How Do Organizations Matter? the Role of Civic Organizations on Ethnic Relations, England and Beyond

HOW DO ORGANIZATIONS MATTER? THE ROLE OF CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS ON ETHNIC RELATIONS, ENGLAND AND BEYOND

KELLI NOELLE MOORE

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2006

Kelli Noelle Moore

I write this dissertation with the sincere hope that it can contribute to better relations among ethnic groups.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The process of matriculating through graduate school was difficult. With that said, this dissertation is dedicated to anyone who over the last few years, treated me to a meal, made me laugh, or decided that I should be on the receiving end of a random, or even better, an intentional act of kindness. I’d also like to express my appreciation to Sue and

Debbie, to my advisor, and to the members of my committee. Finally, I want to acknowledge and thank Dr. Jim Button, the co-chair of my committee, who died the semester before I finished this dissertation. His support was extremely helpful in this long process.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... iv

LIST OF TABLES...... viii

LIST OF FIGURES ...... ix

ABSTRACT...... x

CHAPTER

1 BACKGROUND ...... 1

The Research Problem...... 1 Civic Conflict and Ethnic Life...... 2 Research Premises ...... 3 Importance of this Study...... 9

2 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, CONFLICT, PEACE, AND ETHNICITY...... 15

Putnam, Hyden, Varshney: Foundations ...... 15 Civil Society, Social Capital and Civic Engagement ...... 19 Ethnicity and Civil Society...... 33 Ethnicity and Its Dynamics ...... 36 Conclusion...... 49

3 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND CULTURAL IDENTITY IN ENGLAND...... 51

Politics and Identity ...... 51 How Does Cultural Identity Fit In? Asians in England and the Role of Cultural Identity ...... 59 A Default Identity? Or Is There Something More?...... 64 Does Pro–White Mean Anti–Other?...... 66 Development of the BNP...... 69 Civic and Un-civic Behavior ...... 74 What Happened in Oldham (And What Didn’t Happen in Luton)?...... 78 Brief Background on Oldham ...... 78

v Issues and Oldham...... 81 Disturbances in Oldham. What started the riot?...... 88 Random Violence? Or Sparks to a Tinderbox?...... 89 Luton...... 93

4 METHODOLOGY ...... 97

Approach...... 97 Methods ...... 99 Interviews and Surveys...... 102 Data Analysis and Interpretation ...... 104 Semi-Structured Interviews...... 104 Surveys...... 107

5 HOW DO CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS MATTER? CULTURAL IDENTITY, CIVIC LIFE, AND MANAGING ETHNIC TENSIONS ...... 109

Bonding and Bridging: Results...... 112 Reaching Out: Who is Working with Others?...... 117 Working with Ethnic Groups ...... 117 Working with Others and Working with Diverse and Umbrella Groups...118 Depth and Frequency ...... 121 Civic Life: Response From Civic Leaders about the Civic Landscape...... 124 Informal Relationships...... 128 Oldham and Luton through the Voices of Community Leaders: Cultural Identity and Civic Life ...... 131 Civic Level Bonding Behavior...... 131 What is a Community? Bonding: Is There a White British Cultural Identity? .133 Does The Fish Know That It Is Wet?...... 134 Engaging Whites?...... 139 Community Tensions: Waging War and Exploiting Community Weakness through Race and Resources...... 143 Do Organizations Matter?...... 151 Attitude is Everything...... 156

6 CONCLUSIONS ...... 160

Blinding. Bonding Gone Awry...... 168 Better Understanding Conflict, Government, and Civil Society ...... 171 Isms...... 177 England and Beyond...... 179 Envisioning Multiethnic Life...... 182

APPENDIX

A SURVEYS: OLDHAM AND LUTON ...... 185

Luton Survey ...... 185

vi Oldham Survey ...... 189

B INTERVIEW QUESTIONS...... 193

LIST OF REFERENCES...... 194

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... 207

vii

LIST OF TABLES

Table page

1 Race and Religion ...... 101

2 Age ...... 102

3 Marital Status ...... 102

4 Home Prices (local expenses) ...... 102

5 Demographics Oldham and Luton ...... 111

6 Make up of Mixed Groups in Luton 1999...... 114

7 Make up of Mixed Groups in Oldham 1999 ...... 114

8 Make up of Mixed Groups in Luton 2004...... 114

9 Make up of Mixed Groups in Oldham 2004 ...... 114

10 Mixed Groups versus Bonding: Luton and Oldham 1999 ...... 115

11 Mixed Groups and Bonding Groups: Luton and Oldham 2004 ...... 115

12 Voluntary Group Classification (self-selected)...... 117

13 Working with Ethnic Groups: Luton and Oldham 2000 ...... 118

14 Working with Ethnic Groups: Luton and Oldham 2004 ...... 119

15 Working with Umbrella Groups: Luton and Oldham 2000 ...... 121

16 Working with Umbrella Groups: Luton and Oldham 2004 ...... 121

17 Frequency of Working with Others: Luton and Oldham 2000 ...... 122

18 Frequency of Working with Others: Luton and Oldham 2004 ...... 123

viii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure page

1 Hyden’s Typology of 4 Types of Social Capital...... 17

2 Movement Between Civic and Un–civic Life...... 77

3 State & Local Level Effects of Social Capital...... 177

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

HOW DO ORGANIZATIONS MATTER? THE EFFECTS OF CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS ON ETHNIC RELATIONS, ENGLAND AND BEYOND

Kelli Noelle Moore

May 2006

Chair: Goran Hyden Major Department: Political Science

This dissertation is centered on ethnicity as an integral part of civic life and draws comparatively on two multiethnic cities in England, Oldham and Luton. The riots that erupted between Asian and white British citizens in Oldham during the summer of 2001, and the comparative calm that remained in the multiethnic city of Luton, provide a setting to examine the civic factors that help to manage or, in contrast, advance tensions among ethnic groups. More specifically, this study examines bridging organizations that are thought to improve the ethnic relations, bonding organizations that are thought to be

exclusive and deleterious to relations among ethnic groups in civic life, and the effects of

binding, or ethnic organizations partnering within civic life. The study most specifically studies community responses to shocks, or the blinding effects of extreme or far-right organizations.

This typology of multiethnic civic life is a useful one and lends itself to understanding ethnic relations in a variety of settings across the globe where community

x demographics are changing. Realizing that economic and demographic transformations

in Oldham and Luton–often a result of global shifts–are not unlike changes seen in other cities across advanced industrialized world and in developing nations, this study

identifies several factors that contribute to the ability to better manage tensions. This

study finds that the most important factors in managing ethnic tensions in civic life are

the ability for ethnic organizations to partner with each other, communication among

ethnic communities (specifically, the ability of organizational leaders to communicate

with each other) and having or building an agile voluntary sector that is able to move and

respond to shocks that disturb community relations. Finally, this study acknowledges the

need and desire of every group to bond with members of their own ethnic group and to

celebrate their ethnicity among others in their community.

CHAPTER 1 BACKGROUND

The Research Problem

How do civic organizations matter in ethnic relations? This dissertation focuses on two multiethnic cities in England, Oldham and Luton. In 2001, riots broke out between indigenous whites and Asians, in Oldham, a borough not far from Manchester, England and in several cities across the region. At the same time, other multiethnic communities facing similar challenges were able to manage tensions between ethnic groups. Can relationships among civic groups provide an explanation as to whether a community experiences the outbreak of ethnic conflict or the successful management of tensions between ethnic groups? This research posits that the kind of interaction among civic organizations (in many cases are functionally ethnic organizations) makes a difference in

whether a town experiences ethnic conflict, as seen in Oldham, or whether a city is able

to better manage tensions and prevent the outbreak of ethnic violence, as seen in Luton.

Learning from the past and present experiences of these two cities, this theoretically

informed comparative case study, speaks to building harmonious relationships among

ethnic groups in multiethnic communities through partnership, leadership,

communication, and through celebrating and acknowledging the cultural identity of all

community members.

This first chapter provides a brief introduction to this research and highlights the

work of Ashtoush Varshney (2001) whose work was the inspiration of this research and

the inspiration to use civic life to understanding ethnic relations. This chapter explains

1 2 how this research fits into the context of the work of other political scientists who have written on ethnic conflict and on civil society. The chapter ends by putting ethnic conflict into perspective and explaining the importance of this study.

Civic Conflict and Ethnic Life

In his book Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life (2002) Varshney contributes to the study of ethnic conflict, organizational life, and South Asian politics by testing the effectiveness of civic organizations as a mechanism to curtail violent conflict between ethnic groups and discusses the importance of informal engagement between people of different ethnic groups. By collecting ethnographic and historical data and blending qualitative and quantitative methods, Varshney uncovers how civic life can work to produce either conflict or cooperation between Hindus and Muslims. Using three pairs of each peaceful and violent cities as principal cases, Varshney makes two central arguments. First, sustained long term informal relationships between members of different ethnic groups do moderate tensions; however, this alone –or as compared to the role of organizations– is not a sturdy test for peace. Second, he argues that it is the cities that demonstrate integration among associations, together with informal daily interaction

(not informal relations alone), that curtails conflict and promotes peace (Varshney 2002:

46–47).

Varshney concludes that although informal relationships between individuals are important, formal associations through organizations are much more robust in preventing conflict between ethnic groups. He argues that formal associations, as a form of civic engagement, allow a community to better withstand the rumors and discord within the community that can instigate conflict (mostly through communication with other organizations and the membership). This makes a community resistant to exogenous

shocks, for example, violence or political scandal in a nearby city. Strong, bridging civic

organizations he argues can serve to prevent the spread of (ethnic) conflict to nearby

cities and towns, and this is what contributes to a continuous peace (Varshney 2002: 44–

45).

There are other scholars like Donald Horowitz (1993) whose focus is on political

science, comparative politics specifically, and also on ethnicity, who show that ethnic

conflict is a part of the social fabric but that it can also be managed without wishing away

–sometimes difficult– ethnic relations. Varshney, also accepting this important premise, explores how civic engagement can be either a mechanism for peace or a mechanism for

conflict between ethnic groups. It is a premise and relationship that will be further

explored in this dissertation. It is also an intimate relationship that is imperative for

students of comparative politics and practitioners to understand. Can relationships

among civic organizations help us to better understand ethnic relations? The issues of

ethnicity and civic life are the backbone of this research and both issues are addressed

throughout the dissertation. Likewise, Varshney’s work is linked throughout. It is not a

replication of his study, but his core idea of explaining ethnic relations, whether tense or

harmonious, through civic relationships is reiterated throughout. Below, connections to

the civic literature are introduced as well as the core of the research. The issue of cultural

identity is also key to understanding this work and will be explored more explicitly and

theoretically in chapter two and further, and in the context of England, in chapter three.

Research Premises

This study uses civic engagement as the unit of analysis understanding that social

scientists have correlated civic organizations, professional associations, neighborhood

associations, labor unions, religious groups, sports and hobby clubs, etc., with a robust

civil society that supports harmonious democratic societies (Putnam 1993; Portney &

Berry 1993; Oxhorn & Ducantezeiler 1999; Hyden 1997; USAID 1994). At the same

time it joins the canon of research that reinvestigates the effects of civil society and the

premise that civil society is a cure–all. Further, this study underscores that the

importance of achieving ethnic harmony for a better quality democracy and for better

development in poor countries. That said, this study seeks to achieve a higher level of

specificity, offering a necessary clarification of the relationship between civil society and ethnic conflict that needs to occur in order to achieve a goal in this direction of a better quality society. In short, this study will investigate the kind of organizational behavior that leads to more harmonious, or hostile, relationships within ethnically diverse communities and clarifies how relationships with civil society can help to manage ethnic tensions.

To explore these kinds of behavior I use a rubric that adopts and illuminates the work of Robert Putnam and Goran Hyden. They challenge the notion that civil society should be treated as a monolith. As they state, civil society is a space that extends beyond family, that is neither government nor market, that has the potential for great good, but also holds the prospect for un-civic and un-cohesive behavior that can prove damaging to harmonious and robust communities. Hyden (2001) refines, if not rejects, the notion that civil society is a monolith coming together to advance the development of the state and society. He adds depth to Putnam’s distinction in Bowling Alone (2000) between “bridging” and “bonding” types of social capital. Hyden argues that civil society is composed of four different types of relationships generating four distinct types of social capital: blinding, binding, bonding, and bridging. This classification or

5 typology serves as a useful point of departure to better understand the behavior of civic organizations and to better understand how ethnicity may manifest itself through organizations to be either helpful or harmful to the public sphere.

The four key terms that are used to classify and disaggregate the role of civic organizations and the social capital they foster are: bridging, binding, bonding, and blinding. In this research, bridging refers to frequent and sustained partnerships between organizations of different ethnicities, races, or faiths or umbrella groups that provide a regular forum for interaction for a wide variety of local community groups. It also refers to inclusive organizations that have robustly mixed membership or a group for whom diversity or multiculturalism is an underlying principle or ideology. An example of this type of integrative bridging organization is Operation Understanding, a civic organization focused on cultural identity, historical experience, conflict and cooperation between

African Americans and Jewish American communities in the United States. Based in

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania this organization exemplifies bridging behavior through its mixed group of administrators, leaders, and participants. Other types of bridging organizations can include councils of faith, ethnically diverse or multiracial all women’s coalitions, and groups that unite or serve as an umbrella for voluntary sector organizations or organizations that link to “external assets” for “information diffusion”

(Putnam 2000).

Binding refers to ethnic organizations of different memberships that have engaged in relationships not to integrate their groups, but to reach out to another community in a temporary, sometimes rational, relationship in order to reach a common goal or perhaps more often to carryout a joint project such as a health campaign or a holiday program.

For example, this relationship can occur between Sikhs and Muslims or Afro–Caribbean

people and Asians in England. An example of a binding organization in the United States

is seen in the relationship between three groups formed a coalition in 1983, in Durham,

North Carolina. The Durham Committee on the Affairs of Black People (a group African

Americans), the Durham Voters Alliance (a group of mostly white young professionals), and the People’s Alliance (a statewide mostly white consumer affairs organization) joined forces to control the local political agenda and eventually lead the city to its first fair housing ordinance (Goldfield 1990). Although these groups may not socialize or work together on a regular basis, a common cause compelled them to unite and work together for a specific purpose.

Third, bonding refers to ethnically homogenous organizations whose members enjoy congregating to celebrate their own ethnicity or more simply, to be in a comfortable environment with their peers. The mission of bonding organizations is to maintain strong relationships within the cultural group and support self-pride and cultural identity, such as B’nai B’rith youth organizations or black sororities or white fraternities.

These groups may or may not be open to others. They are expected to have potentially negative effects on ethnic relations and the prospect for conflict resolution and peace, mostly because of the social anomie fostered by ethnic groups not relating to others.

Bonding has been viewed negatively as a more tribal form of association. This will be addressed throughout the dissertation (Hyden 2001; Putnam 2000).

Finally, blinding refers to extreme groups, like the American examples of the John

Birch Society, the Ku Klux Klan, or the civil rights era White Citizen’s Council of

Alabama or the English example of the British National Party (among other less formal

organizations) that have a governing ideology that is ethnically, racially, or religiously

exclusive and intolerant, and may consider violence as a means to demonstrate or achieve

goals. Following this definition, blinding can also refer to extreme Muslim groups,

which would fall into this same category. However, this study goes beyond examining just blinding groups and is probably most concerned with the effects of the shocks that these groups wage and the community response to these shocks. Because of the risks

studying extreme white groups it has been necessary to modify the research to focus on

examining exogenous shocks. For Varshney, an exogenous communal shock would be a

partition, civil war, or desecration of a holy place and mentions forces that can tear

everyday engagement apart thorough criminals and gangs (Varshney 2002: 10). On a

lower but provocative level of conflict, an exogenous shock could include the presence,

pamphletting, and demonstrations exhibited by extreme groups as well as any other type

of agitation (including violence) that they or their supporters might invoke to intimidate

some and make their presence known to others. Shocks in this dissertation also include

(some times “yellow”) journalism, media coverage, and poignant international events that

can affect local communities, from ethnic conflict in India, to riots in France, to train

bombs in Spain, or the war in Iraq. How can one community withstand these shocks

while another cannot?

This study extends Varshney’s work beyond India, his original comparative case,

closely examining civic organizations in Oldham and Luton, in England. Building upon

this work and hopefully setting the stage for future comparative cases, this work will be

the second step in establishing cases to understand ethnic conflict and civil society in a

comparative context. A full body of literature on this topic would give academics and

8 practitioners a more specific approach and a deeper reserve of resources to manage ethnic tensions between Muslim and Western Christian populations and among other ethnic communities in the west and elsewhere. Ethnic conflict has been blamed on tribalism and primordialsim, or leaned toward economically rational explanations for conflict. In explaining ethnic conflict, this research establishes an ideological perspective that is complementary to existing theories and that underscores the importance of civil society and associational life.

Intellectually, I approach this research from the perspective of a comparativist in the discipline of political science. However this research–as does comparative politics– draws on anthropology and sociology. This dissertation further draws on the work of academics in cultural studies and ethnic relations whose work contributes to a better understanding of ethnicity. As research that focuses on ethnicity, this work is not instrumental, nor is it decisively primordial1. It accepts that ethnicity is real and not necessarily contrived by powerholders or by economic circumstances. This approach toward ethnicity accepts that historical factors, economic factors, and indeed leadership and state structures profoundly affect relationships between ethnic relations –either positively or negatively–but that ethnicity itself and conflicts that arise from ethnicity should not be automatically reduced to a superficial form of exploitation by ethnic entrepreneurs. Ethnicity is real and persistent and many groups of peoples across the globe enjoy bonding with members of their own group and this should not be seen as a vestige of the past that we can overcome simply by modernization, but should be

1 Some might call accepting ethnicity primordial, but I believe primordialism goes far deeper in accepting the persistence of behavior, such as bonding. This dissertation also accepts that cleavages cross and that the groups that bond can change their primary identity although the behavior persists.

9 regarded as a human phenomenon that can be accommodated for in a variety of ways, among them, through civic life.

Importance of this Study

Other perspectives on mitigating ethnic conflict within political science (aside from

Varshney) have not used civil society as an explanatory or contributing variable for ethnic conflict. In recent years scholars have gravitated to socio–economic, rational, structural and still quite persistently primordial explanations for ethnic discord. There are scholars who look at ethnic conflict in terms of rational choice and explain ethnic conflict in terms of an economic rationality (Bates 1983). There are also scholars who explain ethnic conflict through ethnic fractionalization, or an analysis of ethnicity in terms of population proportion and political power of ethnic groups (Posner 2003). Primordialists, on the other hand (Huntington 1996), explain ethnic conflict from an essentialist perspective, but have difficulty explaining when ethnic groups cooperate (especially those that resolved conflicts). Still others believe that ethnic/racial identity is shaped by the state and that state formation, structure, and ultimately shape how racial or ethnic groups relate to each other (Marx 1998). These perspectives leave students of ethnic conflict, policy makers, and citizens little agency to manage or prevent conflict based on cultural identity.

This study presents an approach that gives communities the means to mitigate ethnic conflict. Looking at ethnic conflict through civic organizations is a theoretical approach that allows for conflict management, not just determinism. This theoretically informed case study offers an approach that recognizes societal and organizational characteristics that predispose a community to ethnic conflict or ethnic peace.

The subtext of this dissertation questions the impact of ethnic violence on

international development, progress, and reducing the incidence of civil conflict. As a

comparativist as well as a scholar interested in ethnic conflict, the answers to questions

about the intersection between ethnicity and civil society are important in other settings

across the globe. The work of Howell and Pearce (2001) underscore in both Central Asia

and sub–Saharan Africa that donors seeking to create civil society often ignore ethnicity

and think of civil society as a panacea. This dissertation underscores that civil society

generically is not the most important factor, but understanding civil society in a more

nuanced way how organizations is what is important. Further, this work underscores that

it is a grave error to overlook the ethnic aspect of civil society in many communities

across the globe. Indeed the results show that most organizations align by ethnicity. If

civic engagement can be understood in a way that considers ethnicity, proponents of civil

society will have a better means to understand and support this sector and manage

tensions.

Highly industrialized nations also stand to benefit from a deeper look at civil

society and ethnicity. Over the last twenty years the world has witnessed increasing

violence among separatists in the former Soviet republics, in Spain, and in Ireland, war

and genocide in Sudan, Rwanda, and Democratic Republic of Congo, religious violence

in Nigeria, and a growing neo–Nazi movement in many European cities. All of these

conflicts are tied in one way or another to cultural identity and this adds to the enduring

nature of the conflict. Few multiethnic countries have proved themselves immune to conflict on the basis of ethnicity. In fact, since this study began, France was challenged

by riots among Muslim and immigrant populations throughout the country, showing that

11 both advanced and developing countries witness this kind of violence indicating lack of ethnic and racial cohesion. England, the focus of the research, despite its stability, has had its share of domestic challenges that are ethnic in nature. The problem is global and in the current context of globalization, it is a situation that may get worse before it gets better; hence, the importance of trying to find solutions to it.

The case study for this research was conceived after I read about the violence that erupted between Asian2 and white British citizens during the summer of 2001. These riots were the worst that England had experienced in the last twenty years. The outbreak of ethnic violence in various cities and towns across England provides a small, contained setting in which to examine the causes and solutions to ethnic conflict and also provides a template for studying conflict on a local level which can, through case confirmation provide a way to understand how to curtail the outbreak of violent conflict in other settings across the globe. This research can also provide clues to creating more cohesive communities as England as has been recently demonstrated, will continue to be challenged by shocks that rattle communities as exemplified by the London bombings in

2005.

To better understand the ethnic violence, this study examines ethnic conflict and ethnic peace comparatively. Although the violence between Asian and white British citizens was severe and spread across England, there were cities with significant Asian populations that did not succumb to the racial disturbances. Why was this the case? The central inquiry of this study asks what facilitated race riots in cities like Oldham, but prevented violent outbreaks between Asians and whites in cities like Luton? The goal of

2 Immigrants and their offspring originating from the Indian subcontinent

12 this study is to investigate the relationship between the behavior of civic organizations and ethnic conflict; and more specifically, to examine the claim that ethnically inclusive and cooperative organizations will ameliorate ethnic tensions. This research is important to finding ways to create more peaceful multi–ethnic communities in England, but also lays the foundation for thinking about how to reduce ethnic conflict and create stronger more resilient communities in a variety of contexts across the globe where conflict based on race or ethnicity persists.

This work comes out of political science but also contributes to work in ethnic relations, immigration, cultural studies, governance, and, broadly viewed, security studies. This work will also help policy makers locally and regionally in countries across the world in helping different ethnic groups to build more cohesive communities.

Finally, this study does carry a certain uniqueness as there is very little written about the cities of Oldham and Luton England. Both Luton and Oldham have been discussed in the media, but there are no contemporary studies of ethnic relations and civic engagement in these two cities. This comparative case will be meaningful and serve as a useful point of departure for those looking for solutions to the European Union’s changing demographics and to those as in other multiethnic contexts faced with the challenge of growing a sustainable civil society.

This dissertation is based on surveys and semi-structured interviews among civic organizations, their leaders, and community members that were conducted in Oldham and

Luton during the summer of 2004 and the spring of 2005, as well as information collected

during a summer stay in Oldham and Manchester during the summer of 20043 also

informs this study. Although this dissertation gives a thorough examination of civic

behavior, draws evidence, and theorizes about the relationship between bridging,

bonding, binding and blinding groups, it also draws out important conclusions about

other important relationships within civil society. Most importantly, this study highlights

the importance of leadership, attitudes toward ethnicity within civil society, and the

benefits of a positive relationship between the local council and civic groups.

The central idea of this work is to understand if civic organizations matter in

managing ethnic relations. Organizational behavior is not the only factor in managing

ethnic relations, but relationships between civic organizations do matter. There were

strong differences in the extreme forces that attacked Oldham (by the British National

Party, the media, and other far-right groups), which were forces that were significantly

less severe in Luton. However, Oldham was under-prepared to withstand or prevent the

shocks that it ultimately faced. Luton also faced shocks and challenges, but in Luton, the

local council was seen as a cooperative force in uniting communities. In Oldham, the

local council was viewed negatively and had little effect in preventing the riots.

Likewise, leadership within organizations played a key role. In Luton, leaders in the

voluntary sector communicate with each other at the first sign of tensions. In Oldham,

there was little evidence that there was dialogue between community organizations at the time of the riots. Perhaps most important to note is that bonding was strong in both communities, but that this research suggests that organizational binding (or ethnic

3 My base of operation in Oldham was Voluntary Action Oldham, an umbrella organization that provides support to (capacity building) local voluntary organizations among other services to the community and the voluntary sector. See appendices for more information.

14 communities working with each other) combined with bridging is the strongest possible combination of civic energies that can strengthen a multiethnic community. Luton’s agility (after Oldham’s riots) worked in this direction, strengthening their community.

Oldham has seen less improvement than Luton during this time, and also on the whole, believe less in the ability of organizations to reduce tensions.

The following chapters explore these issues and other issues and provide a rich background to understanding the nexus between ethnicity and civic life. Chapter two provides a review of the literature on civil society and ethnicity. Chapter three provides an historical examination of ethnic relations in England, and also provides an alternative approach to understanding civicness in ethnic life. Chapter four reviews the methodological approach. Chapter five discusses the results of surveys and interviews of civic organizations, leaders, and active community members and connects the theoretical and historical background to the behavior found among civic groups in Oldham and

Luton. The conclusion, chapter six, draws these chapters together and provides suggestions on how various forms of social capital contribute to understanding ethnic life and governance in wider ways.

CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, CONFLICT, PEACE, AND ETHNICITY

Putnam, Hyden, Varshney: Foundations

The theoretical foundation of this dissertation is grounded in the work of Robert

Putnam, Goran Hyden, and Ashtoush Varshney. These three scholars seek to advance the understanding and the inter-workings of social capital and civic engagement. At issue is

the need to go beyond superficial readings of social capital and civic engagement and to

go beyond the assumption that there is simply one uniform, like-spirited, civil society that has a particular outcome on all of society and government. With that said, there are other forms of social capital and thus civic engagement that political scientists need to understand before arriving at conclusions and policy prescriptions or requesting or encouraging certain kinds of behavior within civil society. There are also forms of civic engagement that communities should address to better understand how to create a robust civil sector that is capable of managing ethnic tensions.

Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work had a profound impact on the academic and policy communities. Drawing on the correlation between an active and voluminous civil society and an efficient democracy, and he advised other academics and policy makers to encourage or prescribe civic life, particularly in developing countries where democracies are fragile. As a result of the thorough work and compelling argument, civil society, in political science especially, was lauded as a good thing. Although this work is profound, it was incomplete, or perhaps better said, it provided, I believe, only a rough

15 16 map of civil society and civic engagement, which left room for further analysis. Putnam himself, responding to criticism in his book Bowling Alone, charted another approach to civil society with two distinct forms of social capital generated through engagement.

Bridging form of social capital, he argued, encourage people to get together to “generate broader identities”, which transcend the boundaries of family, religion, ethnicity, and/or race. In contrast, bonding forms of social capital on the other hand encourage more insular activity, which does not generate the same returns as bridging forms of social capital. Bonding forms of social capital, he argues, “bolsters our narrower selves” and provides a form of social capital that is just enough to get by (Putnam 2000: 21).

Drawing these boundaries and acknowledging that there is more than just one, positive, kumbaya-type of civil society is really the first step in understanding the make-up of civic life.

Goran Hyden, in an unpublished work entitled In Search of Explanations of the

African Crisis: What Does the Economy of Affection Tell Us? (2001) charts out a more extensive typology of the kinds of social capital generated within civil society. Bridging, binding, bonding, and blinding, forms of social capital operating within civil society.

Bonding and blinding are forms of social capital that are representative of types of social capital that balance expressive behavior emanating from, an ethnic or religious group (for example), and is generated from a groups’ desire to express themselves. These forms of social capital exist along side more intentional attempts to mitigate these more “pre- modern” forms of ethnic expression with binding and bridging.

Expressive

Bonding Blinding

Traditional Modern

Binding Bridging

Instrumental

Figure 1 Hyden’s Typology of 4 Types of Social Capital

In this model, blinding groups are those whose social capital is costly to the rest of society. These close–knit groups are manifested as militias, fundamentalist groups, and terrorist groups. Bonding forms of social capital point toward ethnic groups for example, but more theoretically, this social capital is one that is replicated among and between members of a certain cultural group. Binding forms of social capital identify the partnerships, inclusionary and horizontal1 and exclusionary and vertical2, that exist between bonding groups. Bridging, is the most inclusionary, modern, and instrumental forms of social capital and is the kind of social capital that Putnam (2000) argues reaps positive social benefits. Nonetheless, these other forms of social capital are prevalent and persistent and should thus be factored in to understand the effect that civil society has on governance issues. Hyden’s focus is Africa, however, this more extensive, more critical and creative look at civil society is applicable to civil society in general, and in this case

1 Lose connections seen in civil society

2 As seen in patron–client relations

of this research, most specifically to multi–ethnic communities and civic or voluntary organizations that follow a similar pattern of development.

The third author to provide to inform the approach of this dissertation is Ashtoush

Varshney. Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (2001) joins

Putnam’s (2000) approach toward civic engagement and understanding civil society as a

sector that can prevent (or be the permissive cause of) conflict. In this volume, Varshney

acknowledges the salience of ethnicity, but also shows that civic life can be significant in

mitigating conflict that arises between Hindus and Muslims in urban settings in India.

Using bridging and bonding forms of civic engagement explains the ability or the

inability for ethnic groups or more broadly, in-groups and out-groups, to maintain peace

or become conflictual within a civic and a multiethnic space.

Like Varshney’s research, there are two issues that this dissertation addresses. The

first issue is a theoretical one. The discipline and policy makers, need the theoretical and

empirical resources to understand civil society in a less generic manner. Hence

Varshney, like Putnam, disaggregates civil society to better understand its inner–

workings so that ethnic relations are best understood using bridging and bonding forms of

civic engagements (among other factors) to explain the outcome of peace or conflict

between ethnic groups. I do not believe that Varshney goes far enough in his

disaggregation of civil society and ethnic engagement. Hyden’s typology of social

capital mirrors the way civic organizations behave and engage. Thus, this dissertation

focuses on Hyden’s theoretical model to explain the types of civic engagement seen in

multiethnic settings. The second issue is the treatment of ethnicity as either a non–issue

or as separate from civic life. Varshney rightly marries ethnicity with civic life. And as

this research finds, civic life is a good indicator of ethnic tensions and indicates why

Oldham succumbed to riots and Luton had better mechanisms to prevent such conflict.

Civil society, in multiethnic settings, is ethnic. To disregard the ethnic nature of civil

society would misinform the results we see as an outcome (democracy, ethnic relations,

etc,) of a vibrant or a lackluster civil society. This research then looks at civil society as

an ethnic3 place and understands engagement as often being ethnic in nature and sees multiethnic civic life in terms of bridging, binding, bonding, and blinding as forms of social capital that manifest through civic organizations.

These are the works on which this dissertation was grounded. The following pages provide a more general review of the literature and further explain the approach of this dissertation by highlighting the critiques of the civil society literature. This section will help to show how and where this research fits within a broader picture of literature. This next section also examines ethnicity from a theoretical perspective and provides a foundation for understanding race and ethnicity and how and why it should be a foundation for understanding civic life in multiethnic communities.

Civil Society, Social Capital and Civic Engagement

Since Robert Putnam published his book Making Democracy Work, civil society, social capital, and civic engagement have been concepts to which political scientists and practitioners of development have paid a great deal of attention. To understand if and

3 This research uses the word “ethnic” as racial divides are more biological imprecise divisions. Ethnic is a more precise term as this case can be more broadly applied to situations where groups are in fact of the same race, but other divisions, religious, language, culture, dress, etc. This would be the case with Albanian asylum seekers facing difficulty in England (by far-right and others) or in other contexts, for example in Rwanda where all conflicting parties were of the same race, but were of different ethnicities, however slight those may be. The word race appears from time-to-time as in this case there is a very obvious racial difference --although this is not the most important difference-- and also because respondent sometimes, refer to race.

20 how civil society and civic engagement can help to deepen understanding of democracy, development, and a variety of other social maladies affecting the political sphere –ethnic peace and ethnic conflict, among them– it is important to investigate the roots of civil society and the literature on civil society. Mindful of the critiques of civil society, social capital, and civic engagement, the following pages review the roots of these concepts, focusing on the expectations that academics and practitioners have of these concepts and how past work paves the way for understanding the relationship between civic engagement and ethnic relations.

Considering civic engagement as a powerful entity in creating and investigating the relationship between democracy and civic engagement, Putnam went back to Alexis de

Tocqueville whose volume, Democracy in America (1835), attributed the greatness of the

American democracy to the ‘civicness’ of the people who settled in the country. This civicness was examined qualitatively by Tocqueville in his travels throughout the country where he observed the number of and high level of participation in civic groups. Inspired by the work of Edward Banfield (1958) who had a brief stay in southern Italy, Putnam went to Italy and concluded that government was less efficient in the southern Italian states than their northern counterparts. Putnam further concluded that in the areas where there was less efficient government there was also less social capital and less civic engagement (Putnam 1993). From these studies and observations, political science and development specialists began to focus on the conclusion that social capital and civic engagement leads to efficient (or good) government. These concepts have been so powerful that development organizations and governments have adopted and used them

as a foundation for democratic change (USAID 1994; Portes 1998; Nicolet 2003;

MSI/USAID 2005).

