Balkan Data Descriptions

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Balkan Data Descriptions Balkan data descriptions Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and Territorial Defence (TO) Tito established a two-tier military structure in response to concerns over a Soviet invasion; the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and the Territorial Defence (TO). The TO was a much larger force, in theory able to call upon 1.2 million soldiers nationwide, and was organised as a force which would act alongside the JNA. Towards the end of the 1980s, it was becoming clear that the TO was transforming itself into autonomous militaries answering to the republics. In effect, the republican TOs were becoming threats to the JNA. The JNA became the Yugoslav Army (VJ), or Vojska Jugoslavijia, with the reconstitution of Yugoslavia into the republics of Montenegro and Serbia. Croatia (source: Central Intelligence Agency: Office of Russian European Analysis. Balkan Battlegrounds: A military history of the Yugoslav Conflicts, 1990-1995, Vols. I and II: Washington DC) Croatian forces The Croatian Army (Hrvatska Vojska) evolved from the National Guard Corps, or Zbor Narodne Garde (ZNG), the force established after Tudjman’s new government came to power in May 1990. The Croatian Ministry of Defence also established regional Special Police units which numbered 10,000 active and reserve personnel by 1991. Croatian paramilitary groups were also active in the fighting. Croatian Serbs Forces in the Serb Autonomous areas (SAOs) of Croatia were a mixture of Territorial Defence units organised within each SAO, paramilitary groups from Serbia, the JNA, and Special Units controlled by the State Serbian Security Service. Territorial Defence units were established in the Serbian Autonomous Regions in Croatia in 1991. The Serbian Automous Region (SAR) of Krajina was established in December 1990. The local militia, later renamed as the SAR Krajina Serb Territorial Defence, received arms from the Serbian State Security Service (SDB). Later, the Krajina Serb Army (SVK) comprised the Krajina Serb Territorial Defence force, the principle fighting force during the war with Croatia, and Serbian JNA units “abandoned” by the JNA after its withdrawal in May 1992. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministarstvo Unutrasnje Poslova - MUP) Special Police also participated in the fighting. Other Territorial Defence forces were established in the SAOs of Western Slavonia and Eastern Slavonia-Baranja-Western Srem. The ‘Special Units’ in the SAO of Krajina helped to train and command the Krajina units in their classes with the Croatian Armed Forces. Serbian Volunteer Units (Serbian paramilitaries) Serbian Volunteer Units were an important means of arming the Croatian Serbs. They acted as elite mobile units, moving wherever they were needed. The JNA used volunteers in its fight against Croats, notably at Vukovar. The paramilitary groups were supported by nationalist groups in Serbia. One of the most infamous -and disciplined- groups was the Serbian Volunteer Guard, also known as ‘Arkan’s Tigers’. The Tigers were organised in October 1990 by the Department for State Security of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP), and numbered around 600 men in 1991 at the time of fighting in eastern Slavonia. The ‘Tigers’ also frequently fought alongside SAR Krajina forces. Bosnia and Hercegovina (source: Central Intelligence Agency: Office of Russian European Analysis. Balkan Battlegrounds: A military history of the Yugoslav Conflicts, 1990-1995, Vol. I and II: Washington DC) In Bosnia, Serb forces were often a mixture of Bosnian Serb troops, the JNA and paramilitary units from Serbia. Croatian Serbs also fought on occasion with the Bosnian Serbs. In the data, “Serbian Irregulars, Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina” refers to Bosnian Serb forces (VRS). Where identified, the JNA and paramilitary units are named. Where separate units are not identified, the Serb actors are referred to as “Serb forces.” Croatian forces are named as “Croatian Irregulars, Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina.” Muslim forces are represented by two groups: the “Bosnian Army” and the “Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia.” Serb Forces The Territorial Defence (TO) – BiH’s republican force - was dominated by Serbs. When fighting broke out between the three ethnic groups, the TO fell apart. When Bosnia disintegrated, the Bosnian Serbs inherited much of the JNA’s equipment and infrastructure in Bosnia. In April 1992, on the eve of fighting, Bosnian Serb and federal forces comprised four groups: the JNA, volunteer units recruited by the JNA (which later became the Yugoslav Army), municipal Bosnian Serb Territorial Defence (TO) detachments, and Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs police forces. The Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) was officially formed on 20 May 1992. Throughout the fighting, it received assistance in the form of manpower, fuel and ammunition. Serb forces numbered 200,000 at the start of the war. Support for the Bosnian Serb Army came from the VJ (Vojska Jugoslavija – Yugoslav Army). Forces in the Bihac areas were also supplemented by the State Security Department (Rezor Drzavne Bezbednosti - RDB), the Krajina Serb Army (SVK) and the APWB army. The SVK was formed from the Krajina Serb Territorial Defence force, the principle fighting force during the war with Croatia, and Serbian JNA units “abandoned” by the JNA after its withdrawal in May 1992. