DOCSLIB.ORG

NTERVIEW: WILLIAM COLBY a Somewhat Candid Conversation with the Former Director of the Cia

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
NTERVIEW: WILLIAM COLBY a Somewhat Candid Conversation with the Former Director of the Cia /(767 PLAYBOY►I NTERVIEW: WILLIAM COLBY a somewhat candid conversation with the former director of the cia William Colby is cast in the grand Division. After five years in that job, he to dosing people with mind-control mold: Princetonian, soldier, lawyer, spy. was recruited as deputy head of CORDS, drugs, to domestic spying. During the He-served as a commando paratrooper in the over-all structure under which the hearings, posters went up around-Wash- France cirid-korway during World War infamous Phoenix program was carried ington showing Colby as the ace of Two and with the Office of Strategic out. Since CORDS was run by the State spades and accusing him of assassinat- Services, the precursor of the Central Department, Colby took a "leave without ing 20,000 people under the Phoenix Intelligence Agency. For those extremely pay" from CIA. When he returned to program. dangerous missions—dropping behind Washington in 1971, due to the serious His tenure as director was continuously enemy lines and blowing up railroad (and ultimately fatal) illness of his plagued with bad publicity. At one press tracks—Colby won the Bronze Star, the daughter, he rejoined CIA and, in 1972, meeting, he told a group of editors that Croix de, guerre, the Silver Star and was given the job of executive director- CIA did not use American newsmen as Saint Olaf's Medal. Thinking he was go- comptroller—a seemingly dull job that, spies. Later, he checked, found that the ing to pursue a legal career, he returned in fact, gave Colby a rare overview of agency had used some newsmen and to school after the war and practiced the agency and its inner workings. called back to report this to the press. law for three years. Then along came the Under James Schlesinger's short re- The story was immediately reported un- fledgling CIA and Colby was recruited. gime as CIA director, Colby was made der banner headlines, and thus began the His first overseas assignment, in 1951, was deputy director of operations. When furor over CIA use of journalists that as political attache to the Stockholm Em- Attorney General Richard Kleindienst continues to this day. During his final bassy, a cover for intelligence work in had to resign as a result of Watergate, year in that office, Colby sometimes spent Scandinavia. In 1953, he was transferred Schlesinger became Secretary of Defense. as much time testifying about CIA's to Rome, where Clare Booth Luce was President Nixon then gave Colby the activities as he did Ambassador to Italy. One mission there nod to head the world's most widely running the agency. was to intervene in Italian politics in an publicized intelligence service. It was not And when The New York Times re- attempt to keep the Communists from destined to be easy at the top. vealed some of the details of The Fam- taking over. This much-criticized opera- At the time of the Senate hearings to ily Jewels in a December 1974 story, the tion involved pouring vast sums of confirm his appointment, Colby was re- lid blew off. Colby knew that his career money (officially, several million dollars) lentlessly grilled about The Family was over. It was just a matter of time— into the Italian political arena. Jewels—a secret 693-page report ordered and of taking the heat for Watergate, Colby arrived for his first Vietnam by Schlesinger, directed by Colby and Chile, domestic spying and just about tour in 1959 to take a position as deputy compiled by CIA's own Inspector Gen- everything else that could be dragged chief of station at Saigon. In 1960, he eral's Office. It dealt with what Colby into the House and Senate hearings. On was moved up to chief of station and in calls "some mistakes"—specifically CIA November 2, 1975, President Gerald 1962 became head of CIA's Far East abuses ranging from assassination plans Ford fired Colby in the traditional way: "I think it is quite possible [that a "I don't have a problem with the moral "It's important that people like myself nuclear weapon will be exploded in an justification that if a man is a tyrant, speak out, yet not conceal the fact that aggressive manner]. A single shot, two then somebody under him has the right there are spies and that there need to be; shots, are quite possible in the next to shoot him. But that doesn't mean a that in the past 20 years CIA has made ten years." separate country has a right to do it." some mistakes—sure." 69 M He offered him another job, which on tape about Watergate and it was with coffee. Occasionally, she would re- 0 Colby turned down. resoundingly dull. Colby seemed to have turn with more hot coffee, smiling To find out what a major intelligence absolutely no recollection of certain as- brightly. To begin, I asked a question 111 officer would be willing—or be allowed— pects of the case and absolutely nothing