Romanian Exiles During the Most-Favored-Nation Period, 1974-1988 ______

COLD WARRIORS IN THE AGE OF DÉTENTE AND DIFFERENTIATION: ROMANIAN EXILES DURING THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION PERIOD, 1974-1988 ______

A Thesis

Presented to the

Faculty of

California State University, Fullerton ______

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

History ______

Maryam Morsali Sullivan

Thesis Committee Approval:

Robert McLain, Department of History, Chair Cora Granata, Department of History Bogdan Suceava, Department of Mathematics

Spring Semester, 2017

ABSTRACT

Throughout modern history, groups of people have emigrated without the ability to return home because of the regime in power. While living in exile, they form or join new communities. They also work to determine their role and relation to their host and home countries. This study focuses on the activities and culture of Romanian exiles in the

West from 1974 to 1988. These were the years that the United States granted Most-

Favored-Nation status to Nicolae Ceaușescu’s Romania. During this time, American foreign policy ranged from détente to differentiation.

The culture of Romanian exiles during the Cold War developed into working to combat communism and lessen Romanian suffering, as well as serving as the voice of and preserving democratic Romania. Exiles never gave up hope that communism could be overthrown. When it became evident that their political activities could not achieve regime change, a group of Romanian exiles decided to diversify their goals. This included focusing on humanitarian aid and preserving Romanian democratic traditions.

They allied with the neoconservative wing of the U.S. Congress that originated in the

Democratic Party to focus more on humanitarian victories, raise awareness in the West of what they considered to be the truth about Romania, and find means to provide a threat to or weaken Ceaușescu. Exile groups were most successful in their advocacy for individuals and in providing an alternative viewpoint in the Western media.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... iv

COLD WARRIORS IN THE AGE OF DÉTENTE AND DIFFERENTIATION: ROMANIAN EXILES DURING THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION PERIOD, 1974-1988 ...... 1

Introduction ...... 1 Human Rights in Romania and Relations between Romania and the West ...... 11 Romanian Exile Culture in the United States and Western Europe ...... 54 Radio Free Europe and the Romanian Service ...... 103 Conclusion ...... 125

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 127

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would first like to thank the Staff at the Hoover Institution Library and Archives at Stanford University. Their assistance in obtaining archival materials made this project possible.

I would also like to thank my parents, Bijan, and Karen Morsali, for their encouragement of my academic goals. Finally, I want to express my gratitude to my husband, John Sullivan, for all of his encouragement and support throughout the research and writing process. This project would not have been possible without you.

My interest in Romanian history and culture developed after travelling there in

2008 and 2010. When I began this academic program, I decided that I wanted to explore this interest through my research. After examining the collection of exile papers at the

Hoover Institution Library and Archives, I discovered that I personally related to my research subjects because of my family history. My father immigrated to the United

States from Iran in the 1970s and did not return after the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

Additionally, my family had strong military connections to the overthrown Shah’s regime. Multiple family members lost their high status and some were lucky to survive the revolution. The Romanian exile attitudes towards Ceaușescu discussed in this thesis are similar to those of my family toward the current repressive Iranian regime.

While writing this thesis, I read an interview with Iranian dissident and exile

Shirin Ebadi where she declared, “While living in exile I have become the loudspeaker

iv for the people of Iran. I am the voice of the people in Iran whose voices are silent and whose demands cannot be heard by the rest of the world.”1 Ebadi’s words encapsulate the exile experience for many Iranians as well as the Romanians discussed in this thesis.

1Bryan Schatz, “Iran’s Nobel Peace Laureate Speaks From Exile.” MotherJones.com, February 29, 2016, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/02/shirin-ebadi-interview-iran-human-rights-election (accessed July 20, 2016).

v 1

INTRODUCTION

As Romanians we wish to re-state our belief in the free institutions which made us choose to live in this country in the first place, and to re-dedicate ourselves to the ideal of a democratic Romania where dignity of man will once again prevail. Ion Raţiu1

Throughout modern history, groups of people have emigrated without the ability to return home because of the regime in power. While living in exile, they form or join new communities. They also work to determine their role and relation to their host and home countries. The term “exile” is defined in this work as persons experiencing a prolonged forced or voluntary separation from their country out of fear of persecution.

