: THE NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1932

BY E. JEFFREY LUDWIG*

IN THE Presidential election of 1932, Pennsylvania had one of its closest elections, with the Democrats garnering 1,295,948 votes and the Republicans maintaining their traditional dominance, but with only 1,453,540 votes.' Even with this narrow victory, on the surface the strength of the Republican party seemed to be assured. Yet the event of the Republican party's victory was accompanied by another apparently strange phenomenon-that is, the total number of votes cast in the Presidential election declined from 3,159,612 in 1928 to 2,858,968 in 1932. Although Maryland, Alabama, and Virginia also showed a decline in total votes cast, Pennsylvania's decline was by far the largest of any state (ap- proximately 300,000), and was the only state that went Republican to show such a decline.2 To approach an understanding of the election, it seems ap- propriate to begin with a glance at the interrelation between the changing nature of the county votes in this election and that of 1928, and the associated increase or decrease in votes of the counties. First, let us note that of those counties which went Re- publican in 1928 and Democratic in 1932, sixteen showed a de- crease in the total numbers of voters participating.. Of these sixteen, in the years between 1920 and 1940 Adams, Clarion, and Sullivan went Democratic only in 1932. Twelve counties-Al- legheny, Northampton, Schuylkill, Westmoreland, York, Berks, Cambria, Clearfield, Fayette, Lehigh, Montour, and Northumber- land-were to remain in the Democratic fold through the thirties and at least up to 1940. Only Erie, of the counties with a de- creased vote, went back to the Republican fold after voting Demo-

*Mr. Ludwig has done graduate work at the University of and dur'ng the past year at Harvard University. 'Edgar Eugene Robinson, The Presidential Vote, 1,896-I932 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1934), p. 308. 2Ibid., pp. 131-378. 334 NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1932 335 cratic in 1932 and 1936. Now let us look at those counties which went Democratic and increased in total vote cast in 1932. Of the eight such counties, Columbia, Greene, and Monroe had gone Democratic every year since 1920 except 1928. Fulton, another county that increased in 1932, had previously voted Democratic in 1924. Washington and Beaver Counties went Democratic from 1932 to 1940, while Pike County went Democratic only in 1932 and 1936 in the years between 1920 and 1940. Lastly, the three counties which had gone Democratic in 1928 and remained Demo- cratic-Elk, Lackawanna, and Luzerne-all showed a marked decline in their total number of voters.3 It is often asserted by political scientists that a dissenting or protest vote brings a higher election turnout. In Pennsylvania in 1932 a protest vote would have been a vote for the candidates of the Democratic party. One political scientist has suggested that the "Democratic percentage [in Pennsylvania] was in part the result of a rise in the general interest in voting."4 Yet, in Penn- sylvania in 1932, the opposite seems to have been true. Those counties which went Democratic, and in which the total vote de- creased, had a percentage decrease greater than the percentage increase shown by any of those counties which showed an increase. For example, Pike, which was to go Democratic in 1936 as well as in 1932, did show a small voting increase, from 3,395 to 3,558; but Erie, which also went Democratic in 1932 and 1936, showed a sharp decline, from 50,097 votes cast in 1928 to 40,442 in 1932. Although the three counties that went Democratic in 1932 after having done so in 1928 also showed a voting decline in 1932, this decline came in the wake of a startling increase in voting in those counties between 1924 and 1928-Elk had gone from 9,352 to 13,009, Lackawanna from 62,401 to 99,269, and Luzerne from 87,396 to 141,411.5 The suggested reasons for this increase will be noted later in this article. Further, it should be noted that of those counties which showed an increase and also went Democratic, four had gone Democratic in 1920 and/or 1924, and therefore did

