was scheduled for July 2000. However, He orchestrated unarmed marches on SLA positions in Ma Ministe Prime 2000, 22, May On militia. demoralized with two options by the IDF: replace the routed SLA troops, or immediately implement withdrawal. Barak saw little utility in in abandoned be to due positions to troops sending withdrawal was therefore completed in just over 24 and ties ideological of lack the and support public Widespread casualties. create would Lebanon southern leaving that ensured settlements civilian little domestic protest; the Likud opposition backed withdrawal. Conferenc Herzliya annual the at 2003, 18, December unilateral disengagement; at the same event Foreign fired and parties ejected from the coalition due to in margin 60-40 a by withdrawal rejected Party Likud Sharon’s 2004, May a members’ vote. Withdrawal was consistently suppor of the public, 7 | Volume 20 | No. 3 | October 2017 October | 3 No. | 20 Volume | 6, 5/ 12344/44 0 ,/ . ,- +

In neither case was retreat a mere withdrawal of the product or purely domestic politics.

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8 * l urity Council ND THENDGAZA STRIP lements, home operation began als from southern southern from als teral withdrawal… nts, but US ofﬁcials ofﬁcials US but nts, i withdrawal to the d security aspects of of aspects security d The Israeli Ministry border, while Barak he withdrawals were were withdrawals he ouched Israelis of all operate, Israel turned turned Israel operate, ining equation of land land of equation ining agement; the Egyptian Egyptian the agement; 24 on tactically expedient expedient tactically on al disengagement. The The disengagement. al both withdrawals were were withdrawals both . Thus, withdrawal was was withdrawal Thus, . can negotiations between between negotiations can bureau chief Danny Yatom Yatom Danny chief bureau ts undertaken without the the without undertaken ts agreement was not sought sought not was agreement Israeli negotiators actually proposed an additiona 25 When prompted by the Israeli team for concessions, an | THE ISRAELI| WITHDRAWALS FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON A 26 Supporters and detractors alike framed the withdraw the framed alike detractors and Supporters the extensive Similarly, external involvement in the withdrawal from

OBGEIST PINFOLD 7 opposed, petitioning the Supreme Court and on one occasion forming a human chain from Gaza to Jerusalem. The evacuation on August 2005 15, and 2005. ended Though on scenes September of 11, residents being forcibly evicted from their homes t political stripes, the much-prophesized civil war did not materialize and attacks. there were no Palestinian shif policy i.e., “unilateral,” as Gaza and Lebanon t Though involved. actors opposing the of agreement barga Israeli previous from breaking unprecedented, while “unilateral”: strictly was neither peace, for underlining praxis and strategy the enemy, the from Then- parties. external with negotiations by shaped argues that the Lebanon withdrawal not “was a unila we coordinated with the UN, with the Americans.” of Foreign Affairs recommended conforming to UN Sec Resolution 425, widely interpreted to demand Israel co to refused Lebanon Because border. international to the UN, whose staff delineated the international aband to army the forcing objections, IDF overruled legitimacy international achieve to order in ground which UN, the of legitimization and cooperation full the with undertaken determined the depth of Israeli withdrawal. unilater of conception popular the contradicts Gaza diseng endorsed Bank World the and G8, the Quartet, coordinate Authority Palestinian the and government Israeli-Ameri Intensive Israel. with withdrawal the Ambassador Then-US contours. plan’s the defined 2004 February-March could this that Sharon to clear made “We recalls: Kurtzer Daniel Israel to not be Gaza only.” settleme seventeen from Bank West the in withdrawal rejected this option in favor of more limited withdrawal. Disengagement eventually encompassed four northern West Bank sett to 450 Israelis. American official stated: “We will make it clear that Israel will be allowed be will Israel that clear it make will “We stated: official American to keep the major [settlement] blocs, without going into detail what that