This project will provide an analysis of the activities of Romanian exiles in the

U.S. and Europe during the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) period from 1974 to 1988.

Their shared experiences developed into an exile culture that revolved around politics, monitoring Western media, and humanitarian aid. It will also analyze their relationship with Romania and the neoconservative wing of the U.S. Congress. This relationship existed within the context of the disparities between the rhetoric of the United States towards communism and human rights and its actions in regards to Romania. The relationship between Romanian exiles and dissidents to their home and host countries and among themselves is essential to understanding the role that their communities played.

What do we know about Romanian exiles in the later period of communism? How did

1 Letter from Ion Raţiu to Harold Wilson June 12, 1975, Georges de Serdici Papers, Box 10, Folder 8, Hoover Institution Archives.

2 their precarious place in the world, never fully abandoning their home country, but not fully embracing their host country, shape their beliefs, thoughts, and activities? What kind of shared culture did they develop and how can this help us understand the effect of exile on people’s beliefs and actions. What impact or influence did they have? What allies did they have and what obstacles existed? Answering these questions will help gain additional understanding and insight into the effects of exile.

There are a number of historical studies, both pre-and post-1989, that deal with the Nicolae Ceaușescu regime. They particularly deal with human rights abuses, abuses of power, his megalomania and personality cult, and relations with the United States,

Soviet Union, and the Warsaw Pact.2 However, the characterizations of Ceaușescu’s regime in these works are fairly standardized, focusing on the culture of fear that revolved around the secret police, the Securitate.3 Most works on Ceaușescu’s Romania include discussions of his attempts at economic and policymaking independence from the

Soviet Union, as well as how the special economic and diplomatic relationship between

Romania and the U.S. developed.4 However, these works are not exhaustive on the topic and rarely focus on exiles or neoconservatives.

2Some important works include Dennis Deletant, Ceaușescu and the Securitate Coercion and Dissent in Romania 1965-1989 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995); Deletant, Romania Under Communist Rule (Iasi: Center for Romanian Studies, 1999); Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for all Seasons: A Political History of Romania Communism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Gail Kligman, The Politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction in Ceaușescu’s Romania (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998); Katherine Verdery National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceaușescu’s Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); and Mary Ellen Fischer, Nicolae Ceaușescu: A Study in Political Leadership (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1989).

3They specifically discuss systemization, the natal policy, rationing and shortages of food, heat, and electricity. In addition, they commonly use terms such as “terror,” “neo-Stalinism,” and “despair.”

4Roger Kirk and Mircea Raceanu, Romania vs. the United States: Diplomacy of the Absurd, 1985-1989 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994). Kirk and Raceanu wrote this monograph based on their own experiences as diplomats. They also produced original research on the topic to enhance their recollections. For an exploration of the effects of Ceaușescu’s foreign policy see Robert Weiner, Romanian Foreign

Much of the work on Romanian exiles deals with famous dissident writers like

Eugen Ionesco and Paul Goma. However, these figures are often mentioned within a larger work on socialist Romania and are not usually the central focus.5 Many other works deal with returns from exile after 1989 or are the memoirs of exiled Romanians. In addition, Mark Percival briefly profiled Romanian exile Ion Raţiu in a 1995 article.6

Since I began this project, there have been a few monographs on Eastern European exile organizations in the early years of the Cold War. However, these works focus on the larger government organizations.7 Scholarly interest on Eastern European exiles has increased in recent years. This project adds to that growing body of knowledge.

The Romanian Service of Radio Free Europe (RFE) employed many Romanian exiles, allowing these individuals to create news broadcasts. RFE served as an alternative to the official state run media. People who worked for the agency in various capacities wrote many works on RFE.8 None of these works focus exclusively on Romania, but

Policy and the United Nations (New York: Praeger, 1984). However, this work was published in 1984 so it is limited in scope.

