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Comparative Destination Vulnerability Assessment for Khao Lak, Patong Beach and Phi Phi Don
Sustainable Recovery and Resilience Building in the Tsunami Affected Region
Emma Calgaro, Sopon Naruchaikusol, and Kannapa Pongponrat
(1) Department of Environment and Geography, Macquarie University, Sydney (2) Stockholm Environment Institute (3) Mahidol University International College, Bangkok Stockholm Environment Institute Kräftriket 2B SE 106 91 Stockholm Sweden
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The study presented in this report has been made possible through financial support provided by the Swedish International Develop- ment Cooperation Agency (Sida). However, Sida was not involved in the design of the study and does not necessarily support the views expressed in the report.
Copyright © December 2009 by Stockholm Environment Institute Contents
List of text boxes, figures and tables iv List of abbreviations and acronyms iv Foreword vii Executive summary ix
1 Introduction 1 1.1 The 2004 tsunami and its impact on Thailand’s tourism destinations 1 1.2 Project rationale and main objectives 2
2 Conceptualising destination vulnerability 3 2.1 What is vulnerability? 3 2.2 Developing a Destination Sustainability Framework 3
3 Research design and methods 10 3.1 Research design overview 10 3.2 Case study analysis and site choices 10 3.3 Case study methods 10 3.4 Research implementation challenges 11
4 Khao Lak, Patong and Phi Phi Don: destinations in flux 15 4.1 An introduction to Patong, Phi Phi and Khao Lak 15 4.2 Governance structures influencing tourism in Khao Lak, Patong and Phi Phi 18 4.3 Paradise in tatters: the impact of the 2004 tsunami on Khao Lak, Patong and Phi Phi 20 4.4 Post-tsunami recovery levels 21
5 Comparative assessment of destination vulnerability 24 5.1 Exposure 24 5.2 Sensitivity 27 5.3 Responses and system adaptation 47
6 Strategies for building more resilient tourism destination communities 65
References 69
Appendix 2: Case History Design and Implementation 111
Appendix 3: Focus Group Discussion Design and Results 120
Appendix 4: Post-tsunami planning initiatives 125 List of text boxes, figures and tables
Box 1: Phuket Action Plan Strategies 61 Box 2: Key components of DASTA’s redevelopment concept for Phi Phi Don 128 Box 3: The DPTCP plan for the redevelopment of Phi Phi Island 129
Figure 1: Countries affected and the height of the tsunami waves 1 Figure 2: Destination Sustainability Framework 6 Figure 3: Research tasks and design 13 Figure 4: Location map for Patong, Phi Phi Don and Khao Lak 15 Figure 5: Location of Khao Lak 19 Figure 6: Governance structures influencing tourism development in Thailand 21 Figure 7: Tsunami wave pattern and surface elevation as it approaches the Thai Andaman Coast 24 Figure 8: Relationship between run-up heights, inundation patterns and onshore characteristics 25 Figure 9: Tsunami heights and wave direction at Phi Phi Don 26
Table 1: Methods summary 15 Table 2: Tsunami run-up heights above mean sea level 24 Table 3: Summary of post-tsunami planning and redevelopment initiatives 55 Table 4: Patong Seaboard Master Plan zoning directives & outcomes 56 Table 5: Longer-term initiatives designed to build resilience in Patong 62 Table 6: Longer-term initiatives designed to aid business recovery and build resilience in Khao Lak 63 Table 7: Longer-term initiatives designed to aid the recovery of Phi Phi 64 Table 8: Khao Lak interview stakeholder groups 83 Table 9: Patong interview stakeholder groups 85 Table 10: Phi Phi Don interview stakeholder groups 86 Table 11: Open-ended Interview Participants in Khao Lak, Patong, and Phi Phi Don 97 Table 12: Case histories undertaken in Khao Lak, Patong and Phi Phi Don 112 Table 13: Focus Discussion Participant Groups and schedule 121 Table 14: SRDP Pilot projects affecting (directly or indirectly) Khao Lak, Patong & Phi Phi Don 126
List of abbreviations and acronyms
ADB Asian Development Bank ADPC Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre AICST APEC International Centre for Sustainable Tourism AIT Asian Institute of Technology APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Corporation APELL Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at Local Level ATRP Andaman Tourism Recovery Plan BOT Bank of Thailand CBO Community-based Organisation CULT The Credit Union League of Thailand DART Deep Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis DANIDA Danish International Development Agency DASTA Designated Areas of Sustainable Tourism Administration DPTCP Department of Public Works and Town and Country Planning DDPM Department for Disaster Prevention and Mitigation DSF Destination Sustainability Framework DVA Destination Vulnerability Assessment ECOT Employers Confederation of Thailand EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
iv EPA Environmental Protected Area ETC Ecotourism Training Centre FGD Focus Group Discussion FTUB Federation of Trade Unions of Burma GDP Gross Domestic Product GSB Government Savings Bank Hi Phi Phi Help International Phi Phi IBLF International Business Leaders Forum IEE Initial Environmental Examination ILO International Labour Organisation ITB Internationale Turismus Börse Berlin KTA Krabi Tourism Association MAP Foundation Foundation for the Health and Knowledge of Ethnic Labour MLR Minimum Loan Rate MONROE Department of Coastal and Marine Resources MoTS Ministry of Tourism and Sports NDWC National Disaster Warning Centre NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NOAA US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ONEP Office of Natural Resource and Environmental Policy and Planning PAO Provincial Administrative Office PAP Phuket Action Plan PATA Pacific Asia Travel Association PFHLS Phuket Federation of Hotel and Labour Services PNTA Phang Nga Tourism Association PPTC Phi Phi Tourism Club PTA Phuket Tourism Association PTRMS Phuket Provincial Tourism Risk Management Strategy RC Reinforced concrete RTF Raks Thai Foundation RTG Royal Thai Government SME Small and Medium Enterprise SRDP Sub-regional Development Plan for the tsunami affected Andaman Region SRSA Swedish Rescue Service Agency (SRSA) SNV Netherlands Development Organisation TAG Tsunami Action Group for Migrants TAO Tambon Administration Organisation TAT Tourism Authority Thailand THB Thai Baht TVC Tsunami Volunteer Centre UNDP United Nations Development Program UNEP United Nations Environment Program UTC Coordinated Universal Time UN-WTO World Tourism Organisation WTO.HRD UN-WTO Human Resource Development Practicum WTO.TedQual UN-WTO Tourism Education Quality Practicum
v Acknowledgements
his report was produced for sub-project 4 (Sida). We would like to thank all those who kindly T‘Sustainable Recovery and Resilience Building participated in the project by offering their time, Strategies in the Tourism Industry’ undertaken by insights and experinces, particularly the communities Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) as part of Khao Lak, Patong Beach, and Phi Phi Don. We of SEI’s Programme ‘Sustainable Recovery and would also like to thank Elnora De La Rosa, Dusita Resilience Building in the Tsunami Affected Region’. Krawanchid, Delia Paul and Matthew Chadwick at SEI The programme was undertaken in collaboration with for providing invaluable support in the final writing Macquarie University Sydney between 2007 and and editing stages of the report. 2009 under SEI’s Risk, Livelihoods & Vulnerability Programme with financial support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
vi Foreword
he 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was cataclysmic insurance levels were low, and credit histories not well Tfor Thailand’s economy. Tourism is important established. Many businesses experienced difficulties in to the Andaman Coast and to Thailand as a whole, accessing financial capital, which slowed the recovery accounting for 6.4 per cent of Thailand’s GDP and 10.6 process, stifled earning capacities, and deepened per cent of total employment. Today, as most of the financial sensitivities. Yet the disaster also revealed tsunami damage has been repaired, we look back over Khao Lak’s strengths. The destination’s recovery was five years of recovery efforts. aided by the loyalty of its large repeat-client base, while strong family networks, industry representative bodies Vulnerability analysis, of the kind that was undertaken and resourceful community members also provided for this research, is more important than ever before, support. given the compounding negative effect of new shocks on Thailand’s tourism industry. We have seen the Nevertheless, all three destinations are facing impacts of the global financial downturn as well of the sustainability challenges. domestic political crisis that included the 8-day closure of Suvarnabhumi Airport in late 2008. Both of these In Phuket, the oldest and wealthiest of these tourism have been ‘new tsunamis’. destinations, there is little room to expand further, and the ecological services that the tourism industry Vulnerability analysis takes into account social- relies upon are stretched to their limit. On Phi Phi, ecological systems as well as features of the social there are serious problems in dealing with waste and fabric in each of the destinations studied. Khao Lak, sanitation facilities due to inadequate infrastructure; Phi Phi Don and Patong have different histories and the development model here has failed to provide characteristics that led to differences in their exposure the kind of investment and monitoring that is needed levels to the 2004 tsunami event. This meant that their for responsible tourism development. Khao Lak capacities to withstand, cope and recover from the businesses, being relatively new to the market, have a natural event also varied. These recovery paths offer correspondingly lighter ecological footprint, but local lessons for future tourism development. entrepreneurs are still struggling to overcome tsunami damage to their capital reserves, long after the physical Patong was best able to withstand the shock of the damage has been repaired. tsunami, as its long development history and varied market base left it in a strong financial and market The large amount of aid that flowed into these position for a swift recovery. Underpinning Patong’s destinations after the tsunami provided a unique financial success and prominent international branding opportunity to address issues underlying the is an active, powerful and well-connected tourism vulnerability of these three destinations. Yet, much association that used its political and business of the aid was limited in its impacts by pre-existing connections at the local, provincial, and national levels blockages in society. Community vulnerability levels to quickly access the financial, marketing, and technical were created, maintained or increased by factors and support needed to recover. conditions that included limited savings, poor credit histories, small financial reserves, limited financial Phi Phi too benefited from established markets and credit options for micro and small business enterprises, profitable businesses that have grown over 20 years. and low insurance coverage. Vulnerability levels are The concentration of wealth and power in the hands of further increased by a heavy reliance on seasonal five dominant landowner families, and the strong family tourism-related employment, dependence on national ties that underpin business networks, have created a marketing organisations and international tour operators robust support system that guides island development, to bring in customers, and low skill levels in the tourism promotes business expansion, and improves standards workforce who do not receive much financial benefit. of infrastructure. The mobilisation of resources by the The social exclusion of migrant workers and minorities dominant families after the tsunami was instrumental in has increased vulnerability levels further. rebuilding much of the built environment and lessening the financial burden on tenants. The persistence of government weaknesses and corruption at the local level has hindered the successful Khao Lak’s newly founded businesses did not have implementation of tourism development strategies such a strong financial base. Financial reserves and designed to build destination resilience. The research
vii findings indicate a lack of political engagement Local people are still best placed to shape tourism between local governance bodies and community development in their own communities and should members, leaving Khao Lak and Phi Phi with little continue to be the main players. However they need support and no platform for discussing and resolving support from government and education as to how best community challenges and needs. There is also a poor to develop their own region. There needs to be guidance level of risk knowledge in the community. People and monitoring so that new developments will benefit mistrust disaster preparedness strategies, early warning the area and be sustainable. systems (EWS) technology is not monitored regularly, and disaster preparedness training is sporadic. There This report offers, in a humble spirit, some observations is limited government monitoring of planning and about the tsunami recovery process. There are all development codes, allowing planning violations, sorts of different ways of building more resilient and private encroachment on public lands, and misuse of sustainable tourism destination communities that natural resources. These factors, along with inadequate support local livelihoods and economies whilst limiting infrastructure and wastewater management facilities, physical and social degradation. But to do so requires are leading to environmental degradation and greater a critical rethink of development models, governance exposure to future natural hazards. and social adaptive capacity. It is also possible to figure out the carrying capacity of these destinations, and to Addressing these problems will require us to look at the find realistic ways of compensating for the impacts of fundamentals of how people think about development tourism on ecological systems. and community advancement, about who is ‘deserving’ of help, and who isn’t. One feature of post-tsunami The authors sincerely hope that the recommendations aid at the local level was a tendency for NGOs to be in this report will take us further along this path. prejudiced against tourism livelihoods, which were largely seen in a negative context as non-traditional Emma Calgaro and somewhat exploitative in nature. Yet many tourism Macquarie University, Sydney businesses in these locations are local businesses run by December 2009 local people in need of help and equal consideration.
viii Executive summary
n 26 December 2004, one of the most destructive Khao Lak, Phi Phi Don, and Patong: Otsunamis in recorded history hit 11 countries in Differential histories, characteristics and the Indian Ocean and killed more than 270 000 people. vulnerability levels Thailand’s burgeoning tourism industry was severely Khao Lak, Phi Phi Don, and Patong have different affected; the tsunami caused extensive damage to the histories and characteristics that led to differences in southern provinces of Ranong, Phang Nga, Phuket, their exposure levels to the tsunami event, and their Krabi, Trang and Satun along the Andaman Coast. capacities to withstand, cope and recover from the Due to the severe impact of the tsunami on tourism natural event. Khao Lak is the newest destination (with and the importance of tourism to the Thai economy, substantial growth beginning in 1996) and sustained considerable efforts are necessary to restore tourism the greatest losses in terms of lives lost and rooms activities and consumer confidence, and to enhance destroyed. Over 90per cent of Khao Lak’s infrastructure the resilience of tourism-dependent communities to and rooms were destroyed. Phi Phi Don also sustained socio-economic and environmental risks. heavy losses (approximately 70 per cent of rooms were lost) but Phi Phi has a more established destination This report presents a comparative vulnerability history dating back more than 20 years and a prominent assessment of three Thai tourism destinations international tourism market position. Patong Beach is affected by the 2004 tsunami: Khao Lak, Patong one of the oldest, wealthiest and the most established and Phi Phi Don. The three case study areas were destinations in Thailand. Tourism businesses benefit selected based on (i) the level of damage sustained from a very high international tourism profile that from the tsunami, (ii) the destinations’ developmental has generated strong returns over a 30-year period. histories, and (iii) the differential stages of recovery Damages sustained to tourism infrastructure were the achieved. The report examines the commonalities lowest in Patong with estimates ranging from 10 to 20 and differences in recovery patterns in each of the per cent compared to 90 per cent in Khao Lak. three tsunami-affected destinations and explores the reasons behind these differences in destination Damage level variability and exposure levels were the vulnerability and resilience levels. Identifying and outcome of large place-based differences in geophysical understanding the factors that contribute to tourism characteristics including ocean bathymetry, coastal destination vulnerability provides the foundation morphology and differences in on-shore elevation, of knowledge needed for building more robust and and the absence of significant natural barriers, resilient destination communities in the face of coupled with man-made factors such as development constant change. patterns and characteristics and human alterations to the biophysical environment. The tsunami reached a In the absence of a robust framework for guiding the maximum run-up height of nine metres in Patong but analysis of destination vulnerability, a new framework the steeper on-shore terrain and the high density of is introduced that incorporates the strengths of concrete structures that line the beachfront minimised vulnerability research, advances in sustainability inundation distances and extensive damage to on- science, innovation from resilience theory, and the shore development. Run-up heights and inundation specificity of tourism sector approaches. The new distances experienced in Khao Lak were more extreme Destination Sustainability Framework also introduces due in part to a shallow near-shore slope, low on-shore geographical theories of place and relational scale elevations, and the prevalence of wooden structures, to better understand the importance of contextual as opposed to reinforced concrete structures, with low influences that shape destination vulnerability and on-shore densities. Maximum run-up heights in Phi overcome hierarchical notions of scaled actions. The Phi were the lowest (5.8 metres) but the shallowness results of this analysis indicate that vulnerability of the off-shore bathymetry and the shape of the island levels of Khao Lak, Patong and Phi Phi are outcomes caused the wave to refract around the island producing of multiple, dynamic and interacting factors, two bodies of water that met and submerged the flat including geographical exposure, destination-specific and highly developed isthmus. development characteristics, social structures, and governance. Underlying the social factors and Patong Beach was the first destination to recover processes are competing stakeholder agendas and physically and economically; all reconstruction actions that are based on different cultural norms, was completed after six months with tourist flows institutional preferences, and power structures. surpassing pre-tsunami levels by 2007. Phi Phi took
ix longer to recover due to delays in finalising the new families that own most of the property on the island building code and development plans but by 2007 have diversified livelihood portfolios. But this is tourist flows had recovered. Five years on from the where the similarities end. The concentration of disaster, Khao Lak is still to recover fully in terms wealth and power in the hands of the five dominant of rooms available and tourist numbers. As of April landowner families and the strong family ties that 2008 there were 39 per cent less rooms than pre- underpin these family business networks, have tsunami numbers, whilst tourist numbers were down created a highly effective and robust support system in the Phang Nga Province by approximately 50 per that guides island development, promotes business cent. At first glance it would seem that the amount of expansion, and improves infrastructural standards. damage sustained was the greatest factor in explaining The mobilisation of dominant family resources the swift recovery of Patong for example but it does after the tsunami was instrumental in the rebuilding little to explain the stark difference between Phi Phi of much of the built environment and lessened the and Khao Lak. financial burden on tenants. This collective power also improves the community’s bargaining power, Sensitivity levels were starkly different between enabling the community to effectively respond to Patong, Phi Phi Don and Khao Lak. Patong was best proposed changes from external factors. able to withstand the shock of the tsunami compared to its neighbouring destinations of Phi Phi and Khao Yet despite their differences, there were several Lak, much of which is attributable to differences common factors that heightened the sensitivity of all in their developmental histories. Patong’s long three destinations: limited access to credit amongst developmental history left the destination in a strong micro and smaller businesses, a lack of risk awareness, financial position; strong profit levels and established the fragility of their destination images to negative credit histories built with multiple businesses enabled perceptions of risk and lingering images of devastation, quick access to liquid assets and credit needed to staff shortages, social exclusion of minority groups, rebuild. Underpinning Patong’s financial success and pre-existing weaknesses in governance structures and prominent international branding is an active, at the local level. Governmental weaknesses and powerful and well-connected tourism association corruption at the local level have hindered the that used its political and business connections at the implementation and enforcement of developmental local, provincial, and national levels to quickly access regulations, led to the unequal distribution of resources the financial, marketing, and technical support needed pre- and post-tsunami, and have left the communities to recover. with inadequate infrastructure and little localised support. Unchecked overdevelopment in Patong and Khao Lak’s newly founded businesses did not have Phi Phi has also caused environmental degradation to such a strong financial base; financial reserves were the Andaman Coast’s main natural attractions. low as were insurance levels, and credit histories (if they existed at all) were not well established. This left The Royal Thai Government (RTG) was decisive in many businesses (particularly smaller enterprises) with its response to the tsunami. Short-term emergency problems in accessing financial capital that slowed aid and financial assistance was followed by the recovery process, stifled earning capacities, and medium-and longer-term adjustments and adaptation deepened financial sensitivities. Khao Lak’s sensitivity responses that fell under two overarching initiatives: to the tsunami disaster was further heightened by high the Andaman Tourism Recovery Plan (ATRP) and seasonality levels. Yet the disaster also revealed Khao the Andaman Sub-Regional Development Plan Lak’s strengths. The destination’s recovery was aided (SRDP). Key strategies included: national marketing by the loyalty of its large repeat-client base who offered initiatives to attract tourists back, the provision of financial support through donations and the return of credit to facilitate tourism business recovery, the their business. Strong family networks also provided redrafting of coastal tourism development plans, the financial and moral support, whilst decisive actions development of Thailand’s Tsunami Early Warning by industry representative bodies and resourceful System, the establishment of a National Tourism community members helped source financial capital Intelligence Unit and Crisis Management Centre, and and marketing support. multiple endeavours to promote good governance. These strategies were supplemented by the largest Like its prosperous neighbour of Patong, Phi Phi too mobilization of humanitarian and international benefited from established markets and profitable support in history. Industry-led actions and NGO businesses that have grown over 20 years. This activity ranged from immediate emergency support was particularly the case because the dominant five to financial and marketing assistance, skills and x leadership training, environmental rehabilitation, and Recommendations for building resilient disaster preparedness. Non-governmental Organisation tourism communities (NGOs) and Community-based Organisation (CBO) The comparative Destination Vulnerability Assessment support was greatest in Phi Phi Don and Khao Lak of Patong, Phi Phi and Khao Lak to the 2004 tsunami where damage levels were high. reveals that resilience to the tsunami was bolstered by a combination of factors, the main ones being: appropriate However, any likely success of many of the building types and location, strong destination market government initiatives was compromised across all branding and loyal clientele, diversified livelihood three destinations largely due to funding shortages, portfolios and low seasonality levels, access to liquid government preferences, and the persistence of pre- financial assets and established credit histories, robust existing weaknesses in governance structures and family networks, strong and well-connected industry processes. Emergency aid relief did not reach all representative bodies and community leaders, and the eligible recipients; funding was insufficient and there resourcefulness of entrepreneurs. is anecdotal evidence that available funds were often misappropriated due to corruption and nepotism Yet there are still areas for improvement pertaining operating at the local level. The effectiveness of to governance structures and processes, infrastructure post-tsunami business loan schemes for smaller provisions, livelihood choices, credit availability, businesses was limited by complex credit application environmental awareness and disaster preparedness. processes (particularly for foreign business operators) To address these issues, eight recommendations are whilst the beliefs of Phi Phi’s predominantly Muslim made to help reduce vulnerabilities and build long- population nullified this option. Yet the success in term resilience in tourism destination communities securing credit to rebuild did not necessarily eliminate against future stressors and shocks. the financial vulnerability of all businesses. Those businesses with existing loans such as many of the 1. Create more accessible funding sources new enterprises in Khao Lak were left with higher for micro and small businesses debt levels and an increased sensitivity to increased Accessing credit proved to be one of the largest business competition, economic downturns and obstacles smaller enterprises faced following the future shocks. Marketing support favoured Patong at tsunami disaster. Additional credit was not only a the expense of Khao Lak and Phi Phi that were long necessity for those businesses that sustained physical classified as disaster zones, whilst unaddressed pre- damage; additional credit was also needed to keep existing weaknesses in governance structures and businesses operating during the long-term recovery processes undermined the implementation of new phase to bridge the financial gap between pre-tsunami planning and development strategies and limited the earnings and those gained from modest tourist flows functionality of the early warning system (EWS) in all and earnings. Therefore there is a pressing need to three destinations. Finally, the rights of and support provide alternate financial credit options and solutions for Burmese minority workers remains low despite for national and foreign business owners that have improvements. flexible terms and repayments options. Micro-credit schemes like the Swedish Micro-Credit Foundation’s Humanitarian support in the immediate aftermath and initiative in Phi Phi are one option. short-term was substantial in Patong, Phi Phi and Khao Lak but longer-term initiatives favoured Phi Phi and 2. Improve environmental awareness and Khao Lak due in part to Patong’s quick recovery. Phi Phi provide adequate infrastructure received extensive assistance from NGOs and CBOs Inadequate infrastructure and resource mismanagement and groups that ranged from fulfilling immediate needs has persistently caused environmental degradation in to the reconstruction of housing, financial support, both Patong and Phi Phi pre- and post-tsunami which training and education, infrastructure improvements, threatens the appeal of the physical environment which and environmental rehabilitation. Khao Lak also the destinations depend upon to attract tourists. Urgent received support but initial NGO and CBO responses improvements to infrastructure, waste management were marred by conditional assistance offered by and resource conservation require a four-step approach. some religious organisations whilst preferences for First, increase community awareness on the importance supporting ‘traditional villages and livelihoods’ in the of good environmental management for long-term greater Takuapa district left the tourism community tourism returns and quality of life. This includes raising frustrated, angry, and disillusioned. However, longer- awareness on the harmful impacts of popular tourist term initiatives did much to address credit and skills activities (including diving, snorkelling and water shortages. sports) on sensitive ecosystems. Second, provide
xi training for destination community members, tourism Therefore, there is a need to create strong multi-scaled businesses and staff on best practice with regard to government mechanisms that: the management of solid waste and wastewater and the sustainable use of natural resources, and introduce • Monitor long-term tourism development strategies to reduce resource consumption (recycling and increase the consistency of tourism plan being one example). Third, ensure that the appropriate implementation; infrastructure is in place to effectively process wastewater and solid waste in destination communities • Oversee and enforce development regulations and – a government responsibility that was found wanting zoning that are consistent with strategic long-term in all three destinations. Fourth, create vigorous sustainability goals; and environment monitoring systems that monitor, enforce, and evaluate environmental standards and • Chart the capacity and effectiveness of local management procedures. Whilst the onus of regulation government and monitor the transparency of their enforcement falls under the jurisdiction of government actions and related decision-making processes. authorities, environmental conservation and its success is a common responsibility that requires community Such mechanisms will improve transparency and trust ownership of the issues, community-driven monitoring between the private and public sector (particularly at and regulation based on a shared environmental the TAO sub-district level) and heighten accountability consciousness, and the adoption of more sustainable among industry and government actors. For this to be business practices. successful, greater support is required from higher levels of government (including those representatives 3. Strengthen institutional coordination working at the provincial/state and national level) to and support to advance public-private oversee and strengthen local governance and support interaction and engagement long-term tourism development visions, strategies and Strong leadership and effective institutions provide standards. the enabling governance, socioeconomic, and cultural conditions required for building resilience 5. Build government capacity at the local in coastal communities (US-IOTWS, 2007). level Accordingly, mutually accountable partnerships Strategies aimed at facilitating transparent resource between government authorities, destination distribution and monitoring cannot be achieved without communities, tourism representative groups, and building capacity at the local level of government where informal civil collectives need to be developed financial resources, skill levels, and human capacity and strengthened to alleviate social exclusion, are often limited (ASIST-AP, 2004). Improving mistrust and frustration and enable meaningful and tourism planning knowledge and skills among local informed participation in decision-making processes government departments and increasing awareness on and future tourism development. Experiences the importance of environmental management enables from Patong, Khao Lak and Phi Phi show that a deeper understanding of tourism needs and facilitates the successful design and implementation of effective engagement with destination communities robust development plans cannot be accomplished on wider developmental priorities and complimentary without public-private collaborations; the private planning strategies. These wider priorities encompass sector have the knowledge and market insights tourism planning, enhancing community participation, needed to advance tourism development whilst the infrastructural requirements, alternate industry sector government is needed to provide a supporting role needs, environmental conservation and disaster in the management and monitoring of collaborative preparedness. Deeper engagement and involvement plans. Yet for this to collaboration to work there on both sides also promotes shared governance must be trust and accountability on both sides – this responsibility and accountability. is currently lacking in all three destinations. 6. Improve skills levels and diversify 4. Improve equity and downward livelihood portfolios accountability Language skill levels and hospitality skills were The absence of systematic mechanisms of downward found to be poor among the less educated community accountability and transparency in all three destinations members in all three destinations, which decrease their has led to planning violations and land encroachment employment options. Improvements in both through as well as the uneven distribution and misappropriation regular training would enable greater local participation of resources (including post-tsunami emergency aid). in tourism-related livelihoods and access to greater xii financial benefits. Furthermore, improved foreign Despite the recognised benefits of industry language skills of those small beach activity operators representation, membership amongst micro and smaller would enable them to better assist and instruct tourists enterprises was low due largely to time constraints and in emergency situations, thereby creating a safer a widespread perception that SME needs are not given environment. Knowledge about training programs enough credence by larger enterprises. Yet the shock and accessibility is also a challenge for some sub- of the tsunami has spurred a greater SME interest in groups due to time constraints, costs (which for the membership and participation, an interest that needs most part are set purposely low), and a mismatch of support to sustain interest and eventuate into active existing language capacities and appropriate courses. participation. A natural starting point for greater SME Courses could be centrally advertised and run through representation is an integration of SME interests existing local industry representative organisations into the agendas of existing tourism representative in the destinations to increase accessibility but organisations and connections between SME sub-sets financial backing is needed from government throughout the southern Andaman Region. sources. Accessibility could be improved through the formulation of sub-group specific training and 8. Provide disaster and risk preparedness language programmes that cater to common education training at the local level levels and sub-group availability. The communities of Khao Lak, Phi Phi and Patong believe that increased awareness and preparedness Yet a high dependency on seasonal tourism was does more than promote safety; together they instil also proven to be a major contributor to destination community and investment confidence in livelihood vulnerability. Therefore, alternative livelihood options resilience. The installation of the early warning and the expansion of livelihood portfolios need to be system was a positive step toward achieving this goal. considered to boost income flows throughout the low However, evidence from this comparative assessment season and in times of tourist flow disruptions. demonstrably shows that the installation of early warning system technology must be accompanied by (1) routine 7. Strengthen business associations and maintenance of the technology and evacuation routes increase micro and small enterprise in the destinations and (2) regular disaster preparedness membership training and updated risk and procedural information Strengthened public-private linkages need to be dissemination for the communities. Regular disaster complemented by stronger and more inclusive preparedness exercises increase trust and confidence community networks and tourism representative in the system and prevent unnecessary confusion and bodies headed by strong, active and visionary leaders injuries during events. that foster social and corporate responsibility and action. The advantages of industry representation are The successful execution of a robust monitoring and three-fold: maintenance strategy requires additional financial and technical support for the local authorities responsible • Representative group membership provides for this additional task, both of which are lacking. The a forum for knowledge sharing among like absence of regular disaster preparedness training is businesses and developing common goals and also attributable in part to local financial constraints. overcoming challenges, thereby precluding Another constraint for delivering effective disaster conflict and damaging competition; preparedness training in destination host communities is timing. Training and drills need to be run in the • Industry representative bodies create platforms tourism low seasons to enable the participation of for proactive participation in development smaller operators and employees. The dissemination of processes and form a collective voice needed up-to-date knowledge on possible risks and appropriate to effectively petition government departments responses is also imperative. Such information could be and other industry actors for desired change and circulated through a local disaster-preparedness centre advancement; and or committee. Other dissemination methods include direct-line early warning systems to hotels, resorts • The collective knowledge and expertise of and restaurants, local radio, radio links to temples and members along with their combined connections mosques, and community announcement points. to business networks, social contacts and political forums become a common resource for mobilising multi-scaled actions and securing favourable results.
xiii xiv s t o c k h o l m environment i n s t i t u t e
1 Introduction
1.1 The 2004 tsunami and its areas were popular tourism destinations filled with impact on Thailand’s tourism international tourists at the height of the high season. destinations The worst affected destinations were those located in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Indonesia and Thailand. On the morning of 26 December 2004, the subduction of the Indo-Australian tectonic plate beneath the Thailand’s burgeoning tourism industry, accounting overriding Burma plate generated the Great Sumatra- for 6.4 per cent of Thailand’s GDP (USD 17.3 billion1) Andaman earthquake with a magnitude of 9.3 255 and 10.6 per cent of total employment, sustained the kilometres south-south-east from Banda Aceh in greatest loss from the tsunami disaster (WTO, 2005). Northern Sumatra (McKee, 2005). The vertical uplift The tsunami caused extensive damage to six provinces of the seafloor along the 1,200 kilometre triggered one located along a 400-kilometre stretch of the Andaman of the most destructive tsunamis in recorded history Coast in southern Thailand: Ranong, Phang Nga, (British Geological Survey, 2005). The multiple Phuket, Krabi, Trang and Satun. Those living along tsunami waves radiating outward from the length of the Andaman Coast are highly dependent—directly or the rupture line reached up to 30 metres in height, indirectly—on the tourism sector (WTO, 2005, WTTC, devastating countless coastal communities in 11 2008). In 2004, these provinces generated 17 per countries bordering the Indian Ocean and killing more cent of Thailand’s total tourism revenue (UN, 2005). than 283,1000 people, with 141,000 people still listed The tsunami not only claimed the lives of thousands as missing (ADPC, 2005, NGDC, 2009a, UNISDR, of tourists and industry workers, but also left the 2006). The local time was 07.58 (00.58 UTC). Figure 1 livelihoods of the affected destination communities in shows the maximum heights of the tsunami waves and disarray. A total of 8,212 people were killed, including the countries they affected. Many of the devastated 2,448 foreigners from 37 countries (UN, 2005). Those
Figure 1: Countries affected and the height of the tsunami waves Source: Spiegel Online, downloaded from http://www.spiegel.de/flash/content/0,5532,9709,00.html on 13 August 2005.
1 The exchange rate used throughout the report is 1 USD = 39.22 THB
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that survived the event faced further challenges. More Venton, 2003). Third, local institutions may be limited than 97 per cent of Thailand’s damage was incurred by by restricted budgets and human capacity to undertake private properties, with much of this damage and loss this transformative role on their own at the scale falling on the tourism industry (Scheper and Patel, 2006, required (Mileti, 1999, Miller et al., 2005). Finally, TEC, 2005). The tsunami destroyed 25 per cent of the there is the dilemma of balancing the opportunities total room capacity resulting in an estimated tourism for reform versus the realism of speed in post-disaster infrastructural loss of USD 341 million (UN, 2005). planning (Davis, 2006). Tourist arrivals in the affected provinces decreased by 53 per cent in the 6-month period following the disaster Recognising this long-term need, this project aims to event causing revenue losses of USD 1.4 billion at a support the sustainable recovery of the tourism industry time when funds were needed the most for rebuilding in Thailand by undertaking an integrated study of the and staff remunerations (UN, 2005). Approximately factors that heighten social vulnerability in the affected 120,000 tourism-related jobs were lost and incomes destination communities with the immediate objective significantly reduced (UN, 2005, Young, 2005). of identifying appropriate actions for building capacity and enhancing informed decision making processes in the long-term management of the coastal zone. This 1.2 Project rationale and main study forms one component (Sub-Project 4) of a wider objectives Sida-funded project entitled “Sustainable Recovery and Resilience Building in the Tsunami Affected Region” Given the economic importance of tourism to the affected which supports the post-tsunami recovery in Sri Lanka Thai coastal communities, a revival of the tourism and Thailand through the generation of knowledge and industry is vital. It not only provides employment capacity building. The three destination communities and investment opportunities to these communities, included in the Thai project are: Khao Lak (Phang Nga but the industry’s recovery can help stimulate trade, Province), Patong (Phuket Province) and Phi Phi Don business and construction activities. In the aftermath (Krabi Province). of the tsunami disaster, the provision of immediate emergency relief, the restoration of basic services and This report presents the collective findings from the the rebuilding of damaged infrastructure in destination Destination Vulnerability2 Assessments (DVA) of the communities were of paramount importance. That said, three Thai case studies of Khao Lak, Patong and Phi it is not enough to respond to the immediate disaster. Phi Don. The report examines the commonalities and As the immediate needs of the affected communities differences in recovery patterns in each of the three are tended to, attention must be redirected toward tsunami-affected destinations and explores the reasons longer-term preparedness strategies that aim to reduce behind these differences in destination vulnerability vulnerability and increase a community’s capacity to and resilience levels. This foundational knowledge then cope and respond to future shocks (ACTPPR, 2005, forms the basis of recommendations aimed at building Miller et al., 2005). For this to occur, it is necessary to more robust and resilient destination communities in identify and address the drivers of vulnerability in the the face of constant change. affected communities and build on existing capacity (Miller et al., 2005: 1, Wisner et al., 2004). Long-term resilience plans aimed at securing future sustainable livelihoods cannot be operationalised successfully without understanding the underlying socio-political processes and environmental linkages that form the foundations of vulnerability (Clark et al., 2000, Pelling, 2003, Thomalla et al., 2006, Turner et al., 2003). Vulnerability assessments underpin adaptive strategies and preparedness (Birkmann, 2006). 2 Destination vulnerability refers to the vulnerability of However, longer-term disaster mitigation can be destination communities that host and deliver the tourists problematic to achieve. First, the competitive rather experience in a given place, such as Khao Lak or Patong than cooperative nature of aid assistance can heighten Beach in Thailand. Destination vulnerability differs from vulnerability levels instead of curtailing them (Larsen the vulnerability of the industry as a whole that spans et al., 2008, La Trobe and Venton, 2003). Second, destinations, tourist supply countries and the various external institutions have limited funds to support and businesses that promote and compile tour packages and monitor long-term changes (Rice, 2005, La Trobe and those that transport tourists to destinations.
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2 Conceptualising destination vulnerability
2.1 What is vulnerability? individual’s or group’s ability to anticipate, withstand, and recover from shocks over time is intrinsically Adopting an interdisciplinary approach to vulnerability linked to access and entitlements to socio-political, analysis, vulnerability is regarded as an inherent multi- economic and environmental resources (Adger and dimensional characteristic of the coupled human- Kelly, 1999, Pelling, 2003). The more access and environment system and can be defined as: control a household or group has to resources, the lower their vulnerability to shocks. “The degree to which an exposure unit [human groups, ecosystems and communities] is susceptible to harm due This conceptualisation of vulnerability is built on the to exposure to a perturbation or stress, and the ability idea that people are active participants in shaping their (or lack thereof) of the exposure unit to cope, recover, or lives and the world around them as they interact with fundamentally adapt” (Kasperson et al., 2001: 7) scaled structures of power over time and space. The political economy of resource access and distribution Vulnerability is place-specific, highly scaled, dynamic is determined by: (a) the competing actions and and differential, whereby a population’s characteristics, agendas of social actors, and (b) the strength and the multiple stressors it is susceptible to, and its effectiveness of multiple-scaled governance systems capacity to respond and adapt continuously change and social networks that confer access to some, while over space and time (Adger, 2006, Downing et al., restricting entitlements and influence to others (Adger, 2006, Smit and Wandel, 2006, Vogel and O’Brien, 1999, Pelling, 2003, Wisner et al., 2004). Underlying 2004). These evolutionary changes are determined by these unequal entitlement patterns are historically- three interconnected dimensions of a given location: embedded power structures, cultural norms and exposure, sensitivity, and resilience (Turner et al., supporting ideologies, and doctrines that permeate 2003, Clark et al., 2000). and bind society (Bankoff, 2003, Cannon et al., 2003, Cutter et al., 2000). Identifying patterns of access and Exposure is largely a product of physical location entitlement goes a long way in deciphering differential and the character of the built and natural environment vulnerability but perceptions help to explain why (Pelling, 2003: 48, Villagrán De León, 2006: 13) and is certain actions are taken over others. Perceptions and defined as the degree to which an exposure unit (who assumptions can be highly differential, contextual or what) comes into contact with stressors or shocks and socially-constructed, being influenced by factors (Clark et al., 2000: 2). Sensitivity is defined as the including: access to information, historical experiences, degree to which a household or group are affected by personal characteristics and values, ideologies, culture exposure to any set of stresses (Clark et al., 2000) and and economic circumstances (Baker and Coulter, 2007, reflects the capacity of a population to anticipate and Cioccio and Michael, 2007, Cutter et al., 2000, Johnson withstand the immediate impacts of a hazard (Pelling, and Covello, 1987). Understanding the multiple 2003: 48). reasonings and agendas that underlie the contested choices and scaled actions of government, industry, Sensitivity is characterised predominantly by pre- and civil society enable the identification of both the existing conditions of the social and ecological system causes of problems and alternate trajectories, and afford that may be improved or exacerbated by responses and opportunities for action, change and transformation adaptation strategies post-shock. (Leach, 2008).
Resilience is defined as the ability of an exposure unit to absorb recurrent external stresses without losing 2.2 Developing a Destination its fundamental structure and function (Adger et al., Sustainability Framework 2002). Resilience is a direct expression of the strength of the coupled human-environment system reflecting The need for a framework to assess its immediate response, self-organisation, learning, destination vulnerability and adaptive capabilities (Carpenter et al., 2001). Comprehensive assessments of the vulnerability or resilience of destination host communities are rare (see Vulnerability is largely determined by a lack of options Calgaro, 2005, Calgaro and Lloyd, 2008), as are robust due to the unequal distribution of power and resources frameworks for guiding destination assessments. Some in society (Jäger et al., 2007, Birkmann, 2006). An tourism research has conceptualised the causes of
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vulnerability in the industry, notably the Analytical deeper questions on why some choices and responses Framework for Vulnerability in the Tourism Industry are taken over others, the reasoning for their success (Nankervis, 2000). This framework provides insights or failure (including why appropriate responses into the multi-scaled factors that influence the tourism fail), and who these actions serve and marginalise sector’s vulnerability to shocks but its sector focus (Adger, 2008, Jasanoff, 2008, Leach, 2008, Shah et marginalises the complexity and dynamics of socio- al., 2008, Turner, 2008b). It lacks theoretical depth ecological systems of which destination communities in analysing the social dimension of the socio- are a part. This absence requires the design of a ecological system including the political economy Destination Sustainability Framework. Research into of resource and power distribution and usage within climate change, hazards and disaster management, and the socio-economic system and the consequences food security communities has produced numerous of these patterns over space and time (Leach, 2008, actor-oriented frameworks and methods for assessing Miller et al., forthcoming). There is a pressing need to vulnerability in risk prone locations (see Birkmann, move beyond the socio-ecological system to focus on 2006, Cannon et al., 2003 for framework listings and agency, power and accountability: the role actors have overviews). In addition, the concept of resilience on creating and perpetuating vulnerability, examine offers an alternative systems approach to furthering relationships and networks, and to consider the socio-ecological resilience to dynamic systems. multiple framings or narratives, and ideologies that While each approach affords valuable contributions drive actor choices and competing actions (Jasanoff, for understanding the vulnerability of destination 2008, Shah et al., 2008). Contemporary vulnerability communities, none presents a complete analytical tool and sustainability science approaches do this. Finally, for assessing destination vulnerability. it is highly conceptual, making its use problematic in guiding the assessment of sustainability challenges Grounded in ecology, resilience thinking accepts and informing policy and practice (Berkhout, 2008, uncertainty and change as a constant condition of Jasanoff, 2008, Miller et al., forthcoming). the socio-ecological system. Its focus, then, is on adapting to and co-existing with multiple changes and The longer research history of vulnerability—that cross-scale interactions that unfold at different speeds encompasses advances from food security, development, (gradual versus rapid transitions) over time (Berkhout, and hazards—prompts deeper analysis into who is 2008). Emphasis is placed on process—those that vulnerable or resilient, to what, and why. Vulnerability determine differential outcomes of the adaptive cycle, research offers a more sophisticated understanding of ecological thresholds, socio-ecological relations and context, agency and power; the multi-scaled socio- the consequences of disturbance responses that feed political processes that shape reactions to risk and back into the system (Miller et al., forthcoming, Nelson change and the form these changes take in the socio- et al., 2007). Holling’s ‘lazy eight’ conceptualisation of ecological system including the underlying influences adaptive cycles captures the essence of how adaptive of power systems, values and ideologies, knowledge cycles change and is characterised by four phases: and cultural norms (Miller et al., forthcoming). This growth and exploitation, conservation, collapse or includes resistance to change, trade-offs between release, and reorganisation (Holling, 2001). Resilience people, systems, levels and scales, and the narratives is constructivist in its approach, championing multiple used by actors and institutions to acquire credibility, voices and the existence of multiple stable states, legitimacy, authority and power (Berkhout, 2008). reflexivity, adaptive governance, and diverse framings Two frameworks that best encompass the political of sustainability (Turner, 2008a). Its reframing is of economy of differential resource distribution and risk and change as predictable and unpredictable vulnerability levels within and across populations are constants in the socio-ecological system (as opposed the Sustainable Livelihoods (SL) Framework (DFID, to seeing risk and disruptions as unacceptable 1999b) and the Pressure and Release (PAR) Model and abnormal). Finally, its emphasis on feedback (Wisner et al., 2004). Subsequent frameworks, such as consequences of actions taken following a disruption the Sustainability Science Framework (Turner et al., enable anticipation and adaptation to change over time 2003) and the BBC Model (Birkmann, 2006), situate and space (Miller et al., forthcoming). However, this this place-specific examination of who to what and why approach has some detractors. within a wider context that recognises vulnerability as a dynamic and highly-scaled condition of the Resilience, as a concept, successfully explores socio-ecological system. Both models acknowledge the processes of how to transform through social, that population characteristics, the multiple stressors institutional and organisational learning (Miller et populations are exposed and susceptible to, and al., forthcoming) but does not sufficiently address their capacity to respond and adapt are influenced
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by human and environmental influences operating The Destination Sustainability Framework3 outside the focal population. These frameworks also The purpose of the Destination Sustainability acknowledge that adaptive capacity is contingent Framework (DSF) presented in figure 2 is to guide the upon the pre-existing characteristics (including a identification of the multiple factors and scale processes system’s strengths and weaknesses) of the affected that create and perpetuate destination vulnerability system. Therefore, both short and long-term responses along with the social actors and agendas that drive and consequent feedbacks that dominate adaptive action and non-action. Highlighting these factors and capacity and resilience research are included in the processes creates entry points for adjustments, change frameworks. Together, these actor-approaches enable and transformation. Accordingly, the scope of this the identification of appropriate entry points for action analytical tool is on localised destination populations along with negotiation and decision-making processes where vulnerability and resilience is experienced. (Miller et al., 2008, Miller et al., forthcoming). Yet vulnerability approaches also have limitations in The main elements of the Destination Sustainability assessing the causal factors underlying destination Framework vulnerability. The DSF comprises five main elements: (i) the shock or stressor, (ii) the three interconnected dimensions of Vulnerability approaches are highly normative, vulnerability—Exposure, Sensitivity, and Responses where risk reduction is sought so as to maintain and System Adaptation—that form the core of the equilibrium within the existing socio-ecological DSF, (iii) the dynamic feedback loops that express the system (Adger, 2008). This is beneficial when multiple outcomes or consequences of actions taken looking at calculable risk to a select population or (or not taken) in response to the shock of stressor, institution but it downplays uncertainty and the space, (iv) the root causes and drivers that influence possibility of alternate stable states (Nelson et al., settlement characteristics and natural resource use 2007). Second, the consequential feedbacks of patterns, livelihood choices, resource and power actions taken following a disturbance and their impact distribution, plus human responses to the shocks and (positive or negative) on the system over time are a outcomes, and (v) the scale and timeframes within recent feature of vulnerability approaches but require which socio-ecological change occurs. The role of greater emphasis. Resilience thinking highlights the each element in analysing destination vulnerability and importance of both short- and long-term feedbacks in resilience is detailed below. simultaneously determining resilience for some, while causing emerging vulnerabilities for others. Third, the Shocks and stressors nested representation of scale in recent frameworks, Events, irrespective of the origin or scale, disrupt such as the Turner et al. Sustainability Framework and destabilise the existing system, making them the (2003), is questionable. Both vulnerability and natural starting point for the analysis of destination resilience offer nested and, sometimes, hierarchical vulnerability. The Shocks and Stresses element (to interpretations of scale. However, scaled relationships, what) is shown as piercing the socio-ecological system actions, processes and the structures within the social through the Exposure dimension of the DSF. The event dimension of the socio-ecological system are more does not cause vulnerability but the nature of the shock fluid and relational. Finally, vulnerability approaches or stressor does influence how the system is affected tend to favour the social dimension of the socio- over space and time. Like Turner et al. (2003), the ecological system over the geophysical domain and, DSF makes an important distinction between shocks in doing so, downplay the biophysical live support and stressors. Shocks are rapid onset events, such as system that sustains development (Folke, 2006, Miller terrorist acts, including bombings, natural hazards et al., forthcoming). and health epidemics. These are most likely to be unanticipated events (in terms of frequency and size), In light of the merits and detractors of each approach, a whereas stressors are slow-onset events that are often new Destination Sustainability Framework is presented manifestations of human-environment interactions and in the next section that draws upon the strengths of place increasing pressure on the localised system over vulnerability research, advances in sustainability time. These include: climate change and responses, science, innovation from resilience theory and the specificity of tourism sector approaches. It also introduces geography theories of place and relational 3 This framework was developed by Emma Calgaro scale to better understand the importance of contextual as part of her Ph.D. thesis currently being undertaken influences that shape destination vulnerability and at Macquarie University, Sydney (to be completed in overcome hierarchical notions of scaled actions. 2010).
