Abstract Risks, Resources and Politics
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ABSTRACT RISKS, RESOURCES AND POLITICS: A STUDY Of INSTITUTIONS AND RESOURCE USE PROM INDIA by Arun Agrawal Department of Political Science Duke University Date: Approved: Robert Bates, Supervisor Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University 1991 propose that four kinds of operational rules are crucial for successful institutional solutions to resource use: rules for using (resource), monitoring, sanctioning, and arbitration. The study further argues that institutions, not population or market pressures, form significant explanations of resource conservation or degradation. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First, I thank all the villagers who helped me in small ways and large. Without their openness and willingness to go out of their way, I could not have written this dissertation. They answered my questions (many of which must have sounded very stupid to them), spent time with me, travelled with me, and in diverse ways allowed me to intrude. Academic debts go back a long way. Dr. Anil Gupta guided my interest towards the study of the commons. Works by Dr. Robert Bates and Dr. Elinor Ostrom inspired me to study institutions. At Duke University, Dr. Bates, Dr. Peter Lange, Dr. Carol Smith and Dr. George Tsebelis taught courses which provided the basic grounding of this dissertation. I take this opportunity to thank them. Several individuals have read various drafts of the chapters and of the entire manuscript. With their comments and help, this dissertation has improved greatly. I want to express my gratitude to Robert Bates, Sabine Engel, Kathryn Firmin, Clark Gibson, Christine Glaser, Anil Gupta, Paulette Higgins, Alice Ingerson, Stuart Kasdin, Peter Lange, Sangeeta Luthra, Margaret McKean, Elinor Ostrom and Carol Smith. The usual disclaimer that the faults remain mine alone, has never been truer. I wrote the funding proposals for the dissertation while on a research fellowship at the Workshop for Political Theory and Policy Analysis at the University of Indiana, Bloomington. I thank my colleagues there for helping me settle down in a new place and for providing an atmosphere in which I could think about many of the conceptual problems. When gathering research data I stayed at the Indian Institute of Management in Ahmedabad, India. While I was in India, I also received help and support from several grass-roots development organizations, civil servants, and professors. I especially wish to thank Bharat and Sonali Bisht, Rita Brara, Professor Anil Gupta, Dr. B. R. Joshi, Sri Ashish Madhav, Dr. S. M. Mahnot, Sri L. C. Tyagi and Anup Wadhawan. Grants from several sources made the field work and writing possible. I would like to thank the Population Council, The International Institute for Environment and Development, The Forest History Society and Duke University. I collected data as a Population Council Fellow. A grant from the International Institute for Environment and Development helped me conduct the study on the Raikas. The Forest History Society awarded me their fellowship and generously allowed me to postpone it by a year. The Duke University administration also allowed me to postpone part of the fellowship I held from Duke. Funding from the latter two sources freed my time to write the dissertation after the field work. Finally, I thank all my friends, especially Sabine, for making life easier while I wrote this dissertation. THE STRUCTURE OF DECISION-MAKING AMONG RAIKAS: THE CREATION OF COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS 125 Loci of Decision-Making Major Types of Decisions Decision-Making Among Raika Dangs Analysis of Decisions What About Politics? Conclusion I DON'T NEED IT, BUT YOU CAN'T HAVE IT: POLITICAL RIVALRIES AND COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS. 156 Village Patawal Political Processes Change in the Institutional Arrangement Conclusion RULES, RULE MAKING AND RULE BREAKING: EXAMINING THE FIT BETWEEN RULE SYSTEMS AND RESOURCE USE 18 3 Overpopulation and Market Pressure --> Resource Degradation? Institutional Arrangements and Resource Use Use Rules Monitoring Sanctioning Arbitration Conclusion CONCLUSION 222 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 230 IV LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1: List of Raika Clans 90 Table 2.2: Average Months of Migration during the Year . 91 Table 2.3: Distribution of Migration Periods 92 Table 2.4: Correlation Between Flock Size and Duration, Distance and Frequency of Migration 93 Table 2.5: Number of Ewars in a Dang 94 Table 2.6: Distribution of Dangs by No. of Villages .. 95 Table 2.7: Ownership of Fields in Which Raikas Camp .. 96 Table 2.8: Size of a Dang in Terms of Animals 97 Table 2.9: Family Composition of Ewars: by Villages .. 