5One notable work that includes chapters on Romanian exiles is John Neubauer and Borbala Zsuzsanna Török, eds., The Exile and Return of Writers from East-Central Europe: A Compendium, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009). This work focused on the activism of Monica Lovinescu, who moved to Paris with her husband. She was so prolific on RFE that she became the victim of a knife attack. The assailants were never caught, but it is believed Ceaușescu and the Securitate sent them.

6Mark Percival, “Britain's 'Political Romance' with Romania in the 1970s,” Contemporary European History 4, No.1 (March 1995): 67-87. Raţiu served as a leading voice of dissent against the positive portrayal of Ceaușescu in Britain.

7For a chapter that focuses on the Assembly of Captive European Nations (ACEN) see Martin Nekola, Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War: Agents, Activities, and Networks, ed. Luc van Dongen, Stephanie Roulin, and Giles Scott-Smith (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 96-112. For an article on the history of the Romanian National Committee see Marius Petraru, The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare: Cold War Organizations Sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe/ Free Europe Committee, ed. Katalin Kadar-Lynn (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2013), 121-198. However, the chapters in this monograph are focused works on specific organizations prior to 1975.

8These include Sig Mickelson, America’s Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (New York: Praeger, 1983); Richard Cummings, Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American

4 rather give insight into the structure of RFE and Radio Liberty, the influence that the

United States had on the station, and its evolution over the decades. These works also leave out any discussion of exile criticisms of the organization.

Romanian exiles faced many obstacles in their quest to influence U.S. foreign policy towards Ceaușescu’s Romania. Their successes and failures shaped the culture of the exile community. In order to understand how this happened, it is essential to understand the relationship between Ceaușescu and the United States. The changes that

Ceaușescu made domestically and internationally in the 1960s altered Romania’s relationship with the U.S. and the West. This decreased Romanian exile influence on the

White House and State Department, especially during the MFN years. Exile objectives did not fit in with the foreign policy goals of these nations. Even as Ceaușescu’s regime devolved into a highly repressive Stalinist regime, his earlier actions and continued rhetoric made it difficult for the U.S. to cut ties.

The first chapter begins by focusing on Nicolae Ceaușescu’s foreign and domestic policies to provide context. His foreign policy led to a close relationship with Western governments while his domestic policy led to a collapse in human rights.9 He pursued foreign and domestic policies to gain distance from the Soviet Union, such as refusing to participate in and condemning the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. At the same time, he reached out to the United States, Western Europe, and nonaligned nations as trading partners. Ceaușescu committed known human rights abuses and oversaw the rise of a

Broadcasting in Europe 1950-1989 (Jefferson: McFarland, 2009); George R. Urban, Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy: My War Within the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); and Arch Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000). For a chapter on the Romanian service see Nestor Ratesh, Cold War Broadcasting: Impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, eds. A. Ross Johnson and R. Eugene Parta (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010), 205-228.

9Ceaușescu was the General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party from 1965 to 1989.

5 personality cult. Despite this, the United States and their allies viewed him as a fissure in what was otherwise a monolithic Soviet and Warsaw Pact stance on foreign policy issues.

The U.S. hoped that they could use Ceaușescu’s seeming break with Soviet policies for their own interests against the Soviet Union. They viewed Ceaușescu as a “reform communist,” which the White House and State Department wanted to encourage in

Eastern Europe. In 1975, the U.S. granted MFN status to Romania. The majority of

Romanian exiles opposed this because they viewed it as a means to bolster Ceaușescu without improving the conditions of Romanians.

The issuance of MFN occurred at the same time as the rise of second-generation,

Democratic neoconservatives in the U.S. Congress. They were increasingly concerned with human rights in Eastern Europe. Congressional renewal of MFN was dependent on

Romania maintaining certain levels of emigration. Over the years they increasingly took into consideration additional human rights issues.

