The Limits of Grief in Augustine of Hippo's Sermones 172-173 And
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VOX PATRUM 78 (2021) 293-310 DOI: 10.31743/vp.12259 Joseph L. Grabau1 The Limits of Grief in Augustine of Hippo’s Sermones 172-173 and Sermo 396 1. Introduction In the texts which I intend to examine below, Augustine of Hippo refers explicitly neither to pandemics nor to plagues. What readers will find, instead, is exploration of the author’s thinking in two respects: (1) a brief, critical reading of key passages from the book of Genesis in the City of God, where Augustine formulates a mature theology of both death and human emotion; and (2) a generous and compassionate approach to these phenomena as bishop and pastor, on display in a handful of ex- emplary public sermons (Sermones 172-173 and Sermo 396). In turning to Augustine’s intensely philosophical speculations on the human body, emotions and (original) sin, we find the basis for an important cognitiv- 1 Joseph L. Grabau, Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Theology at the Mexican American Catholic College – and Lecturer at the University of the Incarnate Word’s Pastoral Institute – in San Antonio, Texas (U.S.A.); email: [email protected]; ORCID: 0000-0002-0919-4150. Research for this study was supported by a postdoctoral mandate of the KU Leuven’s Research Council entitled, An Early Christian Anthropology/ Theology of Death: Rhetorical Forms and the Therapy of Grief (3H190262). In addition, this text has been adapted from a conference paper given for the 45th Patristics, Medieval, and Renaissance International Conference, a virtual event hosted by Villanova University (U.S.A.), 16-18 October 2020. I offer my thanks to James Wetzel for graciously moder- ating the session, to Kevin Hughes and colleagues for orchestrating the event, and to my co-participants for their reception. I also wish to thank my advisors at Leuven: in partic- ular Mathijs Lamberigts, especially for his incisive commentary on a draft of this article, and Anthony Dupont, for guidance of this project from the start. 294 Joseph L. Grabau ist, philosophical theory of human nature2. So prominently positioned within the perspective of Scripture, in the City of God and elsewhere Augustine also adapts or synthesizes Stoic and Platonic views, despite at times taking a combative approach in his polemical agenda. Yet no less in his pastoral response to the concrete realities of lived experience, in- cluding the finality of death and vividness of emotions, Augustine main- tains insights into human nature and motivation occasioned by his phil- osophical studies. His pastoral response is clear: consoling those who mourn, weeping with those who weep (cf. Rom 12:15). In this respect, Augustine mirrors the practices of Jerome and Ambrose of Milan, who in their own funeral orations exhibited a remarkable display of emotion- al restraint mixed with genuine sympathy and personal sorrow3. It is on 2 S. Byers, Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine: A Stoic- Platonic Synthesis, Cambridge 2013 offers the basic framework for my analysis, often proposing similar readings to sermons identified below now studied in some greater detail. For the global impact of Stoic thought upon Augustine, see also M. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, v. 2: Stoicism in Christian Latin Thought through the Sixth Century, Leiden 1985, p. 142-238; on Augustine’s reception of the Stoic philosophy of emotion, see J. Brachtendorff, Cicero and Augustine on the Passions, REAug 43 (1997) p. 289-308 and the more recent contribution of G. Yuan, Rethinking Augustine’s misunderstanding of the Stoic therapy of passions: a critical survey of metriopatheia and apatheia, “Scottish Journal of Theology” 72/3 (2019) p. 308-323; on the relevant influence of Platonic trends, see for example G. Van Riel, Mens immota mota mane: Neoplatonic Tendencies in Augustine’s Theory of the Passions, “Augustiniana” 54/1 (2004) p. 506-531, which philosophical tradition occupies a less prominent position here. Readers seeking further inroads to the ancient literature concerning the Platonic and Stoic therapy of the passions – especially in contact with the Augustinian, patristic tradition – will do well to consult these secondary sources for further guidance; presently, I focus my considerations upon the texts of Augustine. 