Relational Autonomy from a Political Perspective
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Relational Autonomy from a Political Perspective Maud Faïle Gauthier-Chung A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy September 2017 London 1 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others. I thereby declare that two chapters are based on former work: a version Chapter 4 has been published in French, under the title ‘Égalité entre les sexes et libéralisme: le cas des congés de paternité’ (‘Sex Equality and Liberalism: the paternity leave case’) (2016), in the peer reviewed journal Politique et Sociétés, and was based on an essay produced in the class GV4G3. A version of Chapter 6 has been published in a special issue of the peer-reviewed Journal Moral Philosophy and Politics on the philosophy of Joseph Raz under the title ‘Hounded Women: The IPV Protocol and the Autonomy of Abuse Victims’ (2017). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 87 192 words. 2 Abstract Individual autonomy is crucial to both liberalism and feminism and, to some extent, for similar reasons: that is, the insistence on everyone being able to shape her own life and not just have it shaped for her. As it is currently understood, however, this ideal is a source of great dissatisfaction for feminists. For one, it is blind to the ‘problem of oppression’ –that is the way social factors, such as oppressive gender norms, can affect individuals’ capacity to lead a self- governed life. In addition, on the political level, autonomy is aligned with individualism, independence and rationality. This makes it an exclusionary ideal, which, under the cover of universalism, promotes a prejudiced and narrow vision of what agents and preferences should be seen as worthy of respect. I refer to this as the problem of exclusion. My thesis is an attempt to reframe our understanding of autonomy in order to answer these two problems. I argue that the relational accounts of autonomy feminists have articulated should be understood as motivated by the need to address these key concerns (Ch. 1). However, none of the relational accounts developed so far truly succeed in simultaneously addressing the problem of oppression and the problem of exclusion (Ch. 2). I suggest that this is because they are still too individualistic in their focus and remain fixed on the question of what individual agent and/or preference should be considered autonomous. In order to ensure we avoid the problem of exclusion, I propose we remain agnostic towards this question. This results in a systematic presumption of autonomy, which commits us to demonstrate respect to all agents (especially vulnerable ones), as well as to their declared preferences. Such a commitment, however, should not lead us to overlook the problem of oppression. In order to address this problem, I argue that we should devote our attention to the way the socio-relational context structures how agents can plausibly exercise their autonomy. In other words, in order to address the problem of oppression without reproducing the problem of exclusion, we need to stop focusing on the question of who should be considered autonomous and instead refocus on the question of what structural changes might promote the autonomy of all (Ch. 3). I call the resulting account an ‘agnostic and structural’ understanding of autonomy. I argue that such a conception of autonomy is promising as it offers an inclusive conception of self-government, which nonetheless gives us grounds to vindicate substantial emancipatory policies. I then present a set of case studies in order to show how such a conception of autonomy could help us deal with entrenched gender inequalities. Doing so enables me to illustrate the difference adopting an ‘agnostic and structural’ conception of autonomy could make in the areas of our legal system that are underpinned by an individualistic understanding of autonomy. Legal frameworks surrounding parental leave (Ch. 4), divorce and separation (Ch. 5), domestic violence (Ch. 6) and even our understanding of criminal responsibility (Ch. 7), I argue, could be effectively reframed using the kind of understanding of autonomy I propose. 3 Content Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………………………………………..……6 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..……..7 1: Individual Autonomy, the Problem of Oppression and the Problem of Exclusion………..…13 I. Autonomy from a Political Perspective………………………………………………………..….14 II. Feminist Dissatisfaction with Autonomy……………………………………………………..