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Figure 2: Destination sustainability framework environmental degradation, changes in biophysical and system adaptation’ was done in order to limit elements (the removal of coastal grasses and trees, current confusion between resilience as a general and alterations to the geological terrain), economic term and resilience theory and approaches (see Miller downturns, and changes in travel and product trends. et al., forthcoming). The factors that contribute to exposure, sensitivity and responses and adaptation are The core interconnected dimensions of vulnerability then broken down into commonly used subgroups that Vulnerability is place-specific. Therefore, the three reflect the key determinants of the three dimensions. interconnected dimensions of vulnerability form The subgroup headings and listed factors enable the the heart of the DSF: Exposure and Sensitivity that easy identification of key assessment and analytical encapsulate pre-existing environmental, socio- focal points for practitioners and researchers but the political and economic conditions, and Responses lists are not exhaustive. and System Adaptation which incorporates short-term coping responses to a shock or stressor, as well as the Exposure: Exposure as the first dimension of long-term adjustments and their consequences. The vulnerability presents an inventory of the destination’s replacement of the term ‘resilience’ with ‘responses defining characteristics including: (i) the population
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(who are the main stakeholders involved in the creation embedded cultural norms (DFID, 1999a). Power and and delivery of the tourist product offered in the focus its distribution is formalised through government destination), and (ii) the characteristics and health of structures and processes that regulate asset distribution both the biophysical and built environment. The focus and influence preparedness levels through the destination population and their characteristics differ regulation of knowledge and strategy (DFID, 1999b). markedly but are made up of the following common Hence, the analysis of these processes and structures sub-groups: households; accommodation providers requires an understanding of roles and responsibilities, and staff (small, medium and large); tour operators, knowledge of rights and relationships between groups travel agencies and guides; support service providers, and organisations (DFID, 1999b). Yet the role of including spas, beach service providers and localised human agency in determining resource access and transport; restaurants, cafés and bars; souvenir and distribution cannot be discounted as there exists a general shops; and localised tourism representative cyclical relationship between actor actions and the bodies and government departments. Destination government structures that help determine action characteristics are further moulded by the natural terrain, outcomes. Finally, the inclusion of physical and supporting ecosystems and the built environment that environmental sensitivities here acknowledges that collectively reflect the tastes of the dominant tourist social and economic development cannot take place groups and the localised interpretations of these. without a functioning life support system (Nelson et Biophysical characteristics (e.g., flat terrain, removal al., 2007, Folke, 2008). Key factors include access to of natural vegetation resulting in erosion, and so on) natural resources, access to lifeline infrastructure and and development type and patterns (large sea-facing communication systems, and biophysical alterations windows or wooden structures, for example) highly and changes. affect exposure levels to natural hazards, climatic changes and environmental degradation but may be Responses and System Adaptation: A household’s a smaller consideration for economic downturns and or community’s capacity to respond, recover and negative travel trends. adapt to shocks and their consequences is dependent upon anticipatory actions for preparedness, including Sensitivity: The sensitivity dimension of the DSF resource stockpiling, immediate and short-term coping captures the pre-existing economic, social and political capacities, followed by longer-term adjustments and conditions that shape anticipatory and immediate adaptations. The final dimension of the vulnerability— response capabilities to shocks. This involves an Responses and System Adaptation—features both exploration of the political economy of access and the immediate and short-term coping responses and entitlements to resources and their distribution at the longer-term adjustments, and acknowledges their time. Particular factors influencing tourism destination consequent feedbacks. Impact and coping responses sensitivity to shocks or stressors include tourist flow (short-term) to shocks depends on the set of available seasonality, livelihood portfolios and dependency on capital including the effectiveness of governance tourism, localised and global economic trends, markets structures, levels of preparedness, and capacity to and marketing strategies, destination developmental learn (Tompkins and Adger, 2004, Villagrán De León, histories, positioning and destination image. Common 2006). This component of the DSF therefore bridges sources of economic capital include the accumulation the Sensitivity and Responses and System Adaptation of liquid and fixed assets, credit histories and insurance, dimensions to acknowledge the aforementioned employment opportunities, business stability, and relationship. Reactionary in nature, immediate impact access to welfare safety nets in times of unemployment. responses to shocks include emergency service actions Human capital includes knowledge, skills, and labour and the provision and distribution of emergency aid. ability. High skill levels enable greater employment Short-term coping actions that flow on from initial flexibility if employment opportunities are interrupted impact responses include financial aid strategies and while knowledge about trends and risk facilitate trauma support. Short-term coping mechanisms usually preparedness. Social capital embodies networks and give way to longer-term adjustments and adaptation connectedness, group membership, relationships, and measures that can involve reflection, self-organisation, levels of trust and reciprocity. Kinship and tourism social learning, and embracing emerging opportunities business networks promote cohesion, connectedness, for transformation. In spite of this, positive change is reinsurance, and stability in times of need. They can not guaranteed. also promote greater access to financial capital and power networks. However, social relationships and Feedback loops networks can also foster social exclusion manifested The outcomes of action, inaction and failed actions (or through dominant power structures and historically- the combination of all three) feed back into the system
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and determine new levels of exposure and sensitivity Pritchard and Morgan, 2000, Young, 1999). ‘Place’ to future shocks and stressors. The monitoring of the as a socio-political construct of multiple meanings consequences of differential system feedbacks over and interpretations by multiple actors interactions time and space is arguably the most important aspect is perfectly demonstrated in the creation of tourist of the adaptive cycle but the least understood. Actions destinations. They encapsulate the enduring tourist can produce both positive and negative outcomes. images of desired experiences that are represented Interventions that address pre-existing weaknesses in and packaged by tour operators and then reinterpreted the system, and increase preparedness, social cohesion, and constructed by the destination host community learning and exchange can enhance access and (Knox and Marston, 2004, Pritchard and Morgan, entitlements to resources and redress power inequities. 2000, Young, 1999). The place and the experience This in turn decreases future exposure and sensitivity it provokes are then reinterpreted by interactions levels to shocks and stressors and enhance resilience. between the destination and the travelling public. In figure 2, these positive outcomes are portrayed by the green arrows. However, adjustments and mitigation The actions of actors involved in the creation of strategies are not always possible or wanted. Lack of destinations are influenced by multiple factors, adaptation and/or the failure of adaptive strategies are including political and economic ideologies, religious a function of institutional capacity and knowledge doctrines, cultural norms and power systems, values, systems, as well as human agency, involving choices perceptions of risk and resultant choices, and the based on perceived likelihood of future risk and the agendas and expectations of both the tourism industry socio-economic cost of implementing and managing stakeholders and tourists. These contextual influences strategies. Inaction in the face of adversity and permeate the fabric of a destination and influence the acceptance of pre-existing limitations merely the nature and intensity of disruptive events, actions, compounds exposure and sensitivity and increases reactions, and consequences and, in turn, vulnerability vulnerability levels (shown by red broken arrows). The and resilience. They are power-laden and deeply choices of which actions to take (if any), consequent rooted in culture, history, religion and ideology. These, trade-offs between choices and the competing needs along with the enabling contemporary processes and of population sub-groups, as well as their success or structures, shape every aspect of the tourist destination failure are coloured by value systems and dominant and help explain the causal factors that underlie ideologies, perceptions of risk and probable gain (socio- vulnerability and resilience over time and space. They political and financial), power system configurations shape governance structures and reinforce dominant and human agency. Together, these conditions form the ideologies, influence developmental decisions and context of human-environment interaction. destination characteristics, determine differential access and entitlement to resources and the value and use of Contextual influences that shape destinations and available resources, influence business decisions, and their vulnerability shape perceptions of risk, as well as short- and long- The pink circle that encompasses the three dimensions term responses to stressors and shocks. These dynamic of vulnerability and, in part, the shock, represents the socio-ecological interactions evolve over time and context within which destinations are formed and their space. vulnerability and resilience to shocks and stresses created and perpetuated. The context includes both Scale and time place or destination characteristics and the wider The final element of the DSF that encircles all the influences that shape it. Understanding the nature of remaining elements represents scale and time. This place and destination creation enables the identification continuous and non-linear time-space element of the actors (who contribute to vulnerability creation, acknowledges that places and their vulnerability perpetuation and resilience) and the causal processes and resilience are dynamic and evolve with people’s (why actions are taken over others) that shape its choices, outcomes, and persistent cause-and-effect vulnerability and resilience to shocks. relationships that play out at different rates over time and space (Adger, 2006, Folke, 2006, Jäger et al., Places are more than physical locations and 2007, Smit and Wandel, 2006, Turner et al., 2003). The politically demarcated spaces; they are dynamic, interpretation of time as a fluid and constant element elastic, and contested landscapes that have of social meaning and organisation is not new but this multiple identities, meanings and interpretations representation of scale is. Scale, as fluid and dynamic, dependent upon multiple viewpoints and socio- replaces hierarchical and nested depictions of scale ecological interactions that evolve over space and that are evident in resilience theory (see Holling time (Agnew, 1997, Massey, 1993, Massey, 1994, and Gunderson, 2002) and existing vulnerability
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frameworks (Turner et al., 2003 is one example) to show scale as a reflection of multidimensional social processes and organisation. This relational depiction of scale is grounded in geographical theories of relational scale that explores the discourse of scale, engaging in how scale is defined and used to manipulate power and facilitate social action.
Relational Scale deconstructs naturalised scales of social organisation—categories of household, local, sub-national, national, regional, global—to reveal the subjectivity of social relations and explore how social actors simultaneously use multi-scaled social processes and supporting structures to either reinforce the differential access to power and resources within a given society or create new landscapes of power, recognition and opportunity (Ellem, 2002, Herod and Wright, 2002, Howitt, 1993, Sadler and Fagan, 2004). These actions are not necessarily directed at one scale; entry points for action can exist at multiple scales simultaneously. The social actors that recognise this and take advantage of all opportunities experience greater levels of success. Relational scale does not devalue, deny or exclude naturalised scales of social organisation. The angle taken by actors depends on the agendas or position of the social actors involved. Put simply, knowing which political buttons to press, what social pathways to use, and at what scale(s) is crucial in bringing about a favourable outcome. Scale and scaled actions, relationships, and supporting structures, then, are dynamic and relational, not nested, hierarchical or privileged.
Recognising scale as an expression of power and control over capital, relational scale adds depth and dynamism to the DSF. First, it provides a greater understanding of the scaled processes social actors use to gain access to the resources they need to fulfil their objectives and agendas. Second, these politicised and agenda-driven actions also illuminate the creation and perpetuation of social inequality and differential vulnerabilities within destinations. Finally, the identification of key actors with a vested interest in tourism development and the multi-scaled structures they work through provide planners, policy makers and community members with a clear directive regarding the type of resilience strategies required, the target audience, and the most appropriate scales for policy action and execution.
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3 Research design and methods
3.1 Research design overview (Bell et al., 2005b). Damages sustained to tourism infrastructure were the lowest in Patong with Vulnerability reduction is a dynamic process not just estimates ranging from 10 to 20 per cent compared an outcome. So monitoring this process and how it to 90 per cent in Khao Lak. evolves over space and time is vital to understanding root causes, as well as charting the success of interventions, social learning, adaptation and 3.3 Case study methods transforming processes (Adger, 2006). Accordingly, 11 tasks were identified to capture the dynamism of Six complementary methods were included in the vulnerability and guide the research process. These case study research strategy to help deconstruct the are summarised in figure 3. complex factors and relationships that influence and drive destination vulnerability over time and space: Document and Map Analysis, Exploratory Literature 3.2 Case study analysis and site Review, Field Observation, Open-ended Interviews, choices Case Histories, and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). The methods were chosen based on three criteria: (i) Case study analysis was chosen as the overarching their capacity to deconstruct the multiple drivers of method for assessing destination vulnerability given destination vulnerability identified in the conceptual that both vulnerability and tourism destinations framework; (ii) human resources available; and (iii) are socially-constructed and place-based. Case time constraints. The advantages of the three main study analysis has come to dominate vulnerability field-based methods (Open-ended Interviews, Case assessment based on its capacity to deconstruct Histories, and FGDs) in deconstructing destination complex and place-based phenomena within its vulnerability along with timeframes and research real-life setting (Kitchin and Tate, 2000, Kyburz- staff involved are outlined in appendix 1, 2 and 3 Graber, 2004, Yin, 1994). The added advantage respectively. of comparative case studies is that they enable the identification of both commonalities and place- The research was undertaken in two phases. Desk- specific differences that influence different patterns based research, including an Exploratory Literature of vulnerability in destination communities. The Review and Document and Map Analysis, provided choice of three destinations at different stages of information on damage sustained in each destination development provided an opportunity to explore the site and institutional responses and created relationship between development levels, destination foundational knowledge pertaining to the underlying placement and popularity, sustained damage causes of destination vulnerability. Supplementary resulting from the tsunami event and vulnerability. documents, including new environmental and The three case study areas were selected based on (i) building regulations and recovery plans, were the level of damage sustained from the tsunami, (ii) collected throughout the second phase of research the destinations’ developmental histories, and (iii) undertaken in the field over a total period of 4.5 the differential stages of recovery achieved. Khao months. Open-ended interviews, case histories, field Lak sustained the greatest losses in terms of lives observation and FGDs provided in-depth knowledge lost and rooms destroyed. This destination is also on the scaled causal factors driving vulnerability the newest out of the three destinations included in in the affected destination communities and on destination vulnerability assessment (DVA); tourism the role of social actors and governance processes development did not begin to flourish until 1996. Phi in influencing vulnerability levels and recovery Phi Don also sustained heavy losses (1400 rooms strategies, and facilitated the identification of in 34 facilities were destroyed) but benefits from appropriate actions for building adaptive capacity a more established destination history dating back and livelihood resilience. Whilst most interviews more than 20 years and a prominent international took place during the 4.5-month field phase, some tourism market position. Patong Beach is one of the subsequent interviews were undertaken to ascertain oldest, wealthiest and one of the most established the outcomes of post-tsunami planning strategies destinations in Thailand. Tourism businesses benefit and destination recovery levels. The purpose and from a very high international tourism profile that deployment of each method is summarised in has generated strong returns over a 30-year period table 1.
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3.4 Research implementation members to share their experiences and stories, and (ii) challenges provided opportunities for contributing to and obtaining more information about shared community experiences The process of making a research strategy operational in needed to promote change. The interview process also a post-disaster destination setting presented numerous provided an opportunity to express trauma and to voice challenges including participant availability, lack of disappointments and frustrations arising from inaction interest, suspicion, and interview fatigue. However, the by government bodies and NGOs following multiple interview process and FGDs also afforded opportunities interviews and meetings and consequent feelings of for sharing experiences, social learning and an outlet isolation. for frustrations and grief.
Seasonality and availability: The interviews were conducted between January and mid-April 2007, constituting the high season in Khao Lak, Patong and Phi Phi Don. People were busy with clients, which placed time constraints on them, hindering their availability and prompting frequent cancellations and rescheduling. This problem was most noticeable in Patong and to a lesser extent Phi Phi where demand has returned to pre-tsunami levels. Availability was less of a hindrance in Khao Lak where tourism numbers are lower. That said, the undertaking of Focus Group Discussions during Khao Lak’s low season proved difficult because many tourism businesses close during this time (April-September). This problem was particularly acute among foreign business owners, many of whom return to their home countries for the low season.
Lack of interest, suspicion and interview fatigue: Lack of interest in participation was largely due to two factors: (i) suspicion surrounding research goals, data usage and confidentiality; and (ii) interview fatigue. Suspicion regarding the study goals, the agendas of the researchers, and the usage of the collected data hindered our success in securing interviews with small business owners and staff. Suspicions were often paired with a fear of self-implication and recrimination when broaching power relationships and governance anomalies. Interview fatigue was another ground for lack of interest in participation. There were two reasons for interview fatigue. First, people did not want to relive the disaster through discussions; instead they wanted to focus on normalcy and the future. Second, people found themselves ‘over-researched’ and subject to multiple enquiries (by government officials, NGOs, the media and research groups) which resulted in little feedback or change.
Interest, shared experiences and healing: The undertaking of interviews and FGDs also prompted much curiosity from tourism community members interested in promoting change and social transformation following the disaster. Two main factors underpinned community interest: the research (i) created a chance for community
11 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
Figure 3: Research tasks and design
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Table 1: Methods summary
Method Purpose Sources, Participants and Deployment
Exploratory Inform theoretical framework and SOURCES: Literature research strategy The vulnerability and risk literature sourced from food Review Establish criteria for selecting case study security and development, climate change, risk and sites natural hazards, political ecology and anthropology Provide an overview of the factors and Development studies literature on sustainable liveli- processes that heighten vulnerability in hoods particularly the DFID SL Framework beach destination community both pre- Human Geography (relational scale and place the- and post-tsunami ory) and Tourism Studies literature focussing on devel- Shape and inform the interview questions opment cycle of tourism destinations and destination and structure vulnerability Document (a) Identify the most appropriate case SOURCES: and Map study sites based on level of damage sus- Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT) press releases and Analysis tained (including natural environment and statistics detailing destination hotel capacity and tour- physical infrastructure, economic losses ism flows and recovery strategies and implementation and tourism flows declines) updates Ascertain developmental history of Khao Government summaries and reports detailing govern- Lak, Patong and Phi Phi ment assessments, responses and updates Provide an overview of the factors and Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) Reports processes that heighten vulnerability in detailing institutional responses and operational destination communities both pre- and procedures; these included: recovery and rebuilding post-tsunami plans, NGO operational frameworks and reports on Shape and inform the interview questions short-term recovery plans and long-term resilience and structure building strategies Identify stakeholder participants Maps of damage sustained and destination tourist Ascertain institutional responses to the maps detailing business types and distribution tsunami in case study areas Field Obser- Identify main tourism stakeholder groups SOURCES: vation in each case study destination Maps of damage sustained and destination tourist Gain an understanding of relationships maps detailing business types and distribution between different stakeholders in the post- Observation in the host communities tsunami environment DEPLOYMENT: Observations were carried out through the fieldwork period during interviews, community meetings, and when surveying area for damage and choosing par- ticipants Observations were noted on a daily basis in fieldwork diaries Open-ended Establish developmental process of tour- PARTICIPANTSa: Interviews ism in each case study destination pre- The 279 participants span the spectrum of stakehold- tsunami and document post-tsunami ers that influence and contribute to tourism develop- changes ment in each case study destination, as well as those Ascertain institutional responses to the playing a role in the recovery: tsunami in each destination -- Private sector Identify the pre- and post-tsunami condi- -- Public sector tions that influence vulnerability levels in -- NGOs assisting with the local recovery Khao Lak, Patong and Phi Phi DEPLOYMENT: Investigate the interconnected nature of Participants were chosen using hotel listings, tourism identified socio-political and environ- stakeholder listings provided by NGOs working in mental factors and the way they are con- each destination, snowballing techniques and ran- structed across a range of scales dom sampling guided by map and field observations
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Case Histo- Establish developmental process of tour- PARTICIPANTS: ries ism in each case study destination pre- The 31 case historiesb were undertaken with: tsunami and document post-tsunami Founding and long-term members of each case study changes destination tourism community Ascertain institutional responses to the tsu- Key informants who are active in the governance of nami in Khao Lak, Patong, and Phi Phi Khao Lak, Patong & Phi Phi and/or belong to minori- Identify the pre- and post-tsunami condi- ties tions that influence vulnerability levels in Random stakeholders who embraced the opportunity each destination to talk in length about their experiences Investigate the interconnected nature of DEPLOYMENT: identified socio-political and environ- Participants were chosen using snowballing tech- mental factors and the way they are con- niques and random sampling structed across a range of scales Focus Group Ascertain livelihood options pre- and post- PARTICIPANTS: Discussions tsunami The 23 stakeholder groups included in the FGDsc (FGDs) Identify the pre- and post-tsunami condi- were chosen from the private sector stakeholder tions that influence vulnerability levels in groupings used to guide the interview sampling. They each case study destination represent dominant stakeholder groups and existing Investigate the interconnected nature of informal stakeholder collectives. identified socio-political and environmen- DEPLOYMENT: tal vulnerability factors and the way they Participants were chosen from the interviewee lists are constructed across a range of scales and using snowballing techniques Gain feedback on preliminary findings Methods used included: Situation Assessments of Identify current community needs and problems, solutions and their ranked importance; explore community-led solutions to build- Rich Picture Diagrams to understand cause and ing capacity and resilience effects of identified problems; and Resilience Building Goals a A summary of the objectives, design and implementation of the Open-ended interviews is included in Appendix 1 as is a list of participants. b A summary of the case history participants is included in Appendix 2 c A summary of the FGD groups, the methods used and limitations is included in Appendix 3.
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4 Khao Lak, Patong and Phi Phi Don: destinations in flux
4.1 An introduction to Patong, Phi Patong Phi and Khao Lak Patong is located approximately 867 kilometres south from Bangkok on the central west coast of Phuket, The rapid development of Thailand’s Andaman Thailand’s largest island (see figure 4). The defining Coast over the past 30 years has coincided with a geographical feature of this destination is Patong Bay, strong rise in tourism. The destinations of Patong, a deep 14-kilometre long U-shaped bay that opens Phi Phi Don, and Khao Lak are a product of this west out to the Andaman Sea and its beach. Patong advancement. Like most tourism destinations in Beach is a wide strip of beach that is approximately southern Thailand, these three destinations offer 3 kilometres long. Surrounding the destination on experiences that loosely revolve around ‘sun, sea and the remaining three sides is a steep densely-forested sand’. But the characteristics of each destination, the escarpment. Much of the tourism development fans out type of client they attract, and their developmental approximately 1.5 kilometres eastward from the beach histories differ greatly. before reaching the steep rise of the escarpment.
Figure 4: Location map for Patong, Phi Phi Don and Khao Lak
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The official population of Patong is 16,370 but a large sports such as jet skiing, windsurfing snorkelling, influx of seasonal migrant workers in the high and sailing, and parasailing (TAT, 2007a). Patong also peak seasons take the population closer to 81,000 attracts divers that use Patong as a base to access (Patong Municipality, 2007). However, Patong started surrounding reefs. It attracts a broad spectrum of from humble beginnings. Phuket’s development as a markets across the high (November to April) and low tourist destination began in the 1970s starting in the season (May to October). The high season attracts two small villages situated on Patong Bay. At this visitors from the US, Western Europe (Italy, France, time, tin-mining was the main livelihood source United Kingdom, Germany, and Switzerland), complimented by subsistence fishing, palm and rubber Scandinavia (Finland and Sweden) and, Australia. plantations. Mining generated much wealth in Phuket Asian markets such as Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, so when the price of tin decreased this wealth was used and Singapore dominate the low season. Interest in to fund the development of a burgeoning destination. cultural activities, health/medical tourism, sport, Patong’s growth as a tourism destination was the and honeymoon packages is being fostered to attract filming of The man with the golden gun (released in emerging markets from the middle-east, China and 1974) in nearby Phang Nga Bay. The film created Russia in the low season. exposure to western markets, which in turn, generated investor interest in building hotels to cater to the new Phi Phi Don demand. Other events that further stimulated tourism Phi Phi Don is located in the Andaman Sea 42 development in Patong and Phuket were: the first kilometres off-shore from the mainland of Krabi advertising campaign in the late 1970s headed by the Province and 48 kilometres from Phuket (see slogan “If you get sick and tired of saying Fiji and figure 4). Phi Phi Don is one of six islands that form Bali say Phuket”, the opening of Phuket Airport and part of the Hat Nopparatthra-Mu Koh Phi Phi National the arrival of international flights in the 1980s, and Park. The other islands include Phi Phi Leh (Phi Phi the creation of a promotional brochure launched at a Don’s sister island located directly across from Phi promotional road show undertaken in Australia in the Phi Don), Bamboo Island, Yung Island, Pida Nok same decade. Patong initially attracted backpackers Island, and Pida Nai Island. Phi Phi Don is the only and budget tourists. But as its popularity grew in the inhabited island and covers 10.25 km2. The island’s early 1990s so did the number of large-scale 5-star topography is dominated by high limestone mountains hotel investments and high-end tourists. covered in tropical forest. The island is almost split into two equal parts connected by a very narrow Today Patong is the most visited destination on Phuket strip of beach forming a butterfly shape. Owing to its - the ‘Peal of the Andaman Sea’ - helping Phuket topography, most of the island’s population and dense become the wealthiest, busiest and most visited tourism infrastructure (hotels, resorts, guest houses, island and province in Thailand’s south attracting restaurants, shops) is located on this narrow sand 4.5 million visitors annually (Partnership of Phuket isthmus between the twin bays of Ton Sai and Loh Agencies, 2007, TAT, 2007a, NESDB, 2008). Tourism Dalum Bays (Ioualalen et al., 2007). Some additional dominates Phuket’s economy, generating THB 22,000 hotels are situated on Long Beach located south-east million (USD 560,938,297) per annum (NESDB, of Ton-Sai Bay and along the north-eastern coast. This 2008). It accounts for 40 per cent of Phuket’s GDP dramatic scenery along with its white beaches and making Phuket the second-most important tourism surrounding coral reefs attracts over 300,000 visitors economy in the country behind Bangkok (Birkland annually and supports a well-established and thriving et al., 2006a). The hotel and restaurant sector alone tourism business community (Department of Public accounts for 3.8 per cent of Thailand’s GDP (Birkland Works and Town and Country Planning, 2005). et al., 2006a). The tourism and hotel sector in Phuket employ up to 39,394 persons or 19.31 per cent of total The island has a short developmental history beginning workforce (NESDB, 2008). Other livelihood options with the establishment of a small Muslim fishing in Patong include agriculture (rubber, coconuts, community in the 1940s; more than 80 per cent of cashew, tapioca, cacao, rice and pineapples) fishing, the resident Thai population remains Muslim to date pearl farms, shrimp farming, and the processing of (TAO of Ao Nang, 2007). Fishing was supplemented marine products (NESDB, 2008). by coconut and cashew nut plantations. Tourism on the island began in 1975 with the building of a few The main attractions in Patong include its bustling simple thatched-roof bungalows called the Cabana by nightlife, cheap shopping at the four surrounding a local family (now known as Phi Phi Islands Cabana shopping centres, and its beach. Favourite beach Hotel). Awareness of Phi Phi grew via word-of-mouth activities include swimming, sunbathing, and water prompting a rise in visitor numbers to the ‘Emerald of
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the Andaman’ and investor interest from local villagers cave paintings that depict long boats resembling those and mainland investors (TAT, 2003). This resulted in of the Vikings), Koh Phai and Koh Yung (two nearby a gradual expansion of tourism development activity islands surrounded by off-shore reefs), canoeing on ranging from accommodation and support businesses Loh Dalum Bay, and walks to the viewpoint located to tourist boat and ferry operations throughout the in the centre of the island offering panoramic views 1980s when the Phi Phi Islands were declared part of the surrounds (Krabi Tourist Association, 2007, of the Noppharat Thara National Park (1983). As Tye, 2009). Furthermore, its close proximity to tourism expanded some local villagers sold their land Phuket and Krabi make the Phi Phi Islands a to investors and moved to the mainland. Those that popular day-trip destination, which contributes remained switched their occupation to tourism ventures to food and support services revenue for Phi Phi (Krabi Tourist Association, 2007). Bungalow-based Don businesses. Phi Phi Don’s main markets in the development remained a strong characteristic of Phi high season (November to April) are Europeans. Phi and its ‘island paradise’ image up until the time Scandinavians account for 60 per cent of the of the tsunami when all were destroyed. Such low- foreign tourists with French, Italians, Germans and key development attracted backpackers and divers. British making up the remaining 40 per cent (Krabi By the mid-1990s Phi Phi had developed into the Tourist Association, 2007). The low season (May thriving destination whose client base had expanded to October) is dominated by Asian markets (with a to include more mainstream tourists looking for a growing demand coming from Korea and China), beach resort experience. Phi Phi Don’s reputation as Australia and Israel (TAT, 2008a). an island paradise was sealed in 2000 with the release of the Hollywood film The Beach filmed on location Khao Lak on and around Phi Phi Leh and Phi Phi Ley’s Maya Khao Lak is located on the west coast of Thailand in Bay. the southern province of Phang Nga, approximately 98 kilometres north of Phuket (see figure 4). It is Today, Phi Phi Don has 1160 registered residents. bordered by Khao Lak National Park to the east and But like Patong high levels of seasonal in-migration the Andaman Sea to the west and encompasses an bring the population to just over 3000 (Department area stretching from Khao Lak Beach up to Laem of Public Works and Town and Country Planning, Pakarang as shown in figure 5. Much of the tourism 2005). Tourism is now the main source of income for development is built on a 12-kilometre strip of flat the island generating USD 113 million per annum in land that extends up to two kilometres inland to the revenue, with 60 per cent of this coming from foreign foot of the bordering escarpment. Khao Lak is made tourists (Department of Public Works and Town and up of six tourism village hubs beginning with Khao Country Planning, 2005). This accounts for 22.86per Lak Beach to the south, Nang Thong, Bang Niang, cent of Krabi Province’s annual tourism revenue then extending up to Laem Pakarang, Pakweep Beach (Department of Public Works and Town and Country and Bangsak Beach to the north. However, the heart Planning, 2005). Phi Phi Don has 79 accommodation of the destination is concentrated in Nang Thong and establishments in total, 45 of which are hotels and Bang Niang. The population of the greater Khao Lak resorts with a room capacity of 1,968 (Department of area is 4 683, with Bang Niang and Nang Thong Revenue, 2006, Department of Revenue, 2007, TAT, accounting for 966 and 343 people respectively 2008a). Supplementary sources of income come from (Khuk Khak TAO, 2007). fishing, small-scale farming and making handicrafts from shells. Khao Lak is the youngest destination of the three case study destinations. Tourism has fast become Phi Phi Don’s main attractions is its natural beauty: it the largest and most lucrative industry in Khao boasts clean white sand, warm turquoise waters, and Lak, attracting 321,938 visitors in 2004 when the stunning coral reefs teeming with tropical marine life. destination was at the height of its popularity (TAT, Therefore, the two pillars of Phi Phi’s market base are 2004). Alternate livelihoods include rubber, fruit beach-based tourism and diving; the reefs surrounding and palm oil plantations, construction, and fishing. the islands offer some of the best diving in Thailand. Yet emulating the development patterns of Patong The popularity of diving around the Phi Phi Islands and Phi Phi Don, Khao Lak started from small-scale supports no fewer than 11 dive shops202 (Department spot development that began with the building of 10 of Revenue, 2006, Department of Revenue, 2007). bungalows on Nang Thong Beach by a German and Other attractions include: day-trips to Phi Phi Leh Thai couple in 1988. Khao Lak’s undiscovered charm (host location for The Beach), the Viking Cave attracted the German naturalist tourist market seeking (featuring assorted colour drawings including ancient new landscapes to explore. However, at this time
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‘Khao Lak’ as a place did not exist until 1996. The respectively) with the UK, Switzerland and Finland successful marketing launch of Khao Lak’s Laguna rounding out the top five markets. The Asian market Resort in the brochures of two prominent European is small while Thais only stay in Khao Lak for long tour operators (Neckermann Reisen in Germany and weekends and public holiday periods. Star Tours of Scandinavia) transformed Khao Lak from an undiscovered ‘sleeping’ tourism community to an internationally renowned tourism destination. 4.2 Governance structures Needing a unique destination profile, the name ‘Khao influencing tourism in Khao Lak, Lak’ was taken from the mountain that overlooks the Patong and Phi Phi valley and used by the tour operators to epitomise the tranquil and untouched destination product. The two main groups that control tourism development Prominent and constant exposure in the brochures in Thailand are: the Royal Thai Government (RTG) of Europe’s largest tour operators is responsible for aided by subordinate levels of government, and the Khao Lak’s exponential growth from 100 rooms private sector (Leksakundilok, 2004, Smith, 2000). in 1996 to 5312 in December 2004, making it the Figure 6 shows the main government departments premier tourist destination in Phang Nga. and private sector stakeholders that influence tourism development in Patong, Khao Lak and Phi Phi Don. The Khao Lak’s tourism boom persuaded many main government bodies overseeing the development people living in the greater Takua Pa District to and promotion of tourism in Thailand and their main start tourism-related businesses. It also attracted responsibilities are as follows: business investors from other parts of Thailand who were looking for opportunities in new destination • Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT): The TAT markets where land and rents were cheaper than creates and projects a strong national and domestic more established destinations such as Hua Hin, Koh tourism image achieved through constant marketing Samui, Phuket Island, and Phi Phi Don. Added activities (Higham, 2000, Phayakvichien, 2005). to the list of business owners are some foreigners who came to Khao Lak as travellers and never left. • Ministry of Tourism and Sport: Formed in 2003, Tourism development spread to Bang Niang in 1999 the Ministry of Tourism and Sports oversees the and then extended northward to Laem Pakarang, direction of tourism policy and planning from the Pakweep Beach and Bangsak Beach. At the time of national level. Its Office of Tourism Development the tsunami, many businesses were relatively new or guides policy through the five-year Tourism in the finishing stages of building. Development Plans (TDPs) that correspond to the National Economic and Social Development In contrast to the bustling destination of Patong, Plans (NESDP) that steer national development Khao Lak is marketed as a peaceful haven for nature (NESDB, 2004, Pupphavesa et al., 2007). lovers who want to relax and dive. There are two types of tourists that are attracted to Khao Lak. The • Provincial and local governments: With the first group are wealthier families and retirees looking reorganisation of tourism policy structures to wanting to escape the European winter. Main and processes in 2003, provincial and local activities include: swimming and relaxing on the governments were awarded control over design and sparsely populated beaches, snorkelling, trekking or implementation strategies to match local needs and mountain biking through the mountainous hinterland, resources (Brickshawana, 2003, Phayakvichien, elephant treks, adventure tours including rafting 2005). The provincial governments of Phuket (for and canoeing, and short trips to Phang Nga Bay Patong), Phang Nga (Khao Lak) and Krabi (Phi or Khao Sok National Park. The second group are Phi Don) tailor central plans to suit local goals but dive enthusiasts that use Khao Lak as a base for the the responsibility for implementing and managing diving destination of the Similan Islands. Located tourism development lies with sub-district 80 kilometres from the coast, the Similan Islands authorities, known as Tambon Administration are rated as one of the top 10 dive destinations in Organisations (TAO) (Leksakundilok, 2004). Khao the world. The importance of this niche market Lak falls under the jurisdiction of three TAOs: is well recognised and guarded by the Khao Lak Bang Muang, Khuk Khak and Bang Lamkan. tourism community who work hard to maintain this Phi Phi Don is locally governed by the Ao Nang distinction. Khao Lak’s main markets are largely TAO located on the mainland. A district officer has Eurocentric: Germany and Sweden make up Khao also been appointed to reside on Phi Phi to ensure Lak’s main markets (31 per cent and 15 per cent that Phi Phi Don is well represented. In Patong,
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Figure 5: Location of Khao Lak
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the sub-district authority is the Municipality of the largest number occurred at Patong beach; a total of Thesaban. Thesaban Tambon was elevated to a 152 persons perished (79 Thai and 73 foreign nationals) Municipality in 2002 to better support the highly (Jayamanna, 2007). Not a single property along the populated destination town (Jayamanna, 2007). beachfront escaped damage (Ioualalen et al., 2007) yet These subdistrict authorities also assist with the structural damage to the resorts and support businesses production of tourism signage, maintaining natural was minimal (see Section 5.1.2). Only 15 per cent of beachside resources, improving English skills, Patong’s total room capacity (approximately 1,500 and promoting tourism activities and ecotourism of 9,919 of rooms) was damaged. An estimated 565 through established networks (ASIST-AP, 2004). micro-business shops were also damaged or destroyed But their main role is the provision of basic (Kong-Chant et al., 2005). Lifeline infrastructure was infrastructure such as roads, electricity, water, and also damaged; wastewater systems were blocked, waste management. water storage ponds were filled with sand and debris, underground electrical grids were submerged, and Operating within these government structures is surface electricity and communication wires destroyed the private sector that collectively drives tourism (Jayamanna, 2007). Yet greatest amount of damage development in Thailand. The private tourism sector was caused by flooding culminating in a total bill of consists of three main groups that operate at the THB46 million or USD1.31 million. Khao Lak and Phi international, national, sub-national (regional), and Phi Don were not so fortunate. local destination level. The formal tourism sector, consisting of accommodation providers, inbound and The first tsunami waves reached Khao Lak and Phi outbound tour operators, local tour operators, travel Phi Don approximately 25 minutes after Patong (Bell agencies, and transport companies, specialise in selling et al., 2005b). Khao Lak sustained the greatest losses core components of the tourism experience. Support in terms of lives lost and rooms destroyed. The first businesses, such as photo developing shops, souvenir tsunami wave hit the tourism destination of Khao and clothing shops, restaurants and bars, convenience Lak at approximately 10.30am, the largest of which stores, and health spas and massage parlours, cater reached a maximum run-up height of 10.62 metres for the tourists’ every day needs and desires. The (Warunpitikul and Tangwisutijit, 2005, NGDC, products and services that these industry practitioners 2009b, Skelton et al., forthcoming). The hotels and offer to the tourists are determined by the wants and bungalows were fully booked for the Khao Lak needs of the client and, as with any business, profit tourism high season. The waves penetrated as far as margins. Supporting these multi-scaled businesses 3.5 kilometres inland resulting in the destruction of are numerous tourism industry representative bodies much of the built and natural environment: 5,295 of that use the resourcefulness and political connections the 6,369 rooms available in Phang Nga (90 per cent of of their members to influence tourism development room capacity) were destroyed culminating in THB20 (Leksakundilok, 2004). billion (approximately USD512 million) in damages (TAT, 2005a, ILO, 2005, Katharangsiporn, 2005, TAT, 2005c). The beachside properties in Nang Thong and 4.3 Paradise in tatters: the impact of the whole are of Bang Niang and Laem Pakarang the 2004 tsunami on Khao Lak, sustained intense damage with many properties being Patong and Phi Phi completely destroyed. Seventy percent (or 5880) of the 8,212 people that died in Thailand were from The 2004 tsunami disaster transformed the lives and Phang Nga Province (UN, 2006), 358 of whom were livelihoods of three Thai destination communities in tourism staff. the space of a few hours. Patong Beach was the first of the three case study destinations to experience the Phi Phi Don also sustained horrific losses as a result devastating impact of the tsunami. The first tsunami wave of the tsunami. The island was struck twice by the reached the western shore of Phuket at approximately oncoming tsunami waves. The first body of water 10am (Bell et al., 2005b, Gregg et al., 2006, Ioualalen struck Loh Dalum Bay from the west washing over the et al., 2007). Approaching from the west, the tsunami township. This sequence was immediately replicated waves struck the first row of development pushing with a second wave pushing into Ton Sai Bay. The through the large windows that faced the beach and water masses collided in the middle of the strip, extended as much as 800 metres inland via the many creating an inescapable death trap (Ioualalen et al., small alleyways that run perpendicular to the famous 2007). The force of the wave pushed people, boats, beach (Bell et al., 2005b). Unpublished data suggests debris and garbage leading to the death of 753 people that of the 987 total deaths recorded in Phuket province,
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Figure 6: Governance structures influencing tourism development in Thailand
and leaving another 1300 still missing. Approximately business owners and workers such as masseuses and 8000 to 10 000 people including tourists were staying handicraft sellers lost their customers while thousands on the island at the time (ADB, 2006a). Property of people who lost their work in the formal tourism damages were also extensive. Up to up to 70 per cent economy moved into the informal economy for of the island was severely damaged and 1400 rooms survival (UN, 2005). This disruption of work patterns were destroyed (TAT, 2005b). Only eight hotels out and employment had greater consequences in the long- of 40 were reported to be operational (ADB, 2006b). term (see Section 5.2.5). Furthermore, 70 000 tons of garbage were left behind on the land and 350 000 tons in the sea (Srisuuksomvong, 2006). Broken coral from the surrounding reefs were 4.4 Post-tsunami recovery levels strewn all over the centre of the destination village and low-lying coconut plantations were severely damaged Being a longstanding flagship for Thailand’s tourism (Srisuuksomvong, 2006). industry, it was imperative to hasten a quick recovery in Patong Beach. This would not only restore tourist The destination communities of Patong, Khao Lak and confidence in Thailand as a whole but revive an Phi Phi experienced both direct and indirect impacts important source of Thailand’s GDP. The recovery in from the tsunami: businesses were destroyed, tourist Patong was swift. There are two reasons for this. First, flows dried up, jobs were lost, and the workforce needed Patong experienced minimal damage compared Khao to run newly opened businesses was severely depleted Lak and Phi Phi Don. Second, close collaborations (UN, 2005, Handmer and Choong, 2006). Those between business, government administrative bodies businesses that escaped physical damage suffered a (at the municipal, provincial and national levels), and loss of income due to a lack of clientele, depriving the media enabled a rapid change from devastation to them of their primary income source. Consequently, functionality within weeks. Basic infrastructure such thousands of workers were retrenched or had their as electricity, water, and telecommunication were income significantly reduced (UN, 2005). Support operating normally in four days after the tsunami
21 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
(Jayamanna, 2007). The effort to clean up and remove cease operating on Phi Phi Don due to the trauma and all debris from Patong was completed four weeks after negativity the tsunami left its wake, which opened new the event. Those businesses that were located more opportunities up for new small business investors. The than 150 metres from the beachfront were operational rebuilding of businesses was very slow due to delays within days once basic services were restored as was in finalising new building code and development plans. Soi Bang-La, the heart of Patong’s nightlife (Mydans, Tourist numbers increased throughout 2006 and 2007, 2005).Within three weeks of the tsunami, 90 per cent of rising from 41,979 at the height of the 2005/2006 the pre-impact hotel rooms were available and by May season to 179,631 in 2006 and then reaching 286,743 2005 most businesses had reopened (Birkland et al., in 2007 (TAT, 2008a). The amount of accommodation 2006a). Six months after the tsunami, the recovery of establishments also rose from 20 in 2005, to 34 in infrastructure and the built environment was complete. 2006 and 45 in 2007 (TAT, 2008a). Occupancy levels Tourist flows took longer to recover. in Krabi rose from 18per cent in 2005, to 55 per cent in 2006 and 57 per cent in 2007 (Office of Tourism In 2005, tourist flows to Phuket dropped 47.6 per cent Development, 2008a, TAT, 2008a). However, despite whilst average occupancy rates hovered around 35 to steady increases in tourist numbers, travel patterns and 40 per cent between April and December of that year main markets have altered as have spending habits. (TAT, 2008c). Tourism proceeds for Phuket were down The length of average stays has dropped from four by 90 per cent in the first quarter of 2005 compared to weeks pre-tsunami to two to three nights (DPTCP, the year before (ILO, 2005). Drops in revenue were 2006). Shop and souvenir owners and staff also noticed partly due to the lowering of tourism services prices by a considerable drop in expenditure on shopping and operators to stimulate demand (Birkland et al., 2006b). goods since the tsunami. Increased accommodation Tourists from the Europe and Australia were the first prices since the tsunami leave tourists with less money to return to Patong, while Asian tourists from China to spend on longer stays and shopping. The backpacker and Korea stayed away from fear of spirits and ghosts market - Phi Phi’s largest market before the tsunami (Chuenpagdee, 2005, Vongs, 2006, Henderson, 2007a). – has also reduced in size due to the increasing cost Tourist numbers improved in 2006. Occupancy rates of accommodation. Instead, 2007 and early 2008 reached 60 per cent in early 2006 and by June hotel showed rises in families or groups that can afford the occupancy rates in Phuket had climbed to 90 per cent higher costs. More tourists, particularly Thais and as the demand for direct international flights returned Chinese, are also coming to the island for day trips (Slayton, 2006). In 2007, occupancy rates reached an frequenting the island between 11am to 4pm before annual average of 65 per cent representing an increase returning to Phuket or Krabi in the late afternoon. of 5.13 per cent from the previous year (TAT, 2008c, These changes in travel patterns and markets are not Office of Tourism Development, 2008c). Total tourist wholly detrimental; souvenir shops and restaurants flows into Phuket in 2007 reached 5,005,653 surpassing (including those belonging to the large resorts) gain pre-tsunami figures by 4.4 per cent (or 212,401) (TAT, income from the day-trippers. The largest impact is felt 2008c). In 2008, these numbers reached 5,313,308, by the dive operators and small tour operators; the dive 6.15per cent (or 307,655) more than pre-tsunami operators have lost considerable business due to lower arrivals (Office of Tourism Development, 2009). The tourist numbers (caused by accommodation shortages only remaining economic detractor from the tsunami and consequent higher prices) whilst localised tour is changes in lengths of stay coupled with lower operators cannot capitalise on day-tripper services as tourist expenditure levels among both domestic and they are pre-packaged by mainland operators instead. international tourists, which is lowering business profit levels. Khao Lak is in the process of rebuilding but the recovery has been slower than in Patong and Phi Phi The recovery of Phi Phi was more modest than Patong Don. The first year was the hardest as tourist numbers given the vast differences in destruction levels. Tourist in Phang Nga dropped 71.63per cent (to 821,263 flow levels dropped 86per cent from pre-tsunami levels tourists) from the previous year’s highs of 2,894,652 (TAT, 2008a). Those that did frequent the island were (TAT, 2008b). The Phang Nga Tourist Association volunteers who had come to help rebuild the island. (PNTA) estimates that tourism revenues for 2005 were Furthermore, the Phi Phi Islands were labelled as a at best a mere 20per cent of those the year before (ILO, ‘danger zone’ by several international governments 2005). Throughout 2005 business was buoyed by the including Germany, Japan and Australia warning their large numbers of volunteers that needed food and a citizens not to travel to any tsunami-affected areas. bed and by loyal repeat clients that wanted to support Many small business owners that survived chose to the community through the generation of much-needed
22 s t o c k h o l m environment i n s t i t u t e
business. The rebuilding of individual businesses was undertaken in stages, regulated by the availability of funds and increasing tourist flows. But ownership of resorts (of all sizes) has changed as people grappled with trauma and monetary flow issues (TAT, 2006b). This is particularly the case in Bang Niang and Laem Pakarang that sustained the greatest losses. An examination of changes in room capacity, overall tourism flows and average occupancy rates in Khao Lak provides insights into the speed and pattern of rebuilding. Increases in tourist numbers have been modest. Tourist numbers to Phang Nga increased by 24.4 per cent in 2006 (to 1,021,448) and rose another 13.6 per cent in 2007 bringing total tourist numbers to 1,160,535, 60per cent less than pre-tsunami tourist numbers (TAT, 2008b). In 2008, tourist numbers increased to 1,342,971, 53.6per cent lower than pre-tsunami levels (Office of Tourism Development, 2009). Only 800 rooms out of the 5312 rooms pre-tsunami were available for occupation by the beginning of the 2005/2006 high season (ILO, 2006) with the number steadily growing each year. As of April 2008 room numbers in Khao Lak had reached 3225 (Phang Nga Tourism Association Representative, 2008, pers. comm. 20 April). While occupancy rates are climbing toward pre-tsunami levels, they are yet to fully recover despite there being 2078 fewer rooms physically available in Khao Lak as of April 2008. Maximum occupancy rates in the high season of 2003/2004 reached 80.1 per cent (TAT, 2008b). This dropped down to an average of 24 per cent in the first quarter of 2005 (TAT, 2008b). The high seasons of 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 recorded significant jumps in occupancy rates with 61.2 per cent and 65.4 per cent respectively but remain considerably lower than pre-tsunami levels (Office of Tourism Development, 2008b).
