APPROVED FOR RELEASE - DATE: FEB 2008

Oral History Reflections of DCls Colby and Helms on the CIA’S “Time of Troubles” (U)

From the CIA Oral History Archives

On 26 June 2007 the CIA released a 700-pagecollection of documents known as the ”FamilyJewels,” com- piled in 1973 under Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)James Schlesinger, who had asked Agency employ- ees to report activities they thought might be inconsistent with the Agency’s charter. Schlesingerk successor, William Colby, delivered the documents to Congress.

Given the release of the “‘FamilyJewels” documents and continuing interest in this aspect of CIA history, the Studies in Intelligence Editorial Board elected to publish portions of transcripts of CIA Oral History Program iritcrviews of William Colby and Richard Hdms. Schlesingers predecessor. on this period of the Agency5 history.

Colby and Helms were interviewed on 15 March and 2 February 1988. respectively, as part of an effort by the Center for the Study of Intelligence to compile the perspectives of former Agency leaders on what has often bem termed the CIA ’s “Timeof Troubles”in the 1970s. The perspectives of these two officials, different in sev- eral rcspccts. illustrate the dilemmas a secret intelligence agency facm in serving a democracy.

The transcripts were edited by Nicholas Dujmovic, director of the CIA Oral History Program-Editor

The Origins and Context of the “Family Jewels”

Interviewer (liereafler iri italics) to both DCIs: There is some indication that younger Agency officers were trnubled by some domestic practices in the years before 1973.

William Colby. There were . I think concerns during the period what these junior officers of the anti-war movement, were alleged to have been 1968 to 1972, among some concerned about was the of the people as to whether whole issue of whether or we were going outside our not the Agency had a role in charter. We would hear just the domestic aspects of stu- little bits and pieces of it. I dent unrest. On one occa- think they had doubts about sion I got some of these the reassurances they were younger officers into a con- getting, that we were stick- ference room and pointed ing to our charter. And, out that the Agency had essentially, we did. They been asked to look into this slipped over here and there, question by the president, that there was a legiti- but most of the things were within the charter. mate role for the Agency in attempting to find out what foreign elements or foreign powers might have been influencing student unrest on our campuses.

Continued on next page. Continued on page 49.

The staterrrents of fact, opiriivn. vr arialysjs cxpresscd in thcsc intcrvicws wcrc those of ‘I’his article is Llnclassified the interview suhjects and the interviewer. Presentation here shvcild nvt bc coristrucd in its entirety. a.5 as\ei7irig or irriplyirig US gvvernnrerrt eridor.sernent of th~ircommmts.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51. No. 3 39 APPROVED FOR RELEASE - DATE: FEB 2008

DCls Reflect on "Time of Troubles"

William Colby (conf.)

[DCI] Helms had a pretty clear what launched the investigation. they were pretty small potatoes. sense of that and kept it very Just that day they announced They really were. The wiretaps much on track. See. there is that I was going to be succeed- were on employees or ex-employ- nothing wrong with Track 11' ing, so we signed the thing jointly ees, I think in almost all cases. under the rules back then -if the that asked for the report on ques- 'The surveillances were mostly of president tells you to do it, he tionable activities. employees or ex-employees. had a perfcrt right to tell you to There were a couple of journal- do it. [Regarding] the dornestic The Schlesinger memo of May- ists who had leaked [informa- stuff, there were a couple of 1973, asking for anything that tion]: there was a lot of pressure, things that went over. might be construed to be outside "Where did those leaks come the legislative charter of the from?" It was really not a very Agency- did.you write that up? wise business putting a tail on Schlesinger had just taken over Jack Anderson, for instance. But [as DCI] when we started the Yes. even then there was a legal basis [internal] investigation. 1 Ie got for it. The director is charged upset hearing about the McCord with the protection of intelli- letters.z "What the hell. some- Iiow was the memo received, as you recall? gence sources and methods. Now thing is going on here? Did you I could give you a lawyer's argu- know about these things?" And I ment that that requires him to go said, *No. they've been in the Oh, down in the directorates they were upset that this could drag out and find out where a leak General Counsel's office." He was out a lot of things. The point was comes from: because it says so in sore as hell; he said, "I thought that, here you got a new director the law. You can also give we were supposed to get every- and he didn't know about one of another interpretation that it thing from Watergate together. the important elements of the means he can do what he can Goddarnn it, let's find out where Watergate thing: we've got to within existing rules and policy, these time bombs are." So that is find this stuff out and keep it to and it would not justify his sur- ourselves. Find it out and then veilling an American citizen. But ' 'I'tieccivei~t action oidcr.ed Iiy l'rc4tlent after we found it out, correct it. there is an ambiguity to it. I go Nixori to hi-iiif dowii ltie Allrritlc govcrri- By then I was in charge, so I back to the old concept of the spy nirnt of Chile. wrote the series of directives, service-if you get a leak you go 2 Iri Colby's iiittnioir. tie states 'the Sccu- "Thou shalt not this, Thou shalt find it-in the good old days. 'The rity OfTice iiifurriietl riic of the fact that the not that." I have long taken the change in American mores is Agency hail rcceivc:il suiric letters frim Jaiiirs McCord Ittie foriricr rhief of secu- position that when you get into a what caused all this change, rityl who had Iicen arrested as a Water- controversial subject, write your because of the fundamental con- gate burglar. in wliicli letters lie macle instructions down very clearly, tradiction that did exist between veiled accusations that ;in atteiiipt was make it clear on the record what the old spy service idea and the being made in the Wliilr t Iiiusc: to piri the your policy is and what your posi- separation of powers. blanie for Walcrgate on the Agency." W111- iani Colby with Petrr Porbath. /~ori~~~abfetion is. I did that when I started Mrn: My Life in the ClA (New York: the in Viet- After the "FamilyJewels" had Sirriori arid Scliustrr. 1978). 339. Colliy nam-"This is not a program of been collected in 1973,you shared writrs. Iiowrvrr. that this rcvelatiori from assassination." Fine, put it down the material with Senators Sym- security about the MrCord Ictters was a in clear text. People will argue, ington and Sterinis, and took it to r-rsult of the directive to collect what becaiile the 'Paniily Jewels." 1101the r'ause "Why do you have to say that?" [Representative F. Edward) of it as tic says iii liis Oral t-fistiiry. In liis "Because people say it is." You Hebert. niciiioir. Cnlhy rccallcd that Sctilrsiiiger know, make it damn clear. and he drafted the directive after tlie rev- Schlesinger and I both agreed elatiori that I loward I luiit--anotlier That same thing applied to the furrriri CIA rriiiri xi-estetl arid corivirtcd that we should let our commit- for the Watrrgate break-in- had also questionable activity. I remern- tees know about this exercise. hclprtl hui-glatizr tlie offire of Daniel Ells- her my impression after looking Since I had been named, he said, Iierg'b foriiier psyrliiati ist. Cnlby. 337. at the whole set of items was that "Why don't you go down and do

40 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51, No. 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE - DATE: FEB 2008

DCls Reflect on “Time of Troubles”

William Co/by (cont.)