31 29 nally-focused, nally-focused, ND THENDGAZA STRIP was reinforced by by reinforced was zbollah, led to the he resettlement of tatus agreement to , the US would not th Israel, rewarding ued a letter to Sharon Sharon to letter a ued n on June 16, 2000. In In 2000. 16, June on n ed attacks in Shab’a , which occupied the ial concessions were ] shouldn’t be done.” be shouldn’t ] s against Israeli targets targets Israeli against s Sharon’s demand that: that: demand Sharon’s he Bush administration administration Bush he powered by its renewed renewed its by powered ugees should take place place take should ugees aeli-Syrian peace meant meant peace aeli-Syrian ther elements mitigated mitigated elements ther ralism” was coordinated coordinated was ralism” ttempts to kidnap Israeli Israeli kidnap to ttempts Thus despite the absence absence the despite Thus the UN concerning border border concerning UN the 27 Yet Israeli responses were in Yet fact often 30 | THE ISRAELI| WITHDRAWALS FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON A However, Hezbollah did not transform into an inter an into transform not did Hezbollah However, 28 Consequently, on April 14, 2004, President Bush iss Bush President 2004, 14, April on Consequently, legitimacy international from gained power soft The OBGEIST PINFOLD

means, and that the Palestinian resettlement of ref of resettlement Palestinian the that and means, state, not Israel.” in the Palestinian guaranteeing that the US other would plan” being oppose imposed “any initiatives. Peace Arab and Geneva the of fears Israeli assuaging Israel, on The letter pledged that the US would only support t Palestinian refugees outside of Israel. Furthermore potential legitimizing lines, 1967 5, June the to withdrawal Israeli demand T settlements. Bank West many of annexation Israeli therefore entered into a bargaining relationship wi disengagement by tailoring US positions on a final s reflect Israeli interests. In the cases of both Gaza and Lebanon, although Israeli decision makers broke conventional norms by failing to achieve a “unilate forces, hostile with withdrawal negotiated with external partners, in a bargain where territor guarantees. security and/or political for exchanged o with coordination Israel’s party, opposing the of the sense of unilateralism. Withdrawal of Aftermath The and Failures: Successes Lebano from withdrawal Israeli the validated UN The em Israel, withdrawal, the following months two the with complaints 199 filed legitimacy, international activity. non-violent political force, and instead concentrat Farms, a section of the Golan Heights conquered by Israel from Syria in over 1967 which Lebanon exercised a territorial claim, thus maintaining Isr of lack The movement. resistance a of image the that Syria had no interest in restraining Hezbollah attack Hezbollah Nevertheless, territory. evacuated to just 50 from 2000-June 2006. in 1999 from 1528 decreased drastically, attacks if fire” on set be will “Lebanon that warned Barak force: of threats continued after the withdrawal. Minister then-Prime by encapsulated as lackluster, Lebanon [in there done be to have doesn’t “whatever a Hezbollah multiple to respond to failures Israeli soldiers, followed by a successful kidnapping by He G

: 9

H 9 goals. a recalibration of a recalibration an act of weakness, Rather than represent Rather than represent withdrawal from Gaza from withdrawal established paradigms established paradigms no longer served stated of territorial control that of territorial control ND THENDGAZA STRIP and Lebanon represented represented Lebanon and ment facilitated l’s effectiveness: ed from 401 in 2005 e withdrawal itself: ost recently the seven seven the recently ost From 2005-2015, 140 140 2005-2015, From ket ﬁre from Gaza in engendered a higher 33 civilians died, denying denying died, civilians sed more fatalities than than fatalities more sed fore withdrawal – small small – withdrawal fore 162 Israelis were killed in in killed were Israelis 162

e facto authority had long long had authority facto e ed. hat hat 35 Thus, the post-disengagement emphasis emphasis post-disengagement the Thus, 34 | THE ISRAELI| WITHDRAWALS FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON A 32 In the eyes of many Israeli commentators, disengage The increase in rockets was boosted by the