3 See J. Cavadini, Ambrose and Augustine de bono mortis, in: The Limits of Ancient Christianity: Essays on Late Antique Thought and Culture in Honor of R. A. Markus, ed. W. Klingshirn – M. Vessey, Ann Arbor 1999, p. 232-249; H. Kotila, Mors, mortalitas, in: Augustinus Lexikon, v. 4, ed. R. Dodaro – C. Mayer – C. Müller, Basel 2012, p. 89- 97; I. Ramelli, Death, in: Encyclopedia of Ancient Christianity, v. 1, ed. A. Di Berardino, Downers Grove 2014, p. 673-681; É. Rebillard, In Hora Mortis: Évolution de la pas- torale chrétienne de la mort aux IVe et Ve siècles dans l’occident latin, BEFAR 283, Rome 1994. Among the vast literature, D. Burt, Augustine on the Authentic Approach to Death, “Augustinianum” 28/3 (1988) p. 527-563 is also a useful point of entry. For precedent within and further attention to the North African context, see J. Scourfield, The De Mortalitate of Cyprian: Consolation and Context, VigCh 50/1 (1996) p. 12-41 and V. Saxer, Mort et culte des morts à partir de l’archéologie et de la liturgie d’Afrique dans l’oeuvre de saint Augustin, “Augustinianum” 19/1 (1978) p. 219-228. The Limits of Grief in Augustine of Hippo’s Sermones 172-173 and Sermo 396 295 this point that Augustine’s philosophical-theological reading of Genesis and the letters of Paul, together with his public sermons that pertain di- rectly to grief and mortality, each bears upon the thematic concerns of this special issue. This topic of human emotion is a recurrent theme in early Christian literature and ancient philosophy, to be sure. Though a concern for both Plato and Aristotle, the Hellenistic and Roman school of the Stoics present- ed doctrines of inward tranquility or apatheia as a distinctive teaching4. It became a shared ideal, first for Plotinus and the Cappadocians, yet also for the Latin Fathers, including St. Augustine5. Drawing upon various theories of the human soul and the ideal of virtue as a stable habit of character, as well as views of the world of nature and metaphysics, authors sought to understand and properly regulate the human spirit’s tendency towards emo- tive responses to life’s events and the soul’s inner landscape6. A key difference emerges in the ancient tradition, however, between the Platonic-Aristotelian account of human emotion and that proposed broadly by Stoic authors7. Sarah Byers identifies the shift in Stoic thought as a cog- nitive theory, which she attaches firmly to Augustine with modifications and synthesis drawing from the Platonic tradition. Most prominently on display in his public sermons and commentary on the Psalms, as Byers demonstrates, this view identifies emotions not as irrational impulses of the spirited or appetitive soul, but rather as resulting from poor judgments, 4 The case against grief, in particular, is made by Plato, Rep. 10, 604c-606a; yet E. Austin (Plato on Grief as a Mental Disorder, “Archive Geschichte Philosophie” 98/1 (2016) p. 1-20) describes this more common view as the “Stoic Reading” of Plato, over and against which the author proposes a “Conflict Reading” – for which grief is “ineliminable, and sometimes appropriate”. For the scope of development into the early Christian period, see especially R. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, Oxford 2000. Among other prominent texts concerning the Hellenistic period in particular, one also recalls M. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, Princeton 1996. 5 Byers, Perception, Sensibility, and Motivation, p. 118-126 regarding a notion the author raises of a “Stoicized Plotinus”. 6 In this broader landscape, Martin Laird, Gregory of Nyssa and the Grasp of Faith: Union, Knowledge, and Divine Presence (Oxford Early Christian Studies), Oxford 2004, p. 35-40 et passim helps to integrate these various philosophical influences, especially on the inner life of the mind for the early Christian saint. 7 J. Cooper (Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of Life in Ancient Philosophy from Socrates to Plotinus, Princeton 2012, p. 203-214) portrays in general terms how the Stoic theory of emotion stands in contrast to those of Plato and Aristotle, which Byers explores in some greater detail with focus upon Cicero, Seneca, and Augustine, among others. 296 Joseph L. Grabau that is a deficit or imperfection of rational self-control8. As commentators on Stoic sources are often eager to point out, however, this understanding does not presume to deny any positive experience of emotion for the wise person. Furthermore, Byers does not seem to suggest that Augustine sim- ply adapts Stoic thought without qualification. In fact, Augustine seems to adopt mediated positions that allow for a healthy expression of grief and other so-called “disturbances”, yet within the proper limits of both reason and the eschatological ordering of history to fulfillment in Christ. Before I offer my own reading of three short sermons of Augustine which touch upon a specific human emotion, that of grief, I offer two major points of departure in Augustine’s City of God. In books 9 and 14 Augustine addresses the Stoic presentation directly, while he develops sig- nificant themes of his own theology of death in conjunction with original sin in book 13. I pass over discussion of Augustine’s own grief at the loss of his mother, Monnica, in book 9 of the Confessions – or the loss of his friend in book 4 – in order to restrict the scope of this brief study9. 2. De civitate Dei 9 & 14: Stoic-Cognitivist Views of Emotion In contemplating the Stoic view in City of God book 9, Augustine identifies a key issue for Stoic moral psychology, questioning whether and how an ideal Stoic may suffer moments of emotional disturbance.