Tour operator charter flights and room allocations rose for the 2008/2009 Andaman Coast high season. Strong indications from the European tour operators suggest that significant business will be directed toward Khao Lak leading to a possible tourist flow increase of 20per cent. This has buoyed confidence levels within the Khao Lak community, prompting predictions of a return to pre-tsunami capacity and occupancy levels by the 2009/2010 high season.
The multiple factors that contributed to the differential vulnerability levels found in Patong, Phi Phi and Khao Lak, the collective actions taken to rebuild the three destinations’ post-disaster and the outcomes of these actions that have shaped the communities respective recoveries are presented in the following section.
23 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
5 Comparative assessment of destination vulnerability
5.1 Exposure the tsunami and suffered huge losses. The tsunami train reached the west-coast of Phuket at approximately exposure and destruction levels differed markedly 9.40am, led by a trough that caused the sea to recede between Khao Lak, Patong Beach and Phi Phi Don. (Bell et al., 2005b, Shuto, 2005). Figure 7 illustrates These differences were the outcomes of a combination the tsunami’s progression toward the Andaman Coast of geophysical parametres (including ocean bathymetry, and sea-level differentiations. The model shows a drop coastal morphology and differences in on-shore in sea level as the tsunami approached the coastline, elevation, the absence of significant natural barriers) causing the initial observed retreat of the sea as the coupled with man-made factors such as development tsunami reached the Andaman Coastline. Three waves patterns and characteristics and human alterations to were recorded, beginning with a weaker pre-wave that the biophysical environment (Chatenoux and Peduzzi, reached Phuket around 10am (Bell et al., 2005b, Gregg 2005, National Science Foundation, 2005a, UNEP, et al., 2006, Ioualalen et al., 2007). The first wave 2005, Dalrymple et al., 2006). arrived at Khao Lak and Phi Phi Don approximately 25 minutes later (Bell et al., 2005b). The run-up heights Differential biophysical characteristics and in Khao Lak were much higher than those at Patong development patterns Beach and Phi Phi Don. With a magnitude of Mw 9.3, the Great Sumatra- Andaman earthquake and the tsunami it generated Table 2 summarises the run-height ranges found in were events of staggering geological proportions. The Khao Lak, Patong Beach and Phi Phi Don. Maximum vertical uplift of the India plate and drop of the Burma inundation penetration reached approximately 3,500 plate caused a vertical difference of up to 8.5 metres in metres in Khao Lak (see Calgaro et al., forthcoming), seafloor elevation that displaced an estimated 30 km³ and 800 metres in Patong (see Naruchaikusol et al., of water forming a tsunami wave that travelled outward forthcoming), whilst the heavily developed sand from the length of the rupture line (British Geological isthmus of Phi Phi Don that lies between its twin bays Survey, 2005, Norwegian Geotechnical Institute, (c. 1.2 km long and 100–1,000 m wide) was completely 2006). The Andaman Coast, located only 500 to 600 submerged (Ioualalen et al., 2007). kilometres from the source, received the full brunt of These differences were caused by variations in off- shore bathymetry, the nature and shape of the on-shore terrain, and differential on-shore development patterns found in the three destinations (Dalrymple and Kriebel, 2005, Kawata et al., 2005). Extreme run-up heights and deep inundation patterns at Khao Lak were caused by six factors. First, the shallowness of the near-shore shelf caused a shoaling effect that created a bore, which greatly increased the wave velocity and height (Chatenoux and Peduzzi, 2005, Dalrymple and Kriebel, 2005, Siripong et al., 2005, Shuto, 2005). Khao Lak’s near-shore slope does not reach 10 metres in depth until approximately 3 kilometres from the shoreline (see Pomonis et al., 2006). Second, the tsunami coincided
Figure 7: Tsunami wave pattern and surface Table 2: Tsunami run-up heights above mean elevation as it approaches the Thai Andaman sea level Coast Run-up height ranges Source: Adapted from Norwegian Geotechnical Institute (2006: 5) Location (m) Snapshot of the calculated tsunami 1 hour and 20 minutes after Khao Lak 4.48 – 11.29 the earthquake just before it reaches the tip of Phuket (delin- eated by the black box). Khao Lak’s approximate location is Patong Beach 4.90 – 8.96 delineated by the black dot. The trough, shown in variants of Phi Phi Don 4.58 – 5.84 blue, reaches a depth of 3 metres below mean sea level with the proceeding crests of shown in green, yellow and orange. Source: Ioualalen et al. (2007) and NGDC (2009b)
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with high tide, causing the tsunami to ride on top of the hotels and support businesses that line the beachfront elevated tidal water level (Bell et al., 2005b, Kawata but greater penetration was constrained and failed to et al., 2005, Dalrymple and Kriebel, 2005). Third, the reach much past the first row of development. However, concentration of the tsunami waves toward Khao Lak having nowhere else to go, the water was funnelled was heightened by convergence due to refraction off along the many roads (sois) that run perpendicular to the northern and southern headlands of Laem Pakarang the beach causing great damage to the small businesses and Laem Hin Chang that border the heart of the that line the sois (Bell et al., 2005b). The curtailed wave destination (Gubbels, 2005, Siripong, 2006, Skelton inundation patterns observed in Patong are reflected in et al., forthcoming). Fourth, the topography of much figure 8, which compares estimated run-up heights and of Khao Lak is extremely flat (areas around Laem inundation distances experienced in Patong and Khao Pakarang and Bang Niang have maximum sea-level Lak. elevations of 10 metres) presenting little resistance to the tsunami waves. Fifth, the waves were largely Wave heights at Phi Phi Don were not as high as those uninhibited by off-shore islands, reefs, seagrass and experienced at Khao Lak and Patong but fatalities were on-shore vegetation that have the propensity to reduce nonetheless very high, standing at 2,053. The reasons wave energy (Chatenoux and Peduzzi, 2005, Shuto, can be attributed to the direction of the approaching 2005, Dalrymple et al., 2006, Siripong, 2006, Cochard tsunami, the shape of the island and the low-lying et al., 2008). Finally, on-shore building densities were nature of the heavily developed narrow isthmus. The not high and therefore offered limited resistance. The island is H-shaped with two high rocky headlands on the force and reach of the waves resulted in heavy structural eastern and western sides (with a maximum elevation damage (90 per cent of development affected) and of 185 metres) connected by a narrow sand isthmus coastal erosion, particularly at the northern headland that reaches 1.5 metres above sea-level (Dalrymple of Laem Pakarang. and Kriebel, 2005, Ioualalen et al., 2007). The island was struck from the west forcing the tsunami to refract Run-up heights were lower at Patong due to steeper and diffract first into the north-facing Loh Dalam Bay coastal morphology and different onshore development causing complete inundation of the isthmus. Then patterns. The near-shore bathymetry of Patong Bay is another part of the same wave struck from the south, deeper and steeper than that found off the coastlines of washing the debris back over the island resulting in Khao Lak; small inundation and more rapid attenuation high fatalities (Dalrymple and Kriebel, 2005, Ioualalen of flow depth with distance from shore are common where a steeper coastal profile is present (Bell et al., 2005b, Siripong et al., 2005, Strand and Masek, 2005, Rossetto et al., 2007). The deeper water allowed the wave to travel much closer to the shore before breaking, whilst the steeper incline of the seabed caused the formation of a plunging breaker just off the beach resulting in moderate run-up heights (Siripong, 2006). The presence of a prominent underwater sand dune in the Bay (see Naruchaikusol et al., forthcoming) also helped to lessen wave energy and velocity (estimated at 3 to 4 m/s) (Matsutomi et al., 2005). Local topography and the density of buildings played a key role in determining differential run-up heights and inundation distances at Patong Beach (Rossetto et al., 2007). The topography of Patong’s main tourist area is higher than Khao Lak and Phi Phi Don. The topography of Patong rises approximately 20 metres above sea-level over a distance of 1 kilometre, which is double that of Khao Lak (see Naruchaikusol et al., forthcoming). Phi Phi’s elevation is lower still, having a maximum elevation of 1.5 metres. Furthermore, the high density of solid development that tightly lines much of the length of Figure 8: Relationship between run-up Patong Beach acted as a barrier to the waves, thereby heights, inundation patterns and onshore limiting inundation penetration (Warnitchai, 2005). characteristics The waves pushed through the large windows of the Source: Lukkunaprasit and Ruangrassamee (2005)
25 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
region. Therefore, buildings have not been designed for earthquake loading or tsunamis. Ministerial Regulation No. 6, B.E. 2527 [5] stipulates a relatively low wind loading of 0.5 kilopascals (kPa) for the lower 10 m and 0.8 kPa for the next 10 metres (for low rise buildings) (Lukkunaprasit and Ruangrassamee, 2005). Wave velocities in Khao Lak ranged from 6 to 8 metres per second, which exerted immense hydrodynamic pressure (20 to 30 kPa) on buildings and obstacles that lay in the path of the incoming waves (Bell et al., 2005b, Matsutomi et al., 2005, Warnitchai, 2005). Most of the development in Khao Lak sustained heavy damages, culminating in a 90 per cent loss of room capacity (Thanawood et al., 2006, Warnitchai, 2005). Wave velocities at Patong Beach were considerably less at 3 to 4 metres per second (Matsutomi et al., 2005) as were damages. Structural damage in Patong was minimal affecting less than 20 per cent of the built environment, whilst 15 per cent of Patong’s room capacity was destroyed. Wave velocities at Phi Phi are unknown but the damage was extensive; 70 per cent of the island was severely damaged (Guy Carpenter, Figure 9: Tsunami heights and wave direction 2005). at Phi Phi Don Source: adapted from Kawata et al. (2005) Such large differences in damage patterns can be explained by substantial variances in building et al., 2007). Figure 9 portrays the dual impact of the materials used, building orientations, structure and tsunami waves on Phi Phi Don and maximum run-up foundation types (Bell et al., 2005b, Dalrymple and heights. The shallowness of Loh Dalum Bay resulted Kriebel, 2005, National Science Foundation, 2005b, in higher run-ups (5.8 metres), whilst the deeper Ton Warnitchai, 2005). The majority of wooden structures Sai Bay recorded maximum run-ups of 4.6 metres were destroyed, creating hazardous debris that claimed (Bell et al., 2005b, Kawata et al., 2005). Furthermore, many lives as it was pushed along by powerful waves the positioning of Phi Phi Le helped to shield Ton Sai (Bell et al., 2005b, Dalrymple and Kriebel, 2005, Bay from the full force of the tsunami (Kawata et al., National Science Foundation, 2005b). These buildings 2005). were commonly smaller buildings ranging in use from bungalows to restaurants and resort service amenities Development type and orientation (Bell et al., 2005b). Wooden structures were common- The locations of human settlements along the with the place in Khao Lak, particularly in Bang Niang where built infrastructure found in the coastal zone played a the largest devastation occurred. Low-rise wooden crucial role in determining vulnerability levels in Khao structures also dominated Loh Dalum Bay in Phi Phi. Lak, Patong and Phi Phi. Extreme events, such as the None of the estimated 300 well-built wood cottages 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami blatantly demonstrate were left standing at Loh Dalum Bay (Ioualalen et al., that environmental degradation and poorly planned 2007), with one resort owner losing approximately 225 and inappropriate development increase community wooden bungalows at Loh Dalum Bay alone. vulnerability to shocks (Sanandang, 2004, Miller et al., 2005). Capitalizing on the water views, much of the Poor foundations in single-storey structures proved to tourism development found in Khao Lak, Patong and be another factor underlying high damage patterns in Phi Phi is located along or close to the beach. However, Khao Lak and Phi Phi. Most buildings in the Andaman the proximity of the resorts to the exposed beach Region are non-engineered and have shallow spread coupled with the types of structures built heightened footings less than one metre below ground (Bell et al., vulnerability to the tsunami. Prior to the tsunami, 2005b, Dalrymple and Kriebel, 2005, Lukkunaprasit building regulations stipulated a 30-metre setback and Ruangrassamee, 2005, Warnitchai, 2005). Limited from the maximum sea level line, but did not include enforcement of engineer-designed construction detailed structural codes (Bell et al., 2005b, Calgaro, plans by local government bodies further undermine 2005). Southern Thailand is a non-seismic-prone minimum structural standards (Bell et al., 2005b).
26 s t o c k h o l m environment i n s t i t u t e
Severe scouring of the supporting sand underneath these • the avoidance of new development along exposed shallow spread footings was very common, leading to sand spits and narrow and flat land strips, widespread foundation failure in all three destinations. Several buildings situated along Ton Sai Bay at Phi Phi • the redesign and reconfiguration of development floated off their spread footings and were displaced along the coast that minimises future tsunami from their original positions (Warnitchai, 2005). The loss, severe scouring was caused by highly turbulent and strong-tsunami induced currents (Warnitchai, 2005). • the adoption of special precautions that protect Elevated buildings that allowed water to flow under the critical infrastructure and property, and structure escaped detrimental damages as did buildings with solid walls that were perpendicular to the ocean • the introduction of evacuation plans and early (Dalrymple and Kriebel, 2005, National Science warning systems. Foundation, 2005b). An Indian Ocean Warning System has been set up (see Brick buildings were also heavily damaged, yet those Section 6.2.2) but the reconfiguration and redesign of with reinforced concrete (RC) frames were more development present a challenge to tourism communities likely to remain structurally sound (National Science and planners as they try to ensure development designs Foundation, 2005b, Warnitchai, 2005). Averaging fulfil safety standards and tourist demands for water 100 millimetres thick, the frame-infill masonry walls views. There is some evidence that structures have set within RC frames could not withstand the high been rebuilt using more robust materials and design but hydrodynamic pressure or the impact of hazardous these are in the minority. Few businesses interviewed floating debris carried by the strong currents (Kawata have changed the design of their buildings or materials et al., 2005, Warnitchai, 2005). Debris articles ranged used in the aftermath of the tsunami. from wood, cars, furniture, trees, metal to boats (Bell et al., 2005b). The great amount of debris carried along by the tsunami not only transmitted more force onto built 5.2 Sensitivity structures but also claimed many lives (Warnitchai, 2005). Reinforced concrete structures founded on deep Sensitivity levels were starkly different between piles proved to be the most structurally sound. Most of Patong, Phi Phi Don and Khao Lak. Patong was better the RC beachfront properties in all three destinations able to withstand the shock of the tsunami than its were orientated to face the beach, featuring large sea- neighbouring destinations of Khao Lak and Phi Phi, fronting windows that did little to resist the force of much of which is attributable to differences in their the wave or protect inhabitants. Entering the buildings developmental histories. Patong’s long developmental through the large sea-fronting windows, the force of the history left the destination in a strong financial position tsunami waves may have gutted the concrete structures that facilitated a swift recovery. Profit levels and credit but left the building structurally intact (Bell et al., histories were strong and were sourced from multiple 2005b). Patong’s coastal landscape is dominated by businesses (including other tourism businesses in multiple-storey RC structures, most of which escaped alternate destinations and those in other industries). major damage and remained structurally intact (Rossetto This enabled a large number of businesses to access et al., 2007). Larger multi-storey RC resorts in both the liquid assets and credit needed to rebuild. This solid Khao Lak and Phi Phi also remained structurally sound financial base was fuelled by Patong’s broad market base (author’s field observations) (Ioualalen et al., 2007, that attracts tourists throughout the year, diminishing author’s field observations in 2005 and 2007). These a financial reliance on the peak season business structures also played a lifesaving role by providing a that was wiped out by the tsunami. Underpinning vertical evacuation route above the waves. Patong’s financial success and prominent international branding is an active, powerful and well-connected These findings have prompted the following five tourism association that used its political and business recommendations (Cochard et al., 2008, Eisner, 2005, connections at the local, provincial, and national levels Warnitchai, 2005): to quickly access the financial, marketing, and technical support needed to recover. Due to a high migration of • the limitation of wooden structures in coastal areas investors into Patong, social networks are weak but and the replacement of shallow spread footings this factor proved inconsequential in light of Patong’s with reinforced concrete deep pile foundations, strong financial and market position and powerful business networks. Khao Lak as a new destination lacked this.
27 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
Khao Lak’s newly founded businesses did not have the fragility of their destination images to negative a strong financial base; financial reserves were low perceptions of risk and lingering images of devastation, as were insurance levels, and credit histories (if staff shortages, social exclusion of minority groups, and they existed at all) were not well established. After pre-existing weaknesses in governance structures at the the tsunami, many businesses (particularly smaller local level. Governmental weaknesses and corruption establishments) experienced difficulties in accessing at the local level have hindered the implementation financial capital, which slowed the recovery process, and enforcement of developmental regulations, led stifled earning capacities, and deepened financial to the unequal distribution of resources pre- and post- sensitivities. Khao Lak’s sensitivity to the tsunami tsunami; and have left the communities with inadequate disaster was further heightened by a high dependency infrastructure and little localised support (particularly on tourism as the primary livelihood option, high in Khao Lak and Phi Phi). Unchecked overdevelopment seasonality levels, and a reliance on the marketing in the more established destinations of Patong and Phi strategies of international tour operators amongst Phi has led to environmental degradation that threatens bigger businesses. Yet the disaster also revealed Khao to destroy the pristine environments that form the main Lak’s strengths. The destination’s recovery was aided attraction for Andaman Coast destinations. by the loyalty of its large repeat-client base who offered financial support through donations and the return of Sector-specific sensitivities their business. Strong family networks also provided Degree of livelihood dependency on tourism and financial and moral support, whilst decisive actions livelihood diversification by industry representative bodies and resourceful Livelihood diversification is recognised as a key community members helped source financial capital strategy in reducing vulnerability and building and marketing support. resilience against a wide range of shocks (Moser et al., 2001, Turner et al., 2003). All three destination Like its prosperous neighbour of Patong, Phi Phi too communities rely heavily on tourism, making them benefited from established and varied markets and sensitive to shocks. Yet the DVAs for each community profitable businesses that have grown over 20 years. revealed that differential vulnerability levels within and This was particularly the case for the dominant five across each community were caused by variations in families that own most of the property on the island livelihood portfolios and business ownership patterns, who had diversified their livelihood portfolios. But this making livelihood portfolios a key determinant of is where the similarities end. The concentration of land differential vulnerability and resilience. Khao Lak ownership and power in the hands of the five dominant and Phi Phi Don are heavily dependent on tourism landowner families has created a very different income for two reasons. First, land resources are community structure in Phi Phi from its neighbouring scarce and livelihood options are limited. Before the destinations that has lessened Phi Phi’s sensitivity introduction of tourism, Khao Lak inhabitants relied to shocks and stressors. The combined wealth of the on a combination of rubber and fruit plantations, dominant families along with the strong family ties that subsistence fishing and farming, and shrimp farming. underpin these family business networks, have created Livelihood choices on Phi Phi Don were confined to a highly effective and robust support system that guides coconut plantations, subsistence fishing and farming. island development, promotes business expansion, and Phi Phi’s isolation from the mainland further limits improves infrastructural standards. The mobilisation livelihood options. Tourism created a plethora of new of dominant family resources after the tsunami was opportunities for people in both communities to start instrumental in the rebuilding of not only hotels but their own businesses and opened up new markets some of the rented shop space, which lessened the for local produce. Second, given the profitability of financial burden on tenants. This collective power also tourism operations, there were no economic incentives improves the community’s bargaining power, enabling to diversify prior to the tsunami, when risk levels the community to effectively respond to proposed were considered low. Alternate income sources do changes from external factors. Yet the downside of such not generate enough income to support the needs of concentration of power and wealth is that advancement the household. Consequently these alternate sources depends upon the discretion and agendas of the local are used to supplement tourism earning particularly business elite. during the low season. Patong’s business community do not suffer from isolation or limited livelihood Despite their differences, there were several common opportunities; it is an integral component of Phuket’s factors that heightened the sensitivity of all three thriving economy, which generates the second-highest destinations: limited access to credit amongst micro per capita income of any other province outside and smaller businesses, a lack of risk awareness, Bangkok (Partnership of Phuket Agencies, 2007). But
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the inclusion of alternative non-tourism businesses in epidemics, such advantages of having multiple tourism livelihood portfolios does not make financial sense in businesses diversification could be lost. Some business Patong; strong and constant financial benefits from owners in Patong and Phi Phi also had businesses in high tourism business demand and strong profits Khao Lak which were either destroyed physically by outweigh the risk of shocks to tourist flows. Alternative the tsunami or business flows were too low after the livelihoods in coconut-derived products, fishing, and tsunami to sustain business activity. Those households rubber plantations are available to the populace but with substantial earnings from non-tourism activities are prove less attractive due to lower profit margins.But the most resilient to these types of stresses and shocks. a high level of dependency on tourism only tells part Adapting to the heightened perception of risk following of the story. the tsunami, some foreign business owners in Khao Lak have chosen to diversify their tourism portfolio by In keeping with the assertions of Moser et al. (2001) either building an alternate businesses in Khao Lak or and Turner et al. (2003), the findings from all three choosing to relocate one of their restaurants to another destinations show that those with a diversified livelihood Thai destination. Such adaptations increase chances portfolio (particularly those based in alternate locations) of resilient futures. But there are sectors of all three were most resilient to risk. Financial resources (earnings destination communities that do not have alternative and collateral) from unaffected alternate business sources of income and remain the most vulnerable to can be used to secure additional credit needed for business interruptions caused by a shock. These include rebuilding, pay staff and supplement earnings if profits informal sector groups such as beach masseuses, beach are temporarily low. Additional businesses can also vendors and employees. be sources of much needed equipment to meet short- term needs. Those with one business are susceptible Seasonality levels and main markets to losing everything when shocks occur. Empirical Differences in seasonality, main market sources and evidence from Patong suggest that the majority of clientele between Khao Lak, Phi Phi, and Patong business owners in Patong have at least two businesses, proved instrumental in determining differential which reduces the reliance on one income source and destination vulnerability levels. Khao Lak’s business can enhance resilience levels. In Khao Lak, 72 per cent is highly seasonal which leaves it very vulnerable to of business owners or co-owners interviewed across shocks like the tsunami that coincide with peak earning the spectrum of business types have more than one periods. Strong market demand generated from Europe business (Calgaro et al., forthcoming), whilst in Phi Phi fills Khao Lak resorts for six months of the year from multiple business ownership is most prevalent amongst late October to March. This provides the community the five main landowners, namely the Cabana Group, with the bulk of its yearly earnings that are used to Chao Koh Group, Phi Phi Hotel Group, the village sustain them throughout the low season (April to mid- headman and his relatives, and the PP Princess Resort October) when occupancy rates average between 20 conglomerate. Some smaller business owners have to 30 per cent. Khao Lak’s high seasonality can be also been successful in diversifying livelihood options attributed to two closely linked factors. First, Khao and income sources through land or rubber plantation Lak has a very heavy wet season. Average monthly ownership based on the mainland. rainfalls in the low season range between 342-462mm (see http://www.weather2travel.com/climate-guides/ Common livelihood portfolios with more than one index.php?country=thailand). Average monthly wet livelihood source fall into three broad categories: (i) season rainfalls in Patong and Phi Phi are considerably those with a different tourism businesses located in less (ranging between 334-398mm for Phuket and Khao Lak, Patong or Phi Phi respectively, (ii) those 259-373mm for Phi Phi). Second, Khao Lak’s client with additional businesses that are an expansion base consists mainly of German and Swedish families of the first business – another branch – either in the and retirees looking for sun-filled getaways during the main destination or an alternate destination location in northern hemisphere’s winter. Khao Lak’s wet and Thailand or abroad, and (iii) those where the second humid low season cannot compete with the coinciding business is in an alternate sector, most commonly in warm northern hemisphere summer. agriculture (rubber tree farming, fruit orchard) and fishing. However, the capacity to redistribute resources Having such a narrow client base also increases among multiple businesses and the resilience of vulnerability levels. As a destination in the early multifaceted livelihood portfolios depends on the type stages of development Khao Lak lacks the strong and location of the second business and the nature of the market presence of its highly branded and popular shock. For example, if tourist flows are interrupted at neighbouring destinations of Patong and Phi Phi Don. multiple Thai destinations by political unrest or health When a shock or stressor occurs, there are fewer tourists
29 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
to take the place of lost markets particularly when the season (ranging between 50 and 60 per cent), the level image is tainted by negativity. Events in key supply of income generated throughout the low season is markets also pose a threat to tourist flows. Prolonged considered to be adequate to meet costs and achieve economic downturns such as the 2008/2009 recession profits for most businesses. have the propensity to affect tourist flows from Europe, which further compounds Khao Lak’s vulnerability. International exposure: opportunity amongst the Recognising this market-based weakness, medium despair and larger accommodation providers in Khao Lak The fragility of destination images to negative are diversifying their low season services to capture perceptions of risk is recognized as a major contributing the conference market, whilst other are turning their factor to destination vulnerability (Huan et al., 2004, attention to Asian and domestic markets who do not Mansfeld, 1999, Richter and Waugh, 1986, Sönmez and covet constant sunshine. Graefe, 1998). This proved true in all three destinations in the short term as the incessant negative images and The tourism seasons in Phi Phi and Patong are more stories of devastation caused numbers to significantly varied as is their market base, both of which proved drop (see Section 4.3). Negative and cautionary reports instrumental in aiding their recoveries following the came from the media and country travel warnings. As tsunami. Phi Phi Don and Patong attract an array of noted in Section 4.3, Asian markets were particularly tourists from different countries that choose to travel deterred by ghost superstitions (Chuenpagdee, at different times of the year. Accordingly, seasonal 2005, Vongs, 2006). Khao Lak’s image was further flows are less of a problem in both destinations. tarnished by its slow recovery; rebuilding delays left Greater seasonal stability decreases the dependence on an incomplete destination landscape which lessened its strong seasonal flows and in doing so decreases their international tourist appeal whilst ongoing construction vulnerability to shocks that happen to coincide with noise has caused tourists to leave prematurely in peak seasons. Phi Phi’s high season (between November frustration. However, these negative images and stories and April) is also highly Eurocentric; Scandinavians also had positive effects on longer-term tourist flows. account for 60 per cent of the foreign tourists whilst Patong was the first to experience greater interest as the French, Italians, Germans and British make up the a result of the tsunami. Patong benefited directly remaining 40 per cent. Business is excellent for these from the diversion of tourist business away from its 6 months. The cheaper low season (May to October) severely damaged neighbouring destinations of Phi is dominated by the Asian market (with a growing Phi and Khao Lak that experienced slower recoveries. demand coming from China and Korea), Australia This was not the first time that Patong had benefited (over the winter break) and Israel, all of which are from another destination’s misfortune; Patong was looking for bargains as prices drop by as much as 50 also the recipient of greater tourist numbers following per cent. The July/August period also attracts bargain the Bali bombings in 2001 and 2005, as was Phi Phi. hunters from the European summer market and divers, More importantly, greater worldwide media exposure with diving conditions being optimal at this time. and heightened curiosity in the disaster and its legacy Since the tsunami, the seasonal flows have changed opened up new markets in all three destinations, which and evened out further. Due to a reduced amount of has the potential to generate greater long-term tourist accommodation available on the island post-tsunami, flows. Some foreign business owners in Khao Lak demand often outweighs room supply leading to a used this additional exposure to their advantage by more even flow of tourists throughout the year. highlighting their plight in their home countries, which in turn, generated much interest in their business and Patong has three seasons which provide income Khao Lak as a destination. throughout the year: “peak season” (November – January), “high season” (February – April), and Strong correlation between destination “green (low) season” (May – October). Peak and high developmental histories and vulnerability levels season tourism flows are defined by European charter Differences in damage levels (as outlined in Section flight schedules: the first charter flight arrives on1 4.3), livelihood portfolios, and seasonality are November and the last one leaves at the end of March. important determinants of destination vulnerability. The enduring strong demand from Europe sustains A comparison between the vulnerability of Khao average occupancy rates of 80 – 90 per cent. The Lak, Patong Beach and Phi Phi Don clearly show market for the low season shifts to Australians, Dutch that a destination’s developmental history profoundly and the Asia market including domestic business, influences destination vulnerability levels. Empirical all of which are looking for bargains and low prices. evidence from the three case studies clearly shows Although occupancy rates are lower during the low that the stage of a destination’s development not only
30 s t o c k h o l m environment i n s t i t u t e
determines the strength of a destination’s brand, market 20 years and benefits from an assortment of business position and its consequent capacity to attract a broad from backpackers, divers and the more mainstream range of markets, but also influences the availability individual tourist looking for an island paradise. This of financial resources, business stability and the strong market base has helped the businesses get strength of supporting industry bodies and governance back on their feet after many volunteers departed in structures. the latter part of 2005, once the basic needs of the community had been met. The high demand for Phi Phi Patong’s resilience and its ability to recover so quickly among Scandinavians, Australians, Israelis, French, could on the surface be wholly attributed to the minimal Italian and German tourists ensured adequate tourist physical damage it sustained from the tsunami; only flows both before and after the tsunami. Furthermore, an approximate 15 percent of Patong’s room capacity the island’s longer development history meant that was damaged compared to Phi Phi and Khao Lak, many businesses were well-established, with strong which sustained heavy losses and have taken longer business and profit levels prior to the tsunami. There to recover. Yet closer inspection reveals that Patong’s is one marked difference between Phi Phi and Patong; swift recovery from the tsunami is directly related to Phi Phi’s collective strength is based upon the wealth Patong’s long and strong developmental history that and connections of the five dominant families that spans over 30 years. Patong is the oldest and most own much of Phi Phi instead of tourism representative established of the three destinations starting from groups. humble beginnings in the 1970s. Over this time Patong businesses have built up a solid profit and credit base, Being in the early stages of development, Khao Lak’s creating a stable and highly profitable tourism business tourism community proved more vulnerable to stresses sector with excellent investment viability. Such and shocks than its more developed neighbours conditions facilitated easier access to the financial of Patong and Phi Phi Don. Khao Lak’s recovery credit needed to rebuild. Such financial stability following the disaster was hampered by problems in and fortitude is complemented by Patong’s strong securing financial capital and attracting substantial international presence as a destination. Time, along market share. Khao Lak’s recent development as an with strong business marketing campaigns has created international tourism destination meant that many a solid and broad market base and strong international businesses were relatively new with some being in the branding that has made Thailand’s second-largest and final stages of building when the tsunami occurred. most lucrative destination in Thailand second only Accordingly, business owners had limited access to to the capital Bangkok (Birkland et al., 2006a). This savings, as most of the money had been invested in strong international branding and business marketing the building of the business, or the potential for large experience enabled Patong to draw upon a diverse set profits. Access to finances depends upon a household’s of markets even in times of crisis to stabilise tourist capacity to respond, whereas access to market share is flows. Underpinning Patong’s destination branding and a destination-wide challenge that is in part outside the the strength of the destination’s business community control of individual and collective destination efforts. are its strong and powerful industry associations who As noted in Section 4.1.3, Khao Lak benefits from a loyal use their power and political connections to ensure that yet small market base and its infancy as a destination the business interests of Patong’s tourism community means that tourism flows are concentrated in a few are considered at the highest levels of government and key European markets making it more vulnerable to fulfilled. Patong’s consequent success in attracting any stressor or shock that may change tourist patterns, business investment and tourists alike has facilitated a including market trends and international operator successful recovery. preferences. Local industry association membership has boosted marketing reach and facilitated greater Like Patong, Phi Phi’s resilience and its capacity to access to financial capital among some business sub- swiftly respond to the disaster is a product of its longer groups but smaller businesses and workers remain ill- development history and the stability and wealth of represented and therefore more vulnerable. its tourism community, grown over the last 20 years. The tsunami had a large impact on both Phi Phi Don Access to markets and clientele and Khao Lak in terms of lives lost and destruction A destination’s vulnerability is heavily influenced by levels. As stated earlier, Phi Phi lost 70 percent of its its market base, business marketing strategies and the built environment compared to Khao Lak’s 90 percent type of clientele they attract. Money is a key factor in but this is where the similarities end. Phi Phi has for facilitating a swift recovery. Equally important is (re) the most part rebuilt where possible. Like Patong, gaining access to a constant flow of tourists to fill the Phi Phi Don has built a strong market over the past resorts once the rebuilding is complete. Marketing
31 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
strategies of destination businesses therefore directly One destination sub-sector that does not possess direct influence its capacity to cope, respond, and adapt to power over tourist flow numbers are support businesses shocks. As noted in the previous section, Khao Lak’s and service providers such as restaurants, souvenir smaller market base leaves it more sensitive to shocks shops, tailor and health spa facilities, taxi services, or stressors than Phi Phi or Patong, both of which local tour guiding businesses, beach activity providers, have more varied markets and a more established and scuba diving companies. This group is highly and recognised brand to sell. However, individual dependent on the marketing success of accommodation businesses do have the power to influence their own providers to attract clientele. This is particularly the case vulnerability levels based on their choice of marketing for two groups: tailors, and beach vendors and activity tools, the strength of their professional business providers (beach masseurs, kayak and paragliding networks (particularly with market suppliers) and operators, long-tail boat operators). Tailors are highly client types. Findings across all three destinations dependent on high-end clientele and resort referrals reveal both the advantages and disadvantages of whilst beach vendors and activity providers solely rely different types of marketing strategies in the context on the successes of accommodation providers, travel of vulnerability to shocks like the 2004 tsunami. agencies and destination marketers to attract business and sustain tourist volumes. Smaller accommodation providers in Khao Lak and Patong source the majority of their clients (individual Marketing aside, repeat clientele can be a valuable travellers) through guidebooks, internet sites, walk- stabiliser for destinations, particularly for those ins, repeat business and personal recommendations. destinations with niche markets like Khao Lak. The For medium and larger resorts, the core client base loyalty and patronage of a large repeat client base comes from package tour guests sourced largely comprised of Germans, Swedes and a close-knit through the brochures and promotional efforts diving community has defined Khao Lak’s ongoing of large international tour operators; European recovery and resilience. Khao Lak’s strong repeat tour operators dominate Khao Lak whilst Patong client base ranges from 20 per cent for larger resorts benefits from European, American and Australia to 80 per cent for some smaller properties. Their firm tour operator exposure. Patong also has a great presence did more than raise much needed capital; reliance on charter flights from the UK, mainland they gave businesses renewed resolve, sent positive Europe, and Australia operated by 11 different tour messages back home to counter sustained negativity, operators including TUI and LTU (PATA, 2005, and increased visitor numbers by returning to Khao Phuketmagazine.com, 2009); charter flights define Lak with family and friends. Patong and Phi Phi both the high and peak seasons in Patong. Supplementary profit from broader market bases but still benefit from business is sourced from internet bookings, repeat repeat business. Repeat business levels of 20 per cent guests and word of mouth. This group also uses large supplement steady tourist flows to Phi Phi, whilst annual international tourism conventions such as the Patong repeat levels range between 10 to 15 percent Internationale Tourismus Börse (ITB) in Berlin to for larger businesses and reach as high as 60 per cent promote their product to international tour operators. for smaller guesthouses and hotels. Yet such dependency on the marketing decisions of international companies with their own agendas High demand for commercial space as new leaves these larger accommodation providers with opportunities open up limited direct control over business flows. Many One drawback of strong market branding is a of the overseas tour operators and travel agents heightened competition for land and shop space that cancelled flights and tours to both Phuket and Khao demands high rental costs and outlay that can hinder Lak in the first year following the disaster and diverted an individual businesses capacity to recover in the business to alternate destinations (Henderson, 2007a, face of shocks. This was evident in both Patong and PATA, 2005). From a marketing perspective, smaller Phi Phi. The business landscape in Patong and Phi bungalow and resort owners proved more resilient Phi has not changed greatly as a result of the tsunami. than their larger counterparts due to their direct The larger businesses have returned and recovered access to clientele through internet sites and word of from the disaster. Some chose not to return because mouth. This lack of control over tourist flows coupled the negativity of the tsunami event was considered too with the added cost and hassle of remote advertising burdensome to overcome from both a personal and and fulfilling annual allocation agreements with tour business perspective. However, the choice by some operators has caused Phi Phi’s businesses - large and micro and smaller businesses not to rebuild (or, in small - to favour alternate marketing avenues such as some cases, the inability to so) has not detracted greatly personal referrals, websites, and walk-ins. from the recovery of both destinations. High business
32 s t o c k h o l m environment i n s t i t u t e
demand has ensured that there are more business business enterprises. This wealth created a strong and investors waiting in the wings for an investment stable financial base for Patong tourism stakeholders opportunity to arise. The newly vacated land and shop to use when shocks like the tsunami destroy tourism space were filled by new businesses looking to take infrastructure and affect tourism flows. Furthermore, advantage of the opportunity afforded to them and Patong community members were less likely to be cash in on the popularity of the destinations and their servicing new debts due to the more established nature famous brandings. The tsunami event created openings of Patong businesses. Businesses on Phi Phi also for new investors to start their own businesses on Phi benefited from a strong and established financial base Phi, with some landowners reducing rents for a short amassed through tourism ventures on the island and in period of time to attract businesses back and hasten the other parts of Thailand over 20 years, which increased recovery. their capacity to recover following the tsunami disaster despite the immense losses. Phi Phi and Khao Lak Having such a strong destination branding is a double- share a common experience pertaining to the tsunami; edged sword, with both favourable and unfavourable both sustained enormous losses from the tsunami event. consequences for destination vulnerability. The high However, this is where the similarities end. Khao Lak marketability of the two destinations coupled with businesses have struggled to access the finances needed their solid investment reputation has underpinned to rebuild following the tsunami and remain financially their recoveries and makes them, as destinations, more viable. As noted in Section 5.2.1.3, Khao Lak is a new resilient to shocks. Those that are able to access the destination and businesses there, for the most part, lack resources they need to survive the shocks benefit in the financial stability of Patong and Phi Phi. Khao Lak the long term from the strong selling power of the community members were most likely to be servicing destination’s image. This tourist pull factor makes new debts due to surge of development and growth that Patong and Phi Phi good investments despite the was occurring when the tsunami occurred. That said, impact that shocks may have on the destination in there are considerable differences in financial access the short term. However, a look under the perfect capabilities within the three destination communities destination veneer suggests that individual business due to differences in ownership patterns, size, and age owners and their workers remain vulnerable to shocks. of businesses. The downside of such high demand means that those who could not access resources quickly enough were Thai businesses forced to leave their businesses behind to start up Micro and small business enterprises somewhere else. High demand also pushes up rental Micro and small businesses were found to be prices and limits rental options for micro and smaller more vulnerable due to hardships in accessing the businesses. Out of desperation some tenants enter into necessary funds needed to rebuild. Like most business informal and non-binding rental agreements leaving development in Thailand, most tourism investors them vulnerable to immediate eviction or extreme rental in Patong, Phi Phi and Khao Lak started with small hikes. Price rises continued after the tsunami with some ventures sourcing capital from family, savings and landowners raising rents to cover reconstruction costs. profits to expand their businesses over time. However, These individuals are vulnerable, while the destination there are considerable differences between micro recovers without them. and small businesses in each destination. Smaller businesses in Patong are largely well-established Access to financial capital for businesses and had long benefited from strong profits. Yet there Findings from Patong, Phi Phi and Khao Lak was a marked difference in recovery levels between categorically show that access to economic capital those that had established credit histories with banks is one of the most important factors in determining and those that had only used profits to expand. Those people’s coping and recovery capabilities. The uneven Patong businesses with established credit histories access to financial resources was a main driver behind and solid business relationships with lenders were the differential vulnerability levels and recovery rates successful in securing bank loans to finance a swift found at Patong, Phi Phi, and Khao Lak (ILO, 2006). recovery. Those without a credit history could only Patong’s ability to recover so quickly is directly related secure a commercial loan if they had a guarantor, to the well-established and stable nature of Patong’s most did not. The only other option available to small business community. Patong community members businesses was to either borrow money from friends have, for the most part, succeeded in accessing the and family or take out private loans from money financial resources needed to rebuild. Savings and lenders at high interest rates (10 to 20 per cent per credit histories were solid having been built up over day/week/months depending on the negotiated terms) many years from multiple and ever-expanding tourism that prove difficult to pay back.
