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AC Vol 42 No 18 www.africa-confidential.com 14 September 2001 Vol 42 No 18 AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL ZAMBIA 3 KENYA Puppet or prince? Levy Mwanawasa’s emergence as Moi versus the economy MMD’s flagbearer is the least bad Galloping inflation, sinking export prices and corruption are bigger option for President Chiluba. problems for the President than the opposition Having abandoned his tilt at a third term, Chiluba finds a malleable President Daniel arap Moi has run out of promises. The Board of the International Monetary Fund candidate and a way to hold on to refuses to unblock further loans – in particular, a hoped for quick credit of US$125 million. This is executive power. Oppositionists suspended until Moi’s ruling Kenya African National Union steers an effective anti-corruption bill are buoyed by the prospect of more through parliament, and sells off the state telecommunications company and Kenya Commercial Bank. infighting in the ruling MMD. Opposition parliamentarians threw out an anti-corruption bill last month and a revised bill can hardly be passed before early next year. Any IMF help will come too late to rescue the economy before the elections SEYCHELLES 4 that are scheduled for December 2002. The economy now hangs on tea. Coffee and tourism, once big foreign-exchange earners, lose millions By a whisker of dollars to official rake-offs. State-owned companies are mired in bureaucracy and corruption. After a tight presidential race, Business is pessimistic, domestic debt is swelling, public services are among the world’s worst and Albert René will find it tough to win officials are among the most corrupt. KANU has chosen political patronage and corruption scams over the parliamentary polls. With no effective economic reform, in a desperate bid to buy next year’s election, as it did those of 1992 and 1997. good economic news in the offing, Hard-pressed local manufacturers, devastated by cheaper imports from Asia and South Africa, are his best chance would be to go for laying off staff in their thousands and fleeing to better opportunities in neighbouring Tanzania and early elections, counting on his presidential squeak to help him to Uganda. The key expatriate and Kenyan Asian investors shift their money out as fast as they can, fearful win a bandwagon victory. of currency depreciation, rising debt and ever greedier officials demanding pay-offs. Business and worker morale is at rock bottom. Prices and rents in Nairobi’s prime residential areas have fallen by 30 per cent since 1999. CÔTE D’IVOIRE 6 In denial No reforms, no cash Kenya’s record was sharply criticised at the IMF Board of Directors last month. The Fund’s new line is ‘There is no political crisis’, to be much more selective in negotiation and lending, laying down broader but simpler conditions for President Gbagbo assures diplomats and politicians but few loans and abandoning countries whose governments refuse reform. Emphasising that message in his Ivorians agree. Violent rivalries farewell address to colleagues, the outgoing Deputy Managing Director, Stanley Fischer, was strongly between government supporters backed by British and United States’ officials. Without IMF cash, Kenya’s economy, which shrank by and the opposition are unresolved, 0.3 per cent in 2000, may go into free fall. There was a shortfall of $1.2 billion, mostly for capital projects, as are those between the army in the budget presented to Parliament in June by the Finance Minister, Chrysanthus Okemo. It was and the gendarmerie. hoped to cover it by new credits, starting this month, from the IMF. The World Bank, European Union, UK and USA will not pay up if the Fund refuses. TANZANIA 7 Even if the KANU government tried seriously to meet the Fund’s conditions, time has run out. It could be next March before a new bill began its slow progress through parliament, where opposition support Bulyanhulu would be needed. More months would then pass until the Fund and other donors could unblock the credits. Environmental activists are calling By then, political life will be dominated by the elections and the race to find Moi’s successor. for an investigation into claims that Moi learned political arrogance by outmanoeuvring the Fund and Bank so many times before. Their more than 50 people were killed faith in him collapsed with the resignation of Civil Service head Richard Leakey and his team of Kenyan when Tanzanian police cleared the technocrats seconded from the international institutions (AC Vol 42 No 7). Kenya’s would-be reformers area surrounding the Bulyanhulu gold mine in 1996. say that Harold Wackman, the Bank’s Resident Representative in Kenya, is weary and frustrated by state obstruction and graft. Too late, Moi and and his ministers realised how badly they needed the Economic Crimes Bill, which would empower the