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On the Reception and Detection of Pseudo-Profound Bullshit

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On the Reception and Detection of Pseudo-Profound Bullshit Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 10, No. 6, November 2015, pp. 549–563 On the reception and detection of pseudo-profound bullshit Gordon Pennycook∗ James Allan Cheyne† Nathaniel Barr‡ Derek J. Koehler† Jonathan A. Fugelsang† Abstract Although bullshit is common in everyday life and has attracted attention from philosophers, its reception (critical or ingen- uous) has not, to our knowledge, been subject to empirical investigation. Here we focus on pseudo-profound bullshit, which consists of seemingly impressive assertions that are presented as true and meaningful but are actually vacuous. We presented participants with bullshit statements consisting of buzzwords randomly organized into statements with syntactic structure but no discernible meaning (e.g., “Wholeness quiets infinite phenomena”). Across multiple studies, the propensity to judge bull- shit statements as profound was associated with a variety of conceptually relevant variables (e.g., intuitive cognitive style, supernatural belief). Parallel associations were less evident among profundity judgments for more conventionally profound (e.g., “A wet person does not fear the rain”) or mundane (e.g., “Newborn babies require constant attention”) statements. These results support the idea that some people are more receptive to this type of bullshit and that detecting it is not merely a matter of indiscriminate skepticism but rather a discernment of deceptive vagueness in otherwise impressive sounding claims. Our re- sults also suggest that a bias toward accepting statements as true may be an important component of pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity. Keywords: bullshit, bullshit detection, dual-process theories, analytic thinking, supernatural beliefs, religiosity, conspiratorial ideation, complementary and alternative medicine. 1 Introduction 2 Pseudo-profound bullshit “It is impossible for someone to lie unless he thinks he The Oxford English Dictionary defines bullshit as, simply, knows the truth. Producing bullshit requires no such con- “rubbish” and “nonsense”, which unfortunately does not get viction.” – Harry Frankfurt to the core of bullshit. Consider the following statement: In On Bullshit, the philosopher Frankfurt (2005) defines “Hidden meaning transforms unparalleled ab- bullshit as something that is designed to impress but that stract beauty.” was constructed absent direct concern for the truth. This Although this statement may seem to convey some sort of distinguishes bullshit from lying, which entails a deliberate potentially profound meaning, it is merely a collection of manipulation and subversion of truth (as understood by the buzzwords put together randomly in a sentence that retains liar). There is little question that bullshit is a real and con- syntactic structure. The bullshit statement is not merely non- sequential phenomenon. Indeed, given the rise of commu- sense, as would also be true of the following, which is not nication technology and the associated increase in the avail- bullshit: ability of information from a variety of sources, both expert and otherwise, bullshit may be more pervasive than ever be- “Unparalleled transforms meaning beauty hidden fore. Despite these seemingly commonplace observations, abstract”. we know of no psychological research on bullshit. Are peo- ple able to detect blatant bullshit? Who is most likely to fall The syntactic structure of a), unlike b), implies that it was prey to bullshit and why? constructed to communicate something. Thus, bullshit, in contrast to mere nonsense, is something that implies but does not contain adequate meaning or truth. This sort of Funding for this study was provided by the Natural Sciences and En- phenomenon is similar to what Buekens and Boudry (2015) gineering Research Council of Canada. Copyright: © 2015. The authors license this article under the terms of referred to as obscurantism (p. 1): “[when] the speaker... the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. [sets] up a game of verbal smoke and mirrors to suggest ∗Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, 200 Univer- depth and insight where none exists.” Our focus, however, is sity Avenue West, Waterloo ON, Canada, N2L 3G1. Email: gpen- [email protected]. somewhat different from what is found in the philosophy of †Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo. bullshit and related phenomena (e.g., Black, 1983; Buekens ‡The School of Humanities and Creativity, Sheridan College. & Boudry, 2015; Frankfurt; 2005). Whereas philosophers 549 Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 10, No. 6, November 2015 Bullshit receptivity 550 have been primarily concerned with the goals and intentions 3 Bullshit