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The Fight for Control Within the Syrian Opposition

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JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC 2014 2015 2016 2016 1 THE FIGHT FOR CONTROL WITHIN Jabhat Ansar al-Din 40 88 92 94 101 120 128 130 HASI HASI 47 129 THE SYRIAN OPPOSITION 7 Suqour al-Sham Suqour al-Sham 36 57 60 11 22 41 46 62 69 126 A comprehensive timeline of the clashes and cooperation of JN 37 56 JN 18 48 58 68 74 ALEPPO 9 opposition powerbrokers in the Syrian Civil War between July Harakat Hazm 63 49 52 78 86 2014 and December 2016 Jaysh al-Mujahideen Sham Front Liwa al-Tawhid 28 59 64 14 YPG YPG 65 96 99 100 115 116 124 SDF SDF 114 119 OES OES 15 17 23 54 Jaysh al-Umma 38 42 84 103 104 107 108 111 117 125 127 131 Jaysh al-Islam Jaysh al-Islam 66 Ajnad al-Sham Ajnad al-Sham 16 43 71 75 89 2 95 DAMASCUS JN JN 10 85 109 HASI HASI 79 97 Faylaq ar-Rahman Faylaq ar-Rahman 3 HARD-LINE ISLAMISTS Islamic Front 24 MODERATES 21 U.S. BACKED MODERATES Harakat Hazm 121 12 19 25 29 31 32 SRF 4 44 61 67 72 76 80 110 50 JN IDLIB 27 13 81 90 105 118 122 123 39 70 HASI HASI 26 Jund al-Aqsa Jund al-Aqsa 33 53 73 82 93 102 HASI HASI 5 87 91 20 30 34 77 DERA’A JN JN 55 106 112 SF SF 45 8 Jund al-Aqsa Events compiled by Author from Institute for the Study of War Syria Updates and Syria Situation Reports between July 2014 and December 2016 Ajnad al-Sham HAMA 98 35 83 113 HASI HASI 6 JN JN 1. Jaysh al-Muhajarin wal-Ansar, Katibat al Khadra, Harakat Sham al-Hazm and Division 13, killing 8. 39. FSA-affiliates and HASI coordinated the defense of Ma’arrat al-Nu- Branch with a tunnel bomb. 85. HASI and Jaysh al-Islam announced “The Victory for the People of 105. Assassinations targeted senior Ahrar a-Sham figures, killed despite agreement, including SVBIED attack on HASI checkpoint. al-Islam, and Sajral-Sham merged into Jabhat Ansar al-Din. man. 63. Western-backed Harakat Hazm formally joined Sham Front coalition, the Camp to fight ISIS. high-ranking HASI commander Majed Hussein a-Sadeq, commander 124. Opposition groups backed by Turkey in OES clashed with SDF near 22. JN, Harakat Hazm, Islamic Front, Jaysh al-Mujahedin, Jabhat Ansar 40. Two IF groups merged with HASI, reconstituting HASI after loss of to envelop Harakat Hazm under the protection of Sham Front from 86. The Sham Front dissolved into constituent groups operating under Sa’ud al-Assaf. Azaz and Tel Rifaat. 2. Faylaq ar-Rahman, Jaysh al-Islam and JN cooperated against the al-Din, and Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki signed local truce to focus leadership. Jabhat al-Nusra. own banners, agreeing to maintain cooperation. Follows defection 106. 3 FSA-affiliated factions merged to form the “Division of Decisive- 125. Jaysh al-Islam expressed willingness to form a joint military opera- regime. JN launched suicide attack. Jaysh al-Islam launched a follow efforts on fighting regime. 41. Jabhat Ansar al-Din and JN advanced against the regime. 64. YPG and Sham Front formed an alliance agreeing to unify judicial from Liwa al-Tawhid in March to form a group called the First Regi- ness.” tions room after emergency meeting between senior leaders of the up offensive to block regime supply lines to the Damascus Interna- 23. Attempted assassination of Jaysh al-Umma commander Abu Subhi 42. Jaysh al-Islam commander was assassinated by car bomb. systems and coordinate security. ment, possibly backed by Turkey. 107. Jaysh al-Islam and Faylaq ar-Rahman reach ceasefire to end infight- two. Faylaq ar-Rahman said it would remove all of its roadblocks. tional Airport. Tahil, killing son and one of his companions. 43. JN, HASI, and Jaysh al-Islam cooperated to form a unified leadership 65. YPG and FSA affiliates in the Euphrates Volcano Operations Room 87. JN arrested 2 fighters from Liwa Tahwid al-Janoub on charges of ing, agreed to form a council of six arbiters to mediate. Jaysh al-Is- 126. Harakat Nour a-Din al Zenki and Jabhat Fatah a-Sham clashed with 3. JN and the Islamic Front gained in Deir Attiyah against Hezbollah. council, a joint operations room, and a Shari’a court. captured Qara Qaqzaq bridge from ISIS. pledging allegiance to ISIS, sparking clashes lam also withdrew from the town of Mesraba as part of the deal. Tajamu Fastaqim Kama Umirt after accusing the group of several 24. Assassination of fighters of Jaysh al-Ababil. 44. JN captured 15 villages from FSA afilliates, executing some FSA fight- 66. Ajnad al-Sham accused JN of assassinating two of its commanders. 