3 Harold F. Alderfer, Presidential Elections by Pennsylvania Counties, 1920-1940 (State College, Pa.: Pennsylvania State College, 1941), pp. 14-15. Hereafter cited as Alderfer, Presidential Elections, 1920-1940. 4Harold F. Gosnell and William G. Colman, "Political Trends for In- dustrial America: Pennsylvania an Example," Public Opinion Quarterly, IV (1940). p. 482. Hereafter cited as Gosnell and Colman, "Political Trends." 5Alderfer, Presidential Elections, I920-1940, pp. 17-19. 336 PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY not have as strong a tradition of Republicanism as did the other counties that voted Democratic in 1932. Of the seven counties that stayed in the Republican ranks and showed an increase in total votes cast in 1932, three went over to the Democratic fold in 1936. Furthermore, the increase in total votes in these counties was quite small; however, in 1936, all seven showed a great increase in the number of ballots cast. In the thirty-three remaining Republican counties, the percentage de- crease in total votes was greater than the percentage increase shown by the other seven Republican counties. But, as with the other seven counties, all showed a marked increase in the 1936 electionY Harold F. Gosnell suggests that "the Catholic, foreign-born, wet elements have tended to support the Democratic candidates, while the dry, rural voters have tended to turn against them with the exception of 1932, when the general protest against the de- pression conditions tended to obliterate these particular relation- ships."7 We might, however, examine the economic scene to see if it really did "obliterate" other socio-political issues. Of the twenty counties having an unemployment percentage higher than 30% in May, 1932, thirteen went Democratic in the November elections. However, of the twenty-five counties showing an un- employment percentage between 25.0 and 29.9 per cent, only six went Democratic in the Presidential election.8 Thus, although there is a very high correlation between those counties having the highest rate of unemployment and the Democratic vote cast in those counties, there is a very low correlation between those counties with the second highest rate of unemployment and Demo- cratic predominance in 1932. Although the statistic gathering sec- tion of the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry did not have the efficient fact gathering methods found after the re- organization of the department in 1933, we can probably assume that while the percentage of unemployment given is inaccurate, the relative unemployment situation of the respective counties is depicted with general accuracy.9 'Alderfer, Presidential Elections, 1920-1940, pp. 20-22. 7Gosnell and Colman, "Political Trends," p. 476. 'Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, Labor and Indvstryv, XIX (), p. 1. 'Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, Pennsylvania Labor and Industry in the Depression (Harrisburg, 1934), p. 19. Hereafter cited as Labor and Industry in the Depression. NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1932 337

The relief efforts of the early depression years in Pennsylvania, while resulting in a flurry of activity, did not really do the job that needed to be done."' Throughout the state, depression con- ditions continued unabated until the year 1932, at the end of which one can discern signs of a lessened severity (e.g., unem- ployment declined). In a study by Harold F. Alderfer, certain correlations are made between the industrial character and the number of wage earners in the state and the Democratic or Re- publican votes cast between the years 1920 and 1940. Industrial character was determined by three factors in this statistical survey: the value of products, the amount of primary horsepower, and the number of wage earners:

VOTING BEHAVIOR AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT". Republican Democratic Minor 1924 .04 -. 31 .00 1928 .43 .40 .16 1932 .30 .22 .40 1936 .61 .59 .47

"lOAt first Governor Gifford Pinchot established labor camps to construct highways and dams. In 1931, the Talbot Bill provided $10,000,000 for "food, clothing, fuel, and shelter for residents . . . without means of sup- port," while at the same time reducing other state appropriations by $10,- 000,000. "Prosperity Bonds" to the amount of $35,000,000 were to be sold to Pennsylvania's wealthy at 4% interest, but the proceeds were not to be used for doles. Furthermore, and Pittsburgh were permitted to make loans up to three million dollars to be a liability in the following year's budget. Charitable donations were also encouraged, with employees of the Department of Labor and Industry taking the lead by pledging $34,420. Lastly, in order to increase revenue, a sales tax of 1% went into effect on September 1, 1932, expected to bring in a gross revenue for the state of $12,000,000. For more detail on the above see Labor and Industry in the Depression, pp. 27-28; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Laws of the Gcneral Assembly of the Coininonwea'th of Pennsylvania, Passed at the Session of igpi, Act 7-E, 1503-1505 (Harrisburg, 1931) ; Isidore Feinstein "Gentlemen in Politics: Honorable Gifford Pinchot," American Mercury, XXIX (1933), p. 84; Pennsylvania Denartment of Labor and Industry, Labor and Industry, XIX (July, 1932), 8; and, Harrisburg Telegraph, September 7, 1932, p. 1. ' Counties are ranked according to their industrial development and then according to their Republican and Democratic votes. These rankings are then correlated using the correlation formula r = 2 sin !7 rho where 6-6 d' rho - I n' n .Alderfer, Presidential Elections, 1920-194o, p. 28. 338 PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY

VOTING BEHAVIOR AND WAGE EARNERS 12 Republican Dentocratic Minor 1924 .09 -. 21 .45 1928 -. 43 .40 .15 1932 -. 33 .31 .14 1936 -. 64 .58 .37

These charts seem to show that, in spite of the industrial blight and the difficulties of workers, the depression apparently did not have a significant new impact (in fact, the correlations are less significant in 1932 than in 1928) on the voting habits of the people living in the state in 1932." We may note, however, that by 1936 the "New Deal . . . turned politicians to those very wage earners whom Penrose [political boss and Senator, who died in 1921] had despised."':4 In the state of Maine, unemployed citizens who used municipal aid within ninety days preceding an election in 1932 were dis- franchised.' 5 Since permission to vote is decided at the time of registration, the question may be raised whether there were special factors at work preventing registration in 1932; and if there were, whether this loss of registration was aimed at, or respon- sible for, the loss of the Democratic candidates in the 1932 elec- tion in Pennsylvania. As a beginning we might do well to chart the basic registration satistics:

REGISTRATION 1928-193416 % Potential o Potential Potential No. Voters Voters No. Year Registered Registered No. Voting Voting Voters 1928 3,971,876 78% 3,150,612 62% 5,085,750 1930 3,522,510 67% 2,105,445 40% 5,258,817 1932 3,912,671 72%7, 2,859,177 53% 5,413,282 1934 4,192,441 75%o 2,950,296 53% 5,567,767

`2Ibid., p. 29. "A significant correlation is to be defined as any coefficient greater than .50 or -. 50. " Gosnell and Colman, "Political Trends," p. 475. ""As Maine Went: Unemployment Disfranchised," Survey, LXVII (Oc- tober 15, 1932), p. 499. "fHarold F. Alderfer and Fanette H. Lukes, Registration in Pennsyl- vania Elections, 1926-1946 (State College, Pa.: Pennsylvania State College, 1941), p. 15. Hereafter cited as Alderfer and Lukes, Registration int Penna., 1926-1946. NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1932 339

REGISTERED VOTERS BY PARTIES" Year Republicans % of Total Democrats %oof Total 1928 2,861,919 70.7% 867,391 21.8% 1930 2,659,850 72.1% 675,584 19.2 % 1932 2,911,068 75.5% 833,977 21.3% 1934 2,624,386 74.4% 1,401,005 33.4%

What can we say about the above statistics? First, it can be noted that there was a six per cent decline in the number of potential voters that registered between 1928 and 1932, and, in absolute numbers, this decline amounted to 50,000 voters. If we examine the registration for individual counties, we gen- erally find that the greater the unemployment the lower percent- age of those registering." With this in mind, it might be wise to see if there was anything in the voting laws which was respon- sible, as were laws in Maine, for the low registration in the high unemployment counties. Before , 1933, the voting qualifications section of the state constitution read as follows:

Section 1: Every male citizen, twenty-one years of age, possessing the following qualifications, shall be entitled to vote at all elections subject, however, to such laws requiring and regulating the registration of electors as the general assembly may enact. First, He shall have been a citizen of the United States at least one month. Second, He shall have resided in the State one year (or having previously been a qualified elector or native born citizen of the State, he shall have removed there- from and returned, no less than six months) immediately preceding the election. Third, He shall have resided in the election district where he shall offer to vote at least two months im- mediately preceding the election. Fourth, If 22 years of age and upwards, he shall have paid within two years a state or county tax, which shall have been assessed at least two months and be paid at least one month before the election [Italics added].1

"Alderfer and Lukes, Registration in Penna., 1926-1946, p. 22. "18Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Manual of the Commonwealth of Pemnsytvania (Harrisburg, 1933), pp. 400-401. Hereafter cited as Manual of Pennsylvania (1933). "19Ibid.,Footnote 1, p. 4S. 340 PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY

The taxes were to have been paid on real estate in all counties except Philadelphia, which charged a fifty cents poll tax. There- fore a meaningful correlation might be established if we consider the ten highest and ten lowest registration counties, and compare the median values of their respective owned and rented non-farm values.2 0 They are listed from highest to lowest "median owned" values.

Io Counties io Counties Lowest Median Value ($) Highest Median Value ($) Registration Owned Rented Registratio? Owned Rented -1932 non-farin -I932 non-farm Allegheny 6,658 33.03 Delaware 7,674 38.75 Lehigh 6,384 28.73 Monroe 5,729 24.31 Erie 5,933 28.32 Pike 4,171 19.15 Philadelphia 5,705 36.81 Cumberland 4,157 18.86 Northampton 5,534 25.49 Wayne 4,153 16.12 Lawrence 5,128 25.05 Wyoming 3,204 13.69 Lackawanna 5,038 26.12 Adams 3,040 14.55 Mercer 4,762 24.02 Bradford 2,900 15.49 Fayette 3,841 11.05 Tioga 2,305 10.51 Cambria 4,149 18.79 Potter 1,702 19.10 AVERAGE $5,331.44 $25.74 AVERAGE $3,904.50 $19.05

Before noting anything more than that the ten lowest registered counties are also those counties with the higher median value for owned and rented non-farm real estate, it is necessary to consider another set of statistics. If the Democrats lost votes because of registration requirements, then we should expect to see a correlation between the counties going Democratic and a lower registration. We should also expect to find that counties which went Republican would have a higher registration rate. In the following chart this is exactly what we find. 21

Lowest ro I tighest I0 Registration I932 Vote Rt?gistration 1932 VOte Mercer .292% Republican Tioga .613% Republican Erie .308% Democratic Delaware .593% Republican Philadelpl iia .320% Republican Cumberland .590% Republican