These conclusions about civil society –perhaps unintended by its intellectual

fathers– suggest that “social capital is good” rather than social capital is social capital, the

result of which can be positive and peaceful or negative and disruptive. Many scholars

and practitioners continue to assume a positive bias, but this is a flawed and

oversimplified approach. It is important as this research understands civic engagement

and social capital beyond good or bad, present or absent, vibrant or lifeless. In fact,

social capital, civil society, and civic engagement, by definition can manifest great good

or great detriment within society. Thus the promise of civil society should be challenged.

Goran Hyden writes, “the notion that social capital is made up of a common currency of

civicness, however is both ethnocentric and misleading for policy or governance

purposes” (Hyden 2001). Whether or not civil society is in fact “good” depends upon

how social capital, civil society, and civic engagement are ultimately used or how it

manifests. These concepts mean different things to different people and likewise the

levels of expectation of what social capital or civic engagement can produce are indeed varied. The following paragraphs discuss and examine social capital in its more neutral state, what is desired of civil society, and challenge that civil society is inherently good or that it should be accepted as presented in Putnam (1993).

Nan Lin a sociologist, looks at social capital in a utilitarian and unbiased way. She argues that social capital is a theory based on the assumption that social capital is a resource harvested from embedded networks and that it is within these embedded networks that research must take place to determine the utility of networks. Lin also

22 underscores that there is a return associated with social investment and that there is a return on the investment made into social networks (Lin 2001: 3). Similarly, citing a consensus among scholars, Alejandro Portes, a sociologist, in a thorough review and critique of the social capital literature, writes that social capital represents the ability of individuals to seek and capitalize resources and benefits (or disadvantages) harvested from group membership or more specifically gained from access to social networks

(Portes 1998). Going into further detail, Portes draws on the work of Coleman (1990) and Sensenbrenner (1993) arguing that social capital or “bounded solidarity” is a powerful source of community and commitment. Social capital in this case can encourage the rich to anonymously endow a church, school, or hospital and can also encourage members of political groups to join movements and protests that could cost them their lives. This proves that group membership and the social capital that results from these bonds are indeed powerful motivating forces.

In this light it is clear that social capital as realized through civic engagement may have a peaceful effect or an effect that aggravates whatever peace might exist. This suggests that the bias toward civic engagement being exclusively positive (rather than neutral) should be reviewed. Investing in social relations and capturing embedded resources can lead to either positive or negative effects.

Within political science, civil society, civic engagement, and social capital gained quite a bit of salience as an explanatory theory following the fall of communism as observers noted the importance of agency and the power to change structure from the bottom up. Despite the general agreement on the importance of this concept to political science, it is necessary to understand what it means to the discipline and how it is

23 important. Political scientists may not always adhere to a basic definition and often examine these concepts at different levels and in different ways than sociologists. The first question that students of comparative politics and international relations ask is what does civil society mean for the international community and for the developing world?

According to Colombia University’s international affairs online website (CIAO), civil society is quite generally defined distinguishing government from civil society, specifically noting that as “distinguished from government and commerce, civil society may be broadly defined as all the natural and voluntary associations in society” (CIAO;

Nicolet 2003). For many political scientists, civil society is the area that is neither government nor market, which indicates the mood or level of the political climate in a country (Naidoo & Tandon 1999). In a study that examines what encourages and what hampers the creation of a democratic polity in post–Soviet states, Kubik examines civil society and the relationships between organizations and individuals. In civil society he argues, there are groups that are both horizontal and democratic that have a tolerance and a willingness to collaborate (Kubik 2000: 201). For political scientists, this is the stabilizing element of civic engagement, which counterbalances the state and thereby supports democracy. Civil society for this discipline is a large space in the societal stratum that holds most potential for organic social change as well as government or structural changes that move a society from authoritarian to democratic regimes. This theoretical perspective has been backed by many authors especially throughout the

1990’s when hope for change and democratizations was high following the end of communism in 1989 in Eastern Europe and Russia and observing the “third wave” of

democracy sweep the world (Putnam 1993; Oxhorn and Ducantezelier 1999; USAID

1994; Keck and Sikkink 1998).

To understand civil society in the process of democratization Kubik looks not at the

process itself (of democratization) but at the ideals that civil society breeds for a better

society. Following Habermas, civil society is first considered a space that is protected

from state infringement or a space that mediates between state and society; second, civil society is regarded as a place that embodies a desired social relationship regardless of how public life is actually organized. Finally, civil society is seen as a set of social groups whose members act in a ‘pro–civic’ way by acting deliberatively and/or collectively to accomplish common goals (Kubik 2000). Because of these prized and valued characteristics practitioners as well as many of those who study political science develop indicators to recognize, capture, and replicate civil society in states and communities where it is lacking. For example, Nicolet (2003) like other scholars looks at non–governmental organizations (NGOs) as one indicator of civil society in the developing world, and concludes that NGOs are “organized appearances of civil society”.

Practitioners examine and count organizations, more specifically civil society organizations (CSOs), grassroots organizations (GROs), and NGOs, which are, inspired by Tocqueville, manifestations of civil society and indicators that a state or a community’s civic life is alive and well.

Although the scholarship tends to view an active civil society as a positive and desirable occurrence, for the purposes of this research it is useful to recognize the distinction between social capital, by way of civic engagement, as first value neutral, and second as a social network from which a return or a potential benefit is derived. Civil

25 society embodies many potentially desired social relationships that are seen as comprised of members who act in a ‘pro–civic’ ways, but who also understanding that the latter is a positive outcome but not a necessary result of civil society (Kubik 2000).

In an article, “The Promise of Civil Society” practitioners are hopeful about the future and see civil society as the vehicle and the mechanism for progressive change and improvement in societies including developing ones across the world. The hope that these authors have for civil society is not value neutral and their high expectations are not masked in any way. Naidoo and Tandon (1999) believe that fundamental values and universal practices throughout civil society have come together and given way to a healthy public life, trust, tolerance, democracy, and civic mindedness. These civic participants in civil society are stellar ones. These citizens are well–connected and aware of their rights and responsibilities and volunteer to create forums where common problems, shared interests and collective aspirations can be shared, developed, and implemented. Civil society can (but doesn’t necessarily) help to create good public policy for the public good.

It is this inclination toward positive outcomes and the broad sweeping conclusions about civil society, social capital, and civic engagement and the expectations of its benefits that raise concerns for those who want to implement and reap the results of civil society. Social scientists, particularly political scientists, have high expectations of civil society and correlate civic organizations, usually, professional associations, neighborhood associations, labor unions, religious groups, sports and hobby clubs, etc., with a robust civil society that supports harmonious democratic societies (Putnam 1993;

Portney & Berry 1993; Oxhorn & Ducantezeiler 1999; USAID 1994). This has fueled

the support of civil society as essential in poor and developing nations. The stakes are

high when putting a theory such as this into practice, therefore these benefits should be challenged and made complex so that better information can come from civic organizations. There are only a few scholars writing on civil society in general, and on

civic organizations in particular, who go beyond the surface to examine and question the

kind of behavior that is necessary in order to create and maintain peaceful, engaged

communities (Callaghy 1994; Hyden 2001; Seligson 1999; Fiorina 1999; Harriss & de

Rienzo 1997). Further, the literature does not widely address how civic organizations can

work in support of, or how they can be detrimental to, ethnically diverse communities

(Uvin 1998).

The authors discussed here take on challenges associated with civil society and its

assumed benefits, highlighting the fact that differences in region, culture, and

circumstance can make a difference. Some conclude that it is not civil society, social

capital, or engagement that makes a positive difference, but argue instead that nuanced

levels of specification, how groups and individuals choose to engage, and environmental

circumstances make a difference in understanding the potential of civil society and should be studied closely.

Other scholars (Callaghy 1994; Seligson 1999; Putnam 2000; Fiorina 1999; Harriss

1997; Berman 1997) realize that the effects of civil society are often not necessarily or

overwhelmingly positive, at best neutral, but can also be negative, and thus these authors critique the examination of civil society with rose–colored glasses. Thomas Callaghy

believes that region and culture are important considerations for understanding what

exactly the role of civil society is. He argues that using the term without higher levels of

specification “muddles more than it clarifies” and Callaghy goes so far as to conclude

that the term (civil society) should not be used. Using associational life as a variable for

democratic change in the (specifically) African context, he argues, is misleading as

associational life often has very little to do with the creation of norms, especially civil ones (Callaghy 1994: 236). Associations, he argues become like little spheres of their own, which can be either beneficial or inimical to democracy. Comparing the development of African –as opposed to European norms– Callaghy concludes that

Habermas’ conceptions of a public sphere are useful, particularly for Africa. Callaghy believes that academics should not have such high expectations of civil society and that to understand democracy, of interest to many political scientists, that the study of democratic transitions and social movements are better indicators.

Other authors look within communities or examine theoretical merit of the conclusion that civil society and civic engagement benefit society. Seligson (1999) concludes that only groups that specifically practice demand–making will contribute to democratization. This is different from Putnam’s conclusion (1993) that bird–watching groups are equally as effect as parent–teacher associations (PTA) in effecting democratic change. The nuances demonstrate to practitioners and to academicians that blanket acceptance of civil society as unequivocally good is flawed.

Further study revealed that as the study of civil society progressed in the post–1989 world, other scholars, including those who had a significant impact on the scholarship on the topic in political science and in government, realized that blanket acceptance was false and reconsidered their own thinking on civil society. Hyden (2001) makes a point in the same vein as the clarifications posited by as Seligson and Callaghy by calling into

28 question, the notion that civil society is a monolith dedicated to advance the (positive) development of the state and society. Hyden adds depth to the distinctions that Putnam made following critique of his earlier work on democracy and civic traditions in Italy

(Putnam 1993). Putnam concedes the need for a distinction between kinds of civic engagement and social capital in Bowling Alone (2000) where he concludes that there is not just one type of social capital, but two: “bridging” and “bonding” types. Hyden adds to this by showing civil society is composed of different types of relationships generating four distinct types of social capital: blinding, binding, bonding, and bridging. Although

Hyden makes this argument to describe the relationship between the peasantry and the state, his typology serves as a useful point of departure to better understand not only the behavior of civic organizations, but how organizations may be either helpful or inimical to the public sphere. This is particularly useful in the study of democracy.

In the same way that Putnam and Hyden flesh out the types of social capital necessary for distinction, Fiorina (1998) addresses the amount of social capital necessary for positive civic results. He shows the importance of taking a closer look at civic engagement and draws the conclusion that more civic engagement is not necessarily better. Again, highlighting the importance of distinguishing between kinds of social capital or how individuals or groups engage, Fiorina measures the amount of engagement. He supports the assumption made by many scholars that high levels of civic engagement are optimal, however he also finds that intermediate levels of engagement may be detrimental to a community and lead to outcomes that are inferior to either higher levels or lower levels of engagement.

Looking more profoundly at the concept and examining its presumed benefits, John

Harriss who examines the unquestioned acceptance of social capital as a public good.

John Harriss argues neither amount nor type is necessarily important. Instead, it is withdrawal or non–participation, which is negative. Social capital is an entity that can be either positive or negative. Social capital can function as a public good because it is open to everyone; however, it does not meet the criteria of a public good because there are those citizens who choose not to participate in social networks where (positive) social capital is stimulated. This is an important point. Harriss accounts for those citizens who choose not to participate in positive social capital. These people form a group of

outsiders constituting a (negative) externality that, Harriss argues, can lead to

conspiracies against the public, such as mafias or other groups that assault the status quo

or the public sphere.

Similarly, in the most flagrant example of the potential for ill effects in civil society, Sheri Berman (1997) shows that an (over) active civil society can be exploited and be damaging and dangerous to society. In Germany, instead of adding to a robust democracy, civil society led to the demise of Weimar Germany. Rather than more common arguments which fault the absence of civil society, Berman shows that it was an overactive civil society that helped to destroy Germany. Her work shows how Nazis penetrated civil society organizations and reached out to disaffected members of the bourgeois who were also apart of civil society organizations. With this penetration Nazis used the country’s organizational infrastructure to make inroads into various constituencies (Berman 1997: 3). Further, writes Berman, “when national political institutions and structures proved either unwilling or unable to address their citizen’s

needs, many Germans turned away from them and found succor and support in the

institutions of civil society instead…”(Berman 1997: 411). Civic life was strong, but the

disaffection combined with a ready civic structure proved devastating to the state and

society. She concludes:

A flourishing civil society does not necessarily bode well for the prospects of liberal democracy. For civil society to have the beneficial effects neo– Tocquevilleans posit, the political context has to be right: absent strong and responsive political institutions, and increasingly active civil society may serve to undermine, rather than strengthen, a political regime (Berman 1997: 402).

Looking at these authors’ work, it is difficult to claim the promises of civil society without closely examining what is actually happening within civil society. What type of civil society? How much? When? With which groups? These are basic questions, but they are essential ones if political scientists and practitioners are going to continue to pursue a deeper understanding of the potential good (or the potential bad) that civil society holds and carry this theory into practice for developing countries. Indeed trust, reciprocity, and universal values as well as a rights-bearing and responsible citizenry may be associated with active and robust civil societies. However, critics and those who have improved the study and understanding of civil society, civic engagement, and social capital in political science realize that it is prudent to investigate these claims before proclaiming their value and necessity. Finally, these scholars acknowledge that a more value–neutral approach should be used to analyze and understand the civil society literature rather than assuming any possible benefits.

The promise of civil society is not dead, but it does seem a bit compromised. What many authors have proved is that by looking at the nuances of what actually happens within civil society, by going back to the foundations of the concept, and by challenging the rigor of the theoretical assumptions made, there are many different answers to how

civil society works. It is not a given that civil society will indeed meet the high

expectations of harmonious democracy, development, and the seeds of social change that

has come to be expected of it.

That said, there have been theories within political science that have been

compromised in some contexts after a few years of being implemented on the ground.

Modernization is a case in point. It failed in the 1950’s and 1960’s and forced political

scientists to look for other theories to explain, for example, ethnic conflict or the success

or failure of democracy. Development is a set of theories, a perspective that in some

ways shares many of modernization’s hopes and desires for poor countries. According to

many scholars and related to this research, development in theory and in practice has

come to rely on civil society for successful achievement of development (Huntington

1968). However, scholars are right to critique and analyze civil society with regards to

its effectiveness in development, especially in multiethnic communities (Kamat 2003).

Marrying the concepts and analyzing the importance of civil society and ethnic life in a

developing setting, Howell and Pearce (2001) eloquently highlight the shortcomings of

applying civil society (in its current format) to international development issues without

considering the effects of ethnicity, and kinship or class ties, for that matter as well. In

Africa and Central Asia where hegemonic powers have intervened and drawn state boundaries irrespective of clans or ethnic groups, the authors call into question a civil society that can grow without regard to these issues. Civil society under colonialism was

racialized and exclusionary, it left little space for indigenous Africans to organize. Since

the colonialism system lifted, ethnic and kinship ties have been persistent, taking over as

an informal means of governance (Bayart 1993; Jackson and Rosberg 1982). Howell and

Pearce thus conclude that civil society is similarly affected by ethnic ties and that kinship

ties trump the liberal democratic vision that Western believers place in the ability of civil

society to deliver. Drawing on the work of Kenyan, Wachira Maina, Howell and Pearce

conclude that:

The tendency of scholars and donors to exclude from the definition of civil society any associational activities along tribal, clan, and kinship lines leads to a very limited view about the democratic potential of such organization and the potential forces of social and political change within society (Howell and Pearce 2001: 186).

Similarly in Central Asia, despite the hundreds and in some countries thousands of

NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs), there is little mention of ethnicity despite emphasis on, for example, women’s organizations. Further, organizations are often run by the elite, and those in urban and professional classes, which leaves leaders out of touch with their members. Howell and Pearce conclude that there is a possibility that democracy/civil society will never become rooted due to its focus on the external rather than the internal character of organizations. Finally, they conclude that “a failure to fully

grasp the salience of ethnicity in associational life can also lead to an unrealistic

assessment of the cohesiveness of civil society and the potential constraining power of

ethnic identities,” (Howell and Pearce 2001: 202). This research agrees with this

assessment.

Development in poor countries has given rise to ethnic conflict, because of rewards

in newly democratic states that follow ethnic lines, and also because of the high stakes

and competition for scare resources in poor countries (Bates 1983). The tenuous political

and economic situations found in developing countries should give the donor community

more incentives to focus on strengthening cross ethnic relationships. Development

(economic, social and political) promises to reduce the problems of poverty and the

liberal democratic approach that the authors mention suggest that civil society might,

without even trying, reduce levels of ethnic conflict (sound like modernization?), which

will reduce the incidence of civil war. But the work of Howell and Pearce suggests that

little cross–ethnic work is being done, leaving us poorly equipped to understand the

differential effects that ethnicity has on conflict and peace.

Within political science, comparativists, especially, examine the ways that civil

society and development work together to alleviate the challenges of development.

Ethnicity, as a persistent problem in many poor or developing countries relates in theory and in practice to development and civil society. There is a loose, implicating triangle that expresses the relationship between civil society, development, and ethnic conflict.

The arrow points to development, which through civil society can alleviate or at least ameliorate ethnic–based conflicts. Varshney (2002) investigates the relationship between civil society and ethnic conflict in India, a multiethnic developing country. As suggested in chapter one, his work is important in investigating a more explicit link between civil society and ethnic conflict. It opens the door to this research project which seeks to better understand the literature on ethnic conflict in hopes of contributing to a better understanding of how ethnicity and civil society relate to one another as peacekeeping or conflict–making forces within a developing or an industrialized community.

Ethnicity and Civil Society

It is important to acknowledge that in addition to the voluminous literature on civil society, democratization and development that focuses on developing countries, there is also a considerable literature on ethnicity and civil society in highly industrialized and developing countries that will aid out understanding of ethnicity in general and bonding specifically. Race, ethnicity, and religion make appearances in American politics and are

considered mainly with regard to its effects on voting participation, political power, civic

engagement, and democracy.

Understanding and clarifying ethnicity within the context of civil society, Portes’

(1998) discussion of ethnicity recognizes that ethnicity is a topic that is germane to social

capital. He writes that the strong ties that help bring benefits to the group are also those

that prevent others from participating in the group. Social capital can be either inclusive

or exclusive. Citing an example of exclusivity to illustrate this point, Portes examines

Waldinger’s 1995 study of the tight control exercised by white ethnics (descendents of

Italian, Irish, and Polish immigrants) over the construction trades as well as the fire and police unions of New York. Other examples include, Koreans, Jews, and Cuban monopoly of various sectors in the market place and in the employment sector and the changing interaction between blacks, Jews and Koreans in urban areas of the United

States (Lee 2002). This mono-ethnic or racial communal bonding affects civic engagement.

Race and ethnicity play a large role in understanding how social capital is used.

Portes looks back to Adam Smith who argues that ethnic groups were not the only groups

using social capital for its own economic advantage. Smith complained that merchants

behaved similarly and that their behavior constituted a “conspiracy against the public”.

Any group with a bonding and excluding behavior would constitute a sub–optimal

situation where an ethnic group becomes a conspiracy against the public (Portes 1998).

Further as certain communities realize and feel the demographic effects of globalization,

the question of how ethnicity fits within civic life is becoming a salient one especially

given the rising number of immigrants and demographic shifts across Europe and in other

places.

The relationship between civil society and ethnic groups is also important when analyzing security within a country. Nicolet (2003) writes about the Balkans where ethnicity is a contributing cause of conflict. He argues that ethnicity is well–reflected in the number of mono-ethnic civic organizations in the Baltic region. Moreover, the author notes that multiethnicity among Kosovar civil society organizations is a rarity. Nicolet

concludes that civil society is definitely linked to security noting that there are malign

forms of civil society groups not often mentioned in the civil society literature and

explains that civil society has positive effects on security only if it is interpreted in

inclusive, pluralistic, and democratic terms rather than exclusivist and ethno–

nationalistic, terms (Nicolet accessed 12/19/05)4. Given this, he agrees with the critique

that it has taken theorists years to include the negative element of civil society within the debates and that their consideration is crucial in studying ethnicity, security, and conflict.

The connection between development, ethnicity, and civil society, therefore, is not

confined to developing countries alone. It is important to recognize here that in

developed countries such as the United States and England, and despite an active civil

society over the last two decades, there have been racial or ethnic riots in Los Angeles,

CA and Cincinnati, OH in the USA, and Oldham and Bradford, in the UK, respectively.

This situation begs the question of whether civil society can affect, lessen, or mitigate

against ethnic tensions or the outbreak of violent ethnic conflict. Varshney (2002) argues

that civic engagement does in fact mitigate against violent ethnic conflict.

4 http://www.ciaonet.org/casestudy/nic01/index.html

Ethnicity and Its Dynamics

In the presence of other ethnic groups, Horowitz (1993) and Varshney (2001) suggest that ethnicity is a secure place of belonging or at least accept ethnicity as a given, the dynamics of which should be better understood. Joining an organization with people from one’s ethnic community allows members to share in their culture, which may be rejected by others. Joining a hobby club to bond with people of one’s ethnic group and sharing in interests beyond ethnic affiliation is a natural progression of feelings of belonging among ethnic groups. Before better understanding the relationship between civic engagement, ethnicity and conflict, let us first understand what ethnicity is, why it persists, why people want to belong, and how ethnicity affects societies?

Ethnicity has broad boundaries and can apply to all individuals in some way shape or form although the term is commonly directed toward recently arrived immigrants who are perceived as being sufficiently different enough to warrant the label “ethnic” (Tonkin

1996). Each society draws ethnic lines in unique ways and although ethnicity is always a marker of difference, it is not in every community, society, or country that ethnicity in itself is contentious. It is also important to note that individuals often experience a heightened (or diminished) sense of identity as they move across and between communities or countries and realize their ethnicity more or less as context and customs change. In short, a person’s ethnicity means different things in different places.

In making an attempt to better understand what ethnicity is and how and when it is relevant, it is useful to see that ethnicity has a component that revolves around common experience and common need and a component that revolves around kinship or family ties, values, and other common markers of ethnicity such as physical features, religion, and lifestyle. It is the latter that most visibly affects the common experience of an ethnic

group and common needs of ethnic groups. These common markers of ethnicity are important in distinguishing between ethnic groups (deciding who is ethnic) and for society as a whole and for ethnic group members to identify and determine who belongs to which ethnic group. For Manning Nash the most critical markers that establish ethnic boundaries are part of a trilogy revolving around lifestyle. He considers kinship, peership

& common living, and religious cult or value systems as critical to determining ethnic identification (Nash 1989). Horowitz (1985) focuses closer attention on ethnic boundaries and highlights the selection process or the process of gaining membership to an ethnic group. He discusses primacy of birth as perhaps most important to establishing ethnic membership; however, he also mentions choice in determining ethnic membership, specifically examining the variety of ways that ethnicity is established, including through marriage, which opens up the variety of ways that individuals can obtain “ethnic” membership and the level of acceptance of others as part of an ethnic group.

Beyond communal practices, kinship, or birthright, what is often most associated with ethnicity are the visible (and the invisible) physical markers that groups members and others often use to distinguish themselves from one another. These markers include distinction in language, dress, phenotypic features (skin color, hair, eye shape, height, etc.), and in scarification, circumcision, and tattooing (Nash 1989). These characteristic vary across groups, some of these characteristics may be also associated with race, such as skin color, hair texture, and eye shape, etc. Race, however, is a broad biological construct (Tonkin 1996; Huntington 2001) and therefore does not include the physical or social nuances of ethnicity such as scarification or dress. Race with its biological focus fails to include language. Race then as a rough cut can include a multitude of ethnicities

and further, people can have both ethnic identification and a racial identification (to

which all are assigned). Thus, there are a plethora of available ways of distinguishing

between or understanding ethnicity. From the many ways to make distinctions, it is clear

that across the globe many groups have a unique character, which can be either revered or

discriminated against because of the above mentioned distinctions.

When most people in the United States or England think of an ethnic group, as

Tonkin (1996) mentions, many refer to recently arrived immigrants. These immigrants as they are recently arrived are unlikely to be a part of the power structure in the host country and are therefore also unlikely to be a member of the dominant group. The dominant group of a society controls more than just the wealth and power in society, they

also control what people value as important relative to appearances, lifetime goals,

purchases, etc. In Schermerhorn’s words, a dominant group is a “collectivity within a

society which has preeminent authority to function both as guardians and sustainers of

the controlling value system” (Schermerhorn 1970: 17).

The relationship between the ethnic group and the dominant group do not necessarily have to be contentious although it often is. Nor does being dominant preclude being ethnic5. Continuing, one formula commonly used in the description and

articulation of racism is applicable in the relationship between dominant and minority

ethnic groups. Relations between groups become contentious when the dominant group

has not only the power within society but also prejudice against an ethnic or racial group

(Tatum 1997).

5 This research views whites as another ethnic group although the dominant group

In addition to the material disadvantages associated with being at a power disadvantage there is a social alienation, which often accompanies power and ethnic differentials6. The base of this social alienation comes with the process of “othering” by

the dominant group (Said 1978). The dominant group controls not only political and

economical power, but also hold power over the arts, research, education, etc. Through

these venues and often through negative and distorted representations of the other (or

non–dominant groups) in daily life, the dominant group reiterates the difference (often

cast negatively) make a clear line between the members of the dominant group and the

members of the minority ethnic or subaltern group. Drawing these distinctions can cause

both withdrawal by the minority ethnic group from the greater society and/or a desire to

fight for individual rights or group inclusion and recognition from the dominant group.

In the case of this research, and as is often the case in Western societies (and sometimes

elsewhere), the dominant group is often synonymous with a white Christian majority and

“ethnics” are the non–white other.

This process of “othering” is not new, nor is it restricted to power and ethnic

relations between whites and non–whites. This is a process present in societies across the

globe from ethnic minorities or immigrants in China or Japan to those in Kazakhstan,

Iraq, or Cote d’Ivoire. It is a process which one can see in Aristotle as he draws a

distinction articulating the difference between uncivilized slaves who are unfit to govern

themselves and Aristotle’s caste of peers who are, due to certain characteristics, fit to lead. It is discussed more recently in Edward Said’s Orientalism as he examines the

West’s gaze toward the East. Despite the universality of these tensions one thing that is

6 Comment made by respondent in Oldham with regard to the advancement of ethnic minority groups fighting for rights versus white/poor white groups

40 left out of many conversations is an analysis and understanding of the dominant group by the dominant group. The process of alienation allows ethnic minorities to develop a greater sense of self through organizing for inclusion and through studying and attempting to preserve traditions and ways of being that are under threat by the dominant group. However, in this case, as the dominant group is white, an understanding of what whiteness is and what it means to an individual is often lost. Even in discussing the other in a Western context, the question easily arises, “other than what”? It takes a minute to get a response to this question and an even longer minute for someone in the dominant group to articulate his or her experience with regard to race and ethnicity. What is whiteness?

The notion of whiteness, further discussed in the next chapter, emerged and was solidified as whites from Europe came into contact with peoples from outside of Europe, thus particularly important to understanding ethnicity. Encounters that Europeans had with people of color from other parts of the globe have had far–reaching historical impact and has set the precedent of power and social relations between Europeans and others.

Colombus’ encounters in the Americas, the interaction between poor American whites and slaves and the descendents of freed black slaves, the experience of African colonization after the Berlin conference of 1884–85, and the immigration of colonials to their European mother country are just a few historic occurrences that shaped the relationship between whites and others. Other authors examining race from an American perspective associate the categorization of whiteness with the rise of slavery in the US and a growing lower/working class, others with contact of Europeans with Africans

(Roediger 1991).

Whiteness as a category and whiteness as an experience has had an overwhelmingly negative association with hegemony and many post-colonial writers reflect on identity as it relates to the history and subjugation and to present manifestations of ethnic oppression. Edward Said writes of the Orient as bounded, exterior, and inferior, while “white identities were tied to feelings of group racial superiority, and more importantly to a sense of superiority that was active rather than passive,” (Said 1978:4–

5). It is clear that the other has been politically and socially victimized, however, times have changed and ethnic minority groups experienced greater freedoms and a greater sense of knowing themselves and a greater ability articulate themselves as a people. Their white counterparts have not been able to achieve a similar degree of comfort or a sense of self in a politically moderate and socially acceptable way, and thus many whites still don’t know how to describe their whiteness.

Consequently, there is a loud absence of whites in conversations about ethnicity

(except the Irish) as they are normally seen as above ethnicity because they are a part of the dominant group in the West and indeed economically dominant worldwide, thus their expression and experience as an ethnic group is not explored and their experience is often

(self) denied or is not cast in racial ways (also an indication of relative privilege). In several conversations about race in England, I often heard people talk about the “ethnics” which demonstrates a definition of ethnicity which has come to mean not only the recently arrived, but also refers to people who are other than white (Tonkin 1996). Over the last several years, scholars in the US and in the UK have begun to address this vacancy in the literature (although the study of whiteness itself is somewhat controversial as many fear recreating the hegemony that many have fought to escape and for fear of

giving ammunition to extreme white groups who have to some degree hijacked the meaning of whiteness). Authors like Stuart Hall (1989) critically examine whites,

racially, ethnically, and religiously and noted political scientists like Samuel Huntington

are also now intrigued by Hall’s question which begs for further analysis of the white

majority and ethnic integration when he asks, who is ethnic?

In response to that question, many whites would argue that they are not ethnic. In

line with this thinking, both Beverly Tatum (1997) writing from the fields of psychology

and education and Amanda Lewis (2002) writing from sociology, emphasize that whites

as a group tend to think of themselves as non–ethnic, as part of the background, as

ethnically nothing (big irony). Tatum uses the journal entries of her students many of

whom were white to emphasize what they refer to as the “normalcy” of whiteness Lewis

argues that the “everydayness” of whiteness needs to be studied ethnographically as

whites rarely thought about their own racialness or ethnicity yet still express their

ethnicity through social issues of difference that matter to whites just as much as others.

As it turns out, who their children’s playmates are matter to them as much as it matters to

other ethnic (or racial) groups, an indication of bonding, culture, and prejudice. Finally,

Lewis also notes that whites have a desire to be around people like themselves which

makes them characteristic of other ethnic groups (Lewis 2002: 9–10). The social

desirability of white cohesiveness has been and will continue to be subject to question,

but it is important to recognize this desire to bond on the basis of characteristics

commensurate with the boundaries and delineation of ethnicity is present and should be

explored and not dismissed because they are dominant.

Critical of the normalcy that whites see as their reality, Tatum (1997) is firm but

empathetic to whites (in the American context) as she writes that they do not want fully

to rid society of a racist system that works to their benefit. At the same time, having

others illuminate the benefits of a racist system or suggesting that bonding with one’s

own is somehow racist may raise anger and guilt in people who avoid conversations

about race/ethnicity and privilege as they know and often believe that racism contradicts

justice. It also puts whites on the defensive leading them to avoid dialogue on the topic

in attempts to avoid discomfort (Tatum 1997). This is a quandary as dialogue is

necessary to heal relations between the dominant group and subaltern or ethnic minority

groups and dialogue can also, unfortunately, elicit resentment7.

This phenomenon is quite passive and occurs among many in the dominant group.

The fringes of the dominant group however have co–opted bonding on the basis of whiteness and are defiant in their stand against the inclusion of others as well as firm in drawing a bright line between whites and others. This position is viewed as racist by some and called pride by others. Bonding in this way edges toward destructiveness

(blinding) and divisiveness can produce exogenous shocks that challenge the community and it is these groups that have less social desirability by the majority and that most whites (I feel confident in writing) do not want to become.

Discussing (white) British cultural traditions, journalist Adam Mansbach (2005) is right in noting that nefarious white groups have been allowed to co–opt whiteness as an identity. Streaming out from the majority society are a number of organizations that play

7 Inspiration for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa

on white identity politics which grow in violence and extremism beginning with more

family friendly right wing groups like the British National Party (BNP) and grow to more

extreme and more violent neo-Nazi groups and loosely organized bands of supporters.

Ryan (2003) chronicles a loose network of hate groups across Europe, including in

England, some of which have links to groups in the United States. Activists and

researchers at the Southern Poverty Law Center in the United States, which reports on

hate groups and their international networks, also chronicles the vehement desire of

extreme white groups to maintain cultural segregation of all groups, but particularly in this case among groups within the dominant ethnic or racial group. The active presence of these organizations is also demonstrative of how organizations, especially ethnic ones, can be detrimental to the public sphere and go beyond “healthy” levels of ethnic expression, bonding, or blinding in their participation.

At the same time that there are growing movements on the fringes against (non–

white) immigrants in England, there are more mainstream (white) groups that on one hand understand the importance of social cohesion and work toward greater inclusion and who while understanding the salience of acceptance and inclusion do not fight for or embrace inclusion8. Albeit passive, there is an alienation that is wholly felt and

boundaries drawn that prevent acceptance into white Western society. Jacobson (1998) examines the feelings of teenage Pakistanis who are both religiously and ethnically different from the dominant society and finds that even if young Pakistanis want to

8 This is also a double standard for whites or a burden that an ethnically dominant group must bear. Must a white English choral group although mandated by government to accept all go out of its way to find a person of Nigerian or Pakistani descent who wants to English choral music in order to live up to the ideals of inclusion? Is there no place for bonding and cultural preservation among whites without needing to solicit membership from ethnic minorities?

interact with the greater society, that they feel that they are regarded by white Britons as

“immutably foreign or alien” thus even when ethnic minorities have the volition to

accommodate or amalgamate is there, the dominant society, albeit passively reminds

ethnic groups of their differences. Jacobson concludes:

… the sense of the inescapability of ethnicity is likely to be greatly enhanced if there is an awareness, as there seems to be among the young people with whom I spoke, that many white Britons regard the minority groups as immutably foreign or alien. This perspective on the part of members of the majority population is, of course, itself a clear manifestation of the fact that fixed or essentialist conceptualizations of identity, however adverse their consequences can be, are still maintained by ordinary social actors. (Jacobson 1998: 153)

As this relates to the broader picture of ethnic conflict, both Varshney (2002) and

Horowitz (1985) support methods of conflict prevention that encourage cooperation

(micro and macro) and strengthen ties between cultural identity groups that share geographic intimacy, not by dismissing the legitimacy and security of cultural identity groups, but by recognizing, accepting, and understanding that groups would like to maintain their integrity.