it?” So, I went down to Hebert conversation with him about it. It Did you ever wonder where he got arid he politely listened to me a just never arose; never answered the bits and pieces? little bit, then he asked me to the question. never even posed brief Lucian Nedzi, who he had the question. In retrospect. it is I long ago gave up trying to fig- appointed as his watchdog for the curious that you don’t think of ure out where journalists get Agcricy.3 So, I wcrit in. Nedzi such an obvious thing. If you are their information. I mean they went over it in great detail. asked going to brief the two chairmen, develop lots and lots of sources. further questions about lots of the least you ought to do is to Very rarely do they have a source things and all the rest of it. He brief somebody in the White who gives them the whole thing. said, ”Well, why don’t you release House that you trust. They are very clever about the this and get the catharsis out of way they call somebody to get the the way?” I said, “Oh. no. No remotest kind of a hint that there way. Sensationalized. trurn- and the might be something; then they peted. exaggerated, it would be a New York Times Expos6s ask this one, they ask that one, disaster.” And I talked him out of and they ask the other. You it. He said, “Well, nothing like There was some concern in the know, inside of a few hours on that anymore?” “Absolutely not, Agency that Seymour Hersh as the telephone. they have most of no sir.” earlyas late 1972 was working on the story in this town. some srories relative to the Agency ‘l‘hat’swhen I put out the direc- and domestic involvement. Did you feel that Hersh had very tives. Stennis asked me to brief much information regarding Syrnington. And Symington was Let’s see, the articles came out in abuses when he met with you in a bit of the old school, really December ‘74. Well, I know a December of ‘74? wasn’t all that anxious to know year before I heard that he was about it, I don’t think. But, I on to the Glomar.4And I went Oh, yes. He had them all in exag- went over it with him. At the down and actually stopped that gerated terms when he walked end. “OK. thanks.” by just flatly appealing to him. I in. yes. He said “you guys have went down and said, “Look. not been in wiretaps, you have been White House Blindsided by only don’t write about this, don’t in mail openings, you have been the “FamilyJewels ” even talk about it-don’t do any- in surveillances, you have been thing. It is much too important.” breaking into people’s houses.” ’Hie curious thing, I never really I put all the sincerity I could into He had it all. thought about it, why didn’t we it. I didn’t tell him what I was brief the White House? Say, Kiss- talking about. He did, he dropped Did he mention assassination, by iriger? I think I didn’t think of it it. Therefore, I owed him one. I chance? because Schlesinger was still in thought I owed him a lot by sit- charge. and he didn’t think of it, ting on that one, because he had No. He didn’t have assassina- and I don’t know why he didn’t worked on it and could have gone tions-domestic [operations], you think of it. I asked him about it on, as he did later. see, that was the thrust of it. He one time and he said something said this thing is bigger than My to the effect that, ”Oh hell, with Later, Hersh ran into bits and Lai-he’s the guy that broke My that bunch of characters down pieces of that assembly of infor- Lai. “This is a much bigger there.” It was almost as though mation we conducted in 1973. He story”-that was his phrase. I he had made a decision not to couldn’t have made that [New said, “Sy. you’ve got it all wrong. brief them. Rut, I never had a York Times] report if we hadn’t What you have gone into is a few done the review in ‘73. little things here and there over the 25 years that we did that

1 NrdA was chaii iiiaii of the House Armed were a little bit over the line. Servicrs Iritdligcncr Subcoinrriittct. at t tie ’ CIA’S effort to salvage a sunken Soviet They were few and far between. tiiiir submarine. There was no massive, no big

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51. No. 3 41 APPROVED FOR RELEASE - DATE: FEB 2008

DCls Reflect on "Time of Troubles"

William Colby (conf.)

[domestic] intelligence opera- He came to me and said, "I tiny piece of the jigsaw for the tions." And I frankly feel that understand from the president newsmen to put together. It's that was the eventual story even that there's been assassinations exactly the way intelligence oper- though you had a lot of hullaba- going on in this country." I said ates. So, I don't think there were loo-when you read the Rock- [to myself], "Oh. shit." I really any sort of flagrantly disloyal efeller Repor t. and the Church clammed up at that point people. Report on the domestic side, you because I knew I was in deep trouble. I said, "Well," and I really have kind of odds and ends In the fall of 1974, beFore the here and there. reverted to what I have done fre- Hersh articles, Senators Mans- quently [which was to] answer field and Mathias were seeking to exactly what the man said. I create a "Select Committee" to So I told him, "Come on in, I'll said, "Well, no, not in this coun- talk to you. You got it all wrong.'' study governmental operations try." But, I didn't say anything with respect to intelligence activi- I was hoping to bring him down. beyond that. I Ie was going to write some- ties. Would there have been inves- tigations even without Hersh? thing. I knew it. I was hoping to Another fellow, another news- bring him down a bit and didn't. man had come to me one time He took it as a confirmation, you about the Glomar. He said, "I Yes, I think there would have see. That's the other thing that is understand you are raising a been some congressional motion, frequently said, if I had said Russian submarine in the Atlan- there had to be.5 That was the nothing. he wouldn't have had a tic." And I said, "That is abso- contradiction that had to be confirmation. But since I said, lutely false." And I was right. resolved somehow. And I think "There are some little things that You know, answer exactly the that both Mathias and Mansfield happened." that was confirma- question: don't get caught in a lie were trying to do it in a responsi- tion. IIe took it as confirmation. because it won't work. Or, if you ble manner, to get this thing even though I was saying it can't answer the question, then moving in the right direction, didn't happen. for heaven's sake get off it, get on sensibly, responsibly. It was obvi- to some other subject, some way. ous, you know, that the climate of the post Vietnam, post Water- Wasn't there also a question You have to turn it off before you gate times were going to bring about assassirlatioris arid was it see it going in the wrong direc- some modifications. But, you you who said, "Not iri this coun- tion. might have had more a sensible try "? Did you feel there was much leak- way of doing it rather than the ing From Agency personnel to the hysterical way we went after it, Yes. Daniel Schorr came to me Congress or media prior to and which did hurt. arid he dropped that little bomb- during the congressional investi- shell on my desk. President Ford, gations? in a background discussion, had The Congressional been asked, "Why are you I could no longer tell the White Investigations: The Church defending this?" Arid he said, House that the CIA never leaked and Pike Committees "Well, there are a lot of things in [information]because I had there you can't handle." "Such enough evidence that things com- What do you see as the most as?" And he said, "Assassina- ing out-the Chile thing and important Factors For bringing tions." They were all under back- some others-that seemed to me about the congressional investiga- ground rules. 'I'tie Times couldn't that we were having leaks. Part tions in the mid use it. But as the newsmakers go, of it was retirees and part of it I970s? they talked. So, Schorr had the was smart newsmen. You know, view that there's a story here if I asking the right question. The Senator Church in 1973 had already con- can just get something to hook it guy doesn't think he is saying ducted an investigation of the Chile covert on to. anything wrong, is giving a little action.

42 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51, No. 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE - DATE: FEB 2008

DCls Reflect on “Time of Troubles”

William Colby (conf.)