"Mfanual of Pennsylvania (1933), pp. 400-401; Leon E. Truesdell, ed., Fifteenth Census of the U.S., £93o, Population, Vol. VI, Families (Washl- ington, 1932), pp. 1137-1140. "Mlanual of Pennsylvania (1933), pp. 400-401. NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1932 341

Lowest io Highest IO Registration 1932 Vote Registration 1932 Vole Cambria .330% Democratic Wyoming .580% Republican Lawrence .339% Republican Bradford .571%o Republican Lehigh .345% Democratic Pike .571%o Democratic Lackawanna .348%o Democratic Monroe .571%, Democratic Allegheny .350%, Democratic Adams .567%o Democratic Fayette .353% Democratic Wayne .567%, Republican Northampt'n.372%7 Democratic Potter .564%, Republican As we can easily note above, seven of the ten lowest counties in registration were Democratic and seven of the ten highest counties in registration were Republican. Generally, then, those counties with the lowest registration went Democratic; and thus the Democrats were not getting as many of the potential votes out of the counties they won, since fewer were voting, as were the Republicans from the counties they won. In looking at the last two charts, we might be led to ask if rather than the poorest counties not being able to register, the wealthier counties did not register because of complacency, and went Democratic because not 'enough people registered to prevent the Democrats from carrying them. This reasoning, however, does not help explain why the total number of votes decreased among those Republican counties which showed a high registration. For, if a county had shown an increase in registration (and therefore, by the above reasoning, a lack of complacency), it should have shown an increase in the number of votes as well as a Republican victory. Only the low registration and high registration counties which went Democratic were consistent, to the extent that the former showed a decrease in the total number of votes cast, and of the latter, two-Pike and Monroe-showed an increase in votes. Since this correlation (a higher registration showing a higher vote and vice versa) was consistent only within the Democratic party, we must see if there was some other factor affecting the higher or lower registration of the counties mentioned. If we look at the ten lowest registration counties in 1926, 1928, 1934, and 1936, we note they were the following:22

1926 1928 1934 1936 Lycoming McKean Berks Blair Delaware Venango Lawrence Crawford Berks Berks Montour Union "2Alderfer and Luhrs, Registration in Pennsylvania, 1926-1946, p. 28. 342 PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY

I926 1928 1934 I1936 Lawrence Dauphin Allegheny Lycoming Venango Lawrence McKean Cambria Lehigh Lehigh Lycoming Berks Lackawanna Montour Blair Philadelphia Allegheny Philadelphia Philadelphia Erie Erie Allegheny Lehigh Montour Philadelphia Erie Erie Lehigh In all these cases, as well as in 1932, the low registration counties were generally urban.23 This would seem to indicate that regardless of party affiliation, urban counties registered in a smaller percentage. Thus, even if the Democrats began to make encroachments in the urban areas, they still were not getting as big a number of the potential voters as were the Republicans ill rural, high-registering areas. Summing up, just as there was a decrease in voting, so there was a decrease in registration in 1932. The low registration counties tended to be counties that went Democratic. No state- ment can be made here with assurance, however, concerning the effect of the tax requirement in curtailing registration. What is clear is that low registration areas tended to be urban areas. But since low registration characterized urban areas even if they voted Republican, low registration was not of itself the deciding factor in the election, except to the extent that it reflected, as did the election results, other underlying factors. We might now consider some of the ethnic influences on this election. In doing this, we should consider the following: first, whether the Democratic counties in 1932 showed a particular ethnic orientation as opposed to the Republican counties; second, whether this orientation was the same or different from that of 1928; and, third, whether these ethnic factors held true in the 1936 election. The three counties which went Democratic for the first time in 1928 all show a high percentage of foreign born, foreign par- ents, or mixed parentage. Of the seven counties that stayed Republican in 1932 but which showed an increase in votes-Bed- ford, Cameron, Centre, Cumberland, Dauphin, Montgomery and "3Throughout this article, urban counties will be those counties having more than 52% of their populations living in towns of 2,500 or more people. See Fifteenth Census of the U.S., 1930, Population, VI, Families, pp. 1141- 1145. NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1932 343