33 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
Unlike their more established counterparts in Patong, did not utilise banking facilities preferring instead to micro and smaller businesses in Khao Lak did not have keep cash with them, which was washed away when a history of strong profits and savings to spend on a the tsunami struck. Consequent financial limitations recovery; all available capital was invested in the new slowed the recovery of micro and small businesses ventures with little means for recovery. Those with a and left them financially weakened and ill-prepared for credit history and pre-existing loans (24 per cent) were future shocks and emergencies. Much-needed short- left with high repayment commitments but little means term financial support was also provided by NGOs. to repay them. The majority, however, had no credit rating. Failing to secure enough credit, micro and small Medium and large businesses businesses relied upon savings, pre-existing social Medium and larger resorts and support businesses in networks, NGOs and the kindness of donors to secure all three destinations had the most success in accessing financial capital. Many small businesses accessed financial capital to finance a recovery due to strong money from friends and family, with some being able credit ratings, multiple investments and strong profits to gain financial support from social networks abroad, accumulated over space and time. These businesses including from new friendships formed as a result of the were found to be more stable, established and resilient, disaster. This is particularly the case among those with confirming the strong correlation between access and a foreign partner who was able to return home to work entitlements to resources and the developmental stage and earn additional money to support the rebuilding of businesses and destinations. Like their smaller process. Informal sources of capital, such as the pawning counterparts, larger businesses started from smaller personal effects, were used to secure smaller amounts beginnings and grew over time and space, often for day-to-day expenses whilst high interest loans from branching out and opening further tourism ventures. private creditors (commonly 20 per cent accrued on a Loans were commonly used to expand business daily, weekly, or monthly basis) were used to fill longer operations creating strong credit histories. Capital was term credit needs . Some smaller enterprises were able also sourced from other business ventures to finance to secure funds through programs set up by Khao Lak the rebuilding effort, be they tourism-related businesses Group for SMEs. Yet despite all forms of assistance or alternate ventures often belonging to the family and generosity, some sections of the community (both unit. This was most prevalent in Patong and Phi Phi foreign and Thai) are still struggling financially and where substantial savings and investment portfolios taking one day at a time. Comparative observations of were drawn upon to fund business reconstruction. business activity made in January and September 2007 Strong credit histories also helped larger businesses revealed that new businesses that had opened for the secure special governmental soft loan provisions set 2006/2007 high season had already closed, a testament up to assist the swift recovery of tourism businesses. to the village’s heightened vulnerability. However, delays in the finalisation of new government development plans for the redevelopment of Phi Phi Despite being a more established destination, micro stalled rapid recoveries on the island. and small businesses in Phi Phi faced different Foreign businesses challenges in accessing finances needed for rebuilding. First, limited space on Phi Phi has raised living costs on the island leaving less money available for savings Strict ownership laws limit foreign or ‘alien’ ownership and emergencies like the tsunami. Second, many of land and business operations in Thailand. Foreigners smaller enterprises were ineligible for loans. Beliefs are not allowed to own land in Thailand, however, of the dominant Muslim population deter them from business activity is possible if in partnership with a Thai paying interest, ruling out bank loans as a financial partner who holds at least a 51 per cent share (BOI, source. Furthermore, most small businesses rent shop 2006). Accordingly, foreign business ventures involve space and land for their businesses from dominant either a silent or active Thai partner. Part-owned foreign landowners and therefore do not have the land deeds ventures in the Patong, Khao Lak and Phi Phi fall needed to secure loans. That said some did have pre- largely into three categories: (i) those owned in part by existing bank and private loans prior to the tsunami. The Western expatriates; (ii) those owned by South Asians; recovery for these businesses was difficult. Some had and larger 4 and 5 star properties owned by multi- access to small loans based on assets located in other national companies. The Western expatriate business parts of Thailand including the sale of houses, land and owners and workers fall into two categories; those that businesses, but most have rebuilt slowly using limited have married a Thai and started a joint family venture savings, borrowed money from family and friends, and and those that came to Thailand as tourists and chosen growing profits. Native people and sea gypsies were to stay. Businesses owned in part by western expatriates also found to be the most financially vulnerable; they are generally small- to medium-sized businesses and
34 s t o c k h o l m environment i n s t i t u t e
are found in all three destinations. South Asian business later when sufficient funds had been saved. One foreign owners and workers originate mostly from Nepal and guesthouse owner also benefited from life insurance. Myanmar (referred to as Burmese throughout the report to match their self-identities) looking for a better life. Nepalese business owners and Burmese workers South Asians were most prevalent in Patong and to a Nepalese business owners run support businesses such lesser extent Khao Lak, with very few found working as tailors and souvenir shops and have slowly built on Phi Phi. The Nepalese work mostly as tailors and up their businesses from savings, family loans and in souvenir shops whilst the Burmese work largely in profits collected over time. But their financial recovery construction with some Burmese crossing over into proved difficult. Savings and private loans from family tailoring to work with the Nepalese. The larger 4 to 5 members were used where possible to rebuild, whilst star multinational resort chains are a prominent feature some were fortunate to receive financial support from old of the Patong business scene, whilst their presence in customers. Being foreigners, loans were not an option. Khao Lak is growing with a noticeable spurt following These support businesses faced another challenge; like the tsunami as smaller operators either could not or other support businesses, they rely heavily on resorts to chose not to rebuild (comparative field observations attract business to their destinations leaving them with made by author in 2005 and 2007). As noted above, little control over tourist flows. being a foreigner in Thailand does place restrictions on land and business ownership and also limits financing Burmese workers make up a significant part of Patong’s options given that foreigners cannot own land and and Khao Lak’s low-skilled tourism workforce therefore are not in possession of land deeds needed to working as manual labourers, restaurant staff, tailor access credit. That said, financial accessibility varies shop staff, and in menial resort jobs (Chit, 2005). markedly between the small and medium Western The Burmese population are the most disadvantaged expatriate business owners, the large multinationals financially, socially and politically (Robertson, 2007). (found predominantly in Patong) and Nepalese and Thai law requires foreigners to have working permits Burmese business ventures. to work in Thailand but many Burmese have come into Thailand illegally, causing them to be regularly Small businesses owned in part by Western targeted and harassed by the police for financial gain expatriates (Robertson, 2007). Those with valid permits are also Similar to their Thai counterparts, Western small routinely harassed generating a constant circle of bribe businesses were initially financed from savings, family money and corruption (see Section 5.2.6.3 for more loans, and the sale of assets accumulated in their home detail). Furthermore, the precarious legal status of countries, with the profits being used to expand their most Burmese negates their access to banking services businesses over time. Yet savings levels at the time of causing them to hide their money in their houses. The the tsunami did differ between Patong, Phi Phi and Khao tsunami washed substantial amounts of savings away Lak. Given Khao Lak’s early stage of development, this leaving the homeless Burmese with little means of practice limited liquid capital availability in Khao Lak survival (Robertson, 2007). Accordingly, their job needed to finance the recovery. Businesses in Patong and security is low, their financial capital routinely depleted Phi Phi fared somewhat better, particularly in Patong by regular bribe payouts, and their basic rights non- where profit earnings were more established and the existent. These combined factors left them very physical damage was much lower than in Phi Phi and vulnerable to the tsunami and further abuse following Khao Lak. Loans were uncommon with the exception the event. of those businesses run by Thai-foreign couples where the Thai partner held land deeds. Furthermore, banks Medium and large foreign businesses are reluctant to lend to foreigners, many of whom have Foreign owned medium sized businesses (found short-term one-year visa restrictions and no residency, predominantly in Patong) benefited from savings and making it too easy for them to leave without paying the having multiple tourism businesses that helped to fund loans bac. Compounding problems of access to liquid the recovery. Alternate business that were unaffected assets and loans was the timing of the disaster. With were used to secure additional credit needed for the event taking place on 26 December, substantial rebuilding, fund staff and supplement profits from monetary takings earned on Christmas (the busiest the recovered business if profits are temporarily and most lucrative day of the year) were washed away low. Furthermore, expensive equipment such as dive by the water; owners had not had the time to deposit equipment was redistributed among the centres to cover the money in the bank. Those with savings used these the immediate loss and need of the affected business. to rebuild slowly. Those without sufficient financial Larger foreign-owned hotels and resorts did not face capital often returned home to work, returning months such hardships, having the backing of offshore hotel
35 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
chain corporations. The recovery of these businesses to a substantial number of employees working for both was funded by the international companies through smaller and larger businesses. Some hotels paid their the redistribution of funds from their multiple business staff full salaries during the closure periods. concerns to the tsunami affected businesses. Additional financial assistance was made available Access to social security and staff benefits through the Office of Labour’s ‘Social Fund for Tsunami In Thailand, the Social Security Act of 1990 (and Workers’, with 1555 workers out of 1600 receiving updated on 01 January 2004) entitles all full-time Thai Fund contributions. Access to social security benefits employees (with the exception of bars and restaurants) proved most problematic among self-employed workers to social security benefit in the event of unemployment, (particularly masseurs) along with part-time Thai staff injury or sickness, disability, maternity, death, child and foreign staff who are not eligible for insurance welfare, and pensions (B.E. 2533 (1990)). Under the benefits under the Social Security Act. This leaves this Act an employee is entitled to receive 50 per cent of group more financially vulnerable when employment their wages for 180 days in the event of job losses is lost. Few employees had substantial savings to rely and covers basic medical coverage (B.E. 2533 (1990)). upon in the event of job losses and union membership The payment timeframe was extended to six months by is non-existent. Encouragingly, there is some evidence the Royal Thai Government following the tsunami, to to suggest that employee saving levels have increased provide assistance to the thousands that had lost their post-tsunami as a result of heightened awareness of jobs (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2005). Contributions risk and the need for preparedness strategies. to the Social Security Fund are sourced from the government, the employer, and the employee but Levels of insurance coverage and risk the onus of responsibility of staff registration for the perception entitlements lies with the employer (B.E. 2533 (1990)). An examination of insurance coverage in Khao However, evidence from Patong, Phi Phi and Khao Lak Lak, Patong and Phi Phi prior to the tsunami clearly show that the disbursal of social security benefits is not shows a direct correlation between business size and universal despite it being a legal requirement. insurance levels. The majority of the micro and smaller businesses interviewed either had no insurance or were In Khao Lak, employees (excluding extended family underinsured, a common trait that heightened their members working in family businesses) were found vulnerability to the tsunami event (Bell et al., 2005a, to be covered by workers insurance but amounts WTO, 2005). Only 9 per cent of small businesses were minimal necessitating alternative arrangements interviewed in Khao Lak had comprehensive insurance until jobs were restored. Some hotels paid staff full whilst 11per cent only had basic insurance for fire salaries during the closure periods because social and/or water damage as the risk of a tsunami was security payments were considered too low to support unknown. In Phi Phi, only 10 per cent of all businesses a good standard of living. Other employers shared interviewed had insurance. Insurance levels among basic provisions and passed on donated money to their small businesses in Patong were also low, with the staff to guarantee their livelihoods. In the Phi Phi, exception of car rental businesses. The informal sector social security coverage was most prevalent among such as beach vendors and masseurs rarely has access employees working for large-scale businesses, but to or knowledge about formal financial recovery there were instances where coverage was also available mechanisms such as insurance (Handmer and Choong, to those working in smaller establishments. However, 2006). Insurance coverage of business assets and a number of employees had trouble gaining access to property was most prevalent among medium and large benefits as the process was very complicated and overly scale commercial enterprises, most of which had pre- bureaucratic. Some employees requested redundancy existing loans; insurance is a prerequisite for securing over a continuation of their contract, wanting a lump- bank credit. Yet those small and larger businesses with sum payment over a steady flow of income from social comprehensive coverage still faced difficulties and security payments. Other employees were fortunate economic shortfalls. Claim payments proved difficult enough to be paid 50 to 100 per cent of their pre-tsunami to secure and payments often fell short of covering all salaries whilst their employers rebuilt their businesses. costs. The larger hotels and resorts on the island also paid compensation to surviving staff that had lost family The reasons for such low and inadequate levels members and the families of deceased staff members. of insurance coverage are attributable to levels of Staff who were not covered returned to their families surplus income, perceptions of risk and culturally- for support. Field evidence from Patong suggest that loaded social norms. First, perceptions of risk among entitlements to social security benefits were available community members were low; there was no prior
36 s t o c k h o l m environment i n s t i t u t e
history of tsunamis. Second, insurance was seen as most established and lucrative destination in southern an unnecessary and high cost. Third, awareness of the Thailand attracts much of this influx. Competition for benefits of insurance is unknown among micro and well-paid positions in the larger prestigious resorts small-enterprise owners. This is not unusual; taking and hotels is high; the allure of higher wages, better out insurance is not common in Thailand as people do benefits and the career credibility that comes with not see the value in spending additional money on risk working in the more luxurious hotels ensures this. that may never eventuate. Finally, those that rent shop Another benefit for staff is the ongoing training that space find it difficult to obtain insurance for the content is offered to employees in the low season. To ensure of their premises,. an excellent standard of service, many of the hotels invest in their staff by training them during the low After the tsunami, insurance was given more season. This is advantageous for both employers and consideration, leading to a moderate increase in employees. The staff are pleased to have their skills insurance coverage amongst those that had no base increased, which in turn, heightens good service coverage prior to the tsunami (6 in Khao Lak, 7 in and staff loyalty. The types of training offered are Patong, and 9 in Phi Phi). Yet for smaller enterprises, either job-specific (housekeeping, food and beverage the high cost of insurance still outweighs the perceived or front desk) or language-specific. However, this high risk, especially when all their money was used for demand for jobs in the larger and more prestigious rebuilding their businesses. Another reason prohibiting resorts causes staffing problems for smaller businesses greater numbers taking out insurance premiums lies in Patong; they provide staff with training only to have with changed insurance premium conditions; following them leave to work in the larger establishments. But the tsunami insurance providers are more reluctant to the problem of sourcing qualified staff (pre-and post- insure businesses in the tsunami-affected areas and tsunami) is most acute in Khao Lak and Phi Phi. insurance premiums have risen to match to higher perception of risk. There is also some scepticism Shortages of skilled staff are a common problem in Khao regarding insurance companies, which could refuse to Lak and Phi Phi particularly for the accommodation honour comprehensive policies citing the ‘act of god’ and diving sectors. Divers do not feel comfortable or clause. Instead, some are putting money aside regularly safe undertaking dive courses and expeditions with to cover unforeseen damage or shocks. instructors with whom they cannot communicate well. Much of Khao Lak’s tourism workforce is from the Access to human capital: shortages of greater Takuapa District and is semi-skilled, having qualified staff and training little formal tourism or hospitality training with the Greater access to skills and knowledge is imperative exception of a minority that are university educated for enabling individual livelihood pursuits, increasing and hold higher level and management positions. the employability of staff and enabling flexibility when Supplementary labour is sourced from other parts of opportunities arise - hence increasing resilience in the Thailand, Burma and Western Europe. The highly face of shocks and change (DFID, 1999b). A strong seasonal nature of Khao Lak’s tourism business is stock of skilled labour also enhances business and, another factor contributing to shortages of skilled staff in this case, wider destination success. As shown in for small and medium businesses that have to compete the previous section, having good access to finances with larger and less seasonal destinations, such as to enable the physical rebuilding of a business proved Phuket, with staff preferring constant work over paramount. This in turn restores lost jobs. But in the seasonal positions. wake of a disaster of the magnitude of the tsunami, the next challenge became finding qualified staff to run Phi Phi’s shortage of skilled staff is attributed to the newly rebuilt resorts, hotels and businesses and three main factors. First, the isolation from the provide the level of service and experience the tourist mainland coupled with high livings costs and limited had purchased. Access to qualified and well-trained entertainment options on the island deters qualified staff was problematic in Khao Lak and Phi Phi prior to staff who can work on the mainland where rates of pay the tsunami. The disaster only exacerbated this. Patong are higher and living costs cheaper. Accordingly, much is largely immune to staffing issues but the tsunami of Phi Phi’s workforce is sourced locally and is highly changed this somewhat. unskilled, this being the second factor. Third, stringent working visa rules hinder access to skilled foreign The Andaman Coast’s rapid economic development staff, many of whom come to Phi Phi to work in the spurred largely by tourism has attracted large numbers thriving diving sub-sector. To obtain work permits for of migrant workers to the region looking for well- foreigners, a business must be registered and show paying jobs (Scheper and Patel, 2006). Patong as the proof of USD 50,994 per foreigner with a maximum
37 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
of 10 foreigners allowed in one business (BOI, 2006) resources needed to create a skilled and committed This has large ramifications for dive operators needing workforce. to employ skilled dive masters who can instruct in the required language. Access to social capital Access to information and risk perception Poor language skills are a great concern in both Perceptions of risk and preparedness are directly destination communities among the spectrum of related to access to information; lack of awareness of businesses – travel agents, masseurs, long-tail boat coastal hazards and vulnerabilities limit capacity to operators, restaurant staff, guesthouse and resort staff, address hazard risk (US-IOTWS, 2007). As noted in and Thai dive staff. Limited language skills inhibit the previous section, few people in the three destination access to higher paying tourism jobs in resorts, local communities were aware of the risk that a tsunami posed tour operators and dive operators. Smaller and family- to the Andaman Region and information about risk was run businesses also have concerns regarding their lack scarce. Accordingly they were completely ill-prepared of good language skills and the negative impact that for the tsunami event. One reason behind the scarcity language-induced misunderstandings has on accessing of available information on risks to tourism-reliant clients, customer service and repeat business. destination communities relates to the simple weighing up of risk levels against potential negative consequences To rectify the skills shortage and promote staff loyalty, to tourist levels if those unsubstantiated risks were many of Khao Lak’s and Phi Phi’s medium and larger known. Potential risks in destinations are often played hotels – like their counterparts in Patong – provide staff down for marketing purposes because the potentially training in languages and hospitality during the low negative consequences of known risks to destination season. However, staff working in small businesses images and resultant tourist flows is considered too rarely receive formal training and only benefit from great to warrant disclosure and forewarnings (Cassedy, daily on-the-job training. But like their Patong 1991, Drabek, 1992, Drabek, 1995, Murphy and Bayley, counterparts, employers who provide training for their 1989). This proved to be the case in Thailand. In 1998, staff suffer high levels of staff turnover as the newly the director general of the Meteorological Department trained employees leave to work in more prestigious issued a warning to the government pertaining to the hotels or businesses that offer higher salaries and likely threat tsunamis posed to Thailand’s Andaman opportunities for career advancement. Coast (The Nation, 26 July 2005) that subsequently featured in media reports broadcast in Phuket at the Staff shortages became acute in Khao Lak and Phi time. However, these claims were played down by the Phi following the tsunami, with Patong recording less central government as the negative ramifications of the difficulty. The loss of lives and disruptions in working perceived risk upon tourism flows to Phuket and the patterns led to a drastic depletion in skilled tourism surrounding area were considered too costly (ibid.). industry workers (WTO, 2005). People were afraid Limiting access to information on the potential risks to to come back or their families were too scared to let the Andaman Coast destinations robbed the destination them return. Many people in Asia have a deep-seated communities of the choice to better prepare themselves belief in spirits and ghosts. After the tsunami, many for potential risks, curtailing the ability of households staff returned to their home towns, due to trauma and to cope, respond and recover from the event. fears fuelled by after-shocks, while others sought work in alternate destinations like Hua Hin and Koh The importance of knowledge in determining Samui (Henderson, 2007a). Some returned shortly immediate responses, coping capacities, and timely after to help with the clearing of debris and rebuilding recovery is clear when reviewing post-tsunami actions. whilst others waited a few months until this process Those who had knowledge about whom to approach for was completed. A few never returned. The reopening emergency aid and financial capital for rebuilding, and of resorts and increases in room capacity over time who had access to institutional support from industry have not been matched by the availability of skilled representative bodies and avenues for securing basic and qualified staff. Market demand for labour is for human rights, were more successful in securing the 10 000, whilst 9324 continue to be underemployed. resources needed for a speedy recovery. Those who did These shortages prompted a proliferation of NGO not, either missed out on aid and financial provisions, tourism skills programs. Industry collaborations with or arrived too late to benefit. Awareness of information local colleges present another longer-term option. pertaining to financing options, insurance benefits Such proactive measures test the resourcefulness and and industry representative bodies and membership engagement levels of industry representative bodies benefits remains low among micro and some smaller and determine their effectiveness in accessing the Thai businesses.
38 s t o c k h o l m environment i n s t i t u t e
Since the event, three factors have better prepared members are among the early inhabitants on the island. Andaman Coast tourism destinations for coastal hazards Most extended family members either work for the and tsunamis: (a) the installation of the Tsunami Early group directly or have branched off to run their own Warning System; (b) the establishment of the National resorts or support businesses on the island. Whilst Tourism Intelligence Unit and Crisis Management money is important, those with money and local roots Centre; and (c) knowledge about tsunami and coastal wield much influence on the island. These blood hazards gained through personal experience. People and marriage bonds are fortified by wider traditional now know what natural signs to look for pertaining village networks; Thai village members consider each to a future tsunami threat and have an improved other as family members irrespective of bloodlines. understanding of the procedures in accessing help Having such strong social networks to rely on in times when shocks and stressors occur in the future. This of hardship provided much needed stability and hope increases their resilience to future shocks. and enabled people to better cope, respond, and recover from the disaster. Access to social networks The resilience of a household or community is The concentration of influence and money in the hands heightened through access to strong social support of the dominant families also benefits the community networks; at the community level, the level of as a whole, a characteristic that was clearly evident cohesion, equity, and the effectiveness of social following the disaster. First, the dominating families networks in facilitating access to resources is crucial cooperate with each other resulting in a stabilised for recovery (Jäger et al., 2007, Miller et al., 2005). environment; there is little tangible tension on the Such networks become particularly pertinent in a island. Second, it promotes a cohesive business post-disaster setting where good relationships with environment and support structure for tenants. Some one’s family, neighbours, and friends, can strongly landowners on the island offer long-term leases of 15 encourage people in spite of their losses (Ito et al., years to promote business stability and help facilitate 2005: 27). Access to finances, governance and power continuity of the type of businesses and thereby tourism structures in Thailand are intertwined due to the close product that is found on the island. These ties served relationship between family and historically-embedded the community well following the tsunami, promoting community leadership structures (Irwin, 1996). This support and cooperation among businesses and workers cultural norm explains the vital role family and social and providing funds to rebuild quickly. One landowner networks played in the post-tsunami recovery of the took responsibility for repairing the structural damage three Andaman Coast destinations. that was incurred and had the capital available to do this. Such a response was not only helpful to the many Family structures form the backbone of Thai society tenants but was undertaken for business purposes; and these ties and support structures have provided the landowner recognised that the sooner Phi Phi support for tourism community members in all three recovered physically, the sooner tourist flows and destinations throughout the rebuilding process. Types of profits would be restored for themselves and tennants. support include financial backing for business ventures Third, this concentration of power and ownership can and the recovery, childminding by grandparents so also encourage community mobilisation, demonstrated that parents can work for the betterment of the whole by the Phi Phi community’s united rejection of post- family unit, plus psychological support and strength tsunami planning proposals drawn up by the Designated needed to overcome trauma and rebuild. The family Areas of Sustainable Tourism Administration (DASTA), unit also serves as the basis for the development and an arm of the central government designated to tourism growth of business opportunities, with various family planning. members contributing to the success of ventures owned and run by the family. This family-oriented business There are, however, pitfalls to such close family model dominates tourism businesses in Khao Lak and networks. First, as in Phi Phi’s case, these dominant is most extreme on Phi Phi Don where isolation from networks may stifle positive change and progress if the mainland has further cemented close family and measures are perceived to hinder dominant agendas, village ties. business interests and profit margins. Second, those that lack family support networks are left with There are four to five main families who own and few social support alternatives and can become run much of Phi Phi Don. The ownership of land and marginalised within the community. Thais do not buildings is demarcated in some cases by the style and naturally rely on outside support structures, be they colours of buildings as well as by names. Family ties community, government or NGOs. A strong tradition are the strongest within the Chao Koh Group whose of social inclusion and exclusion based around family
39 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
units leaves those without strong family ties in the release can cost as much as THB 30,000 to 50,000 area with few support options and highly vulnerable (USD 765-1,275). to unforeseen shocks. Third, such links can also foster nepotism and the misappropriation of funds to family The migrants’ lack of personal security was exacerbated and friends over intended recipients. That said, the by restrictions imposed by employers. The illegal shared disaster experience has strengthened community withholding of migrant documentation by employers relationships in Khao Lak in particular. Camaraderie stopped workers from leaving their employers and and community cohesiveness has increased amongst left them vulnerable to arrest and extortion, and select factions (foreign expatriates, smaller businesses salaries were withheld or paid only in part (Robertson, and dive operators), but the financial strain of rebuilding 2007, TAG, 2005). A climate of impunity further has isolated others. Patong, however, still lacks strong legitimises the abuse of migrant workers in Phang community bonds. High in-migration into Patong Nga and Phuket facilitated through a intricate system for business opportunities has created a fragmented of corruption (Robertson, 2007). Their marginalised community solely focussed on profits and business positions prevent them from reporting employer and growth. Cooperative working relationships between law enforcement abuses (Oberoi, 2005) begging the beach attendants and workers (massseuses, vendors, question, ‘To whom?’ Migrants are banned by law and umbrella rental attendants) are the exception to (Labour Relations Act 1975, Section 101) from forming this, since they interact daily and must work together their own unions but registered workers are entitled to in order to ensure a positive beach experience for their join Thai unions (TAG, 2005). There were no NGO clients. organisations to turn to and they have no knowledge about or access to local tourism representative groups. Social marginalisation of minority groups and Their only other option is to leave their employer with workers the possibility of their employment documentation Conflict and resultant migration can heighten being kept instead of transferred to the new employer, vulnerability in receiving populations when migrants leaving them undocumented, without healthcare (legal or illegal) create new competition for resources, access, and vulnerable to arrest (Robertson, 2007, or upset tenuous cultural, economic or political TAG, 2005). This institutionalised and widespread balances (Jäger et al., 2007). Many low-skilled discrimination increased in the wake of the tsunami and semi-skilled jobs in Khao Lak and Patong are with innocent Burmese being labelled as thieves whilst undertaken by minority workers from India, Nepal Thais looted. Many of them lost their working visas and Myanmar. Main areas of employment include and jobs as a result of the tsunami and went into hiding gardening and maintenance in resorts, cooking and in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami for fear of cleaning in restaurants, and construction work (Chit, being arrested or deported (ALTSEAN Burma, 2005, 2005). Higher pay rates in Thailand enable Burmese IOM, 2007). workers to financially support their families at home (Robertson, 2007). However, their working and daily Having no secure rights inhibited their access to living conditions are difficult and subject to widespread humanitarian aid, financial support and local social discrimination, abuse and extortion making them very networks. The only support outlets available to vulnerable to shocks like the tsunami. Burmese migrants are relatives and compatriots from their village or communities that are in Thailand. These All foreign workers, including Burmese, are required to networks aid in: (i) the initial travel across the border; register with the Thai Ministry of Interior, but the large (ii) finding work with sympathetic employers and majority are undocumented (IOM, 2007). Burmese securing better paid jobs; and (iii) steering migrants workers are issued with temporary one-year residency to supportive Thai-based community networks and ID cards (Tor/Ror 38/1) which allow them to stay in informal structure of assistance when the need arises Thailand and to apply for work permits that cost USD (Robertson, 2007). These networks became a critical 100 (TAG, 2005). Those with work permits are entitled source of assistance following the tsunami. to health insurance, medical assistance and protection under Thai Labour Laws (TAG, 2005). Yet possession of Tourism representative groups and business legal documents does not preclude routine exploitation. associations Both documented and undocumented migrants are According to the Assistant Director of the TAT southern subjected to paying monthly ‘security fees’ or bribes branch (Phuket), “Strong leadership and governance to police and government officials (averaging THB are the keys to a quick recovery.” This proved 1500-2000 or USD 38-51) to avoid arrest (Rice, 2005, resoundingly true when comparing the differences in Robertson, 2007, TAG, 2005). If arrested, securing strengths, power and response capabilities between
40 s t o c k h o l m environment i n s t i t u t e
the tourism representative bodies in Patong, Khao Lak • participation in TAT international marketing drives and Phi Phi. The powerful and well-connected tourism and destination fieldtrips designed to restore tourist representative bodies of Patong and their strategically confidence; scaled actions to the tsunami formed the backbone of the destination’s quick recovery and heightened their • provision of technical building advice and legal resilience to shocks. Khao Lak’s tourism associations support to businesses; and were swift in their response to the disaster but their efforts waned over time as individual attentions turned • employment assistance for those who had lost to the recovery of their own businesses. Phi Phi has the their jobs and help in securing social security largest number of representative organisations but their payments. effectiveness is greatly curtailed by a lack of belief in their effectiveness and limited support. The Centre also supplied much-needed financial support to smaller businesses through two means. First, they Patong: The main power base and driving force raised THB 3 million (USD 76,492) from members behind the private sector is the Phuket Tourism to financially support the recovery of micro and small Association (PTA), which has played a pivotal role in businesses including those that had lost business the development, growth and success of Patong as an despite escaping property damage. Second, the Centre international tourist destination. The PTA has over 300 provided information on special loan options from the members that span the full range of businesses found in government and commercial banks and acted as a loan Patong including transportation, restaurants, souvenir guarantor for micro and small businesses with no credit shops, hotels and ticketing. Many of these members are ratings or collateral. The PTA also encouraged micro local politicians and successful large investors who are and small businesses to form a sub-association that was well-connected to local, provincial and national scales overseen by PTA. This group, with support from PTA, of power. They hold one or two seats in the Provincial successfully petitioned the government to offer special government and they have direct links to the Ministry loans through the Thai Government Bank. of Sports and Tourism. The President of the PTA sits on the National Tourism Council, a private sector lobby The Phuket Professional Guide Association (PPGA) group that influences tourism policy and planning at the also played an active role in the recovery process. The national level. Such levels of political connectedness are Association organised language training programs harnessed through the PTA, enabling them to effectively in conjunction with Provincial Governor, PAO and lobby the government as one unified and powerful the Ministry of Sport and Tourism. This training was force in championing the collective needs of Patong’s offered to both PPGA members and non-members who private tourism sector. That said, the membership is wanted to improve their skills. biased towards well-staffed small businesses, medium and large businesses; the needs of smaller businesses Khao Lak: Khao Lak also has two tourism representative differ from those of their larger counterparts and they bodies with very different histories, aims and capacities: are too busy running their businesses to spare time to the Phang Nga Tourism Association (PNTA) and newly attend meetings. formed Khao Lak SME Group. Both organisations were instrumental in petitioning for more funding to The PTA’s power and connections were instrumental in hasten the rebuilding process, influencing development facilitating and spearheading Patong’s swift recovery plans, and accessing core markets in efforts to restore after the tsunami. The PTA established the Phuket confidence and business. Small Business Recovery Centre on 4 January 2005, financed by select members. The Centre became a The PNTA has played a dominant role in shaping central resource for the affected communities by linking Khao Lak’s character throughout the destination’s up with the relevant government departments in Phuket developmental history. The Association has and funding bodies. The main activities undertaken by approximately 55 members, half the pre-tsunami the Centre included: membership level. Membership to the PNTA is open to all tourism stakeholders but is dominated by medium • accurate reporting of impacts to help manage the and larger accommodation providers for similar negative and inaccurate publicity of the disaster reasons that limit small business membership to the event; PTA in Patong: mismatch of needs, time constraints, plus a limited awareness of PNTA, particularly among micro businesses. Low group membership among some industry sub-groups not only heightens
41 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
their vulnerability but also hinders community of business sponsorships, whereby foreign donors cohesiveness and lessens the community’s capacity supplied financial capital to smaller hotels and to petition for change and action, a point that has resorts for rebuilding in exchange for annual time- gained much credence since the tsunami. The PNTA share options at the resort (taken as payment in has worked hard to develop a strong professional kind) until the debt was repaid. Immediate post- relationship with Phang Nga’s Provincial Governor tsunami marketing support was secured through to ensure that the needs and developmental concerns the use of accommodation websites. The Group of the Khao Lak tourism community are voiced and used accommodation websites to reach their target considered by government. General cooperation markets in order to (i) update the travelling public and support is also sought from other regional and on the progress of the recovery and (ii) advertise national industry associations (particularly Phuket room availability in smaller guesthouses, bungalows and Krabi) and government bodies when needed. and resorts. But the Group’s effectiveness and longevity were hampered by two factors. First, The PNTA’s access to multi-scaled governmental and individual credit problems caused active interest to industry networks proved instrumental in accessing wane once the immediate financial and marketing the financial and political capital needed to advance needs had been addressed. Second, participants left Khao Lak’s post-tsunami recovery. Weekly meetings due to misunderstandings about aid distribution and with the Phang Nga Provincial Governor were used disagreements about how Group resources should to air grievances over financing and building delays. be used. The loose network still exists as does SME The Association also used its close connections with interest in collective group action but actions and the local parliamentary member (a former president active participation are limited. of the PNTA) to petition for additional financial resources and influence post-tsunami planning Phi Phi Don: Phi Phi Don’s destination community strategies for Khao Lak at the national level. PNTA members are represented by five informal members revived consumer interest and confidence representative groups: Phi Phi Tourism Club, Krabi through direct links with long-established European Tourist Association, Phi Phi Marine Resource market partnerships and showcased Khao Lak on the Conservation Club, and the Long-tail Boat Group. international stage through relentless participation However, the effectiveness of these associations in marketing road-shows and joint industry-media and groups is hindered by low membership familiarisation trips throughout 2005. Yet the PNTA- numbers, budgetary constraints, inertia, a lack of led recovery actions slowed over time as members localised leadership, and conflicting interests. The turned their attention to the recovery of their own consequential lack of solid representation left the businesses, which has lessened their ability to community without a collective voice to petition harness ongoing support from government and the government for resources and support after the industry bodies. tsunami.
The Khao Lak Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) Phi Phi Tourism Club (PPTC): The PPTC was Group was set up in direct response to the tsunami, established in 1993 but its effectiveness as a giving small businesses a much needed voice when representative body is continuously hampered by five the need was greatest. Members included any factors including: limited community participation SME in need ranging from medium-sized resorts (having only 12 members) and lack of faith in its to small family beachside restaurants. The Group ability to bring about change; a preoccupation was successful in attracting political attention and with profits over collective long-term goals for the immediate financial and marketing support for smaller island’s development; limited member interest in enterprises that were floundering in the tsunami’s taking on leadership roles and responsibilities; and a wake. The group actively sought political forums reluctance to counter dominant family interests and to voice their concerns regarding the formulation agendas. However, the lack of government support of the new building regulations. A Memorandum for Phi Phi’s post-tsunami recovery has revived was presented directly to Prime Minister Thaksin widespread interest in community action and group Shinawatra in February 2005 outlining SME concerns membership. regarding the rebuilding process. Financial donations were sourced directly from volunteers and indirectly Krabi Tourism Association (KTA): The KTA’s from key markets through websites and distributed main aim is to support and promote all tourism equally among members where possible. Additional businesses in Krabi. In reality however, the KTA’s capital was also sourced through the establishment interests centre around the needs of Krabi mainland
42 s t o c k h o l m environment i n s t i t u t e
destinations such as Ao-Nang and Ko Lanta that by local elites further exacerbate policy and planning are in competition with Phi Phi Don for tourist success leaving the communities frustrated and business. disillusioned with the sincerity and effectiveness of governance structures. Phi Phi Marine Resource Conservation Club: Established in 1999, the Clue comprises of two sub- Planning strategies and enforcement challenges groups: the Long-Tailed Boat Operators Group and Prior to the tsunami, both Khao Lak and Patong had Speedboat Cooperative. The Club concentrates on the 3-year tourism development plans to guide tourism promotion of natural resource conservation practices development in a way that was consistent with wider on the island. Actions include: the establishment of district and provincial development strategies. Planning mooring points for boats and regulations on mooring regulations in Khao Lak stipulated a 30-metre setback practices on the coral reefs, the organisation of regular line for beach development and regulated building beach and reef clean-up drives, and the promotion of density and height whilst Patong’s development mandatory boast insurance to cover tourists. However, plan outlined broader interconnected strategies the Club’s efforts are curtailed by a lack of funds, on education, economy and tourism, livelihood local ignorance about environment conservation, and improvement, infrastructure development, information limited governmental support. technology, natural resources and environment, and urban management. The designation of Phuket, Krabi Long-Tailed Boat Group: A sub-group under the Phi and Phang Nga Provinces as Environmental Protected Phi Marine Resource Conservation Club, this group Areas (EPA) in 2003 resulted in further development consists of former local fishermen that use their guidelines for Khao Lak, Patong and Phi Phi including: boats to provide taxi and sightseeing services around compulsory Initial Environmental Examinations (IEE) the twin Phi Phi islands. Membership for Phi Phi for hotels with 10 to 79 rooms and Environmental long-tailed boat operators is mandatory. Collective Impact Assessments (EIA) for hotels with 80 rooms regulations are set to deter price-based competition or more, and coastal development setback and density between members but these are often ignored, causing restrictions in areas that exceed 40 metres above sea friction and weakening the Group’s effectiveness as a level (ADB, 2006a, ASA, 2009b). However, these representative body. regulations were loosely enforced in both destinations leading to ad hoc tourism development, planning and Another very tight and supportive sub-group on the building code violations, environmental degradation island is the dive community. The dive shops on Phi and the community’s mistrust in local governance Phi Don Island work together to create a supportive processes and capabilities. Phi Phi’s planning history business and working environment on the island. is somewhat different to that of Khao Lak and Patong Mutually beneficial measures include the establishment but the outcome is similar – poor planning and ad hoc of product price agreements to avoid price wars. This development. Few development plans have been drawn camaraderie proved instrumental in aiding the post- up or implemented for Phi Phi Don throughout its tsunami recovery of Phi Phi’s dive shops. Those dive developmental history. Phi Phi Don was declared part shops that had lost expensive dive equipment rented of the Hat Nopparatthara-Mu Phi Phi National Park in equipment from others, enabling them to continue 1983 which forbade development on the island with to their tours and training and earn enough money to the exception of pre-existing settlements that existed in replace lost equipment. the park’s periphery. Existing settlements were subject to two-metre height restrictions 30-metre setbacks Pre-existing weaknesses in governance from the highest water tide, and accommodation structures and processes establishments were forbidden. Yet few development The vulnerability of local populations is intensified or building standards were enforced for existing by poor governance and a lack of capacity (Jäger et settlements, enabling grassroots development processes al., 2007). Weaknesses in governance structures and that led to the building of substandard structures with processes are a major contributor to the vulnerability inadequate waste management systems that were easily of Khao Lak, Phi Phi and to a lesser extent Patong, destroyed. and limit their capacity to respond and adapt to shocks and stressors. Despite the existence of well-developed Despite differences in developmental and planning tourism plans, implementation and enforcement is histories, the reasons behind these planning failings problematic due to a lack of capacity and expertise, are comparable across the three destinations. First, a budgetary constraints, and limited political engagement lack of coordination among government departments at the local levels. Corruption and an abuse of power and overlapping departmental jurisdictions over the
43 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
coastal zone produce unclear and conflicting coastal services where the Ao Nang TAO members reside. This development policies and hinder clear avenues lack of interest and the resultant disconnect between the for regulation implementation and enforcement community and their government representatives has (Phayakvichien, 2005). Second, district and sub-district left the islanders with few political avenues for voicing governmental bodies lack the capacity, expertise, real concerns and resolving issues causing much anger and power and motivation needed to effectively implement frustration among residents. Furthermore, trust in the and enforce plans: there are no real ramifications TAO’s ability to bring about positive change has been for development violations and there are limited eroded by ineffectual meetings and unfulfilled promises government staff available to monitor infringements that have dissuaded further community participation. (ASIST-AP, 2004, Phayakvichien, 2005, Gilchriest The appointment of a resident district officer to Phi Phi et al., 2007a). From a financial perspective, tourism in February 2007 was designed to address these needs. projects in Khao Lak and Phi Phi are given a low Corruption in the government only exacerbates these priority by sub-district TAO administrators because weaknesses and heightens the community’s mistrust they require a high proportion of the TAO budget. The and apathy in existing power structures. Monetary Ao Nang TAO that oversees Phi Phi’s administration bribes and political connections have influenced land attribute their lack of spending and engagement on acquisition and development approval decisions on the Phi Phi to the island’s isolation: the cost of supplying island. the island with these basic services is far greater than providing similar services on the mainland. Khao Lak TAO authorities do not have the excuse Accordingly, local actions favour the mainland of distance to justify their lack of interest in tourism where more can be provided for less capital. Third, development and resultant weaknesses in tourism policy the constant rotation of governmental staff creates and planning implementation. The local authorities planning and enforcement inconsistencies and negates consider the provision of basic infrastructure (road the acquiring of knowledge and appropriate skills systems and pavements, water and waste management, and expertise needed to effectively oversee tourism electricity supply, transportation) as their main role plans. Therefore, whilst the decentralisation of tourism and strength and therefore distance themselves from governance structures in 2003 signalled a positive step tourism concerns. Community members attest to being towards local empowerment, it lacks logistical support repeatedly ignored by local authorities when help and at the provincial, district and sub-district levels, assistance were sought, thereby denying them a voice, causing weakened governmental bodies that cannot support and true representation. Frustrated by a history fulfil their roles (Phayakvichien, 2005). Fourth, TAO of limited government engagement, response and administrators in Khao Lak and Phi Phi show little accessibility, community members have lost faith and interest in tourism-related planning whilst the lack of trust in local government and are increasingly reluctant community participation in planning strategies is a to seek governmental assistance. These weaknesses concern in all three destinations. Consultations between are compounded by non-transparent governance the TAO authorities and the community on tourism processes and corruption. Mirroring the experiences planning and development issues are irregular despite of Phi Phi, those with money and local connections the fact that: (i) community-government participation to power networks are able to secure development is a key component of the TAO directive (ASIST-AP, approvals that contravene planning regulations. The 2004, Gilchriest et al., 2007a); and (ii) the private power of the local elite is deeply embedded in the sector possess the skill base needed by local authorities social structure and local community members will to formulate robust tourism strategies. The lack of not challenge discrepancies due to fear of reprisal government engagement is most poignant on Phi Phi, and marginalisation. Local corruption practices have which up until 2007 lacked a resident governmental been reported to the Provincial Government and local representative. The problem of lack of interest from Parliamentary Representatives but to no avail. The government and limited engagement is embedded continuance of such practices has created mistrust within a larger issue related to access to avenues of and apathy among the community with regard to the power and vested interests of the ruling elite. government’s intentions, their agenda and their capacity to represent the best interests of the whole community Access to avenues of power, vested interests, and instead of particular factions. corruption Phi Phi’s governance problems are attributable in part These governance issues in both destinations have to its geographical isolation and budgetary constraints. caused an ever-growing divide between the destination But the TAO’s inactivity is also thought to be an communities and local government bodies, which are outcome of vested interests in maintaining mainland deemed inaccessible and self-serving. The uneven
44 s t o c k h o l m environment i n s t i t u t e
distribution of aid and limited governmental assistance private sector is the main driver behind tourism for tourism businesses in the aftermath of the tsunami advancements in Phuket. has worsened relations further. The Deputy Chief of Muang District and newly appointed resident officer on Access to physical capital and environmental Phi Phi reasons that Phi Phi’s failure to secure support sensitivities pre- and post-tsunami was the direct result of their Enduring governmental weaknesses have also led to the limited access to avenues of power at the provincial and provision of inadequate infrastructure, illegal usage of national level. This proves a direct correlation between natural resources, and environmental degradation, all access to scaled avenues of power and vulnerability. of which hamper sustainable tourism growth (Santana, Patong has these contacts and benefited from a strong 2003) and limit access to physical capital that becomes recovery; Phi Phi and Khao Lak do not. The further inherently important to recovery capabilities in times deterioration of governance networks in Khao Lak and of stress. This is most prevalent in Phi Phi and Patong. Phi Phi lessens the communities’ collective capacities to cope and respond effectively to future shocks and Infrastructure limitations, resource hence heightens its vulnerability. In the absence of mismanagement, and environmental degradation sustained governmental support, the private sector in The natural environment of Phi Phi was heavily both Khao Lak and Phi Phi shape and advance tourism degraded by man long before the tsunami devastated the development in the respective destinations. This is island. Phi Phi has long been plagued by substandard personified in Phi Phi with most of the power, money sanitation conditions and pollution brought about and influence residing in the hands of the dominant by poor waste management. With no central sewage families. The strong hold of these four families and system on the island, most businesses and residential their money has created a strong community but dwelling used inadequate and crude septic systems the dominant families recognise that governmental that led to pollution of Phi Phi’s surrounding marine assistance is needed to sustainably operate in the longer environment: the limited capacity of popular poppy- term. ring septic systems saturated the island’s water table with the untreated overflow running directly into the Vested interests of the ruling elite are also sea. The larger resorts have installed appropriate waste negatively affecting tourism development planning water tanks. This waste water treatment method has and implementation processes in Patong but the persisted after the tsunami, raising real community circumstances are very different. In contrast to Phi concerns about potential negative effects the resultant Phi and Khao Lak, government authorities like the pollution environmental degradation will have on Provincial Administrative Office (PAO) are trying future tourist flows. Growing pollution problems are hard to work with the private sector to design and exacerbated further by the absence of a central garbage effectively implement tourism strategies but their disposal system on the island. The removal of waste success is hampered by resistance from the private from the island by boat is considered too costly for sector who have money, influence and the backing of some businesses and residents prompting the regular the Phuket Provincial Governor. The private sector does dumping of solid waste on vacant land plots or on not want heavy government involvement in tourism sensitive ecosystems such as mangroves. If past waste development believing that the government should only management mistakes are not addressed there is a have a supporting role, expressed in their view that, high possibility that Phi Phi’s pollution problems will “Business-related practices should remain private.” damage its supporting ecosystem to such an extent that The community holds little respect for the Municipality will threaten not only the success of the island’s main of Patong and believes that the government does not livelihood (tourism) but also long-term habitation. understand the needs of tourists, and policy processes are considered too slow to make an impact. Respect The lack of basic infrastructure is also affecting the for governance processes is further eroded by a lack of quality of life and living costs on Phi Phi. Despite a transparency in decision making: election aspirations decade of community petitioning, a sustained lack of of public office holders (including the Patong Mayor) involvement and investment by mainland-based local lead to biased and plan-violating developmental authorities has left the community with no central decisions that favour supporting factions. Having little electricity, water or waste management services. Again faith in local structures, community members bypass local authorities reason that the costs of providing these the local levels of government, preferring to approach services to a remote and small community are too high the Provincial Governor or central government to justify initial expenditure and ongoing maintenance representatives directly when petitioning for resources despite the receipt of high taxes from Phi Phi businesses or desired changes and actions. Consequently, the and landowners. Electricity is sourced from private
45 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
generators that are prone to breakdowns causing level. If nothing is done to curb the mismanagement of regular electricity outages, whilst water is privately natural resources and waste, environmental degradation sourced from the mainland and delivered by boat. The may become an emerging sensitivity for Khao Lak. only pier on Phi Phi and connecting laneways are also Khao Lak also has other pressing infrastructural needs. too small and narrow for the simultaneous transfer of Despite the TAO’s preferred focus on the provision of supplies and tourist traffic, let alone cater for emergency infrastructure, some parts of Khao Lak still lack some evacuations. The subsequent high costs of water and basic infrastructure such as street lighting, pavements, electricity increases the price of accommodation and and adequate drainage (Gilchriest et al., 2007c). Whilst goods on the island, which deters longer tourist stays taxes and prices for electricity and water are high, the and is out-pricing Phi Phi’s traditional core backpacker poor quality of the infrastructural services is causing market. much community frustration.