OBGEIST PINFOLD G Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip from the Second Lebanon War in July-August 2006. Approximately 500 Hezbollah 500 Approximately 2006. July-August in War Lebanon Second Lebanese 1000 and soldiers, Israeli 121 combatants, war the Nevertheless, quiet. brought had withdrawal that perception the was more a failure of Israeli deterrence than of th would he that acknowledged Nasrallah Hassan Sheikh leader Hezbollah not have ordered the kidnapping had he known Israeli retaliation would be so severe. rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel, which increas – before the disengagement – to in 1722 2006, following the withdrawal. m combat, of rounds several prompted attacks Rocket with weeks 73 in Israelis the Palestinians and summer over of 1000 2014, be attack of methods preferred the However, killed. cau which attacks, suicide or bombs, roadside arms, disengagement. after steeply declined all – rockets whereas Gaza, from attacks by killed were Israelis withdrawal. before years five the on rocket fire was a direct product of the withdrawa impact high cost, low preferred their employ to unable were actors hostile generating in effective less was which fire, rocket to switched and attacks, casualties. In addition, the claim that withdrawal volume of rockets was not consistently correct: roc 2004 was higher than in 2006 and 2009-2012. t argued been has It 2007. in Authority Palestinian withdrawing by coup: the facilitated disengagement Hamas the prevent to unable was IDF the Gaza, from military takeover. Disengagement undoubtedly emboldened Hamas, removing direct IDF control inside the territory and increasing freedommovement of for the Islamistdisengagement only group.concerned the less However,than 20 percent of the territory that Israel still controll Had Israel retained a security presence in 2007, whether of dilemma the with faced been have still would makers decision d where territory, urban hostile dense, re-enter to been ceded to the Palestinians.

37 zog ND THENDGAZA STRIP allegation that d recognize that l from Gaza and ns. Israel’s goal of of goal Israel’s ns. ht “neither peace za were supported supported were za domestic politics. “considerations of equent inability to Netanyahu referred referred Netanyahu amed the Lebanon Israel with extensive extensive with Israel estic, pro-withdrawal pro-withdrawal estic, osition within Israel. state-building, failed Lebanon, IDF kinetic military potential and paradigms of territorial territorial of paradigms gaps between actualized actualized between gaps case studies can provide provide can studies case d Lebanon, hostile actors actors hostile Lebanon, d ﬂuencing policymaking. in 2015, then-leader of the 0pposition Yitzhak Her | THE ISRAELI| WITHDRAWALS FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON A 36 This narrative continues to frame the withdrawals as irrational 38 Disengagement did fail to meet some core expectatio core some meet to fail did Disengagement objectives, its met fully withdrawal neither While By contrast, this article seeks to demonstrate that in neither case was OBGEIST PINFOLD

relieving itself of responsibility for Gaza’s population, while motivating the Palestinian leadership to turn from violence to abjectly, as demonstrated by the Hamas coup and the because Israel controls access to Gaza by sea, land, and air, it continues to occupy the territory. Finally, in both Gaza and confronted have provocations continued to responses and legitimacy in gain net any that suggesting opprobrium, international tactical freedom was limited. and Implications Conclusions Ga and Lebanon southern from withdrawals the Though of failures actualized and perceived the opinion, popular of majority a by the policies generated signiﬁcant ex post facto opp Benjamin Minister Prime incumbent 2009, in Speaking to the Gaza disengagement as athat “mistake” broug nor security”; base.” rocket big “one into Strip Gaza the turned withdrawal that argued Similarly, Israeli military commentator Gal Luft fr withdrawal as strategically unsound, claiming that Sneh, Efraim interests.” strategic outweighed expediency and popularity the attributed administration, Barak’s during Defense of Minister Deputy dom of wailing” “populist the to withdrawal Lebanon groups. withdrawal a mere retreat or purely the product of harmful break and costs reduce to sought makers decision Israeli Instead, stalemates by altering tactics, leveraging Israeli an Gaza both In legitimacy. international realizing utilized the Israeli presence to escalate costs, in Rather than represent an act of weakness, withdrawa established of recalibration a represented Lebanon control that no longer served stated goals. and desired outcomes were also the result of a subs these Nevertheless, deterrence. effective establish relevant policy recommendations. Policymakers shoul and endemic of societal weakness. Y