…..18 A. The Problem of Exclusion………………………………………………………….....….20 B. The Problem of Oppression………………………………………………………………26 III. The Relational Conceptions of Autonomy……………………………………………………..30 A. Why Keep Autonomy?................................................................................30 B. The Relational Accounts of Autonomy……………………………………………….32 2: Existing Relational Frameworks………………………………………………………………………………….37 I. Procedural Accounts…………………………………………………………………………………….38 A. The Minimalist Model……………………………………………………………………….39 B. The Historical Model………………………………………………………………………..41 C. The Self-Regarding Attitude Model…………………………………………………….44 D. The Competencies Model …………………………………………………………………47 II. Substantive Accounts ………………………………………………………………………………….51 A. Strong Substantive Accounts………………………………………………………………51 B. Structural Substantive Accounts………………………………………………………….57 III. Legal Accounts………………………………………………………………………………………….64 3: Towards an Agnostic and Structural Account of Autonomy…………………………………………..71 I. An Agnostic Framework……………………………………………………………………………….72 A. Autonomy as Causally Relational………………………………………………………..73 B. The Problem of Thick Disagreement………………………………………………….76 C. The Problem of Epistemic Uncertainty……………………………………………….78 D. An Open Account of the Competencies Needed for Self-Determination..79 E. Avoiding Exclusion: A Systematic Presumption of Autonomy……………….83 II. A Structural Framework………………………………………………………………………………86 A. Autonomy and Adequate Options………………………………………………………87 B. Listening to the Agent………………………………………………………………………..90 C. Identifying Oppression………………………………………………………………………92 D. The Temporal Dimension of Oppression……………………………………………96 E. The Question of Legitimate Means……………………………………………………..96 F. What about Adaptive Preferences?..............................................................99 4 4: Disrupting Gendered Preferences……………..………………..………………………………..…….……105 I. Champions of the Global Gender Gap Index………………………………………………..106 II. The Structural Forces at Play………………………………………………………………………108 III. The Daddy Quota……………………………………………………………………………..……..111 IV. The Anti-Perfectionism Objection…………………………………………………………..….113 5: When the Family Is No Longer: Separations and the Vulnerable Caregiver…………..……..119 I. The Case……………………………………………………………………………………………..……121 II. The Grounds for the Decisions: The Strong Autonomy View……………………..….122 III. The Grounds for Contestation: The Functionalist Argument………………………....124 IV. Respecting Autonomy While Protecting Caregivers…………………………………..…..126 6: Hounded Women and the IPV Protocol…………………………………………………………..………135 I. The No-Drop Protocol and the Debate Surrounding It………………………………….136 II. Hounded Women……………………………………………………………………………………..141 7: Victims or Agents? When Battered Women Kill…………………………………………………..…..150 I. The Guilty Agent or the Helpless Victim: Diminished Responsibility and Provocation Pleas……………………………………………………………………………………….151 II. What About Self-Defence? Lavallee, the Battered Women Syndrome and Its Consequences………………………………………………………………………………………..…….….157 III. An Agnostic and Structural Defence for Battered Women Who Kill……………..163 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………173 References…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………177 5 Acknowledgements I wish to thank, first and foremost, Anne Phillips. Anne has been a wonderful, insightful and very patient supervisor. I could not have written this thesis without her. Special thanks also to Laura Valentini, who acted as my second supervisor, and has commented on many papers that now compose crucial parts of this thesis. My gratitude goes to all the feminists (activists as well as researchers), who have paved the way to a better world, and who continue to work toward this goal. I am greatly indebted to you, and so are my research. My warm regards to the LSE POTY crew, composed of the peers, friends, and professors (in no particular order): Mollie Gerver, Kai Spiekermann, Sarah Goff, Anahi Wiedenbrug, Marta Wojciechowska, Nimrod Kovner, Chandran Kukathas, Diana Popescu, Kaveh Pourvand, Jacob Huber, Paola Romero, Katrin Flikschuh, and David Axelsen. Many thanks to the distinguished members of the pueblo familia: Charles Côté- Bouchard, Anne-Marie Lévesque, Alexandre Gajevic-Sayegh, Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette, and Tanya Goodchild. You have been a true family to me during these years in London. To those I have met in conferences, and whose generosity, and comments have helped me, thank you. In particular, Chris Mills and Michael Garnett, for your encouragement and