I'lL (IDlYAF85RESTRICTED Vol. 2 Public Disclosure Authorized This report was prepored for use within the Bank and its affiliated organizations. Thny do not accept resmonsibility for its accuracy or completeness. The report may not be published nor may it be quoted as representing their views. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION Public Disclosure Authorized ~~ ~~ A ~?,f T-.7¶~T-hT T T T e fVt% 'T-Tr 1 - 7Tf1C ijfL1V1,.JIjk-n1 I I%- rklr U Jir1 L "XU1~ THE CONGO'S ECONOMY: EVOLUTION AND PROSPECTS. (in three volumes) ,Tr/T TT'XK7' TT Public Disclosure Authorized AGRICULTURE Africa Depaimen Public Disclosure Authorized -Africa Depa.rtment .CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS AND UNITS Fiom November 6, 1.961 to November 9,. 1963 UnitnC^ngolese fra-. (GF) US$ CF 64 From November 9, 1963 to June 23, 1967 Unit - Congolese fianc (CF) US$ 1 = CF 180 (selinig rate) TTC4U 1 - Ct 150 (bilx,rr ;i Atter June 23, 1967 Unit - Zaire (Z) equals 1, 000 CF US$ 1 ZO. 5 ThE CONGO'S ECONOMY: EVOLUTION AND PROSPECTS VOLUME II - AGRICULTURE TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. SULDARY AMTD CONCLUSIONS i-iii I. General Setting ..................................... 1 Introduction ..................................... 1 The Structure of Agriculture ................................ 3 II. Recent Developments in Agriculture .......................... 6 III. Agricultural Sorvicos and Prices ............................ 11 Organization and Staffing ................................... 11 Training and Research ................... 12 Incentives: The M4onetary Reform and Price Control .......... 14 Credit ...................................................... 16 Marketing Institutions ...................................... 18 Export Marketing ....................................... 18 Internal Marketing ..................................... 19 Marketing Boards ....................................... 20 IV. Product Analysis ............................................21 Robusta Coffee .............................................. 21 Arabica Coffee ..................... 21 Tea .... 22 Palrn oil ........................................... 23 Rubber ..... 21 l!rk Anc Wood andod--rt- ----- ==== ---------- 2), Cotton .......................... 25 Sutar ........ .... .. 26 Maize, Manioc, Rice .. 27 Meat and Meat Products .......-.................- e-R- ...... 28 Fish .. 29 V. Future Development of Agriculture .30 The 1968 Program and Budget .30 Futur'e Develou~pments-33 Project Possibilities. 3 APPENDICES Tables rhar-+ This volume ias prepared by Messrs. \V1OJ-LT^.;L - 1ydeHyPdor. (FAO), M. van Gent, and VOLUME III - Transport J.C. de Wilde. tIilt' f'AM, tVf4^iKTfT7i. *TT t1TAMTn Aln fnQD1ZO'C" I 1!! JI4UVrduv J 1 Ju'J.1D% vJr X VV&Mj% .L'.'±S .lJ i .L1.1j;.J j"j VOLUIYE II - AGRICULTURE S'Uri"iflflLR1ANTU01NUCLUSION 1. The Congo is a vast country with a broad range of ecological conditions capable Of supporting a diversified agriculture. Its agricul- tural, livestock, fisheries and forestry resources are very large but as yet inadequately exploited. At the same time the existence of a substan- tial mining and metallurgical, as well as a considerable manufacturing industry reduces the relative importance of agriculture to the econcmy. Thus in 1966, the agricultural and related sectors contributed only 22 percent of GDP at factor cost even though they provided a livelihood for over two-thirds of the population. However, in 1959, when agricultural output was much greater, it accounted for nearly 33 percent of GDP. 2. The revival of agricultural production is critical to the future evolution of the country's economy, since the agricultural sector has been most adversely affected by the internal disturbances and insecurity which have characterized the post-independence period until recently. In 1966, when there was already some recovery from the lowest levels reached in the preceding year, output was still 29 percent below that in 1959. Congolese peasants reverted largely to subsistence production, greatly curtailing the supply of foodstuffs and cotton to the market and making the country increasingly dependent on imports. Similarly, commercial enterprises in the fieldsof agriculture, livestock, fisheries and forestry found it difficult to operate. Thus the actual volume of products marketed in 1966 was only 61 percent of that in 1959. 