I think a combination of the Viet- special-it still is. It was the sov- exist in previous years. So. the nam War. and Watergate, and ereign’s business. That is the way Congress then was groping then the ISeymour] tiersh arti- it runs in most countries. In around for ways to exhibit its dis- cles [in the New York Times on you don’t have the great trust. alleged CIA abuses]. Those are assembly review what the intelli- the three stepping-stones that gence services do, if anything Some writers say that you caused the investigations. The happens, everybody shuts up believed salvation for the Agency first idea was for the Rockefeller right away-it’s a tradition. And lay in cooperation with the inves- Commission to investigate the we essentially adopted con- tigations, while other intelligence allegation of domestic action. sciously that model fw how to professionals thought that intelli- That really didn’t work very well run our intelligence service dur- gence secrets were forever. to contain the degree of concern. ing the early decades of it. I thought, well, here’s a chance to Sure, there is a basic difference get a good resounding stamp of In those days, the understanding of opinion about my role here. approval on the Agency as a was that these committees, Various of them said that I whole. It was a very reputable Armed Services and Appropria- should have stonewalled the bunch of people. If you could be tions, had a responsibility to whole thing because intelligence straight with them, convince vouch to their colleagues in the is too important, resigned and all them, you could get a good report Congress the Fact that the the rest of it. I didn’t think that out of them. I think it might have Agency did need X millions of would do any good at all. In the worked except for the president’s dollars. And they would vouch for context of the politics of the time, mention of assassinations. That it. And how did they do it? They we had just had Watergate, you blew the roof off. did it the way you always did really weren’t going to get away appropriations in the American with stonewalling them. It just It was also clear that we were in government until recently, which wasn’t going to work. On the that period of revolt in the Con- was that you talked to the guy in other hand, if you could go to a gress where that group elected in charge and got a sense that he committee which starts out with ‘74 were some pretty strong- seemed to be decent and level a prosecuting mission and give minded younger people out to with you; and then well, if he them the whole view of Ameri- throw over the old. cozy system. said he needed a hundred mil- can intelligence. which is a very lion. tine, give him a hundred good story, then these become Sortie critics say the corigres- million or, if that’s too much, cut rather small against that larger sional committees overseeing the it down to seventy-five, some- picture. And in order to do that, Agency before I975 were “blind thing like that. You didn’t nit- you’ve got to tell them quite a lot. and toothless watchdogs, that pick every little detail: that was but you don’t tell them names. members of Congress were not the way it was done in the old And that was a basic point that unaware or unconcetned about days. [We would see] only the we came to with the committees Agency excesses. chairman and maybe the rank- as soon as the chairmen were ing minority member. They said, appointed. I think that is unfair. ‘I’he “You come out here on Sunday criticized that afternoon at three o’clock, so As soon as they were named, I Congress did not do its job super- nobody will see you.” They met in went down and talked to them. I vising the Agency. And that is a closed room, the chairman’s said, “Look, you are going to true if you look at it in isolation. office or something, and that was investigate us; I understand that. Sure, the Congress is supposed to the hearing-just a nice conver- Not much I can do about it; you have an active supervision over sation. are going do it. I’d like to give the activities of government. On you a full picture so that you’ll the other hand. very clearly the Now that was changing as a see whatever may have hap- intclligence business had always result of Vietnam and Water- pened in proper proportion and been thought of as something gate. Trust didn’t exist. It did context. Now, I’m not going to

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DCls Reflect on “Time of Troubles“

William Cohy (cont.)

argue with you about your consti- and the committee gave up. They them every now and again. I hap- tutional right to know every- folded; we protected the name. pened to have as my personal thing in the Agency because we’ll assistant a fellow who had been never end that argument. You’ll It cost me telling them what was in Stanleyville and told about take the right that you have cori- going on, sure; but I protected being there-the Simbas coming stitutional authority to learn the names. I thought that was a in the house. Everything was so everything. I’m just going to cori- reasonable trade-off. Now, other still when he was telling us vince you that there are some people say. “No. Shouldn!t have there. They got the message that things that you don’t want to told them anything.” And cer- there are some very special peo- know: you don’t need to know, tainly we scared a hell of a lot of ple [in the Agency]. It was delib- and consequently, that you people around the world with erate. I was trying to get it out should not know. Particularly, what we told them; and it was that these are serious things, you don’t need to know the just what I told Nedzi, it was sen- serious people. names of people who work for us sationalized, it was exaggerated. around the world-foreigriers. Some suggest thatyour coopera Americans, all the rest. To con- Were these discussions with tion during the investigations vince you that you don’t need to Church? saved the Agency from serious know them, I’ll tell you some- harm: do you agree with them? thing: I don’t know them. I’ve Church and that jackass, Pike. made a deliberate point of not I still think I took the right learning names of agents. Why? You wanted to place what was choice. Now, I don’t know Because I had no reason to, I happening in perspective? whether that saved the Agency a didn’t have to know them to do lot of trouble as a result. I can my job. I have to know that there Yes. I thought we could make a hardly say it came out scot-free. is an agent there, about their good story out of it. American It created an awful lot of trouble reliability; but I don’t have to intelligence is a pretty good abroad-people saying how can know the name. You don’t need story. If you read the Church we deal with you, you guys put to know their names. Now, let’s report, there is a little sancti- all your stuff in the newspapers make a deal. We’ll be responsive mony in it, but it’s not bad. I all the time. This was a real to your questions as much as we wasn’t really afraid that they’d problem. So, I wouldn’t say it can, but I’m going to ask you to disband the Agency, but I saved it from any problems. It let me leave the names off.” thought there was a very good did get hurt. No question about chance that they would bar all it. It would have gotten hurt covert action. That was an obvi- more if I had taken the totally And we made the point. And it ous potential. In the end, they negative [approach]. Then I think pretty rnurh stuck. We came to said, “Shouldn’t do it that much, the thing would have just sort of issue on a couple of names, but but got to be able to do it.” disintegrated. all sorts of chaotic not very much. One time I went hullabaloos, then the names to court to protect the name of You didn P think the Agency would have come out. one of our guys the committee would be dismemDcred, dis- was going to release. They said solved? Do you feel the hearings were ben- this guy is known around too eficial for the Agency? broadly, we’re going to put the There were days. But if you name down. I said, “The hell you asked, thoughtfully, I would have No. You have to say they weren’t will. Put that name down and to say that I didn’t believe they because they were sensational- he’s subjert to violent retribu- could possibly do it. I mean, that ized, exaggerated, and did a lot of tion, and I’m not going to have they would be so stupid. And par- harm. I think the revision of the him exposed to that.” So, I went ticularly after I told them what congressional relationship is ben- down to district rourt and met the Agency really was all about. I eficial for the Agency. The hear- the lawyers. Filed an injunction took the right guys down to brief ings were the worst possible way

44 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51, No. 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE - DATE: FEB 2008

DCls Reflect on "Time of Troubles"

William Colby (cont.)

to do it. Maybe it was the only CIA is not out of control; it has I knew I would get fired sooner or way to do it, but it is a bad way been too much under the control later, which didn't bother me. 11 to do it. But the revision of the of presidents, and Congress has wanted to] just get the Agency congressional relationship, I not done its job. That was the through most of the heat. I knew think, is good for the Agency and basic point. that Henry [Kissinger] basically gives it much more support. didn't agree with my tactic; he The Pike Committee was hope- didn't make any secret of it, used 01icAgcsricy officer commented in less. They were hopeless. Curi- to tease me about it. There were 1976. "7lie Congressional investi- ously, too. because Pike had a couple of things I did without gations were like being pillaged identified three good questions: telling him about It sufficiently in liy a foreign power only we had' How much does intelligence cost? advance, kind of hit him like a becri occupied by the Congsess How good is it? What are the bombshell. I thought I sort of had with our files rifled, our officials risks? They are very good ques- the job of handling it myself. huniiliated arid our Agency tions. But then he hired a staff There was no way I could get pxposed. " that was just ~loppy,and he them to handle it for me: I had didn't pay attention to them. It an obligation to keep them I-Ie must have been dealing with sort of just ran all over the place. informed but I had the responsi- some of the Pike Committee peo- bility of handling it. And I think ple. 'There were elements of that, Are there lessons to be learned that's right. but if you ran into too egregious a from the Church and Pike investi- thing, you could step in and stop gations? Did you ever have the feeling that it. you wished President Ford would take a firm stand regarding the Your-offer to bring the dartgun to Sure, deal with them straight security of CIA files and thus tlic hearing arid so on. were you.. . and don't try to run around them force the issue into the courts? the way this jackass Ollie North That wasn't an offer. We had a did. Don't try to stonewall, try to No, if we went to court, we'd lose demand out of the Church Com- handle it in a fashion that gives it. That's my judgment. The only mittee that it be brought up and you a majority, not unanimous, thing that you could hang it on a statement that if we didn't, but majority support. was the executive privilege and they'd subpoena it. even that is fairly dubious, it's a What are your reflections regard- legal question. Because certainly Do yoii think you were treated ing support from the White House you can't hang it on classifica- fairly by the Church Committee? during the congressional investi- tion, so what [are]you going to gations? hang it on? Intelligence is spe- Yes. The Church committee was cial? Where does it say that? responsible. Had sharp ques- I don't have any real complaints. tions from Mondale. Gary Hart, People in the White House others. Some of them were quite wished it wouldn't happen. The Hearings and the supportive. Goldwater was like Henry [Kissinger] would fulmi- Jewels: Mail Opening, that. They were very responsi- nate, you know. Brent Drugs,Assassina tion, ble. [Senator Frank] Church is [Scowcroft] was always very Journalists the guy who asked, "Is CIA a level, straight. President Ford rogue elephant?" as a question; was supportive when you got it I said [the mail opening] was he didn't say it as a statement, up to him. I tried not to bother wrong. It shouldn't have been and he is the guy who signed the him. You see. the president was done. Actually. I don't think final report which said that CIA easy because he came from Con- there is any doubt, it shouldn't was not out of control. He raised gress. He understood what we have been done. I can under- the question and then he were dealing with and the prob- stand why it was done; 1 can answered it in the final report: lems. understand the thinking at the