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, or Ministarstvo Unutrasnje Poslova (MUP) Special Police also participated in the fighting. Serbian Volunteer Units (Serbian paramilitaries) As in Croatia, Serbian Volunteer Units were active in Bosnia. Serbian irregular groups are not always independently identified, but certain groups are more active and recognised than others. The most infamous -and disciplined- group was the Serbian Volunteer Guard, also known as “Arkan’s Tigers”. Another paramilitary units were the “Serbian Chetnik Movement,” organised by Serbian Radical Party leader Vojislav Seselj; and the “Red Beret” special operations troops led by “Frenki” Simatovic and comprised of crack Serbian RDB/MUP units. Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina / Muslim forces The Bosnian Muslims established the Patriotic League in February 1991 numbering 40,000 armed personnel (CIA) which was subsequently incorporated into the reorganized Territorial Defence in April 1992. At the start of the war, the Bosnian government had around 100,000 men. The Bosnian Army or Armija Republika Bosna I Hercegovina (ARBiH) was initially a band of armed civilians which was gradually transformed into a proper army during 1993. At its height, the ARBiH numbered over 260,000 troops. Some brigades within the ARBiH were “armed criminal gangs.” Elite Special Police battalions from the Interior Ministry also assisted in some offensives. The Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia (APWB), in the Bihac region, was declared by Fikret Abdic in September 1993, following a split with the Sarajevo government. The ‘Army’ of the APWB was composed of two defected ARBiH brigades, raised from the Velika Kladusa area. At times, the Bosnian Serbs exploited the existence of two Muslim forces, and supplied the APWB with small arms. By the end of 1993, Abdic’s forces numbered 5000 – 10,000 fighters, drawn from the two defected brigades and his followers. Bosnian Croat Forces Bosnian Croat military was initially divided along party lines: The Croatian Armed Forces (HOS) aligned to the HSP party; and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) – also known as the Bosnian Croat Army - to the HDZ party. The HOS had 5000 fighters, including some Bosnian Muslims. Initially rivals, the HVO became dominant as the conflict progressed, thanks to support from, and its subordination to, the Croatian Army. The HVO was less appealing to Bosnian Muslims due to its goals of partitioning BiH. The combined forces of the Croatian militias at the start of the war numbered around 25,000 men. In 1993, the Bosnian Croat army was still an adjunct to the Croatian Army. Croatian Paramilitaries… Macedonia (Source: Hislope, Robert. 2003. ‘Between a bad place and a good war: insights and lessons from the almost-war in Macedonia. Ethnic and Racial Studies. 26:1. 129-151. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870022000025306 ) National Liberation Army (Albanian minority) The National Liberation Army (NLA), or UCK (Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombëtare) first emerged in early 2001, calling for greater rights for the ethnic Albanian minority in Macedonia. The NLA’s first recourse to violence (and thus the start of the Macedonian conflict) took place in February 2001 at the same time as the official demarcation of the border with Serbia. The rebels attacked Macedonian security forces after they entered the border village of Tanusevci (Hislope 2003). Much of the leadership and resources of the NLA came from Kosovo, particularly former Kosovo Libration Army (KLA) members (ibid). Armed hostilities officially ended in August 2001 with the signing of the Ohrid agreement. Republic of Macedonia forces The Macedonian Army (ARM) was formed in 1992 after the withdrawal of the JNA. At the time of the conflict the ARM was said to be poorly equipped and trained (Zoran Kusovac ‘Macedonian Army lacks strength’, Janes.com1). The Special Forces of the Macedonian army, the “Wolves”, were sent to assist the border controls at the areas of Dolno and Gorno Blace, Kodra Fura observation post, Tanusevci and Lojane (International Crisis Group, ‘The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion,’ 5 April 20012). Kosovo (source: Kosovo/Kosova as seen, as told. 1999. Organization for Security and Co- operation
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