3. Since 1965 there has been a slow recovery of production which was interrupted by the mercenary uprising in mid-1967 but appears now to be gaining considerable momentum. The gradual restoration of security in the country is the principal factor in this revival. However, the monetary reform of June 1967 has also helped by improving somewhat the incentives to produce and export. A significant spontaneous increase in production can be exnected in the next few years provided internal security is assured and a renewed inflation prevented, and, above all, nrovided an effective attack on existing and potential transnort bottle- necks is mounted. Improvement of the existing deplorable conditions of road and inland water transnnot is, the most imnorttnt. nontri'bition which the Government can make to the revival of output in the years immediately n h-en d- 4 Govetm.entpolic--- relatt., Lo agric-lbuze r.ust -.e in+ account the very significant actual and potential roles which the "co^m.rcal"asdisin+ fro. +)-.e "peas&+" sec+or play ;- +he eelp ment of the country's production and exports. This commercial sector cor.sis+s ofP redor na.t,l4y fore.n-o4 n corporate --ar.dirdiviml entne-= prises engaged in the cultivation of plantation crops, the raising of 1~~~~34.v+a.kZn .......->l....h _.P....... r_._2 . -.r--n^ >--... _hir . ,r-__ ........Tn1n - ii - large and medium enterprises of this type accounted for 80 to 90 percent of the nroduction of nerennial crons and 60 nercent of the foreign ex- change earnings derived from the agricultural sector as a whole. Although the output of these enterpr4ses as t'1ired 9ter 4n ndee-nri e and a considerable proportion of individual entrepreneurs abandoned the country, there isno r to beiv -h. t.4i relative importance hs been diminished. Corporate enterprise in particular has maintained its out- T puti+. ton n re.n ka' degre.a here 4is evie.c +ha+ the ,4mmal seto can be expected to increase its production considerably provided security nanA- t or.s nd o+her+n factorA-- . ;_ ,vestf,.nt14,-+a nar a However, some enterprises which have suffered severe damage during the 4 nt zma A4 1. A S P;Az54-- "nV A U.lsturDaCes oL lChue paS1E n;eed Special gove.LiiXment assi VGAce for their rehabilitation. Many others can undertake the necessary re- hablitationUU41 e.± jJd4±pvi.LUUded tleU y have access t Ucredit;U.L .I tu provision of such credits would be greatly facilitated if the current project .. o .rte estabLU±±JUIsL4mIe Uof a UdV.lop1,ient firn.cL .stLitJ.L LU4t were realized. 5. Although the peasant sector is also evidencing signs of a spontaneous revival, it ia important that the Government be enabled as rapidly as possible to carry out projects that would directly stimulate output. However, owing to an insufficiency oI qualified personnel and deficiencies in management and organization, the Ministry of Agriculture will for some time have only an extremely limited capacity to undertake development. Under the circumstances it will have to concentrate on working out and undertaking a rather modest number of projects designed to increase the production of particular crops in narrowly delimited areas where there is a good production potential and demand conditions are favorable. Initially, food crops and fishery projects in or near food deficit areas should receive primary emphasis. The Ministry of Agriculture needs foreign technical assistance to enable it to elaborate and carry out these projects. Agricultural credit will undoubtedly be needed but in a form which is geared closely to the implementation of specific crop programs in designated areas. 6. In view of its own limited capacity the Ministry of Agriculture should actively explore - again with foreign technical assistance - the possibility of using existing private enterprise and quasi-public organi- zations for elaborating and carrying out other projects on its behalf. There are a number of enterprises and organizations that might play a use- ful role in this respect. In particular it is vital that cotton marketing and ginning companies be utilized in a campaign to promote the production of cotton, which used to be the most widely grown cash crop and has in recent years been largely imported. 7. In the longer run it is necessary to increase the capability of the Ministry of Agriculture, especially for enhancing the share of the peasants in commercial agriculture. This capability can probably be improved somewhat by a more effective organization of the Ministry and re- inforcing technical assistance. For the most part, however, improvement depends on the education and trainina of more qualified staff. Fortunately, a gradual increase in the availability of such staff can be expected. - iii- Existing limitations appear to be due not to a lack of facilities for training and education, but rather to the failure to attract enough candidates and to give them a sufficiently practical orientation. T rlt-T, T QVrr Tf 2 Tntroduction 1. The Congo, straddling the equator, is a vast country with varied Uerrai" rang±zng from, tropical raun f'orest to savariili adu coo'l hlghU.ands. It has a broad spectrum of climate and soil which permits the