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Reflections of Dcls Colby and Helms on the CIA's APPROVED FOR RELEASE - DATE: FEB 2008 Oral History Reflections of DCls Colby and Helms on the CIA’S “Time of Troubles” (U) From the CIA Oral History Archives On 26 June 2007 the CIA released a 700-pagecollection of documents known as the ”FamilyJewels,” com- piled in 1973 under Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)James Schlesinger, who had asked Agency employ- ees to report activities they thought might be inconsistent with the Agency’s charter. Schlesingerk successor, William Colby, delivered the documents to Congress. Given the release of the “‘FamilyJewels” documents and continuing interest in this aspect of CIA history, the Studies in Intelligence Editorial Board elected to publish portions of transcripts of CIA Oral History Program iritcrviews of William Colby and Richard Hdms. Schlesingers predecessor. on this period of the Agency5 history. Colby and Helms were interviewed on 15 March and 2 February 1988. respectively, as part of an effort by the Center for the Study of Intelligence to compile the perspectives of former Agency leaders on what has often bem termed the CIA ’s “Timeof Troubles”in the 1970s. The perspectives of these two officials, different in sev- eral rcspccts. illustrate the dilemmas a secret intelligence agency facm in serving a democracy. The transcripts were edited by Nicholas Dujmovic, director of the CIA Oral History Program-Editor The Origins and Context of the “Family Jewels” Interviewer (liereafler iri italics) to both DCIs: There is some indication that younger Agency officers were trnubled by some domestic practices in the years before 1973. William Colby. There were Richard Helms. I think concerns during the period what these junior officers of the anti-war movement, were alleged to have been 1968 to 1972, among some concerned about was the of the people as to whether whole issue of whether or we were going outside our not the Agency had a role in charter. We would hear just the domestic aspects of stu- little bits and pieces of it. I dent unrest. On one occa- think they had doubts about sion I got some of these the reassurances they were younger officers into a con- getting, that we were stick- ference room and pointed ing to our charter. And, out that the Agency had essentially, we did. They been asked to look into this slipped over here and there, question by the president, that there was a legiti- but most of the things were within the charter. mate role for the Agency in attempting to find out what foreign elements or foreign powers might have been influencing student unrest on our campuses. Continued on next page. Continued on page 49. The staterrrents of fact, opiriivn. vr arialysjs cxpresscd in thcsc intcrvicws wcrc those of ‘I’his article is Llnclassified the interview suhjects and the interviewer. Presentation here shvcild nvt bc coristrucd in its entirety. a.5 as\ei7irig or irriplyirig US gvvernnrerrt eridor.sernent of th~ircommmts. Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51. No. 3 39 APPROVED FOR RELEASE - DATE: FEB 2008 DCls Reflect on "Time of Troubles" William Colby (conf.) [DCI] Helms had a pretty clear what launched the investigation. they were pretty small potatoes. sense of that and kept it very Just that day they announced They really were. The wiretaps much on track. See. there is that I was going to be succeed- were on employees or ex-employ- nothing wrong with Track 11' ing, so we signed the thing jointly ees, I think in almost all cases. under the rules back then -if the that asked for the report on ques- 'The surveillances were mostly of president tells you to do it, he tionable activities. employees or ex-employees. had a perfcrt right to tell you to There were a couple of journal- do it. [Regarding] the dornestic The Schlesinger memo of May- ists who had leaked [informa- stuff, there were a couple of 1973, asking for anything that tion]: there was a lot of pressure, things that went over. might be construed to be outside "Where did those leaks come the legislative charter of the from?" It was really not a very Agency- did.you write that up? wise business putting a tail on Schlesinger had just taken over Jack Anderson, for instance. But [as DCI] when we started the Yes. even then there was a legal basis [internal] investigation. 