Patong was also highly polluted prior to the tsunami Development demand and illegal encroachment on due largely to the mismanagement of waste water. public lands Patong does have a waste water treatment facility but its Increased development pressure in the established capacity is limited. Accordingly, only half of Patong’s destinations of Patong and Phi Phi is also placing wastewater is treated before being discharged directly greater strain on public lands and sensitive ecological into Pak Bang Canal (located at the southern end of areas resulting in illegal encroachment and a loss of Patong Beach) and then Patong Bay (Phuket Gazette, those alternative livelihoods that depend on these 2005). The routine discharge of untreated human waste resources. into the canal resulted in bacterial contamination and high levels of ammonia (Department of Marine and Sustained development pressure in Patong has Coastal Resources, 2005, Phuket Gazette, 2005). resulted in the government-supported sale of sensitive Water quality improved following the tsunami; levels ecological public resources to private investors. The of harmful bacteria in Patong Bay fell from over 1,000 Pak Bang Canal and the adjacent mangrove forest - the pre-tsunami to two in January 2005 (Phuket Gazette, last mangrove forest in Patong - is one of these areas 2005). However, high nutrient levels returned causing that have subsequently been converted into lucrative frequent algal bloom events in 2007 (three recorded palm tree plantations. Parts of the remaining public in 2007 alone) (Phuket Marine Biological Centre, mangrove forest have been built upon illegally whilst 2007). Patong’s water pollution also threatens tourism pollution and untreated waste water from Patong has activities as tourist complaints about the sea water depleted water quality and destroyed natural marine quality increase. The degradation of Phuket’s 16.63 nurseries that once flourished in the mangroves hectares of coral reef is another concern. A great number (Department of Marine and Coastal Resources, 2005). of boat trips and diving around the coral reef areas has The small fishing community that settled the area damaged the coral reef in Patong Bay. Eutrophication 40 years ago are facing immense pressure from the caused by wastewater pollution found in Patong Bay Patong Municipal Government and large investors to also damages the coral; excessive algal growth, oxygen abandon their land and boat piers to relocate further level reductions, and increases in turbidity over time north. The impacts of the privatisation of the canal reduce coral growth and lead to the decline of species and surrounding land and increased illegal land (Tomascik and Sander, 1987). encroachment into the forest are proving ecologically and socially detrimental. Once a natural buffer to storm Khao Lak does not have pressing environmental surges, the removal of sections of the mangrove forest concerns; prior to the tsunami there was not enough has left the canal unprotected from annual monsoonal development to place significant pressure on the natural storms. From a social perspective, the livelihoods of the environment. However, the community is worried that existing fishing community are being threatened due to the unmonitored rebuilding of post-tsunami development an inaccessibility to piers and docks needed to moor and future growth may place unsustainable pressure on their boats particularly during the monsoon season. fragile coastal ecosystems. There are rising concerns Inaccessibility to public lands is also a concern along about the poor management of solid and wastewater the beachfront where sections of the public beach have disposal systems and the detrimental impact subsequent been illegally claimed by 55 ‘beach owners’ known as environmental degradation may have on tourism flows “Nai-Hua”. Small beach vendors, massage workers and livelihoods. Not all businesses have adequate and beach chair rental businesses give as much as 30 wastewater facilities and there is little monitoring or to 50 per cent of their earnings to the beach owners for support from local authorities despite multiple attempts the use of public resources. to have this resolved at the sub-district and district
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Phi Phi Don has a long history of land ownership However, the success of many of the government disputes and encroachment on public lands. As noted initiatives was compromised across all three destinations in the section on planning strategies and enforcement attributable largely to funding shortages, government challenges, the inclusion of Phi Phi Don as part of the preferences, and the persistence of pre-existing Hat Nopparatthara-Mu Phi Phi National Park in 1983 weaknesses in governance structures and processes. forbade development on the island with the exception Emergency aid relief did not reach all eligible recipients; of pre-existing settlements that existed in the park’s funding was insufficient and available funds were periphery. Land deeds for pre-settled land were not often misappropriated due to corruption and nepotism systematically issued leading to some contention over operating at the local level. The effectiveness of post- land rights particularly for those investors that bought tsunami business loan schemes for smaller businesses pre-settled land from original settlers before land deeds was limited by complex credit application processes were issued. Some 2,000 rai of land (320 hectares) (particularly for foreign business operators) whilst the remain in dispute with land titles being the issue; in beliefs of Phi Phi’s predominantly Muslim population 2007 four cases of illegal encroachment on National nullified this option. Yet the success in securing credit Park lands were being processed by governmental to rebuild did not necessarily eliminate the financial authorities. Conflicts over access to land are heightened vulnerability of all businesses. Those businesses with further by the ever-increasing demand for land to existing loans such as many of the new enterprises expand high-yielding tourism development; the main in Khao Lak were left with higher debt levels and an beneficiaries are often the local elites. Thailand’s increased sensitivity to increased business competition, national parks are under the control of the Royal Forest economic downturns and future shocks. Marketing Department but regulation enforcement is difficult support favoured Patong at the expense of Khao given the absence of a forest monitoring station on the Lak and Phi Phi that were long classified as disaster remote island. zones whilst unaddressed pre-existing weaknesses in governance structures and processes undermined the implementation of new planning and development 5.3 Responses and system adaptation strategies and limited the functionality of the Early Warning System in all three destinations. Finally, the The tsunami prompted the strong mobilisation rights of and support for Burmese minority workers of destination community action channelled remains low despite improvements. through family and social networks and industry representative organisations. This was accompanied Humanitarian support in the immediate aftermath by the decisive actions of the Royal Thai Government and short-term was substantial in Patong, Phi Phi and (RTG). Short-term emergency aid and financial Khao Lak but longer-term initiatives favoured Phi Phi assistance was followed by medium and longer- and Khao Lak due in part to Patong’s quick recovery. term adjustments and adaptation responses that fell Phi Phi received extensive assistance from NGOs, under two overarching initiatives: the Andaman community-based organisations (CBOs) and other Tourism Recovery Plan (ATRP) and the Andaman groups that ranged from fulfilling immediate needs Sub-Regional Development Plan (SRDP). Key to the reconstruction of housing, financial support, strategies included: national marketing initiatives training and education, infrastructure improvements, to attract tourists back, the provision of credit to and environmental rehabilitation. Khao Lak also facilitate tourism business recovery, the redrafting of received support but initial NGO and CBO responses coastal tourism development plans, the development were marred by conditional assistance offered by of Thailand’s Tsunami Early Warning System, the some religious organisations whilst preferences for establishment of a National Tourism Intelligence supporting ‘traditional villages and livelihoods’ in the Unit and Crisis Management Centre, and multiple greater Takuapa district left the tourism community endeavours to promote good governance. These frustrated, angry, and disillusioned. However, longer- strategies were supplemented by industry-led actions term initiatives did much to address credit and skills and NGO activity that ranged from immediate shortages. emergency support and redressing infringements of human rights for migrant workers to financial Short-term impact and coping responses and marketing assistance, skills and leadership Emergency responses training, environmental rehabilitation, and disaster The RTG led and executed a well-planned post-disaster preparedness. NGO and Community-based emergency response and short-term strategy (Scheper Organisation (CBOs) support was greatest in Phi Phi and Patel, 2006, UN, 2005). The government set up the Don and Khao Lak where damage levels were high. National Tsunami Disaster Relief Committee to respond
47 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
to the needs of the survivors and a USD 76.5-million the delivery and distribution of public donations, fund was set up for tsunami recovery programmes materials, personnel and volunteers throughout the (OPM, 2007). Nine sub-committees were appointed emergency relief operations (UN, 2005). These efforts to coordinate the emergency response and recovery were supplemented by generous contributions from programs to address the following needs: immediate the Thai public who donated blood, clothing, bottled assistance for Thai and foreign survivors, financial water and cooked meals to sustain the volunteers aid for affected businesses and fishermen, assistance and crisis centre staff (ADPC, 2005). Newly formed for the newly unemployed, provision of housing volunteer groups and community-based organisations and restoration of public facilities, and support for (CBOs) also played a key role in meeting immediate affected children (TAT, 2007b). Immediate emergency community needs, particularly on Phi Phi. The Phi measures included: a massive forensic operation; basic Phi Maphrao Resort, Phi Phi Reléve-Toi, and Help provisions for food, water, and medical attention; the International Phi Phi (Hi Phi Phi) assisted with the construction of temporary and permanent housing, land-based clean-up, collected and distributed basic and the repatriation of foreign tourists (UN, 2005). supplies, and restoration activities including basic The Thai military forces played a key role in the initial repairs and tree planting (Marshall, 2005). The latter search and rescue efforts and assisted in the building of two organisations paid Phi Phi locals a daily wage, a temporary and permanent housing in affected areas. The practice that created instant employment for community forensics operation was a collaborative effort involving members that needed both an income and a sense of the Thai and Australian Police, the Ministry of Health, normalcy in extraordinary circumstances. The Family the Department for Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Care Foundation Tsunami focussed on the immediate (DDPM), and 500 Thai and international experts from needs of orphaned children (Family Care Foundation, 30 countries (Scheper and Patel, 2006). Psychological 2005). Khao Lak also benefitted from the help of and social support for Thai nationals was overseen by volunteer-based groups. Volunteers from the Tsunami the Ministry of Social Affairs and Human Security. Volunteers Centre (TVC) helped some businesses The office of the Phuket Provincial Governor also set (particularly the dive community) to clear debris from up the Andaman Tsunami Relief Centre (ATRC) to act the beachfront and their properties. However, the as a central coordination point for tourist assistance relationship between volunteers and business owners and evacuation operations, medical care, donation was not always beneficiary. Some volunteers refused coordination, public relations management, public to assist business owners and actively abused some, infrastructure restoration, and the coordination of local believing them to be opportunists and rich enough administration actions (Singbun et al., 2008). to help themselves. This was a gross misconception centred around preconceived judgements on who Assistance for foreign tourists was rapid. The deserved help, that caused TVC volunteers to focus Immigration Bureau helped repatriate approximately their attention on fishing communities and sea gypsy 5000 foreigners and assisted thousands of tourists who minorities north of Khao Lak and left the Khao Lak had lost their belongings and passports (UN, 2005). tourism community frustrated and upset. Visa extensions were waived by the RTG whilst the TAT provided financial and logistical assistance to survivors Emergency financial relief and distribution that included return airfares, accommodation, food and problems transport; approximately USD 243 was given to every Responding to immediate financial needs, the Ministry surviving tourist for basic provisions. Tourist medical of the Interior provided immediate emergency payments expenses were covered by the Ministry of Health while of THB 2000 (USD 49) for every victim (UN, 2005). the Immigration Bureau established centres at airport All Thai registered businesses were entitled to an arrival halls to aid family friends that were arriving to additional THB 20 000 (USD 487) payment to assist check on the injured, missing and the dead (UN, 2005). them with immediate recovery needs (UN, 2005). International tour operators, such as Swedish Star Tours Unregistered businesses received no benefits. The and Fritidsresor, provided immediate support by using Ministry of Labour also offered unemployment benefits their charter planes to evacuate people and flew doctors equalling the minimum wage of THB 175 (USD 4) per and medical staff from Scandinavia to Thailand. day to employees who had lost their job for a period of 30 days (UN, 2005). Yet this benefit excluded Government emergency efforts were supported by 77 those who were not directly affected by the tsunami NGO, bilateral and UN organisations in the immediate (WTO, 2005). A further THB 40 000 (USD 1000) was aftermath of the disaster (Scheper and Patel, 2006). The provided for the loss of family members and assets Princess Sirinton Foundation along with the Thai and (FES and MAC, 2005). However, there were problems French Red Cross played a vital role in coordinating with the distribution of funds at the district and sub-
48 s t o c k h o l m environment i n s t i t u t e
district levels (Scheper and Patel, 2006) causing aid Registered Burmese workers were also entitled to distribution anomalies, heightened mistrust in local humanitarian assistance from the Thai Government governing bodies, anger and frustration. but assistance was refused due to discrimination at the local level (ALTSEAN Burma, 2005, Oberoi, 2005, The first problem was that there were insufficient Scheper and Patel, 2006). Instead, both registered and funds to cover all eligible recipients causing some illegal workers were subjected to abuse and inequity to miss out. Community members were advised to (Hedman, 2005, Hulme, 2005, Oberoi, 2005, TAG, wait for government notification regarding collection 2005, Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2008). Unsubstantiated periods once individual damage reports were lodged. Thai media reports about Burmese looting intensified Some were never notified and told that funds had anti-migrant sentiment among factions of Thai society run out when following up on their registered claim culminating in the arrest, extortion, and deportation with government officials. Second, there was a lack of both documented and undocumented workers; of knowledge about procedure, the complexity of the 2000 workers were deported in the first three weeks process, and who to approach. Procedural complexities following the tsunami (Chit, 2005, Hulme, 2005, Maw, were a particular problem for Phi Phi survivors. Only 2005, TAG, 2005, Robertson, 2007). The Burmese those that were registered as Thai Phi Phi residents at junta also refused assistance to its citizens (Robertson, the time of the tsunami were eligible for emergency 2007). Fear of deportation and abuse curtailed efforts payouts for personal family or property losses. Those to search for relatives and prompted the payments who had not changed their official residency from the of bribes to local authorities (Robertson, 2007). The mainland (be it from Krabi or Bangkok) to Phi Phi or problem was compounded by a lack of sufficient those who had lost their documentation in the disaster knowledge about human rights and information on were not eligible. Third, business losses were not where to source reliable assistance (Robertson, 2007). factored into aid distribution decisions, causing aid The collapse of the tourism industry caused some to be aimed primarily those who sustained losses in employers to abandon their migrant workers, making property and assets. Accordingly, those businesses in it difficult for them to replace work permits lost in each of the destinations that escaped physical damage the disaster (Oberoi, 2005). For others, the death of but lost business revenue were given no emergency aid. their employer made it impossible for them to prove Finally, the misappropriation of funds at the local level their legal working status, leaving them vulnerable of government (including village leaders) in all three to deportation, while some found it difficult to break destinations saw funds and emergency provisions being work contracts due to the increased demand for cheap unevenly distributed among friends, family and the manual labour for rebuilding efforts (Chit, 2005, local elite leaving some eligible recipients with nothing ALTSEAN Burma, 2005). (Scheper and Patel, 2006). There is no government monitoring mechanism to deter the misappropriation of Longer-term adjustments and adaptation resources. These procedural breakdowns slowed down responses the recovery and strengthened the financial position Strong national response facilitated through the of the ruling elite while marginalising others in the Andaman Tourism Recovery Plan process. In doing so, it also heightened the sensitivity Once lifeline emergency needs were fulfilled, attention of some to future shocks. turned to longer-term recovery and rebuilding efforts. Following the 2004 tsunami, the Thai government There was also a marked difference between the introduced the Andaman Tourism Recovery Plan immediate financial assistance provided to Thais (ATRP). A product of multiple stakeholder input, the and resident expatriates. The Minister for Natural ATRP aimed to stimulate rapid and sustainable tourism Resources and Environment and the Minister of recovery in the ten tsunami-affected Andaman Coast the Interior confirmed that all affected victims were sub-districts (spanning six provinces) through three entitled to aid assistance. However, financial assistance key strategies (TAT, 2005b): (a) the facilitation of a was only provided for Thai nationals at the local level. strong private sector recovery by offering financial Few Western expatriates received financial or logistical support; (b) the formulation and implementation of an assistance from the local Thai authorities, with those in integrated tourism development strategy; and (c) the Khao Lak being treated with scorn when they followed launch of multiple marketing drives. While the ATRP government requests to report their losses. This offers strong guidelines for the affected communities, prompted many to approach their embassies for help, their successful implementation is proving difficult to with mixed results. The plight of the Burmese workers achieve due to deficiencies in governance structures was much worse. and conflicting interests operating at various scales of social organisation.
49 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
Government-led financial assistance B. Soft Loan Provisions under the ‘Lending to The first component of the ATRP involved substantial Entrepreneurs Affected by the Tsunami in Six government-led financial assistance to promote a strong Provinces’ Programme. With the endorsement of recovery for Thai businesses of all sizes that were the RTG, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) extended a line directly and indirectly affected by the tsunami through of credit to both state and private banks at an annual the creation of two programmes: the Tsunami Recovery interest rate of 0.01per cent to underwrite soft loans for Fund supported by the Venture Capital Fund (VCF), businesses (WTO, 2005). The BOT financial outlay of and soft loans for smaller businesses underwritten by THB 4.8 billion for the programme was supplemented the Bank of Thailand. Tax reliefs were also offered by an additional THB 1.2 billion to make up a total credit to affected businesses. While these measures have line of THB 6 billion (Bank of Thailand, 2005, Bank assisted the recovery of many businesses, stringent of Thailand, 2006). The main lending funds included: conditions, application complexities, and bureaucratic (i) the Tsunami SME Fund and the Thai French Joint obstacles hindered their effectiveness. Furthermore, Credit Project that catered for small business interests; increased access to credit also had a downside for and (ii) soft loans through the commercial banking newer businesses in Khao Lak. The decrease of system open to all. The funds were available for business financial reserves following the tsunami, reconstruction, re-financing existing loans, re-stocking coupled with increasing debt levels borne out of a need and working capital (WTO, 2005). to take on new loans (some of which come on top of pre-existing loans used to start or expand businesses), Soft loans for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs): have compounded the financial instability of many The SME Bank’s Tsunami Small and Medium Enterprise businesses in the new destination of Khao Lak, which (SME) Fund aimed at assisting the recovery of smaller is yet to recover its pre-tsunami occupancy rates and businesses by offering short-term loans for up to THB tourist flows. Together, these factors greatly increase 1 million with the support of the BOT. Credit limits for financial vulnerability to any type of stress, including new clients were THB 500 000 (USD12 749) and the future shocks, economic downturns that may negatively collateral needed was real estate deeds and a guarantor. affect tourist flows or changing consumer preferences. An additional THB 500 000 was made available for The impact of this can already been seen in Khao Lak existing clients with real estate collateral culminating for example, where some businesses have been forced in a maximum of THB 1 million. Existing clients to close due to financial ruin. with no real estate collateral required the backing of a guarantor and were limited to credit allowances of THB A. Tsunami Recovery Fund for larger businesses. 500 000. All loan applicants also needed to show proof The RTG used its Venture Capital Fund (created in of a steady source of income. Lenders were to pay back 2003) to provide venture capital to medium-sized the loan with 2 per cent interest (per annum) within businesses through the provision of loans with a 1 a maximum repayment period of three years. During per cent interest rate for the first seven years, before this period, a SME Bank member sat on the board of reverting to the national Minimum Loan Rate (MLR) the business and oversaw decisions. Loan applications for the remaining lifetime of the loan. Offices were were accepted up until 28 February 2006. set up in Patong, Khao Lak, Ao Nang, and Ranong to enable rapid access to these funds. Applications The Government Savings Bank (GSB) made funds under this scheme were simple; businesses were only available for micro and small businesses under its Thai required to present a business plan. This plan was very and French Joint Credit Project run in collaboration popular and proved an effective financial instrument with the French Government. A maximum of THB 300 for assisting medium-sized businesses (WTO, 2005), 000 (USD 7649) was available for a lending period so much so that claims surpassed the capital made of three years at 2 per cent interest per annum, before available in the first few months of its inception, leading reverting to the national MLR for a further five-year to claim delays. Ministry of Industry figures show that period. An additional advantage was that repayments by the end of 2005, 61per cent (THB 2.8 billion or were postponed for the first year. Applications were USD 72.7 million) of financial capital granted to small accepted up until June 2008. If real estate deeds were and medium businesses was sourced through this fund unavailable as collateral, a guarantor was required. The (WTO, 2005). It has joined 114 ventures (50 per cent in BOT has provided the GSB with a total of THB 410 Phuket alone) with these medium-sized hotel projects, million to fund this project (Government Savings Bank, consuming 78 per cent of all funding made available 2005, Government Savings Bank, 2006). However, the by the end of 2005 (WTO, 2005). effectiveness of these schemes in assisting a recovery in Patong, Khao Lak, and Phi Phi was lessened by the following five factors:
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• Awareness of these lending options was low had difficulties in servicing the repayments of both the among micro businesses thereby excluding them loans (pre-existing and new loans). Smaller businesses from a funding oppor,tunity; did report some success with the securing of loans. This was particularly the case for smaller businesses • The SME Fund loan application process was in Patong that were well-established and had built complicated, difficult to understand, and very up strong credit histories over time. That said, many slow causing time delays in recovery. This faced the same challenges that limited access to SME not only resulted in applications being denied, and GSB bank loans: lack of a proven credit history, but also prevented people (particularly micro incomplete business records, no land deeds, and limited businesses) from applying. Complicating the access to suitable guarantors (ILO, 2006). As noted in application process further for some stakeholders Section 5.2.2.1, smaller businesses tended to expand were application anomalies and non-transparent their businesses using profits generated over time, processes; which negated the need to apply for credit prior to the tsunami. Furthermore, soft loans were available for a • The loan conditions and short repayment schedule very short period of time only, thereby limiting their proved too strict, making this option both difficult reach (ILO, 2006). The only other credit option was and unpopular among SMEs (WTO, 2005). Many to seek credit under normal loan conditions charging small businesses were unable to secure funding 8 per cent interest, a rate that was too much for some because they lacked the required documentation small businesses. Repayment conditions have made it and collateral, i.e., business registration papers, difficult for smaller businesses in Khao Lak to save proof of former assets, business plans and, most enough to cover the interest costs, given that parts of importantly, land deeds. Prior to the tsunami, the destination such as Bang Niang Beach still suffer small businesses were not required to register from lower tourist numbers. unless business earnings exceeded THB 300 000 per annum. The need for land deeds also Home government assistance to foreign business prevented businesses with pre-existing loans owners and workers with other banks, those who rent their premises Western business owners were ineligible for the special (particularly on Phi Phi), and foreign business loan schemes offered by the RTG, causing many to owners from securing loans. The additional SME approach their home governments for assistance. Fund condition of surrendering part-control of The response was mixed. The Italian government their business strategies to the SME Bank was a provided financial support with favourable conditions. strong deterrent for some; The German government provided loans through the German Embassy in Thailand to three German • The credit limit was considered too low to make a business owners for a two-year period. Two other real recovery contribution for some SME lenders; German business owners had the option but refused and due to the strict and short-term repayment conditions. The Dutch government offered no support, nor did the • Lastly, some small businesses were experiencing Swiss government. This left them with limited financial difficulties in servicing these debts. Increased debt support from both native and localised financial and and the hardship of paying back pre-existing and governmental institutions. Consequently, foreign new loans were contributing to the vulnerability of business owners relied heavily on savings, donations many small businesses. from family, friends and old customers, and loans from family and friends. Those with insufficient financial Favourable commercial loan conditions: In all three capital returned home to work, returning months later destinations, medium and larger Thai businesses with when sufficient funds had been saved. Others have a credit history or a strong business history benefited sold off assets in their home countries to help finance greatly from the changes in commercial loan conditions the recovery of their business in Thailand. Assistance initiated under the soft loan programme, whereby to Burmese citizens was refused both by the Burmese interest rates were set at 2 per cent for a period of three junta and the Thailand Government (Robertson, 2007). years with additional payments suspended for two Nepalese community members also received little help years. This money was used both to fund the rebuilding from their home country government. To survive, they effort and to pay staff during the closure of the resorts. have borrowed from friends to cover shop rental and These loans were supplemented with savings and taxes. One Nepalese tailor benefited from subsidies profits from family business portfolios. However, some provided by a sister tailor shop in Patong that received larger businesses in Khao Lak with pre-existing loans more business than the Khao Lak branch. Businesses
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run jointly by foreign-Thai couples were able to get efforts. But these preferences only marginalised the access to loans either from Thailand or from banks in badly affected destinations of Khao Lak and Phi Phi the foreigner’s home country. further. A TAT representative interviewed in 2005 stated that Khao Lak was not considered a priority due National tourism marketing strategies to restore to the belief that it could not recover from the sustained consumer confidence damage (pers. comm. 7 July 2005). Furthermore, the Restoring consumer confidence and tourism flows to TAT have no direct presence in Phang Nga where pre-tsunami levels was one of the biggest challenges tourism market share is still small compared to Phuket for the tsunami-affected destinations. The marketing and Krabi Provinces. That said, the TAT has increased strategy outlined in the ATRP addressed this need. their marketing support of Khao Lak since 2007 by The RTG allocated THB 1,500 million (USD 46.8 working in conjunction with local operators and hotels million) to help re-position the six Andaman coast to help promote the area. Phi Phi community members provinces and fund a sustained TAT marketing and were angered by the lack of support they received from public relations campaign to restore the confidence of the TAT. On the first anniversary of the tsunami, the domestic and international travellers in Thailand and TAT organised a gala dinner for foreign media on Koh show that the Andaman Coast was open for business Lanta. The media were more interested in the Phi Phi (OPM, 2007). The TAT worked in close collaboration Islands as the worst hit destination in Krabi, but the with the private sector to design and execute a TAT justified their choice by saying that the existing combination of strategies to achieve this aim. The TAT rubble on Phi Phi would convey a negative image of hosted field trips for international and domestic tour the island. Instead, some tourism community members operators and travel agents to show the true patterns used their contacts with the Thai media to project the of damage and recovery in each area (TAT, 2005b). true plight and story of Phi Phi’s tourism community. Media representatives were also invited to generate positive media attention and awareness. An aggressive Formulation of a new tourism planning strategy for the promotional campaign was run to recapture main Andaman Coast international markets in Asia, Australia, the USA and The tsunami disaster presented the Thai tourism Europe. This included numerous road-shows hosted by industry with a unique opportunity to embark on the TAT international offices in key target market countries systematic and integrated redevelopment of the affected such as Sweden. Discount and incentive packages areas and planning budgets were quickly allocated were also offered stimulate tourist flows (TAT, 2005b). to achieve this aim (UN-WTO, 2005a, Segschneider The discount packages were particularly targeted at and Worakul, 2007). Many new plans were formulated the domestic market to compensate for the reduction to facilitate the rebuilding of Khao Lak, Patong and in foreign tourists, whilst the corporate sector was Phi Phi. A summary of these plans is given in table 3. encouraged to hold conferences in affected areas that However, the implementation of the proposed plans had structurally recovered but still suffered from post- proved difficult and saw most fail. disaster images. The TAT also set up an online Crisis Communication Centre on its website to relay factual A. Andaman Tourism Recovery Plan (ATRP). updates on recovery rates for all affected destinations The planning component of the ATRP aimed to build and minimise the negative effect of imprecise reporting resilience against future shocks through the introduction in the media. However, these promotional activities of strict coastal zoning regulations and an integrated did not represent or benefit the affected destinations evacuation system by road that facilitates a quick equally. escape in the event of another tsunami. The new zoning laws and building codes include a 30-metre coastal These initiatives were targeted at restoring confidence development setback, multiple graded density zones, and tourist flows to Thailand, with Phuket benefiting and structural codes (see appendix 4 for the detailed from much of the attention. Promotional efforts also plan). These changes are applicable to any structures endeavoured to divert tourism flows to alternate Thai built after 1 May 2005, leaving pre-existing buildings destinations that were not affected including Ko Samui exempt. Like the financial and marketing components and Chang Mai to recapture much needed tourism of the ATRP, the planning strategy was designed to be earnings (TAT representative, pers. comm. 7 July 2005). applied to the ten tsunami-affected Andaman Coast This is understandable from an economic perspective. sub-districts, which include Khao Lak, Patong and Phuket is the international face of Thailand’s tourism Phi Phi. However, the implementation of the planning industry and generates the most revenue out of the regulations proved challenging in each destination affected provinces. It was also the first to recover from causing mixed results. the tsunami, making it a natural choice for promotional
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Khao Lak: The revised zoning and building codes have Patong’s beachfront, and pre-existing structures that been applied to some buildings in Khao Lak but their survived the brunt of the wave force were exempt application to all developments is not consistent for two from the new beach redevelopment stipulations. This reasons. First, some regulations, such as the provision left little room for substantial changes to beachside of escape platforms on the top of higher structures, developmental patterns, setback lines or significant were seen as requiring aesthetically unsuitable features structural changes. Second, budgetary constraints and for resorts, affecting their marketability; they were preferences for pre-existing municipal plans caused the therefore ignored. Second, the government lacks the Patong Municipal Government to reject the centralised financial and human resources required to enforce ATRP in favour of the three-year Municipality Plan that these strategies at the local level, resulting in planning was already covered in the Municipality fiscal budget violations (Civil Engineer at Department of Public for that year. Third, ongoing problems of corruption Works and Town and Country Planning Phuket, pers. and limited capacity at the local levels of government comm. 12 July 2005). The successful implementation continue to encumber the success of new initiatives. of these plans is further hampered by an overlap of Compounding these governance deficiencies is the department jurisdictions, corruption and a change in power of the private sector and their opposition to government. These development challenges mirror the new plans. The private sector has long dictated those that hindered the success of pre-tsunami developmental advancements in Phuket and their development. The initial plan for an emergency opposition to significant changes left little chance for road evacuation system was cancelled due to local the ATRP’s planning success. The only plan to find opposition and bureaucratic complications. Local some success in Patong was the Patong Seaboard stakeholders opposed the new road plans fearing that Redevelopment Plan (see Sub-section C below). Phi changes to the beachfront would negatively alter Khao Phi Don, on the other hand, was singled out for a Lak’s beachfront appeal and lower tourist numbers. total redevelopment under the ‘Sustainable Tourism Furthermore, the central government were unable to Rehabilitation & Development of Koh Phi Phi and finance the repossession of prime development land Surrounding Island Plan’ and therefore became exempt needed for the widening of the road system (Khao Lak from the initial ATRP (see Sub-section D below). Tsunami Recovery Plan [TRP] project manager, pers. comm. 4 July 2005). B. Sub-regional Development Plan (SRDP). The Sub- regional Development Plan was designed by the Asian A Khuk Khak TAO representative confirmed that post- Development Bank (ADB) at the request of the Ministry tsunami development patterns and regulations have not of Finances to facilitate the long-term sustainability changed. Plans continue to follow the three-year plan of the three tsunami-affected provinces of Phang model. Since the inception of the ATRP, the TAO and Nga, Phuket and Krabi. While the Andaman Tourism the Phang Nga Tourism Association have formulated a Recovery Plan focuses on reactionary redevelopment new three-year tourism development plan that complies (coastal zoning and building code requirements) and with the provincial tourism strategy. However, the preparedness strategies linked directly to the disaster, implementation of this strategy has also failed due the SRDP is a proactive and strategic blueprint aimed to insufficient staff capacities and a lack of expertise at maximising long-term sustainability in the Andaman in tourism-associated affairs. No obvious steps have region over the next 15 years. Specifically, the SRDP been taken to address these pre-existing governance (Gilchriest et al., 2007b: 3): issues (Khao Lak TRP Project Manager, pers. comm. 4 July 2005) resulting in wasted collective resources, • Creates a common planning framework for shaping increased exposure levels and detractions from and directing the various recovery aid programmes sustainability goals. Furthermore, the absence of active and plans by government, international donors, and government engagement is negatively affecting post- NGOs, toward common and mutually beneficial tsunami development standards, trust in governance goals that avoid duplication and diseconomies of processes, and tourism investor confidence. scale;
Patong and Phi Phi: Whilst the implementation of the • Introduces a common long-term vision for the ATRP in Khao Lak was sporadic, the planning strategy Andaman Coast that encourages contributions and failed completely in both Patong and Phi Phi but for engagement from government, civil society, the very different reasons. The ATRP was not implemented community and the private sector; and in Patong; the tourism community members interviewed were unaware of the plan’s existence. The reasons are • Reduces risk among investors and other four-fold. First, structural damage was minimal along stakeholders by establishing a transparent,
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consistent and practical planning system that similar reasons to those that underpinned the ATRP identifies the most appropriate type, form and planning strategy failings: distribution of development that matches needs with sustainable resource use. • the landscape is too well-established and developed to enable great changes to the beachfront, whilst The SRDP covers short- (to 2010), medium- (2011) delays in finalising the master plan made it obsolete and long-term (2016-2020) plans that incorporate for those who were able to rebuild quickly; six key elements that shape regional sustainability: economic and tourism development targets, social and • business interests in retaining pre-tsunami community development, environmental management development patterns are too strong with financial and preservation, robust infrastructure provisions, and gains from trade on the road and the beach being risk management. Twenty-three projects were identified too valuable to allow substantial changes; and as priority action points. Thirteen of the recommended projects have the propensity to benefit Khao Lak, • corruption and bribes have again enabled Patong, and Phi Phi either directly or indirectly. These exceptions to be made. are summarised in table 14 in appendix 4. Khao Lak has the most to gain from this plan with additional help D. Sustainable Tourism Rehabilitation & being planned for improvements to Khao Lak’s Town Development of Koh Phi Phi and Surrounding Centre, the introduction of a much needed central Island Plan. The tsunami’s widespread destruction wastewater treatment system, and the strengthening of of Phi Phi opened up an opportunity to redevelop community participation and multi-sector partnerships Phi Phi in such a way that not only lifted tourism (Gilchriest et al., 2007a). But being in the proposal development and living standards on the island but stages, there are no guarantees that the SRDP strategies also improved disaster preparedness, the sustainable can or will be adopted, prompting the authors to usage of Phi Phi’s unique and sensitive ecosystem, and flag ongoing implementation challenges that have boosted community participation in the future design hindered such work in the past. These include: lack of of the island. The fulfilment of such targets would institutional support and coordination among agencies move Phi Phi away from the unsustainable and ad hoc at the national, provincial, and local level; financial development practices of the past and help restore the constraints; and a lack of long-term commitment and island’s image as an island paradise. All construction government engagement with local actors, including and building modification were prohibited on Phi Phi the private sector (Gilchriest et al., 2007a). by the Krabi Provincial Governor and Ao Nang TAO until new plans were finalised or special permission C. Patong Seaboard Redevelopment Plan. The was granted (National Human Rights Commission, Patong Seaboard Redevelopment Master Plan was 2006). developed by the TAT and follows the main principles set out in the Andaman Tourism Recovery Plan. The The Designated Area for Sustainable Tourist main aim of the Plan was to promote a safe beach Administration (DASTA) (a national governmental environment and safe beach recreational activities. To body)4 was assigned to develop a new strategy for Phi achieve this, the Plan focuses on the development of Phi that included both short- and long-term tourism a built and natural landscape that is: (i) appealing to planning on Phi Phi and the neighbouring islands. tourists, (ii) sustainable in its usage of sensitive coastal The resultant Tourist Attraction Rehabilitation and marine landscapes, and (iii) robust enough to and Development Plan of Phi Phi Don Island and withstand and cope with natural events (TAT, 2007b). Neighbouring Islands focussed on the following key The plan introduced five beach zones to guide the areas: the sustainable redevelopment and repositioning redesign of Patong Beach (including the installation of tourism facilities and services, natural resource of public early warning systems, evacuation routes management, infrastructural improvements, disaster and information points) and the redevelopment of the beachfront (TAT, 2007b). These zones and the outcome of each initiative are outlined in table 4. 4 Established in 2003, DASTA is a national body situated under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environ- The first three zoning initiatives were successful ment. Its main directive is to oversee the development of but again the implementation of the new building tourism in designated areas with natural and cultural sig- regulations and setback zones along the beachfront nificance in a way that meets global tourism standards, proved difficult to achieve and essentially failed for complies with governmental policies, and enables Thai- land to compete with other tourism destinations abroad.
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Table 3: Summary of post-tsunami planning and redevelopment initiatives
PLAN ORGANISATION(S)* SECTOR FOCUS OVERARCHING PLANS FOR PHANG NGA, PHUKET AND KRABI Andaman Tour- Royal Thai Govern- Coastal destination zoning & building regulations ism Recovery Plan ment (RTG) Disaster preparedness: emergency road evacuation system (ATRP) Sub-regional Royal Thai Govern- Economic & tourism development targets Development Plan ment (RTG) Social & community development (SRDP) Asian Development Environmental management & preservation Bank Infrastructure provisions Risk management PATONG ONLY Patong Seaboard Tourism Authority of Beach redevelopment Redevelopment Thailand TAT) Infrastructural improvements Plan Royal Thai Government Disaster preparedness & beach safety (RTG) PHI PHI DON ONLY Sustainable Tour- Designated Area for Natural resource and environmental management ism Rehabilitation Sustainable Tour- Destination repositioning with emphasis on high-quality tourism & Development of ism Administration Infrastructural improvements Land rezoning of private lowlands (relocation of existing illegal Koh Phi Phi and (DASTA) settlement to uplands), mangrove areas & mountainous uplands Surrounding Island Disaster preparedness emphasising emergency management Plan plans Phi Phi Don Reha- Department of Pub- Environmental management to promote sustainable usage of bilitation Plan lic Works & Town & natural resources Country Planning Destination repositioning with emphasis on high-quality tourism Coastal destination rezoning and stringent building regulations (DPTCP) for lowland settlement Disaster preparedness: emergency road evacuation system * Organisations marked in bold are the leading organisation of each strategy, with those in non-bold indicate supporting part- ners. preparedness, and land rezoning (DASTA, 2006). The Both propositions and DASTA’s entire plan were key components of DASTA’s development concept vehemently blocked by the community on three are detailed in box 2 in appendix 4. DASTA’s Plan grounds. First, residents did not want to relocate supported two momentous and controversial changes to higher and ground that is hard to access. Second, to Phi Phi. The Plan proposed a complete change in the community mistrusted DATSA’s environmental the destination’s character from a popular diving and intentions, believing vacated land would eventually backpacker throng to a more exclusive destination be sold off to wealthy investors for massive profits. (with rooms costing up to USD1,000-a-night) that Lastly, the simultaneous consideration of two all- would outprice and displace smaller business owners. inclusive new luxury resorts – one from Sofitel and the The second major shift concerned the relocation of other from Intercontinental Hotels Group - throughout the existing settlement from the devastated isthmus DASTA’s initial ban on further Phi Phi development to the steep forested mountains that overlook the reaffirmed community suspicions (Pleumarom, 2007). twin bays. This included the resettlement of 5000 After sustained local opposition, DASTA’s Plan was residents ranging from Muslim villagers, resort and abolished in February 2006 (Xinhua, 2006) and the pub owners to operators of tour boats and diving shops Department of Public Works and Town and Country (Pleumarom, 2007). Both propositions complied with Planning (DPTCP) charged with formulating a new the DPTCP’s Krabi City Planning Regulations and the strategy. Environmental Protection Areas Act by The Office of Natural Resource and Environmental Policy and E. Phi Phi Don Redevelopment Plan. The Planning (ONEP) (DASTA, 2006). DASTA and DPTCP plans share a common purpose
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Table 4: Patong Seaboard Master Plan zoning directives & outcomes ZONE DIRECTIVE OUTCOME 1 (sea) Set up beach activity safety zones: (i) for swimming Success (ii) for water sports (iii) sea-plane landings 2 (beach) Exchange wooden umbrella chairs for plastic & limit number Success with new chairs lim- Introduce 20-metre intervals between chairs for evacuation ited to 2000 Identify appropriate positioning for lifeguard towers 3 (green strip) Introduce green strip along Patong Beach with walkways, public Success but with limited com- gardens & recreational parks munity participation in proc- Identify integrated positioning for early warning towers ess 4 (walkways) Increase pavements widths to 3 metres along Taweewong Road & Failed Baramee Road Introduce more frequent pedestrian crossings 5 (building Introduce 15 metre set-backs from the beach Failed regulations) Limit beachfront building heights to 5 metres & no less than 75per cent total open space area All beachfront signage must be attached to buildings and not exceed 2 metres in height Source: adapted from TAT (2007b) of environmental conservation, infrastructural Details of the development zones that fall under the improvements, and disaster preparedness. The main Phi Phi Islands Community Specific Plans and the difference lies with the relocation of the main tourism corresponding building regulations for each of the settlement. Unlike the DASTA Plan, the DPTCP allows three zones are outlined in box 3 in appendix 4. development on the narrow sand isthmus that divides the twin bays as long as it adheres to strict building Yet the DPTCP plan has not been implemented due regulations. Completed in 2006, the DPTCP Plan for to budgetary constraints. The DPTCP received no Phi Phi Don is guided by the Krabi City Planning Plan, funding to implement the plan despite the failure of which adheres to Thailand’s overarching Building the DASTA initiative. With no final plan in place, Control Act (1979). The National Park Act (1961) the Ministry of Interior gave permission for building still protects all remaining natural areas that were not to commence under the Building Control Act (1979) settled prior to 1983 when Phi Phi Don and Phi Phi Ley and Environmental Protected Area Declaration (2003), were incorporated into the Hat Nopparatthara-Mu Phi both of which were amended in 2007 (ASA, 2009a). Phi National Park. The DPTCP Plan comprises of two This decision overturned the building ban applied in distinct sub-plans (Modas Consultancy, 2006): 2005 and allowed land owners to rebuild within the following codes (ASA, 2009a): • The Phi Phi Islands Land Use Policy and Management Interim Plan outlines regulations • buildings must adhere to a 30-metre setback; to guide land use and marine use around Phi Phi Don including marine biodiversity conservation • buildings on Phi Phi cannot not exceed nine metres and tourism water activities, infrastructural in height; and facilities and standards. It also details government responsibilities for implementing and monitoring • all buildings must have a minimum elevation of the plan; 0.8 metres from the ground.
• The Phi Phi Islands Community Specific Plan However, no new hotels and resorts are allowed to be provides guidelines on building zones and codes, built; these codes only apply to those structures that island infrastructure including transportation existed prior to 26 December 2004 (ASA, 2009a). (boat and roadways), terrestrial management and That said, those buildings that were rebuilt illegally conservation, designation of public recreation during 2005 and 2007 remain. spaces, and disaster preparedness strategies and evacuation routes. The lengthy delays in finalising the plans and the ongoing problems with the process had numerous
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negative repercussions. First, multiple planning Introduction of a Tsunami Early Warning System meetings held with the community yielded few results, and disaster preparedness training causing much community frustration, apathy, and a The introduction of the Indian Ocean Early Warning drop in participation. Frustrated with the process one System in 2005 was heralded by both the government Small Resort General Manager remarked: and tsunami-affected communities as a crucial tool for both increasing consumer confidence in the safety There are many plans but not…I think they have so many of the Andaman Coast and community preparedness plans and so many thinking. Then so many problem. against future shocks. As of 26 June 2006, a total of 79 Yeah. For me, talk, talk, talk, talk. Many, many people warning towers were installed in the six affected Thai in the government. This one OK, this one not OK. Like provinces under the direction of the Department for that. But I don’t know which because we don’t have time Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM) and the to call them.” Ministry of Interior. Twenty early warning towers line the coast of Phuket, Phang Nga has 18 towers whilst Second, planning indecision halted the timely provision Phi Phi Don has three (TAT, 2006a). The warnings of emergency aid and access to finances needed for are broadcast over the loudspeakers in five languages, rebuilding. The central government was reluctant with additional alerts being broadcast via, radio, to provide any assistance until a resolution had been television and SMS (the latter being a free service reached, leaving the Krabi Provincial government to which people can subscribe). In December 2006, in a difficult situation concerning the distribution of Thailand’s first tsunami detection buoy was installed emergency supplies. Insurance payouts were delayed and is now functioning. Under the Memorandum of and the securing of loans made near impossible Understanding signed by Thailand’s National Disaster (Cohen, 2007). The financial ramifications were great, Warning Centre (NDWC) and the US National affecting most on the island. Business for dive shops, Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), for example, has not returned to pre-tsunami levels. The Washington is assisting Thailand and other countries reason for this is the post-tsunami drop in room capacity bordering the Indian Ocean with the installation of a in Phi Phi Don; as of 2007, there were approximately Deep Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis 40 per cent fewer rooms than before the tsunami. This (DART) system by providing the region with two deep shortage of accommodation and increased demand ocean buoys (TAT, 2006a). resulted in high occupancy rates (creating the image of recovery) and higher accommodation prices (increasing The establishment of the National Disaster Warning approximately 30 per cent). Although prices went up, Centre and the provision of disaster preparedness value-for-money diminished, reducing affordability and training and instructions of evacuation procedures causing a drop in the average length of stay. The need complemented the Early Warning System’s technical to restore livelihood incomes and a lack of faith in the hardware. The National Disaster Warning Centre in planning process prompted many smaller enterprises Bangkok, opened on 31 May 2005, is responsible for and some larger ones to rebuild illegally before plans monitoring the incoming data from the DART System, were settled. According to one resort owner, “If we wait evaluating the intensity and severity of triggering for the government to review and give a hand, you have natural events, and issuing public warnings (TAT, to wait about five, six years...” Those businesses that 2005d). The DDPM was charged with the designing of rebuilt illegally realised they may need to rebuild again evacuation plans for every destination and providing once the regulations are in place. But the additional disaster preparedness training and evacuation drills cost of rebuilding for the smaller businesses is minimal for communities (TAT, 2005d). Disaster preparedness compared to the money that they were making whilst training in risk reduction strategies and evacuation the planning decisions were finalised. Finally, the plan management was also provided for governmental delays and continued absence of a successful plan for officials. Phuket also benefited from the creation of the Phi Phi has caused a return to ad hoc development. Phuket Provincial Tourism Risk Management Strategy Cheaply-built guesthouses, restaurants and makeshift 2007-2012 (PTRMS). This strategy was a government- vendors’ stalls are scattered all over the island. The led initiative designed to: (i) make the Phuket tourism continued neglect of proper building standards has also industry more united and resilient to threats (natural or led to the absence of appropriate waste management man-made events) to normal business activities, and (ii) systems and deteriorating environmental conditions, build partnership and enhance knowledge on tourism which could deter tourists in the future. risk management among government, business, tourism representatives and organisations, and tourism related
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stakeholders5 (Partnership of Phuket Agencies, 2007). Launch of National Tourism Intelligence Unit Included in this strategy are evacuation preparedness and Crisis Management Centre plans and maps for several communities. The tsunami dramatically highlighted the impact that shocks, uncertainties and highly competitive trends can The presence of the Early Warning System made have on tourism flows. Recognising this, the Ministry of community members feel safer. But there are Tourism and Sports launched the Tourism Intelligence concerns regarding the effectiveness of the system Unit and Crisis Management Centre in March 2007 in all three destinations. First, the warning sirens to better monitor and respond to such events. This and announcements cannot be heard in some areas, government initiative at the national level is a good including the north end of Bang Niang Beach and example of adjustment and adaptation responses towards the southern end of Ton Sai Bay near the local that improve industry preparedness, and may prove school. Second, key parts from some of the warning instrumental to the long-term resilience of destination towers have been stolen rendering them useless. Third, communities to future shocks and stressors. previous tests have not worked properly causing some Placed under the direct jurisdiction of the to lose faith in their effectiveness. Fourth, training Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT), the role in the warning procedures and disaster preparedness of the National Tourism Intelligence Unit is to among local communities has been limited and monitor emerging trends, including changes in training dates not widely known, evacuation signage the behaviour and lifestyles of travellers, and is irregular, marked evacuation distances unclear, and to conduct impact assessment studies to gauge evacuation roads are sometimes too narrow (in Phi the impact of such changes on the Thai tourism Phi) or blocked by development and trees. The director industry (TAT, 2007c). The Crisis Management of Phuket’s DDPM Office also highlighted problems Centre was established to enhance the collective with institutional participation in DDPM initiatives, ability of the TAT, tourism agencies and with the TAT and Patong’s Tourist Police (among organisations to respond to shocks and events others) showing little sustained interest in disaster that threaten tourism flows to Thailand. A preparedness workshops and training. Furthermore, centralised centre enables rapid and orchestrated evacuation drills and disaster preparedness training responses to sensitive situations with decisions are infrequent due to restricted local budgets – another based on accurate information. The centre will institutional obstacle. A growing mistrust in the Early also interface with volunteer, emergency and Warning System was demonstrated in September 2007 relief organisations that operate hotlines and are following an earthquake off the Sumatran Coast. News set up to receive, as well as broadcast, real-time of the threat and the issuance of tsunami warnings in on-site situation updates, announcements and neighbouring countries came via international news reports (TAT, 2007c). channels causing many locals to run to high ground for safety (Montague, 2007). No news or reassurance was issued from the NDWC, causing much uncertainty The integral role of industry collectives, and fear. Without adequate public awareness and NGOs, CBOs, and volunteers in the recovery knowledge of disaster preparedness procedures, The RTG’s efforts to restore tourism-dependent early warning technology is useless. Furthermore, a livelihoods and regain tourist confidence were not reliance on a faulty early warning system (including carried out in isolation. The size of the disaster and procedures) creates an emerging sensitivity to future scope of the subsequent devastation spurred one of the shocks. In the face of these technical problems, the real largest mobilisations of aid and support ever seen (UN, warning system may take the form of social network 2005). International aid agencies such as the Red Cross, communication now that the community is aware of World Vision and multiple UN agencies provided the natural signs. emergency assistance and technical support (see UN, 2005). Industry support bodies like the UN-World Tourism Organisation (UN-WTO) and the Pacific Asia Travel Association (PATA) amassed collective industry action, whilst thousands of volunteers flocked to 5 Stakeholders included in the design of this initiative are: affected areas to help any way they could. This large- Phuket Provincial Governor’s Office, Phuket Provincial scale mobilisation also saw the emergence of new aid Administrative Office, Phuket Office of Tourism Sports linkages and networks - from formal organisations to and Recreation, Phuket Tourism Association, Phuket individuals – all of which played an integral role in Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and Department the recovery and rebuilding of the Andaman Coast of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM-Phuket) with support from MoTs, AICST, AusAid, and ADPC.