Studies in Inteelligence Vol. 51, No. 3 45 APPROVED FOR RELEASE - DATE: FEB 2008

DCls Reflect on "Time of Troubles"

William Colby (cont.) You don't want CIA to be on ically, it's dynamite. We may do record as doing it, so you need dumb things, we chased all the tirne-it was started in the some kind of a front to do it for Japanese-Americans off the west 1950's and it was handled so you. But, there are rules about coast because we were scared. secretly. It was, after all, fairly testing on human beings. The Countries do dumb things when legitimate when you think of it- medical profession has them. I they get scared. reading thc mail coming from the think you assume you would fol- to the United low those rules. Apparently, they What ifthe president orders it? Statbs, looking for hints. Never didn't. This gets back to the old produced anything that I know mystique idea-intelligence is of. And. like everything bureau- different, we do things differ- Well, that gets into this whole cratic, it .just went on and on and ently-which is nonsense. goddamn plausible denial thing, on. It went on long after it should which I think is gone. I think t1ave stopped. You know, that's the thing that plausible denial died when really scares you about intelli- Dwight Eisenhower accepted What did Schkesinger think? gence agencies-where they go responsibility for the U-2. He had wrong is when thcy do violate no choice; he had to accept Well, my memoranduni Ito him] people's rights under the "higher responsibility for it. Jack said that I didn't see that we had good." The KGB should not be Kennedy, the same thing with got anything out of it; my review our rationale. the Bay of Pigs. We had the elab- of it was that it should be orate structure that this was just stopped. I wrote him a memoran- Wereyou surprised about the a bunch of ragtag Cubans, balo- dum in which I said that I assassination issue? ney. Anything that big, he is reviewed it and found conflicts responsible for it. So, the whole with postal law here. In addi- No, not terribly. I don't think I plausible denial is just totally tion, it just doesn't seem to be was morally shocked at it. If you impossible. And now with a Pres- really think about assassination, producing anything; therefore, I idential Finding, no way. recommend it be terminated. that's what I was forced to do, it That led to a series of discus- seems to me it just doesn't add sions which Jim (Angleton] up. You think you can solve What do you think about employ- defended. But I still couldn't firid something by eliminating a ingjourna lists? any result from it. And 1 think guy-it's playing God. You have that is probably what swayed no idea who is going to succeed Oh, that is a terribly false issue. I Schlesinger, how it doesn't seem him, you have no idea what the mean, I've used journalists as to be producing much. repercussions will be, or, the agents. and case officers have, and worst, you getting caught doing our rule was what they wrote for it. The repercussions are poten- How about drug experirnenta- the journal was their business. I tially enormous. tion? What were your reactions at didn't tell them what to write or that time on that issue? not to write for an American jour- For intelligence operations, it nal. We understood that. They I was understanding of the fact seems to me, that you have sev- were useful agents and then this that you had a group of people in eral simple questions to ask crazy business got loose-you can't the Agency who were curious before you start one. One, how about the properties of some of important is it? What are the use journalists, you can't use aca- these drugs and were legiti- risks? What is the impact if it demics, you can't use missionar- mately fearful that they would be goes sour? And on the last issue, ies, you can't use something else, used against us. They had an it seems to me, you have to turn you can't use this, you can't use idea of lrarning something about it down. Now that is being prag- that. There's nobody left. So, that's the properties. You can under- matic, not moral. I think there a totally false issue. Everybody stand a scientist wanting to know are moral considerations, too; but says, "Oh, it's all right, yes. go how things work. Now, there are bcing pragmatic. I just think that ahead and do your intelligence ways to do legitimate testing. assassination doesn't work. Polit- operations; but don't use me."

46 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51. No. 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE - DATE: FEB 2008

DCls Reflect on “Time of Troubles“

William Colby (cont.) go in in an ordinary way and go teams working on it that never into the ordinary analytical pro- talk to each other!” I mean it’s Angleton, Golitsyn, cess. While they were valuable. just nutty. I understand some of Nosenko, and they weren’t just rolled gold. I the reasons for it and all this, but Counterintelligence sort of had that sense that the I felt I had to change this. Angleton approach was to run The author [Edward Jay1 Epstein these highly personalized things. Then I found that he had a whole sciggests that the “FamilyJew- Then, remember, I was appointed lot of people, a very large staff- els”story was leaked by you as for a while to take over the Soviet I’ve forgotten how big it was- part of a nianeiiver to relieveyou Division. I began the briefing and and I was under pressure to cut of an extremely vexing problem. it was pretty clear that the Soviet at that point. I had been trying to that is James Angleton. and so Division in the Agency had been find out what the hell these peo- on. all tied up the last several years ple did. I couldn’t find that they in this whole series of Nosenko were doing anything that I could I don’t know why [Epstein] said and Golitsyn and all that crap. understand. Seemed to me this this. You know he’s the one also Every time they tried to move an was a good place to cut. So then that was on the edge of calling inch, the CI people said, “No, it’s when I was DDO. I broke off the me a big mole in the CIA. a fake.” I think that’s why Helms Israeli thing, gave it to the NE Bullshit. I’ve been called every was going to send me there to try Division: then I made some cuts. name iri the world by somebody, to straighten the goddamn thing Of course, we cut off the mail so it doesn’t bother me. out. Let Angleton do his thing, opening and so forth. It was obvi- but get something going there ous that I had no confidence in How about your relations with that made sense. Jim actually running it. So, I MI: Angleton? tried to sort of edge Jim toward Then, of course, I went over to the door in a nice way, in as nice I had first known of him when I Vietnam, but that left a bad taste a way as possible by taking these was in Italy. He had superb Ital- in my mouth. Seemed to me that things away, hoping he would get ian contacts. €Ie had been there we were hurting ourselves. I the point. I had a couple of con- in the latter part of the war and never thought that the object of versations with him, but I didn’t met a lot of people. He is a very CIA was to protect itself against force it. I didn’t sort of say. “Out.” opinionated guy, which is all the KGB. The object of the CIA is I should have. I now realize that right except the idea was that his to get into the Kremlin: that’s I should have; it would have been reports should go straight to God. what our function is. Sure, you much cleaner and noisier. I 1 remember really getting upset protect yourself. but you god- should have done it right when I when I heard that he was back in damn well better have the offen- came in. but I was, you know, Washington one time, stood on a sive mission. So, I had doubts concerned about him. He had street corner and a car drove by about that. done a lot for his country and I with and the secre- did not want to shame him. I tary of state, picked him up and Then I ran into the goddamn wanted to edge him away. I had they had a talk in the car. I said, mail thing and Jim’s insistence two or three conversations over “My God! Is this a serious intelli- on holding it. Then I ran into the the year with him. long conversa- gence agency?” Having this guy Israeli business when I became tions about moving, doing some- with his strong opinions directly DDO-here the Israeli account thing else-all very subtle. He at the policy level without any was over here in a corner some- knew exactly what I was talking analysis, any comparison with place and had nothing to do with about and didn’t want any part of the other factors going on. Itjust the rest of the Middle East. The it. So, he dug his heels in. violates my sense of what intelli- officers in those stations were gence is all about. prohibited from communicating Then, finally, when the Hersh with each other. I said, “This thing blew I figured, “Oh. God. I spent some time gradually can’t be serious! You’ve got a we’re going to get blamed for this working him inlo a more normal common problem in the Middle but I am not going to go into this pattern so that his reports would East arid you’ve got two separate with Jim on my hands. I’ve got to