If anything, the world has seen an increase in ethnic consciousness in recent years,

not the least of which has led to ethnically homogenous states like Eritrea, the ethnic

federations in countries like Ethiopia, and even declarations for self–determination for

groups like the Basques in Spain. Further, and more common, ethnically homogenous

neighborhoods continue to be common across the world and are likewise found across the

UK in London, Manchester, Oldham, and Luton, as well as other cities. The seeds of

separatism begin to take hold in the presence of insecurity or group threats on the local or

individual level (Joly 1987) and also at the state level (Connor 1972), which is why local

management and awareness of ethnic relations are important for larger governance issues.

The question that many people ask with regard to maintaining the integrity of a cultural identity group is: how does a group preserve its identity and avoid conflict when the conflict is a result of the dominant group threatening the power and cultural integrity of another group? This is a relevant question for white English and Asian citizens. As presented by Jacobson, among the reasons why Pakistani groups formed was a result of insecurity (and displacement) stemming from being ostracized by the white English citizens. The most obvious example of this insecurity was manifested through “Paki– bashing” (most popular in the 1980s), a particularly vicious act that instilled insecurity, alienation, and discomfort with the majority community.

Nationally, Asians felt ostracized as British law became much more racialized and when Britain’s non–white subjects began to migrate and settle in England, at the end of colonialism. The British notion of identity made a distinctive shift from “place” (which made citizenship a direct result of residing in British empire– the ‘ius soli’) to “race”

(which excluded non–whites regardless of colonial status). Thus, British identity became much more racialized and exclusive while at the same time creating a level of alienation for the Asians who migrated. The racialized conception of cultural identity was a negative response to non–whites which gave both whites and Asians, sufficient reason to retreat into their own groups for security for the legal protection of their cultural identity group and to protect against the social disintegration of their ethnic group in the face of rising insecurity (Baucom 1999).

Whether ethnic communities can get along and prevent conflict in spite of the desire to bond and celebrate ethnicity (including the dominant group) is the central question in the face of continued communal, sectarian, and ethnic violence around the

world today. Varshney (2002) writes that communities do not have to forfeit strong

cultural identities for communal peace. He supports the notion that ethnic groups can

maintain their cultural identities within multiethnic communities and that peace,

harmonious relations even, can be maintained. This is a marked difference from scholars

who believe that diversity and adherence to cultural identity is inherently divisive,

especially when Islam is considered (Huntington 1996). Varshney writes:

If Hindus and Muslims live peacefully in so many cities in India, the reason, I argue in this book, is not that they cease to be who they are in peaceful cities. Rather, despite being Hindus and Muslims, they can have peace. Something other than identity is explaining this pattern. Ethnic or national identity can be a source of meaning and security without implying hatred for another for another group. (Varshney 2002: 29)

It is because ethnicity is also a meaningful source of security, that the approach toward the study of ethnicity and organizations in this research will not take a decisively instrumentalist perspective. Wealth and power will always be issues considering ethnic groups and social capital, but there is more to ethnic cooperation than solely economic gain. There is also a desire by ethnic groups across the globe to maintain a coherent group and to be able to express that identity freely within a multicultural society. The puzzle of this study is how to achieve free ethnic expression without conflict.

Ethnicity is real, whether it is socially constructed or biologically abstracted is irrelevant, as educating people on this point alone does not resolve conflict. Ethnic groups understand their place in the community through understanding their historical experience and their historical relationship with dominant and other minority groups in their community. Groups may view their position in the community positively or negatively as ethnic relationships and multicultural communities are not necessarily contentious. However, it is important to realize that historical experience frames the way

in which ethnic groups engage in community activity and engage socially within the

political boundaries of a neighborhood, township, city, province, or country.

Sanchez-Jankowski (2002) argues that cultural identity formation within a society

is developed through signs received during childhood, social class, and from broader

systemic issues such as economic or political issues. He refers to three ways of viewing one’s position in society’s ethnic realm, each being referred to as a “transfer station”. The

first refers to youth. In this first stage, individuals get signs from and are told by elders

and family members, and through oral history, political, religious leaders, and popular

culture as to who they are. The second transfer station refers to social class. Sanchez-

Jankowski writes that each social class will come to view its group’s history and identity

in a different light. This will influence how civic they are and how they participate in politics. More successful members of an ethnic group will begin to develop the ideas of the privileged class. Finally, the third transfer station includes a broad and complex mix

of influences: the economic organization of the area, the history of ethnic relations, the

openness of the political system and the legal codes that govern the area.

This framework is useful in understanding that there are a variety of issues beyond

biology that impact how identity develops and how different perceptions and realities

develop about one’s societal lot including group history (Nash 1996). Sanchez-

Jankowski further argues that ethnicity plays a role in how ethnic groups engage in civic behavior. He argues that:

Within the United States, as well as in other countries, there are multiple patterns of civic engagement that can be considered civic subcultures. The basis of these subcultures in the United States has to do with how the various ethnic groups in the country have interacted with each other and the formal institutions of society. (Sanchez–Janowski 2002: 237)

This author shows that experience (positive or negative) with formal institutions

matters to the ethnic experience and the question of this research acknowledges that

formal institutions are important and key to creating a sustainable environment among

ethnic minorities. This work understands formal institutions to be a backdrop to civil

society, and further argues that there is a correlation between sustainable ethnic relations

and the behavior of civic organizations. In studying the literature on civic engagement, it

becomes clear that civic engagement, certainly in its early years, did not theorize with

minority or ethnic communities in mind and believed that the theory was robust enough

to account for any differences based on ethnicity. Sanchez-Jankowski makes three conclusions about the relationship between identity and civic engagement. The first is

that civic engagement is relative to ethnicity and status in life; the second is that both

formal and informal institutions that are important in socializing minority youth; and

finally, although there are subcultures are different, having different subcultures does not

diminish their importance or contribution in building a ‘good’ civil society (Sanchez–

Jankowski 2002: 244). This marriage between ethnicity and civil society is important to explore. It is also important to understand how ethnic groups (whites included here) can contribute to peaceful ethnic relations through civil society realizing that civil society is being used as a rubric for understanding and achieving development in the most tenuous of situations in multiethnic states across the globe.

Conclusion

The next chapters seek to better understand civil society and ethnic relations in the context of England, specifically two cities, Oldham and Luton, which are relatively small cities of 217,000 and 180,000 respectively, lying outside of Manchester and London. In this focused and contained setting the hope is to understand whether civic engagement is

50 different in two small cities, both with significant Asian populations, 12% in Oldham and

18% in Luton, one of which succumbed to riots and one that did not. Are civic groups, mindful that ethnic groups bond and associate along ethnic lines, but also work together, which in Luton that promotes peace? Does the lack of ethnic association across different groups in Oldham cause conflict? How does the dominant group relate to others and more importantly, how do they understand their own identity as the demographics of their homeland change? If there is a distinguishable difference in the ways that civic organizations engage in cities that have conflict (riots) versus cities that do not have ethnic conflict (riots), then this understanding should be adopted into the literature and understanding on civil society and development. At present, as described by Howell and

Pearce (2001) civil society is implemented as a development strategy in ethnically contentious places without regard to the question of ethnicity. In attempts to reiterate the importance of ethnicity on civic life this research involves itself in investigating the multiethnic cities, their citizens and civic leaders, and understanding how civic organizations work and matter when ethnicity is present and especially when it is contentious.

The next chapter explores cultural identity more extensively and focuses on the historical relationship between whites and Asians in England. This chapter also outlines differences between civic and un-civic behavior drawing clear distinctions and adding to the literature showing how to better understand civil society and civic engagement.

CHAPTER 3 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND CULTURAL IDENTITY IN ENGLAND

Politics and Identity

This chapter outlines cultural identity among whites, extreme groups, and also puts immigration, violence, and cultural identity in some historical context. In contextualizing this history in England and the issue of cultural identity, the story of the Oldham riots is recounted. Finally, and most theoretically important, a continuum to better understand ethnic life is introduced.

To understand the potential for conflict based on cultural identity, particularly in

England, it is important to understand the history out of which recent violence between

Asians and whites derives. Racial and ethnic riots are not foreign to Britain. Panikos

Panayi writes critically of the notion of Britain as a tolerant country, as Cypriots, Italians,

Germans, Jews, and Irish all suffered discrimination prior to this more current discussion

of Asians, for the purposes of this dissertation, but also West Indians and most recently

asylum seekers, who have also encountered problems. Outbreaks of ethnic violence on

English soil reach as far back as World War I when Germans were targeted in 1915, and

later blacks in 1919, who were recruited as sailors to meet the labor shortage created by

WWI. Many of these blacks stayed in Britain and competed for jobs with whites.

Racism and job competition led to tensions, which led to a number of murders and

lynchings, and to disturbances that summer1. However, this ethnic-based conflict was not

1 As emphasized elsewhere and in Karapin 1999, employment is not the only reason for tensions.

51 52

as severe as the violence between white British and the Germans. The extreme

nationalism generated from WWI led to riots against Germans. Panayi writes that violence against Germans reached a peak in May of 1915 and that every region of the country was affected by these riots in Britain. Among the worse affected places were

Manchester, Liverpool, Sheffield, and London (Panayi 1996).

Conflicts continued as the population in England became more diverse. After

World War II, people from the colonies began immigrating to fill the labor shortage, the vacuum, in the indigenous labor supply. During the fourteen years after the war there were major in flows of brown immigrants from the colonies, specifically between 19482 and 1962. During this time there were also, according to historian Panayi (1996), five different episodes of race riots3, which targeted both blacks and Asians. These episodes

involved anywhere from 250 to 1000 white British people congregating to attack immigrants or their businesses. In 1948, in one episode, tensions between blacks and whites specifically led seamen in Liverpool to advocate for the exclusion of black sailors

from British ships after the war. This these calls to eliminate blacks as sailors, indicative

of the hostilities, led to an attack of a hostel for black seamen by a reported 2000 whites.

That same year, in another episode, 250 whites attacked a house full of Indians (Panayi

1996). One of the most infamous riots during this time were the riots of Notting Hill

(London) which lasted throughout the summer of 1958 and peaked when approximately

800 whites with bottles, clubs, and other makeshift weapons, attacked a West Indian café

2 Year of the British Nationality Act which welcomed citizens of the Commonwealth enter, work and settle in the UK

3 For Panayi race riots is an attack by a large number, hundreds or thousands of the dominant groups upon members of the minority group at a time when that group faces widespread animosity (Panayi 1996).

(Pilkington 1996). Racism grew and these disturbances exemplified the growing resentment of newcomers, most obviously non-white ones after WWII. These

immigrants were met by groups such as the Teddy Boys, a group of young, black boot

clad, working class whites who clashed with immigrants4. Anti–black and far-right activity also fueled the Notting Hill riots. The nearby White Defense League another white organization, along with the Union Movement whose leaders encouraged whites to take action against blacks and who met with anti-other messages on the street corners of

Notting Hill likely abetted the summer’s attacks (not unlike the situation in Oldham).

The police did little to quell tensions and violence (Karapin 1999). Violent conflict also brought on legislation to address and eventually curb immigration by many of the non- white peoples of the former colonies.

These events put immigration on the political map, and this along with the changes

associated with the loss of empire, prompted legislation to deal with the political

challenges that accompanied the influx of newcomers. The legislation brought on in the

1960’s began to reverse the ius soli, or the right of the soil. The 1948 British Nationality

Act addressed post-WWII immigration, and drew a distinction between the

Commonwealth and Britain, but upheld the long held right of people from the British

Commonwealth, from countries like the newly independent states like Indian and

Pakistan to immigrate to Britain, which facilitated the labor shortage and allowed the

country to rebuild its infrastructure and economy. While there were distinctions and

citizenship laws within the colonies and Britain, it was still relatively easy for a

4 This group is a good example of the kind of group that would “shock” a community. It is a good example of the kinds of people who affiliated themselves with the BNP on whom the riots were blamed. This group is not unlike the Fine Young Casuals who were implicated on the right with the BNP for touching off riots.

Commonwealth citizen to become a citizen through, for example, 12 months residency in

the United Kingdom (Blake 1982). As illustrated above, however, conflict became more

racialized during the 1950s and 1960s, and this prompted some controls on immigration and also prompted changes in the relative openness of the 1948 Act. The introduction of the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962 tightened laws around immigration politicized the debates about immigration and identity. This Act was the first of several

acts to enforce tighter restrictions on immigration. The Act, directed toward blacks and

Asians, required citizens of Commonwealth states to obtain work vouchers from the

Home Office before entering Britain, which significantly decreased the immigration.

Tighter controls continued and the number of work vouchers issued was reduced again,

demonstrating still stiffer control, in 1965 (Karapin 1999: 428).

Watching the tightening controls of the early 1960s and the political climate in

Britain, the changes brought another wave of immigrants from the Indian subcontinent

before 1962 to secure citizenship as the Act of 1962 had instituted, and the climate

promised, more stringent controls on future immigration (Husband 1994; Bowling 1996;

Karapin 1999). After 1962, ethnic violence also changed in character and scope (Panayi

1996). Riots on the whole decreased, but there continued to be significant racial

hostilities and outbreaks between individuals, as exemplified through the violence in

Accrington in 1964, which was sparked by the apparent stabbing of a white man by an

Asian that led one to two hundred white British citizens to chase down “Pakis” (Bowling

1996).

During the mid to late 1960’s, most of the ethnic hostilities were characterized by

murders and other types of severe racial harassment, and by this time, the Asian

community had become more organized in the face of growing anti-immigrant character

of British politicians. The Conservative Party5 blamed immigration for the riots (Karapin

1999) and the Asian community (and other communities) became increasingly politicized

by Member of Parliament (MP) Enoch Powell whose anti–immigrant stance was noted by

the British Nationality Act of 1968. This Act instituted tighter restrictions against

immigrants and sought to control immigration, including attempts to restrict the

immigration of East African Asians, who were British passport holders and who had been

kicked out of East Asian countries like Kenya as a result of liberation and

Africanization.6 East African Asians had the right to settle in Britain as a result of a

quota system established under the 1968 Act, unlike other Asians; however, the

unwillingness of the government to give British citizenship to these populations,

according to Pilkington, amounts to racism (Pilkington 2003).

The 1980’s still marked tighter restrictions on who was entitled to British

citizenship and who was not. The British Nationality Act of 1981 inacted two main

policy changes: one, to control secondary immigration and two, to align citizenship laws

with the changes that had been made by the pieces of legislation (immigration acts)

passed in 1962, 1968, and 1971 (Pilkington 2003: 219). The law is discriminatory and

the ius soli, or right of the soil, by this time had been clearly modified to limit citizenship of those born outside of the United Kingdom, and more specifically in the British

Nationality Act of 1981, laws prevented families from joining their immigrant family

members in England and attempted to restrict family (or immigrant) growth. One

5 Karapin 1999 also implicate in Labour Party some anti–immigrant legislation.

6 These citizens had to be admitted eventually as they were considered stateless and were protected and in many cases employed by the British government (Karapin 1999).

example of the restrictions intended to exclude black immigrants comes through in

Charles Blake’s analysis of the British Nationality Act of 1981. In discussing the British

government’s logic in denying citizenship to the illegitimate children of West Indian

mothers he writes:

The Government’s argument was that as the mothers would not become British citizens except in special instances such as residence in the United Kingdom the children should not benefit either…. This is no justification for denying people of an existing right of entry and abode. It shows that even where small numbers are involved immigration considerations are paramount as almost everyone involved is black. Moreover it [the law] is inherently racially discriminatory. (Blake 1982:184)

In addition to the tightening legislation, the leadership, championing many of these

changes, was staunchly anti-immigrant, which angered ethnic minority (or black)

communities7. Asian communities were also polarized against indigenous citizens by

Margaret Thatcher’s conservative, anti-immigrant leadership, which antagonized

immigrants and their offspring (and others) through the 1980s (Bowling 1996). Powell,

Thatcher, and the legislation that they endorsed marked an era of xenophobia, if not

racism. In response to this anti-immigrant mood, race-hate violence, and political

matters, more organizations formed during the 1970’s among Asians and there was more

resistance against the police, most significantly marked by a 7,000 person march of

mostly Bengalis, protesting an Asian murder and the infamous case of the Notting Hill8 riots, which was also a response to police brutality (Lloyd 1998; Owusu and Ross 1988).

Riots and race matters still had not yet been resolved. In the 1980’s, for Asians, it was “Paki bashing” or somewhat random and violent crime by whites inflicted on

7 Black is often used to describe people from either south Asian or African descent.

8 West Indian neighborhood

Pakistanis. But there were more widespread disturbances that involved Asians and other minority groups. Two major riots shocked both Liverpool and London in 1981 in the neighborhoods of Toxteth and Brixton and again in Brixton (south London) in 1985.

These riots involved mostly blacks (from Africa and the Caribbean) but parallel the violence and frustration between the Asian and white communities during the 1960’s and

1970’s. It is the memories of Toxteth that the nation recalled when this last round of riots was set off between Asians and whites during the summer of 2001 almost twenty years to the day.

At the macro level, these outbreaks of violence are noxious to government and governance and are often indicative of socio–economic problems and shifts, but they are

also recurring in highly industrialized democracies. These democracies despite racial and

ethnic problems in their past claim that they are immune to the sort of ethnic violence

associated with developing areas like Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Although the

violence may be more contained and the less severe in industrialized democracies, the

heart of the issue of ethnic conflict is the same for highly industrialized countries as for

developing countries. The heart of this issue is the way that cultural identity groups

interact and their ability to withstand internal and external provocations.

Although ethnic conflict is a more eminent danger and indeed more seductive to

study, there are indeed ethnic groups that live in the absence of conflict. Admittedly,

there are a lot of reasons that affect group relations both positively and negatively. The

focus of this study is to examine the nexus between civic life and ethnicity. To work

toward better governance within an environment, a country, with shifting demographics

and economic situations, patterns of behavior, for example among civic organizations

need to be better understood. It is also important to better understand cultural identity

and its mutations through political and cultural change. Cultural identity is the variable

that political science as a discipline often overlooks. But cultural identity is also the

variable that often governs how and why people interact and react to each other within a

community. The outbreak of violence correlated to ethnicity or cultural identity is still

regarded as an aberration in highly industrialized democracies. Recent riots in France in

2005, Australia 2005, and England 2001, are signals that highly industrialized

democracies have not escaped challenges associated with ethnic conflict. These conflicts

show that cultural identity issues among majority, minority, and immigrants, etc. are yet

to be well understood or in some cases, well addressed along side politics and civic life.

Key to understanding the persistence of ethnic conflict is understanding the

‘ethnic’. The ‘ethnic’ is problematic as whites have not been considered ethnic, but have been considered or considered themselves a ‘default’ identity. This default identity

(although a majority group) should be better understood as issues of cultural identity, civic life, social change and social conflict are explored.

In addition to research mentioned earlier, a feeling of belonging is key to life. It is wrong to assume that just because a culture is a majority culture that there is no cultural identity that stems from, for example, being white and being from Oldham or being white and being from Luton. Failing to examine cultural identity –a more appropriate term than

‘minority’ to consider whites and other shifting and cross cutting identities– will leave us clueless to understanding how civic groups behave with regard to identity. With that said, the next pages discussing cultural identity, Asian and white, and will also consider

59 the mutations of a white identity, and explore the spaces whites as a cultural identity group occupy.

How Does Cultural Identity Fit In? Asians in England and the Role of Cultural Identity

Cultural identity and conflict don’t necessarily go hand–in–hand. But it is clear that the presence of groups, particularly those that are phenotypically, religiously, linguistically, and/or regionally –among other differences– different heightens awareness of self and group identity (Said 1978; Nash 1989). All of these differences are present between the indigenous whites in England and the immigrating and settled groups from

Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, etc.9. Thus, as the face of England changed so to did the level of cultural self–identity among Asians that settled there and the whites who had been there.

Over the last half century the Asian population in England rose significantly. The first wave of Asian immigrants arrived in Britain from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh following WWII, filling the vacuum in the labor supply and helping to rebuild the country’s economy and infrastructure (Neilsen 1992; Husband 1994; Panayi 1996;

Chessum 2000). This was specifically the case of Oldham whose demographics mirror these national and international shifts. As mentioned before, another wave of immigrants arrived in the early 1960’s in response to legislation that was designed to restrict entry to immigrants. During this time it is clear that white British people were changing their ideas about their British identity and, simultaneously, immigrant communities stuck close together also finding commonness with each other. The indigenous white British did not see Asians (or Afro-Caribbean for that matter) as a threat at first. As the number of

9 There is a significant range of differences between and within these groups.

immigrants increased, the level of racism increased. As these others settled in England in large numbers the English developed a more local form of “indigenous racism” which, sometimes, but not always led to problems and sometimes violence for both groups

(Bowling 1996).

In building a new home in a foreign land, many Asian communities –as other immigrant communities have across the globe– sought the comfort of other Asians and also sought to recreate the foundations of their culture and community from their motherland ensuring continuity of comfort, culture, and familiarity. Consequently, there are Asian communities in England that have a high degree of cultural and institutional completeness and have recreated communities complete with religious schools, schools where Asians are in the majority, restaurants, and businesses. At the same time, many

Asian communities work within the system to serve the needs of its members, many of whom are Muslim, through local government in the English cities and towns in which they have grown up or settled. Asians have fought to maintain their cultural integrity and to have it respected. First and second generation along with the newly arrived worked as a community for greater accommodation within schools, businesses, and local councils, largely controlled by white British citizens. At the same time, Asians moved toward becoming apart of the community while encouraging accommodation of their religious and cultural traditions that are very different from English religious and cultural traditions. Over the years, Asian communities built mosques in neighborhoods and pushed for single sex activities in schools, and worked toward dietary changes in schools, and respect for religious holidays, among other issues, which are necessary to accommodating and integrating new communities. But these changes (and attempted

61 changes) also pose questions and challenge how many towns and cities are governed throughout England where demographics and needs have changed (Werbner 1994; Eade

1993; Neilsen 1992; Ritchie 2001).

These community challenges have deep consequences for ethnic relations between

Asians and whites. The challenges touch on which touch on the struggle for integration, the resistance to change, the struggle for power and rights, and connect with deeper issues of prejudice, resentment, and finally question the cultural integrity, adaptability, and willingness for people to transform their cultural identity. Society’s responses have affected the way both white and Asian feel about the other community. On the one hand, the British Empire extended a home to its subjects from abroad, which was an offer that proved increasingly complicated to keep and ultimately, by the 1960s proved compromised.

The issues of acceptance run deep and are cross cutting as indigenous white also felt the difficulties associated with integration. Asian communities sometimes feel challenged to truly feeling a British identity, and in the case of Jessica Jacobson’s 1998 study, Pakistani youth, are alienated from becoming an organic part of the English life.

Studying East London, John Eade documents that the building of mosques and community centers threatened white neighbors who felt that their culture was being challenged, which resulted in white residents attempting to restrict the growth of this

Asian community through battles in local government (Eade 27: 1993). In this way, being an immigrant, or the children of immigrants, and becoming apart of local British communities is a difficult, or at least an accommodating task that heightens tensions among both groups. Young Pakistanis document feeling that, “many white Britons

62 regard the minority groups as immutably foreign or alien,” which reinforces the rift and prevents bridging between cultural identity groups. Conversely, the alienation by whites fosters some sense of unity among Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis as Asians despite the cultural, linguistic, religious difference and tense histories between and within some of these groups (Jacobson 1998; Joly 1987).

For the Pakistani youth in Jacobson’s study there was a willingness to integrate into the majority community, but the Asian youth felt that the messages they received from the indigenous white community underscored that ethnicity is immutable to change making integration difficult. In addition, religion, which is often confounded with ethnicity, was seen by the youth as a matter of choice, but seen by whites through essentialist lenses as ethnic and religious tradition are often considered together. At the same time, whites underplayed feeling infringed upon. Whites should not be seen only through the lens of hegemony (local and colonial) but perhaps also as a people unto themselves seeking to retain ‘cultural completeness’ and attempts to name and retain white local culture. One important and not often enough addressed question is whether there is or whether it is appropriate to acknowledge a white cultural identity that has similar needs of bonding and association as other cultural identity groups do. As mentioned by Tatum (1997) and Lewis (2002), whites have tended to think of themselves as non–ethnic (even when in the numerical minority), but the conversations about the terms of integration and the discomfort with demographic changes and the resulting – sometimes violent– conflict suggests that understanding white identity formation (and not just hegemony) may be an important part of understanding civic organizations and understanding how to see past ethnic conflict in Europe, among other places.

The history and narrative of the development of a white English10 identity also

follows the twists and turns of history along with migration and the coming together of different peoples. White English identity developed in both social and political ways.

There was no consensus among people as to what exactly determined English cultural identity as much as it was the encounter with others in their former colonies and especially at home that pushed the solidification of identity (Baucom 1999; Neilsen 1992;

Husband 1994; Panayi 1996; Chessum 2000). Although, local value as with most tradition is found in local dialects, traditions, and memories, the thrust of defining

English cultural identity then was derived not from who they were, but from who they were not (Hall 1998; Baucom 1999). This external focus used to form internal identity was intensified by the global loss of empire, which also provoked demographic shifts.

World changes evoked a profound look at what British identity was, particularly in regards to others.

The political conclusion, through several acts over 25 years, was to shift the definition of British identity from place to race. The British Nationality Act of 198111, as

another part of the series of Acts, which rejected several hundred years of British law that

privileged citizenship in the Empire over an individual’s race. The right of the soil or the

“ius soli” was a raceless and unifying concept. Abandoning it solidified identities, but

also drew boundaries, becoming socially as accepting of many (Australians, New

Zealanders, Canadians, etc.) and both politically and socially rejecting many others

(Asians, Afro–Caribs, etc.) and sowed the seeds for social conflict and identity change.

10 Here, British identity as opposed to English identity, privileges political ties rather than cultural and local ties

11 Came into effect in 1983.

This Act laid the groundwork for white English citizens not just to question the place of

birth of another, which had previously allowed the possibility of brotherhood through the

ius soli, but to narrow citizenship and membership through the Act and question the birth

place of the parents of immigrants. This change effectively raised the bar placing

generations between the potential shared brotherhood between white English citizens and

the others to whom the promise of the ius soli was extended. This racialized approach to citizenship, immigration, and the loss of Empire was encapsulated through Enoch

Powell’s approach to “islanders” who could never become an Englishmen (Baucom

1999). What is an Englishman?

A Default Identity? Or Is There Something More?

There is a for some, fine line between understanding and even appreciating white

cultural identity and understanding and treating a white cultural identity as an identity

whose core is racism and hatred. Although power and privilege are part of white identity that is not the only character of white identity. Like many identities, it can be a complex one. Defining this line (and later understanding whiteness as a base around which people identify) must come from understanding that whites are not simply a base group to which others are compared and this defining this line must come from understanding that whites are not identity-less (Roediger 1998). In fact, the need for belonging comes along with demographic changes. As mentioned above, there is a greater sense of whiteness vis à vis the presence of the other. Along, with these demographic changes comes a second wave of literature on whiteness emerges (McDermott & Samson 2005) poised to assist in interpreting and trace identity changes in Europe, especially in cities like Oldham and

Luton, the United States and beyond. Most of this literature on whiteness and white identity has come out of education, sociology, communication and psychology and not

out of political science despite its relevance and usefulness in understanding conflict.

This dissertation argues the relevance of understanding whites as a cultural identity group, and not just a default group, as this is important to understanding bonding, ethnic relations, collective action, what informs political decisions, civil society, and governance.

It makes sense following the literature on ethnicity that whites in England belong to a (or perhaps more than one) cultural identity group with their own rituals customs and myths and also kinship ties and birth right that entitle groups to being considered ethnic

(Hall 1998; Nash 1989; Tonkin 1996). Nonetheless, the British have had (much like

American whites and other groups of whites) an ambivalent stance toward their own

British identity; further, Britishness, although associated with whiteness and having

“British” heritage, remains highly contested, and like whiteness, largely undefined

(Jacobson 1998; McDermott & Samson 2005). Although some scholars are making progress in better to understand whiteness, they are also finding that their white respondents are unwilling, unable, or feel guilty about being white, and in many cases deny obvious association with white identity like privilege precisely because of guilt.

These emotions inhibit the willingness of whites to understand cultural identity and privilege on a deeper level and understanding their own identity as a complex one (Tatum

1997; Warren & Hytten 2004; McDermott & Samson 2005). These feelings do not however lessen the fact that as a cultural identity group, although in many situations a majority group, there exists a desire to bond together and find within a white identity a secure place of belonging. This pattern of behavior, this desire to bond, is mirrored in

this research as much for whites as for other ethnic groups regardless of majority status

(Varshney 2002; Horowitz 1985).

Does Pro–White Mean Anti–Other?

Because of a close association between whiteness and political, economic and

cultural domination, there is a fear that focusing attention on whites may lead to no good.

However, having a space where a group can bond does not have to be a threatening

space. The most obvious critique is that whiteness studies might enable or encourage

white supremacy groups. However, it is clear that there are constructive, analytical, and

critical ways to understand white racial identity that complete the picture of ethnic and

racial society. Further addressing this critique and to assuage any fears, whiteness is

entangled with, and at times confluent with, power and privilege (much like links to the power and privilege associated with other majority groups, like Hutu, Hindu, etc.), these relationships should be explored from both minority and majority perspectives.

Following the typology of bridging, binding, bonding, and blinding, bonding and blinding among the white majority need to be explored and differentiated. This research suggests that there is a clear difference between bonding such as what we see among civic organizations (for example a male church choral group) and bonding gone awry (or blinding) as demonstrated by exclusively white groups that have ethnic or racial hate as a primary principle and that call for, use, or do not object to violence or extreme action against non-white groups. There is a place for bonding and a need for bonding white groups to work across ethnicity within civic life to protect who from those groups that have gone awry. The far–right groups that waged the exogenous shocks on the community in Oldham, dominated white space, and through extreme anti–Asian

discourse and exploitation of socio–economic problems, acted as a magnet for disaffected

whites who had few other channels to work through within civic life.

White supremacist and pro-white groups operate on the borderline and outside of the mainstream and have established their own racial histories based on real and/or contrived history and real or contrived biology and often take a mutually exclusive approach to living in a multi-ethnic society. The success of them, white supremacists believe, means the demise of us.

These are groups that embarrass many mainstream whites. These exclusively white, anti-other groups, believe that cultural understanding often has less to do with understanding of one’s own cultural identity in order to better understand others for a better society, than it has to do with pushing politically (through sometimes violent means) and socially for separation from, all non–whites. McDermott & Samson (2005) offer an accurate description of the ways in which these groups seek to draw boundaries.

For these authors, white supremacist organizations are gendered constructions of “white, patriarchal, heterosexual, […]masculinity” that consequently obsess over miscegenation and that draw boundaries by “framing difference as absolute” (McDermott & Samson

2005: 253). For those truly on the fringes, these absolutes are reiterated in different ways. One way is through collective living where Aryan beliefs are transmitted to the next generation in a communal setting, which intensifies and reiterates their goals as a movement (McDermott & Samson 2005). For others, that means plugging into a transnational network of organizations, who have similar beliefs across the West in

Europe, the United States and elsewhere. For some it means supporting local or national action and pushing a local agenda to intimidate others and to “repatriate” the others who

68 immigrated. This somewhat neutral description should not distract from the violent nature and the criminal element present in many of these movements and the hateful culture (e.g. hate core music, race hate crimes, etc.) that has developed alongside them

(Ryan 2003; Potok 2001; Ebata 1997). It should however, begin to clarify where and how these groups enter into the organizational or civic life and how this relates to cultural identity issues.

With that said, there are a wide range of groups with these anti–immigrant anti– other stances. The groups that might support this agenda range from those that wear suits in political parties and seek to recruit the working and even middle classes (BNP), to those who are militant and fascist (skinheads), to a poor criminal element that empathizes with this cause and is predisposed or who do not preclude the use of violence (hooligans,

NF, BNP “defense” force). There also exists the possibility, especially among groups on the borderlines of society, or on the cusp of civic life, that there are aspects of kinship, bonding, and instances of domestic “civicness” (e.g. KKK’s desire to adopt a highway) and international “civicness”12 (e.g. transnational groups/social movements which reflect a network of white hate groups that scholars like Keck and Sikkink (1998) disregard.

The white cultural promotion that comes from these groups is not representative of how all whites (in England) feel. There is also a difference between the civicness associated with a male choir of a mainstream church in a white liberal neighborhood in

Luton and the civicness associated with members of the BNP who form a sub–committee to make and distribute flyers with anti–immigrant messages, although the level of bonding among group members may be the same. Prior definitions (Putnam 1993) of

12 Mark Potok identified international white power groups and wrote on the American group that raised money (illegally) in support of the BNP

civic organizations do not preclude either of these groups from being called a civic group.