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(Tan-Mullins et al., 2007) and its tourism-dependent The main NGO initiatives undertaken in Khao Lak are communities. summarised in table 6. Much of the assistance received in Khao Lak came in the form of training and education The Phuket Action Plan (PAP): the tourism industry to heighten skills levels and increase employment unites under one banner and livelihood opportunities. This emphasis on The importance of tourism to the affected Indian Ocean skills proved beneficial in three ways. First, it gave Region and the extent of the tsunami’s devastation survivors something immediate and positive to focus also stirred a united industry response headed by the on. Second, it gave the newly unemployed a reason to UN-World Tourism Organisation (UN-WTO). The stay in the region, thereby circumventing further staff UN-WTO launched a multi-national and collaborative shortages. The tsunami disaster left Khao Lak with a initiative called the Phuket Action Plan (PAP). The depleted skilled workforce, with many of the surviving main aims of the PAP was to: provide assistance and workers leaving to escape the memories and pursue training for newly unemployed tourism workers; aid employment in alternate destinations. Third, the skills the recovery of small and medium tourism-related training in tourism and hospitality enabled greater businesses; restore consumer confidence and visitor local participation and financial benefit, whilst creating flows; and introduce strategies that focus on disaster risk a skilled workforce for business owners. Finally, the reduction and strengthening tourism sustainability (UN, programs helped to diversify livelihood options. The 2005, WTO, 2005). Its reach extended to Indonesia, Sri acquiring of new and transferable skills (in business Lanka, Thailand, and the Maldives. Partners included planning and administration, money management, in the formation and execution of the PAP included the leadership, computing and English) builds individual Pacific Asia Travel Association (PATA), Asia-Pacific resilience against future shocks. These ventures were Economic Cooperation (APEC), VISA, Netherlands assisted by an influx of private donations in the first year Development Organisation (SNV), and private sector but these have dwindled leaving some organisations companies. Measures aimed at stimulating a recovery struggling to keep operating. The Tsunami Volunteer along Thailand’s Andaman Coast are detailed in box 1. Centre closed in 2008 (Tsunami Volunteer Centre, Other corporate assistance came in the form of funds 2008). Yet the greatest need for business recovery was raised through hotel chains and corporate websites financial support. The ILO, the Raks Thai Foundation (Henderson, 2007a). However, some of the efforts (RTF) and the 4Kali.org Foundation helped micro and proved ineffective as governments chose to implement small businesses access financial services and small their own measure with little regard for the PAP, whilst loans (ILO, 2006). Further financial support came systematic and transparent monitoring was found from local grassroots organisations and donations from wanting (Rice, 2005). long-standing clients and those collected via websites. One drawback of some of the donation offers were Building resilient destination communities through the conditions attached; some Christian organisations long-term support were offering donations in exchange for participation On completion of the immediate relief efforts and in Christian events and pressure to convert to the short-term restoration work those volunteers and Christian faith, which lessened their appeal. aid organisations involved in immediate recovery operations left (Kongrut, 2007). However, some NGO and CBO assistance for Phi Phi was more varied NGOs, CBOs and volunteer groups recognised a than that given to Khao Lak (figure 7). Like Khao dire need for long-term capacity building measures. Lak, Phi Phi benefited from training initiatives but The types of longer-term initiatives undertaken in were also recipients of much needed infrastructural Patong, Khao Lak and Phi Phi fell into five categories: support, disaster preparedness training, environmental financial and livelihood assistance, social support, rehabilitation (to help reverse pre-tsunami degradation skills development and training, disaster preparedness, and prevent future problems), and financial support and environmental rehabilitation. Patong benefited for micro and small businesses. Financial support, from skill development initiatives headed by the particularly the Swedish Micro-Credit Foundation International Labour Organization (ILO), disaster revolving interest-free loans to micro and small preparedness training, environmental rehabilitation businesses, was crucial in enabling the largely Muslim strategies and some financial assistance. These are population access to credit needed to rebuild their summarised in table 5. But the balance of assistance businesses despite some credit availability delays was heavily skewed towards the severely devastated caused by slow loan repayments by initial recipients. communities of Khao Lak and Phi Phi. However, there were challenges in implementing
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DANIDA’s wastewater management project and (TAG, 2005, UN, 2005). The ILO also provided housing projects. temporary financial relief to minorities through THB 30,000 (USD 764) cash handouts. The TAG - formed DANIDA’s wastewater management project is from local NGOs and led by Human Rights Education complete but there are problems with the scheme. First, Institute of Burma (HREIB), Grassroots Human the capacity of the natural treatment facility is too small Rights Education and MAP Foundation - provided for the needs of the destination village; the scheme direct emergency relief to 4792 migrants alone (TAG, only has the capacity to treat approximately one third 2005). According to the TAG (2005), conditions for of the village’s wastewater. The consequent untreated an estimated 2500 Burmese migrants have improved overflow is polluting some areas of the village, considerably since the tsunami. Increased post-tsunami resulting in unpleasant odours and a rising wave of media attention highlighting the plight of Burmese animosity among some community factions. Second, workers attracted NGO support, giving both legal and there is a real concern that the Ao Nang TAO does not illegal Burmese workers a much needed voice against have the capacity to expand or maintain the facility that routine discrimination and exploitation (TAG, 2005). is now their responsibility. The provision of permanent Once emergency needs were met, attention turned to housing on the island proved contentious due in part longer-term financial, social, livelihood needs. These to unresolved land ownership and land encroachment included Hakoda, 2005, TAG, 2005: issues. In accordance with World Vision’s housing project plans, a new housing village containing 231 • The replacement of migrant ID cards (Tor/Ror houses was built on the mountain above Laem Phaw 38/1), work permits, and birth certificates of (Cape Phaw) on privately donated land. However, the newborns; donated land is located well within the boundaries of the National Park, raising questions of the legality of • Temporary financial aid to construction employees the private acquisition of a large tract (an estimated waiting for the resumption of construction; 150 Rai or 230 hectares) of publicly-owned land. The location was also unpopular with Phi Phi residents; • Assistance with reclaiming money from the the village was thought to be too far from the business police; centre and ports and the access road is very steep. Consequently, daily access to work via foot or bicycle • Securing the legal rights and livelihoods of migrants is harder and the routine transportation of goods from (including salary rates and employment conditions) the ports below to the settlement via cart (there are through constant advocacy with government very few cars on the island) is near-impossible. There authorities, UN bodies and journalists; are also concerns that the annual monsoonal rains and strong winds will quickly degrade the road and hinder • Improving migrant access to information, all access. The housing project supported by the Small education, health and legal services; and Entrepreneurs, Labour, and Community/Credit Union Cooperative of Phi Phi Islands faced similar land use • Strengthening migrant communities and their issues, with the building of houses taking place within capacity to cope with trauma, to exercise their the National Park boundaries. A sub-committee on land rights as a group and to self-organise. and forest management, under the Thailand National Human Rights Commission, investigated the problem The Federation of Trade Unions Burma (FTUB) offered of land conflict with the National Park in February two information and training sessions in Phang Nga 2006 to accelerate the right authentication process and aimed at building capacity and facilitating cohesion to find a suitable area for permanent accommodation. among Burmese workers that were affected by the tsunami. The outcomes of the initiative were three- NGO initiatives for Burmese workers fold (ILO, 2005): (i) migrant workers gained a better Receiving limited support from the RTG, various understanding of the role of trade unions, workers’ rights NGOs and CBOs stepped up to aid the estimated 60,000 and assistance services; (ii) trade union membership Burmese workers working on the Andaman Coast was increased; and (iii) collaboration between Thai and (Hakoda, 2005). The provision of basic emergency Burmese trade unions was enhanced. necessities, food, water and medical assistance were supplied by numerous NGOs including the Thai Red Cross, International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Medicins Sans Frontieres, World Vision, Stella Marie, and the Tsunami Action Group for Migrants (TAG)
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Box 1: Phuket Action Plan Strategies Source: (UN-WTO, 2005a, UN-WTO, 2005b) Marketing and communication strategies:
The PAP aimed to boost consumer and travel trade confidence in Thailand’s affected destinations through: • the establishment of a centralised recovery website providing provided accurate and live updates; • hosting a series of familiarisation trips for the international press and the major tour operators from the major generating countries (U.K., Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Russia, China, Korea) to provide an accurate picture of the damage sustained and recovery progressions.
Tourism Community relief:
Two actions were taken under the PAP to aid the recovery of small and medium business enterprises (SMEs): • An in-depth study was conducted to ascertain the recovery progress and outstanding financial needs of SMEs; and, • A workshop on post-disaster SME financing was held entitled Enhancing Capacities for Rapid Recovery in Asia.
Professional skills training:
Three types of training were offered to improve skill levels and employability: • The UN-WTO and supporting partners offered training for new tourism employees, courses for the retraining of tourism employees while they waited for their old jobs back, and management training courses; • The UN-WTO Education Council provided funds for three Thai officials to attend the 2005 UN-WTO Human Resource Development (WTO.HRD) Practicum and the UN-WTO Tourism Education Quality (WTO.TedQual) Practicum. in Madrid; and, • A 5-day Swift Water safety course was conducted in Pitsanulok Province, Thailand.
Risk and crisis management:
To reduce risk in the tourism sector the PAP conducted two initiatives in conjunction with partners: • The Global Advanced Technology Emergency Information Network for the Tourism Sector aims to fill existing gaps between communication and information exchange and the multiple actions undertaken by the tourism industry, governments, international organisations, NGOs and the media; • The Future Leaders of Andaman Sea Workshop for 50 youth from Phang Nga and Krabi Provinces aimed at increasing disaster awareness and coping capacity and providing the Region’s youth with the skills needed to become future leaders in disaster risk reduction.
Sustainable tourism redevelopment:
To improve the socio-economic and physical environs of coastal tourism development the PAP recom- mended: • The formulation of a Green Belt Development Plan for Phuket and outlying areas; and, • The introduction of a Regional Tourism Development Master Plan for southern Thailand.
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Table 5: Longer-term initiatives designed to build resilience in Patong
Focus Organisation* Projects (P) and Goals (G) Actions
Umbrella Project: Post-tsunami Liveli- Technical assistance to the growing informal economy hood Recovery Project in the Tourism Technical assistance to help micro and small businesses get Sector in Phuket & Phang Nga access to financial services and small loans G1: To increase employability of newly unemployed G2: Support organisations servicing their needs G3: Encourage employees to stay in destination sites to circumvent further staff shortages P1: Tourism product diversification, Offered emergency response training for beachfront and emergency & conflict training by the coastal businesses Employers Confederation of Thailand Promoted home-stay development in Phuket to diversify tour- International Labour (ECOT) ism products Training & Organisation (ILO) Provided conflict management and negotiation skills training UNDP education for human resources managers, union leaders & worker rep- Ministry of Labour resentative groups P2: Hospitality and tourism service Provision of hospitality and tourism service training (including (executed with local training with the Phuket Tourism Asso- language lessons) to raise the skill base of retrenched workers partner cooperation) ciation (PTA) and interested community members P3: Safe sex awareness and support for Offered legal advice to entertainment and sex workers sex workers from EMPOWER Founda- Provided safe sex and emotional health education to workers tion with a heavy focus on HIV/AIDS prevention
P4: Get Ahead Entrepreneurship Train- Training of trainers programme aimed to create skilled lead- ing Sessions headed by Phuket Cham- ers within government, community organisations, and among ber of Commerce micro-entrepreneurs. An information and training workshop held for 250 affected workers, providing occupational guidance and training, infor- mation on employee financial aid schemes, social security and workers compensation advice, and language training Christian Foundation G: To restore livelihoods Provision of new boats and engines for fisherman/long-tail Phuket boat operators Financial & Livelihood Laguna Resorts and P: Phuket Tsunami Recovery Fund Provision of emergency clothing, food & medical supplies G: Assist local tsunami victims rebuild Provide funds to rebuild houses & repair boats Assistance Hotels Group [N/F]# lives and livelihoods Created central point for accessing information on financial assistance & rebuilding livelihoods UNEP P: Awareness and Preparedness for Conducted series of seminars & workshops with local authori- Swedish Rescue Service Emergencies at Local Level (APELL) for ties (e.g. DDPM, Patong Municipality, Phuket Provincial Gov- Disaster Agency (SRSA) Patong Municipality ernor) & tourism stakeholders (PTA, tourism businesses, resi- Prepared- International Hotel and G: To increase disaster preparedness dents) ness Restaurant Association through disaster preparedness and Undertook assessment of local hazards emergency education Danish International P: Wetland wastewater treatment project Creation of wetland polishing ponds in Patong Municipality Environ- Development Agency (3 year duration) to treat wastewater sourced from drainage mental (DANIDA) Rehabilita- Asian Institute of Tech- tion nology (AIT)
Sources: 178 (Laguna Phuket, 2004, Kowitwanij, 2005, UNEP-DTIE, 2006, ILO, 2006, Henderson, 2007b, Ministry of Foreign Af- fairs of Denmark, 2008) * Organisations marked in bold are the leading organisation of each strategy, with those in non-bold indicate supporting partners. # N/F denotes those newly formed community-based organisations that arose in reaction to the tsunami event
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Table 6: Longer-term initiatives designed to aid business recovery and build resilience in Khao Lak
Focus Organisation* Projects (P) and Goals (G) Actions
Umbrella Project: Post-tsunami Livelihood Technical assistance to the growing informal economy Recovery Project in the Tourism Sector in Technical assistance to help micro and small businesses get access to financial services Phuket & Phang Nga and small loans Increase employability of newly unemployed workers Support organisations servicing their needs Encourage employees to stay in destination sites to circumvent further staff shortages
P1: Job assistance and skills training by Provided information to workers, assisted with job searches, & offered skills training and ILO Phuket Federation of Hotels and Labour marketing assistance to 300 retrenched Labour Club members. UNDP Services (PFHLS) Ministry of Labour P2: Hospitality and tourism service training by Provision of hospitality and tourism service training to raise the skill base of retrenched the Phang Nga Tourism Association (PNTA) workers and interested community members (executed in part- Introduction of a new website promoting Khao Lak plus reservation service nership with local partners) P3: Product development assistance by Thai- Technical assistance with product design, skills development, & marketing and product Craft distribution for 3 post-tsunami community groups in Takuapa District: The Saori Weaving Group that produces woven products The Tsunami Doll Group Tsunami survivors that produced crafts for the Tsunami Craft Centre
P4: Phang Nga Labour Bureau’s Get Ahead Training of trainers programme aimed to create skilled leaders within government, com- Entrepreneurship Training Sessions munity organisations, and among micro-entrepreneurs. An information and training workshop held for 250 affected workers, providing occu- pational guidance and training, information on employee financial aid schemes, social security and workers compensation advice, and language training
Thailand Busi- P1: IT Skills Program to improve skill levels of Conducted student IT skill classes in the Ban Sak School, Phang Nga Province and pro- ness Partner- newly unemployed by KPMG vided computers, internet access and teacher support ship and Inter- national Busi- P2: Career Transitioning Training to promote Undertook skills assessments followed by training in appropriate alternative livelihoods Training ness Leaders livelihood diversification by Manpower Incor- including landscaping golf courses, tailoring, and massage. & edu- Forum porated cation Tsunami Vol- P: English training English training offered for hotel staff unteer Centre (TVC) [N/F]#
4Kail.org Foun- P: Establishment of a community centre to The establishment of a community centre south of Khao Lak to teach diving, English and dation [N/F] help people help themselves other livelihood skills needed to sustain future livelihoods
P: Micro-enterprise Development and Train- Main courses offered: English, hospitality, and computer skills Step Ahead ing Centre
G1: To build local capacity by training young The 9-month intensive training includes diving, English, environmental awareness, busi- Ecotourism people to become leaders and catalysts for ness education & computing Training Centre change in their communities End PADI diving award enabling graduates to seek professional employment as certified (ETC) [N/F] PADI diving instructors and dive masters
G: To create opportunities and post-tsunami It provides newly-formed producer groups with a centrally-located shop to sell their prod- Tsunami Craft stability through the development of small ucts, as well as various support services to aid in their development Centre [N/F] business networks The 11producer groups arose from temporary housing camps and villages
G: To help weavers ease their minds and Offering of freestyle weaving courses for traumatised victims & unemployed villagers Saori Weaving release any trauma and sorrow through craft Create alternate job opportunities for local villagers as unemployment rates in the area Centre [N/F] remain high
P1: Tsunami Recovery Action Initiative Pro- TRAI assists the recovery of small businesses and communities, builds capacities in sus- gram (TRAI) tainable tourism to improve livelihoods, and helped establish a long-tail fishing boat Kenan Institute repair centre and pier Asia P2: Future collaborative projects The Kenan Institute is collaborating with the WTO to promote sustainable tourism in Khao Lak area and devising a Provincial Strategy Plan for ecotourism and natural resource management, in partnership with the Provincial Governor and Lum Lu National Park.
Buddhist Fel- P: English Teaching Conducted free English classes in Khuk Khak for the benefit of adults in the local com- lowship munity.
ILO P5: Establishment of credit union savings Provided technical assistance to help micro and small businesses gain access to financial UNDP groups under direction from Credit Union services and small loans. Finan- Ministry of League of Thailand (CULT) Provided information sessions on the advantages of cooperative savings and aided the cial & Labour establishment of registered credit union savings groups. Liveli- hood 4Kali.org Foun- G: Livelihood recovery through provision of Awarded small grants & micro-credit loans for those not entirely dependant on tourism Assist- dation [N/F] SME loans (mobile food carts, laundry businesses, restaurants, barber shops, massage) ance Raks Thai Foun- G: Livelihood recovery through provision of SME loans awarded to small businesses to finance the rebuilding of their businesses dation SME loans
Disaster G: Increase disaster preparedness in Khao Introduction of disaster awareness and preparedness program to hotels prepar- TVC [N/F] Lak edness
Sources: IBLF 2006, ILO 2006 * Organisations marked in bold are the leading organisation of each strategy, with those in non-bold indicate supporting partners. # N/F denotes those newly formed community-based organisations that arose in reaction to the tsunami event
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Table 7: Longer-term initiatives designed to aid the recovery of Phi Phi
Focus Organisation* Projects (P) and Goals (G) Actions and outcomes benefiting Phi Phi’s destination community
G: To assist Phi Phi’s youth by The Phi Phi children were encouraged to express their grief and experiences, with the raising awareness and funds resultant pieces (writings and pictures) being presented in the form of 2 books Training Children of the Phi Phi to help families and children The proceeds of the books - entitled The Children of Phi Phi Islands and The Heart & Educa- Islands [N/F]# recover. of Phi Phi Children - were used to fund: children’s general education; training fami- tion ING Life Co. Ltd lies new skills, such as arts and crafts; teaching basic business skills; and teaching English. Small Entrepreneurs, G: To re-house Phi Phi tsu- Houses for 30 unregistered Phi Phi residents were built – Phi Phi residents that had Labour, and Com- nami victims & provide basic not registered Phi Phi as their place of residence with the RTG were ineligible for munity/Credit Union infrastructure post-tsunami government housing Perma- Cooperative of Phi Phi A new bridge was also built nent Islands Shelter Berlinger Company Ltd. & Infra- World Vision Interna- G: Provision of housing Funded and constructed the Tsunami Village consisting of 231 houses on privately structure tional donated land located on the mountain top above Laem Phaw (Cape Phaw) Support G: To provide financial assist- Raised funds for the rebuilding of the local school, hospital and sanitation facilities. Friends of Phi Phi ance for the rebuilding of Association basic infrastructure G: To financially support Bought 30 long-tailed boats for fishing and tourism activities the rebuilding of Phi Phi & Funded the provision of 60 pensions for elderly community members for the duration distribute aid in a transpar- of 7 months Phi Phi Reléve Toi ent way that benefits those in Supplied rental assistance for people returning to Phi Phi for 4 months [N/F] most need. Offered micro-credit schemes Bought fire-fighting equipment for the community & a beach grader to remove glass and cigarettes from the sand. Financial G: To assist the recovery Offered interest free loans to micro and small businesses (interest-free component Swedish Micro-Credit & Liveli- of micro and small busi- enabled Phi Phi’s predominantly Muslim population access to credit) that were to Foundation hood nesses through the provision repaid when possible Thailand Islands Foun- Assist- of micro-credit as start-up As of March 2007, a total of 230 families have received loans ranging from Baht dation ance capital. 10,000 to Baht 100,000 & close to 60per cent of the loans had been re-paid G: To aid those affected by Provided financial assistance and goods needed for the restoration of livelihoods the tsunami in Phi Phi to help recovery including boats, gas cookers for food stall owners, and lifejackets for taxis Phi Phi Aid [N/F] themselves and rebuild their service boats lives and livelihoods Phi Phi Maphrao G: To aid the recovery of lives Purchased boat engines for fishermen Resort [N/F] and livelihoods Helped distribute donations with the help of NGOs and foreign embassies P: Awareness and Prepared- Conducted series of training seminars & workshops with senior industry advisors, UNEP ness for Emergencies at Local local government officials, and community members of Phi Phi (business owners, Swedish Rescue Service Level (APELL) for Phi Phi tourism workers, and representative group members) Agency (SRSA) G: To increase disaster pre- Department of Coastal Disaster paredness through disaster and Marine Resources Prepar- preparedness and emergency (MONRE) edness education Help International G: To increase disaster pre- Produced an evacuation map for the community in the event of another tsunami Phi Phi paredness threat that is now featured in most shops and hotel rooms. (Hi Phi Phi) [N/F] Danish International P: Re-establishment of waste- A wastewater collection system for the main business and hotel area (covering 32 Development Agency water management services hectares) was established that included the introduction of a solar-powered pump (DANIDA) (wastewater collection and station and a user-pay fee system Asian Institute of Tech- treatment) on Phi Phi Don The existing wastewater treatment pond was converted into a 0.64 hectare con- nology (AIT) Department structed wetland system that included landscaping of Pollution Control (Wastewater Manage- ment Authority) P: Palm Tree Recovery & The project focused on strengthening the underground palm tree root system and Environ- Replanting Project halting erosion mental To achieve this, surviving coconut tree root systems were replanted and a further 300 Rehabili- Hi Phi Phi [N/F] new coconut trees planted tation Phi Phi locals expect the roots to develop into fully grown trees within approximately 10 years P: Restoration of the coral Debris was removed from the reefs, sandy substrates, beaches and rocky peripheries reefs to negate further coral damage and help restore the beauty and attractiveness of Phi Phi Phi Tsunami Dive Phi’s coastlines Camp [N/F] Long-term coral reef monitoring and restoration projects were established PATA A model education program aimed at educating travelers and the local community on how to help protect the Islands’ natural resources and promote sustainable tour- ism was set up
Sources: ADB, 2006a, UNEP-DTIE, 2006, Persson, 2007, Phi-Phi.com, 2008, Phi Phi Aid, 2009 * Organisations marked in bold are the leading organisation of each strategy, with those in non-bold indicate supporting partners. # N/F denotes those newly formed community-based organisations that arose in reaction to the tsunami event
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6 Strategies for building more resilient tourism destination communities
he comparative vulnerability assessment of Patong, • Broad stakeholder participation in community- TPhi Phi and Khao Lak to the 2004 tsunami provides based and industry representative groups, which valuable insights into those factors and conditions that creates a platform for social leaning and collective create, maintain, and increase destination vulnerability action; levels, and those that strengthen a destination’s resilience to shocks. Destination community resilience • Open and responsive governmental bodies and in the context of the tsunami was strengthened by the international industry bodies that respond quickly following factors: to industry needs including marketing support;
• Appropriate building types and location – in the • The existence of established public-private case of the tsunami, reinforced concrete structures linkages and engagement, particularly those linked proved the most resilient; to higher scales of governance; and
• Strong destination market identity and branding; • Resourceful business owners that transform adversity into new opportunities. • Varied tourist market-base and tourist products; Yet there are persistent weaknesses and emerging • Low seasonality levels – directly related to weather sensitivities that increase destination vulnerability and patterns and tourist markets; require attention, improvement and fortification.
• Diversified livelihood portfolios (including • Limited savings, poor credit histories, and multiple tourism businesses in various destinations diminished financial reserves coupled with and alternate industries) compounding debt from both pre-existing and new loans needed for rebuilding; • A resilient and loyal repeat client base that provide support through the return of their business and • Limited financial credit options for micro and encouraging friends and family to return; small business enterprises due in part to strict and inflexible bank lending conditions; • Possession and access to liquid financial assets; • Low insurance coverage; • Established credit histories; • Strong reliance on seasonal tourism-related • Strong family and social networks that provide employment and business returns; personal support and help in accessing financial, human and social capital; • Heavy reliance on marketing strategies and preferences of national marketing support • A varied skill base that enables greater employment organisations and international tour operators; options and mobility in times of business and employment disruption; • Low skill levels among tourism workforces and villagers who are, in turn, excluded from the • Knowledge about and access and entitlements to monetary benefits of tourism; social security; • Social exclusion of new destination residents and • Strong and well-connected (politically and minorities that leave these sub-groups with few socially) industry representative bodies and local support options in times of stress; community leaders that stimulate positive action, facilitate greater access to resources through • Poor knowledge of risk and mistrust in disaster multiple avenues and initiatives, and help build preparedness strategies; community cohesion;
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• The persistence of governance weaknesses – a lack 2 Improve environmental awareness and of capacity in local levels of government along provide adequate infrastructure with financial constraints, departmental overlap, Infrastructure limitations and resource mismanagement limited political engagement, and corruption – that has caused environmental degradation in both Patong reinforces the uneven distribution of resources and Phi Phi which threatens the appeal of the physical and hinders the successful implementation of environment, on which the destinations rely heavily tourism development strategies designed to build to attract tourists. Phi Phi’s substandard waste water destination resilience; treatment facilities and the absence of a central garbage disposal system has polluted Phi Phi’s onshore • Limited monitoring of planning and development and surrounding marine environment. High levels of codes enables planning violations, land water pollution found in Patong prior to the tsunami encroachment on public lands, misuse of natural were also a consequence of the inadequate treatment resources, and environmental degradation; of waste water; only half of Patong’s wastewater is treated before being discharged into Patong Bay. No • The absence of regular monitoring of Early Warning substantial improvements have been made to basic System technology functionality and sporadic infrastructure, waste management systems, and local disaster preparedness training undermines the governmental environmental monitoring activities in effectiveness of the system and generates mistrust either Phi Phi or Patong, leading to further degradation. its reliability; The return of high nutrient levels in Patong Bay caused three algal boom events in 2007 alone, prompting • Inflexible governance systems that impede an increase in tourist complaints about the sea water beneficial adjustments in the face of change; quality and the degradation of coral reefs in the Bay due to eutrophication. If past waste management mistakes • Inadequate infrastructure and wastewater are not addressed, and waste management is not greatly management facilities, leading to environmental improved there is a high possibility that pollution degradation; problems will substantially damage the supporting ecosystems in Patong, Phi Phi and potentially Khao • A lack of political engagement between local Lak to such an extent that will threaten not only the governance bodies and community members success of the destinations’ main livelihood (tourism) leaves the populace with little support and no but also long-term habitation. platform for discussing and resolving community challenges and needs. Discussions with stakeholders in all three destinations have prompted calls for a four-step approach to In light of these collective findings we propose eight improve resource conservation in tourism destinations. action points that aim to reduce vulnerabilities and First, increase community awareness on the importance build long-term resilience in tourism destination of good environmental management for long-term communities against future stressors and shocks. tourism returns and quality of life. This includes raising awareness on the harmful impacts of tourist 1 Create more accessible funding sources activities (including diving, snorkelling and water for micro and small businesses sports) on sensitive ecosystems that attract tourists. Accessing credit proved to be one of the largest Second, provide training for destination community obstacles smaller enterprises faced following the members, tourism businesses and staff on best tsunami disaster. Additional credit was not only a practice with regard to the management of solid waste necessity for those businesses that sustained physical and wastewater and the sustainable use of natural damage; additional credit was also needed to keep resources, and introduce strategies to reduce resource businesses operating during the long-term recovery consumption (recycling being one example). Third, phase to bridge the financial gap between pre-tsunami ensure that the appropriate infrastructure is in place earnings and those gained from modest tourist flows to effectively process wastewater and solid waste in and earnings. Therefore there is a pressing need to destination communities – a government responsibility provide alternate financial credit options and solutions that was found wanting in all three destinations. Fourth, for national and foreign business owners that have create vigorous environmental monitoring systems that flexible terms and repayments options. Micro credit monitor, enforce, and evaluate environmental standards schemes like the Swedish Micro-Credit Foundation’s and management procedures. Whilst regulation initiative used in Phi Phi are one option. enforcement is the responsibility and falls under the jurisdiction of government authorities, environmental
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conservation and its success is a common responsibility Such mechanisms will improve transparency and trust that requires community ownership of the issues, between the private and public sector (particularly at community-driven monitoring and regulation based the TAO sub-district level) and heighten accountability on a shared environmental consciousness, and the among industry and governmental actors. For this adoption of more sustainable business practices. to be successful, greater government support is required from higher levels of government (including 3 Strengthen institutional coordination those representatives working at the provincial/state and support to advance public-private and national level) to oversee and strengthen local interaction and engagement governance and support long-term tourism development Strong leadership and effective institutions provide visions, strategies and standards. the enabling governance, socioeconomic, and cultural conditions required for building resilience in coastal 5 Build government capacity at the local communities (US-IOTWS, 2007). Accordingly, level mutually accountable partnerships between Strategies aimed at facilitating transparent resource government authorities, destination communities, distribution and monitoring cannot be achieved without tourism representative groups, and informal civil building capacity at the local level of government where collectives need to be developed and strengthened financial resources, skill levels, and human capacity to alleviate social exclusion, mistrust and frustration are often limited (ASIST-AP, 2004). Improving and enable meaningful and informed participation tourism planning knowledge and skills among local in decision-making processes and future tourism government departments and increasing awareness on development. Experiences from Patong, Khao Lak the importance of environmental management enables and Phi Phi show that the successful design and a deeper understanding of tourism needs and facilitates implementation of robust development plans cannot be effective engagement with destination communities accomplished without public-private collaborations; on wider development priorities and complementary the private sector have the knowledge and market planning strategies. These wider priorities encompass insights needed to advance tourism development whilst tourism planning, enhancing community participation, the government is needed to provide a supporting role infrastructural requirements, alternate industry sector in the management and monitoring of collaborative needs, environmental conservation and disaster plans. Yet for this collaboration to work there must be preparedness. Deeper engagement and involvement trust and accountability on both sides – this is currently on both sides also promote shared governance lacking in all three destinations. responsibility and accountability.
4 Improve equity and downward 6 Improve skills levels and diversify accountability livelihood portfolios The absence of systematic mechanisms of downward Language skill levels and hospitality skills were accountability and transparency in all three destinations found to be poor among the less educated community has led to planning violations and land encroachment members in all three destinations, decreasing their as well as the uneven distribution and misappropriation employment options. Improvements in both these of resources (including post-tsunami emergency aid). areas through regular training would enable greater Therefore, there is a need to create strong multi-scaled local participation in tourism-related livelihoods and government mechanisms that: access to greater financial benefits. Furthermore, improved foreign language skills of those small beach • Monitor long-term tourism development activity operators would enable them to better assist and increase the consistency of tourism plan and instruct tourists in emergency situations, thereby implementation; creating a safer environment. Knowledge about training programs and accessibility is also a challenge for some • Oversee and enforce development regulations and sub-groups due to time constraints, costs (which for the zoning that are consistent with strategic long-term most part are set purposely low), and a mismatch of sustainability goals; and existing language capacities and appropriate courses. Courses could be centrally advertised and run through • Chart the capacity and effectiveness of local existing local industry representative organisations government and monitor the transparency of their in the destinations to increase accessibility but actions and related decision-making processes. financial backing is needed from government sources. Accessibility could be improved through the formulation of sub-group specific training and language
67 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
programmes that cater to common education levels and 8 Provide disaster and risk preparedness sub-group availability. training at the local level The communities of Khao Lak, Phi Phi and Patong A high dependency on seasonal tourism was also believe that increased awareness and preparedness proven to be a major contributor to destination does more than promote safety; together they instil vulnerability. Therefore, alternative livelihood options community and investment confidence in livelihood and the expansion of livelihood portfolios need to be resilience. The installation of the early warning considered to boost income flows throughout the low system was a positive step toward achieving this goal. season and in times of tourist flow disruptions. However, evidence from this comparative assessment demonstrably shows that the installation of early warning 7 Strengthen business associations and system technology must be accompanied by (1) routine increase micro and small enterprise maintenance of the technology and evacuation routes membership in the destinations and (2) regular disaster preparedness Strengthened public-private linkages need to be training and updated risk and procedural information complemented by stronger and more inclusive dissemination for the communities. Regular disaster community networks and tourism representative preparedness exercises increase trust and confidence bodies headed by strong, active and visionary leaders in the system and prevent unnecessary confusion and that foster social and corporate responsibility and injuries during events. action. The advantages of industry representation are three-fold: The successful execution of a robust monitoring and maintenance strategy requires additional financial and • Representative group membership provides a forum technical support for the local authorities responsible for knowledge sharing among like businesses, the for this additional task, both of which are lacking. The development of common goals and overcoming absence of regular disaster preparedness training is of challenges, thereby precluding conflict and also attributable in part to local financial constraints. damaging competition; Another constraint for delivering effective disaster preparedness training in destination host communities • Industry representative bodies create platforms for is timing. Training and drills need to be run in the proactive participation in development processes tourism low seasons to enable the participation of and form a collective voice needed to effectively smaller operators and employees. The dissemination of petition government departments and other industry up-to-date knowledge on possible risks and appropriate actors for desired change and advancement; and responses is also imperative. Such information could be circulated through a local disaster preparedness centre • The collective knowledge and expertise of or committee. Other dissemination methods include members along with their combined connections direct-line early warning systems to hotels, resorts to business networks, social contacts and political and restaurants, local radio, radio links to temples and forums become a common resource for mobilising mosques, and community announcement points. multi-scaled actions and securing favourable results.
Despite the recognised benefits of industry representation, membership amongst micro and smaller enterprises was low due largely to time constraints and a widespread perception that SME needs are not given enough credence by larger enterprises. Yet the shock of the tsunami has spurred a greater SME interest in membership and participation, an interest that needs support to sustain interest and become active participation. A natural starting point for greater SME representation is an integration of SME interests into the agendas of existing tourism representative organisation and connection between SME sub-sets throughout the southern Andaman Region.
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Appendix 1: Open-ended interview design and implementation
1. Overview and rationale of use of three from the identified groups was set based on The aim of interviews is not to be representative expected reasonable coverage of experiences within but to gain insights into the complexities of social and across the destination sites (Quinn Patton, 1990). phenomena through the subjective eyes of social actors Participants were chosen using: that form part of the social tapestry (Valentine, 1997, Winchester, 2005). Valuing the subjectivity of data • Hotel listings provided by the TAT and the Phang collection, interviews reveal how individuals make Nga Tourism Association that indicate the size of sense of their social world and act within it (May, hotels in terms of rooms and the contact details. 2001). The advantages of using open-ended interviews to explore destination vulnerability in multiple • Tourism stakeholder listings provided by NGOs communities are twofold. First, they promote a two- that had undertaken tsunami-related work in the way dialogue between the researcher and participant, destination areas. whereby information is exchanged, reflected upon and preconceptions on both sides verified and/or challenged • Snowballing techniques, including personal (Dunn, 2005). Second, open-ended interviews create referrals and introductions. These were very opportunities for participants to voice what is most effective in securing new stakeholder interviews relevant and important to them (Dunn, 2005), while in each community and creating a rapport. This providing a structure for comparability (May, 2001) sampling technique allowed the team to remain between stakeholder groups and across destination flexible in the ‘field’ and follow unexpected sites. avenues of enquiry (Brockington and Sullivan, 2003). 2. Objectives The main objectives of the open-ended interviews are • (d) Random sampling, based on tourism maps to: and street observations, was the most common sourcing method. This technique limited the • (a) Establish a developmental process of tourism problem of focusing on homogeneous groups and in each destination pre-tsunami and document shared opinions possibly held among friends and post-tsunami changes; colleagues (May, 2001).
• (b) Ascertain institutional responses to the Stakeholders were contacted via phone, email and in tsunami in each destination; person. The number of interviews was determined by financial and time constraints. A total of 279 interviews • (c) Identify the pre- and post-tsunami conditions were conducted by a team of three (authors) over a that influence vulnerability levels in each period of 3 months (January to early April). Each destination; and interview was carried out in a location suggested by the interviewee and lasted between 45 to 90 minutes. • (d) Investigate the interconnected nature of The familiarity of the interviewee’s surroundings both identified socio-political and environmental factors added to their comfort levels and awarded them some and the way they are constructed across a range of control over the interview process. Interviews were scales. taped unless participants expressed discomfort with recordings. In these instances, responses were written. 3. Sampling design and deployment The taping of the interviews facilitated a more natural The sampling strategy reflected the need to produce flow to the conversation and captured detail. Due to the a degree of replication between groups in each sensitive nature of some of the disclosed information, destination and across multiple sites (Punch, 2005). the identities of the participants will be kept confidential The participants interviewed reflect the spectrum of using pseudonyms. stakeholders that influence and contribute to tourism development in the case study sites, as well as those The interview design remained dynamic throughout the playing a role in the recovery. The groups represented research process. Questions derived from the literature in the sample are listed in Table 8 for Khao Lak, Table and document analysis were reviewed and reworded 9 for Patong and Table 10 for Phi Phi Don. A minimum throughout the fieldwork process as new information
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came to light making some pre-determined questions • A list of the participant groups in each destination obsolete. A list of the questions and issues raised with site, target numbers and actual numbers obtained the participants is listed in List 1. Stakeholder grouping was created to keep an ongoing tally that was also changed in the field to reflect the make-up of updated throughout the duration of the fieldwork businesses in each site. Two summary documents were (Table 8, Table 9, Table 10). kept and updated throughout the research process, providing an overview of what information had • A summary of all interview participants was been gathered and what information needs remained kept, creating a centralised record of who was outstanding: interviewed, when and the main issues raised (revised version shown in Table 11).
Table 8: Khao Lak interview stakeholder groups
Khao Lak Stakeholder Type Specifics Done (BNa & NTb) Accommodations (Resort / Hotel / Smallc (T) 3 3 Guesthouse / Bungalow) Small (F) 3 5 Mediumd / Largee (F) 3 1f Medium / Large (T) 3 9 Hotel / accommodation Staff 3 1 Tour operators Diving 3 2 Travel agent / operators 3 9 Guides N/Ag - Souvenir and gift shops 3 3 General Shop Incl. Grocery, drug store, photo. 3 2 Service Spa and Massage 3 3 Tailors 3 3 Book stores N/Ah - Beach Services: - Umbrellas, kayaks, beach vendors- N/Ai - Tourist Boats 3 2 Other (internet, laundry, taxis) 3 4 Restaurants, Cafés and bars Owners (T) 3 9 Owners (F) 3 2 Staff N/Aj - Support Organisations Khao Lak SME Group 1 1 Phang Nga Tourism Association 1 2 SME Bank 1 1 Step Ahead Foundation 1 1 4Kali.org 1 1 Tsunami Volunteer Centre 1 1 Tsunami Craft Centre 1 1 Ecotourism Education Centre 1 2 UN-WTO 1 1 Kenan Institute Asia 1 2 Buddhist Fellowship 1 1 North Andaman Tsunami Relief 1 1 Other Researchers in the field and freelance - 1 English trainer - 1
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Government departments and representatives TAO Khuk Khak 1 1 TAO Bang Muang 1 1 TAO Bang Nam Khem and 1 1 Community Leader Assistant Headman of Nang Thing Vil- 1 1 lage Khao Lak National Park 1 1 Department of Marine and Coastal 1 2 Resources Department of Disaster Prevention and 1 1 Mitigation Department of Public Works and Town 1 1 and Country Planning Strategic Planning Division 1 1 Phang Nga Provincial Office Plan and Budget Division 1 1 Provincial Administration Organisation Department of Disaster Prevention and 1 1 Mitigation Phang Nga Office of Tourism and Sport 1 1 Chamber of Commerce N/A - Department of Labour 1 1 Department of Skill Development Cen- 1 1 tre Dept. of Labour)
Notes: a Bang Niang b Nang Thong c Small hotels and bungalows were defined as those with less than 25 rooms. d Medium hotels and resorts were defined as those with 25-100 rooms. e Large hotels were defined as those with more than 100 rooms. f There are few large foreign resorts operating in Khao Lak. g Community members advised that few guides had remained in Khao Lak. Those still working as guides also ran travel agents/ operator businesses, thereby undertaking a joint role. hThere were no independent book stores in Khao Lak i The Phang Nga Tourism Association does not allow Beach Vendors to operate on the beach stating that this type of service is not what the Khao Lak market is looking for. j Most of the restaurants, cafés and bar are smaller ventures run and staffed by families.
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Table 9: Patong interview stakeholder groups
Type Specifics Patong Done Accommodations Small (T) 3 4 (Resort/Hotel/ Small (F) 3 3 Guesthouse/Bungalow) Med/Large (F) 3 4 Med/Large (T) 3 3 Hotel/Accommodation Staff 3 4 Tour operation Diving 3 3 Travel Agent 3 3 Guides 3 2 Souvenir & gift shops 3 3 Service Spa & Massage 3 4 Tailors - Owners 3 3 - Staff 3 2 Beach Services: - Umbrellas, Jetskis & 3 3 Beach Vendors - Boat operators 3 5 Car & motorbike hire 3 3 Taxis 3 2 Other (internet, laundry, 3 4 tourist police) Restaurants & bars Owners (T) 3 1 Owners (F) 3 3 Staff 3 4 Support Organisations TAT- Southern Region 1 1 Phuket Tourist Association 1 2 Phuket Professional Guides Association 1 1 Phuket Ecotourism Association 1 1 Tsunami Recovery Centre 1 1 Umbrella Group 1 1 Beach Massage Group 1 1 Shop Massage Group 1 1 Patong Beach Long-tail Boat Group 1 1 Beach Vendor Group 1 1 Government departments and representatives Tourism Rescue Centre (Navy) 1 1 Tourism Development Office, Phuket Municipality 1 1 Department of Marine and Coastal Resources 1 1 Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation 1 Regional Environmental Office, Phuket 1 1 Provincial Natural Resource & Environment Office, 1 1 Phuket Mangrove Resources Development Office, Phuket 1 1 Department of Public Works and Town and Coun- 1 1 try Planning Phuket City Hall (Office of Provincial Governor) 1 1
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Type Specifics Patong Done Kathu District Office 1 1 Provincial Centre of Tourism and Sport 1 Chamber of Commerce 1 1 Department of Labour, Phuket Office 1 1 Labour Skill Development Centre (under Dept of 1 1 Labour) SME Bank 1 1 Phuket Social Development Office 1 1 Phuket Community Development Office 1 1 Phuket Provincial Administration Organisation 1 1 (Planning & Policy) Phuket Provincial Disaster Prevention and Mitiga- 1 1 tion Office Phuket Tourism, Sport & Recreation Centre 1 1
Table 10: Phi Phi Don interview stakeholder groups
Area Type Specifics Phi Phi Don Done
Accommodations Small (T) 3 5 (Resort/Hotel/ Small (F) 3 2 Guesthouse/Bungalow) Med/Large (F) 3 1a Med/Large (T) 3 8 Hotel/Accommodation Staff 3 3 Tour operators Diving 3 3 Travel Agent 3 4 Guides 3 1b Souvenir & gift shops 6 5 General Shop Incl. Grocery, drug store, photo. 3 2 Service Spa & Massage 3 4 Tailors 3 1c Book stores 3 2d Beach Services: - Umbrellas, kayaks, beach 3 3 vendors - Tourist Boats 3 5 Other (internet, laundry) 3 Restaurants & bars Owners (T) 3 4 Owners (F) 3 5 Staff 3 3 Other Electricity Generator Operator - 1 Support Organisations Phi Phi SME Hotels Group 1 1 Phi Phi Tourism Club 1 1 Krabi Tourist Association 1 1 Swedish Microcredit Foundation 1 1 Phi Phi Dive Camp 1 1
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Area Type Specifics Phi Phi Don Done
Ko Phi Phi Marine Resource Conservation 1 1 Group Phi Phi Speed Boat Cooperative 1 1 Phi Phi Water Sport Group 1 1 Phi Phi Islamic Leader 1 1 Government departments and representatives Ao Nang Headman 1 1 Ao Nang TAO 1 2 Muang District Officer Phi Phi 1 1 Provincial Administration Office 1 4 Phi Phi Island National Park 1 1 Department of Marine and Coastal N/A - Resources Provincial Natural Resources and Envi- 1 1 ronment Office, Krabi Department of Disaster Prevention and 1 1 Mitigation Provincial Planning Strategy Office, Krabi 1 1 Department of Public Works & Town & 1 1 Country Planning Provincial Centre of Tourism and Sport, 1 1 Krabi Labour Bureau 1 1 Labour Skill Development Centre (under 1 1 Dept of Labour) SME Bank N/A - Provincial Public Health Office 1 1 Social Development Office N/A - a There are few foreign resorts (small/medium/large) on Phi Phi Don. b There are few tour guides on the Island. The long-tailed boat operators often take on duel roles as guides when escorting tourists on boat rides around Phi Phi Don and over to Phi Phi Leh. c There is only one tailor on the Island. d There are two book stores on Phi Phi Don.