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51, No. 3 47 APPROVED FOR RELEASE - DATE: FEB 2008 I I

DCls Reflect on "Time of Troubles"

William Colby (cont.) them to do the offensive of get- surface the options in written ting guys into the enemy camp. form, and he would go away and be able to handle this without That I still wanted them to do. study it, really study it, read the Jim's problems." So, I said, "Jim, That was actually a priority-to 60 pages or whatever, annotate it go. You are finished. I will give get some guys into the other side. and so forth. A very studious you a job of writing the history of That was what we needed. kind of guy. And Ford would use the CI Staff or something so you Because I became director, and the regular machinery more: the can be around, keep involved and then I left it to the DDO to run NSC would have a meeting, and so forth; but I am going to put in counterintelligence. I didn't want you'd have a discussion of the a new chief and a new staff, new it to come out of the director's meeting, just the NSC, be sort of systems." And I did it. office anymore the way it had. It a more formal relationship. And had essentially gone around Carter .... Each one different. What about Nosenko? channels. I said, 'No. let the DDO handle it." I'm not an expert on the Nosenko Did you feel it was much more case, but I spoke to [former DDO Reflections as DCI difficultto be DCI after Water- Thomas] Karaniessines about it, gate? and I know that both Karamess- In your book, you noted that one ines and Helnis signed off on the ofyour errors as director was a Oh, I suppose so because there fact that they accepted Nosenko's failure to press forgreater access was more astir. The Bay of Pigs story as basically true. Both of to the Oval Office. Would it have was trouble. The U-2 was trou- them are good, careful guys and made much difference? ble. Directors are supposed to they are not going to sign sonie- pay for trouble. That's what they thing that's false. So, period, that I don't think it would have been a are there for. to handle things did it. The Golitsyn thing is all hell of a lot different. I mean, that go wrong. You know. you are over the place. I ran into the fact Stan Turner came in, Carter not going to be an intelligence that some people were shoved out promised to see him twice a week officer if you just take the safe to outer darkness because they or something, drops back to once a way. You've got to take chances had somehow been in Berlin at the week, drops back to once every wrong time or something with no two or three weeks. You know, it and that means some of them evidence-again. I am a lawyer- is the normal thing. Henry [Kiss- will go sour on you. no evidence that they were in any inger], of course, was not about to way involved, but you had careers let me get around him. And I say Didyou hope to stay on as DCI ruined. I said. "Bullshit. we are that with respect. I don't think he after the investigation ended? not going to do that." should have. If he is the National Security Advisor, he should be I sort of realized that people down Ifow do you feel counterintelli- informed of anything on top, the in the White House didn't like the germ was affectedby the hearings? president. Otherwise, he can't do way I did some of the things so his job right. probably., .. I was always very con- Oh, 1 don't think it was very scious of the phrase on the com- much affected by the hearings. You know, each president is very mission, "You serve at the Counterintelligence buffs will tell different. Eisenhower used the pleasure of the president." When- you that I destroyed counterintel- military staff system to help com- ever he decided, I'd go. When Pres- ligence. I contest that because I plete his staff work for him. Jack ident Nixon left, I sent in a letter don't think it was doing any- Kennedy would get 30 people in of resignation to Ford. He's the thing before I moved, and I think the room [and have] everybody new president; he has the right to it was as least as good after I argue the case. President appoint his own guy. They sent it moved it as before I moved it. I Johnson had his Tuesday lunch, back in two days. No, you don't made the point that I wanted which sometimes met Friday have any lock on that job. them to do the protective side morning. but nonetheless, it's the through the normal divisions as eight or 10 guys close to him. much as they could. But I wanted Nixon, he used the machinery to .:. .> .>

40 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51, No. 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE - DATE: FEB 2008

DCls Reflect on "Time of Troubles"

Richard Helms (cont. from page 39)

So this was a perfectly legiti- Also, in an effort to work with tee, that whole aura and investi- mate role for the Agency to play. the FBI on this whole issue, the gation brought about this FBI sent the Agency a lot of opportunity to conduct an inves- reports so we'd know about the tigation, and Senator Church Later on, this became blown out names of these various individu- was very anxious to do this. of all proportion. Not because of als and so forth. Well, that was young people in the Agency who bitterly criticized later on-that Church wanted to run for presi- had any misgivings about it. but the Agency never should have dent, and he felt this was a great because when the hearings were had reports on domestic individu- launching platform to bring his held about these things. and als and so forth. But quite name before the public and get a principally in the Church Com- frankly, I thought the thing was lot of media attention, which it mittee. the fact that the opera- way overblown; I didn't think the certainly did. And there was no tion was known as MHCHAOS Agency had really overstepped reason not to hold such an inves- was one of the things that trig- the bounds. If it had a little bit, tigation if they felt it desirable at gered a lot of focus on this. Actu- okay, but it wasn't egregious. the time to have been done in a ally, that was quite an innocent This was just a congressional fire responsible fashion. But it struck code name. Anybody inside the storm over nothing. me that Senator Church's politi- Agency knew that digraphs were cal ambitions ran far ahead of his used for various general catego- As for mail opening and a couple interest in really doing a ries of operations and the of other operations, these young thoughtful and serious job. I was digraph in this particular area people didn't know anything in Tehran [as US ambassador1 all was MH and then there was a about them, so there was no this time and came back spas- list of perfectly ordinary words basis for their criticizing some- modically to testify. But even then went along with it and thing they didn't know about. from that distance it was not dif- CHAOS happened to be the one ficult to see that this was a hear- ing run to get the headlines that came out of the registry at The Congressional that time. and that's what it was rather than to really find out Investigations: The Church called. It had nothing to do with whether the Agency was doing its the operation itself. and Pike Committees job or not doing its job. The con- clusions it came to about the esti- What do yuu think are the most mating process was unfair to the Now when it was established iniportant factors for bringing Agency, because the allegation that on one occasion. in an effort about the congressional investiga- that the Agency in those days to put a man into the student tions in 1975? was giving in to political pres- movement and give him some sures is simply not true. There real legitimacy in there, that he Certainly the Ramparts busi- were times when estimates were was put into a demonstration ness' and what flowed therefrom changed, after all they were the here in the , that had a role in this, but I think director's estimates, and he had tie did see some things, he did that more important than that the right to change them. report to the Agency about it, and was all the dust that was cre- the Agency in turn passed this on ated by Watergate and by the Now one of the great changes to the FBI. That may have been a Watergate investigation. Even that came out of the Church misjudgment: we shouldn't have though the Agency was cleared of Committee hearings and in sub- let that fellow report, but it was any involvement in Watergate sequent years was the beginning necessary to get him in there finally by the Watergate Commit- of sending classified papers, anal- because we wanted to send him yses, reports and estimates up to [abroad1 to report on student Congress. When I was director, I Revelations in I967 that CIA was fund- unrest overseas. He needed cre- ing the National Student Association and no secret papers went to Con- dentials and he needed to be able other American non-governmental organi- gress-to anybody-unless they to say he'd done this. zations. were taken up there by the direc-