In fact, Varshney argues in describing civil society and civic life that political parties, in

playing out their political roles provide social platforms for people to bond and come together which is evident here in the work of BNP just as others forming strong bond

through work or social activities (Varshney 2002: 4).

Development of the BNP

The far-right and the extreme right are reductionist terms that are used to

encompass a wide variety of groups from football hooligans to neo–Nazi groups to more

successful political parties that reflect a direct hate of the state and that have an agenda that revolves around a xenophobia inherent to all of these groups regardless of their level of organizations or predisposition to using violence (Ebata 1997). The terms far-right and extreme right also include fascist groups whose ideology is grounded in anti- liberalism and who challenge democracy. This hatred of (or disagreement with) the state and its ideology are important threads of commonality among far-right groups; however, state hatred is not the direct focus of this dissertation. The focal points are the effects and manifestations of the far-right in civic life, understanding that extreme groups in general, and neo-Nazi groups in particular, protest a (democratic) government that encourages civil society in general and that, more specifically, supports multi-ethnic civic life. There is much variance in size, societal impact, level of organization, level of violence, and objectives among the groups falling under the title of far or extreme right. Given this variance, as explained above, it is important to understand and make careful choices

about where to draw the line between what can and cannot be included in civil society.

The far-right and the extreme right are similar in their focus on issues of

immigration, citizenship, and nationalism (Eatwell 2000; Ebata 1997; Hainesworth

2000). In general, these formal organizations or rag–tag groups are racist and anti–

immigrant in practice, policy, and/or belief. These groups blame much of their

communities’ and their country’s problems on immigration. In the case of European

countries like Britain, France, and Germany, Arabs, Turks, and Asians bear the brunt of

racist activity whether that be through personal or violent attacks in the street or through

rallying points for a political campaign. Jews and blacks are often “residual targets” and are vilified whether or not they actually have a presence in the community (Ebata 1997:

14–16). All non–white groups here serve as scapegoats for any societal problems that might exist.

Britain is not known for its extremism at the national level (although the Thatcher years did reflect strong conservatism and right leaning policies that were unfriendly to

immigrants). However, there has been a small but active chorus on the far-right that has

rallied targeted communities and across the country over the last several decades. The

National Front was established in 1967 and the British National Party (BNP), billed as slightly more “family oriented”, was later established in 1982, and as a political party that rides the fence between civil and uncivil society. These groups formed as smaller organizations joined together, with participation from individuals and groups with Nazi ties.

The BNP worked for some time under the name ‘Rights for Whites’. This title and slogan racialized political issues, played whites as victims in their native country, and portrayed immigrants as detrimental to the progress and well being of whites. This perspective is revealed through its own slogans and publicity (flyers, websites, etc.) and through its public and private acts.

In an attempt to learn more about, and to possibly bring charges against the British

National Party, the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) sent an undercover reporter to

spend six months as a member of the party during the summer of 2004. This video

showed the party operating just inside the law and operating as an un-civic organization –

and certainly as a racist and xenophobic organization– waging war on Asians and

Muslims specifically and a multiethnic civil society in general. On the one hand, in

response to the airing of the video13, the party leader, Nick Griffin took advantage of and

reminded the public that it is legal to criticize Islam. On the other hand, the video

supplied evidence of group members participating in violent acts and recounting their detailed role in waging attacks on Asians (Asian businesses) and participating in the

Bradford riots14 in the video15. The riots themselves, for extreme right groups, provide

proof of the negativity that immigrants bring to British (white society)16. The BNP is a

political party, and though small, won votes and seats in a number of communities.

Whether this organization is operating inside the law or outside of the law, community

strength is needed to prevent deterioration and destruction of the multiethnic fabric of any

community as both personal threats and community threats have been launched against

Asians specifically and immigrants in general by this organization.

13 This video was aired the summer that this research was conducted, July 15, 2004 on BBC 1

14 Occurred in 2001, also. These riots were sparked as a direct result of the riots in Oldham.

15 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3894529.stm http://www.manchesteronline.co.uk/news/s/124/124029_bnp_members_exposed_by_undercover_television .html

16 http://www.nationalvanguard.org/story.php?id=3783

The BNP was able to win an election in the Isle of Dogs in 1993 by exploiting local grievances, rallying around a racially motivated killing of a white youth, playing up the threatening nature of recent immigration, and being able to gain media support (Eatwell

2000). In general, the far–right and extreme groups are able to gain support by often exploiting socio–economic problems locally and nationally. Rising unemployment, increases in poor housing and crime, along with antagonism toward European integration have been rallying points for these organizations to establish a white base of support that despises immigrants and feels that expelling immigrants would lead to material and in some cases moral improvement (Hainesworth 2000; Eatwell 2000).

There is, as alluded to above, a socio–economic connection to the success of right– wing extremist groups, thus they have flourished in smaller towns among less–educated and lower income groups and have targeted the middle class and older groups (Ebata

1997). On a more individual level, when describing some of members of right–wing extremist groups, Ryan (2003) describes them as white people with cultural sameness in dress, values, and who hangout in the same places. The point made is that although disagreeable, these individuals are bonding and creating social capital. These groups of

people often mirror the sameness found among other groups in other types of

organizations.

The British National Party won electoral votes in 33 cities in towns across England

in the 2001 elections. The party averaged approximately 4% of the vote in these areas,

rarely attaining more than 5% of the vote. This does not constitute a very high threat, but

does reflect a steady but small presence that can prove disruptive. Targeted by the BNP,

two cities reached a disproportionately high percentage of the far-right vote. The small

cities of Oldham and Burnley, were targeted areas that received 16% (the highest in the country) and 11.3% respectively, during the 2001 elections17. Both cities experienced

riots between Asians and whites,18 suggesting the divisive and potentially destructive

effect of this party’s interactions with multiethnic communities. (The correlations

between being targeted by the BNP and gaining a high percentage of the vote and having

a high Asian population is high. No Luton votes went to the BNP, as it was not a

targeted area, however, it is also possible that work with civic organization and the their

considerably more cohesive community kept these groups out and kept the community

strong).

Although the actual members are often drawn from working and lower classes, the

actually leaders of and supporters (benefactors) of the British National Party, the National

Front, and several other informal organizations are often well-educated, articulate, wealthy people19. Targeting Oldham was not a random choice. Far-right leaders saw

Oldham as a perfect town from which to recruit supporters and to exploit the issues that in fact had been facing Asians and whites alike: deprivation, exclusion, unemployment,

etc. The mantra of the old mill town that has no new industry, but a growing number of

immigrants who drain resources that belong to the rightful indigenous white residents is a

story that is easy to exploit and one that appears to be true. Leaders likely knew of the

17 While the BNP ran more candidates country–wide (57) in their previous election in 1997 they received country-wide only 1.3% of the vote. In contrast, in 2001 the party ran only 33 candidates country-wide, but succeeded in winning 3.9% of the vote. This is reflective of a strategy to target certain communities (among them, Oldham) for more successful results. The BNP focused their attention in the northwest and in east London (http://politics.guardian.co.uk/election2001/story/0,9029,503710,00.html). 1997 country– wide election results can be confirmed in the UK Elections Statistics 1945–2003 research paper.

18 Statistics– The Electoral Commission– http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk

19 Documented in Nick Ryan (2003) and elsewhere.

74 reticence of local council leaders to include Asians and their apathy toward change and integration, and could calculate (if not confirm) the kind of response (or lack of response) that their presence would receive from the Oldham police. Many Oldham residents say that their problems stem from a lack of integration; but it is not just integration that is to blame, but permissive causes among local government, the media, civil society, and ordinary citizens that contribute to Oldham’s difficulties. The far-right leaders see these issues and they work to exploit them. The rogue hooligans who were apart of the riots responded to far-right leadership. The bottom line is that Manchester and London, obviously bigger cities, are also diverse20, and have areas of deprivation; however, there are a number of other forces that would not tolerate persistent, aggressive demonstrations by far-right groups. Even Luton had been making efforts to form umbrella groups prior to 2001 and to include Asians in the local council and from talking with leaders, an attitude that was significantly less tolerant of this behavior. Targeting Oldham, was a well-calculated decision. Targeting Luton would have meant greater resistance by civic organizations Asian, other ethnic and faith groups, and by local public leaders.

Civic and Un-civic Behavior

What often goes un–discussed in political science is that the trust and social capital that deepen individual and inter–group relations in civil society, also deepen relationships among those on the cusp of and those outside of civic life. Trust through organizational life is neutral. Groups on the cusp and outside of civic life also have the opportunity to form relationships through their work associations, even if the group mission is abhorrent

20 Noted in the forthcoming chapter, Manchester and London have marketed diversity as a strength for many years and would also not likely jeopardize the integrity of the community precisely because of this outlook.

to those in the mainstream (abortion, racism, etc.) therefore racist and anti–immigrant

cannot be automatically dismissed from civil society or civic life. Social capital itself is neutral rather than, as many political scientists have claimed, beneficial to the public sphere. Given this, there are many similarities between the BNP, the KKK, and a white male church coral group in terms of social capital and bonding. Social capital then is not the difference between these two types of groups. It is then important to turn to the question of civicness and violence to explore important differences in these groups.

Generally, the class of organizations that Putnam (1993) referred to were not generally perceived to be contentious or violent, (although labor unions certainly had the potential to be contentious). In fact, the unspoken assumption of civic life is that it is peaceful.

However, with a sector as big as civil society, which is contained only by family on one end and state on the other (in its broadest definition) and with the question of ethnicity and violence on the table, other lines need to be drawn to better understand and explain civic life. Does violence or contentiousness preclude civicness or does civicness preclude violence or contentiousness?

The answer to this question may seem to be easy: a group is not civic if it is violent.

But this also means that there are organizations that will cross in and out of the voluntary and civic realms with periods and potential for violence and perhaps longer periods with mere contentiousness. Is an organization no longer civic if it evokes violence? If it provokes violence? A women’s group that supports a woman’s right to choose an abortion if needed (pro-choice) and an organization that disagrees with a woman’s right to have an abortion under any circumstances (pro-life) can both evoke or provoke violence and disrupt the public sphere (abortion bombings), but these groups are

76 generally accepted as part of the public sphere and civil society, despite their potential for moral reprehensiveness in their actions. This forces the question of whether an organization can be easily labeled ‘not civic’, or if the anger and incivility that it may evoke or provoke at any given time is the behavior that students of civil society and civic engagement must better understand to evaluate its civicness.

Given the range of issues that many find offensive or contentious within civil society and the diversity that is supposed to be present within civil society, it would not be wise or effective to use contentiousness or evocativeness as a barometer for what is civic and what is not civic. Thus all white anti–other groups cannot be cast out of a category of civicness simply for being evocative or contentious. It is perhaps most useful to understand that many civic organizations have the potential to step outside of the civic realm and “shock” the rest of the public. When these groups step out of civil society the group is resorting to provocative tactics for political gain or social ends. Riots in this case may be provoked and used by extreme organizations as an example of why immigration is harmful. More conclusively, these groups that walk back and forth, in and out of civic life are different from those that opt out of the political and legal system altogether with a complete disavowal of the existing system (militants, fascists, etc.) to advance their agenda (Hainesworth 2000). These groups are not civic. Groups like the

BNP however operate just inside the fence or go back and forth over the fence. Suffice it to say that there are pro-white anti-other groups that may masquerade as garden-variety civic groups, but actually operate on the fringes, moving back and forth across the establishment fence, at times opting out of civic life to further their cause. This operational space is evocative, provocative, and sometimes violent. Officially civic or

77 not, these groups both (BNP and non–civic extremists) have the potential and use their ability to “shock” communities living in ways that they deem inappropriate. Other groups such as abortion groups have potential to ‘shock’ by moving out of civic space to attain a goal.

Shocks Shocks

UN-CIVIC CIVIC UN-CIVIC

BNP Figure 2 Movement Between Civic and Un–civic Life

The space between the fence riders and those who opt out of civil society and civic life altogether, needs to be discussed separately from the civic space better defined as a place where whites might bond through organizational life. The latter group being representative of the majority of the public, seeking social belonging and a desire to participate in civic life and do not entertain waging war on civic space. The goal is to look at and investigate this space as a place that is culture–full that dissuades disaffected white youth from participating in un-civic activity. Is this a space where whites can better understand their own identity to share with others (not compete with or relinquish to others)? Is it enough to tell whites to open up their organizations to others? Results will address these questions realizing that culture shifts (for example open businesses on

Saturday, not having and office happy hour on Friday) are difficult.

Although it is a claimed space, civic life does not have a named space dedicated to better understanding or accepting white culture identity. Yet some whites just as many ethnics are joining groups in civic life to explore interests as well as for cultural camaraderie. This is the bonding space that needs to be better understood and a space

that should not be subsumed by (or threatened or tempted by) fence riding or extreme white groups.

Based on being a place of secure belonging, bonding in civic life among whites alone is not bad. Results will show that it is the partnership of these groups with other ethnic groups in civil society that builds a cohesive community. However, the extremist group with a racist culture and mantra, has been allowed to confirm society’s worst fears about whiteness and left whites who do not fall into this category to remain identity–less, neither self–perceived as “ethnic” nor (necessarily) overtly racist. Is there a space for whiteness to grow and bond and define without nefarious consequences? One problem for whites is that white supremacist groups have taken over white space and have been allowed to publicly define whiteness for all whites causing some to opt out of the race

(McDermott & Samson 2005). This has allowed racist, anti–immigrant, borderline violent white groups to define whiteness and left a vacuum leaving the majority of whites to conclude, as mentioned earlier, that “they don’t have a culture” as they have been clearly defined by what they are not– neither racist nor “ethnic”.

One group that dominates white discourse on culture, identity, and tradition, is the

British National Party. Understanding the organization in terms of white identity and in both civic and un-civic ways is important to understanding the arguments posited above.

The next section sheds light on how far-right activity affected Oldham.

What Happened in Oldham (And What Didn’t Happen in Luton)?

Brief Background on Oldham

The accounts of the riots are based on over ninety newspaper reports from newspapers across England (local and national) that recount four days of riots in Oldham.

These accounts match responses to a dozen semi-structured interviews, many of whom

had extensive knowledge the riots and all of whom were long time residents of Oldham.

The following pages represent a cohesive story formed from the above sources.

Just a couple of weeks before the June election that proved relatively successful for

the BNP, on Saturday, May 26, 2001 three days of racial violence touched off between

Asians and whites in Oldham, a city and center of a metropolitan borough situated in

Lancashire. Oldham is a satellite city of Manchester, which is a short bus or rail ride away21, but developed its own identity as a mill town that earned its spot on the map

during the 19th century. Oldham was a Victorian town that grew up out of the cotton

boom of the late 19th and early 20th century and it became home to some 330 cotton mills

and one eighth of the world’s spindles. Oldham grew quickly in notoriety and its population. Oldham had a population of approximately 12,000 people in the 1830’s and grew to approximately 150,000 people as it become a key cog in the industrial economy by World War I (Oldham Beyond 2004).

Although the economy developed well and speedily, Oldham itself grew quicker

than its public institutions could. It was the largest town not to have a free public library

and it was the last to build a town hall to conduct city business and the first town to

abandon its town hall. The city had an acrimonious debate over the opening of a public

park, Alexandra Park, which ironically re-opened the summer that this research was

conducted drawing a cross–section of people from different cultural and religious

communities (Oldham Beyond 2004).

21 The area has strong rail lines to Manchester and Leeds. More than 12,000 commute into Manchester while only about 2,700 commute into Oldham for work. 20,000 people do commute into Oldham from the surrounding boroughs (Oldham Beyond 2004)

Oldham reached the peak of its economic success at the beginning of the 20th century. From the 1920s, cotton prices were being undercut by foreign competition (with the very machinery that was made in Oldham) and a protracted slowdown began that lasted until the 1960s-1970s. The slowdown of the 1960s-1970s prompted many workers to leave the industry which also caused labor shortages that were filled by Pakistanis and

Bangladeshis who were also willing to fill the vacancies and further willing to take the undesirable late–night shifts that white British workers were reluctant to take as conditions across the country improved for workers. Oldham also experienced growth during this time, creating the Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council, which incorporated smaller surrounding local councils and has since developed shopping areas and institutions of higher education in the city (Oldham Beyond 2004; Ritchie 2001).

Oldham is a mostly white working–class town with middle classes living in the

Saddleworth area. The indigenous white population can trace a long history, but it is clear that many people came from other areas of England and beyond have come to populate and work in the city since the boom in the 19th century. The first ethnic groups

to move into Oldham were the Irish, who came in the 19th and 20th centuries. Following

World War II both Polish and Ukrainian immigrants settled and worked in the area (and

still maintain cultural organizations in the area). Afro–Caribbean people settled in the

area during in the 1950’s and 1960’s. Asians began arriving as described above during

the 1960’s–1970’s. All of these groups were met with a certain degree of hostility as

culturally (and racially in some cases) different outsiders. Although each group has

fought their battles, Asians are still facing their battles in an era that is expected to be

81 significantly more tolerant as compared to previous eras (Oldham Beyond 2004; Ritchie

2001).

The Asians who settled in Oldham, like in other communities of immigrants, settled in the neighborhoods with people of similar language, religion, culture and comfort could be maintained. The Asians involved with the disturbances of 2001 were both British citizens and immigrants. Many were primarily the children of this generation of immigrants that arrived in the 1960s and 1970s or those who came to join their families in Oldham.

Issues and Oldham

Oldham is a small quaint city. The town center is clean and neat and a number of storefronts line the streets that emanate out from the Spindle’s center (a shopping mall).

Patrons and people working in the city center, as well as those coming from the surrounding towns, walk the area shopping and taking care of business. Oldham is well organized and well planned. From the cities tallest building one can see the neighborhoods that surround the town center as well as the smoke stacks of a half dozen cotton mills dotted, like the ends of bicycle spokes around Oldham a short distance from the town center, and convenient at one time for local workers. Older buildings meld into the architecture and style of newer buildings, making for an almost seamless theme. It is a very livable city, and to an outsider, even its poor neighborhoods seemed relatively well kept.

The town square revealed the diversity of the city. Muslims in traditional dress, visibly different, Asian women in exclusively more traditional clothing and in both

Western clothes and in hijab walked around the town. Of course the majority of those in the city center were white, once or twice an interracial pair was sighted, Afro-Caribbean

82 people, and older people conducted their business during the day. My daily bus ride revealed the younger working class segment of society. Young (white) mothers and young men rode the busses in the morning and in the afternoon. The bus headed toward

Manchester, making a number of local stops in Oldham and greater Oldham had many kids, not just white, but also, though fewer, Asians and Afro-Caribbean students. One or two evening rides showed young white male teens on busses some of whom might stereotypically pass for the trouble making type. One bus labeled “Storke” had a number of these passengers. Storke is the greater Oldham area town that had a number of residents to come into Oldham and who were accused of taunting and starting trouble with Asians.

Despite the normal appearance there were palatable tensions not far below the surface. One respondent who had worked for the local council (and who had summarily moved after the riots) described the town as a "powder keg". This did not seem to be the case just observing the city, but this dramatic description of inter-ethnic relations of

Oldham was one that I ultimately shared after talking with 40 people as part of the research and with a number of others informally.

Although Oldham received a great deal of attention following the riots from policy makers and concerned community members and organizations there continued to be a great deal of sensitivity with respect to racial and ethnic relations. There was anger and outrage when respondents to semi-structured interviews were asked to recount the riots.

Others gave politically correct answers which sometimes seemed not genuine or very scripted as it is common knowledge and has been emphasized in many countries in

Europe in the United States as well, that prejudice unacceptable. One white woman in

response to open-ended questions discussed her negative feelings toward Asians

(discussed in the findings). She was the exception and not the norm in her expression,

but I am not convinced that she was the only one who might have some politically

incorrect feelings.

To best understand the sentiment of whites in Oldham it was necessary to read

between the lines. "We don't have problems because we don't have many Asians in our

neighborhood" one middle aged to older white person said. Asians, Muslims in

particular, are equated with problems as at times informally people separated Indian

(Hindu) communities from other Asian (Muslim, often Pakistani). I had never heard of

an opposite case made by Asians, “we don’t have any problems because there are no

whites here". Clearly there are many issues that go beyond race and ethnicity. There are

also a number of issues that provoke problems because of perception.

The problems that Asians have revolve around poverty, acceptance,

accommodation, change, and in working within a system that is not favorable to the

religious and cultural traditions of, for example, Pakistan. Whites have socio-economic

problems also (lest we forget that not all whites are middle class, a perception brought out

by one Asian respondent grappling with how to define whiteness). Whites in Oldham

specifically, but perhaps in other contexts as well, there are issues associated with

knowing how to welcome and appropriately included cultural newcomers (although the

Asians in Oldham have been in the community, many for more than 30 years) and

equally, some Asians also have been reluctant or resistant to change.

From interviews and from observing, there are individual level frustrations and

more systemic problems that aggravate inter-ethnic relations and that antagonize the

individual from pursuing relationships with the other. There are stereotypes and

perceptions associated with resources that tend to exacerbate conflict and misgivings about the other population, in this case Asians. In Oldham and in the slightly more wealthier Luton, and there are also perceptions about who gets allocated the most

resources, specifically in terms of housing allocation and money for organizations. The

idea that whites receive more raises levels of resentment or prejudice of whites toward

Asians. In Oldham (and in Luton), it was raised as a source of contention based largely

based on the fact that Asians live in bigger houses. Although this has the illusion of

being discriminatory toward whites of similar means, the fact is that Asians have bigger,

close-knit families and are thereby allotted bigger houses to accommodate families.

These perceptions co-exist with other frustrations. At least one leader in Luton agreed

that this raises tensions and consistent with bridging, said that forums where many

communities get together usually dispel these myths.

When asked or illustrating what raises tensions in their community, respondents to

the interviews in both Oldham and Luton mention resource issues:

Things are actually getting worse for Asians (not for Afro-Carribean people)/ People not getting jobs, Nazi-style propaganda… (General Secretary of an Asian, Pakistani organization in Luton)

Perceived jealousy and misgivings by the BNP. BNP, brilliant use of community politics. (Leader of an Afro-Caribbean organization in Oldham) Italics mine.

Exploitation of resource issues are explosive in many contexts across the globe, it

is near universal. It is easy to blame resource issues for conflict, however this research

suggests that it is important to explore civic responses to all conflict and in this case

bridging, an environment that allows myths to be dispelled. Resource issues can be

contentious between any groups, and certainly as seen by the BNP and far-right groups, can be easily exploited, therefore organizations that disseminate the truth, bridge, clearing up at least one area of contention, between ethnic groups is important as a mechanism to curtail conflict.

Other areas of tension evoke individual level frustration and call for system level changes. In the case of Muslims (who are mostly Asian in this context) when cultural traditions come into conflict with, for example, the employment system and present challenging questions as to how to accommodate a cultural new comer to a society in a way that the person can honor his or her traditions and still participate in the workplace.

These questions are very well explored in the Multicultural Citizenship (Kymlicka 1995).

Every group of people has a way of doing things, ways to express friendship, ways of welcoming people, and indeed establish social patterns and ways of governing. For many

British, but in Oldham in particular, as this is the case being studied, inviting a colleague

out for a round of beer on a Friday (or any day) as it is the official end of the work week

is a show of collegiality. This is a way of showing friendship, and opening the door to

the culture and to getting to know a person better. Although this is quite normal for the

British, for Asians, this violates religious beliefs and cultural practices. Alcohol is not

supposed to be consumed following Islam, thus going out “for a round” is not an

acceptable practice. I heard the frustration in the voices of some of the white

respondents, who were willing to take one (maybe only one) step forward and who

retreated quickly, frustrated with rejection, unwilling to look for common ground. I also

heard inflexibility if not elitism from Asians who are not willing to take a step toward the

others. An Asian woman working at a local umbrella group, who had grown up in another part of England before moving to Oldham quite openly said that the Asians in

Oldham, adults in particular, do not want to change. “Asians tend not to want to integrate and little integration in Oldham. [They] hang on to their values and they are not willing to change”. These sentiments intimate that Asians are not victims only, but also share in the responsibility of providing forums where both groups can meet on common ground and establish deeper relationships.

Whites in Oldham do bear some responsibility in accommodating on a systemic level, specifically in the workplace. Co-workers part ways when invited out for a round, not just because it involves alcohol, but because it often occurs on Friday, a day to celebrate the end of the work week for those majority Christians who worship or take a day of rest on Sunday, but for Muslims, Friday is a day of worship on which many would not work were the system designed to accommodate religious differences. A former

Asian Councilor for Oldham expounded on these issues and also grappled with many other related issues in response to his interview question on British cultural identity.

Well this is the million dollar question. And I am struggling with it and I am very controversial on this. I was talking to a group of youngsters about this issues and I said, tell me what is British tradition? Now this is a question that I posed to white British people. It is difficult and it is muddled. Now traditionally, what is Asian culture? What is British culture? What is any culture? The culture say that there is some religious aspect, environmental bits, some traditions that you follow, then arts and music and those kind of things to the culture… However the current British culture doesn’t honor those strands what comes out is the element of drunkenness, or the macho image, so if you go back, these are the elements that nobody wants about the culture. The traditional community, Brits go to church on Sunday, Jews on Saturday, Muslim on a Friday. Why should that be a problem? …If you look there are differences in dress, we are influencing their culture and dress and we are accepting changing our culture to British culture. So where is the conflict. It arises in things we don’t like. The Asian community don’t like drunkenness. Why should we go out and get stoned? British will say, that’s the way we do it. So every Friday we finish early. The Muslims say no, why don’t we all of Friday off? We’ll

work Saturday. …The people want to take the negative and criticize because they don’t want to change themselves and because the decision makers are providing that opportunity. So if they walked up and said, right, if you want to work on Saturday instead of Friday, and make them equal and flexible, then it is fair, but if someone says I don’t want to come in Saturday because I’m stoned don’t want to come in, I want to preserve what I want to do on a Friday night, then it’s not fair. So those kind of things cause conflict. Same with food. If it is everyone’s money, then why am I having your food? I have as much right as you do… people don’t want to change. So as people become more and more active they are reclaiming their rights and the people who are there, they [whites] are feeling threatened then they start to fight back and say you are not going along with our culture. But actually it is economics, they want to make sure that the have nots stay the have nots– control them and we’ll (decision makers) will carryon doing what they are doing.

So a traditional culture, I have yet to find someone who can tell me what it is. And I think it is so rich in the various cultures that it has and it has room, you know we can accommodate any every culture. I have yet to find an institution that says it can’t provided that it is prepared to change its current system. There is no reason why no culture can’t be accommodated in all the major institutions– … There isn’t any reason why not. I think people fit more into the minority text than in the majority text, vegetarian food. I don’t know what it is like where you come from. You have alcohol and non–alcoholic beverages. The first thing that will go is the soft drinks, then the veg food, and then the meat. That means that these two things need to be supplied in excess. Why don’t the decision–makers say, ok, let’s make it so that everyone can eat.

Can someone tell me exactly what traditional culture is? If you talk about the drink, that’s not your culture, because if you talk to the elderly, they will tell you it’s not like that. If that’s your culture, nobody wants it. So who’s it? Criminality?

These are hard questions about how and when it is appropriate to accommodate, what British cultural identity is, and most importantly these comments and issues raised provide important background and helps us to understand the issues at stake in the

Oldham community (and elsewhere in England) and what issues are in contention as the

BNP and other joiners seek to exploit ethnic and economic issues to cause conflict and pursue a mission of cultural homogeneity.

Disturbances in Oldham. What started the riot?

What happens in neighborhoods and schoolyards across the world, escalated on

Saturday, May 28, 2001 into a race war by the worst accounts. By the most constructive

accounts, these riots (officially referred to as “disturbances” by the police) were an indication that Oldham had to change something in its local operations to address the

deep–seated hostilities that boiled over that day. Two schoolboys were fighting, one was

Asian, and one was white. The fight between the schoolboys escalated when the mother

of the white schoolboy called others to come to the aid of her son. It was widely reported

that 10 men, all white22 arrived in cars. In response to this, Asians quickly mobilized.

Asians mobilized to defend not only Asians as a group as represented through the schoolboy who was unfairly ganged up on, but this fight also represented whites on some level demonstrated through the initial call that they would not be overtaken by Asians. A riot, or “disturbances” quickly ensued.

Reports agree that at its height a group of approximately 500 Asians23 gathered and

began to riot, clashing with police, torching cars, and throwing bricks, rocks, and petrol

bombs. Significant damage was inflicted upon a bar ironically called “Live and Let

Live” by Asian youth. A group of whites was accused of walking from pub to pub singing racist chants ( Kennedy & Jenkins 2001: 4). Asian families and their homes and businesses were also targeted by whites. Among the targeted places was the home of the deputy mayor of Oldham an Asian man, whose home was fire–bombed before the three days of rioting and disturbances ended. Approximately 30 arrests were made and a

22 In content analysis note that the newspaper referred to the arriving men as English as if English precludes Asianess… not representative of belonging… schooling people how to think and excluding.

23 Other reports counted as few as 100 or 200

special judge was appointed to deal with those involved in the riots whose ages ranged

from ages 16 to 41. The disturbances in Oldham spread to other cities and towns in the

region within days.

Random Violence? Or Sparks to a Tinderbox?

It was hardly the random violence that is so often portrayed in ethnic conflict.

There were many issues that can be argued on both sides that created a situation ripe for

violence. However, there were two specific factors that contributed to growing hostility

among Asians. The first contributing factor –or exogenous shock– is the active presence of the British National Party, the National Front, and their sympathizers who played a role in instigating the disturbances. The second contributing factor or shock to the community was the media, who according to Asians and whites interviewed for the dissertation, argued that the media was biased against Asians in their reporting and further contributed to explosive tensions, thus a contributing factor to the violence.

These two factors were the most significant exogenous shocks facing the community at the time.24

The National Front25 (NF) targeted Oldham and had designed plans to march in the

area, much to the displeasure of many local anti–racist groups. Jack Straw, then Home

Secretary, blocked the National Front’s request to march on May 12, 2001. Although the

National Front did not march, the party did leaflet council estates26 eight days prior to the

24 The “war on terror” –spearheaded by the United States and the United Kingdom– began just a few months after these riots as a this same year following the hijacking of two commercial American planes and the subsequent destruction of the World Trade Center in New York and the damage to the Pentagon in Washington, DC. This is considered a third exogenous shock affecting communities where Asians reside and informs the responses of all informants as this information was collected after these events and during the height of the war.

25 More extreme than the BNP

26 Government sponsored housing

90 riot according to one newspaper. Informants also cite the British National Party as leafleting estates with flyers targeting individuals with provocative statements and racist overtones. Despite this blocked request to march, both respondents and the local newspaper reported on the high level of activity of the National Front, their defense force,

Combat 18, and their sympathizers, up to and during the riots, some of whom were alleged to have come from outside of Oldham. The BNP also made their presence known in Glodwick, a mostly Asian area prior to the riots, Asians gathered in response, but community leaders turned the group of Asians around preventing further disturbances.

Both personal and news accounts confuse which far–right group owned which specific actions, but all can be called and represent a high degree of far-right activity.

Putting some of these events in perspective, a respondent from the police confirmed that the BNP had indeed “exploited the race card”. Most importantly the police officer was able speak to the verbal abuse that Asians suffered prior to the riots when BNP members (and I believe sympathizers) –borderline criminal types noted the officer– came from outside of the community27 for a football game and walked through an Asian neighborhood, drunk, en route to the stadium and took the opportunity to taunt Asians.

This, he said in an election year (2001) where the BNP had played the race card in running candidate for the general election. Consequently, the BNP marched in Oldham once a month throughout the spring (March and April). The officer assured that factions were kept separate.

The mobilization and campaign for the election resulted in some significant results in Oldham, was about a year and a half in the making (Kennedy & Jenkins 4: 2001;

27 Storke

Copsey 2004). The BNP won a noticeable part of the Oldham electorate, 16% in Oldham

West and Royton and 11% in Oldham East and Saddleworth (Ritchie 2001).

This activity left Asians feeling that they needed to protect their families in this heightened atmosphere of hate, aggression, and anti–immigrant sentiment. Further,

Asians had community concerns about their safety. There were grievances that many

Asians had against the police, among them that police did not treat white and Asian troublemakers equally. The Asian community complained that many walked free after abusing them. Operating just inside the law, the authors of the leaflets that sparked tensions, crafted them in such a way that those on the far-right could not, be prosecuted for their words and actions. Consequently, riots were an attempt to protect their communities (Anti–racist group respondent). One newspaper reported (though not mentioned by any respondents) a somewhat more organized violent response to far-right attacks by a group of Asian youth fighting back against the extreme white organizations in Oldham and Bradford called Combat 786.

The second shock was the media. In one third of the interviews in Oldham, respondents blamed the media in some way. The coverage of the action riots over a period of several days can be scrutinized and critiqued as problematic for race relations.