proposed Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority. POINTERS 8 On 14 August, for the first time in his 23-year reign, Moi attended a parliamentary debate, compelled to leave behind for once his trademark ivory baton lest it be confiscated as an offensive weapon. Moi had Congo-Kinshasa, personally canvassed the opposition benches, following failure by Vice-President George Saitoti. Africa/Vatican, Togo Legislation affecting constitutional powers must be supported by two-thirds of the total 222 sitting & Guinea members of parliament; KANU’s coalition with Raila Amolo Odinga’s National Development Party couldn’t muster the required 146 votes. Clean-up or cover-up; Milingogate; The opposition’s unusual solidarity was stiffened by the six ‘rebel’ KANU MPs: Simeon Nyachae, the Chile factor; and constitutional Conté. Kipkalya Kones, Jimmy Agwenyi, Zebedo Opore, Anthony Kimeto and Kipruto Kirwa. After his defeat, Moi abused the bill’s opponents as ‘enemies of the small man and of Kenya’s development’ and 14 September 2001 Africa Confidential Vol 42 No 18 promised to form a special police anti-corruption unit – which was the position before the IMF and the main Western donors insisted on an Mixed marriage independent anti-corruption authority. Some lawyers and politicians resented the law, as proposed by IMF The wedding of the Kenya African National Union and the National Democratic Party was consummated in a carnival lawyers unfamiliar with Kenyan practice; others feared it would shore atmosphere at the Moi International Sports Complex outside up Moi’s hold on power. The Association of Manufacturers urged Nairobi on 17 August. Some 6,000 delegates (4,500 KANU, parliament to pass it, not because it would change much but because it 1,500 NDP) agreed to fight the next election as one party, leaving alone would make economic recovery possible. Civic activists and details about party structures and names to a joint task force. religious groups rejected the bill largely because it offered an amnesty Raila Odinga of the NDP claimed that Kenya’s new union for economic crimes before 1997 – exonerating those who raised would ‘strike a death blow to ethnic chauvinism’ (meaning unlawful funds for KANU’s election win in 1997. The usually Kikuyu politics; he leads the Luo). The parties have prepared a fractious opposition parties boosted their morale by uniting to defeat joint proposal for Ethiopian-style ultra-federalism, based on KANU; they think they will win more votes if economic conditions get ethnic homelands or majimbo. The hardliners of KANU’s ‘B’ faction (Nicholas Biwott, even worse for lack of foreign credits. Local lawyers argued that the Joseph Kamotho and George Saitoti) fear that NDP stalwarts bill was unconstitutional because it challenged the Attorney General’s will edge them and their protégés out; Raila wants Saitoti’s job as right to prosecute all crimes. (The Chairman of the Constitutional number two in the new party. The hardliners have the support of Review Committee, Yash Ghai, has since proposed the establishment KANU’s Luo old-guard (Ndolo Ayah and Dalmas Otieno) who of a Ministry of Justice and a fully independent Attorney General.) will be wiped out once the NDP moves into KANU. Biwott is playing cautious, for fear of being blamed if the pact Ethics code for civil servants unravels. But the combative Maasai minister, William Ole Further, the IMF wants parliament to approve a Code of Ethics for Ntimana, who had hitherto kept his distance from KANU-B, has thrown his weight and (he said) ‘that of all Maasai’ behind Saitoti Public Servants, and insists that the government should speed up the in the race to succeed Moi. KANU apparatchiks complain that sale of Kenya Telekom, Kenya Commercial Bank and Kenya the NDP is getting too many favours and the merger has renewed Reinsurance Corporation. Earlier this year, the government agreed to the rivalry between KANU-A and KANU-C (Musalia Mudavadi, sell 49 per cent of Telekom to the highest bidder. The highest bid ($305 Katana Ngala, Bonaya Adhi Godana). mn.) came from the Mount Kenya consortium, whose members were Mudavadi, the Information Minister, is Luhya/Maragoli, who South Africa’s Eskom, Zimbabwe’s Econet and Kenya’s Industrial are neighbours of the Luo, and has been cultivated by Raila as a Credit and Development Corporation, headed by Nairobi businessman running mate. Maasai leaders who oppose Saitoti’s candidacy, Chris Kirubi. KANU’s ethnic die-hards perceived this as a Kikuyu such as Julius Sunkuli (Minister of State) and John Ole Muyaa outfit, so politically undesirable. (a Kajiado councillor) now back KANU-C. At Kasarani, Moi spoke of the need to ‘use bait so that you can In March, the government said Mount Kenya must offer at least catch a fattened fish.’ There is not much bait left in the Treasury. $350 mn. and the consortium refused to raise its bid.
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