49 Studies in lnfelligence Vol. 51, No. 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE - DATE: FEB 2008

DCls Reflect on “Time of Troubles”

Richard Helms (cont.)

tor for sonic reason. The only tes- for the Agency and did a good job Very significant factor. If you tifying was done by the director, of it. look for a single issue that would and it was done by other people have caused the focus on the when the director wasn’t nor- With the change in American cul- Agency that led to the Church mally there. but it was very rare ture, which came about as a Committee hearings, it was the that anybody else went up to tes- result of the ’60s and spilled over Hersh story in the New York tify. In those days when some- into the OS, and the whole Times that was on the front page. body in the Congress wanted seniority system in the Senate That was. I believe. in December somebody from the Agency, the and House in its traditional form of 1974. I don’t think that the director went. And it was after I broke down, at this point we got Watergate Hearings and the left that this business of sending the Church Committee hearings Ramparts business. in and of documents to the Congress arid and the Pike Committee hear- themselves. would have coa- briefing the congressmen by peo- ings. It was this era in the Sen- lesced an interest in the exami- ple all through the Agency began. ate that a lot of senators had the nation of the Agency until this impression that the oversight Hersh story came along. And, Sonip critics. spaking ofemigres- responsibility was not being exe- obviously, Hershs source was sivrial committees overseeing the cuted, which in some respects it Colby. That has been attested to Agency before 1975,have called was not. So this issue of tooth- by various people. including them “blindand toothless watch- lessness and so forth may be a Colby himself, I guess. Colby dogs, *‘ saying that members of valid charge, but this was not thought that by leveling with CvrigsesJ were una ware or uncon- true of the House. We always Hersh he was going to protect cerned about Agency excesses. Do gave full information on the bud- himself. All he succeeded in you feel congressional oversight of get, line-by-line, item-by-item, to doing was getting on the front ttic Agency was effectiveand help- the House Appropriations Com- page of the New York Times with ful before 1975? mittee. It’s a total canard [to headlines. assert] that this wasn’t going on. Well. that is a hard question to From day one they got a report I was then in Tehran. I remem- answer and a rather complex with everything in it. ber getting a back-channel mes- one. When Senator Russell was sage from Kissinger; I had worked for four years with Kissinger the chairman in thr Senate and And did it happen that you when he was the national secu- Congressmen Rivers and Boggs wanted to tell them more than had oversight of the House and they wanted to hear? rity advisor in the White House, then Clarence Cannon and later so we were well known to each George Mahori had Appropria- other. I remember his saying, tions in the House. there was a Sometimes. Senators and con- ”This is an issue that’s not going good interchange between the gressmen are not wild to know to go away,” meaning that this is members of Congress and the about some of the types of things going to cause congressional focus Agency. And there were no leaks. that go on. Sometimes they and the newspapers are going to Members of Congress were would just say, “Look, forget it be after it and all the rest of it. Of extremely careful about their and don’t bother to tell us.” At course, he was right about that. secrecy responsibility. In fact. other times, “All right now we’ve Colby used terrible judgment on Senator Russell’s Conimitter had heard about it, let’s go on to that by thinking that he could just one staffer who was cleared. something else.” sweet talk this fellow [Hersh] out I think the I louse Appropria- of printing this stuff. tions Committee had one. possi- bly two staffers who were Seymour Hersh and Colby Then later on there was an epi- cleared. In other words, this was sode in connection with Daniel a very close hold operation in Were the writings of Seymour Schorr about which I’m not par- those days, and these senators Hersh a significant factor in the ticularly proud but it caused a and congressmen really went bail congressional investigations? fair to-do at the time. I came out

50 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51, No. 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE - DATE: FEB 2008

DCls Reflect on "Time of Troubles"

Richard Helms (cont.)

of ow of the hearings with the public squabble about this. I The Hearings and the Kockefeller Conirnission. and think it's bad for the Agency. The Jewels: Mail Opening, there he was, and he asked me a Agency has enough problems. Drugs,Assassination, question about assassinations Journalists and I called him a rude name. The Report of the Rockefeller After I had a little press confer- What'syour view what the Commission2 of ence, he followed me down the hearings revealed about mail hall and he said, "What did you openings? get so mad at me for?" And I said, I didn't think it was a particu- larly good report. I was particu- "Dan, I got mad at you because 'The issue of mail opening has larly resentful of the that's a crock. Where do you pick certainly been controversial one recommendation in there that a up this stuff?" He said, "Let me and one of the things that inter- the director of central intelli- tell you where I heard that. Pres- ested me as much as anything gence ought to be a man with ident Ford had a luncheon with was to watch various postmas- either considerable means or the New York Times editors and ters general up before the powerful political backing. I dis- go during that luncheon he talked Church Committee, take the oath tort the wording a bit, but that about these so-called Crown Jew- and then lie about what they was the general thrust of it, the els or whatever they were that he knew about these things. I don't thought being that a fellow who heard about from Colby, and want to make too heavy a point had made a career of intelli- among them were these assassi- on that, I don't want to get you gence. as I had. didn't have the nation plots." involved in something that might strength to stand up to a presi- lead to legal procedures later on, dent who wanted certain things Well, here was the president of but the directors of the Agency done, that I would be afraid for the United States talking off-the- always cleared this with the post- my job or not able to stand up to t erord, theoretically, to the edi- master general. Orally, obvi- the pressure. and I resented that. tors of a big New York newspa- ously, you don't write pieces of per and then one of those fellows It seemed to me that I had stood paper about something like that. leaks the thing to Schorr who up very well to Nixon when he was working for CBS. and so How about the issue drug was trying to get us to cover up of' Srhorr feels free to use it. Terri- experimentation that was raised with the Watergate, and I don't ble judgment on Ford's part, I by the committees? know of any time when I yielded thought. But terrible judgment to that kind of political pressure on Colby's part to go around col- Well, that has been a controver- on any front, so I resented the lecting these things the way he sial issue from day one. There implications of the report. As for did by circularizing [sic] every- was the feeling, from Allen the rest of it, on the only really body in the Agency arid then Dulles's time on, that these drugs difficult thing they had to deal packaging the whole thing were available, that the Rus- with which was the whole assas.- together and sending it down to sians had access to them, maybe sination issue; they punted and the White House. So when you they were using them, we let that go to the Church Com- so add all that, on top of this of should therefore know what they mittee. turning the papers over to Con- could do and what they couldn't gress, you can see why I disagree do, both for protection and in

with Bill Colby. I'm sure that 2 President Ford on 4 case it was felt at some time that you're going to talk to him and announced that Vice President Nelson it was desirable to make use of let him defend himself. Rut I Rorkrfeller would liead a blue-ribbon coni- them. So that's where the drug would appreriate it if, when you mission to investigate CIA'Sdomestic testing program originated. I activities. Ford had hoped to quell grow- talk to him. that you don't han- know there's been a great hoo- Ing controversy about CIA and foi estall a dle this thing in such a fashion congrcssiorial investigation. but the cre- hah and lawsuits and all kinds of that it gets into the riewspapers. ation of the Church and Pikr Corninittees jiggery-pokery about whether I'm not interested in having any followed within weeks. this was done legally or illegally,