98 Table 2.10: Family Composition of Ewars: By Households. 99 Table 2.11 Ewar Size according to Membership and Animal Ownership 100 Table 2.12 Reasons for Disputes between Shepherds and Farmers . 101 Table 2.13: Distribution of Flocks by Size 102 Table 2.14 Proportion of Male to Female Sheep in the Flock 103 Table 2.15 Proportion Between Males and Females Including Culled Animals 104 Table 2.16: Proportion Between Male and Female Lambs . 105 Table 2.17: Total Returns for Each Flock 106 Table 2.18 Joint Expenses Incurred by Different Flocks 107 v Table 2.19: Expenses Incurred Directly on Sheep 108 Table 2.20: Expenses Incurred on Labor 109 Table 2.21: Total Expenses Incurred by Each Flock .... 110 Table 2.22: Income and Expenditure Statement For the Flocks 111 Table 2.23: Surplus Earned in Different Flock- Size Categories 112 Table 3.1: Aggregate Decision-Making Data by Issue Area 153 Table 3.2: List of Decision Issues: Ewar Management 154 Table 3.3: List of Decision Issues: Market Interactions 155 Table 4.1: Distribution of Village Households by Caste 180 Table 4.2: Livestock Ownership in Patawal According to Caste Groups 181 Table 4.3: Land Distribution According to Caste Groups in Patawal 182 Table 5.1: Condition of the Resource and Pressure on Local Forests 2 08 Table 5.2: Condition of the Resource and Distance From Markets 209 Table 5.3: Agricultural and Forest Revenue in Kumaon 210 Table 5.4: Basic Statistics on the Six Studied Villages 211 Table 5.5: Rule Violations in Panchayat Forests: Village 3 212 Table 5.6: Rule Violation in Panchayat Forests: Village 6 213 VI LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Map 1: Migration Routes A 123 Map 2: Migration Routes B 123 Diagram 1: When Women are Present in the Dang 124 Diagram 2: When No Women are present in the Dang ... 124 Figure 2.1a: Economies of Scale: Per Sheep 125 Figure 2.1b: Economies of Scale: Per Person 125 Figure 5.1: Population Pressure and Resource Condition, A 217 Figure 5.2: Population Pressure and Resource Condition, B 218 Figure 5.3: Population Pressure and Resource Condition, C 219 Figure 5.4: Population Pressure and Resource Condition, D 220 Figure 5.5: Market Pressure and Resource Condition 221 Figure 5.6: Resource Condition and Market Distance: Six Villages 222 Figure 5.7: Resource Condition and Population Pressure, A: Six Villages 222 Figure 5.8: Resource Condition and Population Pressure, B: Six Villages 222 Figure 5.9: Resource Condition and Attention to Monitoring, Sanctions, Arbitration: Six Villages 222 vii LIST OF APPENDICES Appendix 1.1 47 Appendix 1.2 48 Appendix 2.1: Kin Relationships in Raika Ewars 113 Appendix 2.2: Consolidated List of Decision Issues.. 115 Appendix 2.3: Migration Routes 118 Appendix 5.1: Income/Expenditure Accounts of Van Panchayats 214 viii INTRODUCTION Community owned and managed resources form the basis of subsistence for millions of Indians in ecologically fragile environments.1 In the absence of benefits from common pastures and woodlots, poor households may well starve, lose their livestock, and be forced to eat their food raw.2 In recent years community owned and managed resources - the source of sustenance, fodder and fuelwood for millions of Indian households - have been threatened by a constellation of adverse factors: government policies, local political rivalries, increasing pressures from a larger population, encroachment of market forces, and most important, declining local institutions. In this study, I place the influence of institutions -- defined as sets of rules that guide human behavior -- at the core of my analysis as I examine resource use. A large number of studies in India have documented the reliance of poor households on common resources. They have also speculated about the 1Detailed evidence is available in Center for Science and Environment, The State of India's Environment 1982: A Citizens' Report (New Delhi: Center for Science and Environment, 1982); idem. The State of India's Environment. 1984- 85: The Second Citizen's Report (New Delhi: Center for Science and Environment, 1985). 2See N.S. Jodha, "Common Property Resources and Rural Poor in Dry Regions in India." Economic and Political Weekly 21 (1986): 1169-81; idem, "A Note on Contribution of CPRs to PPR-based Farming Systems in Dry Tropical Regions of India," Paper presented at Common Property Resources Workshop in Sariska, Rajasthan, India, 1987; idem, "Population Growth and Common Property Resources: Micro-Level Evidence from Selected Areas." Paper presented at Expert Consultation on Population and Agricultural Development: Institutions and Policies, FAO, Rome, June 29-July 1. importance of institutional arrangements in resource use.3 Nor are studies on commons restricted to the Indian context. In many developing countries in Africa, S. Asia, and Latin America, large numbers of studies document that poor households