about something that had always in- it say about America's most mysterious to say about others. For example, fames trigued me." al and notorious branch of service, we sent McCord was the man who left the piece Articles Editor Lautsece Gowenlen, who for of tape on the door—which led to the PLAYBOY: What was it like to be the head years has written on intelligence-related discovery of the burglars in the act. But of CIA and really know what's going on? al matters for PLAYBOY, to talk with him. McCord was an excellent CIA security COLBY: Wonderful! The biggest change Gonzales' report: officer, bringing up the question of how in my life, frankly, was the day I walked "I first determined to interview Colby he could do something that stupid—or out of CIA Headquarters at Langley about two years ago, when I _appeared and no longer read "The Morning . • . whether, perhaps, McCord's act Was in- oft- ft-telszniton show and learned from tentional. Colby, in responding_to this, News." I work very hard now to try to the moderator TIRit he had had Colby as merely shrugged and allowed thatMc- keep up with what's happening in the a guest. During the course of their talks, Cord was probably an all-right security rest of the world and I know I'm not in Colby had said that - CIA had never officer. Period. In general, there seem to the same ball park in terms of what I assassinated anybody. I wanted to look be whole areas that Colby has made a knew then. in his eyes and have him repeat that. personal policy decision not to think PLAYBOY: What is "The Morning News"? When we finally sat down over a tape about. He told me that he purposely COUIY: An attempt to encapsulate the recorder, I learned what a master of didn't read certain controversial CIA- major events of the previous day. It's language he was and how well his years related books, so that he wouldn't have really very good. I made it into a news- of answering hostile questions had served to talk about them. On the face of it, paper, because I found that a very use- him. Questioning Colby was like talking this seems to contrast with the ample ful way to present information, with to a man who has something hidden in evidence of research in 'Honorable Men,' headlines and all the rest. his pocket. You must guess what it is. Colby's recent book published by Simon PLAYBOY: You're now retired, but people You have no clues and your question i!i! Schuster. The careful reader will also may wonder: Has he really retired? must be exactly right—close doesn't Once CIA, always CIA, as they say. count. If it is a piece of gold and you ask COLBY: I have two connections at CIA, if it is money, you will learn nothing. my pension and my secrecy agreement. And if you happen on the right answer, "CIA is the best I hope I keep both. the man is bound by an oath not to tell PLAYBOY: Do you still consult with CIA? you that you have guessed correctly. intelligence service in the COLBY: I canceled my clearance the day "CIA's reality is different from our I left office. I have not seen one classi- reality. Widely publicized all over the world. The Soviets did some fied bit of information since I left. Oh, world was the fact that CIA built a brilliant work years ago, both former director George Bush and spy ship called the Glomar Explorer to current director Admiral Stansfield raise a sunken Russian Golf Class sub- but I don't think they're Turner have asked me to speak at their marine. Yet Colby, under his secrecy training courses. I've seen them for little agreement, is not allowed to talk about doing that well now." chats; they've picked my brain. And what is common knowledge to the rest every now and again I call up over there of the world. Officially, to him, the story and pass along somebody who's inter- ested in having his name dropped in for does not exist. It is very 1989. notice certain inconsistencies or even in- "During the interview, Colby often accuracies in some of Colby's statements. possible employment. would pause after hearing a question and Although many were challenged, I have PLAYBOY: What is CIA, as you would define it? think for a long time—sometimes 90 no way of knowing what Colby's sources COLBY: CIA is part of the United States seconds or more.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Church Committee, the CIA, and the Intelligence Dimension of US