1 Ie got for it. The director is charged upset hearing about the McCord with the protection of intelli- letters.z "What the hell. some- Iiow was the memo received, as you recall? gence sources and methods. Now thing is going on here? Did you I could give you a lawyer's argu- know about these things?" And I ment that that requires him to go said, *No. they've been in the Oh, down in the directorates they were upset that this could drag out and find out where a leak General Counsel's office." He was out a lot of things. The point was comes from: because it says so in sore as hell; he said, "I thought that, here you got a new director the law. You can also give we were supposed to get every- and he didn't know about one of another interpretation that it thing from Watergate together. the important elements of the means he can do what he can Goddarnn it, let's find out where Watergate thing: we've got to within existing rules and policy, these time bombs are." So that is find this stuff out and keep it to and it would not justify his sur- ourselves. Find it out and then veilling an American citizen. But ' 'I'tieccivei~t action oidcr.ed Iiy l'rc4tlent after we found it out, correct it. there is an ambiguity to it. I go Nixori to hi-iiif dowii ltie Allrritlc govcrri- By then I was in charge, so I back to the old concept of the spy nirnt of Chile. wrote the series of directives, service-if you get a leak you go 2 Iri Colby's iiittnioir. tie states 'the Sccu- "Thou shalt not this, Thou shalt find it-in the good old days. 'The rity OfTice iiifurriietl riic of the fact that the not that." I have long taken the change in American mores is Agency hail rcceivc:il suiric letters frim Jaiiirs McCord Ittie foriricr rhief of secu- position that when you get into a what caused all this change, rityl who had Iicen arrested as a Water- controversial subject, write your because of the fundamental con- gate burglar. in wliicli letters lie macle instructions down very clearly, tradiction that did exist between veiled accusations that ;in atteiiipt was make it clear on the record what the old spy service idea and the being made in the Wliilr t Iiiusc: to piri the your policy is and what your posi- separation of powers. blanie for Walcrgate on the Agency." W111- iani Colby with Petrr Porbath. /~ori~~~abfetion is. I did that when I started Mrn: My Life in the ClA (New York: the Phoenix program in Viet- After the "FamilyJewels" had Sirriori arid Scliustrr. 1978). 339. Colliy nam-"This is not a program of been collected in 1973,you shared writrs. Iiowrvrr. that this rcvelatiori from assassination." Fine, put it down the material with Senators Sym- security about the MrCord Ictters was a in clear text. People will argue, ington and Sterinis, and took it to r-rsult of the directive to collect what becaiile the 'Paniily Jewels." 1101the r'ause "Why do you have to say that?" [Representative F. Edward) of it as tic says iii liis Oral t-fistiiry. In liis "Because people say it is." You Hebert. niciiioir. Cnlhy rccallcd that Sctilrsiiiger know, make it damn clear. and he drafted the directive after tlie rev- Schlesinger and I both agreed elatiori that I loward I luiit--anotlier That same thing applied to the furrriri CIA rriiiri xi-estetl arid corivirtcd that we should let our commit- for the Watrrgate break-in- had also questionable activity. I remern- tees know about this exercise. hclprtl hui-glatizr tlie offire of Daniel Ells- her my impression after looking Since I had been named, he said, Iierg'b foriiier psyrliiati ist. Cnlby. 337. at the whole set of items was that "Why don't you go down and do 40 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51, No. 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE - DATE: FEB 2008 DCls Reflect on “Time of Troubles” William Co/by (cont.) it?” So, I went down to Hebert conversation with him about it. It Did you ever wonder where he got arid he politely listened to me a just never arose; never answered the bits and pieces? little bit, then he asked me to the question. never even posed brief Lucian Nedzi, who he had the question. In retrospect. it is I long ago gave up trying to fig- appointed as his watchdog for the curious that you don’t think of ure out where journalists get Agcricy.3 So, I wcrit in. Nedzi such an obvious thing. If you are their information. I mean they went over it in great detail. asked going to brief the two chairmen, develop lots and lots of sources. further questions about lots of the least you ought to do is to Very rarely do they have a source things and all the rest of it. He brief somebody in the White who gives them the whole thing. said, ”Well, why don’t you release House that you trust. They are very clever about the this and get the catharsis out of way they call somebody to get the the way?” I said, “Oh.
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