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51, No. 3 51 APPROVED FOR RELEASE - DATE: FEB 2008

DCls Reflect on “Time of Troubles“

Richard Helms (cont.)

morally or immorally, and there’s Now, as far as journalists are way, and they get away with it absolutely no percentage in my concerned, I was a newspaper- most of the time. But I have no trying to sort this out and say man before I went with the apologies for using newspaper- which was which or whirh I Agency. I knew very well what men. After all. we’re all in the thought was which. But it was the rules and regulations were of United States. we’re all Ameri- established that that was a legiti- the journalistic fraternity, what cans; we all should be working mate function of the Agency to their traditions were. So when I for our country. If these newspa- try and do this, and we went had anything to do with these permen think their calling is ahead and did it. things, I controlled what journal- higher than the calling of any- ists were used and what were not body else, that’s their opinion, One of the things that I think a used. To use a journalist you had not necessarily the public’s. thorightful person might ask is: to have my signature on it. For a why is a country spending so long time I was the chief of oper- How about employing academics, much of its time complaining ations in the Deputy Directorate which also came up in the hear- about a minor operation of this for Plans, that’s what [the opera- ings? kind which has a useful function tions directorate1 was called in to it? Why is it that as a country those days. so I was the number I was all in favor of that, too, if we always have to wait until two there for a long, long time; any of them would be useful. In disaster strikes and then we seven years I think, and then I World War 11, in the OSS. we had want to spend billions of dollars was deputy director. So I had a priests, academics by the score, trying to solve the problem? hold on all of these things all the lawyers, anybody that you could AIDS is a good example; cancer is way through, and I just okayed find, doing espionage for the a good example. We’re always or approved ones that I thought United States, and nobody late in the game, trying to run to made sense, where we couldn’t thought twice about it. Why? catch up. So I have no apologies get this material any other way, Because the Nazis were nasty. for that whole affair, and I think [through] people I felt we could Nowadays people take a slightly that some of the lawsuits have trust not to blow the operation. different view. They don’t think been absolutely egregious, I that these other fellows were all mean ridiculous. I can’t possibly Obviously, the newspaper frater- that nasty. Why? Because they explain why certain psychia- nity is very sensitive about this haven’t dropped any bombs on trists did the things that they because they’re afraid that their our head, I suppose. I see no rea- did, but at least they were sup- access in foreign countries would son why Americans shouldn’t posed to be reputable people at be closed down if they become serve their country in one capac- the time that they were given involved in intelligence or any- ity or another, if they’re person- financing. body thinks they’re spies. But ally willing to do it. this doesn’t give me any heart- burn because in this twentieth IIow about the issue of assassina- How about the issue of eniploy- century of ours the Soviets use tions? ingjourrialists. which came up in newspapermen all the time. So the Church Conmiittee? Were you do other countries. ?’he Agency never assassinated surprised by the outpouring of anybody, ever. I was there from opposition? Newspapermen in this country the day the doors opened until I think that they’re a special breed left in ‘73.and I know the Agency I wasn’t surprised at all. The because they are protected by a never killed anybody, anybody, press and the Congress have a First Amendment, in a way that You can take my word for it. If synergistic arrangement. They they’re protected in no other you can find anything in the were always protecting each country in the world. They‘ve record of anybody the Agency other. It takes a lot to get an come to think that they’re rather killed, bring it in here and show investigation ofa congressman or special and that they have to be it to me. This whole business a senator. taken care of in a very special about Castro was caused largely

52 Studies in Intelligence Vof. 51. No. 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE - DATE: FEB 2008

DCIs Reflect on "Time of Troubles"

Richard Helms (cont.)

by the fact that the task force things that was, I thought, fatu- very clean hands with respect to that was working on Cuba had ous in the extreme was all this this. This idea of Church's-that some idcas floated as to ways to issue about that poison that came the Agency was a "rogue ele- get rid of Castro. to make him up. There was some that was phant"-I'd never heard any- sick or to do something about kept back after the poisons were thing so ridiculous in my life. him. I don't want to go into a long destroyed. It was shrimp or some And, of course, that just went disquisition about this assassina- kind of a poison deriving from zooming over the country. Every- tion business. I've said every- fish. body thought that was a great thing I have to say before the term. If the Congress isn't care- Church Committee and there's Shellfish toxin. ful, they're going to so micro- absolutely no pcrccntage at this manage the Agency that it's late date in my going over this Shellfish toxin, that's it. And I going to be put in a straight whole area again because it gets didn't remember anything about jacket with by various laws. And complicated by nuances and who shellfish. I didn't know this fel- then it isn't going to be nearly as said what and who didn't say low hadn't destroyed it all. I useful to the American people as what. I just really don't want to remember issuing the orders that it should be, go into it any further. I've told we were going to change our you we didn't kill anybody. and it approach in these matters. But to Do you have any reflection on the seems to me that's the important make such a big issue out of that senators on ttie Church Commit- thing. We didn't even try to kill was absolutely ridiculous. Maybe tee? anybody. the fellow's desire to save this stuff for use in some extreme sit- What were the most difficult uation was pretty sensible. But The senator who was the most deniands on you during the con- for this committee to go ape aggravating was Church him- gressional investigations of 1975? about the thing I thought was self. Mondale didn't play much of ridiculous. And there were a lot a role: he just was there for the A seventeen-and-a half-hour trip of other picky things that they cameramen. Tower and Mathias, one-way from Tehran to Wash- wanted to quiz me about. The I think, did their best as Republi- ington: by that time I had some larger things certainly I could cans but also as sensible men to experience with this because I talk about, but I thought that try and keep this hearing on the was called back in connection whole hearing was charged with rails, to try to make it useful and with the Watergate hearings as the interest in headlines and in bring about examination of infor- well. In one 36-month period I making the Agency look foolish mation, if whether this was a made 13 round-trips to the and emphasizing every little good idea or bad idea, whether United States. I would arrive in thing that they thought the pub- things should be done differently time to get some kind of a night's lic would be interested in. even and so forth. So I think they were sleep and have a day to prepare though it wasn't terribly impor- a good influence. myself for whatever ttie investi- tant in the wider scale of affairs, gation was going to be before the and trying to make it look as There was another fellow on Churrh Committee. That was though the Agency wasn't under there who used to be a foreign hard work to get brought up-to- control. service officer, and he was one of date. And it was particularly those who was absolutely bound hard on me because they were On those covert actions, every and determined that the Shah focusing on what I thought were single one was cleared with the must go. Church encouraged peo- extremely minor issues, which I Executive Committee, which was ple of this kind and it isn't a didn't remember very well. set up to deal with these mat- question that they weren't bright Maybe I had signed the papers, ters, called the Special Group or or it isn't a question that they riiaybc I did go to this place and the 404 Committee; it had vari- weren't very well educated, it that place, but certainly I didn't ous names in various other had nothing to do with that. It's remrmher it then. One of the administrations. Everybody had just that they were interested in

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DCls Reflect on "Time of Troubles"

Richard Helms (cont.)