    13 Unquiet Americans: The Church Committee, the CIA, and the Intelligence Dimension of U.S. Public Diplomacy in the 1970s Paul M. McGarr On September 13, 1974, William E. Colby, the Director of U.S Central Intelligence, stood before the annual conference of the Fund for Peace, a Washington D.C. based non- profit institution, concerned with security and development in the global south. Speaking in the context of a post-Watergate political climate heavily laden with conspiracism and suspicion, Colby surprised his audience by making a case for greater “openness” and transparency on the part of the Central Intelligence Agency. Alluding to CIA-led interventions stretching back to the late 1940s, that had sought to effect regime change in Italy, Iran, Guatemala, Indonesia, the Congo, and Cuba, amongst others, Colby acknowledged the Agency’s record in, “assist[ing] America’s friends against her adversaries in their contest for control of a foreign nation’s political direction.” Remarkably, America’s spymaster went on to publicly defend the utility of CIA interference in the internal affairs of independent sovereign states. “I . would think it mistaken to deprive our nation of the possibility of some moderate covert action response to a foreign problem,” Colby volunteered, “and leave us with nothing between a diplomatic protest and sending in the Marines.”1 In India, where the CIA had been under a media microscope since 1967, when the American magazine Ramparts exposed the Agency’s longstanding financial relationships with an international network of anti- communist educational and cultural bodies, Colby’s candor, in the words of U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Reflections of Dcls Colby and Helms on the CIA's
    APPROVED FOR RELEASE - DATE: FEB 2008 Oral History Reflections of DCls Colby and Helms on the CIA’S “Time of Troubles” (U) From the CIA Oral History Archives On 26 June 2007 the CIA released a 700-pagecollection of documents known as the ”FamilyJewels,” com- piled in 1973 under Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)James Schlesinger, who had asked Agency employ- ees to report activities they thought might be inconsistent with the Agency’s charter. Schlesingerk successor, William Colby, delivered the documents to Congress. Given the release of the “‘FamilyJewels” documents and continuing interest in this aspect of CIA history, the Studies in Intelligence Editorial Board elected to publish portions of transcripts of CIA Oral History Program iritcrviews of William Colby and Richard Hdms. Schlesingers predecessor. on this period of the Agency5 history. Colby and Helms were interviewed on 15 March and 2 February 1988. respectively, as part of an effort by the Center for the Study of Intelligence to compile the perspectives of former Agency leaders on what has often bem termed the CIA ’s “Timeof Troubles”in the 1970s. The perspectives of these two officials, different in sev- eral rcspccts. illustrate the dilemmas a secret intelligence agency facm in serving a democracy. The transcripts were edited by Nicholas Dujmovic, director of the CIA Oral History Program-Editor The Origins and Context of the “Family Jewels” Interviewer (liereafler iri italics) to both DCIs: There is some indication that younger Agency officers were trnubled by some domestic practices in the years before 1973. William Colby. There were Richard Helms. I think concerns during the period what these junior officers of the anti-war movement, were alleged to have been 1968 to 1972, among some concerned about was the of the people as to whether whole issue of whether or we were going outside our not the Agency had a role in charter.
    [Show full text]
  • Nomination of William E. Colby Hearing Committee On
    NOMINATION OF WILLIAM E. COLBY HEARING BEFORE TIE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON NOMINATION OF WILLIAMl E. COLBY TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE JULY 2, 20, AND 25, 1973 Printed fdr the use of the Committee on Armed Services U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 99-275 WASHINGTON : 1978 REST COPY AVAILABLE 5 1o/-- .I7 ", f COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES JOHN C. ST)NNIS, Mississippi, Chairman STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri STROM THUR-MOND, South Carolina HtENRY M. JACKSON, Washington JOHN TOWER, Texas SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina PETER H. DOMINICK, Colorado HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada BARRY-GOLDWATER, Arizona THOMAS J. .IcINTYRE, New Hampshire WILLIAM% SAXBE, Ohio HARRY F. BYRD, JR., Virginia WILLIAM L. SCOTT, Virginia HAROLD E. HUGHES, Iowa SAM NUNN, Georgia T. EDWARD BRABWILL, Jr., Ohief Coudtte! and Staff Direotor' JOHN T. Ticn, Chief Clerk (I) CONTENTS Page William E. Colbii to be Director of Central Intelligence --------------- 2 119 lion. Robert F. rinan, U.S. Representative from Massachusetts ------- 31 Samuel A. Adams ------------------------------------------------ 55 Paul Sakwa ------------------------------------------------------ 84 David' Sheridan Harrington ---------------------------------------- 95 Kcnneth Barton Osborn ------------------------------------------- 101 (l11) NOMINATION OF WILLIAM E. COLBY MONDAY, JULY O, 1973 U.S. -SENATE, (.70MM i'rTEEi~ oN AIn1EI SERVICF.S, 1Va.hhngton, I).C'. The'committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in. room 318, Richard B. Russell Senate Office Building, Ion. Stuart Symington (acting chairman). ]Present : Senator Symington (presiding). Also resti: T. Edwar(TBraswell, Jr., chief counsel and stall direc- tor; John. T. ''ieer, chief clerk; It. James XWo5lsoy, general counsel; John A. Goldsmith, Robert Q.