Wyoming-only a small proportion of their populations were within one generation's attachment to foreign-born people.2 4 Of those eight counties that went from Republican to Democratic and showed an increase in votes between 1928 and 1932, only three-Beaver, Pike, and Washington-had at least 40%o of their populations foreign-born or children of foreign born people. And, lastly, of those counties which went Democratic but which showed a voting decrease between 1928 and 1932, all except Adams, Clarion, Montour, Sullivan, and York had substantial foreign populations. In all counties that had significant foreign populations, the dominant foreign ethnic groups were the Italian, German, Yugoslavian, Czechoslovakian, Irish, Polish, and Austrian. With the exception of the Germans, these groups were all from strongly Catholic countries.2 " Until now, we have not been able to establish a significant correlation which has been able to account either for the direc- tion the election took in 1932 or for the diminished number of votes in that year. In considering the facts of the ethnic composi- tion of the varying counties, however, we may find a clue to ac- count, at least, for the rising and falling of total votes cast. In 1928, all counties showed a sharp increase in voting (1,000,000 more than in 1924), with the predominant increase in the indi- vidual counties coming in either the Democratic or Republican party, depending on the composition of the population (whether or not it was "old stock"). In 1932, however, no ethnic issue was so clearly focused, because neither of the candidates had Al Smith's Catholic origins. So we find that many of those who had voted Democratic in 1928, but who no longer felt ethnic ties with their 1932 candidate, voted Republican; and many more, who had voted Republican in 1928, and who no longer felt an ethnic antagonism towards the Democratic candidate, with the reinforce- ment of other anti-Republican issues, voted Democratic. Many from both parties, however, voted in 1928 only because of enthusiasm wrought by ethnic bias, and, as such, in 1932, faced with an election that had no "racial" implications, did not vote at

24That is, "foreign-born, foreign parentage, or mixed parentage." Ter- minology from Fifteenth Census of the U.S., 1930, Population, III, Table 14, pp. 680-684. 25 Fifteenth Census of the U.S., 1930, Population,III, Table 14, pp. 680-684, and Table 1&, pp. 703-705. 344 PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY all. In 1936, although the same counties that were Democratic in 1932 stayed in the Democratic ranks, the addition of new voters and the gaining of fourteen new counties all seem to point to other new, and more important, correlations. 2 6 Thus, between the elections of 1928 and 1932, it would seem that ethnic affiliation (and its concomitant-religious affiliation) was the chief element in the rising and falling of voting between the two elections. Although statistics are extremely useful in helping us form judgments about elections, it is perhaps wise at this point to consider some of the non-statistical factors-e.g., the campaign issues, newspaper editorializing, political maneuvers. As the campaign began, five issues were spotlighted by the Democrats and Republicans in their platforms and in the speeches of their respective candidates-prohibition, tariff needs, the bud- get, the bonus to veterans, and economic recovery. On the first issue Roosevelt wanted repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, while Hoover was ambiguous. On the issue of the tariff, Hoover insisted on "protecting" American markets and producers, while Roosevelt, although noting the dire effects of a protective tariff, equivocated about how far we should go to remedy the situation. Both agreed wholeheartedly on the need for a balanced budget, and because of this opinion on the budget, neither would commit himself definitively to the giving of a bonus to veterans. As for the area of economic recovery, the Republican platform asserted that the President had indeed initiated "a constructive program" through the Railroad Credit Corporation, the Federal Land Bank Fund, and The Reconstruction Finance Corporation. 2 7 At the same time, the Democrats were offering economic suggestions which were later implemented by New Deal legislation under Franklin D. Roosevelt. With the above issues in hand the campaign was underway. The Republicans surprised many by sending Charles Curtis, the Vice-Presidential nominee, into Pennsylvania to open the cam- paign. As one analyst suggested, "The state has been gyrating in a queer way for several years, and this Republican anxiety about

"6 ee page (6): VOTING BEHAVIOR AND INDUSTRIAL DE- VELOPMENT AND VOTING BEHAVIOR AND WAGE EARNERS. "' Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson, National Party Platforms (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956), p. 340. Hereafter cited as Porter and Johnson, National Party Platforms. NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1932 345 it caps the climax."'28 The Curtis visit initiated a generally high paced campaign by the Republicans, and according to the Literary Digest, "The Republicans profess great confidence that they will win some important states by their whirlwind campaign of recent weeks, and they expect especially they say to carry Pennsyl- vania."29 Part of this "all out" campaign called for rallies on the Saturday before the election in the county seats of each of the sixty-seven counties in the state, with 1,000 smaller rallies to be held between Saturday and Sunday, all of which would utilize 500 speakers throughout the state.20 At the same time, some more "aggressive" Democrats were circulating hard-hitting campaign books, such as the Hoover Scandal Book which claimed that Hoover was not an American citizens Furthermore, the Democrats suggested that business interests were coercing many of their workers, with veiled threats, not to vote for the Democratic party. Julius Bux was said to have warned that if a low tariff man were elected, 100,000 men might be laid off. 2" This statement was offered as a "joint issuance of a statement of individual opinions . . . of a non-political nature."2" Although the newspapers noted that 100,000 persons cheered Hoover on October 31, 1932, in Philadelphia's Reyburn Plaza, they also noted that "unusual precautions were taken by the police to safeguard Hoover in Philadelphia. . . . [Most of the] main disturbances [were] from Communist groups."' 4 Although the campaign was spirited, the cost was considerably less than that of the 1928 campaign. In 1928, the Republicans reportedly spent $4,911,744, and the Democrats $4,088,932. In 1932 the Republicans reportedly spent $960,290, the Democrats $1,261,412."5 In spite of the lowered costs, charges were hurled regarding the acquisition of these funds. John R. Collins, chair- man of the Democratic State Committee, said that a " 'voluntary' contribution is being strong-armed" from state employees to aid