But prior to the coverage of the riots, or disturbances, the Asians thought that the media, specifically their local paper, the Oldham Evening Chronicle, was guilty of giving more coverage to violence against whites (demonizing Asians) than to violence against Asians thus leading to the belief that the paper was unfair (Kennedy & Jenkins 2001: 4). Out of a dozen in depth interviews, one third of the respondents reported that the media affected, if not escalated, tensions between Asians and whites generally, and the far-right

specifically. One former member of the local council commented on how badly distorted

and racist the reporting of the Oldham Chronicle was. When the paper reported on

“blacks”28 who had been victims of violent crime by whites only received, she argued,

“two lines at the bottom of the page” were dedicated to the story. However, when a

white person was the victim of a violent crime that was inflicted by a “black” person, the story would get “half a page and a photograph”. Further, the respondent argued that

incidents involving blacks were so disproportionate that the there was a debate over the

figures as seemingly no blacks were the victims of white crime. In short Asians were

unfairly demonized in the media and characterized as being a negative and damaging part

of the Oldham community (Bjorgo 1993).

The media was apart of this story before, during and after the riots. In the lead up

to the riots, a representative from the police department pointed a finger toward the

media, commenting that the media’s portrayal of a story of extremes created attention

that increased the tension between communities leading to a critical levels where things

could spark. The Oldham Evening Chronicle was also accused of helping to paint

Oldham as a segregated city involved in a race war. One respondent commented that even the editor of the Chronicle admitted that he might have gotten some things wrong.

Overall, the media not only created tension between communities, but also had a

demoralizing affect on the people. Another interviewee from a local civic organization responded to the first question about the causes of the riots, not with the complex story as many did, but with one simple answer; the media. The respondent believed that the entire story of the riots was built up beyond what it really was. Having been interviewed

28 Black and Minority Ethnic group, BME, and black in Oldham were common references to Asians

by the BBC, she said that her true sentiment toward the media in regards to this situation

was, “leave us alone”. Her sentiments also border on embarrassment and frustration. In

addition to being an exogenous shock and contributing to elevated tensions between

whites and Asians, the media also proved to have a demoralizing affect on the Oldham

community with many embarrassed at what went on at the end of May 2001 (Ritchie

2001; Oldham Beyond 2004).

Luton

Luton began as a quiet market town, which grew rapidly during the 19th century.

Luton was known for its hat making industry, which fell into decline in the 20th century.

Vauxhall came to the town in 1905 and as the century progressed, Luton’s car

manufacturing industry became well-known. Vauxhall announced in 2000 that its car

plant would close and production soon ceased. In 1998 the Luton Borough Council

signed a deal with London-Luton Airport Operations, Ltd to bring an airport to the area to

service its biggest neighboring city, London. Relatively speaking Oldham had less

industry, but has worked and continues to work to grow its economy.

Luton, economically, is slightly better off than its northern counterpart, however, it still has issues with poverty. To address these issue, like Oldham, Luton has been given regeneration funds. Luton has targeted areas for regeneration, and has also placed great

emphasis on the issue of employment. In Luton’s Regeneration Strategy, its third

objective of five key strategies, outlines some of the needed areas of improvement to

resolve a variety of issues associated with regeneration:

• Bring about major coordinated change in the Marsh Farm NDC area in accordance with the New Deal Programme • Close the deprivation gap for struggling parts of Luton including assisting wards out of the 10% most deprived in the UK

• Deliver key anti-poverty initiatives such as Luton’s Neighborhood Renewal Strategy • Develop initiatives to promote access to jobs29

Luton has also outlined targets for 2011, which include improving their

government rating, eliminating vacant houses, increasing education levels to national

standards, decreasing crime levels, and pulling the most deprived areas of Luton out of

poverty. As a city examining its economic standing relative to all cities in England,

Luton still rests within the bottom one-third of all cities in England30.

Luton is a place that celebrates its diversity. Luton sponsored its first carnival in

1976 and this event has grown to be a large international event. In 2000, more than

140,000 participated. Almost every respondent surveyed mentioned the Luton Carnival.

Although the police said that in 2004 there were a few racialized pranks, overall everyone

concluded that it is a good event. It is a source of pride amongst the town’s residents.

The Luton First website31 boasts that Luton is, “a model of amicable community

relations”. Despite some problems and shocks to the community, Luton is proud of its

diversity, a characteristic that is still growing on Oldham.

When Luton residents talk about ethnic relations, they are not as problem free as what is portrayed above, however relations are good, and community organizations and the local council do work at it. Most would agree that ethnic relations are good, all of

29 http://www.luton.gov.uk/Media%20Library/Pdf/Environment%20&%20regeneration/Regeneration/Business%20tea m/Reg%20Strat%20PDF%20for%20Web.pdf

30 http://www.luton.gov.uk/internet/portal/tab/Bookmark%20Track/Community%20strategy%20- %20Luton%202011

31 www.lutonfirst.com

those interviewed, in chapter five, reflect on the effort that has gone into improving

relations among ethnic groups. Residents have mentioned isolated incidents, but focus on

the improvements that have been made. The most notable and recent tensions (involving

Asians) evolved out of the start of the war with Iraq when there was fighting in the

streets, in addition to the scrutiny under which Asians and Muslim Asians in particular

have come. Luton has also had challenges with extreme Muslim groups, specifically a now disbanded Muslim fundamentalist group accused of acts of terror. There have also

been tensions between Asians and Afro-Caribbean people, as many Asians (according to

one police officer) have come to be the recipients of more resources. As in Oldham there

are also communities of asylum seekers from Africa and Eastern Europe who have also

rippled the ethnic landscape and who have also been the target of the ire of the far-right.

*****

This chapter has focused on the relationship between history, cultural identity, and

civil society. England has become an incredibly diverse country over the last several

decades. Cultural identity in England, just as in other countries, is in an important issue

that becomes more pronounced as immigrants seek to maintain their culture and practices

in a new geographic setting. This chapter shows that cultural identity is also an important

issue (or non-issue as seen in subsequent chapters) for the indigenous whites who become

more aware of their own cultural identity in the presence of others. Although for most,

cultural diversity and celebrating identity is beneficial, to both minority and majority

groups, the extreme right has exploited this issue. The exploitation of cultural identity

steers many whites away from celebrating identity (or at least admitting it). The extreme

right has co-opted if not hijacked white cultural identity from mainstream whites leaving them embarrassed.

Also explored in this chapter and important to this study is the movement of far-

right organizations is their ability to move in and out of civic space. Looking at the case

of Oldham, the movement of extreme white organizations in, out, and on the cusp of civic

life is clear. This chapter also shows how organizations generally are able to disturb (in this case) multiethnic civic life by partnering with organizations outside of civic space in order to disrupt a multiethnic civil society. Understanding this movement into and out of the civic sphere helps us to see that organizations are not only civic or un-civic. Further,

it is important to understand that organizations are mobile and therefore have the

potential to vary in their civic or un-civic effects. This counteracts notions of kumbaya civil society as it is shown here more explicitly that groups can leave civic space in order wage attack on civil society, in this case, a multiethnic civic space, but in a more general sense when a groups ideology is fervent and disagrees with the mainstream.

Following the methodological chapter, chapter five maps out the results of the study and the civic landscape in Oldham and Luton. The chapter offers the empirical and qualitative results explaining how civic organizations reflect a multiethnic civic space where organizations bridge, bind, bond, and blind. Further, through interviews with respondents active in the voluntary sector as well as surveys, the study will show more clearly how Luton has been able to manage ethnic tensions and why civically, Oldham was in a more precarious position, which combined with a number of shocks aimed at the community, the city ultimately succumbed to riots.

CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY

Approach

The case study follows my epistemology as comparativist. Broad strokes and

cross-national studies are important, but my beliefs are mirrored in a maxim in political

science, “all politics is local”. It was just a fight between kids that sparked the riots in

Oldham that spread across the northwest. I believe that this is why it is important to look

at the attitudes, political, and social events that between people, at the local level, and that

emanate out into other parts of a country or a region. Understanding the players, the

institutions, and the factors at work, on a local level will provide a better understanding

as to how to resolve what might become national problems. With that said, inter-ethnic

conflict can be easily viewed through civil wars, for example on a national level; however, I believe that local level interactions are often the kindling, if not the root cause, of national manifestations of ethnic conflict. The view is often better and more precise at the local level. Therefore, it is important to use the case study approach to better understand the mechanisms that can prevent such conflict as well as those that can facilitate conflict at the community level.

Case studies have a number of benefits and drawbacks. Although it takes several iterations of a study in a variety of locations to generate theory, the close work allows the researcher to, among other things:

• Identify new or omitted variables and hypotheses

97 98

• Examine intervening variables in individual cases to make inferences on which causal mechanisms may have been at work

• Develop historical explanations of certain cases (Bennett 2004)

There are of course drawbacks to the case study approach which include:

• Trade offs between case selection and selection bias

• A relative inability to render judgment on the frequency or representativeness of particular cases

• Weak capability for estimating the average causal weight of variables (Bennett 2004)

Despite the drawbacks, the case study approach is strong in providing a forum to

understand the dynamics within a certain community and, as stated above, allows the

possibility of identifying new hypotheses, and indeed new independent variables that are

at work within the case community. Although measuring the weight of causal variables

is not as precise as in other methods and in quantitative statistical approaches, in this

research there are topics that clearly carried relatively more weight than other variables.

Those variables and nuances were often discovered through the inductive process of

allowing the researcher to speak to the researcher and respecting the voices of the study

participants. Although the case study approach cannot generate theory, adding

comparative cases can begin to confirm or deny patterns linked local level ethnic conflict,

constructing a compelling case for adopting or rejecting certain patterns of behavior, in

this case, within multiethnic civic life.

This dissertation project stems from the fact that there were cities like Oldham,

England which experienced racial violence between Asians and whites in 2001, but

others cities, like Luton, England that were able to escape this kind of violence. This

comparative case study examines two very similar small cities that had very different

outcomes with respect to ethnic peace and ethnic conflict. The unit of analysis used to examine the persistence of peace or the outbreak of violence is civic organizations. The hypotheses for the dissertation test the assumption that civic organizations lead to lower levels of ethnic conflict and suggest frames (that are not monolithic) of how to examine civic organizations. The hypotheses including types social capital are as follows:

1. Bonding groups that work with bridging (integrated) groups, lead to lower levels of ethnic conflict. (Survey and key informants)

2. According to Varshney’s argument (2001), a community with only bonding organizations will be more prone to ethnic conflict. I argue that civic organizations characterized by bonding groups lead to neutral to higher levels of ethnic conflict (depending on the mix of groups/behaviors represented. Note: neutrality is argued here because bonding in itself is an important space to have for all ethnic groups, both white and Asian). (Survey and key informants)

3. Groups that bond can also blind as bonding is a prerequisite for blinding. Blinding is also known as bonding gone awry. Blinding groups, depending on the proportion to other groups and the size of the group will lead to higher levels of ethnic conflict. (newspapers, key informants, possibly surveys). Please note that blinding groups such as extreme right political groups and their unofficial groups of supporters were not included due to issues associated with personal safety. Instead, blinding is interpreted as an exogenous shock, or the presence of groups that provoke communities or religious groups or groups that take extreme public action (through leafleting or, for example). The media can also blind with “yellow” journalism or biased reporting.

4. Groups that bond and that bind (partner with) blind groups will lead to higher levels of ethnic conflict. (newspapers and key informants)

5. Communities with many bridging (or integrated groups) lead to lower levels of ethnic conflict.

Methods

To measure and assess the results of the hypotheses, surveys, systematic sampling and semi-structured interviews were employed. These methods were supported by archival research, which entailed reading articles from various newspapers across

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England that covered the violence in Oldham as well as produced assessments the situation in Oldham, such as the Cantle Report.

Oldham and Luton were chosen as most similar cases (with different results) as the small cities have arguably similar characteristics. Gathered from the United Kingdom’s

2001 census, the total populations of Oldham and Luton respectively are 217,273 and

180,000. Approximately 12% of Oldham’s population is Asian, while 18.3% of Luton’s population is Asian. Both cities are approximately an hour away from major metropolitan areas (Manchester and London, respectively). The statistics for employment and unemployment, including students, individuals looking after home/family, and retirees are almost identical, with differences of less than two percentage points. Car theft in Oldham and Luton are similar, only crime against individuals and home burglary differ more than 4 percentage points of each other with crime against individuals at

17.6% and 12.2% respectively and home burglary at 14.9% and 7.6% respectively. Both are higher than the national average. Luton is a slightly wealthier city that Oldham, however, economically both cities are among the country’s bottom one third, Oldham being slightly more deprived than Luton. Luton was a city that also actually had riots in a poor neighborhood (Marsh Farm) in 1995 following a police incident. All organizations surveyed were asked about the riots and they almost universally concluded (despite some media reports) that these riots were more economic, than racial, in nature. Below is a general outline, followed by several tables that highlight other demographic information important to understanding about the cities.

City Profiles1

1 UK Statistics (online) 2001

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City 1– Oldham Total Population: 217, 273 Ethnic breakdown: 11.9% Asian Violence summer 2001 SES: Employment Employed 59% Unemployed 3.7% Economically Active full time students 2.1% Retired 13% Economic inactive student 4% Looking after home/family 6.6% Sick or disabled 3.8% Crime Crime against individuals 17.6% (Oldham) 11.4% (Eng/Wales) Car Theft 14.1% 6.4% Burglary of a home 14.9% 7.6%

City 2– Luton Total Population: 180,000 Ethnic breakdown: 18.3% Asian No violence summer 2001 SES: Employment Employed 59.6% Unemployed 3.8% Economically active full time students 3.7% Retired 10.9% Economic inactive student 5.5%

Looking after home/family 7.6% Sick or disabled 4.6% Economically inactive 4.2%

Crime Crime against individuals 12.2% 11.4% Car Theft 11.4% 11.6% Burglary of a home 7.6% 7.6%

Table 1 Race and Religion RACE AND RELIGION OLDHAM LUTON

Afro-Caribbean & African .3% 6.3%

Christian 72.6% 59.6%

Muslim 11.1% 14.6%

Hindu .1% 2.7%

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Table 2 Age OLDHAM LUTON Male/Female 52% (f) 48% (m) 50% (f) 50% (m) UNDER 16 23% 23.5% 16-29 17% 21% 30-59 40.8% 39.3% 60-74 12.5% 11.2% OVER 75 6.8% 5.1%

Table 3 Marital Status MARITAL STATUS OLDHAM LUTON

Single (never married) 28% 33.4%

Married 51.1% 49.5%

Table 4 Home Prices (local expenses) HOME PRICES OLDHAM LUTON Below National Average Below National Average Detached Home 122,042 pounds (11% own) 154,352 pounds (13.4% own) Semi-detached Home 64,134 pounds (33.6% own) 93,998 pounds (40.3% own) Terraced Home 35,320 pounds (41.9% own) 73,417 pounds (28.3% own) Flat Home 49,408 pounds (12.9% own) 52, 511 pounds (17.8 own)

Interviews and Surveys

The results of this research are based on 20 semi-structured interviews and 60

surveys of civic organizations in Oldham and Luton, England. The units of analysis for

this research are civic organizations. The civic organizations surveyed come from a

universe of civic organizations in Oldham and Luton. The cases were selected from city-

wide directories provided by Voluntary Action Oldham and Voluntary Action Luton, two

umbrella organizations working to provide support for the voluntary sector in their

respective cities. These directories served as the sampling frame for organizations to survey. Both directories contained many, if not most of the area civic organizations working in the voluntary realm. After categorizing the groups in to categories, which

103 included social club, neighborhood, political, religious, child or youth, health or support, sports, social or political advocacy, cultural, or miscellaneous, a combination systematic

random sampling and purposive sampling (when ethnic minority groups were

underrepresented) used to generate a list of organizations to call. Once in categories

every other (or every 2 or 3 depending on the number of organizations in the category)

organization was chosen until a relatively balance list of 60 organizations was generated

for each city as a 50% response rate was (rightly) anticipated. The table below reflects

the organizations that were selected randomly and surveyed (with general or no

descriptions in some cases to maintain confidentiality) and their founding year.

Luton Women's Social Club 1963 Tenant Support and Advocacy 1999 Learning for Seniors 1997 Multi-Church Organization 1993 Irish Group 1997 Groups for Seniors/Advocacy 1927 Umbrella Group 1974 Asian Hobby Club 1991 Tenant & Resident Association 1979 Long standing church community group 1885 Women's Center 1990 Residents Association 1985 Rights/Advocacy 1982 Irish Group 1992 Asian/Bangladeshi 1998 Religious/community service 1992 Homeless support 1997 Large Service Org/Program 1999 Well-linked Crime Reduction Org 1988 Alcohol Support Group 1979 Veterans Group 1982 Multicultural Women's Group 1996 Girls Guide Group 1970 Culture & Senior Support 1999 Asian Drug Outreach Program 1999 Workers Education Association 1920 Luton Male Voice Choir 1992 SSAFA Forces Help Luton and District 1885 Muslim Women's Association 1973 Cultural/Asian Community Group 1975 Oldham European Cultural Group 1949 Oldham MBC Sports Council 1960

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Tenants & Residents Association 1979 City Sponsored Arts 1854 Home Owners Association 1996 Men’s Club 1994 Sports Club 1975 Sport Enthusiast 1878 City Youth Services 1984 Churches Unity Group Not Avail. Domestic/Family Crisis Group 1979 Disease Advocacy 1986 Group supporting disabled 1967 Bridge Club 1989 Health Advocacy 1998 Community Association 1990 Friendship Group 1999 Services for Older People 1993 Community Center 1953 Widespread Youth Development Program 1991 Tenants & Residents Association 1991 City Council 1979 Opportunities for Women 1991 Glodwick Bangladeshi Society 1979 Unity Sports for Kids 1999 Church Group Community 1813 Group for Vision impaired 1974 Services for People 1983 Housing Project 1976

Interviewees were selected through a snowballing method, identifying key people through people who knew the voluntary sector and the communities well. Surveys were conducted by telephone, which eliminated some bias. Interviews were conducted by phone and in person, at the convenience of the participant.

Data Analysis and Interpretation

Semi-Structured Interviews

There are many ways of coding and many purposes for coding activities across the different qualitative methods. They all share the goal of getting from unstructured and messy data to ideas about what is going on in the data. All coding techniques have the purpose of allowing the researcher to simplify and focus on some specific characteristics of the data. And all of them assist the researcher in abstracting, or ‘thinking up’ from the data. (Morse & Richards 2002)

Topic coding was used to bring passages from the semi-structured interviews together physically, where they could be highlighted, reviewed, and analyzed. “Codes, at their simplest, are just labels” (Morse & Richards 2002). The labels or the codes relevant

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in getting at the questions raised in this dissertation around inter-ethnic relations and civic

life are, bridging, bonding, binding, and blinding. The semi-structured interview

questions relate directly to these themes, the theoretical crux of the research. For

example, there were interview questions that asked whether or not British cultural

identity should be preserved, as well as a question as to whether or not it is problematic

that there are so many organizations that cater to one particular demographic. These

questions, among others, generated discourse on bonding, bridging, and integration

(although all responses were evaluated as responses relevant to these themes may have

appeared elsewhere in the interview). Responses were ordered by theme, interview

number, last name and city in order to facilitate review of the data.

In order to retrieve more nuanced and richer information from the data, it was

necessary to work up from the data and find themes from the responses. There were also

instances where I borrowed from grounded theory and matched themes that had emerged

to existing theories. In short, there were elements of inductive coding to discover what

the data had to offer; however, deductive coding was also used, as interview questions

worked from the hypotheses that were centered on the themes of bridging, binding,

bonding, and blinding (Bernard 2002).

Working up from the data, following the example and interview question on

whether or not there is a British cultural identity that should be preserved (which relates

to bonding), a number of themes emerged among the answers: 1) There is a British

culture/and being preserved 2) There is a British culture, and it should change 3) There is

no British cultural identity 4) What is British cultural identity? 5) Respondent ignored the

question 6) Respondent pushed diversity/integration 7) No attempt made to define British

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cultural identity, most… list those who did. Here it was possible for the same respondent

to reflect more than one theme.

In writing up the analysis, the respondent’s background, job or voluntary organization, city, mood, perspective on relevant issues, character impression, and language used were considered to bring more richness to the description with respect to

the themes that emerged. There was also an opportunity and a need to mull over and get

a deeper understanding of why and when certain words were used or if the tone or

language suggested a closer association or a more distant one. Although an extended stay

in Oldham helped to facilitate interpretation of the mood of the town, long conversations

and analysis of the language used as described above, also uncovered a great deal of

useful rich data. In addition to this analysis, again working up from the data and

borrowing from grounded theory, for example, in the case of the question on whiteness, a

curious theme emerged. There were a number of respondent who evaded the question of

a British cultural identity or surrendered British identity to change. This observation was

related to arguments, observations, data, and substantive theory (not formal theory in this

case) posited by McDermott & Samson (2005) and Tatum (1997) about why whites deny

or ignore the questions of white or British cultural identity, or simply elect to take a stand

gravitate toward an identity change for the whole of the British culture. Further, in the

conclusion, hypotheses for this question was further discussed and analyzed with an

eminent scholar (Goran Hyden). Thus, considering the sub-themes that emerged, the notion that a civic identity could in itself be a “cultural identity” replacing other ethnic

identities for British citizens was explored as a possible explanation from the theme that

emerged from the data.

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Although I melded two approaches, top down and bottom, up I believe that this was

a complementary tactic. The research began with hypotheses about bridging, binding,

bonding, and blinding relationships in multiethnic society and how the outcome would

affect multiethnic peace or violence. In some cases it was necessary to test the

hypotheses to confirm, deny, or better understand the hypotheses, but I believe that it is

also important to allow the respondent’s truth to emerge from the data, whether or not it

fit neatly into hypotheses. So, inductive coding helped to better understand the data, but also facilitated understanding the themes that emerged around whiteness. Deductive coding, for example, confirmed the approach of this research and in some ways disproved the hypothesis (following other) that bonding in itself was not nefarious and that it was a universal occurrence among ethnic groups as leaders in Luton believed that bonding was acceptable, although it is important to note that bonding does not preclude working with other groups.

Surveys

A dataset was built to organize and accommodate survey data. The survey data was coded, collapsed, and entered into an SPSS file. With the data in this electronic form, frequencies and cross-tabs were conducted to assess organizational behavior.

Responses to open-ended questions in the survey were brought together in a file where responses could be compared, assessed, and tallied, and compared to or showed how the data collected challenged existing theoretical perspectives, most notably the work of

Putnam, Hyden and Varshney (much like, though with less frequency than with semi-

structured interviews).

For the interviews (and for surveys where appropriate) quotations from respondents

were highlighted to complement conclusions and findings.

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CHAPTER 5 HOW DO CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS MATTER? CULTURAL IDENTITY, CIVIC LIFE, AND MANAGING ETHNIC TENSIONS

This research examines the relationship between two key characteristics of many

modern cities: multiethnic communities and civic life. In looking deeper at these interrelated independent variables, this research hopes to better understand how civic/voluntary organizations affect multiethnic civic life, conflict, and the management of tensions among ethnic groups. In short, the dependent variable or the outcome that is explained is the relative conflict or peace (diminished tensions) that exists community-

wide as a result of the behavior and interaction among civic organizations and their

response to shocks, although other factors, such as relationship with the local council,

attitudes, and agility and pro-activity of the voluntary sector, will prove salient. This

information is based on a sample of 60 surveys1 of civic organization leaders (for

example, president, secretaries, or a people with a long institutional memory), 30

conducted in each Oldham and Luton. There were several open-ended questions on the

survey, which served as a source of rich data on community opinions and the mood of

each comparative community. Nineteen (19) semi-structured interviews from key

organizational leaders, police, and others are included, 12 in Oldham and 8 in Luton. An

1 All surveys collected by telephone, interviews collected mostly by phone, although there were several face-to-face semi-structured interviews conducted in Oldham. Organizations were categorized into sub- categories (social, sports, youth, cultural, neighborhood, health, religious, social/political advocacy, etc.) and a list of at least 60 organizations was generated estimating a 50% response rate. Organizations were chosen randomly across a variety of organizations. Every other organization (or every 2 or 3 depending on the number of organizations in the category) was selected until a relatively balanced list of 60 organizations was generated. Purposive sampling was used in cases where ethnic organizations were not represented or representative. One survey was lost for Oldham, leaving the total surveys at 59.

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interview from an expert on extreme white, neo-Nazi, and far-right groups and activities

is also included among the sources drawn on to better understand and reach conclusions

about the intersection between civic organizations and ethnic relations. Much of the

information, especially about the mood of the town, is confirmed through participant

observation in Oldham during the summer of 2004.

The first step in this investigation is to understand how civic organizations behave.

Which city has more bonding organizations? Which city has more umbrella groups? Are

there any differences between they way organizations behave in Oldham, where there

were riots, and Luton that did not experience riots in 2001? The second step is to

understand from leaders in the voluntary sector how organizational life affects interethnic

relations (and vice versa), cultural identity issues, and how or if organizations play a role

in managing tensions between cultural identity groups, especially in the face of

exogenous shocks and internal disturbances. How have voluntary organizations affected

community stability or instability and what does this ultimately tell us about how or if

voluntary organizations can affect the outbreak of violence among ethnic groups? In the

face of a multitude of intervening factors where do voluntary organizations surface to

make a difference? Let’s begin by looking at the similarities and differences between

civic organizations in Oldham and those in Luton.

The civic differences between Oldham and Luton are not overwhelming on every count, however, examining organizational life helps to sketch an outline of these communities that can overlay the canvas on which the voluntary leaders that were interviewed have painted a clear picture of the voluntary sector.

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Table 5 Demographics Oldham and Luton City Oldham Luton Population 217,273 180,000 Asian Population 11.9% 18.3% Employment 59% 59.6% Unemployment 3.7% 3.8% Economically Active Full- 2.1%/4% 3.7%/5.5% time Students/Inactive Students Crime (against individuals) 17.6% 12.2% Car Theft 14.1% 11.4% Burglary 14.9% 7.6%

Oldham and Luton are very different in the change in bonding organizations, the number of richly diverse voluntary groups, in the number of ethnic groups that work with other ethnic groups (binding) and overall and maybe most importantly, in their agility and ability to respond external circumstances and ability to create a multiethnic civic community that is not so easily disturbed. On the other hand, the communities have similarities in the number of organizations that classified themselves as umbrella organizations and in group relations prior to the riots in 2000. The following analysis examines the differences and similarities of these communities broadly by looking at the organizational divisions and descriptive statistics in comparative perspective. The second part of this chapter looks deeply into the communities through the eyes of its leaders. In this section, the character, culture, behavior of the communities are evident and provide a rich context to better understand the organizational life and behavior of these communities and their ability or inability to manage ethnic tensions. Informal relationships are also examined.

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Bonding and Bridging: Results

Both Oldham and Luton, before and after the riots had a similar number of bonding

organizations. Roughly 35% of the civic community or 12 organizations in Luton and 13

in Oldham were bonding2. Bonding here is 100% homogeneity with no group diversity whatsoever. There were only slightly more bonding organizations in Oldham (as compared to Luton). However, when looking at organizations that were predominantly3

one ethnic group, Oldham had more ethnic groups sticking together in voluntary life

before and after the riots. Looking at groups that are made up predominantly of one

ethnic group of is important because, while there are many organizations that are 100%

of one ethnic group without participation with others, there are many groups that simply

do not have a robust mix of people and that are dominated (decision-making and input)

by one group. For example, one organization might be 92% of one ethnic group with

only one or two members from a background different from the majority in the group.

These are not qualitatively or richly mixed groups.

Comparing the organizations that are predominantly of one ethnic group, the surveys showed that in both 1999 and 2004 Luton had a total of 16 bonding organizations

or 59% of the voluntary sector sampled that was classified as a bonding organization. On

the other hand, Oldham had significantly more bonding organizations with 23 bonding

organizations or 85% of the voluntary sector surveyed, in this sample, in Oldham were

2 Fellowship with one’s own ethnic group and not interacting with others. This is the most reliable assessment of a groups ethnic background as mixed groups have asked for guesstimates.

3 Establishing predominance looks at organizations that are more than 85% of one ethnic group with most groups predominant with percentages in the 90% range

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classified as bonding organizations4. This underscores that there are and were more

ethnically bonding organizations in Oldham, the city that had ethnic riots. This is also

consistent with the hypotheses and ideas set forth in this dissertation. The appearance of

bonding in Oldham in particular also speaks to a contention raised by Hyden, Putnam,

and Varshney as to how detrimental bonding might be within civic life. But as discussed

earlier and what will be discussed shortly, bonding alone is not necessarily negative for civic life, there are other factors to consider.

In both 1999 and in 2004, before and after the riots, Luton had more mixed organizations than Oldham did. Luton had 7 mixed organizations in 1999 and 11 in

2004, whereas Oldham had only 3 in 1999 and 4 in 2004. Mixed groups are a part of the bridging equation. As discussed in the introduction, bridging groups (below, also referred to as diverse or umbrella groups) encapsulate two kinds of organizations. The first is an organization that manages frequent and sustained partnerships between a variety of organizations, which include organizations that are inclusive of different ethnic

groups (diverse or umbrella groups). The second kind of organization is one that is

robustly mixed, such that in itself it reflects a kind of beneficial cohesion among two or

more ethnic groups. The kinds of groups included among mixed and umbrella

multicultural women’s groups and inter-faith organizations.

When asked about mixed groups, respondents refer either to the staff or to the

ethnicity of the users of the organizations and responses were estimated by respondent.

As these numbers are often not kept by the organizations nor are they mandatory by the

4 Luton is a more diverse city, so there is the opportunity to have greater inclusion in civic organizations; however, the diversity that Luton sees does not mean that individuals or groups will take the opportunity to mix unless there is a greater spirit of openness.

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state, gathering this data relied largely on the memories and experiences of the

respondents5.

Table 6 Make up of Mixed Groups in Luton 1999 Luton 1999 Organizations White Asian Afro–Caribbean Other

Org. 1 75% 25% Org. 2 68% 23% 8% Org. 3 70% 30% Org. 4 1% 51% 18% Org. 5 29% 14% 57% Org. 6 75% 25% Org. 7 40% 30% 30%

Table 7 Make up of Mixed Groups in Oldham 1999 Organizations Oldham 1999 White Asian Afro–Caribbean Other Org. 1 50% 50% Org. 2 72% 14% 11% 3% Org. 3 47% 50% 1% 2%

Table 8 Make up of Mixed Groups in Luton 2004 Organizations Luton 2004 White Asian Afro–Caribbean Other Org. 1 60% 20% 20% Org. 2 65% 5% 20% 10% Org. 3 20% 40% 40% 10% Org. 4 64% 22% 14% Org. 5 1% 51% 18% Org. 6 40% 20% 40% Org. 7 50% 25% 25% Org. 8 50% 25% 25% Org. 9 25% 40% 35% Org. 10 77% 23% Org. 11 15% 45% 40%

Table 9 Make up of Mixed Groups in Oldham 2004 Organizations Oldham 2004 White Asian Afro–Caribbean Other Org. 1 50% 50% Org. 2 65% 29% 6% Org. 3 69% 14% 14% 3% Org. 4 47% 50% 1% 2%

5 This issue of memory and accuracy accounts generally accounts for those groups that did not respond to this question for 1999 and for the increase in the number of respondents in 2004.

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In 1999 in the Luton sample there were 7 out of 30 mixed organizations, a total of

approximately 30% of the civic or voluntary organizations surveyed for this dissertation.

In 2004, the number of mixed groups increased to 40% of the voluntary sector surveyed6.

In contrast, Oldham had only 3 mixed groups7 in 1999 or a total of just 14% of the

voluntary sector sampled for this project. This number did not change significantly over

the 5 years since the riots with 3 mixed organizations in 2004, 13% of the voluntary

sector in Oldham as there were more respondents in 2004.

Table 10 Mixed Groups versus Bonding: Luton and Oldham 1999 LUTON OLDHAM TOTAL 100% One 12 13 25 Ethnic Group >80% of One 4 10 14 Ethnic Group Mixed Group 7 3 11 Don’t Know or 7 3 9 No Information TOTAL 30 29 59

Table 11 Mixed Groups and Bonding Groups: Luton and Oldham 2004 LUTON OLDHAM TOTAL 100% One 11 13 24 Ethnic Group >80% of One 5 10 16 Ethnic Group Mixed Group 11 4 14 Don’t Know or 3 2 5 No Information TOTAL 30 29 59

There are groups that bond, often, but do not always, label themselves as an ethnic,

cultural or faith groups. Interestingly, there were more ethnic, cultural and faith groups

6 Less information was available in 1999 for Luton, thus this number could have been higher.

7 Included in this group in the Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council (OMBC) which is slated to work with all groups as it is a statutory organization (not a voluntary one), although it is performing a civic function. There is cross–fertilization between statutory and voluntary organizations.

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in Luton than in Oldham (probably due to their greater diversity) or 26% of the voluntary

sector surveyed in Luton identified themselves in this way. Oldham on the other hand

had only 3 groups that identified themselves primarily as ethnic, cultural, faith, groups, or

10% of the voluntary sector sampled, falling only slightly below the city’s average number of minorities and also vastly different from the number of organizations that were bonding. By their behavior, many of groups serve as ethnic organizations even if they are not labeled that way. The remaining organizations are a mixed bag of sports, hobby, youth, neighborhood, and crime reducing organizations, among others.