    [Show full text]
  • Killing Hope U.S
    Killing Hope U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II – Part I William Blum Zed Books London Killing Hope was first published outside of North America by Zed Books Ltd, 7 Cynthia Street, London NI 9JF, UK in 2003. Second impression, 2004 Printed by Gopsons Papers Limited, Noida, India w w w.zedbooks .demon .co .uk Published in South Africa by Spearhead, a division of New Africa Books, PO Box 23408, Claremont 7735 This is a wholly revised, extended and updated edition of a book originally published under the title The CIA: A Forgotten History (Zed Books, 1986) Copyright © William Blum 2003 The right of William Blum to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Cover design by Andrew Corbett ISBN 1 84277 368 2 hb ISBN 1 84277 369 0 pb Spearhead ISBN 0 86486 560 0 pb 2 Contents PART I Introduction 6 1. China 1945 to 1960s: Was Mao Tse-tung just paranoid? 20 2. Italy 1947-1948: Free elections, Hollywood style 27 3. Greece 1947 to early 1950s: From cradle of democracy to client state 33 4. The Philippines 1940s and 1950s: America's oldest colony 38 5. Korea 1945-1953: Was it all that it appeared to be? 44 6. Albania 1949-1953: The proper English spy 54 7. Eastern Europe 1948-1956: Operation Splinter Factor 56 8. Germany 1950s: Everything from juvenile delinquency to terrorism 60 9. Iran 1953: Making it safe for the King of Kings 63 10.
    [Show full text]
  • William Colby's Vietnam
    William Colby's Vietnam LOST VICTORY A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year involvement in Vietnam By William Colby win) James McCargar Contemporary Books. 438 pp. $22.95 By Arnold R. Isaacs N INTO the 21st century, no doubt, former policymakers will still be churning out memoirs on how the United States could and 0should have won the Vietnam War. William Colby was associated with the war longer than most, beginning when he was sent to Saigon in 1959 as the CIA's sta- tion chief. He remained involved with Viet- nam in subsequent assignments as chief of the agency's Far East Division, head of the Vietnam pacification program and finally as CIA director, the post he held when the war ended in 1975. With that background, it's no surprise to find Colby joining the long list of former officials who have sought to ex- plain in print how, if only their advice and MOM 'WV NCTOIlr pet programs had been adopted, U.S. policy William Colby (center) with the Rural Development Cadre Team in Delta province, 1968 could have succeeded. What is surprising, though, is how shallow, trite. muddled and To make this case, Colby gives a version sive and (with the help of heavy U.S. bomb- unconvincing Colby's arguments are, and of events so full of omissions and distortions ing) successfully recaptured one and de- how little new information he contributes to that even those on his own side of the con- fended two others of the three province cap- the debate. tinuing Vietnam debate may find this book itals that were the main targets of the com- To begin with, Last Victory, Colby's mem- unpersuasive and embarrassing.
    [Show full text]
  • The Central Intelligence Agency's "Family Jewels": Legal Then? Legal Now?