"21Charles Willis Thompson, "The Campaign and its Meaning," Common- weal, XVI (October 5, 1932), p. 524. " "Our Poll is O.K., What Price Pennsylvania?" Literary Digest, CXIV (, 1932), 6. "Philadelphia Inquirer, October 30, 1932, p. 20. '3 Hazleton Plain Speaker, January 2, 1932, p. 4. "33Philadelphia Inquirer, , 1932, p. 9. "Ibid. "Ibid., , 1932, pp. 1, 15. "Hazleton Plain Speaker, , 1932, p. 1. 346 PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY the candidate supported by Governor Gifford Pinchot.36 T. E. Williams suggested that Pinchot was not permitting state officials to be assessed, even though $300,000 was collected from them in 1928.3T Certainly the Republican strength was not hurt by the vast corps of appointed and elected county officials. With the decline in income in all walks of life, noted earlier, the fees and salaries paid these officials showed an increase between the years 1929 and 1931. In 1929 this figure amounted to $1,269,818, while in 1931, it was $1,406,940, an increase of $37,022."' This increase might be defended on the ground that it represented an increase in personnel hired to cope with the depression. But if we look at the per capita costs, we can see that they also increased.30 The G.O.P. also hurled charges, claiming that bankers were be- ing offered federal receiverships in return for campaign funds.40 Further, the Republicans produced a letter from A. P. Homer of the Democratic National Committee offering G. C. Eddy, a Chi- cago industrialist, favors in return for funds. James Farley, Democratic National Chairman, denied any knowledge of this letter and disavowed its authenticity.41 Having considered the charges and countercharges, we might turn to a discussion of the internal political machinations of the state of Pennsylvania at this time, and their impact on the out- come of the election. Since the political situation of Pennsylvania in the 1920's is beyond the scope of this article, that period will be considered only to the extent that its activities are relevant to understanding the election of 1932. With wonderful ease the Republican forces in the state had coalesced in the senatorial and gubernatorial election of 1926 to elect John S. Fisher to the governorship and William S. Vare to the Senate. But Gifford S. Pinchot, then governor, refused to certify Vare after he won. Furthermore, after the report of the Reed Committee on Campaign Expenditures the United States

"3 Ibid., April 1, p. 1. "4'T. E. Williams, "Will Pennsylvania Go Democratic?" Nation, CXXXV (, 1932), p. 452. "SFrederick P. Weaver and Harold F. Alderfer, County Government Costs iiv Peinsylvania, Bulletin 287 (State College, Pa.: Pennsylvania State College, 1933), p. 29. 39Ibid., p. 30. 40Philadelphia Inquirer, , 1932, p. 3. Philadelphia Public Ledger, November 1, 1932, p. 9. NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1932 347