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List 1: Open-ended interview questions and vegetation planned to help protect this area form issues storm surges or other natural hazards for the Focus: future? If so, what are they? If not, what not? • How is tourism in KL, Patong and Phi Phi scaled (in terms of power base and institutions)? • What was the condition of the natural environment before tourism development started in the area • What factors cause vulnerability and what societal (nature of coastal natural defence systems, namely structures perpetuate vulnerability? mangrove forests, reefs, sand dunes)?
□□Has the tsunami event triggered any changes in • Was this altered by tourism development? these structures of power? □□If so, in what way (removal of vegetation, • How do the communities rank these factors? reshaping of the natural landscape to make it suitable for building)? • To what extent do these communities self-organise and scale their actions to further their own agendas • What policies are in place to protect the coastal and goals (consolidation, enlisting help from environment in Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi? NGOs, local tourism representative groups)? • I read that Thailand has key conservation □□Have the communities learnt to adapt to shocks? legislation in place: In 1992, the Thai government adopted a Coral Reef Strategy in order to improve • What are the community’s needs now and what the management of coral reefs bordering Thai measures would help build resilient tourism coastline; and the Constitution of 1997 that livelihoods? enshrines the rights of local communities in conserving natural resources. Exposure of Khao Lak / Patong / Phi Phi to natural hazards: □□Are you aware of this strategy?
Target stakeholders: □□If so, who is responsible for implementing and managing this policy? TAT, local tourism representative groups, and lo- cal tourism community stakeholders, where ap- □□Do regional co operations with ASEAN for plicable. example assist in the protection of coastal resources in Phang Nga/Patong/Phi Phi (supra- • Which area sustained the most damage along the national)? Andaman coast—can you show me on a map? □□If so, do these policies affect tourism • What in your opinion led to the massive destruction development? of the tsunami on the built environment (force of the wave, lack of mangrove forests, lack of • Are there any obstacles to the successful vegetation, inappropriate buildings)? implementation and management of existing coastal management policy? • From an environmental perspective, what physical factors left the destinations so vulnerable? □□If so, what are they (lack of knowledge, manpower/capacity at local/regional level)? • What damage was sustained by the natural coastal zone and how long-lasting are the effects? □□What is being done to rectify these weaknesses?
• Were there any coastal defence mechanisms in • How are these policies managed and which place (natural or man-made) to stop the force of governmental departments are responsible for the tsunami or even storm surges? managing the coastal zone areas?
• Are any defence mechanisms such as seas walls • Have these policies changed post-tsunami? or the regeneration of mangroves and natural
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□□If so, how have they changed? □□Country: International vs. domestic?
• Who is responsible for enforcing these policies pre □□Independent travel (tour operators vs. individuals), and post-tsunami? group travel?
□□Are they enforced effectively? □□Have these markets changed post-tsunami and why? □□Are there any barriers to the enforcement of these policies? • How are the main markets sourced?
□□If so, what are they? □□Guide books, travel websites, tour operators (domestic vs. large international) • What are the benefits from these new rezoning laws (safety, coastal protection, etc.) from an □□Who controls access to these sources? environmental perspective? □□Has this changed post-tsunami? • Have any businesses violated the set-back lines or other environmental or building standards pre-and □□Did these market sources hinder or help access to post-tsunami? key markets post-tsunami?
□□If so, in what ways? • What type of tourism development is most prevalent in Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi) and why □□Have any steps been taken to rectify the violation (skill bases, access to financial resources, training of these building regulations including the set- possibilities, development approval)? backs? □□How many small/medium/large resorts and □□If not, why not? businesses are there?
Destination characteristics: □□Formal vs. informal workers and businesses and why?
Target stakeholders: □□What constitutes an informal business vs. formal (registration with government, size)? TAT, key tourism community stakeholders, tour- ism representative bodies. □□Are most tourism-related businesses foreign- owned or local enterprises (directly linked to type of development)? • How large is the tourism community in each destination site? □□What types of support businesses exist in Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi? □□What percentage of the local population is involved in this industry? □□Are most tourism-related businesses foreign- owned or local enterprises (directly linked to • How are each of the destinations defined in terms type of development)? of: □□Is the staff of these enterprises predominantly □□Geographical space/area local or brought in from other areas of Thailand and/or from overseas? □□Destination image and main attractions • Has the composition of ownership and workforce • When and how did tourism start in Khao Lak/ changed post-tsunami? Patong/Phi Phi? □□Were there problems with staffing resorts/tourism • Who are the main markets (high/low season) for support facilities post-tsunami? each destination and why?
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□□Did staff leave the resorts and why? □□How were these measures carried out?
□□How did businesses overcome this problem? □□At what scale(s) were they carried out / who were the main target groups/departments and why? Main actors in shaping destination development: Private sector • Have tourism groups formed any other collaboration to help push their agenda post- tsunami? Target stakeholders: National and local tourism representative bod- • Have the destination communities changed ies, key local stakeholders. their business/working habits in order prepare themselves for future shocks?
• Who are the main actors in shaping tourism □□Development type and patterns, strengthening development in each destination site? (associations, local networks or international/domestic key business investors) marketing links, more savings, insurance?
□□Why? • Have they used local networks to rebuild their livelihoods? • Are there any tourism representative bodies operating in Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi? □□If so, how have these networks helped?
□□Tourism associations, tourism support groups, • Are there any local elite/influence groups in Khao unions? Lak/Patong/Phi Phi?
□□What are their roles? □□If so, who are they and how did they gain power in the community? □□Who do they represent? □□How do they influence tourism development and □□Are all groups (including, the informal sector operations in each destination? and Burmese minorities) represented? Development process of tourism □□Across what scales do they operate (local/ destinations: provincial/central)?
• Have these groups influenced development and Target stakeholders: job conditions in each destination pre-tsunami? Tourism community stakeholders, local tourism representative bodies, and some for local TAOs. □□If so, how have their actions impacted the community? Livelihood profiles and diversification • Have these representative groups helped the • What type of business do you have (owners) or tourism recovery (rebuilding of businesses and work in (workers)? restoration of jobs) in Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi? □□For owners: Do you have another business or is □□If so, what types of actions have been taken? this the only one? If so, what other businesses do you have? How do you divide your time □□Did these groups act alone or did they work in between each of your businesses (high/low collaboration with other partners (who)? season, day/night)? Which business provides you with your main income source? If not, □□What were the main aims of the actions/ why have you chosen to focus on tourism for strategies? your income?
□□And who was involved in the implementation of □□For workers: Do you have another job in addition these strategies? to this job? If so, what is it and how is your
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time divided between these jobs (high/low • Did you have insurance? season, day/night)? If not, does your tourism job provide you with enough income for the □□If so, have the companies paid up following the whole year? tsunami?
• Why do you work/have you invested in tourism? • Have more businesses invested in insurance post- tsunami? □□Lucrative business venture, easy to start? □□If yes why do you think that is? • Do the earnings from tourism stay in the destination community or do they benefit outside interests? □□If not why not?
• Are there any negative impacts from tourism • What were the main funding sources for rebuilding development in each destination area? your business post-tsunami?
□□If so, what are they? (environmental, social, □□Savings? natural resource access) □□Commercial bank loans? • Is livelihood diversification a viable option for destination community members? □□Did funds from second businesses help to fund the rebuilding of tourism businesses? □□If so, what are the alternate options? □□Family and friends (social networks)? □□If not, why not (limited personal skills, limited access to fertile land, financial limitations, • Are you saving more of your income now after the time)? tsunami or have your savings levels remained the same? Legal regulations: • Is it easy to set up a tourism-related business? • What other types of financial services are available to the tourism businesses and workers and what • Do businesses have to register their business services do they provide? interest? □□Have new micro-credit schemes been created □□If so, who must register? post-tsunami to help the recovery?
□□Are there any reasons for businesses not to • To help businesses recover after the tsunami, as register (taxes, size)? part of the Andaman Recovery plan, the national government offered support in the form of tax □□Is this enforced? relief measures, and the establishment of special funds for the restoration of tourism businesses: □□If not, why? The SME Fund and the Tsunami Recovery Fund.
• Have the regulations to set up a business changed □□Are you aware of this? post-tsunami, and if so how? □□If yes, what do you understand of the special Economic resources: funds? • Where did you get the finances to begin your business pre-tsunami? □□Did you benefit from either the SME Bank loans or the Tsunami Recovery Fund? □□Savings, family assistance, micro-credit, bank loans (commercial banks or other)? • Did you benefit from commercial bank soft loans (with low interest rates) after the tsunami? • Did you have savings or assets to use, live off and rebuild with following the tsunami? • Are employees and employers entitled to social security payments if they lose their income?
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□□If so, what are the conditions of the payments? Effect of tsunami on people’s livelihoods:
□□Who controls their distribution and how often are they distributed? Target stakeholders: Local government representatives, local stake- Physical/natural resources: holders, local tourism representative bodies, • Do you own the land and/or building where your tourism stakeholders. business is located?
□□If you own the land and/building, did you buy it • How much have the communities lost in terms of of was it owned by the family? business revenue (numbers or percentage)?
□□If you rent, do you have a contract and how long • How much damage in terms of money and/ is the contract for? or infrastructure was done to your business/ workplace? • Are there any land ownership disputes over the coastal zone? □□For employers: How long did it take for you to reopen your business? What were business □□If so, what actions have been taken (social, levels like in 2005, 2006 and now in 2007? political, environmental) to alleviate these problems and at what level (national, regional, □□For employees: Were you working for your local)? current employer at the time of the tsunami? If you did, did you keep your job following • Are any groups excluded from accessing land? the tsunami? If you did, did your receive your full salary during the rebuilding and 2005 low □□If so, who are they and why? season? If you didn’t, what did you do for employment or income? Did you have any Skills base: support from family, friends or other social • What skills and training/education opportunities networks? Were you covered by staff insurance are available for the locals to draw upon to set up at the time of the tsunami and did you receive tourism-related businesses? your payments? If not, why not? When did you return to work? If you are a new employee, □□Is access to education and skills and resources where were you working before the tsunami equal among community members? If not, and why did you change jobs? what determines/blocks access? □□Who were the most vulnerable community □□Are there any training programs to enhance the members to losing everything and why? skill base of tourism workers post-tsunami? □□Employers, employees, casual workers, Burmese □□(ILO) Phang Nga Tourism Business Association workers many of which were working in Khao held training for retrenched workers to provide Lak/Patong/Phi Phi illegally. more skilled labour post-tsunami. • How long did it take to restore basics infrastructure □□(IBLF) Manpower retrained former KL (roads, sanitation, water supplies, communication tourism staff (bell boys, cleaners, gardeners) systems, housing, and energy supplies)? in landscaping golf courses, tailoring and massage. □□Were there any changes in quality and amount of infrastructure post-tsunami? □□Who has access to these programs and have these programs create new localised opportunities □□Were the changes appropriate? Why or why not? for livelihood diversification? Other shocks • Have other events such as political unrest in southern provinces, military coup, travel trends,
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SARS, terrorist attacks in other countries or □□If so, can you tell me what the main development economic down-turns affected tourism flows to goals of the latest Tourism Development Plan Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi? 2007-2009 are?
□□If so, what were the effects in terms of tourist □□Are there any differences between pre and post- flows, loss of business revenue/loss of jobs? tsunami TDP?
• Now after the tsunami, do you think that risks □□If so, what are the differences and why did from events or natural hazards have increased or it change (b/c of tsunami event or another do you still feel the same about risk levels to your reason)? business? • Are Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi included in the □□If so, what precautions are you taking to safeguard Tourism Development Plan 2007-2009? your business/job? • Who is involved in the formulation of the TDP? □□ Savings, insurance, diversifying your livelihood options? □□What level (national, regional, and local) are these goals decided upon? □□What did you (business owners/workers) do to survive financially when numbers are down □□Do any stakeholders dominate the plan (social security, family support)? formulation process?
• Were there any (other) planning and development Tourism governance structures: Policy, planning strategies for Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi pre- and implementation: tsunami?
□□If so, what were the plans/strategies? Target stakeholders: National tourism government departments, re- • Were local representatives involved in the planning gional and local government authorities where and decision-making process pre-tsunami? applicable, national and local tourism represent- ative bodies. □□If so, who participated and how did they participate?
□□Do these chosen representatives represent the Policy and planning: National and regional level whole community or just a specific interest group—and who are they? Interviewers’ notes relating to governance and power: □□If not, why not? • Ascertain governance processes and the • Has local representative involvement in planning way in which resource allocation decisions and decision-making changed post-tsunami? are made (nationally, regionally, locally). • Ascertain power relations and structures of □□If so, how? inequality – driven by preferences (social, political, economic). • Has the formulation process changed pre-and post- • Who is actively involved in the governance tsunami? of tourism (local government, NGOs, private sector, traditional structures, support □□If so, what are the differences? groups)? □□If not, why not?
• Are you aware of the Tourism Development Plan • The former TAT Governor mentioned in an article (TDP) 2007-2009? published in ‘The Nation’ newspaper in 2005 that there have been problems with the decentralisation
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process: the skills/knowledge from the TAT was □□What actions have been taken to solve these not transferred over to the Ministry, nor to the problems? CEO Provincial Governors. • What are the implications for stakeholders who □□In your opinion, have there been any problems ignore development regulations? with the transfer of responsibility from the TAT to the Ministry? • Do lower levels of government (Provincial/ District/Tambon) receive adequate support (skills/ □□If so, what is being done to help the situation? knowledge/supervision/monitoring power) from the central government in order to successfully Implementation and enforcement: National, implement and monitor plans? regional and local level □□Has support for local authorities increased/ improved since the tsunami? Target stakeholders: National tourism government departments, re- □□If so, why or why not? gional and local government authorities where applicable, national and local tourism repre- Policy and planning: Post-tsunami sentative bodies. • Has the composition of business ownership and types of workers changed post-tsunami – can you show me on a map? • In reality, how does the TDP shape tourism development in Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi? • Have development patterns changed post- tsunami? □□Is it effective and how is the success monitored? □□If so, how and which strategies have influenced □□If not, who/what are the main blockages to these changes? (Compliance with set-backs, successful implementation (lack of coordination, structure changes in building)? lack of capacity, skills and budget)? • Are you aware of the Andaman Recovery Plan (if □□What measures are being taken to solve these not, explain it to them – many times they don’t problems and at what are the scale(s) of know the name but know of the changes)? response? • Has the Andaman Recovery Plan been fully • Who is responsible for implementing the implemented in Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi? development strategies pre-tsunami (for tourism) in Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi? □□If so, which parts have been successful and why? □□How are the policies and plans implemented? □□If not, what are the barriers to the implementation □□And at what scale does this happen (national → of this plan (other plans, lack of political will, regional → local)? no leadership, recommendations do not match community goals or needs)? • Have implementation responsibilities changed post-tsunami? □□What steps have been taken to overcome these barriers? □□Why or why not? □□If there are other plans, what are these plans • Are there any problems with enforcing the plans? and how are they different from pre-tsunami plans? □□If so, what are the blockages and at what scale to they occur? □□for Phi Phi this will include DASTA Plans - ask the participants if they aware of this plan
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□□Is the implementation of these new plans Development and marketing of Khao Lak/ successful? Patong/Phi Phi post-tsunami
□□If not, what are the barriers to the implementation Target stakeholders: of this plan (lack of political will, no leadership, TAT, local tourism representative groups, and recommendations do not match community local tourism community stakeholders, where goals or needs)? applicable. • What are the implications on the rights of the hoteliers etc who already have dwellings in the • How many of the resorts have been rebuilt in set-back zones? each destination, percentages and numbers of businesses? • Are there any other measures (environmental plans, coastal buffer zones, tourism development • Have tourism flows been affected by the terrorist strategies) being undertaken to build resilience attacks in southern Thailand or the military coup? in Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi, both in terms of If so how strengthening the natural and built environment? • What collaborations have the Thai government Patong specific: For TAT and government made to strengthen tourism development in the officials region pre-tsunami? • The government has announced that Patong and other areas are to be rebuilt in line with strict • What links have the TAT made with other tourism principles of sustainable development and will bodies to strengthen the marketing campaign to be used as a model for future development in get people back to this area? Thai coastal tourism. TAT has been entrusted with overseeing the development of the Patong □□And what has been the outcome of this marketing Seaboard Redevelopment Master Plan which is campaign for each destination Khao Lak/ designed to bring ‘system and order’ to the Patong Patong/Phi Phi? beachfront. The model city planned for Patong will have a bicycle lane, good public transportation, • Has the TAT linked up with PATA to entice people sufficient parking areas and all other necessary back to the region? tourist amenities. Everything would be properly zoned. • What measures were taken by industry representative groups to get people back (promotions-through □□Why was Patong beach chosen for the first site? what means and conducted at what level, national Was it heavily destroyed by the tsunami? Or government campaigns or sourcing from regional did the tsunami provide an opportunity for markets instead of international)? redeveloping a badly developed/unsustainable/ environmentally degraded tourism attraction? □□Who has the power/the role and reach to get people back? □□Has this master plan for Patong Beach been started? Recovery plans and initiatives:
□□Who will be responsible for choosing future sites earmarked for redevelopment under the plan? Target stakeholders: And who will be responsible for implementing NGOs, Private Sector Groups. and enforcing the plan? • What are the main aims and objectives of the □□How does the Patong Master Plan fit in with the recovery strategy/program? wider Andaman Recovery Plan? • Was the community given an opportunity to help design the program?
• Who are the main partners?
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• How were these partners chosen? • Is this project interlinked with other projects?
• What is/was the time frame for the project and □□Sub Regional Development Plan for Andaman why? Region, Andaman Recovery Plan?
□□Monetary constraints, interest, new disaster □□If so, how is this interlinkage managed? (short-term vs long term goals)? □□How do organisations relate/communicate with • Is project designed for disaster relief/immediate each other/avoid duplication? coping strategies/long-term resilience building strategies? • Can the tourism communities rely on ongoing assistance once the project finishes? • Who is funding the project? □□What provisions have been made for long-term • Which group/area does it target? capacity building and support?
• What is the organisation’s history with their chosen □□Who will take over the responsibility of the area? programs implementation on completion?
• Why did they choose this area or community □□Who are the chosen parties and why were they (agenda behind initiative)? chosen?
• How has the destinations characteristics changed □□Have/will these chosen parties be trained? pre → post-tsunami? □□How will the success of the program be monitored • How were the needs of the target community/area and by who? assessed? □□If no provisions have been made, what will the • How does this project aid capacity building in the ramifications be for the community? community/area?
• At what scale(s) is the project implemented and what is the process of implementation?
□□Is the community involved with the implementation of the program?
□□If so, how do they participate?
• How is the success of the project monitored and who is responsible for this?
• Are there any blockages to implementation procedures?
□□If so, what are these and at what scales do they occur?
□□What measures have been undertaken to overcome these blockages and at what scale?
□□If none have been taken, why not?
96 s t o c k h o l m environment i n s t i t u t e
Table 11: Open-ended Interview Participants in Khao Lak, Patong, and Phi Phi Don
Interview Date of interview Institution/Participant
BANGKOK 1 10.01.07 Chumchon Thai Foundation (CTF)
2 10.01.07 Thai Fund Foundation (TFF)
3 11.01.07 RECOFTC Capacity Building Coordinator Kasesart University 4 11.01.07 RECOFTC Thailand Collaborative Country Support Program Director Kasesart University 5 11.01.07 ACTPPR Research Centre 6 12.01.07 Senior Researcher Thailand Institute of Scientific & Technological Research (TISTR) 7 15.01.07 Thai Professor Institute of Environmental Research Chulalongkorn University 8 15.01.07 IUCN Asia Regional Office, Bangkok Projects Coordinator Thailand Programme IUCNThailand Programme Manager 9 15.01.07 WWF Thailand 10 16.01.07 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Senior Specialist Employers Activities for East Asia ILO Tsunami Response Coordinator 11 17.01.07 ADPC 12 18.01.07 Thailand Environmental Institute (TEI) 13 18.01.07 National Economic and Social Development Broad (NESDB) Plan and Policy Analyst 7 14 18.01.07 The Office of Natural Resource and Environmental Plan (ONEP) Plan and Policy Analyst 15 19.01.07 UNESCO Project Assistant Education for Sustainable Development
Project Officer Office of the Regional Advisor for Culture in Asia and the Pacific KHAO LAK, PHANG NGA PROVINCE 16 20.01.07 Project Researcher Department of Geography Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences National University of Singapore 17 21.01.07 Foreign Local Tour Operator Local Guide Nang Thong (builds upon pilot study interview 12.07.05)
97 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
18 22.01.07 General Manager & Owner Thai Large Resort Nang Thong
Former President of PNTA (builds upon pilot study interview 09.07.05) 19 22.01.07 Thai restaurant Owner Nang Tong 20 22.01.07 Front Desk Manager Thai Large Resort Nang Tong (builds upon pilot study interview 09.07.05) 21 23.01.07 Thai Small Guesthouse Owner Thai Food Restaurant and Guest House Bang Niang 22 23.01.07 Project Coordinator Ecotourism Education Centre Bang Niang 23 23.01.07 Director/General Manager Thai Large Resort Bangsak Beach
President Phang Nga Tourist Association 24 23.01.07 Project Coordinator UN-WTO 25 24.01.07 Managing Director & Owner Thai Medium Resort 26 24.01.07 Thai Café Owner Bang Niang 27 24.01.07 Manager – Phang Nga Site Kenan Institute Asia Baan Kaolak, Lamkaen, Thaimuang, Phang Nga 28 21.01.07 & Foreign Bungalow Owner 25.01.07 Bang Niang Beach
Founder of Khao Lak SME Group (builds upon pilot study interview 30.08.05) 29 25.01.07 Thai Restaurant Owner Bang Niang 30 25.01.07 Programme Coordinator 4Kali.org Thailand Headquarters Bang Niang 31 25.01.07 Thai Noodle Restaurant Owner Bang Niang 32 25.01.07 Thai ex-owner of restaurant Bang Niang 33 25.01.07 Thai Medium Resort Co-owner Bang Niang 34 26.01.07 TAO Representative TAO Khuk Khak
98 s t o c k h o l m environment i n s t i t u t e
35 26.01.07 Foreign Bungalow & Café Owner Bang Niang 36 26.01.07 Thai Medium Bungalows Owner Nang Thong 37 26.01.07 Thai Tour Agency Nang Thong 38 26.02.07 Khao Lak National Park Representative 39 26.01.07 Thai Travel Agent Nang Thong 40 26.01.07 Three Massage Workers Nang Thong Beach 41 26.01.07 Thai Travel Agent Nang Thong 42 27.01.07 Thai Owned Bungalow & Internet Service Bang Niang 43 27.01.07 Thai Tourist Boat Operators Bang Niang 44 28.01.07 Laundry Service Owner Bang Niang 45 28.01.07 Grocery Store Owner Bang Niang 46 28.01.07 Thai Restaurant Owner Bang Niang 47 28.01.07 Thai Tour Operator Nang Thong 48 28.01.07 Program and Project Coordinator Buddhist Fellowship Singapore 49 29.01.07 Phang Nga Tourism Association Representative Bang Niang 50 29.01.07 Foreign/Thai Small Guesthouse Owners Bang Niang 51 29.01.07 Tourist Information and Tour Booking Service Bang Niang Beach 52 29.01.07 Photo Shop Owner Bang Niang 53 29.01.07 TAO Representative Bang Muang TAO 54 29.01.07 TAO Representative TAO and Nam Khem Community Leader 55 30.01.07 Manager Large Thai Resort Nang Thong 56 30.01.07 Foreign Small Resort Owner Bang Niang 57 30.01.07 Director North Andaman Tsunami Relief Training Resource & Education Centre Kuraburi Phang Nga
99 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
58 30.01.07 Head of Mangrove Station 17, Kuraburi (DMCR)
Head of Mangrove Station 19, Thai Muang (DMCR) Lam Ken sub-district, Tai Muang district, 59 31.01.07 Foreign/Thai Small Resort Owner Bang Niang 60 31.01.07 Phang Nga Business Centre Manager SME Bank Muang district, Phang Nga 61 31.01.07 Head of Strategic Planning Division Phang Nga Provincial Office 62 31.01.07 Plan and Budget Division Representative Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO) 63 31.01.07 Head of Disaster Relief Division Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Phang Nga Province 64 01.02.07 Managing Director Ecotourism Training Centre Bang Niang 65 01.02.07 Foreign Restaurant Owner Bang Niang 66 01.02.07 Tsunami Craft Centre Manager Bang Niang 67 01.02.07 Thai Co-owner of Small Resort Bang Niang Beach 68 01.02.07 Director Kenan Institute Asia Environment & Sustainable Development Division Baan Kaolak, Lamkaen, Thaimuang 69 02.02.07 Thai Restaurant & Small Bungalow Owner Nang Thong 70 02.02.07 Manager Diving Operator Nang Thong Village 71 02.02.07 Tourist Representative Thai Travel Agency Nang Thong Village 72 02.02.07 Souvenir Shop Owner Nang Thong 73 02.02.07 Souvenir Shop Owner Nang Thong 74 02.02.07 Thai Massage Parlour Owner Bang Niang 75 02.02.07 Tour information-taxi service-laundry Nang Thong Beach 76 04.02.07 Thai Restaurant & Small Guesthouse Owner Nang Thong (builds upon pilot study interview 13.07.05) 77 04.02.07 Thai Medium Resort Owner Nang Thong Beach
100 s t o c k h o l m environment i n s t i t u t e
78 05.02.07 Executive Assistant Manager Thai Medium Resort Khao Lak Beach 79 05.02.07 Tailor Nang Thong 80 06.02.07 General Manager Thai Medium Resort Nang Thong Beach 81 06.02.07 Tailor Nang Thong Village 82 06.02.07 Tailor Nang Thong 83 06.02.07 Foreign Travel Agent Bang Niang (builds upon pilot study interview 10.07.05) 84 06.02.07 Urban Planning Department Phang Nga Province 85 07.02.07 Tsunami Volunteer Centre Representative Khao Lak 86 07.02.07 Foreign Diving Operator Manager Nang Thong Village 87 07.02.07 Director Department of Labour Phang Nga 88 07.02.07 Representative for Department of Skill Development Phang Nga 89 07.02.07 Thai Restaurant Owner Nang Thong 90 07.02.07 Thai Massage Parlour Owner Nang Thong 90 08.02.07 Foreign Café Owner Nang Thong Village 92 08.02.07 Assistant to Manager Large Foreign Resort Laem Pakarang 93 08.02.07 Step Ahead Representative Micro Enterprise Development Training Centre Bang Niang 94 08.02.07 Thai Tour Agency Nang Thong 95 08.02.07 Thai Souvenirs and Décor Shop Owner Nang Thong Beach 96 08.02.07 Village Headman & Thai Medium Resort Owner Nang Thong Village 97 09.02.07 English Trainer Khao Lak 98 09.02.07 Assist. Director. Of Office of Tourism and Sport Centre Phang Nga 99 09.02.07 Laundry Owner Nang Thong
101 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
100 09.02.07 Small Thai Resort Owner Nang Thong 101 10.02.07 Assistant Headman & Taxi Driver Nang Thong PATONG BEACH, PHUKET PROVINCE 102 12.02.07 Assistant Director Tat Southern Office – Region 4 103 12.02.07 Labour Academics Staff Department Of Labour – Phuket Office 104 12.02.07 Head Of Phuket Strategic Plan, Phuket City Hall 105 12.02.07 City Planner 7 Department of Public Works And Town And Country Planning – Phuket Office 106 13.02.07 Executive Assistant General Manager Large Thai Hotel & Vice President Phuket Tourist Association (PTA) 107 13.02.07 Provincial Community Development Officer Phuket Community Development Office 108 13.02.07 Social Development 8 Phuket Social Development Office 109 14.02.07 & Managing Director 23.02.07 Travel Agency & Member of PTA & Phuket Recovery Centre 110 14.02.07 Plan and Policy Analyst Phuket Provincial Administrative Organisation 111 14.02.07 Chief of Phuket Provincial Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Office, Phuket, Provincial Disaster Prevention And Mitigation Office 112 15.02.07 General Manager Medium Foreign Report 113 15.02.07 Manager Medium Foreign Resort 114 15.02.07 Director Phuket Tourism Sport And Recreation Centre 115 16.02.07 Tailor Employees Tailor Shop 116 16.02.07 Travel Agent Rooms, Travel Agent and Car Rental 117 16.02.07 Front Desk Manager Medium Thai Resort 118 16.02.07 Labour Analyst Staff Labour Skill Development Centre 119 16.02.07 Head of Environmental Planning Regional Environmental Office 15 120 16.02.07 Head of Marine Biology, Ecology, and Coastal Resource Division Phuket Marine Biological Centre (DMCR) 121 17.02.07 Tailor Shop Owner Tailor Shop
102 s t o c k h o l m environment i n s t i t u t e
122 19.02.07 Assistant F/O Manager & General Manager Medium Thai Hotel 123 19.02.07 General Manager Tsunami Recovery Centre Representative Large Thai Hotel 124 19.02.07 Assistant Association Manager Tourism Association 125 19.02.07 Phuket Chamber of Commerce Board Representative Phuket Chamber of Commerce 126 20.02.07 Manager Foreign-Owned Dive Shop 127 20.02.07 General Manager Foreign-Owned Dive Shop 128 20.02.07 Account Manager Dive Shop 129 20.02.07 Chief of Mangrove Resources Development Station 23 Mangrove Resources Development Station 23 130 20.02.07 Head of Community Forest Management Division, Provincial Natural Resource And Environmental Office Phuket 131 21.02.07 Tailor Tailors Shop 132 21.02.07 Director Phuket Professional Guide Association 133 21.02.07 Travel Agent Travel Agency 134 21.02.07 Owner Souvenir Shop 135 21.02.07 Senior Deputy Head of Kratu District Office Kratu District Office 136 21.02.07 Tourism Development Staff Patong Municipality Office 137 22.02.07 General Manager/Owner Medium Thai Resort 138 22.02.07 Manager Foreign Medium Hotel 139 22.02.07 Manager Small Thai Hotel 140 22.02.07 Head of Local Occupation Group Beach Umbrella Group 141 23.02.07 Bar Owner And Manager Foreign-Owned Bar 142 23.02.07 Owner Thai Spa 143 23.02.07 Owner Thai Restaurant 144 23.02.07 Administration Manager Large Thai Resort 145 23.02.07 Head Of Local Occupation Group 2 Ex-Head Of Local Occupation Group 3 Beach Masseur Group
103 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
146 24.02.07 Managing Director Large Thai Resort & PTA Member 147 24.02.07 Taxi Driver Phuket Taxi Service Co-operative 148 24.02.07 Head of Local Occupation Group 4 Patong Beach Long-Tailed Boat Group 149 24.02.07 Tourist Fishing Boat Owner Fishing Shop 150 25.02.07 Owner Internet Shop 151 25.02.07 Member of Local Occupation Group 5 Speed Boat/Jet Boat Owner 152 25.02.07 Head of Local Occupation Group Beach Vendor Group 153 26.02.07 Manager Small Thai Hotel, Travel Agent, & Medical Clinic 154 26.02.07 Owner Foreign-Owned Bar Owner 155 26.02.07 Association Head of Local Occupation Group Shop Massage Group 156 27.02.07 Manager SME Bank- Phuket Branch 157 05.03.07 Owner Foreign-Owned Small Guesthouse & Restaurant 158 05.03.07 Owner Foreign-Owned Restaurant & Bar 159 06.03.07 Shop Manager Souvenir Shop 160 06.03.07 Travel Agent Worker Travel Agency 161 06.03.07 Manager Foreign-Owned Restaurant (Pub) 162 06.03.07 Car And Motorbike Rental Owner Car/Motorbike Rental 163 06.03.07 Restaurant Employee Restaurant 164 06.03.07 Souvenir Shop Owner Souvenir Shop 165 06.03.07 Bar Employee Patong Bar 166 06.03.07 Laundry Owner Laundry Shop 167 06.03.07 Tailor Shop Owner Tailor Shop 168 06.03.07 Accountant and General Hotel Management Large Thai Hotel 169 07.03.07 Manager Small Thai Hotel
104 s t o c k h o l m environment i n s t i t u t e
170 07.03.07 Travel Agent Travel Agency 171 07.03.07 Travel Agent Travel Agency 172 07.03.07 Head of Local Occupation Group 6 Patong Motorbike Service Cooperative 173 07.03.07 Masseur Thai Massage Shop 174 08.03.07 Guesthouse Owner Small Thai Hotel 175 08.03.07 Guesthouse Employee Thai Guesthouse 176 08.03.07 General Manager Medium Thai Hotel 177 08.03.07 Member of Local Occupation Group 1 Long-Tailed Boat Group 178 08.03.07 Member of Local Occupation Group 2 Long-Tailed Boat Group 179 09.03.07 Tour Guide Travel Agent 180 09.03.07 Tour Guide Travel Agent 181 09.03.07 Owner Internet Shop 182 09.03.07 Patong Tourist Police 183 10.03.07 Owner Small Thai Hotel 184 11.03.07 Guesthouse and Restaurant Co-Owner Small Foreign Hotel 185 11.03.07 Deputy Manager Thai-owned Bar 186 12.03.07 Member Of Local Occupation 3 Beach Vender Group 187 12.03.07 General Manager Small Thai Hotel Business 188 13.03.07 Head of Tourism Rescue Centre Tourism Rescue Centre (Navy) 189 13.03.07 Taxi Driver Small Travel Company PHI PHI DON, KRABI PROVINCE 190 15.03.07 Travel Agent Phi Phi 191 15.03.07 Travel Agent Phi Phi 192 15 .03.07 Head of Krabi Strategy Planning Krabi Town
Public Health Officer and Deputy Provincial Strategy Planning Krabi Town 193 16.03.07 Swedish Microcredit Foundation Phi Phi Don Branch
105 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
194 16.03.07 General Manager Dive Operator Phi Phi 195 16.03.07 Grocer Cooperative grocery of community Phi Phi 196 16.03.07 Souvenir shop owner Ton Sai Beach Phi Phi 197 16 .03.07 Provincial Centre of Tourism, Sport and Recreation Krabi Town 198 17.03.07 Book Centre and Souvenir Shop Ton Sai Beach Phi Phi 199 17.03.07 Thai Medium Guesthouse Phi Phi 200 18.03.07 Souvenir Shop Owner Phi Phi 201 18.03.07 Souvenir Shop Owner Phi Phi 202 18.03.07 Muang District Officer Phi Phi Branch Office 203 19.03.07 General Manager Large Hotel Phi Phi 204 19.03.07 Bar Manager Phi Phi Don 205 19.03.07 Restaurant Owner Phi Phi 206 19.03.07 Village Headman and Small Thai Hotel Owner Phi Phi 207 19.03.07 Tour Guide and Travel Agent Phi Phi 208 19.03.07 Civil Engineering The Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Krabi Town 209 19 .03.07 & Civil Engineers (x2) 05.11.09 Department of Public Works, Town and Country Planning Krabi Branch Krabi Town 210 20.03.07 Manager Dive Operator 211 20.03.07 Manager Thai Medium Hotel Phi Phi 212 20.03.07 Long-tail and Tourist Boat Operator Phi Phi 213 20 .03.07 Labour Bureau Officer Krabi Labour Bureau Krabi Town
106 s t o c k h o l m environment i n s t i t u t e
214 20.03.07 Departmental Representative Department of Natural Resources and Environment Krabi Branch 215 21.03.07 Foreign Bar Owner Phi Phi Don 216 21.03.07 Foreign Restaurant Owner Phi Phi 217 21.03.07 Thai Restaurant Owner Ton Sai Bay Phi Phi 218 21.03.07 Travel Agency Staff Phi Phi 219 21.03.07 Hotel staff Phi Phi 220 21.03.07 Pharmacy Owner Phi Phi 221 21.03.07 Chief Administrator of PAO Provincial Administrative Organisation Krabi Town 222 21.03.07 Head of Chief of Administrator Division, PAO Provincial Administrative Organisation Krabi Town 223 21.03.07 Ex-chairman of Krabi Professional Guide Association Provincial Administrative Organisation Krabi Town 224 21.03.07 Head of PAO Tourism and Sport Promotion Provincial Administrative Organisation Krabi Town 225 21.03.07 Head of Labour Training Division Krabi Labour Skill and Development Centre Krabi Town 226 22.03.07 Manager Diver Operator Phi Phi Don 227 22.03.07 Small business owner Phi Phi 228 22.03.07 Restaurant staff Phi Phi 229 22.03.07 Small Thai Resort Owner Phi Phi 230 22.03.07 Bar Staff Phi Phi 231 22.03.07 Office Representative Provincial Public Health Office, Krabi Krabi Town
107 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
232 22.03.07 President Krabi Tourist Association (KTA)
Managing Director Travel Agency
Headman Ao Nang District (Kamnan) Phi Phi 233 23.03.07 General Manager Small Thai Resort Phi Phi Don 234 23.03.07 Representative Nopharatara Beach – Phi Phi Islands National Park 235 23.03.07 Chief of Administrator Ao Nang TAO
TAO Legislator/Lawyer 236 24. 03.07 Executive Director Medium Thai Resort Phi Phi Don 237 24.03.07 Manager Dive Operator Phi Phi Don 238 25.03.07 Dive Master Dive Operator Phi Phi 239 25.03.07 Dive Shop Employee
Bungalow Owner
Ao Nang TAO member Phi Phi 240 26.03.07 Foreign Small Guesthouse Owner Phi Phi Don 241 26.03.07 Foreign Restaurant Owner Phi Phi Don 242 27.03.07 Massage Shop Co-owner 243 27.03.07 Owners Small Thai Guesthouse and Restaurant Phi Phi 244 27.03.07 Sales and Marketing Manager Large Hotel Phi Phi Don 245 28.03.07 Manager Travel Agency 246 29.03.07 – UNEP-led Workshop on ‘Disaster Risk Reduction in Tourism’ 30.03.07 Phi Phi 247 30.03.07 Bar Owner Phi Phi Don 248 30.03.07 Owner Restaurant and Medium Hotel Phi Phi Don
108 s t o c k h o l m environment i n s t i t u t e
249 30.03.07 Islamic Leader, Speed Boat Rental Business, Small Electricity Genera- tor Business Owner Phi Phi 250 30.03.07 Chairman Phi Phi Tourism Club& Medium Resort Owner Phi Phi 251 31.03.07 Waitress Phi Phi Don 252 31.03.07 Spa Manager Phi Phi Don 253 31.3.07 & Long-tailed Tourist Boat Operators 5.4.07 Phi Phi 254 1.04.07 Massage Shop Owner Phi Phi 255 1.04.07 Long-tailed Tourist Boat Operator 256 02.04.07 Bookshop Owner Phi Phi Don 257 02.04.07 Dive Operator Staff Phi Phi Don 258 02.04.07 Small Restaurant Owner Phi Phi Don 259 2.04.07 Massage Shop Co-owner Phi Phi Don 260 2.04.07 Laundry Shop Owner Phi Phi Don 261 2.04.07 Beach Umbrella Worker Phi Phi Don 262 03.04.07 Bar Co-owner Phi Phi Don 263 03.04.07 Manager Small Thai Bungalows Phi Phi 264 3.04.07 Accounting Staff Large Thai Hotel Phi Phi 265 3.04.07 Electricity Generator Operator Phi Phi 266 04.04.07 Reservations and Front Desk Manager Medium Thai Resort Phi Phi Don 267 04.04.07 Jewellery Shop Worker Phi Phi Don 268 04.04.07 Owner/Leader of SME Group Phi Phi Don 269 04.04.07 Medium Thai Hotel Manager Phi Phi Don 270 4.04.07 Local Laundry Shop Owner Phi Phi 271 4.04.07 Beach Kayak Worker Water Sport Group (Kayak, Wave Board, and Banana Boat) Phi Phi
109 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
272 4.04.07 Chairman, Speed Boat Cooperative Phi Phi 273 05.04.07 Restautant Owner Phi Phi Don 274 05.04.07 Human Resources Manager Medium Thai Hotel 275 5.04.07 Souvenir Shop Owner Phi Phi Don 276 5.04.07 Beach/Island Vendor Phi Phi 277 6.04.07 Chairman, Koh Phi Phi Marine Resource Conservation Club Phi Phi 278 07.04.07 Co-owners Large Resort Phi Phi Don 279 05.11.09 Deputy District Head of Muang Krabi Muang Krabi
Research Team: Emma Calgaro Macquarie University/Stockholm Environment Institute Sopon Naruchaikusol Stockholm Environment Institute-Asia Kannapa Pongponrat Stockholm Environment Institute-Asia
110 s t o c k h o l m environment i n s t i t u t e
Appendix 2: Case History Design and Implementation
Overview and rationale of use destination evolution provided a tapestry of ideas, Case histories of people, places and events collectively aspirations, goals, opportunities and limitations that disclose what happened, how, why and what it was like form the contextual conditions from which vulnerability from a personal perspective (George and Stratford, evolves. In keeping with the sampling process used for 2005: 107). Largely unconstrained by pre-determined the open-ended interviews, participants were chosen issues, these testimonials allow participants to speak using: for themselves and create their own texts (Brockington and Sullivan, 2003) whilst allowing the researcher to • Tourism stakeholder listings provided by NGOs track and understand the evolution of social processes that had undertaken tsunami-related work in the through time and space (George and Stratford, 2005). destination areas.
Objectives • Snowballing techniques including personal The main objectives of undertaking case histories in referrals and introductions. These were very the assessment of destination vulnerability are to: effective in securing new stakeholder interviews in each community and creating a rapport. • Establish the developmental processes of tourism in each destination pre-tsunami and document • Random sampling based on tourism maps and post-tsunami changes; street observations.
• Ascertain institutional responses to the tsunami in Stakeholders were contacted via phone, e-mail and in each destination; person. The case histories were undertaken between January and April 2007 by the three team members • Identify the pre- and post-tsunami conditions that (authors). Each case history was carried out in a location influence vulnerability levels in each destination; suggested by the interviewee and lasted between 60 and and 120 minutes. Case histories were taped unless participants expressed discomfort with recordings. In • Investigate the interconnected nature of identified these instances, responses were written. The taping of socio-political and environmental factors and the the interviews facilitated a more natural flow to the way they are constructed across a range of scales. conversation and captured detail. Due to the sensitive nature of some of the disclosed information, the Sampling design and deployment identities of the participants will be kept confidential The 31 case histories were collected with key using pseudonyms. informants and random stakeholders who embraced the opportunity to talk in length about their personal experiences. A summary of all the case histories undertaken is presented in Table 12. Evolving out of the foundational work obtained through the open-ended interview process, case histories provided more in- depth detail about the participant’s personal histories, their choices and motivations for choosing tourism as a livelihood source and the progression of their business/ working interests and opportunities over space and time. These testimonies also provided detailed insights into the way in which destination community members responded to, cope with and adapted following the disaster. Select oral histories conducted with founding members of each destination community also provided insights into how destinations as imagined spaces evolve over space and time and the multiple agendas that shaped each destination. Together these collective and personal accounts of livelihood choices and
111 comparative destination vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t f o r k h a o l a k , p a t o n g b e a c h a n d p h i p h i d o n
Table 12: Case histories undertaken in Khao Lak, Patong and Phi Phi Don
Date Participant Details
22.01.07 General Manager Participant provided information on: the financing of the recovery, construction aspects, of & Owner the recovery effort, political problems with rebuilding in a sustainable manner (no will and Thai Large Resort corruption payments), limitations to collaborations with provincial and local government Nang Thong authorities & marketing strategies and collaborations with TAT. Participant’s activity with the Phang Nga Tourism Association has diminished in the last 2 years because they have had Former President too much to worry about with rebuilding. They also commented that the Phang Nga Tourism of Phang Nga Association has not been so strong or active in petitioning for a strong recovery in the last Hotels Association year due to a lack of strong leadership. This just goes to show that organisations are only as strong or motivated as their leaders. Unfortunately the Association may have lost some power and effect through inactivity over the last 2 years. 23.01.07 Thai Small Guest- Participant talked about her experiences with rebuilding her business. She did not register house Owner her business. Unclear why. She says its east to start a business but she is currently struggling Thai Food Restau- to keep her business open. Her English boyfriends send money back from England to help rant and Guest her survive but she actually lies about the amount she needs. She asks for more and uses House this money to pay off credit card debt. She is afraid of him finding out how much she owes because she thinks that he will insist that she sell the business because it is costing them too much. 21.01.07 & Foreign Bungalow Provided detailed information on the politics of the recovery along with changes in type of 25.01.07 Owner development that could impair repeat tourist flows, problems of enforcing regulations, and Bang Niang getting access to funds to rebuild for small resorts and businesses particularly in Bang Niang. Beach Local elites get away with violating the new building regulations. Similarly, the power of the local elites is so ingrained in the system that the locals will not do anything against the wishes of the local elite. The informal governance system is not fair, still very corrupt and self- serving. Participant explained the predicament of each of the resorts and businesses in Bang Niang. Also discussed the current needs of the community & the Thai habit of not following advice given by a foreigner due to them not wanting to lose face – a stumbling block for successful business practices as sometimes Thais misunderstand what the western market wants. It also shows mistrust within the community. 25.01.07 Thai ex-owner of She used to have bungalow in Bang Sak, then she sold the bungalow to open a restaurant in restaurant Bang Niang instead. No insurance for this restaurant plus she got a loan from bank to open Bang Niang this. After tsunami, she received only THB20,000 from government and that’s all she got for assistance. She did not know how to receive assistance or any organization to help her. Til now she still cannot set up occupation again. Her husband works as tour guide which unreliable on income. People start to think she is mental sickness. 29.01.07 Tourist Informa- Before the tsunami, she had her own business in Nang Thong but now she works for a tion and Tour resort. She gave information about: corruption and inequality of assistance in the area, dif- Booking Service ference between high and low seasons, rebuilding her business after the tsunami, and amaz- Bang Niang ing support from repeat clients which are largely German. Beach 30.01.07 Manager This was a fantastic case history. It became very clear throughout the interview that this fam- Large Thai Resort ily has grown with Khao Lak (one of the original families) and they understand their market Nang Thong completely. They evolve with the market but know their strengths. They have built slowly so they do not have large loans. And even though they are a medium sized resort they do not rely on operator advertising for business. It’s all based on repeat clients and word of mouth. They are self sufficient in monetary terms and market terms = very resilient to shocks. They are also actively looking at ways to diversify their markets while retaining their unique market positioning. They do not have formal tourism training but this family is smart and they think in the long-term. They are a shining example of how to run a tourism business. The partici- pant also realizes that the tsunami created an opportunity for the TAT to learn more about tourism and become more actively involved in its development. She sees this as key for Khao Lak’s future development as a sustainable destination community.
