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PERSPECTIVE Indonesian Security Forces in West Papua

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PERSPECTIVE Indonesian Security Forces in West Papua A special message for you from Noam Chomsky Donate Today! West Papua Report January 2015 This is the 129th in a series of monthly reports that focus on developments affecting Papuans. This series is produced by the non­profit West Papua Advocacy Team (WPAT) drawing on media accounts, other NGO assessments, and analysis and reporting from sources within West Papua. This report is co­published by the East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN). Back issues are posted online at http://www.etan.org/issues/wpapua/default.htm Questions regarding this report can be addressed to Edmund McWilliams at [email protected]. If you wish to receive the report directly via e­mail, send a note to [email protected]. Link to this issue: http://etan.org/issues/wpapua/2015/1501.htm The Report leads with "Perspective," an analysis piece; followed by "Update," a summary of some developments during the covered period; and then "Chronicle" which includes analyses, statements, new resources, appeals and action alerts related to West Papua. Anyone interested in contributing a Perspective or responding to one should write to [email protected]. The opinions expressed in Perspectives are the author's and not necessarily those of WPAT or ETAN. For additional news on West Papua see the reg.westpapua listserv archive or on Twitter. CONTENTS This edition's Perspective is part two of Made Supriatma's overview of Indonesian security force deployments in West Papua. This looks at the police and intelligence agencies. In the UPDATE: A report on the brutal killing of five Papuan civilians and wounding of many more by security personnel in the Paniai area in early December. Papuan leaders gathered in Vanuatu launched a new coalition to apply for membership in the Melanesian Spearhead Group. President Widodo pledged during a Christmas visit to West Papua to launch a joint investigation of the killings in Paniai. His administration also promised to "listen" to Papuans and to direct more resources to West Papua to develop railroad infrastructure. A minister contends that money flowing from the Freeport mine will finance development plans. December saw more violence in the vicinity of the mine. The discovery of gold in protected forests in West Papua does not necessarily auger well for Papuans. In Chronicle, Yan Christian Warinussy, Executive­Director of the LP3BH, opposes plans to create a new military command in West Papua. PERSPECTIVE Indonesian Security Forces in West Papua (Part 2) By Made Supriatma Made Supriatma is an editor with Joyo Indonesia News Service. Part 1, published in the December 2014 report covers the Army, Navy and Air Force. Police Intelligence Conclusion Police The police is second biggest security force in West Papua. Like the army, the regional police headquarters (Polda) encompasses both Papua and West Papua provinces. It has 29 precinct/district­level offices (27 Polres and 2 Polresta), 174 subdistrict offices (Polsek), and 165 police posts. The Polda has various agencies including intelligence, Indonesian police and soldiers after dispersing a demonstration in Mimika in August 2014. Photo from Antara. crimes, and traffic. The presence of police in Papua grows following the proliferation of civilian bureaucracy. They have offices at nearly every regency and municipality. The police have become a significant security force in West Papua. The regional police (Polda) have around 2,700 personnel. At the precinct level (Polres) police have 10,904 personnel distributed in 27 Polres. In total there are around 14,854 police in West Papua.[1] Polda Papua also has two battalions of Brigade Mobil or Brimob, which have headquarters in Jayapura and Sorong respectively. As more responsibilities over domestic security are now handed over to the police, Brimob have been forced to take over many jobs that previously were done by the army. However, one drawback is immediately apparent: Brimob are not trained in anti­guerilla combat. In this case, the army is still taking the leading role. On the other side, however, we can also see that the police assume a greater role in handling unrests in this region. This is especially apparent with targeted killings done by Densus­88 (Detachment 88), an anti­terror detachment established following the Bali bombings in 2002 and funded by Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. If killing of Papuan leader Theys Hiyo Eluay in 2001 was conducted by the army’s Kopassus, the killings of Kelly Kwalik in 2009 and Mako Tabuni in 2012 were both allegedly performed by Densus­88. The role of Densus­88 will likely be greater in West Papua in the future. Intelligence There is no doubt that West Papua is the primary There is no doubt that West Papua is focus for Indonesian intelligence. There are the primary focus for Indonesian intelligence. There are multiple multiple intelligence agencies operating in West intelligence agencies operating in Papua. Intelligence has a special role to support West Papua. operations against separatist movements and social unrests. Formally, the Indonesian intelligence community consists of Badan Intelijen Negara/State Intelligence Agency (BIN); TNI intelligence; police intelligence; the state prosecutor office (kejaksaan); and ministerial intelligence. The task to coordinate intelligence agencies is supposedly done by BIN, but BIN has no control over other intelligence agencies.