Senate refused to seat Vare.42 This outcome did not endear Hoover to Vare, since Vare received no aid from the President.4" The event marked the beginning of decline for the Vare machine. Further, in August, 1928, there was a grand jury investigation of racketeering in Philadelphia, which also hurt Vare's position. In 1931 Vare suffered another setback when he nearly lost the "preprimary" mayoralty campaign in Philadelphia.44 At first Charlie Hall, president of City Council, picked a vulnerable mayoralty candidate in George H. Biles. He was backed by 32 of 42 ward leaders, but powerful State Senator Sam Salus refused to back this candidate. Senator Salus then went to see the vice- president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and threatened to support Pinchot in his drive for more utility regulation, if the Pennsyl- vania Railroad executives did not tell Hall to withdraw his sup- port from Biles. Vare and his confederates finally supported the compromise candidate J. Hampton Moore.4 5 The other two principal factions in Pennsylvania Republicanism were the Mellon family and the Pennsylvania Manufacturers' As- sociation. The Mellon family of Pittsburgh was abetted by the Leslie Coyne organization of Allegheny County and United States Senator David Reed.4 6 The PMA commanded the respect of the citizens of the state, had access to funds from manufacturers, and was supported by the organizational skills of Joseph Grundy, its president. These forces had agreed on the Fisher-George Wharton Pepper ticket of 1926, but they were not to have this unity in the early thirties.47 With the rejection of Vare by the Senate, Gov- ernor John S. Fisher appointed Grundy to Vare's Senatorial Seat.48 This combination of Grundy and Fisher united to defeat such measures as the old-age pension bill, which was supported by the Vare machine and the Democrats.4 ' Gifford Pinchot, a "dry," "reform" candidate, however, was to " Samuel J. Astorino, "The Contested Election of William Scott Vare," Pennsylvania History, XXVII (1961), 187-201. "T. E. Williams, "Will Pennsylvania Go Democratic?" Nation, CXXXV (November 9, 1932), 451. "John F. Salter, "End of Vare," Political Science Quarterly, L (June, 1935), p. 220. " Ibid. "46Jesse Roff e Wike, The Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association (Phila- delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), p. 228. " Ibid., p. 220. "Ibid., p. 222. "4Ibid., p. 223. 348 PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY receive support from Grundy in 1930, as he did in 1923. J. Roffe Wike suggests that this support by Grundy came because "if you cannot obtain sufficient support from other organizations in the party for your desired 'friendly' candidate, support an independent whom no one else is supporting, whether you agree with his political and economic views or not."5 0 In 1930, Grundy and the Mellons had originally intended to support Samuel S. Lewis. The Vare group made several overtures for compromise, but these were rejected by the Grundy and Mellon factions. De- spite the support of the latter factions, Lewis decided not to run. This was probably because, as state treasurer, he had made the mistake of opposing any bond issue, saying that there were enough funds available for special state expenditures.5 1 Unable to settle on a candidate, Grundy decided upon Gifford Pinchot as opposed to the Vare candidate, Francis S. Brown. Pinchot was a "dry," a popular issue in up-state rural areas from which came most of his support; and, Grundy knew that at least Pinchot paid his patronage debts.5 2 Therefore, Grundy and Pinchot ran against James J. Davis and Francis S. Brown in the Republican primary of 1930. In a raucous primary campaign, Grundy made such vicious attacks as: "The Philadelphia gang and the Pennsylvania Railroad are attempting [to] . . . dominate all the important rela- tionships of this great state. . . . 53 In spite of these accusations, Grundy lost to Davis while Pinchot won, with Davis finally beat- ing the Democratic candidate Joseph Hemphill in the election. Pinchot's leadership, while it meant expansion of the facilities of the state Department of Labor and Industry, road building measures, and new dams, did not, however, really mark a sharp departure from bossism politics, but only a realignment with Grundy forces ascendant. The position of all the bosses in the state, however, was never again to be the same. Vare was ill, and rival factions competed for control in Vare's own Philadelphia. 5 4 Grundy's position had been weakened by his activities in the pri-

6Ibid., p. 225. "William A. Cornell, The Political Career of John S. Fisher, Governor of Pemisylvania, 1927-1931 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1949), p. 97. 2Wike, PMA, pp. 230-232. 6 Ibid., p. 231. "AJohn F. Salter, "End of Vare," Political Science Qzuartcrlv, L (June, 1935), pp. 230-232. NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1932 349 mary. By 1932, Pinchot, although Republican, left some doubt as to his position in the national election, and participated very little when he finally did come out for Hoover. 5 5 In that same election, Grundy, who usually collected money, stayed in the back- ground.5 6 All these factors worked to the detriment of the Re- publican party, which accounts to some degree for the loss of Republican votes. But at the same time the Republican tradition in the state, as well as the considerable if diminishing influence of the old factional leaders, helped keep the Republican party on the winning side of the ballot in 1932. Walter Davenport was correct when he predicted that, in spite of Pinchot's claims of distress and the "low estate of the Mellon-Kline and the Vare Machines," the state, and particularly Philadelphia and Pittsburgh would go Republican.5 7 As election day drew closer everyone was making predictions, with a mock election at Drexel Institute of Technology showing a Hoover victory.5 5 Organization leaders in all counties claimed victory. Montgomery County said that it would be helped by the neutrality of a wet group known as "the Crusaders." 5 " The Literary Digest gave Roosevelt all states but Maine, Vermont, New , Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Jersey.6 6 Men such as George Wickersham, attorney general in President Taft's Cabinet, claimed that a "serious-minded elec- torate" had brought a surge to President Hoover.6 " County chair- men were wild with predictions. Through Republican cries of "victory" came cries of "foul." Warren Van Dyke, Democratic state chairman, fearing a ballot plot, secured Congressional in- vestigators, who were sent into the anthracite regions "to investi- gate election irregularities."6 2 There had been talk circulated that mine workers had been unduly threatened by veiled threats con- tained within Republican circulars.' 2 In addition to the Farm