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01.02.07 Managing Direc- This centre focuses on training young people to become leaders in their own communities (E) tor and in doing so is building capacity for the future. The training to become Diving Masters is Ecotourism Train- the means through which the centre aims to achieve this. The participant set up the centre ing Centre after noticing that very little funds or programs were directed at building capacity for young Bang Niang adults that were left with nothing following the tsunami in a community that relies heavily on tourism. Both aspects were being ignored. This centre benefits both the people and the sec- tor. Participant also spoke in depth about where the idea originated from and his personal journey which resulted in this work in Khao Lak. 06.02.07 Tailor Fantastic interview re Burmese workers rights. The participant is Burmese and runs a tailoring Nang Thong Vil- business in partnership with his friend. He came to Thailand in 2000 as an illegal immigrant lage and worked in Bangkok, Patong & now KL. He has a legal workers permit now but he still has to pay the police to ensure that they leave his business (which is legal) alone. Also his workers permit is only for Phang Nga – he cannot legally work in any other province and transferring this visa to another province is very difficult. His brother and friend only have immigrant working passes which give Burmese workers limited working options (construction and very low skilled jobs the Thais don’t want). But immigrant cards are only valid for a par- ticular job meaning that it is extremely difficult for Burmese workers to change jobs. To do so they need the permission of their current employer and their new employer in the new loca- tion and province. This leaves them very vulnerable to abuse by employers – if they are not paid they cannot even leave. They are tied both to the job and the mercy of the employer. The participant says that conditions for Burmese have improved a lot since the tsunami. The plight of the Burmese workers came under international scrutiny following the tsunami. This attention has attracted support from various NGOs that help illegal and legal Burmese with workers rights and give them a voice. They have no voice through the Thai government because many are illegal and will be deported (they are considered criminals by the Burmese government) but those that are legal are disliked by Thai and seen as thieves – this dislike is rooted in historical Thai-Burmese conflicts and still runs deep for Thais. From a business perspective, he is struggling like other tailors who rely on resorts to attract business to KL. He has borrowed from friends to cover shop rental and taxes. But he is still better off here in KL than in Burma so despite the business uncertainty and hassles with the police, he will remain in KL- he has no real choice. He has no access to tourism support groups. 07.02.07 Diving Operator The participant is the manager of a dive company – very nice and interesting guy. He was Manager here at the time of the tsunami and gave an account of that day and the immediate help Nang Thong Vil- that was received or not in this case –not all details of the stories were written down. For lage more detail, go to last quarter of tape. The owner of the dive shop is Swedish but has a Thai wife. The participant said the business has built back slowly due to the owner receiving no help from the Thai or Swedish government despite the fact that the original shop was totally destroyed along with the dive equipment and boat (all of which is very expensive to replace). It was located down next to the Happy Lagoon Restaurant and Bungalows across from Nang Thong Beach. He gave info on the strong client base (that was made even stronger as a result of the tsunami event), the slow recovery process, the lack of financial aid, price rises in KL to cover recovery costs, impact of negative press in 2005 but positive effect on long term tourist flows (most westerners know where KL is now), the cooperation between the dive com- munity members to help support each other during the 2005/6 season and funding initia- tives started by himself to help fund the community (www.diveaid.com). He also talks about the nature of KL in contrast to Phuket and who controls this. 09.02.07 English Trainer Very interesting but very sad. Participant was here just after the tsunami and stayed to help. Khao Lak She provided info on: KL characteristics pre and post tsunami, occupancy rates in some of the resorts, unequal distribution of funds and the lack of government support for tourism businesses in KL, impact of tsunami on the community and various stories of the survival and immediate impact on locals & English training in KL.
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PATONG 13.02.07 Executive Assistant Phuket Tourism Authority seems to be the powerhouse behind tourism development here. General Manager They organised the Phuket Recovery Centre and centralized help through this centre, linking Thai Large Resort up with all the relevant government departments here in Phuket and funding bodies. This Patong Beach way the populace that was affected had a one-stop shop for help and assistance re social Phuket security payouts, engineering and structural requirements for rebuilding, marketing drives, & lawyers, financial grants for rebuilding for all types of businesses including souvenir shops, Vice President resorts, tour operators etc. They even organised funding through member donations. They Phuket Tourist raised 3million BHT just from members to assist small business in their rebuilding. And they Association (PTA) even organised for payments to businesses that may not have lost property but business. Pretty amazing compared to KL that had no such centralised or organised body to do this. And not surprising they are still struggling. This case history was instrumental in understanding the central role the Association played in the recovery revealed how important it is to be able to access resources quickly and have strong leadership in streamlining this access. These points are KEY to reducing vulnerability. Patong may not be a good example of environmental protection but they are extremely well connected and organized when it comes to social networks and access to the right avenues of power and influence. Scale of action also very important here. 14.02.07 & Travel Agent Participant has two businesses (small hotel built after tsunami + Travel agency). Participant 23.02.07 Patong Beach provided info on: Phuket Tourist Association and their role in the recovery effort, the Phuket Phuket Recovery Centre, access to finances at the micro- small-medium- large business level, lack of & involvement of the government sector in shaping tourism development (private sector shapes Member of PTA & development in Phuket and this includes the influence tour operators have over the Phuket Phuket Recovery tourist product – this correlates with what was said in KL) the PTAs power and linkages to Centre all levels of governance and influence in Thai tourism circles. Not all is rosy for micro-busi- nesses. They have no credit rating as before the tsunami they never needed access to credit. Many have borrowed money from informal sources (other private stakeholders) but with an interest rate of 20% per month, its difficult for them to pay their debts back. This also creates money flow problems for the private lenders who can’t get their money back. Also advised on the land issues in Kamala – some small businesses built on public land. After the disaster, they struggled to get access to this land. 15.02.07 General Manager Participant provided information on: corruption in Phuket (tsunami aid money did not go to Medium Foreign the right people – it went to friends and family of local officials), self-help for the refinancing Resort of the recovery (rich vs opportunistic change in ownerships from those that could not access Patong Beach financing to start again to those that were waiting to take this opportunity to access shop space), lack of planning (lots of plans but those few that are implemented are not managed and maintained = failed plans due to no follow-up and wasted resources, occupancy, own- ership rates in Patong, key markets, pollution pre-tsunami and problems with effluent going directly into the sea, staffing (paid staff through recovery period to keep staff & help them) and training. Participant also commented on risk. There were also warnings transmitted from German satellites a few days prior detecting movement in the plates but this warning went unheeded due to the impact of a false warning on tourism numbers (interesting – check this out!).
Also advised on the links between Phuket over development and the growth of KL – develop- ment spilled over into KL for some Phuket business owners that were looking for new hori- zons. Participant’s friend was a hotelier in Phuket then decided to move business in KL as it was booming. Had just opened before tsunami when whole business was washed away. Now he is bankrupt. The family tailoring business started in Phuket and then branched out to KL. Add this to history of Patong – did not know this was the case before and haven’t flagged this in interview write-up as this was an afterthought that dawned on me later. 16.0.07 Tailor employee Participant is Burmese and had worked in Phuket for 6 years. He provided information on: Tailor Shop unequal treatment of Burmese working in Thailand (similar story to those from KL), no help Patong Beach for Burmese after tsunami, corruption payments to traffic and local police (despite having the correct papers), recovery of small businesses in Phuket, loans from friends and family & own- ership changeover of some small businesses, help from repeat guests.
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19.02.07 General Manager He and his PTA colleagues had such foresight and knew that getting tourism back asap was Thai Large Resort imperative not only for the stability of the tourism industry but the community as a while as Karon Beach tourism makes up 80% of development and business in Phuket. HUGE! The Tsunami Recov- & ery Centre was opened in the 2nd week of January 2005 – very quick initiative focussed on Tsunami Recovery both physically damaged businesses and those who lost business. Gave info on: importance Centre Repre- of access to information in facilitating quick recovery for both businesses & main tourist mar- sentative kets, the function and activities of the Tsunami Recovery Centre, access to multiple and multi- scaled avenues of power, creation of new support networks for small businesses with little access to financial support, and usage of website as central point for information sharing, promotion, recovery updates, logging of assistance needs of small businesses in particular, & lethargy of governmental support within 1st year. Also commented on impact of drops on tourist levels down supply chain (which includes local produce from farmers and fishermen) and perceptions of needs and the deserved (government looks good if they help ‘local com- munities’). This interview makes it very clear that the PTA and businesses run this town and were inte- gral to the recovery. They are the ones that instigated the idea of soft loans (government took credit for that under Andaman Recovery Plan), media drives and familiarisation trips for tour ops and media reps. This shows power of strong leadership, access to power avenues and know-how. Members of PTA drew upon their own resources to promote a quick recov- ery. Stark contrast between Phuket & KL. KL can only dream of type of organisation but then Phuket has had a long time to develop this. 21.02.07 Director It was clear when speaking to her that Phuket’s tourism community gets its strength from Phuket Profes- two things: the established nature of the community –it is 40 years old & it had very strong sional Guide associations and organisations that assisted the community members access the resources Association they needed to recover. Granted the association do not help every single stakeholder But they Guide & Travel do petition for resources on behalf of many businesses that help the majority recover. Gave Consultant information on: role of various associations in the recovery, overview of avenues of power at Phuket Town the provincial, municipality and local level. Also stated why Patong has been more successful in their recovery than Kamala _ Patong is governed by a municipality that oversees all devel- opment compared to Kamala that is ruled by the TAO that evidently is not so organised or strong. 24.02.07 Managing Direc- The participant is essentially the founder of Phuket as a tourist destination. He described the tor history of Phuket as a destination and explained how the tourism business has grown and Large Thai Resort developed in Patong, then Kamala (a bit) and how this interest has spread out to Krabi first, Nai Yang Beach Phi Phi Islands & most recently Phang Nga. Phuket was big tin-mining area pre-tourism, and National Park complimented by subsistence fishing, palm and rubber plantations. Also gave brief history of Phuket Tourist Association and their campaign for support from government at the very Founder of PTA beginning to make Phuket an international destination.. Emphatic that there has been no planning with Phuket at all. A detailed master plan was done for Phuket in late 1970s before development really started that factored in environmental considerations, waste manage- ment & zoning to avoid inappropriate development. This was not implemented due to: budg- etary constraints, no political will to implement and maintain such a comprehensive plan, transitory government members & lack of skills and forethought at the local levels. This was the problem at the beginning and still remains a problem today with all new plans (including the Andaman Recovery Plan). The private sector has always been behind advancements in Phuket not the government and this will continue into the future as there is no room now to introduce new sustainable plans. 26.02.07 Foreign Bar The participant is an Australian that owns a bar on Bangla Road. He bought it 7 years Owner ago with his own money brought from Australia. He has other businesses in Australia also. Patong Beach Opened bar after 2 days as there was a lot of damage despite being only a few doors from the beach road. Has strong client base from Australia who return 3-4 times a year (mainly miners who come over on their long 6 weeks breaks), Sweden & Europeans. He financed the rebuilding using his own funds. Most bars on Bangla Road were open within the first few weeks after the tsunami. He had insurance but only basic insurance and had no pre-existing loans. Now it is difficult for businesses to get comprehensive insurance – insurance compa- nies won’t give it to businesses in the tsunami area (might need to check this).
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05.03.07 Small Foreign The participant is English and has lived in Thailand for eight years. She started her guest- Guesthouse, Res- house (12 rooms) and restaurant using savings that she brought from England but her busi- taurant & Bar ness has it evolved over the last eight years. She also has a pie making business that she Patong runs con-currently with the guesthouse and restaurant. She provided interesting insights into: access to finances for foreigners, pre-and post-tsunami, lack of assistance from the Thai and British government, unequal treatment for Thais and foreigners with regard to assistance - deservedness versus the needy issue is also a problem in Patong - lack of recovery for many foreign businesses, corruption and lack of planning in Patong. 08.03.07 Front Desk Man- The participant has worked in Patong for 7 years, 3 months for current employer. She spoke ager candidly about: conditions for workers including access to training and skills, lack of unions Small Foreign or representative bodies for workers, how Patong has changed over the last 7 years, Patong Hotel as the focus for government recovery efforts over other destinations, and recovery of tourism Patong in Patong since the tsunami.
PHI PHI DON 19.03.07 General Manager The participant is a member of one of the main land-owning families on the island. The fam- Large Hotel ily started the Phi Phi Hotel 13 years ago. The interview was long as he showed me around Phi Phi Don the family’s 4 properties. He gave lots of info on: history of his family’ involvement on Phi Phi, main markets, impact of tsunami on hotels and tenant businesses, lack of planning and planning conflicts regarding post-tsunami plans (including Andaman Recovery Plan & DASTA’s failed plans), access to financing (they funded recovery with savings, alternate family businesses – palm farms, rubber plantations – and soft loans) and insurance (they had insur- ance but it did not cover full costs of repair), access to markets, total lack of government sup- port from TAT or central government following the tsunami, strength of PP tourism community members (they help themselves), Thai Hotels Association membership and Phi Phi Tourism Association membership, importance of cooperating as a group to create a strong platform and voice for the tourism community of Phi Phi in terms of marketing and planning for the future. He also talked a lot about the limited access PP has to water resources, electricity and garbage – these should be supported and supplied by the government but they are not despite the fact that they pay high taxes due to the high price of land. He says that whilst they have money on the island, the community cannot supply these facilities on a long term basis for themselves – they need help and are very angry that they don’t receive this basic support 21.03.07 Foreign Bar He told me his story: when he first came to Phi Phi as a tourist, his experience of being Owner caught in the tsunami, his involvement in the clean-up with Hi Phi Phi, his decision to stay Phi Phi Don after the tsunami, the opening of new opportunities for him in PP (the owner of Phi Phi Villa Resort offered him land on the beach to open a restaurant), access to financing to start the restaurant in 2005 (he used EUR100,000 of his own money to build the restaurant), and business through 2005 & 2006. He also commented on the lack of government support in Phi Phi following the tsunami – people in the community helped themselves. There is some corruption and payouts to police in PP but he is lucky to be on the good side of the police – they do not bother him or his Thai partner and friend in which the restaurant’s name is in. 24.03.07 Manager The participant has been working on Phi Phi for 12 years as a dive instructor, videographer, Dive Operator dive master and now manager. The dive operator is owned by Thai partners but the partici- Phi Phi Don pant unofficially funds the growth of the dive operator. He gave info on: the growth of Phi Phi over the last 12 years and his story, the growth of the dive shop, rental conditions, access to finances pre-and post-tsunami, pre-and post-tsunami, lack of insurance (due to the lack of fire station on the island – cant get insurance easily without these basic services, process of rebuilding (limited government support vs volunteer assistance), working conditions for for- eigners and access to visas, main markets and differences between high and low seasons, planning delays >> rebuilding delays. He also spoke about his involvement with the Dive Camp and Hi Phi Phi and the lack of basic infrastructure.
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26.03.07 Foreign Small The participant moved to Thailand with her husband straight after she finished her masters Guesthouse degree in Sydney. Her and her husband started a restaurant in Krabi 13 years ago and then Owner moved to Phi Phi 4 years ago. They converted their restaurant into a Guesthouse (named Phi Phi Don after her daughter) 1 month before the tsunami hit. She and her husband also has a house in Phuket and a rubber plantation in Krabi The conversion was funded partially by savings and partially by a loan from the bank. She did not have insurance at that time. The tsunami wave destroyed the ground floor of her guesthouse but the building was structurally sound. She lost her daughter and her sister as a result of the tsunami as well as 7 Thai staff. She received some assistance from the Australian government (money for the funerals of her family members, and social security payments from Centrelink for the first 3 months of 2005 when she was home. They also received THB10,000 for the death of their family members to help pay for the funeral ceremonies in Thailand. Her sister had life insurance. Some of the life insurance money was used to pay of her pre-existing loan and for rebuilding the guest- house. She also received donations but distributed them to people that she knew needed them more – she not only had access to some of the life insurance money but also had sav- ings to fall back on and live off for 7 months before she returned to Phi Phi on 3 August 2005 (her dead daughter’s birthday). The guesthouse was opened again in December 2005. Business during 2006 was OK – occupancy was approximately 50%. But this past high sea- son has seen occupancy return to 100% over the past 4 months. Spoke about the volunteer efforts in the recovery. The participant also gave interesting insights into the power dynamics of the main 4 families and their access to land, finances and power. Also said that there are not many foreign businesses with the exception of the dive shops. 26.03.07 Foreign Restau- Excellent case history! The participant has lived on Phi Phi Don for 20 years. He was one of rant Owner the first businesses on the island apart from a few resorts. He came initially by mistake as a Phi Phi Don tourist (he was supposed to go to another island but was taken to PP instead). He fell in love with the place and decided to stay and start a business. Initially started a bar/café near the Pier with a Thai partner then moved to Loh Dalum Bay and started a restaurant and guest- house where the minimart is now. These were started with savings. Did not have insurance – no one perceived the risk. Tsunami destroyed his business and boat – he lost EUR500,000 in total. He rebuilt 1.5 years later again using savings alone. He spoke about lack of dona- tions from Europe that got through to the people and the writing of his book to help raise funds for PP businesses in need. Business levels now are low due to changes in clientele post- tsunami – more young people since tsunami. Pre-tsunami there were more of a balance of older and younger tourists. Not a member of any tourist organisation and says the commu- nity is not so close – businesses are competitive. 27.03.07 Owners The Inn began 20 years ago. The family who owns the Inn & Restaurant & Backpackers is Small Thai Guest- originally from Krabi but moved here to start their small hotel. It started with 10 rooms and house & Restau- then grew over time. When they started the business, there was not much else on the island rant except for coconut trees and some subsistence fishing. They initially built their business using Phi Phi Don family savings and expended their business over time using the profits. Six years ago, they added the Rock Restaurant & Backpackers. At this time, they took out a loan from the bank to refurbish the Tara Inn which was originally made out of wood. The new structure was more solid, constructed out of concrete. At the time of the tsunami, the guesthouse had 18 rooms and the backpackers could sleep up to 16 in one large room. The owners lost THB2 million due to the tsunami. Damage was direct and indirect – people broke windows and doors at the time of the wave as they were desperate to find refuge in the Inn which is on the hill. Loan payments have been suspended on the pre-existing loan for 3 years (interest only). Managed to get another loan post-tsunami to pay for rebuilding at low interest rate using their land deeds from their house as collateral. SME Bank not an option as they did not want to lose control over their business. Complained about little assistance from govern- ment – only got THB20,000 in total but gave this to their staff. They went to post-tsunami planning meetings but saw that there were no results and stopped going – from then they helped themselves. Had insurance for their staff but staff had troubles claiming this money – too bureaucratic. Now complain about future planning of PP saying that Thais on the island think only about money and the short-term – waste water solution is too small for volume of water. Wants big business owners to do more for recycling. Tanks are not enough and with- out a good environment, tourists will not come. Then there will be no money! Also talked a bit about power dynamics on PP.
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30.03.07 Thai Bar Owner The participant is Thai but came to Phi Phi after living in the US. She opened a restaurant 12 Phi Phi Don years ago then grew over time. She has owned her Bar for the past 8 years. She lost 3 fam- ily members in the tsunami and is now looking to sell her bar despite rebuilding. She gave information on: access to land, rental conditions, access to finances pre (savings and profits & private loans pre-tsunami) and post-tsunami (savings & bank loan), brief development history of Phi Phi, main markets and changes in the market over last 12 years, self-help after tsunami (businesses help themselves), access to insurance (none), planning problems on the island (lots of meetings pre and post-tsunami but never any action >>>meeting fatigue and drop in interest and participation), power base (main families can do what they want as they have money >>> access to national park land) & power relations (one of main families is local mafia – get jealous of other successful businesses and try to intimidate business owners they do not like), access to insurance benefits fro her staff (she paid the insurance in full and provide her staff with money through 8 months when she was closed), part played by volun- teers in the rebuilding, and business levels pre and post tsunami. 02.04.07 Small Restaurant The participant was from Sri Saket province, north-eastern part. He used to work at restau- Owner rant in Pa Thong then moved to work as a chef on PP 1 month before tsunami. He was hit by Phi Phi Don the wave and was sent to Krabi hospital. He came back to open his own restaurant by receiv- ing financial aid from his friend who was from America. He rents the land that the restaurant sits on. 04.04.07 Owner/Leader of The participant is from Trang province. First he opened a small shop to sell clothes in Phi SME group Phi then he take over Phi Phi Inn business before Tsunami. He is the leader to form a loose Phi Phi Don group of small and medium entrepreneurs during early recovery period. There was less assistance from government. Business sector help themselves with assistance from volunteers and tourists. German company gave 5,000,000 B for community and he put as “Credit union cooperative”. About DASTA and planning from government, it came with politicians’ benefits with the big investors, so Phi Phi community did not accept them. Now Phi Phi is waiting for a plan that appropriate for local condition which should be come up as soon as possible since Phi Phi really in need of planning and management system. 04.04.07 Medium Thai The hotel group the participant works for is a big group of business owned by one of the Hotel Manager main families. This group has various businesses such as resort, ferry, salons, massages, and Phi Phi Don mini-marts. The hotel was not damaged much. It opened after tsunami 2-3 days to serve as accommodation for volunteer with very low price on that time. Government did little to support the community at that time and have shown little support to date. Business need to be run in Phi Phi, so entrepreneurs try to help themselves for restart business. Phi Phi lack of political voices to call for attention from outside community, not like Pa Thong that some poli- ticians have business around Pa Thong area, so they receive supporting and attention. Phi Phi lacks of linkage between community and government.
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07.04.07 Co-owners They started their first resort (2 star bungalows) 20 years ago as a small bungalow resort Large Resort of 20. They got a small loan for this and then built over time using the profits which have Phi Phi Don always been high on Phi Phi. They then built their hotel financed through another loan as well as profits. They did have insurance on both properties but it was not enough to cover the renovation costs (1/6th of cost post-tsunami). They have access to finance to rebuild (sold resort not on PP, sold off land on mainland + have a large loan from bank based on the acquisition of a piece of land that their plaza is now situated on). What is holding them up is the lack of a finished development plan being drawn up now by the Department of Town and Country Planning. They gave information on the development of Phi Phi as a destina- tion and its changing markets over time, lack of impact of other shocks, access to finances, access to land (rent with long lease of 10 years), lack of development plans for PP through- out its developmental history, process of drafting development plan for PP + departments involved and the many blockages that have hindered the finalisation and implementation of a developmental plan for PP (little interest from TAO, nepotism at TAO level meaning that plans that do not favour powerful family members are not endorsed by PP TAO representa- tives, corruption involving local officials and powerful families of PP with regard to planning approval and access to land – money can buy you anything in Thailand, lack of strong Tourism Association and reasons for this (he started the PP Tourism Association which was then taken over by another community member took over – doesn’t have unity among island community as everyone is only interested in making money), lack of long-term vision among community members (short-term monetary goals most important), lack of consideration of natural environment, lack of community spirit (the Thai people do not help each other – all out for themselves), power dynamic of island community (nepotism and money hinder long- term planning and goals).
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Appendix 3: Focus Group Discussion Design and Results
Overview and rationale of use Objectives Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) are a valuable tool The objectives of the FGDs are four-fold: for the exploration of group norms and the socio- political dynamics that shape human interactions and • Identify the pre- and post-tsunami conditions that outcomes (May, 2001) through brainstorming. The influence vulnerability levels in each destination; tapestry of processes and practices that make up the social world and the richness of relationships between • Investigate the interconnected nature of identified people and places come to the fore (Cameron, 2005: socio-political and environmental vulnerability 119). In doing so, focus group discussions promote the factors and the way they are constructed across a formulation of simultaneous insights and understanding range of scales; for both researchers and participants during the research process (Goss and Leinbach, 1996: 116-117). • To gain feedback and validation of preliminary This transforms knowledge through social learning, findings from the open-ended interviews and case promotes empowerment among the ‘researched’, histories; and heightens participant participation throughout the research process and creates opportunities for social • Identify current community needs and explore transformation (Cameron, 2005). community-led solutions to building capacity and resilience in their community. The use of this method in understanding destination vulnerability is advantageous for three reasons. First, Sampling design and deployment the encouraged interaction between group members A total of 23 FGDs were undertaken in the case study provides an opportunity for participants to explore destinations (10 in Khao Lak, 10 in Patong and 11 in different points of view, reconsider their own views and Phi Phi Don). A list of the FGDs is presented in Table understands, and formulate new opinions (Cameron, 13. The stakeholder groups included in the FGDs were 2005). For Kitzinger (1994: 113), ‘participants do not chosen from the private sector stakeholder groups used just agree with each other. They also misunderstand in the interview sampling design (see Table 8, Table 9, one another, question one another, try to persuade and Table 10 in Appendix 1). They represent dominant each other of the justice of their own point of view and stakeholder groups and existing informal stakeholder sometimes they vehemently disagree’. The process collectives. The intended target groups were adjusted of social learning is important for building unity and once in the field due to the availability of participants. common understandings within and across community Availability of participants did prove problematic groups and sub-groups, a process that is an integral for some stakeholder groups (small foreign and Thai component of successful resilience building strategies. hotels/bungalows, restaurant participants, and dive Second, this dynamic and energetic interaction between shops) due to the timing of FGDs. The FGDs were participants proves instrumental in highlighting the undertaken in September 2007, which falls into the power discourses that shape thoughts and actions within low season for Khao Lak and Phi Phi Don when many the community at what level these occur. Identifying small businesses are closed. Availability in Patong these underlying drivers of social patterns and change was hindered by people being too busy to attend. and the scale at which they occur provides information Furthermore, some small Thai hotel/bungalow owners on appropriate entry points for transformative action. cancelled and rescheduled on numerous occasions due Third, the creation of small community forums to unforeseen problems that needed urgent attention. provides the researcher with an opportunity to report back on initial findings ascertained from other data (in Participants were chosen from the interview participant this case secondary documents, open-ended interviews list presented in Table 11 (Appendix 1) personal and case histories), verify results and gain answers referrals and snowballing techniques. The average size to outstanding queries. In doing so, this gives the of each group was between 3-7 participants to facilitate participants an opportunity to directly influence the a good in-depth discussion where all participants output. have ample chance to voice and discuss issues. One exception to this was the Massage group in Khao Lak where there was much interest. The duration of the FGDs was approximately 1.5 hours. The FGDs were
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• Ratchaneekorn Thongthip facilitated by the following three SEI researchers with Khuk Khak Community Knowledge Management the help of research assistants: Centre (Khao Lak Research Assistant)
• Kannapa Pongponrat • Phenphan Manyuen Stockholm Environment Institute-Asia Research Assistant for Patong and Phi Phi Don
• Sopon Naruchaikusol • Lalita Chatmongkol Stockholm Environment Institute-Asia Research Assistant for Patong and Phi Phi Don
• Emma Calgaro Macquarie University/Stockholm Environment Institute
Table 13: Focus Discussion Participant Groups and schedule
Date No. of par- Group Time (dd.mm.yy) ticipants KHAO LAK A Massage 09.09.07 15.15-17.05 14 B Thai-owned medium & large hotels/resorts 10.09.07 10.15-11.50 4 C Tourist Boats 10.09.07 15.05-16.20 4-7 D Thai-owned Restaurants 11.09.07 10.50-12.20 6 E Thai-owned small resorts/guesthouses 12.09.07 10.10-11.50 3 F Foreign-owned small businesses 14.09.07 14.30-15.50 3 G Tour Agencies 16.09.07 09.50-11.30 3 PATONG H Beach Massage 17.09.07 11.20-13.00 6 I Tailors & Burmese workers 19.09.07 14.50-16.20 7 J Tourist boats (Long tail & speed boats) 19.09.07 18.30-20.30 3 K Beach Umbrella operators 20.09.07 10.40-12.10 4 L Taxis 20.09.07 14.25-15.25 2 M Beach Vendors 21.09.07 10.55-12.10 2 N Motorbike Taxis 21.09.07 15.05-16.30 4-5 PHI PHI DON O Massage Shop 24.09.07 11.00-12.25 7 P Beach Umbrella/Water Sports 24.09.07 15.40-17.10 10 Q Dive Operators 25.09.07 10.30-12.00 3 R Restaurants/Bars 26.09.07 15.30-16.40 2 S Tour Agencies 26.09.07 18.45-19.50 5 T Medium/Large Resorts 27.09.07 10.05-12.10 3 U Souvenir Shops 27.09.07 14.30-15.30 4 V Resort/Bungalow Staff 28.09.07 16.10-17.25 17 W Small Resorts/Bungalows 29.09.07 20.25-21.25 3
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Methods Organisation Situation Assessment: Problems and Possible • The facilitator presents the preliminary findings Solutions Identification and Prioritising (Ranking from the interviews and case histories to the and Scoring) participants verbally before writing them up on a Objective board/sheet of paper. • To gain feedback and validation of preliminary findings from the open-ended interviews and case • The facilitator asks participants to discuss (agree/ histories; not agree) the presented issues.
• To identify the pre- and post-tsunami conditions • Participants discuss the issues amongst themselves that influence vulnerability levels in Khao Lak; and clarify or add any outstanding issues not already raised. • To ascertain current community problems and needs and explore community-led solutions to building • Participants prioritise problems by scoring each capacity and resilience in their community; and identified problem using a scale of one to50 points. This process starts with each participant • To prioritise current problems and possible writing their main problems on soft cards provided solutions. by the facilitator, and then awards a score to each problem. This is followed by a wider discussion Issues and Questions among group members to finalise collective • Do the participants agree with the problems found opinions and problem prioritisation. from the stakeholder interviews? • This process is repeated to ascertain possible • What are the current, 2007, and/or additional solutions. This process starts with each participant problems faced by tourism stakeholders? writing possible solutions on soft cards provided by the facilitator and then awards a score to each • How are these problems ranked in terms of solution using a scale of one to 50 points. This importance to community members? is followed by a wider discussion among group members to finalise collective solutions and • What are the possible solutions and actions that prioritisation. help to overcome these problems? Timing • How are these solutions ranked in terms of support • The facilitator presents the preliminary findings and feasibility amongst stakeholders? and issues deduced from the interviews and case histories (5 minutes) • Significant issues to be considered: • The facilitator introduces the tool to participants □□Social aspects: social network, community (5 minutes) strengthening, awareness on assistance, perception on risk • Participants work individually to identify their main problems and rank those problems (5 minutes) □□Economic aspects: financial support, capital investment, marketing • Participants work together to identify common problems and collectively rank them (10 minutes) □□Institutional aspects: plans and policies to support local community, capacity building program • Participants work individually to identify solutions to the common problems and rank them (10 □□Environmental aspects: natural resources planning minutes) and management for tourism development • Participants work together to identify common □□Issues of trauma solutions and agree on solution rankings (10 minutes)
• Total time allocation = 45 minutes.
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• Total time allocation = 45 minutes. creatively about future tourism-orientated goals and sustainability goals and provide a common platform Rich Picture for developing a strategy that will provide support to Objective the tourism community in attaining these goals. • To understand the contributing causes and effects for a particular problem identified in section 4.1; Issues and Questions • What visions do the participants have in terms • To investigate the root causes and competing of future developmental outcomes and resilience stakeholder agendas that drive this issue and the building strategies for the next 5 years? way it is constructed across a range of scales. • What factors and steps facilitate the attainment of Questions these visions? • What are causes and effects of main problem identified in the Situation Analysis? • How does the community execute these steps and at what scale? • Which social actors are involved in this issue and what role to they play in its formulation and • What is the most feasible action plan for attaining continuance? the collective Khao Lak 5-year vision and reducing vulnerability? Organisation • Participants discuss the causes and effects of the Organisation chosen issue identified in section 4.2. • Participants discuss amongst themselves possible visions that reduce their vulnerability to future • Participants draw a rich picture of identified causes shocks, build community resilience, and increase and effects of particular problem on a common the sustainability of their tourism-orientated board or sheet of paper. livelihoods.
Timing • Participants discuss possible factors and steps • Facilitator introduces the tool to participants (10 required to achieve their vision. minutes) • Participants discuss and design a possible action • Participants help to draw rich picture with plan for reducing their vulnerability and enhancing facilitator guidance (25 minutes) their resilience (what, who, how).
• Total time = 35 minutes Framework:
Visioning on Resilience Building Strategy Factors Action Plan Objective Vision Facili- Activ- Pur- To develop a shared 5-year community vision of desired Who How tating ity pose developmental outcomes and resilience building initiatives designed to reduce their vulnerability and increase the sustainability of their chosen tourism- related livelihoods. This will help them to think
Framework:
Problem
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Timing • Facilitator introduces the tool to the participants (5 minutes)
• Participants discuss their visions for reducing their vulnerability (10 minutes)
• Participants discuss and identify steps that help them to achieve their vision and design a feasible action plan for achieving their collective goals (10 minutes)
• Total time = 25 minutes
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Appendix 4: Post-tsunami planning initiatives
1. Andaman tourism recovery plan zoning and building regulations
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2. Sub-regional Development Plan Table 14: SRDP Pilot projects affecting (directly or indirectly) Khao Lak, Patong & Phi Phi Don
OVERARCHING PLANS THAT BENEFIT KHAO LAK, PATONG AND PHI PHI DON
Sec- tor and Project (P) Objectives sub-sec- tor focus P: Establish- Rectify current planning and jurisdiction inconsistencies between government depart- ment of new ments and levels by strengthening the administrative planning system that controls Urban plan-making the expansion of development in Krabi, Phang Nga and Phuket tourist destinations and framework for (including those on Phuket’s west coast), and urban expansion in Phuket Town. regional the Andaman Determine institutional support needs for the following four planning components: planning sub-region comprehensive and proactive plan formulation and governance; plan formulation structure for the Andaman sub-region; refining of the zoning process and system; and public awareness and participation in planning process.
P: Support for Promote sustainable tourism development in each destination through the following the implementa- wastewater strategies: tion of new cen- Build a centralised and municipally controlled wastewater treatment plant for Khao tralised waste- Lak and introduce an eco-tax’ on accommodation to be paid in part by tourists to water treatment help fund the installation and maintenance of the proposed plants; plants in Khao Support the introduction and maintenance of a wetlands-based wastewater treatment Lak, Patong & facility on Phi Phi in partnership with DANIDA and AIT; Phi Phi Support the rehabilitation of Pak Bang Canal which receives more than 60 percent of wastewater of Patong’s wastewater and the creation of a constructed wetlands with polishing ponds to treat wastewater before it is discharged into the sea.
P: Environmen- Promote environmental conservation through the: Environ- tal conservation Establishment of coastal conservation best practices for residents, developers and mental promotional tourists to be disseminated in Thai and English via multiple media channels and bro- manage- program chures available at airports, hotels, PAO and TAOs; ment Implementation of a ‘Greencall’ public environmental monitoring program to facili- and tate public reporting to appropriate authorities on pollution problems; infra- Expansion of the Department of Coastal and Marine Resources’ (DCMR Phang Nga structure Regional Office) marine and coastal resources awareness display programme that includes the formation of Coast Care Conservation Clubs in schools and youth clubs.
P: Orientation Increase skills and capacity levels within provincial, district and local government bod- training for ies responsible for SDRP implementation through the provision of 2 types of training: environmental Training of key personnel at the provincial and local level in environmental planning management and application of the SRDP. This includes instruction on evaluating potential environ- mental impacts of development, sub-regional plan formulation, and assessment of carrying capacity and mitigation measures over time. ‘Training the trainer’ programmes to build capacity at the local level and strengthen environmental best practices.
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P: Establishment Set up an Andaman Tourism Marketing and Promotion Board that: of Andaman Creates a cohesive Andaman image that can competitively compete for market share Tourism Market- in the national and international tourism domain; ing and Pro- Facilitates widespread marketing exposure of smaller enterprises that lack the capital motion Board and/or expertise to implement a robust marketing strategy that reaches key national (ATMPB) and international markets; Maximises social and economic contributions that tourism makes for all stakeholders. Tourism P: Web portal Establish a unified web portal and e-commerce facility that combines research, client Market- and e-com- relation management (tourists and operators), e-commerce (booking of accommoda- ing and merce facility tion and services) and disseminates data and information. Certifica- tion P: Establish- Develop joint branding for the Andaman that effectively promotes the rich diversity of ment of joint available activities to key markets; and branding for the Generate a unique personality or ‘feel’ for Andaman destinations that creates a Andaman Coast unique selling point. P: Andaman Establish an Andaman certification program that incorporates eco-labelling to pro- Coast Certifica- mote the adoption of sustainable tourism products and services, help suppliers raise tion Program for their service standards, and create a powerful marketing tool to attract tourists to the Tourism (ACT) region. Skill P: Establishment Increase skill levels and research capacity of the Andaman Coast populace through devel- of the University the foundation of the University of the Andaman Coast. The proposed University opment of the Andaman would focus on social sciences (particularly tourism-related courses), science and and Coast technology and health sciences. Higher Educa- tion P: Strengthen- Increase wider access to the economic benefits of tourism in villages in close proximity ing community to tourism centres (incl. Khao Lak) by: Commu- mechanisms for Increasing skills and knowledge of local leaders, enabling them to create innovative nity and participation in mechanisms for ensuring village participation; Social socio-economic Augmenting the effectiveness of community development efforts by fortifying organi- Develop- development in sational capabilities of governance and community development organisations; ment the region Establishing effective structures to ensure active and sustained participation of com- munity-based organisations (CBOs) and vulnerable groups in local governance. SRDP BENEFITING KHAO LAK DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY Urban P: Restructur- Prepare a feasibility study for the diversion of the National Highway Route 4 that runs and ing of Khao Lak directly through Khao Lak and the conversion of the existing road into a tourism boul- regional Town Centre evard and rambla. planning
P: Strengthen- Increase wider access to the economic benefits of tourism in villages in close proximity ing community to tourism centres (incl. Khao Lak) by: Commu- mechanisms for Increasing skills and knowledge of local leaders, enabling them to create innovative nity and participation in mechanisms for ensuring village participation; Social socio-economic Augmenting the effectiveness of community development efforts by fortifying organi- Develop- development in sational capabilities of governance and community development organisations; ment the region Establishing effective structures to ensure active and sustained participation of com- munity-based organisations (CBOs) and vulnerable groups in local governance. P: Strengthen- Secure stable tourism-orientated livelihoods for community enterprises and promoting ing multi-sector local business competiveness by: partnerships Establishing strong and mutually beneficial partnerships between village communities, for livelihood CBOs, NGOs, industry and government actors that will facilitate the development of development in shared plans and activities and greater community cohesion; villages Providing training and coaching interventions for CBOs SMEs and cooperatives on business planning and management, product development, network building, enter- prise evaluation, communication and social management, and capital generation.
Sources: (ADB, 2005, ADB, 2006b, ADB, 2006a)
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3: Sustainable Tourism Rehabilitation and Development of Koh Phi Phi Don and Surrounding Islands Plan by DASTA
Box 2: Key components of DASTA’s redevelopment concept for Phi Phi Don • Facilitate the sustainable and safe use of the sea by classifying areas for various activities (particularly div- ing) and seaports; • Restore the shoreline and beaches; and • Protect, preserve and restore forests and other terrestrial natural resources.
a. Redeveloping and repositioning Phi Phi as a tourism destination: • Raise the quality of destination facilities and services through a focus on the development of medium and high-class hotels and resorts; • Develop tourist services that yield positive experiences and foster return visitation; • Distinguish Phi Phi in the competitive international travel market by marketing its distinctive seascape; • Promote Phi Phi as a safe destination by maintaining and publicising its emergency management plan and the presence of the Early Warning System. b.Infrastructure development: • Revise and maintain the transportation system designed around usage classifications; • Repair and restore infrastructure, such as the electricity and water services; • Construct a wastewater treatment plant with pipelines from buildings to prevent future disasters; • Manage and transfer solid waste from Phi Phi Don by providing garbage trucks, garbage collection points, and gather and classify all waste for transfer by boat for elimination on land; • Manage land use according to laws regulating area planning, building management, and maintaining the quality of the environment; • Provide safety areas, evacuation routes and emergency management plans for people in the event of natural disasters; • Manage safe marine routes for tourists; • Restrict construction through the designation of prohibited areas to ensure safety for people and properties; • Maintain the dock around Ton Sai Bay in accordance with international standards for transferring passen- gers, goods and waste; and • Improve health services and transferring of emergency patients to a hospital on the mainland. c.Land rehabilitation in two main areas: • Private lowlands and beaches (totalling approximately 1320 rai or 20.61per cent of Island) that were human settlements before the declaration of the Hat Noppharat Thara – Phi Phi Islands Marine National Park in 1983. Most of this land is less than 10 metres above sea level. . High risk areas to nature disas- ters should not be settled but should rather be open for afternoon activities only. Consequently, Safety standards specify the size of settlements, population and tourist numbers, the use of natural resources and the environment, and public health management; • Mountains and mangrove forests in the Hat Noppharat Thara – Phi Phi Islands Marine National Park that cover approximately 5086 rai or 79.39per cent of Island. Most of land is mountain landscape (gra- dient > 20°) with a height of 60 to 190 metres above sea level. The National Park area could be desig- nated for: public use (public institutions, schools, hospitals, temples), as an One Tambon One Product (OTOP) business area, and/or as a disaster-safe area. Public buildings and safety zones in the National Park should be in high areas away from flooding. Private land in high risk areas can be modified into open lowland that is suitable for recreation and afternoon activities. Any government land above 10 metres above sea level should be allowed to be used as a safety zone in the case of another tsunami.
Source: DASTA (2006) Sustainable Tourism Rehabilitation and Development of Koh Phi Phi Don and Surrounding Islands Plan. Bangkok, Designated Area for Sustainable Tourism Administration (DASTA).Preserve, protect and rehabilitate marine resources including coral reefs and marine habitats;
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Box 3: The DPTCP plan for the redevelopment of Phi Phi Island 1. According to the regulations: “Coastal line” is defined as the maximum wave distance inland
“Zone 1” is defined as an area from the coastline to 20 metres inland
“Zone 2” is defined as an area from Zone 1 to 150 metres inland
“Zone 3” is defined as an area from Zone 2 to 300 metres inland
2. Building construction regulations on the Phi Phi Islands: • Zone 1: Residential house (single house) -- Building height not higher than 6 m (single story house) -- Total building area not more than 75 m2 -- Space around building not less than 75per cent • Zone 2: The following construction is prohibited: -- Buildings with the height higher than 12 m -- All types of factories, as defined by factory regulations, with a total area for all stories of more than 100 m2 -- Theatres -- All types of animal-raising buildings with a total area exceeding 10 m2 -- Large buildings with total area exceeding 2000 m2 -- Markets with total area exceeding 300 m2 or with distance of less than 50 m from other mar- kets -- Gas stations or storage -- Fuel stations or storage -- Signage or billboards except those not exceeding 8 m in height -- Buildings made of non-fire resistant materials or unstable materials except single storey houses or buildings with a height not exceeding 6 m and further than 5 m from other buildings -- Sheds or stalls -- Buildings with less than 60per cent open space -- Row houses -- Crematories -- Storehouses or transfer buildings for commercial or industrial use -- Solid waste -- Dump sites or landfills • Zone 3: The following construction is prohibited: -- Buildings with a height of more than 16 m -- Buildings having less than 50per cent open space
Note: Building height = part from ground level to the highest part of building.
3. In the zones specified in No. 2, any changes in construction or use of the buildings are prohibited. The existing buildings before the announcement of the implementation of these regulations are exempt from these regulations. Officially approved construction plans already under construction are exempt from these regulations. Source: DPTCP (2006) City Planning for Phi Phi Island, Krabi Province, Thailand. Bangkok, Department of Department of Public Works and Town and Country Planning (DPTCP), Ministry of Interior.
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