    Indiana Law Journal Volume 84 Issue 2 Article 6 Spring 2009 The Central Intelligence Agency's "Family Jewels": Legal Then? Legal Now? Daniel L. Pines Central Intelligence Agency Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons Recommended Citation Pines, Daniel L. (2009) "The Central Intelligence Agency's "Family Jewels": Legal Then? Legal Now?," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 84 : Iss. 2 , Article 6. Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol84/iss2/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Central Intelligence Agency's "Family Jewels": Legal Then? Legal Now? DANIEL L. PINES* Congressand the media recently have claimed that various activities ofthe Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-from rendition operations, to the destruction of videotapes, to the maintenance of secret detentionfacilities overseas--are illegal. Critics levied similar charges againstthe CIA thirty-five years ago, with regardto activities contained in the "Family Jewels"--the 1973 compilation of the CIA's darkestsecrets. The recent releaseof the FamilyJewels provides the opportunity to try to put today's concerns in perspective. This Article evaluates the key activities conducted by the CIA as described in the Family Jewels-experimentation on unconsenting individuals, attempted targeted killings offoreign leaders, electronic surveillanceofAmericans, examination of U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The OSS Society: Keepers of General Donovan's Flame
    88 oss society >> The OSS SOcieTy: KeeperS Of Gen. DOnOvan’S flame By susan L. Kerr and John D. Gresham “We were not afraid to make mistakes because we were not afraid to swashbuckling actor Douglas Fairbanks Jr., Academy Award-winning director John Ford, and Sterling Hayden, who won a Silver Star for try things that had not been tried before.” bravery behind enemy lines. The majority were above-average Joes, and some Josephines, recruited from the ranks of the U.S. military, “You can’t succeed without taking chances.” along with civilian trades and well-traveled intellectuals. An ideal OSS candidate was once described as a “Ph.D. who can win a barfight” and – Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, OSS founder Donovan described OSS personnel as his “glorious amateurs.” The man who assembled this stellar cast was perhaps the biggest and quietest swashbuckler of them all: Medal of Honor recipient Gen. William “Wild Bill” Donovan. Donovan was one of those larger-than- “I’m responsible for a group of very dangerous senior citizens.” life characters who strides across the landscape of history when he is needed most. He had been performing ad-hoc intelligence work well – Charles Pinck, president of the OSS Society before Dec. 7, 1941. Roosevelt called Donovan his “secret legs.” Since that time, military and intelligence professionals have appreciated and admired Donovan’s depth of perception and breadth of vision. Richard Helms, director of central intelligence (DCI) from 1966 to 1973 and an sk any American adult about the CIA and there’s a good OSS alumnus, said: “He was truly the father of American intelligence.
    [Show full text]
  • NIXON's AXE MAN: CIA DIRECTOR JAMES R. Schlesingeri
    Original citation: Moran, Christopher R. (2017) Nixon's axe man : CIA director James R. Schlesinger. Journal of American Studies. Permanent WRAP URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/87325 Copyright and reuse: The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions. Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made available. Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for profit purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. Publisher’s statement: This article has been published in a revised form in Journal of American Studies. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S002187581700086 . This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © Cambridge University Press and British Association for American Studies 2017. A note on versions: The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please see the ‘permanent WRAP URL’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that access may require a subscription For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: [email protected] warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 1 NIXON’S AXE MAN: CIA DIRECTOR JAMES R.