[2] In West Papua, BIN has offices in Papua and Papua Barat provinces. Each provincial office is headed by Kabinda (Kepala BIN Daerah/Head of Regional BIN). The Kabinda position is held by a brigadier general–level official, which means that the Kabinda have ranks equal to or higher than the existing intelligence officials in the region. Kabinda positions in both in Papua and Papua Barat provinces are held by army officers. The army is clearly dominating the intelligence community in West Papua. Kodam XVII Cendrawasih has the most complete network of intelligence, from provincial center down to village level. The Kodam commander has an intelligence assistant who supervises Kodam’s intelligence detachment (Den Intel). At the Korem level, intelligence is handled by a “Chief” (Kasi Intel) who supervises a platoon (Ton Intelrem). At the Kodim level, smaller unit of intelligence officers (Unit Intel Kodim) is at work under a perwira seksi intel (Pasi Intel). Finally, the lowest level of Kodam’s territorial outreach may provide the best human intelligence (HUMINT). The army establishes Koramil at every subdistrict and at the village level it has Babinsa (Village Guidance Noncommissioned Officer). Other military intelligence units are also working in West Papua besides Kodam’s territorial command. TNI’s main intelligence body, BAIS (Badan Intelijen Strategis), works independent from the Kodam structure. It usually inserts its officers in other task forces such as the Border Task Force, in the navy’s primary base (Lantamal) or in the air force’s base (Lanud). It is not clear how the BAIS officers coordinate their work with Kodam. However, we can expect that there is close coordination and cooperation between local and national military intelligence officers, because many officers assigned at the local level previously served at the national level, and vice versa. Two combat units within the army also have their own intelligence operated independently in West Papua. Kopassus is known for deploying Tim Sattis (Tactical Unit) Tribuana in the border areas. The unit is operated independently although it is deployed with other nonorganic (BKO) forces. Meanwhile, Kostrad also has its own intelligence whenever the Kostrad troops are deployed as BKO in one region. Both Kopassus and Kostrad have Tontaipur (peleton pengintai tempur/combat recon platoon), which is a rapid reaction team. Tontaipur activities mix combat missions and intelligence gathering. The Indonesian navy also operates its intelligence on both of its Lantamal X (Jayapura) and Lantamal XI (Merauke). The Lantamal’s intelligence assistant’s post is held by a colonel, which makes this post equal to the similar post at Kodam XVII. The navy’s intelligence focus, however, is more toward infiltration from the sea, smuggling, and piracy. The air force also has a small intelligence team lead by a major and is actively involved in conducting intelligence operations in Papua. The Indonesian police also have their own intelligence networks. At the Polda level, intelligence is administered by Direktorat Intelijen dan Keamanan/Directorat of Security and Intelligence (Dit Intelpam). It is headed by a Police Grand Commissioner/Komisaris Besar Polisi (Kombespol), equivalent to the army’s colonel.[3] Meanwhile, at the precinct level (Polres), there is Satuan Intelijen dan Keamanan/Intelligence and Security Unit (Sat Intelkam), which is headed by a Police Commissioner Adjutant/Ajun Komisaris Polisi (AKP), or captain level in the army. Dit Intelkam works with its equivalent Den Intel Dam at the Kodam level. Meanwhile, Sat Intelkam at the precinct level works with its counterpart, Unit Intel Kodim. On the civilian side, some intelligence agencies also operate in West Papua. The local state’s prosecutor office, both at the provincial and regency levels, has the so­called “prosecutor intelligence” (intelijen kejaksaan) that oversees sensitive legal cases, especially corruption and other crimes. The other institution that also has an intelligence operation is immigration. The largest civilian agency that conducts intelligence work is the Interior Ministry. The ministry has a directorate called
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