In addition to groups that bond and groups that reflect a rich mix, it is important to look at bridging organizations, those diverse and umbrella groups (the other category of group factored into bridging) that cast a wide net in attempts of bringing organizations together for common purposes. Bridging organizations supply the kind of social capital that according to Putnam and Hyden is believed to allow a community to “get ahead”

(Putnam 2000). Looking at the table below, surprisingly, there are roughly the same number of diverse/multicultural groups or umbrellas groups sampled in Oldham as there are in Luton (4 and 5 umbrella organizations respectively), indicating that there are opportunities to unite in both cities, although one city might have a stronger network than the other, which seems to be the case as indicated by information gathered during the interviews. This was unexpected as Oldham was assumed to have less vibrant life overall and to be less likely to network with others given. However, looking at mixed organizations combined with the number of diverse or umbrella groups, in 2004 Luton had a total of 16 bridging organizations and Oldham had a total of 88. The number prior

8 This number was attained by adding the number of mixed groups in both years from both cities, to the number of diverse/umbrella groups (a static number).

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to the riots was lower, 12 and 7 bridging organizations in Oldham and Luton, respectively but still reflect a difference in kind organizational behavior and social capital accrued before the riots.

Table 12 Voluntary Group Classification (self-selected) LUTON OLDHAM Total (Mono) Ethnic 8 3 11 and/or Faith Group Multicultural or 5 4 9 Umbrella Group Other types of 17 22 39 Civic Organizations TOTAL 30 29 59

Reaching Out: Who is Working with Others?

Working with Ethnic Groups

In both cities, certainly the tendency is to work with one’s own ethnic group or

with an umbrella group. However, Luton more than Oldham, has a segment of the

voluntary sector that reaches out to other groups with membership bases of a different

ethnicity than their own. The differences are not outstanding, nonetheless, there are some

slight differences that are worthy of note. On binding, in Oldham in 2000, ninety three

percent (93%) of the voluntary organizations or 27 out of the 29 organizations surveyed

reported not working with any other ethnic group. Only two organizations, representing

7% of the organizations sampled, reported working with more than one ethnic group. By

contrast, in Luton, roughly 20% (or 6 out of 30 organizations) of the voluntary

organizations reported that they worked with at least one or more than one voluntary

groups that had an ethnic or racial base that was different than their own. I think this

difference contributes to why Luton may be able to better manage tensions and also

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speaks to the city’s agility and ability to move in more cohesive directions. Further, this

activity is a resolution to the bonding behavior found in every community. Groups,

maintaining their own integrity are able to communicate with and work with other ethnic

groups, which may play a role in preventing the outbreak of violent conflict.

Working with Others and Working with Diverse and Umbrella Groups

In 2000, 14 out of the approximately 30 organizations in each Oldham and Luton

did not work with umbrella groups while the other half of the voluntary groups surveyed

in each Oldham and Luton said they worked with at least one other umbrella group. The

rise in the number of voluntary organizations that plugged into diverse or umbrella

groups (bridging) is evident. Based on the theory set out in chapters 1 and 2, plugging into diverse or umbrella organizations is positive for communities. In Luton in 2000, 16 organization worked with at least one diverse group. That rose to 20 by 2004. In

Oldham 15 organizations said they worked with at least one diverse or umbrella group.

This increased more modestly (than did in Luton) to 17 in 2004 and can be viewed as a preventive strategy having seen riots in other parts of the country and realizing both the extreme Muslim and the potential for far-right activity in the area.9

Table 13 Working with Ethnic Groups: Luton and Oldham 2000 LUTON OLDHAM TOTAL Work w/ No 23 27 50 Ethnic Organizations Work w/ One 3 3 Ethnic Organizations

9 There is no significant difference in the ages of the umbrella organizations surveyed

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Table 13 Continued. LUTON OLDHAM TOTAL Work w/ More 3 2 5 Than One Ethnic Organizations Don’t Know 1 1 TOTAL 30 29 59

Table 14 Working with Ethnic Groups: Luton and Oldham 2004 LUTON OLDHAM TOTAL Work w/ no 23 25 48 Ethnic Organization Work w/ One 3 2 5 Ethnic Organization Work w/ More 4 2 6 than One Ethnic Organizations TOTAL 30 29 59

There was an increase among groups that worked together with organizations with

different ethnic membership. In Luton, in 2004 this increased to 3 organizations that worked with one group and 4 (out of 30) organizations that worked with more than one

ethnic group. Oldham, by 2004 also had an increase of 2 organizations that worked with

one ethnic organizations (still relatively small). No organizations in Oldham in 2000 reported working with even one other ethnic group. Two organizations in Oldham made this change in 2004, however, as in 2000 there was no reported increase of any organizations working with one ethnic organization. Thus in 2004, approximately 14% of the voluntary sector sampled for this project in Oldham reported working with one, or more than one, ethnic organization. Likewise there was a small increase in Luton over this four-year period in Luton, with one more voluntary organization that reported

120 working with more than one ethnic group, which accounts for a total of approximately

23%, almost a quarter, of the voluntary sector sampled reaching out to one or multiple groups, more than in Oldham. Overall, there were small, but positive increases in ethnic organizations binding or working with other ethnic groups within civic life. This underscores that many organizations stay in a safe zone working with their own communities (bonding), but that in Luton in particular, organizations see the benefit of coming together and/or are able to come together if needed. In Luton 13% of the civic organizations sampled working on various types of projects with not just one, but two or more organizations of different ethnic or racial bases. This is an important step toward communities taking responsibility for stronger positive relationships with other ethnic groups (whether they are a majority ethnic group or not) within their communities while not necessarily giving up the cultural integrity of their cultural identity group. It also shows the willingness of community organizations to seek partners.

Between 2000-2004, the biggest change in both Oldham and Luton was seen in bridging. There were more groups, and a larger percentage of the voluntary sector that moved toward plugging itself into diverse or umbrella organizations. There was a 13% increase in the number of organizations reporting that they worked with at least one diverse or umbrella group for a total of 67% of the voluntary sector that was apart of a larger body of civic organizations. Similarly Oldham, though more modestly saw a 6% increase in organizations that worked with at least one diverse or umbrella group with a total of 58% of the voluntary sector that now networked with broader organizations.

Change in Oldham 2000-2004 was a bit slower to happen but these changes according to

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the literature will be important for assessing future relations between ethnic groups as

they related to civic life.

Table 15 Working with Umbrella Groups: Luton and Oldham 2000 LUTON OLDHAM TOTAL Work w/ No 14 14 28 Umbrella Groups Work w/ at 16 15 31 Least One Diverse or Umbrella Group TOTAL 30 29 59

Table 16 Working with Umbrella Groups: Luton and Oldham 2004 LUTON OLDHAM Work w/ no 10 12 22 Diverse or Umbrella Groups Work w/ at 20 17 37 Least One Umbrella or Diverse Groups TOTAL 30 29 59

Depth and Frequency

The data suggest for the most part that there was little difference in the level or the

depth of relationships within civic life in either Oldham or Luton in 2000, prior to the

ethnic disturbances in several cities across England. The level of work between

organizations across the voluntary sector in both Oldham and Luton is effectively the same. From the 59 organizations surveyed, 28% (about 16) of the civic organizations

that responded to this question in both Oldham and Luton said that they had more

shallow or rather brief interactions throughout the year. Similarly, 20% and 19% of the

voluntary organizations in Luton and Oldham, (6 or 7) respectively reported working

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with organizations every three months or on a quarterly basis. In examining the

organizations that worked together either monthly or more than once per month, reflecting a deeper relationship, the survey revealed that 52% (or about 16) of the civic

organizations in Luton and slightly lower 44% (or about 13) of those in Oldham reported

that they worked frequently with other organizations. This difference is noteworthy, but

tempered by a drop in respondents on this question (this is most likely due to the specific

nature of the question and the time frame of the question as many were hesitant to answer

to what happened several years ago). There were a greater number of respondents in

2004 and a clear increase in the depth of work, which is again correlated to (I believe) to

ethnic disturbances, world events and policy emphasis.

Between 2001 and 2004, many voluntary organizations in Luton increased the level

and depth of activity within the voluntary sector. Thirteen of the civic organizations

surveyed reported working with other organizations either monthly or more than once per

month. Oldham followed to a lesser degree with eleven of the voluntary sector working

with other organizations either monthly or more than once per month. Over time both

cities, but Luton in particular, made strides toward increasing the quality of their

voluntary sector, Luton making slightly bigger strides than their northern counterpart as

reflected above by a larger increase between 2000-2004.

Table 17 Frequency of Working with Others: Luton and Oldham 2000 LUTON OLDHAM TOTAL 1–2 Times per Year 7 6 13 Quarterly 5 4 9 Monthly 6 6 More Than Once per 7 11 18 Month Don’t Know 1 1 Not Applicable 4 8 12 TOTAL 30 29 59

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Table 18 Frequency of Working with Others: Luton and Oldham 2004 LUTON OLDHAM TOTAL 1–2 Times per 4 5 9 Year Quarterly 3 3 6 Monthly 10 2 12 More Than 10 14 24 Once per Month Not Applicable 3 5 8 TOTAL 30 29 59

Assessing the behavior of civic organizations or the depth of their relationships

means looking into the kinds of projects that civic organizations conduct together. As

Luton demonstrated more agility by increasing civic relationships in a number of ways

over the three-year interim between the riots in Oldham and the time of this survey, it is not surprisingly, when combining monthly and more than monthly behavior in 2004,

there is a higher level of frequency of work between organizations in Luton as opposed to

Oldham10. In 2000, 13 organizations increased to 20 organizations working together

monthly or more than once per month. In Oldham, in 2000, 11 organizations worked

together more than once per month and this increased to 16 organizations working

together monthly or more than once per month in 2004. Similarly, Luton has a higher

number of organizations reporting joint projects than in Oldham. Forty–four percent

(44%) of the voluntary organizations in Luton participate in joint projects with their civic

colleagues as opposed to 32% of the organizations in Oldham.

10 More voluntary organizations responded to this question in Luton than in Oldham. Further, looking at monthly and more than monthly meetings together, Luton, indeed has a greater frequency of interaction among civic organizations than is seen in Oldham.

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Civic Life: Response From Civic Leaders about the Civic Landscape

Oldham had more (16 in Luton and 23 in Oldham) bonding organizations than did

Luton prior to the riots. With regard to working with other ethnic groups11 (binding) and the number of richly mixed organizations12 across the voluntary sector, Luton also had

higher levels than did Oldham prior to the riots in 2000. Luton’s voluntary organizations also work together more intensely as organizations have a higher level of joint projects across the sector as noted in the previous section. Interestingly, Luton and Oldham both have roughly the same number of bridging organizations only when added to the number of mixed organizations is there a better sense of the differences in bridging in these two cities.

Oldham, the city that experienced riots in 2001 also had a very high proportion of its voluntary sector that was composed of bonding organizations. Eighty–five percent

(85%) of the voluntary sector in Oldham is considered bonding as compared to Luton’s voluntary sector, which is 59% bonding. This is consistent with findings and hypotheses of Hyden, Putnam, and Varshney, which suggested that cities with higher levels of bonding organizations would experience ethnic conflict. Blinding groups were not interviewed, but Oldham, which suffered far-right activity and exogenous shocks to the community, had an outbreak of violence. The number of bridging organizations in both cities is very similar in spite of the prediction, so it is not bridging organizations alone that make a difference. However, it is worthwhile to note that in binding 20% of the organizations in the voluntary sector in Luton worked with more than one voluntary

11 6 organizations in Luton and 2 in Oldham

12 7 mixed organizations in Luton and 4 mixed organizations in Oldham

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group of a different ethnic group as opposed to 7% in Oldham. This combination of

bridging organizations and other organizations taking the initiative to work with groups

that have a different ethnic base than their own may point toward a stronger community.

It appears that Luton has a more agile voluntary sector. Since the riots, Luton’s voluntary sector has increased more on every count than Oldham, the city that actually had the riots and that between 2000–2004 and the city that was subject to intense national

and international scrutiny. Oldham and Luton had the same regeneration money

available and were encouraged similarly (in not Oldham more) from the national level to grow civil society. Yet it seems that Luton’s increases have been slightly bigger than

Oldham’s. Between 1999 and 2004 Luton increased the number of mixed organizations

by 4 organizations and the number of mixed organizations in Oldham increased by one.

Luton experienced a 13% increase in the number of voluntary organizations working with

diverse or umbrella groups. Oldham organizations only plugged in 6% more to umbrella

organizations over the last 5 years. Both Oldham and Luton increased the frequency with

which they worked with other organizations13. Oldham increased frequency of

interaction by 20% and Luton increased interaction only slightly more, by 22%. This

kind of growth was seen in Luton, and in the city did not even suffer disturbances in

2001. This in addition to conversations with voluntary leaders in Oldham and Luton

leads to the conclusion that Luton is a more willing, vigilant, and agile community than

Oldham. Most importantly, in Luton there is a keen sense that preventing conflict is the

due to hard work. Although most would agree that things in Oldham are not perfect,

13 Note that the number of respondents also increased significantly.

126 several leaders interviewed commented on the work that has gone into improving interethnic relations:

Luton’s populations are about the same as other towns that have had problems, but because we’ve done a lot of diversity work that the outcome is not the same (Chair of a city-wide partnership/umbrella organizations)

Relations are good. [There is] lots of support from the local council, [and there is] harmony between groups and the local council. [We have] 7-8 years of trying to get more people sitting at the table. (From a contact person at an inter-faith organization)

In response to a question about the role of voluntary organizations:

They come together to stand for a purpose- to solve problems. (Grassroots faith organization)

[There are] several organizations who are all on board to approach problems collectively (Grassroots faith organizations)

[Civic organizations in Luton] Breakdown barriers and run workshops. (Community respondent working in childcare and youth programs)

An interviewee involved in childcare and youth programs reflected on the work that has been done and that is being done in Luton. Citing the good work of a leader in the

Muslim community who works through an umbrella organization with local area mosques, she concluded that relations are better.

Most important, civic organization leaders in Luton believe that organizations work to better inter-ethnic relations and can serve to alleviate tensions caused by outside forces. In response to questions asked about what causes tensions between ethnic group and what alleviates tensions, fringe groups and the role of voluntary organizations, respondents from the semi-structured interviews gave answers that highlight the importance of voluntary organizations in counteracting shocks to the community.

1- What causes tensions? (shocks to the community)

2- What alleviates tensions?

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1) People not getting jobs, because of Nazi-style propaganda, etc.

2) Regular meetings with local authorities alleviate tensions and trying to teach English. No problems with the local authority! (General Secretary of an Asian community service organization in Luton)

1) Media looking for publicity. Extreme groups deliberately incite hatred

2) the last they want to see is everyone working together (Spokesperson for Muslim faith/umbrella organization in Luton)

1) Radical whites create tensions. Media portrayal of extreme messages

2) Communities get together and publicly send out statements of unity (Asian leader of city-wide inter-faith council)

1) When one community sees that another is getting more favorable treatment

2) When communities come together see that no one is getting special treatment (rumors don’t fly). Take down Muslim [from Muslim extremists] posters quickly. (Leader in city-wide umbrella organization to increase safety and chair of one other umbrella organization)

I International– terrorism if you look at what happens between Israel and Palestine (large Jewish community hear too) and obviously a large Muslim population

II National– incident in London, general election, extreme Muslim groups got into a local mosque in London saying that Muslims shouldn’t vote and not that is being reflected in Luton and that is reflected in the extreme Muslim groups

III Local Events– murder, for example– last night a group of people have caused damage to the car of an Asian family will need to be address–– by whites. That is a on–going investigation.

Voluntary are very useful because they pick up what’s left by statutory and use people who are well–known in the community and we can work with them to reduce tension. Certainly many organizations increase positive race relations in any event.

Also relevant with regard to police reaction to shocks from fringe groups…

…If you mean the United British Alliance and BNP (by extreme or far right) occasionally we get leaflets, but in general small. We do have a football team here who’s following is connected to right wing group. Last year we had a small protest

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against Muslim extremists. We had to do some work around that to reassure community. Have white groups come from elsewhere because of the Asian community here, and we as police act on that positively. (Luton police, a sergeant).

This hard work, pro–active attitude, and belief in organizations observed in Luton falls in line with the advances made between 2000-2004 as demonstrated in the paper and serve as a layer of protection helping to defend Luton from internal and external shocks of the media, the extreme white organizations, extreme Muslim organizations and international and local hot button issues.

Informal Relationships

Varshney’s study argued that informal relationships were not as robust as civic organizations in predicting peace or violence in a particular community. It is interesting to note though that while this survey did not test the sturdiness of informal over formal relationships between ethnic groups, the study did ask of approximately sixty active voluntary group leaders how much day to day interaction there was in each community between Christians and Muslims, Asians and whites. Not surprisingly, there was more reported daily interaction in Luton than in Oldham; while, there were similarities between in how people reacted between the two cities.

There are qualitative differences in the approach toward others in Oldham and many of those in Oldham who reported little interaction often said that segregation or not living among others was a reason for the small amounts of daily interaction. This may be the case, although as discussed in chapter three many immigrant groups find it comfortable to live in common areas, but what was perhaps most noticeable was that the answers were considerably more loaded and more reflective of the tensions in the community than the responses in Luton. Several respondents in particular were very

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articulate about the issue of integration (or day to day interaction), which also spoke

volumes about how whites felt about ethnic relations in Oldham:

People who go to work come in contact, for me, just shopping where they are serving. I don't come into much contact. To make the ethnic want to integrate [they] put a lot of energy into them, but very little into us. If theirs were going down got money... Were atrocious ethnics lived in them, can't make them move elsewhere they wanted to live together but shouldn't spend money on them at the expense of others. (Committee member on a council housing estate)

Leaders do things wrong. You can't make people do things [integrate] all white people would say the same… It is an impossible situation with the ladies…. It’s hard to see with two eyes peering out. They cover their whole body. They just don't come to meetings. They don't try to integrate. (Secretary of a health advocacy group)

Stopped going to Oldham don't feel its theirs because of Asians. When ethnics move in, whites move out. (Residents reside in Chadderton, a middle class neighborhood in the borough of Oldham)

No problems because there are no Muslims here [in their neighborhood]… [we] get on with the eight Indian families living here. (Chairman of a community center)

These comments contrast comments by those who recognized evidence that the next generation will form stronger bonds on an interpersonal level and interact with each other more often. Several respondents commented that children play and get along well

together in school and in sports, although it was clear that adults were not as open.

Further, efforts by churches and organizations to foster better relationships were recognized by at least two respondents. Ethnic relations on a more informal level is perhaps best described, as one Oldham respondent working with families in the voluntary sector said, “a work in progress”.

Although Luton is better at managing ethnic tensions, although the comments on

the whole were more positive and there was considerably less tension and racism in

discussing these issues, Luton for many is not seen as a completely integrated city. Luton

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is not segregated, but it is also not completely integrated. Two Asian leaders one from a

Muslim women’s organization and one from a multicultural organizations said that

people organize in their own centers, the other, in the same vein said that people integrate

at work, but have little reason to leave their areas to conduct business. Others agreed that people were not so interlinked. While it is common to eat curry instead of fish and chips, people do so in their own homes rather than with other whites or Asians. Speaking of socializing on an informal basis (and focusing on the example given of eating together), several respondents commented on how people socialize:

Shopkeepers a lot– people eating lunch not problems co–existing but people are not that interlinked. (Well established Christian organizations running several programs)

Our staff team does, very diverse, but in other work places probably not– Asians might eat together at an Asian restaurant and others (whites) go elsewhere, majority of people tend to associate with own background. (Manager of a city-wide umbrella organization focused on safety)

People are in their own centers, but sometimes we organize. If white interested in Islam or festival they call. Medium amount. (Respondent is a director of a Muslim women’s group)

I’d say moderate its not segregated but not high integration, plenty of community work to try to bring different communities together but I wouldn’t say you’d be struck by informal integration if you walk through.

You’d be struck by the number of ethnic minority in our office, but getting together, being apart of each other’s lives is different. (Respondent from a large local non-profit speaking of their area)

Luton voluntary sector workers and leaders speaking on informal relations between whites and Asians, Christians and Muslims, also expressed some similar concerns with parents passing on racism, but also spoke to the schools, churches, and sports as institutions or activities around which people integrate. Responses collected in Luton show that there is quite a bit of interaction in the establishments, such as work and

131 school, but that in neighborhoods and among ethnic groups and families, there is not a great deal of interaction. However, as this chapter will demonstrate, most community members do not see a problem with bonding or spending time with their ethnic peers, nor is it impossible to manage ethnic tensions amid bonding behavior. The key is perhaps the ability to come together when needed even as a unified group rather than to necessarily integrate every aspect of one’s life. Likewise, it is important to mention that the outlook with respect to race and ethnicity are quite different in Oldham as opposed to Luton.

Racism or acrimony against other ethnic groups on a personal level and tensions between ethnic groups in Oldham (three years after the riots) were far more prevalent than in

Luton. While one Asian youth leader in Luton said that “things aren’t that hunky dory” there were tensions and perceptions about ethnicity were more clearly present and damaging in Oldham, which although informal, it makes a difference in how quickly or perhaps better said, effectively, change in civic life in Oldham.

Oldham and Luton through the Voices of Community Leaders: Cultural Identity and Civic Life

Civic Level Bonding Behavior

Consistent with findings from the surveys that examine civic organization behavior, the majority of residents and voluntary sector leaders in Oldham and in Luton believe that it is acceptable and expected to carryout organizational life along ethnic lines. Leaders from Luton showed more security in expressing the need for and acceptability of ethnicity in civic life. However, and somewhat ironically, the majority of Oldham leaders interviewed believed that failing to integrate or self–segregation was problematic for ethnic relations within their city. Most (approximately 75%) said that people organize within ethnic groups and simultaneously expressed no desire to change this

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organizational predisposition. This, rightly –or rather not wrongly– is the way that people are inclined to behave.

The majority of those interviewed concurred that there was a need to feel at home within one’s voluntary organization and that race played a role. Many discussed the importance of working with ethnic groups. One Luton native working through a faith based umbrella group remarked that it was human nature to stick together, but added sticking together does not preclude an awareness of others. This is key. Like Varshney

(2002) and Horowitz (1985) have documented, and the community leaders agreed, people like to feel secure. Simply put, the general secretary of an Asian community group remarked that it is “healthy” to have different groups. He added that it is also healthy for

authorities to communicate through groups and not just through individuals.

Those who expressed reservations about bonding within this group feared that exclusivity might be problematic, one respondent noted that clubs can easily become exclusive, another said that organizing along ethnic lines is okay provided that groups are able to integrate or work with each other when necessary. (These finding concur with why Hyden, Putnam, and Varshney have all cited about bonding behavior). What is interesting to note here is that most civic leaders regardless of living in either Oldham or

Luton feel that bonding, or bowling with your brother, is okay and that it is not necessarily destructive to the public sphere. Bonding, in prior studies has been pitted

against the more preferable bridging. This research shows that people want to maintain

their organizational and ethnic individuality on some level. It is also important to note

what descriptive statistics suggest in the previous and what leaders seem to imply, is that

it is good to work across ethnic communities (bind). Binding is a compromise that allows

133 groups to maintain their integrity, but allows for partnerships to form across ethnic lines leading to a stronger multiethnic civic community. According to leaders may be a healthy way to pursue cohesion as it maintains a level of comfort and group integrity and also provides communication and strengthening across communities. This trend is beginning slowly in Luton.

What is a Community? Bonding: Is There a White British Cultural Identity?

Both white and Asian civic leaders agreed that it is healthy to work in one’s own ethnic group. However, working across communities implies that every group in society is representative of a cultural identity community14. The behavior of white groups reflects bonding as a cultural identity community, which is acceptable and natural as many noted above; however, the language some whites use, but Asians also, often opts whites out of being apart of an easily describable cultural identity group and shows tension between what whites say about British cultural identity and how they behave.

Despite the number of predominantly white voluntary organizations in Oldham and

Luton and the recognition by white civic leaders that it is okay to organize and bond within your ethnic comfort zone, there is a tension between how civic life operates and how whites and Asians alike think of or conceive of a British white or English white identity. This tension is reflected in the comments of one broadcast journalist from Luton who said that he was not a part of any ethnic organization, but reiterated that groups

(except his?) should not lose their individuality. While this comment could be made out of empathy for the immigration experience, does this not leave whites out of bonding within their own cultural identity group? Or is it simply unspoken?

14 This does not preclude people having multiple cultural identity communities.

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Out of twenty semi–structured interviews with a cross section of participants who were active in civic life and the voluntary sector, both Asian and white (and one person with an Afro–Caribbean background) many challenged the very existence of a British or white cultural identity despite their conformity in agreeing that it is acceptable, if not beneficial, for groups to organize along ethnic lines. Some either ignored the question or answered indirectly. Others agreed that there is a British cultural identity, although they did not define it, but felt strongly that it –whatever “it” is– should change. Many dedicated their answers to the importance of diversity. Only four made any positive attempt at all toward defining a white British cultural identity.

Does The Fish Know That It Is Wet?

As an outsider and a researcher, I found it very difficult on the surface to understand why people, those active in the voluntary sector no less, found it difficult to respond to the question about the character of British cultural identity. Upon reflection, I came up with a few possible reasons as to why the majority of the respondents either questioned British cultural identity, said that it did not exist, wholly ignored the question, or used it as an opportunity to express their feelings about diversity and integration. The first possible answer is the simplest one. People question British (white) cultural identity or ignore the question altogether because it is a difficult question as no one actually knows what British (or white) cultural identity is or, as one Afro–Caribbean leader (in

Oldham) concluded, it simply does not exist. More likely, the second possibility calls

British cultural identity into question, refusing to define any qualities that might be associated with a British (white) cultural identity, or surrendering the identity to change.

This is in itself a statement about British cultural identity as a form of protest in how people feel about defining and/or embracing it (McDermott & Samson 2005). In this

135 same vein, asserted in the previous chapter, an extension of this second possibility is the supposition that acknowledging a British cultural identity gives power to those of the far- right who have co-opted (and to some extent denigrated) British tradition and white space. These ethnic disturbances in Oldham have made those who are supportive of a multi-ethnic civic space, reluctant to acknowledge Britishness or whiteness. Finally, and also possible, is that the question is difficult to answer because British cultural identity is treated as a default identity, whether it actually is or not. Thus the question was often ignored or re–directed to discuss those who are perceived as having culture, in this case

Asians and Muslims.

Two Asian respondents from Luton along with many others among the interviewed called British cultural identity into question. Never answering the question of British cultural identity, the first respondent, who was both Muslim and British remarked that there is no uniform thinking about British culture. In short, if you ask several different people about British cultural identity, you will get several different answers. The other respondent posited the rhetorical question that came up in one out of four respondents.

Challenging the assumption they asked, what is British cultural identity? The second respondent countered the question by speaking of diversity. British cultural identity is an

“amalgam,” of what, the respondent did not say (Hussein, Singh).

A former white employee of the Oldham Council said that she didn’t know what traditional British cultural identity was and responded by saying that she never felt any so–called cultural identity. However, when she was asked about Asian culture, she conceded the there is a need in the Asian community and others to maintain their identity, specifically through language groups (majority and English speakers excluded?). Finally,

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the comments of a woman associated with a tenant and resident’s association and a

lifelong Oldham resident also hinted at that Asians were entitled to a cultural identity, but

she easily surrendered any white or British identity to cultural identity to change

recognizing it as a space that has been co–opted by extremists. Never defining what

British cultural identity is nor how British cultural identity should be preserved, she

reiterated the necessity of integration like six other respondents. She cited the religious

tolerance that she experienced growing up between the Church of England, the Catholics

and the Methodists. She took the opportunity to tell me about the city’s Asian leadership and how the church has come together to translate prayers “from Asian to English”. She concluded this answer about British cultural identity by implicitly speaking of the right, saying that it or problems with ethnic relations all comes down, not to the majority, but

“to the few that want to cause trouble”.

A little more than a quarter of those interviewed emphasized the need for British society to embrace change. Only one person interviewed ever intimated at what that change might be from. Traditions change, cultural transformation is good, keep some of the old and some of the new were the kinds of phrases that civic leaders used to emphasize their openness to any change that Asians might bring. This positive attitude toward newcomers is clearly beneficial to furthering and continuing good ethnic relations. But whether, or if, British (or white) cultural identity is an identity is still the elephant in the room that stands ironically against white groups that clearly practice bonding, while declaring that there is no British cultural identity.

The idea that the British identity is a “default” identity that will go decidedly undefined is glaringly present in many of these interviews. An active respondent in

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Luton who serves a chair of an umbrella organization offered a clear example of these

tensions. Her comments are representative of how British cultural identity is treated as a

default identity and also representative of those whose responses embrace diversity. In

her response, she does not attempt to define British identity. However, she implies that

there is a definite culture as she remarked that immigrants have a notion that they have to

give up their identity when coming to England and “act like a British person”. The Luton

community leader concluded that British identity is made better by others and by integration. Better than what? It is clear that there is something to British identity, but

many respondents like this one left it to be assumed or undefined. What is it that exists

prior to the cultural change and integration. What is acting like a British person?

An Asian respondent from Luton acknowledged the presence of a British cultural identity to which Asian children adapt. He concluded that change goes both ways, but he focused on the experience of Asians children who are “better off” adapting as the British did not understand the older generation. The character of the British culture that Asian children were adapting to (British culture) went undefined. What is the character of the culture of which they are becoming apart?

There were only four respondents, all white men, three of whom were police officers and three of whom, not surprisingly, reside in Oldham15 made reference to what a

British cultural identity is. An officer in Luton said adamantly that British cultural identity is being preserved. The officer continued saying that “we do live as a race in an ever changing world, but that doesn’t mean that we have to stop everything”. His proclamation was followed by empathy for Asian immigrants who are trapped between

15 Found a slightly higher sense of identity definition in Oldham as it had the riots.

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cultures and discussed how this affects anti–social behavior in the community. He ended

his comments by stressing that many take the best of both worlds. A teacher and labor

union secretary living in a neighborhood that received many BNP votes responded by

acknowledging a British cultural identity and by saying that it should be preserved while

also integrating. He exemplified his ideas showing how culture should and has changed.

For him curry is a reflection of how Asian food has become a national favorite now,

perhaps unofficially is the most popular dish in the country. He also advocated that

Asians speak English to help them to integrate. Finally, the Oldham officers were quick to acknowledge Britishness. One mentioned British “uniqueness” with the Queen,

Parliament, and the royal family (the only person to mention!), but also mentioned the cultural divides that hinder interrelations like the fact that the other said “you can’t talk to the women or share a round”. So there is something to British cultural identity.

Clearly, to at least four respondents, there is a British cultural identity and there is

something positive about it. One Asian respondent and former local government

representative acknowledged a British cultural identity, but advocated societal change as

what is considered British culture for him is negative. Citing machismo and getting

drunk, the respondent said that the (white) British themselves do not want that in their

community, so change, acceptance, and integration, is in order.

This unflattering comment introduces a theme that three respondents raised and that

has been raised to some extent in the literature. In both Oldham and Luton, respondents

established a link between (white) British identity becoming a community issue only

when the cultural identity group itself becomes threatened. In Oldham, two outspoken

leaders of color established this link (although ironically one leader said that British

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cultural identity did not exist). In Luton, a leader originally from India, reached a similar conclusion saying that black and Asian identities can be threatening to British identity.

Seeking to resolve this tension the leader recounted his plans to have a British cultural

evening in his church that he was to organize to address this very issue.

Engaging Whites?

Most attention has been focused on ethnic minority groups, also referred to

(especially in Oldham) as Black and minority ethnic (BME) communities. At state and

local level, and especially in the voluntary sector, the questions asked of respondents

focused on how to engage ethnic communities in civil society and how to integrate ethnic

communities into the “broader” (white middle class) community. Little attention, arguably little need, and little publicity has been dedicated to engaging whites as whites despite their organizational behavior. However, there is also and little attention is focused on engaging, most specifically, poor or ‘disaffected’ whites, and bringing them into civic life and into the “broader” (white middle class) community. This unbalanced approach to civic life raises questions about bonding and blinding among whites and raises questions about efforts to reach groups that are vulnerable to being recruited to

blinding groups like the BNP or the National Front who in turn wage shocks on the whole

community.

The rioters and instigators of the riots in Oldham were members and sympathizers

with the BNP, the National Front and other “tribes” of hooligans, but many were also

poorer whites who might fall into the category of disaffected whites. Most whites found

it easier to refer to these whites as a group and their need to engage. For far-right groups

across the world, immigration and specifically immigration as related to poverty, are

central issues. Any sort of poverty, or deprivation along side immigration, is exploited.

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In an article in New Start Magazine, reported that after consulting with the community

cohesion review team after the riots in 2001, the Home Secretary commented that the

same effort that is dedicated to BME groups should be mirrored for disaffected white

groups. Interestingly, although many respondents shied away from acknowledging group

identity when asked if there was a British cultural identity, when asked about disaffected

whites, many comfortably answered the question and treated whites in this context as a

group. Their responses implied that disaffected whites are a community that also needs

to be engaged and that might also have the needs that other communities have.16

More than half of those interviewed agreed that efforts to engage black and minority ethnic groups should be mirrored for disaffected whites. More leaders in the voluntary sector in Luton agreed, or agreed somewhat, that similar efforts should be made for whites, than agreed in Oldham where there were more poignant disagreements with this approach. Of those who agreed with this approach toward engaging disaffected whites, showing the level of pro–activity in that community, two leaders were actually working on projects that address this very issue in their Luton communities. Working through a faith based group, one leader strongly agreed with the need to engage whites.

He looked at what was going on in society and remarked that everyone is “excited about

BME [communities] and the home team seems abandoned” said the Luton leader of a religious group. This realization, prior to my interview with him, inspired him to organize a British cultural evening at his church.