receptivity of the bullshitter, we are interested in the factors that pre- dispose one to become or to resist becoming a bullshittee. What might cause someone to erroneously rate pseudo- Moreover, this sort of bullshit – which we refer to here as profound bullshit as profound? In our view, there are two pseudo-profound bullshit – may be one of many different candidate mechanisms that might explain a general “recep- types. We focus on pseudo-profound bullshit because it rep- tivity” to bullshit. The first mechanism relates to the pos- resents a rather extreme point on what could be considered sibility that some people may have a stronger bias toward a spectrum of bullshit. We can say quite confidently that the accepting things as true or meaningful from the outset. Ac- above example (a) is bullshit, but one might also label an cording to Gilbert (1991, following Spinoza), humans must exaggerated story told over drinks to be bullshit. In future first believe something to comprehend it. In keeping with studies on bullshit, it will be important to define the type of this hypothesis, Gilbert, Tafarodi and Malone (1993) found bullshit under investigation (see Discussion for further com- that depleting cognitive resources caused participants to er- ment on this issue). roneously believe information that was tagged as false. This Importantly, pseudo-profound bullshit is not trivial. For a indicates that people have a response bias toward accepting real-world example of pseudo-profound bullshit and an ap- something as true. This asymmetry between belief and un- plication of our logic, consider the following: belief may partially explain the prevalence of bullshit; we are biased toward accepting bullshit as true and it there- fore requires additional processing to overcome this bias. “Attention and intention are the mechanics of Nonetheless, it should be noted that previous work on belief manifestation.” and doubt focused on meaningful propositions such as “The heart produces all mental activity.” The startling possibility This statement bears a striking resemblance to (a), but is with respect to pseudo-profound bullshit is that people will (presumably) not a random collection of words. Rather, it first accept the bullshit as true (or meaningful) and, depend- is an actual “tweet” sent by Deepak Chopra, M.D., who has ing on downstream cognitive mechanisms such as conflict authored numerous books with titles such as Quantum Heal- detection (discussed below), either retain a default sense of ing (Chopra, 1989) and The Soul of Leadership (Chopra, meaningfulness or invoke deliberative reasoning to assess 2008) and who has been accused of furthering “woo-woo the truth (or meaningfulness) of the proposition. In terms nonsense” (i.e., pseudo-profound bullshit; e.g., Shermer, of individual differences, then, it is possible that some indi- 2010). The connection between (a) and (c) is not inci- viduals approach pseudo-profound bullshit with a stronger dental, as (a) was derived using the very buzzwords from initial expectation for meaningfulness. However, since this Chopra’s “Twitter” feed.1 The vagueness of (c) indicates aspect of bullshit receptivity relates to one’s mindset when that it may have been constructed to impress upon the reader approaching (or being approached with) bullshit, it is there- some sense of profundity at the expense of a clear exposition fore not specific to bullshit. Nonetheless, it may be an im- of meaning or truth. portant component of bullshit receptivity. Put differently, Despite the lack of direct concern for truth noted by some individuals may have an excessively “open” mind that Frankfurt (2005), pseudo-profound bullshit betrays a con- biases them to make inflated judgments of profundity, re- cern for verisimilitude or truthiness. We argue that an im- gardless of the content. portant adjutant of pseudo-profound bullshit is vagueness The second mechanism relates to a potential inability to which, combined with a generally charitable attitude toward detect bullshit, which may cause one to confuse vagueness ambiguity, may be exacerbated by the nature of recent me- for profundity. In the words of Sperber (2010): “All too dia. As a prime example, the necessary succinctness and often, what readers do is judge profound what they have rapidity of “Twitter” (140 characters per “Tweet”) may be failed to grasp” (p. 583). Here, the bullshittee is simply un- particularly conducive to the promulgation of bullshit. Im- aware that the relevant stimulus requires special considera- portantly, vagueness and meaning are, by definition, at cross tion. This mechanism is linked to what has been labelled as purposes, as the inclusion of vagueness obscures the mean- “conflict monitoring” failures (e.g., De Neys, 2014; Penny- ing of the statement and therefore must undermine or mask cook, Fugelsang & Koehler, 2015). In the context of reason- “deep meaning”
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