88. HASI and Jaysh al-Islam and five others announced the joint oper- 108. Jaysh al-Islam and Faylaq ar-Rahman concluded ceasefire agree- alleged abuses, including assassination of a commander in another 4. JN attacked the bases of FSA linked groups, including Darkoush, 25. Clashes occur between SRF and JN, after SRF tried to detain JN ers. 67. JN fighters attacked HASI members trying to prevent JN checkpoint ations room “Conquest of Aleppo” after dissolution of the Sham ment, deal followed negotiations mediated by the HNC head Riyad group. Izmarin, Salqin, and Harem. fighters accused of looting and attacking civilians, per Shari’a court 45. Gunmen assassinated rebel brigade associated with US TOW recipi- in Idlib countryside, killing an HASI Shari’a official and injuring Front Hijab in Qatar. 127. Negotiations on a joint opposition operations room broke down on 5. JN attacked the bases of the al-Haramayn Brigade and Omar al- order. JN forced SRF out of several village. Harakat Hazm established ent Suqour al-Ghab. others. JN and HASI agreed to dismantle check points and form a 89. JN and Jaysh al-Islam lost Jabal al-Muhassa to ISIS, which cuts a stra- 109. JN and HASI captured Dirkhabiyal in operation “Roar of the Free- Oct 31 when Faylaq ar-Rahman prevented a delegation room Jaysh Mokhtar Battalion. checkpoints to separate JN and SRF, but JN and Harakat Hazm have 46. JN and Ansar al-Din clashed with the regime, losing al-Mallah to the judicial commission to investigate. tegic rebel supply group. men to Break the Siege”, reopening key supply routes to besieged al-Islam to attend a meeting to discuss its creation. clashed at these checkpoints as a result. regime and Hezbollah. 68. JN captured a Harakat Hazm headquarters after accusing Harakat 90. JN, HASI, and Jaysh al-Islam announced the formation of the “Battle opposition-held places in Western Ghouta. 128. Opposition infighting, HASI seized several checkpoints from the 6. JN and Islamic Front captured the town of al-Shahya. 47. Rebel group and JN attacked Suqour al-Sham, forcing Suqour al-Sh- Hazm of being a western client group. JN attacked Harakat Hazm of Victory” Operations Room, to target Jisr al-Shughour 110. Suicide bombing targeted opposition headquarters of Kata’ib al-Fa- Sham Front, accused them of selling weapons to YPG. Agreed to 26. JN, Jund al-Aqsa, Hamza Division, and Suqour al-Ghab launched 7. JN and Suqour al-Sham lost Akhtarin, Dabiq to ISIS, allowing ISIS to am to withdraw. headquarters near Sheikh Ali, arresting two Hazm fighters. 91. Regime was gaining Busra al-Harir, but reinforcements from the rouq, killing at least 5 opposition fighters and wounding at least 15 formation of “reconciliation committee”. four suicide operations against regime checkpoints. connect east Aleppo. 48. A field commander for US TOW recipient Harakat Hazm was serious- 69. JN and Sham Front lost villages to regime and counterattacked. Southern Front and JN opposition groups forced the regime to re- others. 129. FSA affiliates announced merger with Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki. 27. JN, Sham Legion, and HASI formed an Islamic body issued regula- ly injured after assassination attempt through car bomb. 70. Jaysh al-Islam and HASI announced the “Battle to Free Fu’ah.” treat 111. Clashes occurred between Faylaq ar-Rahman and Jaysh al-Islam. 130. HASI and the Sham Front formed Jaysh Halab a coordinating body 8. Jund al-Aqsa and Ajnad al-Sham captured the town of Khattab and tions for media activities, banning filming of airstrikes for security 49. 3 rebel brigades defected and formed independent entity from Jaysh 71. Joint operation between JN and Eastern Ghouta Unified Military 92. FSA-affiliated and Islamist rebel factions including the Sham Front 112. Covert MOC (U.S.-backed) demanded that SF refrain from launching to unite efforts to lift the pro-regime siege on opposition-held dis- a nearby regime weapons depot. purposes. al-Mujahideen. Command targeted ISISmembers in Kafr Batna, arresting 25 and and HASI conducted an operation which severed supply line con- an offensive against a regime-held town of Sheikh Miskeen, accord- tricts. 9. Harakat Hazm, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement 50. HASI, JN, and the Islamic Front captured Wadi al-Deif and al-Ha- killing two. necting regime positions in western Aleppo with the Nayrab Airbase. ing to local activists. In return for deal, the MOC provided monthly 131. Faylaq ar-Rahman and Jaysh al-Islam reached a deal to end clashes 28. FSA left Aleppo after disputes with YPG over access to US weapons announced “Nahrawan al-Sham” to fight ISIS in Aleppo.
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