other things than improving the about Church because I thought Cofby's Openness intelligence process. it was silly. What are your impressions of Mr. Was the Pike Corninittee niiirh The recommendations they came Colbyk cooperation with the Church and Pike Committees? rlitkcnt from the Church Cam- out with later-putting into leg- niittcc? islation the thing that Admiral Well. I have been very careful in Turner apparently wanted, a I only testified before the Pike the years since to say nothing statement of exactly what the Committee once and that wasn't publicly about Colby. But I think a very long testimony. I had Agency's functions and responsi- Colby did this just wrong, and I known Pikc before; when I fin- bilities are and so forth-were believe that to this day. My feel- ished he said, "I've known you ridiculous. particularly in the ing about Bill Colby is that he and I believe what you say and so field of secret intelligence and should have gone to the presi- forth but. you know, this hear- covert action. If you want to do dent and said, "I don't think we ought to do this, sending these ing's got to be seen through the something like that then do away usual pyrotechnics." But Pike documents about secret opera- with the organization. I mean, if tions and so forth up on Capitol was more responsible than you feel you've got this whole Church, I mean that, you didn't Hill. Will you support me?" And legalistic. moralistic incubus over have to agree with Pike lo know then if they insist on it, you'll that at least he was doing a more your head. and then I think you have to go to the Supreme Court, businesslike job. 'That was my ought to stop this entirely. It's and I think that's what should impression. easy to do, just disband it and have happened. don't do that kind of thing. But to Instead of that, Colby went the At one point you said that during put it in legal terms and write it last mile in cooperating with the the corigrcssional investigations down on paper, and tell the world Church and Pike Committees. He so much paper arid so inuch this is what we're going to do and felt he was constitutionally obli- information were released that this is what we're not going to do gated to do this, and in his book itk alriiost impossible to tell what and so forth, it belies the whole he says this, I believe. I don't has been cornprairiiseri-is that idea of having a secret intelli- know what gave him the idea still .your feeling? gence organization. And I think that he was a constitutional law- we ought to face up to this. Why yer but, anyway, this is what he That's still my feeling. Even more are we so gutless about it? did. A lot of people on the inside so. know my feelings, which, I say. I avoided saying publicly because I How did the congressional irives- I think the American people. if think it's unseemly for prior tigations affect.your morale and they had to vote on it, they would directors to be squabbling with feelings about the Agency? vote on it. Americans are pecu- each other in public about who liar in this particular respect. As did what to whom. Well, I found them unpleasant. one very wise American said to obviously. And I found them me one day, "Look, this is sim- A lot of people think that I'm unfair. Rut certainly I live in this ple. The American people want mad at Colby because he sent world and I'm farriiliar with you to go out and do these things, those papers down to the Justice Department to try and get me Washington practices, and this is they just don't want to be told what happens sometimes if the convicted of perjury. I'm not mad about them, and they don't want pendulum of public opinion at him about that. I'm mad at swings in this country from one to have them on their con- him about the way he handled side to another. Arid so I have no science." Period. I think that's the Congress and about sending feeling of heartburn that the true. That's part of our Puritan all these papers down there. And hearings were held. I was sad ethic. "being mad at" is a colloquial-

54 Studies in intelligence Vol. 51, No. 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE - DATE: FEB 2008

DCls Reflect on "Time of Troubles"

Richard Helms (cont.)

ism. I think he was wrong. As far said, "Well. it's really kind of an think that to this day. In fact, as that perjury thing is con- academic question because I've I've become more convinced of it cerried. if his lawyers and the already loaned the documents to as time goes by. people he appointed felt this way, the committee." And I think that fine, send the papers down to the both Ford and Kissinger were Some observers think the congres- Justice Department. I don't think very irritated about this. I don't sional hearings in 1975 were a hc used very good judgment know if it had anything to do watershed in CIA history; do you because I think that in doing with Colby's being let go by Pres- think that's correct? something like that about his ident Ford or not, but it may well predecessor he opens himself up have. Yes, I think they undoubtedly to getting the same thing done to were. I wouldn't have picked the him. word watershed; that's the kind CIA and Congress of newspaper language that I But leaving that personal ele- hope is not appealing to academ- ment out of it, it tends to set up a You said in an interview in 1978 ics because it isn't descriptive of precedent. I mean. he who lives that the Agency is part of the anything. A watershed for the in glass houses shouldn't be president's bag of tools. IS the CIA, what does that mean? But if throwing stones. But that was a Agency also part of Congress's you are referring to the fact that pain in the neck for me. and it bag of tools? from the Church Committee was very difficult for me to han- hearing on, the Congress got far dle. arid it certainly didn't do my That, I think, is a question for more involved in CIA affairs, got reputation any good. But he felt the Supreme Court. I'm sur- far more briefings from the CIA, he had to do it. prised that it hasn't been forced got far more documents from the up there. That basically was my CIA, began to try and manage Hadyou heard the term 'Consti- quarrel with Bill Colby's han- intelligence relations and so tutional Intrlligence Agency" dling of the Church and Pike forth, then it was a watershed. while you were director? Committees in 1975. I never thought he should have sent all What do you think are the les- No those documents up to those com- sons to be learned from the mittees. I thought that he should Church and Pike Investigations? That's R term used later on by have sought the support of the Colby. president to stonewall and force That they shouldn't be con- that issue into the Supreme ducted that way again. If you're I know. This was his effort to pro- Court to find out whether we going to have intelligence over- tprt himself. I don't think he was were obliged to send all those sight it ought to be done on a rea- the one to make that judgment. I secret documents about secret sonably current basis and such was told by operations, overseas relation- an investigation shouldn't be nec- that, on one occasion, there was a ships with foreign security and essary again. meeting in the Cabinet Room intelligence services, all of those things-whether or not we were with President Ford and Kiss- Do you think the Agency today required to do that. I think it is inger and various other wor- more effective because of the hear- should have been forced into the thies: maybe it was a National ings? Security Council meeting. And Supreme Court, and instead of they asked Colby about certain Rill Colby's saying that he was a documents that were being lawyer and he knew what the No, I think it's less effective. requested by thr llill and said Constitution required, I think we that he shouldn't send them should have found out what the Do you think it very important to down there. They had a long talk people who really are supposed to tell congressional committees about whether they should or interpret the Constitution about something before they read they shouldn't and finally Colby thought about all this. I still it in the newspapers?

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51, NO. 3 55 APPROVED FOR RELEASE - DATE: FEB 2008

DCls Reflect on “Time of Troubles”

Richard Helms (cont.)

I believe that firmly. ’l‘hey don’t exposed.” Think that’s too would give me 15 minutes might like surprises. Presidents don’t strong? not end up agreeing with me but like surprises; senators and con- they would certainly know that gressmen don’t like surprises. It’s a good statement. side of the case. I think it’s time some people stop playing hop- And tiow about dircctors? It was Jini Angleton. scotch or fun and games with the Intelligence Community. Directors don’t like them either. Good statement. Jim Angleton was a believer in secret intelli- Do yoti believe it’s much more dif- gence, to be run in the tradition ficult to be DCI after Watergate in Do you think (lit Ctiuidi arid of the British and other good Pike Committees appreciated the comparison with the decades European services. You have to before that? IICI responsibility for the protec- do this in secrecy and with the tioii of sousces arid methods? confidence of your superiors and with a whole network of trust Much more difficult because it’s No. I think that [because] that and mutual support. And it can- much more complicated. You’ve was put into the law. it had to be not be done properly without got many more constituencies to observed. As director, I that, he’s quite right. And you worry about. I don’t think the attempted to comply with it and can find all kinds of people who intelligence side of the job is any then when I did I was criticized are going to argue with every- more difficult, I think in some for having done so. thing I have said. Certain sena- respects, it’s easier because tors and congressmen would you’ve got a lot of gadgets these A retired Agency officer said in gladly argue with it, newspaper- days that help you with intelli- 1976. “Thecongressional investi- men will argue with that, fel- gence collection, particularly gations wwe like being pillaged lows out at the Agency to regarding the Soviet Union. by ii foseign power, only we have protect themselves would argue Where it’s more difficult is han- been occupied by the Congress about it. What I’ve tried to do is dling the Congress, the White with our files rifled, our officials give it to you with the bark on, House, the press, the public. Particularly the Congress. humiliated arid our agents and I believe .:.that .:. .:.anybody who

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