"55 PhiladelphiaInquirer, October 31, 1932, p. 1, and T. E. Williams, "Will Pennsylvania Go Democratic?" Nation, CXXXV (November 9, 1932), 452. 'T. E. Williams, "Will Pennsylvania Go Democratic?" Nation, CXXXV (November 9, 1932), 452. ' Walter Davenport, "Hoover-Roosevelt Fight in the East," Collier's, XC (November 5, 1932), 11. ' Philadelphia Inquirer, November 7, 1832, p. 4. ' Ibid., October 30, p. 20. 'Ibid., November 3, p. 13. 51Ibid., November 5, p. 14. 12Ibid., November 7, p. 2. "G.Ibid. 350 PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY

Journal poll, which showed that a sample of Pennsylvania farmers gave Hoover a 305 to 187 vote edge over Roosevelt, the Repub- lican state chairman predicted that Hoover would capture the agricultural counties of "Cumberland, Juniata, Northumberland, Adams, Lebanon, and Montour."6 4 Election Day, Pennsylvania, , 1932. . . . Only Cumberland, Juniata, Northumberland, Adams, Lebanon, and Montour went Democratic. The Literary Digest was wrong. Some were gleeful; others were dismayed. Yet all confirmed the need for unity under the new President, to "help" him lead the country out of distress. Perhaps the most acute new distress was that of William S. Vare. Why? The people had voted to continue the use of election machines-the era of the stuffed ballot box in Pennsylvania was over.65 Gosnell suggests that "the proportion of registered voters who participate in a given election varies with the closeness of the struggle, the dramatic quality of the election, and with the efficiency of the local party organizations."66 If by "closeness of the struggle" and "dramatic quality of the election," he means the nature of the issues and their importance to the electorate, we might glance once again at the issues of 1932. Although generally ignored by post-election political analysts, the tariff issue was often discussed in Pennsylvania newspapers during the campaign. Although there was some equivocating by Roosevelt, it was generally believed that he was opposed to the high tariff, implemented during the Hoover administration. While we are not able to show any state-wide correlation be- tween economic depression and voting results in 1932, in certain areas of the state a correlation could easily be made. In the South- west Soft-Coal Region, the Northeast Hard-Coal Region, and the Eastern Middle Region (highly industrialized), most of the counties went Democratic in 1932.67 Many writers believe that Prohibition remained an issue of

" Farm Journal, November, 1932, p. 6; Philadelphia Public Ledger, No- vember 1, p. 9. "Philadelphia Public Ledger, , p. 4; M. C. Krueger, "Elec- tion Frauds in Philadelphia," National Municipal Review, XVIII (1929), 294-300. "Harold F. Gosnell, Getting Out the Vote (Chicago: University of Chi- cago Press, 1927), p. 107. '7 Harold F. Alderfer, Presidential Elections, 1920-1940, pp. 38-41. NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1932 351 great importance in 1932.65 Although Hoover made certain con- cessions to the "wets," Roosevelt took the much stronger stand in favor of repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. If, as some claim, the national victory was a "landslide against Prohibition," then the loss of the Democrats in Pennsylvania might be inter- preted as reflecting the state's desire to continue Prohibition.6 9 But this hypothesis must be rejected. Not only is it difficult, if not impossible, to separate one issue from so many other factors operant in Pennsylvania, but also in Pennsylvania newspapers the "wet-dry" issue was mentioned less frequently than any other issue. There are too many other variables to permit these ob- servations. The political "efficiency" of the Republican party in Pennsyl- vania was in fast decline by 1932. With its disintegration, how- ever, there is nothing to indicate a simultaneous buildup of the Democratic party organization. The only non-Republican buildup to be found in the five years preceding 1932 was that of the Socialist party in Reading.7 0 Thus, while Republican organization was disintegrating, that disintegration was not being encouraged significantly by a rejuvenated Democratic organization. While we already noted that the ethnic factors were partly responsible for the diminished registration and vote in the state, we have not been able to note any group of factors which in themselves were responsible for the Republican victory. In fact, it is this inability to focus upon any set of issues that clearly points up the political and economic dislocation which was really responsible for Republican victory. Thus, while there was a multitude of issues upon which victory or loss might have been hinged, none were effectively utilized because the political machinery of the state was not in a position to co-ordinate them. The state had a Republican governor, who was not a "regular" Republican; the Republican machine organization was not work- ing with "machine-like" precision; and the Democrats, demoralized by many previous years of Republican dominance, did not capital- ize on enough of the many issues that were open to them. Thus, the real margin of Republican victory was the margin of habit. ""Election in Retrospect," New Outlook, CLXI (December, 1932), 9; "Election Results," New Republic, LXXIII (, 1932), 1. 0 9 Ibid. "Henry G. Hodges, "Four Years of Socialism in Reading, Pa," National Municipal Review, XX (1931), pp. 281-288.