    [Show full text]
  • William E. Colby Papers. GTM.960101 Colby, William E
    William E. Colby Papers. GTM.960101 Colby, William E. Finding aid prepared by Georgetown University Library Special Collections Research Center. This finding aid was produced using the Archivists' Toolkit July 11, 2012 Local Practice Georgetown University Manuscripts William E. Colby Papers. GTM.960101 Table of Contents Summary Information ................................................................................................................................. 3 Biographical Sketch.......................................................................................................................................4 Scope and Contents Note.............................................................................................................................. 4 Administrative Information .........................................................................................................................5 Controlled Access Headings..........................................................................................................................5 Collection Inventory...................................................................................................................................... 6 Series #1. Correspondence to William E. Colby.................................................................................... 6 Series #2. Manuscripts...........................................................................................................................18 Series #3. Reports and Memos..............................................................................................................18
    [Show full text]
  • THE CIA and the PERILS of POLITICIZATION by Melvin A
    THE CIA AND THE PERILS OF POLITICIZATION By Melvin A. Goodman March 2008 The CIA’s mission to provide intelligence to poli- to “support the administration and its policies in our cymakers renders the agency vulnerable to political work. As agency employees, we do not identify with, pressure, particularly when policies fail and policy- support, or champion opposition to the administra- makers are tempted to control the fl ow of intelligence. tion or its policies.”1 Thirty years earlier, Schlesinger The CIA was created as an independent, non-depart- didn’t put it in writing, but he assembled the agency’s mental agency precisely because its founders recog- Soviet experts and warned them “this agency is go- nized the need for an intelligence service that was not ing to stop screwing Richard Nixon.” I was one of part of a policy department and there- those Soviet analysts, and Schlesinger’s fore would be less susceptible to language was actually stronger manipulation in support of and more vulgar. Currently, policy goals. Through- critics of the intelligence out the CIA’s 60-year community are citing history, there have the new estimate on been many efforts Iran to accuse lead- to slant analyti- ing intelligence of- cal conclusions, fi cers with trying skew estimates, to embarrass the and repress evi- Bush administra- dence that chal- tion. lenged a particular policy or point of Schlesinger’s view. As a result, the objective was to rein agency must recognize in the CIA, which had the impact of politiciza- produced analysis that tion and introduce barriers challenged the Nixon admin- to protect analysts from political istration on the war in Vietnam.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction
    Introduction Because of the secrecy that enveloped the U.S. Office of Strategic Services in World War II, it surprises most people, including nearby residents, to learn that spies were trained in some of the National Parks—not just spies but guerrilla leaders, saboteurs, clandestine radio operators and others who would be infiltrated behind enemy lines. What are today known as Catoctin Mountain Park in Maryland and Prince William Forest Park in Virginia played a vital role in the training of the operatives of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services. Known by its initials, the OSS was a specially created wartime military agency that fought a largely invisible and covert war against the Axis powers between 1942 and 1945. America’s first national centralized intelligence agency with thousands of clandestine operatives, spies, and intelligence analysts, the OSS is acknowledged as the predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency. 1 With its Special Operations troops and Operational Group commandos, the OSS is also widely considered a forerunner of today's Special Forces. 2 From 1941 to 1945, the men and women of the OSS were part of a "shadow war," a war largely behind the scenes and often behind enemy lines around the world. Highly secret during the war and in many instances for years thereafter, that effort was designed to help undermine the conquests of Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and militaristic Japan. The “shadow warriors” sought to supply and guide local resistance movements, demoralize the enemy through “black propaganda,” and to gather intelligence and commit sabotage in enemy occupied territory to contribute to the victory of the Allies’ armed forces as they overcame the totalitarian, Axis aggressors.
    [Show full text]
  • The Round Tablette Founding Editor: James W
    The Round Tablette Founding Editor: James W. Gerber, MD (1951–2009) Thursday, 10 March 2016 threats posed by the Third Reich and the 29:08 Volume 29 Number 8 Japanese Empire became more glaringly Published by WW II History Round Table obvious, Franklin Roosevelt began to indulge Edited by Dr. Connie Harris his curiosity in the capabilities and intentions www.mn-ww2roundtable.org of other nations by hiring Donovan to lead the Office of the Coordinator of Information – the Welcome to the first March meeting of forerunner of the OSS. the Dr. Harold C. Deutsch World War Unlike William Donovan, Allan Dulles had II History Round Table. Tonight’s speaker diplomacy in his blood; his maternal is a familiar one, Douglas Waller, who grandfather was John Foster, who was a previously spoke to the Round Table about his Secretary of State under Benjamin Harrison, monograph Wild Bill Donovan. This evening he and an uncle through marriage was Robert will discuss his follow up work entitled Lansing, Secretary of State in the Wilson Disciples: The World War II missions of the CIA Administration. Dulles traveled extensively as Directors who fought for Wild Bill Donovan. a youth, graduated from Princeton, and was These “disciples” are men whose names are well teaching English at a missionary school in known to those of us “of a certain age”: Allan India at the start of the Great War. When he Dulles, Richard Helms, William Colby, and returned to the United States, his grandfather William Casey. and uncle urged him to take the Foreign Service exam; having passed, he joined the General William Donovan’s intimate State Department.
    [Show full text]