J I

[ Z 6, 27, no. 1 27, Strategic ND THENDGAZA STRIP , June 5, 2000, he worldview of the the of worldview he erritory deemed not not deemed erritory , November 20, 2000, eempted significant uch as rocket fire. In Jane’s Intelligence constant reevaluation reevaluation constant Time y; territorial evacuation evacuation territorial y; Journal of Palestine Journal of Palestine calibration undermined undermined calibration vis-à-vis ongoing conflict conflict ongoing vis-à-vis The Iron Wall: Israel and the The Iron Wall: BBC News Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs Israel Journal of Foreign British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 2003). Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic (Tel Zion’s Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy Zion’s Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy New Rules of the Game: Israel and Hizbollah after Israel and South Lebanon: In the Absence of a Peace Treaty with Treaty Israel and South Lebanon: In the Absence of a Peace Withdrawing Under Fire: Lessons Learned from Islamist Under Withdrawing | THE ISRAELI| WITHDRAWALS FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON A (Virginia: Potomac Books, 2011). (Virginia: Potomac (London: Penguin, 2001), p. 427. 2001), (London: Penguin, 2, no. 1 (1999): 19-23; and Avi Shlaim, and Avi 19-23; 2, no. 1 (1999): 5 (1999). 5 (1999). 35, no. 2 (2006): 38-55, p. 39. (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1999). (Tel http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2056186,00.html. (2000): 24-47; for Barak’s position, see Freilich (2012b). for Barak’s position, see (2000): 24-47; no. 3 (2012b): 41-75. no. 3 (2012b): Conflict in Lebanon: The Search for an Alternative Approach to Security Process,” during the Peace Invasion, 2000 Withdrawal, and 2006 War,” and 2006 War,” Invasion, 2000 Withdrawal, Review Insurgencies Arab World Arab World Assessment Syria Withdrawal from Lebanon Withdrawal http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1032701.stm. (New York: Cornell University Press, 2012a). Cornell University (New York: Laboratory: Notes in the Wake of Disengagement,” of Disengagement,” Laboratory: Notes in the Wake Studies

OBGEIST PINFOLD Y 11 Author interview Mordechai, June 28, 2017. with Yitzhak 12 “The Time Had Come to End a Tragedy,” Lisa Beyer, 10 10 Israel’s Long Simon Murden, “Understanding Sharon’s stance, see For 9 The 1982 Freilich, “Israel in Lebanon — Getting It Wrong: Charles D. 7 Gleiss, Joshua 8 Ed Blanche, “Light at the End of Lebanon’s Tunnel?” withdrawal does not end involvement with a territor a with involvement end not does withdrawal is not a panacea for national security challenges s t transform withdrawal did Lebanon nor Gaza neither ability enemy’s the limit did retrenchment territorial though actor, hostile cases both Finally, form. particular a of least at intent, hostile actualize to represent the danger of path dependency: the prolonged continuation of a Thus, expired. long has usefulness whose policies policy sound for necessary is benefits and costs of re policy Lebanon, and Gaza both In territory. over a paradigm with declining strategic validity and pr t on expenditure capital economic and human further essential to the national interest. Notes 1 Shlomo Brom, 2 Daniel Sobelman, 5 Charles D. Freilich, 6 Asher Arian, “Israeli Public Opinion on Lebanon and Syria,” 3 million is from 2005; see Darryl Li, ‘The Gaza Strip as a The figure of 1.4 4 Hopeless in Gaza,” “Analysis: Martin Asser, (London: ND THENDGAZA STRIP Strategic Israel Journal of Warriors of God: Inside Warriors (London: Taylor and Francis, (London: Taylor A High Price: The Triumphs and A High Price: The Triumphs The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Israeli-Palestinian (New York: Random House, (New York: No. 450, 2001. Israel’s Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); 2011); Press, University Oxford York: (New . The Strategic Balance of Israel’s Withdrawal from The Strategic Balance of Israel’s Withdrawal (Conneticut: Praegar Security International, 2005). p. 242. , June 27, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ 2016, , June 27, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America Elusive Peace: Israel and Palestine: Peace Plans and Proposals from Oslo to Peace Israel and Palestine: , Molad: Center for Renewal of Israeli Democracy, http:// Democracy, , Molad: Center for Renewal of Israeli Jerusalem Viewpoints , July 27, 2000. , July 27, (Princeton: Markus Weiner, 2007). (Princeton: Markus Weiner, 4, no. 3 (2010): 33-44, 36. 4, no. 3 (2010): | THE ISRAELI| WITHDRAWALS FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON A New Rules of the Game 8, no. 3 (2005): 26-32. Israel’s Wars. al-Monitor A High Price, Penguin, 2005). Penguin, Associated Press 2013). 2013). Doves,” originals/2016/06/israel-left-camp-generals-shin-bet-the-gatekeepers-idf. html#ixzz4F1iOWFrj. 2011); for Gaza, see Anthony H. Cordesman, 2011); Escalating to Nowhere Assessment Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Foreign Affairs Foreign more For to be taken by both sides, prior final-status negotiations. information, see Ahron Bregman, Gaza (2015-2016) Counter-Terrorism Israeli of Failures of Perception for the Strategic Planning Division, see Joel Fishman, “Failure in the Context of Historically and Self-Deception: Israel’s Quest for Peace Related Cases,” Disengagement www.molad.org/images/upload/files/Disengagement-Eng-report-full_final- for-website.pdf. Beilin and Palestinian Yossi agreement pioneered by former Israeli minister Initiative is a final- Abd Rabbo. The Arab Peace Authority minister Yasir more details status proposal, endorsed by the Arab League in 2002. For see Galia Golan, OBGEIST PINFOLD