16 This makes me wonder if British cultural identity has anything to do, as one young Asian respondent commented, with being middle class as poor whites, were easily discussed, almost as a cultural identity group of their own- a cultural identity group that was different than that of middle class and richer whites.

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In contrast, in Oldham, the majority of voluntary sector leaders interviewed agreed

either that it was necessary to reach out to all and specifically to disaffected whites; however, no leaders discussed working on implementing such a plan though arguably this

community may need it more. One Luton leader agreed with the approach saying that

engaging whites was important as the “powers that be have become detached from the

indigenous white community as a whole”. Those who disagreed with the premise of engaging whites would likely disagree with the aforementioned quote. In response to reaching out to whites, three outspoken leaders from various communities (Asian, Afro-

Caribbean, and white) in Oldham posited that these whites should wait their turn behind

BME groups to be engaged. One respondent called into question the idea of mirroring

attention for whites when Asians, not whites are discriminated against in getting

employed in the town council. The Council she argues, clearly favors whites over

Asians. A leader in Oldham’s Afro-Caribbean community said that before attempts to

mirror efforts toward BME communities, there needs to be a focus on making things right with those in the Afro–Caribbean community suffering from deprivation. A similar view was shared by an Asian councilor about his community, showing that there is resistance to this notion of engaging poor whites and a distrust for the motivation of the engagement

regardless of the potential to reduce shocks to the community. Others have been standing in line for fair treatment and resources, which is (apparently) associated with being civically engaged.

These comments from the Oldham leaders stress prioritizing government attention

and resources, voluntary or otherwise, to resolve deprivation and social inequalities. The

issue of resources is a divisive one that also came out among leaders in Luton in response

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to engaging disaffected whites. Three leaders in this community believed that the

comments made by the Home Secretary17 alluded to the alleged racialized allocation of

funds. There is a widespread perception in Oldham and Luton that Asians receive more

benefits than whites although the responses to this allegation is a misperception as Asians often have bigger families, they often have a greater need (for example bigger homes).

Nonetheless, in both communities the issue of biased distribution of resources emerged on several occasions and in Luton, many emphasized that each community should be allocated resources according to its need. One white Luton leader did say that it was a misperception that BMEs were the poorest and that much white poverty gets overlooked.

Resources and the distribution of resources are issues that spark conflict in both communities. The suggestion that resources matter might lead one to a rational reading

of conflict; however, it is important to point out that rational choice explanations do not

preclude the need of organization-based resolution to conflict (including conflict based

on resources). It is further most important to look at bridging organizations as forms of

social capital that facilitate attempts to work out unfair practices and policies, among

other things. Civic bridging does not eliminate the politics of hegemony at the heart of

resource-based conflict, but it does offer an environment to form more egalitarian

relationships, which can improve a groups’ economic standing or access to resources

within a community through collaborative processes. Resource issues are universal.

How a community handles and responds to these and other issues is what matters in the

day-to-day management of conflict –and racialized conflict in particular– in a

community. Thus, the focus should stay on community based, civic–based explanations

17 Ted Cantle

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or interpretations, of cooperation, conflict, and conflict prevention within multiethnic life.

As resources are issues in almost every society, even the perception in this case, that

funds are not evenly distributed across ethnic communities, serves as a rumor or a shock

that can compromise relationships between ethnic communities. Admittedly, without bridging and binding forms of social capital, real or perceived resources issues will

quickly worsen interethnic relations.

As seen in Luton (and not in Oldham), rumors are controlled by effective

communication between communities, community groups, and community leaders.

Blinding groups, the far-right and other extremes for that matter, wage war on

multiethnic communities by exploiting resource issues and ethnicity in sometime

successful attempts in becoming a community’s cultural entrepreneurs. The tools to

exploit ethnic differences are deprivation and the real or perceived inequalities, which

create tension between the already (sometimes) tenuous relationships between whites and

others. The culture a community creates over time and the way organizations

communicate and the ability to keep blinding organizations at bay will explain a

multiethnic community’s ability to maintain its integrity and prevent conflict.

Community Tensions: Waging War and Exploiting Community Weakness through Race and Resources

Every community has certain issues that raise tensions, ethnic ones in particular,

and Oldham and Luton are no different in this regard. The tensions fall, more or less into

two categories: the first, tensions arising from problems within the social or socio–

economic infrastructure and second, tensions arising from shocks, both internal and

external. Tensions within the social infrastructure of a community include socio–

economic realities, ethnic relations, and the condition of the local civic and political

144 system. Tensions arising from shocks include local incidents (murder/crime) and media exploits as well as the extremist attacks on and attempts to disrupt the public sphere and multiethnic life.

In Oldham, voluntary sector leaders named a variety of tensions arising from problems with the city’s social infrastructure. There is unemployment among both Asian and white youth and leaders discussed deprivation in general as contributing toward creating ethnic tensions. Leaders noted that Asians experience alienation and many respondents felt that segregation, sometimes put, ghettoization, contributed toward tensions among ethnic groups. Born of immigrant parents from the Caribbean, one Afro–

Caribbean leader in Oldham who has seen social and political improvement for his community remarked that it is the opposite for the Asian community. Things for Asians are getting worse over time, rather than better. Subsequent generations should be able to reap the benefits of their parents. Obviously, the most recent events in the Middle East have proved challenging for Muslims and Asians in the West in general. These tensions which not one respondent mentioned in Oldham provide a backdrop against local issues

(again exploited by the extreme white groups and the political right) of taking jobs, prejudices, economic problems and of how the homogeneity, security, and safety of

England is sacrificed when (non-white) newcomers arrive.

Further, there is evidence that Oldham’s Local Council has not been instrumental in terms of resolving tensions. In fact, some respondents would argue that they are a part of the problem. One Council insider recounted how leadership was unwilling to step into try and prevent racial conflicts, which were indeed a harbinger of the riots. The former employee also discussed the severity of the city’s racism and the town’s unwillingness to

145 create a more diverse and welcoming environment for all of Oldham’s resident. One weekend prior to the riots, the BNP rallied in Oldham earlier and had marched through the Asian neighborhood. Two groups of Asians, fired up, ascended from their neighborhood to respond to this action. Watching the trouble brew, the former council insider placed a call to a leader of the Oldham Council to ask him to come out as the situation was in dire need for leadership. The council leader responded that he was cutting the grass. Asian leaders emerged and dispersed the crowd of Asians who had gathered. No respondent mentioned a cohesive message of leadership coming from city or community leaders. Only one person mentioned the role of faith leaders.

This, for the Council insider was just one example of the level of racism in the town and how poorly the Council has failed to embrace diversity. The Council, she alleged was not welcoming to Asian employees either. Likewise, there are some in the white community who are very unwelcoming to Asians. One Asian person was hired by the Borough to work on a white council estate. The worker was attacked and the Council insider was told not to send any more Asians to work there. This respondent, the former

Oldham Council employee quit upon exhaustion and frustration in dealing with these issues, and contrasted Oldham’s approach to becoming a multiethnic city to that of

Manchester and Leicester that have gone out of their way to celebrate and market diversity since the 1980’s. My experience in speaking with one respondent in particular was indicative of the sort of racism that the Council insider described. One white respondent proceeded to discuss how “impossible” Asians were and spoke pejoratively of

Muslim women wearing hijab referring to only their two eyes that you see peering at you.

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The respondent had said so many negative things toward the end of the interview until she hung up on me. Fortunately we had reached the end of the survey.

In short, as recorded in the preceding paragraphs, there is evidence that the social infrastructure is plagued by deprivation, institutional and community racism. More specifically, social tensions in Oldham particularly arose out of weak institutional response and lack individual leadership. The voluntary sector was not a strong enough body to contend with any of these issues. Thus when shocks came from the outside, they fell.

The racial and ethnic tension described above is confirmed by the relatively large amount of support that the BNP received in 2001 from Oldham’s citizens. This combined with an Asian population unwilling to take abuse from the far-right or the town itself, set the stage for tensions. The far-right’s approach to penetrating Oldham proved a shock to the community. It was a very hands on attack. Members of various far-right organizations joined forces, went door-to-door, passed out inflammatory flyers, and rallied in Oldham. In one incident, participants in far-right, some of them outsiders, taunted Asians as they stomped through town drinking on their way to a football game.

Other members targeted specific people within multiethnic life to intimidate them and engage in personal attacks. This approach formed a significant external shock to the community. The rallies and the formal public demonstration, served as an accelerant to the riots. Further the rallies, the far-right message, and the aggressive strategy exploited the vulnerabilities in the city’s social infrastructure (unemployment, deprivation, immigration, unfair distribution of city resources, etc.) and as one older lifetime resident

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of Oldham and leader in her tenant and resident association said, “they loaded the gun and left the minorities to fire the bullets”.

Luton also has tensions and has had tensions during the time of the riots in Oldham.

Interestingly, few if any leaders, mentioned the issue of deprivation although Luton also falls in the bottom third of most deprived places in the England, but other issues emerged multiple times. Things are not perfect one broadcast journalist said that tensions are not so much different that what one might find in Bradford or Oldham. Asians feel under

scrutiny from the white majority stemming from terrorism. There are tensions between

Muslims and Christians. Many whites think that Muslims can do anything because they

are Muslim and there is a post–911 “Islamaphobia” that has given rise to tensions. There

are also problems between Afro–Caribbean people and Pakistanis, and problems between

Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. There was street fighting after the war with Iraq began, but

these problems have improved. One respondent qualified relations as tolerant. Riots or disturbances are not foreign to Luton. They experienced riots in their city in 1995 in the

Marsh Farm area. Although race was a component, many pointed to deprivation and the police as reasons for the outbreak.

Unemployment in Luton is at the same levels as in Oldham. The city was also chosen for regeneration funds to alleviate deprivation that social scientists and policy makers know lead to problems within communities. The social infrastructure –despite the alleged unfair distribution of resources, immigration, etc.– as assessed by its own civic leaders, is not as bad as Oldham. However, unlike Oldham, for Luton leaders, violence, crime, drugs and alcohol came up as minority and youth issues although

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ironically, according to the 2001 Census, the crime rate in Oldham is higher than the

crime rate in Luton.

Also mentioned in response to issues or stressors that raise tensions in the

community, although there was no outbreak of violent conflict in Luton, three Luton

respondents volunteered the media as a source of interethnic tension. The media was

seen among Luton community leaders as blowing things out of proportion and

highlighting negative stories about Asians. Negative news stories were those that

highlighted Muslim (Asians) when they protested the West particularly after 9-11-2001.

Luton, unlike Oldham, has also suffered from shocks arising from Muslim

extremists and protests.18 These shocks were less severe than in Oldham (the far-right

had clearly waged war on Oldham) but shocks in Luton came from both sides of the spectrum. There were clear international, national, and local shocks that affected the

community. These tensions manifested among Asian communities, often in response to

the media, which aggravated tensions. International events, including but not limited to a

train burning in India, September 11th, the war against Iraq, and the ongoing politics in

Israel and Palestine, are international issues have caused Muslim fundamentalists19 and

one, now disbanded Muslim group, to protest. There are national tensions that can arise

from national incidents, for example, a controversy over a mosque or an imam in

London, or local incidents that raise tensions, for example, a murder where the victim and

the alleged killer are of different races. The BNP (and in this case the United British

Alliance, another far-right group) does not have a stronghold, but does have a small

18 Calling Muslim extremists the far left as a dichotomy of the far-right is logical, but in some ways might misplace the ideology of these groups. Both in any case, pose shocks to the community.

19 Al–Muhajiroun is the group responsible for London bombings in 2005.

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presence in the area, which combined with football hooligans, connected with the far-

right, has caused some problems. Both groups use inflammatory flyers with verbiage just

within the law and graffiti, in the case of Muslim fundamentalists, to mount community

tensions to fire up the multiethnic public.

Following a protest by the far-right of the Muslim extremists in Luton, one police

sergeant and community liaison offered, that considerable work was done to reassure the

Asian community in the wake of the incident. Herein lies the difference between community responses and management of internal tensions and external shocks. There was an overwhelmingly positive response to the role of organizations, the community work that has been done to improve ethnic relations, and the state of ethnic relations in

Luton by their community leaders. Leaders working in the voluntary sector for the most part feel very good about a reduction in tensions over the years. Almost all of the respondents reported that ethnic relations were good. Many admitted that, like all towns, there are problems, but that overall things are very good. As one faith leader said, the

“sharing and caring is not there, but tensions are well managed” . Every town, one Asian leader said has its tensions, its how they are controlled that is important.

Two issue areas emerged out of interviews with Luton voluntary sector leaders that

they believe helped to improve ethnic relationships and reduce tensions: first, the

relationship with the local authority and second, interethnic communication. Two leaders

in the Asian community gave positive feedback about their relation with and within the

local council in Luton. One civic leader commented that in the past, the community had

problems with the local authority that was believed racist. Changes over time resulted in good relations with the local authorities who “understand the situation and deal with it

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properly”. Another Asian leader appreciated the support the local council gives and said that there was “harmony” between the groups on the local council, this after he commented on the efforts over the years of trying to get more people to sit at the table.

Luton has had its fair share of tensions, one Asian leader said, but many other leaders, agreed with him that as a community they have done a lot of diversity work and made significant efforts toward making things better. Organizations in Luton have picked up on this and responded immediately. In responding to shocks, leaders gave a good example of managing tensions in their community. One Asian leader of a city– wide faith–based organization recounted how they combat the media. Understanding that the media want to “stir things up”, if the headlines report and exploit a problem between

Muslims and Sikhs for example, their organization, gets on the phone immediately and talks with people in the Sikh community to resolve the problem. “We have a process of dialog so we get people important in the community together at the table. Nine times out of ten we resolve the problem. We are not unique”. In fact, none of those interviewed in

Luton believed that their community was uniquely different from any other community.

One respondent pointed out that their Asian population is higher than in places like

Bradford where they have tensions. Simply put, they put in the work to get the desired result.

Some organizations and community workers realized the power of controlling rumors (Varshney 2002). The interviews revealed that there is a significant amount of proactive and preventive work that goes into the improved relations about which so many leaders commented. An ethnically diverse local council and regular inclusive meetings with the local authority establish a firm base and an arena for conversation. Taking down

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flyers posted by extremist groups (Muslim fundamentalist or white far-right), communicating with other communities upon first sight of negative headlines, and when necessary, mainstream Muslims disavowing violent or extreme violent acts by other

Muslims, not only control rumors, but verifies the community strength and the willingness not to succumb to shocks that are being waged. Admittedly, Luton is not a

BNP stronghold (it’s no wonder with the work being done), but when the far-right do wage attacks on the community, community leaders’ and their group’s determination to publicly give a message of strength against the action, or if a community is abused (in this case the Asian community), working to reassure the community (in this case the majority/white police) demonstrates strength and dispels rumors that the police or the larger community condone this sort of activity.

Do Organizations Matter?

Lutonians have confidence in organizations. City leaders gave overwhelmingly

positive feedback about the role of voluntary organizations and their ability to help

resolve conflict. Most believed that society would be severely compromised without

voluntary organizations and recognized that voluntary organizations work in areas that

governmental organizations do not reach. A community liaison from the police

department said that voluntary organizations were useful not only because they pick up what’s left after government, but because they know the community well and the police

work with them to reduce tensions. Another woman working in the voluntary sector said

that society would “fall apart” without voluntary organizations. She continued saying

that issues can quickly become racial and discussed an arbitration group that is built into

her community project. Scaling up slightly, the leader of a Muslim umbrella organization

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noted that they work with various groups that are “on board” to approach problems

collectively.

This kind of behavior speaks not just to filling voids in the community market, but also to bridging, binding and effective communication and programming between ethnic

communities. Survey questions asked about the mechanisms that cause and alleviate community tensions and all participants responded to the function of voluntary

organizations and the state of ethnic relations in their communities. An organizer of a –

wide group charged with making safer communities by working with a number of

community groups and the police in Luton (and also the chair of another city–wide

umbrella group) said that in getting communities together so that they see that no one is

getting special treatment alleviates tensions fueled by misperceptions of favoritism.

Umbrella organizations provide that forum for communication. Likewise, the leader of

the Muslim umbrella organizations mentioned above, remarked that the members and

leaders involved with his umbrella group have all visited the religious

communities/places of worship of other members. Thus, bridging or umbrella groups,

provide a regular forum for familiarity among leaders and members. The respondent

listed other events such as interfaith walks and educational evenings, which serve to

break down barriers that might exist and that create a family community where there is

respect (without losing the integrity of individual communities)20. In Luton, in

particular, the snowballing method led me to respondents who were very involved with

bridging organizations, and most had pride in the results of their labor.

20 Hence the danger of fragile bridging institutions and efforts, and the fragility of bridging alone, without binding. See conclusion.

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The only respondent who dissented (a journalist) only somewhat said that he

doubted the agenda of some voluntary organizations, but did concur affirmatively that voluntary organizations created dialogue and emphasized that the onus of resolving conflict is not just on one organization, but on all. Although organizations create dialogue, which is positive, that is not to assume that all organizations reach out to other ethnic groups. The respondent said that groups such as Guide groups (Girl Scouts) are

“thin” in connecting with ethnic groups and that they are for the most part white middle class organizations. Repeating this sentiment, a well–connected woman involved in three umbrella organizations in Luton said that groups work primarily for themselves and their own communities, but importantly, come together with others when needed.

Practically speaking, a Pakistani woman’s group (Muslim) is not going to work with a male group. Coming back to the organizations that are bonding and leaders’ sentiments

that its okay to organize along ethnic lines, many times very practically, each community

serves its own needs.

The views of the uses and abilities of the voluntary sector among Oldhamers are

strikingly different from those of Luton leaders. Voluntary sector leaders (interviewed in

2004) in Oldham had either a compromised opinion of the voluntary sector or believed

that factors or sectors other than the voluntary ones play the primary role in resolving or

preventing conflict. Moreover, there were mixed responses to the ability of voluntary

groups to step into help resolve ethnic conflict before, during, and after the disturbances.

From the responses, one can deduce that the voluntary sector did not play a major role in

preventing or resolving conflict although there were a couple of groups whose efforts

were noted.

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Three out of ten respondents who happen to work with the police and the local council said that they did not know of any voluntary organizations that stood up to resolve conflict before, during, or after the riots. A former council member and voluntary sector leader said that no voluntary organization, aside from the umbrella organization for which he worked, worked at the grassroots level around this time. A few other leaders mentioned this organization and a woman’s organization as being helpful. But other leaders said that organizations in general are not helpful bodies. One outspoken respondent commented that white organizations in general were not helpful. Lacking a sense of community, most he said had a “not on my doorstep” attitude leading those groups not to involve themselves in ethnic matters. One police officer said that organizations exist for “their own satisfaction” unlike statutory organizations that exist for all. He continued saying, “…it seems to me that voluntary organizations actually are not generally involved in the community”. This viewpoint is markedly different than the perception of civil society in Oldham.

There were three umbrella organizations that were mentioned in surveys and interviews, but respondents for the most part did not comment in a specific way about the work or accomplishments of these groups. A survey questions asked whether or not there were organizations in the area that drew out the whole community. Most respondents said no (most Luton respondents said yes). Again, there were two or three umbrella organizations mentioned, and there was evidence of individual organizations making efforts to work together prior to the riots, but no evidence of umbrella organizations making attempts to resolve issues during tense times. There was no overwhelming response about organizations working together, bridging, or evidence of regular patterns

155 of interaction. Snowballing led to interviewees who were important community members and leaders, but only one or two who could speak of cohesive efforts through umbrella organizations (which had recently started) and who further commented that efforts were being made to make these organizations independent of the local council, which for some was problematic in response to escalating tensions prior to the riots. There is a noticeable difference between the evidence of and attitude toward bridging organizations in Luton as opposed to Oldham. Using Luton as a model, these organizations seemed to be helpful in managing tensions through creating strong and effective channels for communication and respect by, for example, eliminating accusations of favoritism which fuel tension and through activities that foster familiarity among communities as seen above, in Luton.

Half of those interviewed in Oldham said that it was not organizations that mattered, but other issues that mattered more. Poverty, deprivation, then rights, education, the police, and the media were all areas that respondents felt were more important than bridging organizations in preventing conflict. Ironically, voluntary leaders in Luton used organizations to overcome problems such as the police, media, or the educational system. There were some positive comments from voluntary sector leaders in Oldham said something positive about organizations. One young Asian leader said that they helped to dispel myths, another said that groups working together helped to make an impression about working together, but also mentioned economic factors. For some Asian communities (not all), Bangladeshis in particular, it is an economic, but also stressed the upgrades going on in many Asian neighborhoods. There is little confidence overall that organizations and working together can resolve any of the aforementioned

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problems. This when the local council itself falls short of community needs leaves little room for change in Oldham.

Attitude is Everything

There is a clear distinction in the attitude toward civic organizations in Luton and

Oldham. Even after the riots, the fallout, and the national attention that has lauded civil society–looking back and looking forward– there is no wholesale realization of the potential of voluntary organization. Further, it is clear that there was a failure among all sectors, but the particularly the voluntary sector as the part of community in question, to prevent the outbreak of conflict between ethnic communities in Oldham. The BNP and the far-right waged war on Oldham. It proved to be an easy fight. Luton, on the other hand, not because of its level of deprivation, but because of it strong community has not

been such an easy target despite multiple attempts to disrupt multiethnic life by Muslim

fundamentalist, the media, and by the xenophobia far-right. Luton, unlike Oldham, both

with a history of waves of immigration, was able to craft a strong patchwork quilt. Gone

are the melting pot analogies that were popular in the United States in discussion about integration in an immigrant country with roots in slavery. Luton ethnic organizations retain their character, color and individuality, but come together frequently and necessarily to prevent those outside of the multiethnic community from tearing it apart.

Luton as a multiethnic community and as a body or voluntary organization is adequately prepared and –somewhat consequently– under attacked. Conversely, Oldham was under prepared and (consequently) over attacked.

Why not Luton? was one of my initial questions in sketching out a research design.

It simply does not make sense that there are multiethnic (and poor) communities that live in the absence of conflict and those that live with tensions brimming. I agree with a

157 couple of Luton leaders who say they are not unique in their economic or ethnic situation, but they put in the effort to keep tensions from boiling over. Oldham has groups that are working, but as a collective has not put in the kind of collective effort or belief needed to curtail conflict. Poverty and deprivation are issues and there is an undercurrent of racism and poor relations with the local council, but leaders in Oldham are not looking proactively to their own resources, scarce as they may be, to address the issues. Quite frankly, most people told me what the problems were, very few offered solutions as to how to change things.

In many ways, what went right in Luton is what went wrong in Oldham. First, communication and dialogue between ethnic communities (including white community) to combat such forces as the media (named often as a contributing factor in the riots) was not there. This kind of communication is relatively low cost, yet can have, as seen in

Luton, a strong and positive impact on the community. Communication is not just organization to organization, but leader to leader and leaders to members and other community supporters. Leadership in both Oldham and Luton have played critical roles at critical points in determining whether or not ethnic relations intensify or remain calm.

In Oldham, the Asian community leaders who encouraged the gathering crowd to turn back one Saturday when the BNP had marched through their neighborhood helped to calm the crowd were key in helping to control the situation that day. The council leader who made the decision not to show up that same brewing conflict on a Saturday because he was cutting his grass shows how a lack of leadership and the failure to communicate with citizens could be devastating. The Muslim leader in Luton who realized that picking up the phone and talking to key people in the Sikh community when the headlines

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boasted of conflict shows clearly that it is not just organizations, but those leaders who

make good decisions that exemplify intercommunity communication that are important in

a community and that it is not just vigilant organizations, but vigilant leaders. Second,

although there was only one council member who explained how problematic the local

council in Oldham was, many other leaders and residents I spoke to had a negative view of the local council; further, despite many open ended questions, the council was never

offered as a helpful force in the community (the opposite was the case in Luton). Thus, it

appears that the relationship between the local council and the voluntary sector is important to strengthening the community. Third, the voluntary sector in Luton seems to

use organizations to address the communities’ vulnerabilities. Oldham on the other hand

saw little role for organizations to address any issue that affected their community. There

was little belief that organization could help to solve community problems. Instead,

many said that deprivation (among other issues) would solve the communities’ problems.

Most did not seem to think that voluntary organizations could help address deprivation.

The willingness to take advantage of voluntary organizations and understanding their

potential and effectiveness is a clear difference between communities. Finally, there was

an active community effort to make change and manage ethnic tensions in Luton.

Although motivation is not a characteristic that political scientists often discuss or acknowledge, the difference in language and attitude among voluntary sector leaders and

people in Oldham was noticeably different than in Luton.

In sum, given the information from surveys and interviews, it seems that the (dis)

belief in organizations (despite the presence of organizations) and negative attitudes toward culture, race, and ethnicity would in itself leave a town vulnerable to shocks

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waged by outsiders and the media. Further, the disaffected and those dissatisfied with socio-economic status support these attitudes and reflect a readiness for and a receptiveness to shocks. The political parties, far-right tribes and combat forces, and the media, the blinding sector of civil society’s continuum, are independent variables that

contribute to the level of ethnic tensions and conflict in a community. At the same time

the attitudes toward ethnicity and organizations and the consequent leadership and

positive work emerging from civic organizations and local government must also have an

effect on the success, failure, or depth of the shocks. In short, Oldham may have been

more than a convenient choice for local organizing groups, but these attacks may have

been a very rational choice given attitudes and the organizational capital–or lack thereof–

that had been produced in that city. Luton also faced some shocks (particularly post 9-

11), by the media and religious extremists, but not an onslaught by extreme white groups.

There is no doubt that the onslaught by blinding groups made a difference in outcome,

however, this dissertation suggests that the preventative work among civic organizations

in Luton allows it as a city to better absorb whatever shocks the city might be exposed to

and as said above, suggests that that preventative and integrative work might help it to be

a less rational choice for those who want to wage shocks on multiethnic civic life.

The next chapter will return to the core theoretical assumptions of this research and explore the outcome that various types of ethnic engagement lead to more peaceful or more violent outcomes.

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS

This study examines civil society, in order to better understand civic life as related

to ethnicity. Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work failed to consider ethnicity and

he later along with others critiqued himself for looking exclusively at “kumbaya” civic

organizations. In Bowling Alone, Putnam proposed bridging and bonding types of social

capital to account for different behaviors and outcomes in civil society, but still

ultimately supported lots of participation and focused on the why and the why not of participation over several decades of American history. Goran Hyden suggested that

bridging and bonding was still not a complete enough model to understand civil society.

Instead, he argued that we should consider bridging, bonding, binding, and blinding as a

more complete model of actors and actions within civil society. Finally, Ashtoush

Varshney operationalized bridging and bonding among Hindus and Muslims in India,

tracing four and a half decades of history and conflict with civic life, concluding that

vigorous associational forms of engagement between ethnic groups (and not just day-to-

day interactions) proves to promote peace among ethnic communities in India.

This study is centered on ethnicity as an integral part of civic life and draws comparatively on the two multiethnic cities in England, Oldham and Luton, to better understand how civic life contributes to managing ethnic tensions. Drawing on and responding to the core assumptions of the aforementioned studies, this dissertation contributes better understanding of the choices and behaviors that actors make that help

to manage or worsen tensions and ultimately to prevent the outbreak of riots.

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Both before and after conducting research, I found bridging, bonding, binding, and

blinding to be a useful model to understand relationships within civic life, especially

among ethnic groups. This is a useful framework as it allows for a more robust

understanding of bonding, which alone, compared only to bridging, has been understood

as a somewhat negative force within civic life. Binding is an extension of bonding.

Binding allows for the possibility that ethnic groups will carry out joint projects and work with groups with membership of ethnicities different than their own. Bonding has been

treated in the literature as a sort of familial anomie and a minimum civic standard that is

reflective of pre–modern behavior. It is viewed as negative rather than a positive quality

for civil society. Putnam (2000) refers to bonding as a reflection of our “narrower selves” that is good only for “getting by” in civic life versus bridging forms of civic

engagement, which allow us to “get ahead”. However, looking at the behavior of

organizations in Oldham and Luton and examining the responses of civic leaders in

Oldham and Luton alongside the literature, it seems that bonding is not necessarily as

nefarious as certain scholars make it out to be. Bonding is not all bad.

In both Oldham and Luton, organizations reflected bonding behavior, and in Luton

especially, leaders in the voluntary sector thought that organizing along ethnic lines was acceptable and necessarily reflected in civic life. People are inclined to organize along ethnic lines, those in Luton’s voluntary sector said, and that is okay. Cleavages will not always cut everyway. One Luton leader drew attention to the fact that a Muslim women’s group will not meet with a male group of any sort. Scholars and commentators find bonding problematic despite the fact that there are times when it is an interest, comfort, and practicality in meeting with one’s own ethnic group. Leaders in Oldham on

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the other hand felt overwhelmingly that not integrating, or bonding exclusively, was the

city’s biggest reason for interethnic conflict. In some ways, that is a fair assessment, as there was more than just bonding going on in Luton’s voluntary organizations, there was partnering and effective communication through individual ethnic organizations and through umbrella organizations, or bridging groups.

As just stated, civic life in Luton was different in two ways. First, organizations in

Luton before the riots in Oldham were more likely to bind; that is, one (bonding) ethnic group would work with another, or in just as many cases, work with more than one organizations that had a different ethnic membership than their own group. In 2000, before the riots, only 7% of the organizations surveyed reported working as an organization with another civic organization with a different ethnic base. Luton, in contrast, reported approximately 20% of bonding groups working across ethnic lines, or binding. The second difference was the level of integrity and leadership in group–to– group relations. In Oldham, in the moments leading up to the riots, there was no leader or group that seemed to emerge to manage tensions coming internally from, for example, the media, or externally from far-right. In Luton, leaders seem to communicate immediately during times of potential upheaval. One leader of a Muslim council recounted making phone calls when headlines shouted of violence between Muslims and

Sikhs. Another leader from a umbrella faith organization sent an email to me of an interventionist forum sponsored by his organization in Luton in response to African

Muslims who were rioting in neighboring France during the fall of 2005. These are just a few examples of group to group communication and proactive leadership.

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Given this information, it is not bonding in itself that is bad, but that failing to work

with other groups, or not binding, and failing to communicate with other ethnic

communities is what is detrimental to ethnic relations. This is what makes bridging so important. Bridging, as you will see below has virtue. At the same time, bonding also has merit and it does not have to lead to a communities’ breakdown if there are links being made among common people and their organizations, that are most often ethnically based, white groups and faith groups included. In having this conversation about ethnic organizations, this study approached ethnicity and bonding in a very broad way.

Ethnicity should not be relegated to non–white, non–Christian groups only, nor should manifestations of bonding be seen as a relic of our prehistory. In many ways, although some organizations have an integrationist view, which is positive, other groups are only willing to go part of the way and do not want to replace bonding with complete integration. There is a recognition of comfort and cultural celebration that individuals, in

Luton at least, don’t see so much as pre–modern as a part of life. One person in the

voluntary sector said quite simply, people shouldn’t lose their character and individuality.

In other words, it is okay to be culturally different and maintain your own identity even in

a new setting. From this person’s perspective, and many others, although some cultural

practices are challenging, there is no request for a wholesale rejection of one’s native

culture. In fact, many said that they appreciate the diversity that others bring to their

community.

Most respondents regardless of their ethnic background seemed to think that Asians

needed a space to celebrate their ethnicity. Immigrant groups should be allowed (in the

host country) space to celebrate and bond. Respondents said that space should be

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allowed for Asians (the subject of this study), as second or third generation, British Asian

if you will as well. Most seemed to think that this space to celebrate would in turn enrich

the community. Most seemed to think that England was better off as a diverse more

integrated place and that they had reaped the benefits of having a multiethnic community.

When asked if there was a British cultural identity and if it should, like other

cultures, be preserved, tension emerged over whether there was a British cultural identity.

This study found that there was a clear identity among all minority groups, but that there

was a reluctance to admit or acknowledge as well as difficult to define a British cultural identity. Perhaps, one professor suggests1, this is because British cultural identity is an

integrationist one that leans on its civicness and openness (like a democratic culture)

rather than a cultural identity that is linked directly to race. In other words, the political

culture is in a sense adopted in place of an ethnic identity, most easily done as ethnicity

for whites is defaulted. This hypothesis suggests that respondents have replaced an

ethnic outlook with a civic and integrationist outlook, which accounts for why so few

might have mentioned a white or British cultural identity. This may be true, however it is

evident that there is no clear language that emerged among the respondents to address

these ethnic differences. Illustrating this tension, another conflict emerged between the

actions of white civic organizations that bonded just as often as other ethnic groups did,

and the words of many white and some Asian respondents who said there was no British or a white cultural identity.

It would be easy to say that these tensions arose because the British culture is the majority culture; however, being in the majority does not preclude having an ethnic

1 Noted in a conversation with Goran Hyden on March 9, 2006.

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identity (just ask Hindus or Muslims in Pakistan). There is a pattern of bonding that

British whites experience just as much as other ethnic groups whether because it is

comfortable or because it is convenient demographically (in the neighborhood) within

civic and personal life. Thus calling British cultural identity into question and refusing to

define British (white) cultural identity is hypothesized here to be a form of protest against those who have co–opted white space and the language of a British “tradition” to terrorize immigrants and provoke and disturb the public sphere (far-right). It is further a statement advocating a more welcoming community that embraces integration and rejects attempts to draw divisive lines between communities (McDermott & Samson 2005).