31 31 Ibid., p. 250. 30 30 Byman, 27 27 2017. June 7, Author interview with Dov Weislgass, 28 Over Lebanon Border,” “Israel Files 27 More Complaints with U.N. 29 29 Sobelman, 19 19 Mazal Muallem, “Why So Many of Israel’s Security Hawks have Become 24 2017. June 27, Author interview with Danny Yatom, 25 2017. January Author Interview 11, with Daniel Kurtzer, 26 Ahron Bregman, 20 20 Bregman, 21 2017. June 27, Author Interview with Danny Yatom, 22 Ibid. 23 Meir Elran, “The Domestic Effects of the Disengagement,” 13 13 the statistics on Lebanon, see Nicholas Blanford, For 18 18 advocated parallel, confidence-building measures The Roadmap for Peace 14 14 Ben-Sasson Gordis, Avishay 17 17 Later,” “The Gaza Disengagement: Five Years Joel Peters, 15 15 information on troops, see Daniel Byman, For 16 The Geneva Accord is an unofficial, proposed final status, Israeli-Palestinian Y

\ Z

] I . , August 10, , August 10, ND THENDGAZA STRIP Middle East The National , August 27, 2006, http://news. , August 27, , May 21, 2010, http://www.haaretz. 2010, , May 21, BBC News Haaretz The Strategic Balance of Israel’s Withdrawal from Gaza The Strategic Balance of Israel’s Withdrawal | THE ISRAELI| WITHDRAWALS FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON A , August 10, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel- 2015, , August 10, 7, no. 3 (2000): 13-20, http://www.meforum.org/70/israels-security- 13-20, (2000): 3 no. 7, Reuters com/why-i-opposed-israel-s-withdrawal-from-lebanon-1.291383. Quarterly zone-in-lebanon-a-tragedy; and Efraim Sneh, “Why Israel’s I Opposed from Lebanon,” Withdrawal bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5291420.stm. 2009, https://www.thenational.ae/uae/netanyahu-calls-gaza-withdrawal-a- mistake-1.539134. On,” gaza-disengagement-insight/shadow-of-israels-pullout-from-gaza-hangs- heavy-10-years-on-idUSKCN0QF1QQ20150810.

OBGEIST PINFOLD Y 33 Ibid. 34 Ben-Sasson Gordis, 37 37 Years “Shadow of Israel’s Pull-out From Gaza Hangs Heavy Ten Luke Baker, 38 Gal Luft, “Israel’s Security Zone in Lebanon: A Tragedy?” 35 35 Ibid. 36 Mistake,’” ‘a “Netanyahu Calls Gaza Withdrawal 32 32 “Nasrallah Sorry for Scale of War,”