Finally, this tension between the behavior of white organizations and the words of respondents may be a also due to the fact that British cultural identity is treated as a default identity, whether it actually is or not to which all others are compared. People are therefore not accustomed to articulating this ubiquitous and dominant community2. It

may also be true that there is simply no agreement as to what British cultural identity is.

Despite these difficult questions, one Luton leader, who happened to be Indian,

responded to the need to celebrate British cultural identity. He organized a celebration

responding to fellow white church members who felt left out and wanted to participate in

cultural celebrations, which to that point had been dedicated to other minority groups.

Another Asian leader commented on the fact that the “home team” seems abandoned.

While people do get together and bridge, this study found that it is important to bond and

celebrate one’s own group. Bonding in isolation does have a more negative effect,

especially in a case where there are other challenging factors (economic, social, etc.).

2 Both institutionally and economically and in some places culturally dominant

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Oldham did have more groups that were predominantly of one ethnic group and only two of the thirty organizations surveyed actually worked with a group of another ethnic group. Looking at Luton, binding, however, and celebrating cultural identity had a positive effect.

In Luton, several people commented on the value (of immigrants) not losing their individuality. The dream of modernization and bridging enthusiasts is to have a completely integrated world. This is a beautiful dream; but there are many who also see the beauty in individuality. When I go to an Indian restaurant, I want Indian food, not curried hamburgers. Although for some (obviously not those who are Hindu) this syncretism might be beautiful, there is also beauty in retaining individuality. Likewise, if

I go to a mainstream Protestant church on Sunday, I expect to hear words from the New

Testament of the Bible. I do not expect to hear the preacher giving a sermon from the

Koran. Syncretism has a place, and I believe a useful place in co–existence with bonding

(and sometimes creating new bonds) but there are those who attend their own group’s events seeking the (presumably positive) core of their group’s practices. There is a balance that communities need to achieve between retaining the old and creating something new. Binding is a form of communication between groups and also a form of community strengthening that is important to managing tensions and also to allowing groups to keep bond within civic life.

With that said, are bridging organizations as beneficial as scholars make them out to be? Bridging, more specifically, ethnically mixed groups and umbrella organizations are important, but that was only slightly evident through surveys as both Oldham and

Luton show similar behavior in this regard before the riots. The presence of mixed

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groups and plugging into umbrella groups does seem to have a positive effect on the

ability to manage tensions, when interviews are factored into the equations. Unlike

Oldham, almost every leader interviewed in Luton was more effectively linked to the community through umbrella organizations or agencies groups and many paid

complements to umbrella organizations. Perhaps more important, this study found that

Luton, the town that seems to better able to manage ethnic tensions, over four years since

the riots in Oldham, the number of robustly mixed organizations increased significantly

for organizations in Luton and actually decreased for groups in Oldham (see tables in chapter four).

This sends a message more important than just having umbrella organizations or just having civil society. Interviews and surveys showed that working across communities and across the voluntary sector as a whole, the voluntary organizations in

Luton were better communicators, more proactive, and on the whole responded in a four year period more quickly to national threats (disturbances in Oldham, Bradford, etc) and international disturbances that threatened their multiethnic community. The Luton community, somewhat ironically, as compared to Oldham was more proactive, nimble, and efficient and simply, as a sector, had many leaders willing to put in the work to protect the community against the many internal and external shocks to the community.

Oldham, on the other hand, has responded to the bad publicity and poor community relations associated with the riots, but not nearly as quickly or efficiently as Luton a city that needed only to see what happened in several cities north of them and to experience several shocks (fallout from the Iraq/Afghani war) to realize the survival work that needed to be done.

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Blinding. Bonding Gone Awry.

Blinding is the fourth part of a useful model for understanding more fully the

expressions of civil society and civic life. Social capital, the wider, more utilitarian, and slightly more neutral term for describing the networks and trust between parties, is in some ways a more useful than the term civil society as it does not imply “civility” per se and should understand that networking through an interfaith council reaps the same

“amount” of social capital as the networking seen in Into a World of Hate (Ryan 2003)

that chronicled the networking among the groups of people in far-right groups across

Europe.

Putnam (1993) was criticized for not recognizing the more unpleasant side of civil society. Indeed most writing in political science in general extols the virtue of civic life,

which is “civic”, minimally controversial, and mainstream. It is the public sphere that is positive, idyllic, and the space that makes democracies thrive. It is a space where protests for community rights, for example, protesting the building of a Walmart to save a local

business, is romanticized. Organized groups that object to a country becoming more

diverse or object immigrants, minorities, and other groups of people are not exemplified

when we examine the civic landscape. Further, groups that use disturbing tactics up to

and including violence are also not discussed, or are easily dismissed as being “un”civic.

Yet civil society is in the most general sense the space between family and government

and should not dismiss these organizations so easily. Mildly put, there has been a sort of

double standard in examining civil society, focusing on the groups “we like”3 and leaving

3 Bridge clubs, PTAs, NAACP, etc.

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those groups “we don’t like”4 alone, dismissing them as not of civil society. In many

ways some scholars have introduced cultural bias and personal preferences into their

examination of civil society using a mainstream middle class view of an idyllic American

city or town as the model, and closing our eyes to forces that might disturb this realm.

Examining blinding groups and their shocks is helpful in understanding not only the

effect of certain blinding groups, but the movement of these groups, and how they

interact with civil society and when or whether it is civil society in which they are

operating.

This dissertation first draws a line of demarcation between the civic and non–civic

realms5 and focusing on the use of violence helps to see how and when organizations are moving in or out of the civic realm (see Figure 2).

Shocks Shocks

UN-CIVIC CIVIC UN-CIVIC

BNP Figure 2 Movement Between Civic and Un–civic Life

Further, there are groups that can shock civic life in general, but multiethnic civic life specifically, and these shocks can come either from inside or outside of civic life.

Looking at a group like the British National Party (BNP), as a political party in a democracy6, it functions like a civic organization.7 In the case of the Oldham

4 KKK, Knights of Colombus, etc.

5 Within an established democracy.

6 Some definitions of civil society include political society, others do not, political society is included in civic life here.

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disturbances, the BNP marched on several occasions prior to the actual riots, well within their civic rights. This organization however, affiliated and partnered with more extreme groups were reported to have antagonized Asians while marching through their

neighborhood and saying very un–neighborly things. Likewise, inflammatory leaflets distributed from door to door were reported to be just within the law. The BNP also

aligned with other far-right groups that are known to be more violent and have a membership that has a criminal element that is willing to if not desiring to use violence.

These alliances make the BNP complicit in blinding behavior (never mind that members were reported to participate in violent acts) as they let go of some organizational channels to accomplish their goals, and also allowed, albeit tacitly violence to be a method to express the purpose and goals of their organization, effectively waging war on multiethnic civic life from outside of civil society (despite their very civic base).

In many ways, the BNP is strategically placed to attempt change from inside and outside of civil society. Blinding is a more useful term and recognizing this movement is helpful instead of relegating all negative groups to mafia or “gangs” against the public.

This model could just as well be used on the far left like the Black Panther Party an organization that began as a breakfast club and that organized with the objective of serving and protecting (at times with weapons) their African American community. They used what some would call antagonistic language, which was within their organizational and civil rights to do. This group also moved outside of or stood on line of the civic realm and rightfully or wrongfully (depending on who you are) did not preclude the use of violence to accomplish their goals. In Luton, organized Muslim extremists may be on

7 One woman volunteer with an umbrella organization spoke of her neighbors, all in the BNP who went to the races together.

171 opposite sides of the color line, but similarly use extreme words and acts intending to mobilize the willing and disturbing sometimes already tense interethnic relations within the public.

The fear of bonding organizations is that the can become somewhat extreme or violent manifestations of ethnicity and there is sometimes an assumption that this is the natural progression of bonding relationships. However, these relationships are forms that either legitimately or illegitimately (usually because of the political climate) have caused bonding to go awry or to go into more violent, sectarian, forms that most importantly to this study, either disturb relationships between groups in multiethnic life or threaten multiethnic civic life. These blinding groups can and do recruit from civic life and shock individuals, organizations, and relationships within multiethnic civic life.

Blinding groups whether in, out, or on the cusp of civic life can cause a shock.

Likewise, organizations like the media can cause a shock to the community. Similarly, international and national events from far or near can shock the community, as is the case with Luton. Finally, shocks or provocative bombs can be and usually are exacerbated by the exploitation of socio–economic realities (and sometimes falsehoods) that threaten multiethnic civic life. Blinding groups, as seen throughout the research have and do, as standard practice, exploit the poverty among whites and distorts any benefits that immigrant groups might get to cause tensions within the community and to recruit those buying into civic life as disaffected individual whose ire will encourage them to wage attacks on multiethnic space.

Better Understanding Conflict, Government, and Civil Society

Development organizations and political scientists encourage the development of civil society, the implication is, more is better. Morris Fiorina (1999) challenged that

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assumption and this study makes it clear that more civil society isn’t necessarily better.

Similarly, this dissertation challenges the assertion that the beneficial outcomes of civil

society are predicated upon the amount civil society rather than, as this dissertation

posits, the kind interaction. This dissertation largely through interviews and to a weaker

degree through survey data shows that having civil society is not enough. Both Oldham and Luton had civil society, but there were differences in the leadership and the ethnic

group–to–group relationships that made the difference in how tensions were managed. It

is the communication across ethnic groups, a proactive and vigilant leadership, and a

nimble and agile multiethnic civic realm, a good relationship with the local council, and

more open attitudes toward others that has allowed Luton to protect itself against

interethnic violence despite shock from the far-right and extreme Muslim groups.

Hardwork in the voluntary sector pays off. Further, this study shows that regardless of

interest (bird watching, playing cards, faith community, etc) that civic life is ethnic.

Failing to address the ethnic nature8 of civil society, be it benign or nefarious, is to lack a

complete understanding of its dynamics and of how to understand and better manage

ethnic tensions.

Conventional thinking within the discipline tends to steer clear of primordial or essentialist explanations of ethnic conflict and rightfully so as they offer little counsel on how to actually resolve ethnic conflicts. There are still a few essentialist explanations of conflict by, for example, famous scholars such as Samuel Huntington (1996), who might look at community conflict between Muslims and Westerners as a local manifestation of a clash of civilizations; however, this dissertation supports civic resolution of conflict at

8 Race, religion, language group, etc. and includes whites

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the local level. The study also shows that no ethnic group in particular is more guilty of

bonding than another and thus evens the playing field by showing that each community

and community organization bonds and that both white and Muslim (in this case) are

apart of extremist organizations that are ready to wage war on a multiethnic civic space.

This dissertation underscores that there are difficulties, namely deprivation, cultural

practices, norms, and the structural challenges as discussed with Multicultural Citizenship

(e.g. creating an employment policy that favors Muslims by allowing them to rest on

Friday and work on Saturday), but with hard work, co-existence between Asian Muslims

and white Christians, Luton shows, is possible and desirable. Luton also shows that this co-existence does not come for free.

Rational choice theorists and others who study ethnicity often analyze ethnic conflict in terms of resources. In short, they argue that scarcity creates conflict (Bates

1983). Others still look to situations that demonstrate instrumental tendencies and where political entrepreneurs exploit ethnicity for their own gain, which often ends in conflict.

These explanations are somewhat compelling, and also enduring, as resource conflicts don’t see an end quickly; however, these explanations offer no viable form of community cohesion when the reality of the situation is that communities need to learn to survive in spite of political entrepreneurship and the exploitation of deprivation or resource conflicts. Deprivation among whites or Asians, or conversely economic success while others suffer relatively, leaves fodder for exploiting ethnic difference and will be exploited by extreme parties. While these issues cause tensions in Oldham and Luton a number of respondents believe that voluntary organizations through bridging in particular could manage tensions. It is likely precisely because of the work that has gone into (and

174 continues to go into) creating a sustainable multiethnic civil society and a can-do attitude that Luton has not succumbed to interethnic disturbances or riots and precisely why extremists focus their attention on more divided cities that lack communication across ethnic communities and that suffer from a lack of resources that touches Asians and whites as in Oldham.

Postmodern approaches to understanding ethnicity focus on historical narrative, experience, and imagining to best understand how ethnic relations arrived at their present conflicted or peaceful manifestations. I find these approaches persuasive in understanding conflict and tribalism, and believe that they are strong in creating clarity and understanding. A postmodern approach is still weak in offering solutions to resolve conflict. The civic approach to ethnic conflict does not preclude other theoretical explanations for conflict or structural or economic problems, but is again strong offering solutions in how to protect a community that is vulnerable to ethnic conflict.

The civic approach using bridging, binding, bonding, and blinding forms of understanding civil society provides insights and understanding into the tensions or peace in multiethnic context. Further, upon analysis, we see that bridging and bonding should not be treated as opposites at all, but as complementary forms of civic engagement and social capital formed in a multiethnic context. Thus the kind of social capital and civic engagement that might “get you by” is not as important as understanding how the kinds of social capital and engagement that might lend itself to certain political and social outcomes.

In reality, there is space, as this dissertation proves, to have all four forms of social capital and engagement; however, it is likely that some forms of social capital and

175 engagement might be more dominant in a community than others. As this is a theoretically informed case study, to understand the effects of these forms of social capital better, the following paragraphs articulate the effects of (ethnic and interethnic) social capital and engagement at the local and national level in pairs: bonding and blinding, bonding and binding, bridging and binding, bridging and bonding, respectively.

Bonding and blinding at the local level create tense social and political relationships that ripen the seeds for, if the community is not already engaged in, civil violence. This form of engagement provides little in the way of communication between cohesive and bonded groups, solidifies cleavages, and aggravates them, which results in violence. This was hypothesized to be this situation in Oldham, although Oldham in the end proved to have umbrella organizations also, though weaker and less mentioned or relied upon than those that were very obvious in Luton. Bonding and binding forms of social capital and engagement are precarious together. While there may not be forces aggravating communities, the partnerships formed in binding relationships can dissolve.

Even in the event that partnerships are maintained, the relationships between communities are thin contrasted by strong intra-group bonds. Bonding and binding stand in the balance in this situation. Any form of discontent in this situation (natural disaster or socio–economic issues) can threaten to raise tensions and without established forms of communication between groups to maintain integrity and safety within the community.

In short, it is important to have a forum to diffuse tensions and connect, and these forms of social capital provide that on a very limited basis only.

Bridging and binding are the strongest forms of local civic engagement and social capital. A community that is strong with these forms of social capital and engagement

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reflect a community with a high level of integrity, which would be difficult to shatter or

penetrate to cause discord. This does not preclude discord, but the unity, diversity, and effective communication found in bridging organizations, coupled with communication between bonding groups (binding) –functioning as community insurance– leaves communities with the tools and the social infrastructure to fight any shock that might threaten the community.

Bridging and bonding operate much in the same way as communities strong with bridging and binding types of social capital, except that a community dependent on bridging and bonding forms of engagement are slightly weaker because they lack a second layer of insurance (binding). Bridging alone will allow a community to get along, but without agency of individual bonding communities to communicating with each other, the success in managing tensions and challenges falls on organizations that bridge.

In order to be successful then, umbrella organizations have to be effective and mixed organizations must own a strong voice in the community. Not superficial creating the

illusion of integrity and cohesion.

Scaling up to the state or national level, these forms of social capital are relevant in

determining the strength or weakness and the collaborative power of government

institutions. Less integrative (between communities) forms of social capital mentioned

above, bonding and blinding, and bonding and binding necessitate or beget stronger,

more authoritarian or autocratic forms of government, which unify (through whatever

means) the state in the case of bonding and binding forms of social capital, or as a result

of the civil conflict that comes with bonding and blinding forms of social capital. In

contrast, stronger (more integrative) forms of social capital allow for more civically

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driven forms of government, or majoritarian or consociational forms of democracy. The

coalitions, partnerships, and the relative harmony that comes from these forms of social

capital allows space for greater governance by the people. Thus on both a local and a national level, these forms of social capital are instructive of outcomes seen in ethnic

relations and also instructive on a greater scale in political relations.

Peaceful

Bridge Bind Bind Bond

Integrated Segregated

Bridge Bond Bond Blind

Tense or Violent

Figure 3 State & Local Level Effects of Social Capital.

Isms

I have faith in the strong theoretical framework presented in this study; however I also realize that within communities, cultures and attitudes whether cosmopolitan, provincial, xenophobic, or culturally open, affect the efficiency of organizations. It is

unlikely that a community where there are deeply negative feelings of prejudice toward the other that its civic organizations, would function as efficiently as possible with the mission of integrating people or that there would be much bridging behavior. This is not

to say that organizations will not work, but it is to say that garnering participation and

building linkages (and in the process creating more egalitarian relationships) will likely

be slow at first. Isms cannot be ignored. There is a direct correlation between the

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outcome of riots and the negative or positive attitudes toward ethnicity that each

communities’ citizens had in Oldham and Luton. In Oldham, there were more

acrimonious feelings against Asians, against Muslims, and occasionally against whites.

There were some tensions in Luton also, however, tensions in Oldham, were far higher

than those heard in Luton. In addition to this, the Oldham community had little faith that

voluntary organizations could make a difference in relations between ethnic groups9.

Instead, they pointed to economic disparities, segregation, and the educational system as

the culprits of conflict, these issues, they concluded needed to be resolved. While these

issues do need to be resolved, this does not preclude the usefulness of civic organizations

and the social capital and the relationships that come from bridging and binding forms of

social capital.

In contrast, the Luton community tackled the schools and integrated the local

council and created a number of umbrella organizations and group-to-group bonds that

directly or indirectly attacked the issues, tensions, and attitudes in their community.

From Ohio to Ossetia, after deteriorating between communities, community leaders and

organizations often convene to create organizations and mechanisms to attack prejudice

and the deteriorating relations between groups. The voluntary sector has a role to play in

patching up and strengthening their own communities. Organizations matter and

communities can overcome deprivation through community action. Luton has

exclusively Asian neighborhoods and there are neighborhoods and areas in towns across

the world that have been settled by certain ethnic groups, not as much to exclude others

as much as to retain comfort and cultural integrity. To argue that ethnic peace is

9 In fairness to the Oldham community there has been progress in the faith community that some respondents mentioned

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impossible without complete integration would be faulty. It is not integration that matters

as much as creating strong links between ethnic communities along with the proactive

effort within the voluntary sector to take on the burden of the challenges that provoke

tensions within communities. Government is not free of its responsibility, but voluntary

organizations can press government to make changes and cover for government what

government cannot do.

England and Beyond

Development agencies continue to support that there simply is civil society in

hopes of supporting the growth of democracy rather than focusing on how relationships

within civil society develop. In multiethnic societies where conflict between ethnic

groups can jeopardize the integrity of the state and the democracy itself, it is a grave error

not to understand the organizational relationships between ethnic groups. This

dissertation presents evidence supporting the idea that it is not just that there is civil

society, but that the multiethnic relationships within it, the leadership, and the voluntary

sector’s work with local government are strong and proactive with regard to

strengthening ethnic civil society and protecting it from exogenous shocks.

In both Europe and Africa, the developing world and advanced industrialized

democracies have relatively recent experiences that show the importance of proactively

strengthening and protecting multiethnic civic life from exogenous shocks. A number of

issues have served to disturb multiethnic communities. There are three issues that have

been the impetus for shock to local communities: 1) right wing political and neo-Nazi

(formal and informal) groups in Europe clamoring against the presence of religiously and

racially different immigrant groups from Africa, Asian and Eastern Europe, 2) the failure of the broader society to address the needs of these relatively new groups, and 3)

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international political decisions that have disturbed Muslims in Europe. The media has

enhanced the flames of conflict. The glaring example of the role of the media in the

genocide in Rwanda shows how the shocks exemplified in this dissertation can get

grossly out of hand and how the voluntary sector has a role in managing tensions so that

ethnic life remains calm. It also shows that bridging voices need to be loud. In Oldham,

few could name organizations that stepped up to the plate in times of conflict. In Luton, calls for unity and calls between groups at the slightest hint of a disturbance were cited as examples for the management of ethnic conflict. The problem is persistent, but the intent of this research is to offer insight on the means to prevent conflict, especially in the wake of 9-11, which exemplifies the most the much-stereotyped clash of Western communities and Muslim communities in Europe. Muslims can live in harmony with others just as

other ethnic groups can, but as in other potentially contentious multiethnic communities, it does not come free.

The social capital that is reaped through strong bridging and binding organizations is invaluable and paves the way for greater understanding and forming more egalitarian relationships to tackle some of the more difficult structural challenges of whether one works on Saturday instead of Friday or how communities create forums for socializing that reach beyond a happy hour that might not be appropriate for some groups. Forming these relationship can also foster a willingness, by both sides, to meet the other and accept some change. Strong forms of bridging and binding are argued here as this is more important than bridging in name only. Throughout the research process it became clear that there were very thin forms of bridging, for example organizations that keep databases of organizations and can contact member organizations individually, but do

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little in terms of providing an environment where ethnic groups can work through

problems. In Oldham, bridging forms of social capital were thinner. In Luton, there

were also seemingly thinner groups, but they existed amongst a number of other

organizations that cross-cut the city and that worked hard at providing an environment

where stakeholders could voice their concerns and make change. I saw the results of

their labor. It is not surprising, although things are not perfect, that a city could manage

the shocks associated with the war in Afghanistan and Iraq and the terrorist bombings in

London without succumbing to riots.

Finally, the words of a police offer in Luton struck me as incredibly important in

managing ethnic relations in tense times. In recounting an incident where a far-right

group marched through an Asian neighborhood, he said that they (the police, the

community, the city) had to do some work to “reassure” the Asian community.

Reassurance among ethnic communities (who are often vulnerable communities) by the

police10 and civic organizations from majority (white) and other ethnic backgrounds is important in creating trust between communities, managing tensions, and is in fact an

exercise in binding. In Oldham, one of the complaints I heard amongst Asians (from a

third source) who were arrested after the riots was that they were charged and persecuted

for protecting their community. Everyone invested in Oldham agreed that things needed

to change, but there was nothing in my research to indicate that whites worked to reassure

the Asian community. The vulnerability that ethnic groups feel, especially when attacked

or wronged, in host environments can foster bonding, acrimony, tension and in the case

Combat 786 a violent Asian group that emerged one newspaper reported, can give rise to

10 Police are majority dominated or often white in the West

182 blinding groups. Likewise, in citing violent disturbances in the United States in chapter two, it seems that even racial groups such as African Americans can continue to feel vulnerable in a community and could benefit from reassurance by the police and from, in this case white and other ethnic minority civic organizations. Accordingly, in addition to bridging and binding forms of social capital, when ethnic groups are wronged or their vulnerabilities are exploited by blinding forces, the majority and ethnic civic community needs to provide reassure, lest the community jeopardize or destroy the small amounts of social capital that might exist.

These finding are important; however, as this is a case study, other cases should be examined to learn whether these strategies, attitudes, and local relationships are isolated occurrences or if these observances begin to mark a pattern of behavior among multiethnic communities. Future research calls for iterating this study within England.

The cities of Leicester and Bradford are dichotomous like Luton and Oldham. Leicester did not experience riots, Bradford did. To build theory, this study should also be extended to other settings in other parts of Europe that have faced similar challenges and most importantly, to the developing world. Civil society has been encouraged as a part of development, but many developing countries are places where there are blinding forces and where ethnic conflict has caused society to fall to civil war. This dissertation offered an alternative to understanding civil society, by quantity only. More research needs to be done to further develop this theory.

Envisioning Multiethnic Life

I treated myself to several good meals in “the curry mile” in Manchester while conducting field research. Asians and the local indigenous whites in Manchester like that the curry mile is there and like the community diversity. Locals like the access to

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different foods and culture, Asians like the comfort of having culturally important stores

and foods convenient to them. Should the curry mile be integrated? Is this segregation

or diversity?

I also sought out the best fish and chips, made sure I shared a round of beer with

some of the locals I met, and asked for the traditional drink when I was in England during

Wimbledon. These are quite superficial examples of culture. The harder questions tackle

religious questions of working on Saturday instead of Friday, not working closely with

men or women, having the flexibility to adhere to religious traditions, and resistance to change. But hopefully, this point underscores that the maintenance of culture is important –white British and Asian– and it is equally important and finding balance of how to maintain culture and change is important. Wholesale cultural abandonment is not necessary, nor do those active in the civil sector that I spoke to want to abandon culture.

Given this, what is important is dialogue and a proactive voluntary sector that will make a difference. In short, increasing community-to-community relations within organizational life, proactive organizational leaders, and good relations make the difference. In countries where demographics are changing and there is an active or developing voluntary sector, these relationships should be sought out and nurtured. Further, the

“home team” needs to be a part of this process as a cultural group. Treating (in European settings) indigenous whites as a default identity instead of approaching differences as cultural one obscures and distances people more than it clarifies and includes. Non-white groups are simply are not the only ones with culture. The silence in the mainstream about white cultures has allowed far-right white groups to co-opt this space. Further, white communities become inclined to argue integration as a statement against bigotry

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overlooking the whites who may also want to maintain or more explicitly articulate their culture (lest others be asked give up their culture). In Luton, two groups proactively responded to including whites in the conversation about culture instead of only allowing them in the conversation about integration. This is a step in a positive direction, which includes rather than abandons the home team on this front. This may lessen resentment, allow whites feel more included and apart of the conversation on race and ethnicity, and be on a more even footing to negotiate co–existing and inter–existing ethnic communities. Being and feeling more apart of the conversation on ethnicity may make whites less likely to relegate what happens to ethnic matters to others. In the end as civic life is ethnic in many settings across the globe and this dissertation underscores that ethnicity should not be left out of the civic picture and that the civility and organizational

behavior are most important in coming to an understanding about how to manage ethnic

conflict.

APPENDIX A SURVEYS: OLDHAM AND LUTON

Luton Survey

1) Name of organization:

2) Position of respondent in the organization?

3) When was your organization established? (If organization was established AFTER 1999 then they cannot participate– thank them and move on to the next organization)

4) Blank

5) How many active members did you have: in 1999: today:

6) What is the mission statement or the aim of your organization?

7) What is the purpose of your organization? Is the purpose of your organization? a) To primarily support, develop, and (or) to provide services for members in, other words, “internal development” OR b) Directed “outward” toward providing services for beneficiaries outside of your organization (if so, please note who these outside beneficiaries are______) OR c) Something else:______

8) Does your organization ever work with other civic/voluntary organizations? 1. Yes (continue) 2. No, check all that apply. Reasons: (answer this, then skip to question, 17) Outside of mission or scope Lack of willingness by members Exist solely for members (internal development) Other, explain______

185 186

9) Which organizations do you currently work with? 9a) What is the ethnic make up of these organizations (can be a guesstimate)? a) organization: ethnic make up: b) organization: ethnic make up: c) organization: ethnic make up: d) organization: ethnic make up: e) organization: ethnic make up: f) organization: ethnic make up:

10) Which organizations did you work with prior to 2000/2001? 10b) What is the ethnic make up of these organizations? a) organization: ethnic make up: b) organization: ethnic make up: c) organization: ethnic make up: d) organization: ethnic make up: e) organization: ethnic make up: f) organization: ethnic make up:

11) Has your work with other organizations changed Since 2001? (For example, have you worked more or less often with these groups, or worked with them for different reasons)?

12) How often would you say you worked with these groups (prior to 2000/2001)? –1 to 2 times per year –Quarterly –Monthly –More than once per month

13) How often would you say you work with these groups (now/today)? –1 to 2 times per year –Quarterly –Monthly –More than once per month

14) What kinds of projects do you carryout with other organizations?

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Any circumstances, we go out of our way to partner with others, example: ______Other reasons, please state: ______

16) Have the circumstances under which you work with organizations changed over the last 5 years (since 1999)? Please describe.

17) What is the ethnic makeup of the membership of your organization

In 1999?

Today? Guesstimate:

Community Relations

18) How important do you (as a representative of your organization) think racial relations are here in Luton? Very Important Important Neither important nor unimportant Somewhat Important Not important

19) How important do you (personally) think racial relations are here in Luton? Very Important Important Neither important nor unimportant Somewhat Important Not important

20) Compared to 1999/2000 – do you think that ethnic relations are a) better, b) the same, or c) worse, here in Luton?

Why?

21) Have there been riots or racial tensions in Luton at all since 1985 (Over the last 15–20 years)? If so, between who, and why.

22) Do you think organizations like yours have: a) helped b) hurt or c) had no effect on race relations in Luton? Explain.

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23) Are there any national celebrations and/or local festivals that draw the whole community out? a) yes b) no

24) If yes, which are they?

25) Are there any community organizations that draw the whole community out?

26) Are these organizations and celebrations well–received by the community? A) Yes? B) No? Explain.

27) Does you group participate? If yes – how?

28) Since 2001 has your organization been aware of any conflicts between Asians and whites? If so, what kind?

29) When other towns in cities and towns in England experienced riots during 2001, your city did not. Why do you think that is the case?

*30) How much day–to–day interaction would you (your personal observation) say there is in your community between Asians/whites? Christians/Muslims? (Examples: informal dining, business lunches or sports, children playing together, chatting with shopkeepers, etc.)

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Oldham Survey

1) Name of organization: 2) Position of respondent in the organization (try to interview Chief Officer/Main manager, someone with an overview of the whole organization)?

3) When was your organization established? (If organization was established AFTER 1999 then they cannot participate)

4) Blank

5) How many active members or service users did you have: in 1999: today:

6) What is the mission statement or the aims of your organization?

7) Is the purpose of your organization? a) To primarily support, develop, and (or) to provide services for members (or clients) in, other words, “internal development” b) Directed outward toward providing services for beneficiaries outside of your community c) Something else:______

8) Does your organization ever work with other organizations? 1. Yes (continue) 2. No, check all that apply. Reasons: (answer, then skip to question, 17) Outside of mission or scope Lack of willingness by members Exist solely for members Other, explain______

9) Which organizations do you currently work with? a) b) c) d) e) f)

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10) Which organizations did you work with prior to 2000/2001? a) b) c) d) e) f)

11) Has your work with other organizations changed Since 2001? (for example, more or less often, for different reasons)?

12) How often would you say you worked with these groups (prior to 2000/2001)? –1 to 2 times per year –Quarterly –Monthly –More than once per month

13) How often would you say you work with these groups (now)? –1 to 2 times per year (or less) –Quarterly –Monthly –More than once per month

14) What kinds of projects do you carryout with other organizations?

15) Under what circumstance(s) do you participate or work with other groups? Only to push forward common initiatives (city legislation or event i.e. “Don’t Smoke” campaign) As part of your organizations’ mission, please explain briefly:______Socially Any circumstances, we go out of our way to partner with others, example:______Other reasons, please state:______

16) Have the circumstances under which you work with organizations changed over the last 5 years (since 1999)? Please describe.

17) What is the ethnic makeup of the membership of your organization/service users of your organization (raw number or percentage, preferred. Guesstimate, if necessary) In 1999? Today?

191

Community Relations

18) How important do you (as a representative of your organization) think racial relations are here in Oldham? Very Important Important Neither important nor unimportant Somewhat Important Not important

19) How important do you (personally) think racial relations are here in Oldham? Very Important Important Neither important nor unimportant Somewhat Important Not important

20) Compared to 1999/2000 – do you think that ethnic relations are a) better, b) the same, or c) worse, here in Oldham?

21) Why, in your opinion did riots take place in 2001?

22) Do you think organizations like yours have a) helped, b) hurt, or c) had no effect on race relations here in Oldham? Explain.

23) Are there any national celebrations and/or local festivals that draw the whole community out? a) yes b) no

24) If yes, which are they?

25) Are there any community organizations that draw the whole community out?

26) Are these organizations and celebrations well–received by the community? A) Yes? B) No? Explain.

27) Does you group participate? If yes – how?

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28) Since 2001 has your organization been aware of any conflicts between Asians and whites? If so, what kind?

29) How much day–to–day interaction would you (your personal observation) say there is in your community between Asians/whites? Christians/Muslims? (informal dining, business lunches or sports, children playing together, chatting with shopkeepers, etc.)

APPENDIX B INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

• Tell me about the riots from your perspective–– what were the causes? What did you witness?

• Other cities in England have experienced quite a bit of tension between ethnic groups– why is Luton (or is Luton) any different?

• Tell me about ethnic relations in Luton–

• What pressures cause tensions in your community? What do you think alleviates it?

• What pressures gave rise to the riots? There are other cities in England with large Asian and working class white populations, why do you think Oldham (and Burnley) succumbed to riots and not other places?

• What was the role of the BNP? What about other organized or unorganized white groups? Other parties? What about the role of individuals?

• How and which (voluntary) organizations do you think were helpful before, during and immediately after this time? Hurtful?

• Do you find it problematic that so many organizations only cater to one particular demographic rather than being fully integrated?

• How should or should “traditional” (race, religion) British Cultural Identity be preserved? Asian identity in England? How does this jibe with immigration?

• Read quote in “New Start” would you agree or disagree with this statement?

• Do you think that bridging organizations, integrated organizations and cross– fertilization between voluntary organizations will prevent conflict? Or do you think that it is something else? If so, what is that?

193

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Kelli Moore grew up in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. She earned a Bachelor of Arts degree from Spelman College. While studying at Spelman she spent a year studying at

universities in the Dominican Republic and Brazil. While earning her PhD at the

University of Florida, she worked on civil society projects in Albania and Jamaica. She

is also a teacher and has recently taught classes in international relations and comparative

politics, focusing on international development issues and Africa.

Democratization and issues related to development are of great importance to Kelli,

but she is perhaps most passionate about interethnic relationships. She hopes to work in

fields that allow her to continue to explore these issues.

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