The chapter then uses this context to focus on the neoconservative and exile responses to MFN. Romanian exiles did not have the power or influence to enact change on foreign policy at their will. However, they shared the same views with and reached out to neoconservatives in Congress. Exiles were determined to have an impact. Both groups used the language of human rights to push for changes in Romania. MFN was the perfect starting point for the human rights argument, with many members of Congress open to hearing the Romanian exile point of view. They also worked together to improve human rights in Romania. Many exile groups either testified during Congressional sessions on

MFN renewal or submitted written communications to be considered in the

Congressional Record. The neoconservative wing of the U.S. Congress worked to

6 undermine the White House policies of détente and differentiation. Members of Congress utilized Romanian exile voices when it fit in with their own aims. This took the form of

Congressional testimony, both oral and written, hearings, correspondence, and interviews.

A small group of mostly neo-conservative members of Congress regularly and increasingly pressed the issue of expanding human rights and placed pressure on

Washington and Bucharest. However, they were bypassed because of favorable recommendations from the White House and State Department. While the executive branch was concerned about human rights in Romania, it prioritized weakening the

Soviet Union. Even though Congressional votes and influence were not strong enough to change State Department policies, they were a vocal opposition contingent able to place pressure on Ceaușescu. They not only ensured higher emigration rates, but also were able to extract concessions on religious freedoms and releasing political prisoners. Exiles served as an additional source of information for Congress.

The second chapter focuses exclusively on the activities and shared culture of

Romanian exiles. In particular, it focuses on a group of elites who were part of the first wave of exiles during the Cold War. After the establishment of the Romanian communist regime in 1945, the government convicted Iuliu Maniu and other leaders of the National

Peasants’ Party (PNȚ) of treason in a show trial in 1947. The PNȚ was one of the two leading political parties during the interwar period. This signaled the end of political freedom in Romania. As a result, many Romanian citizens fled to the U.S. and Western

Europe, joining exiles who escaped during WWII, but who did not always share the same political beliefs. The Cold War exiles participated in political, cultural, and humanitarian

7 activism and advocacy. As exile numbers grew, Romanian citizens living in the West joined anti-communist, pro-democracy advocacy groups. They viewed themselves as the official mouthpiece for democratic minded Romanians who could not speak out.

The exile groups had earlier successes in the 1940s and 1950s, when their goals were more aligned with Western foreign policy goals. Groups such as the Assembly of

Captive European Nations (ACEN) and the Romanian National Committee (CNR) received funding and support from Western governments. Allen W. Dulles and George F.

Kennan were among the prominent Americans who created the Free Europe Committee

(FEC), which was secretly the public face of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) project.

The FEC founded ACEN, which was a coalition of representatives from the Eastern Bloc dedicated to liberation from communism. CNR was the Romanian organization represented in ACEN and claimed to be a government in exile. However, after Stalin’s death in 1953 and the failure of the West to support the Hungarian Revolution of 1956,

Western governments made changes in their foreign policy, rhetoric and attitudes towards the Soviet Union and its satellite nations.

The détente of the 1970s and differentiation of the 1980s did not align with the attitudes and goals of Romanian exiles. They viewed these policies as forms of appeasement. Romanian exiles used a variety of methods in their attempts to change US foreign policy towards Romania and Ceaușescu’s domestic policies. Some advocated for regime change altogether. They contacted members of Congress and the White House, as well as their equivalents in other Western nations such as Great Britain. Exiles described the situation in Romania and urged them to take action against Ceaușescu. They also worked to influence public opinion to place pressure on the government. This took the

8 form of letter writing to newspapers, magazines, and other media outlets to combat what they viewed as false or misleading coverage of Romania. They served as watchdogs of

Western media reports on Romania, often writing letters, many of which were published, to support or contest articles written about the Ceaușescu regime.

Exile groups also focused on humanitarian efforts in Romania. Beginning in the

1970s, the White House’s rhetoric increasingly included human rights language and goals. As a result, Romanian exiles learned that focusing on human rights was a more tangible method to help their compatriots that remained in the East. They also hoped that this could weaken Ceaușescu’s stature within the West by highlighting his hypocrisy.

They sent aid to people in need and worked to help increase the profile of dissidents in the West. Doing this helped protect dissidents and reunite families. In addition, there were several Romanian language newspapers dedicated to exile affairs as well as advocacy organizations and political parties in exile, most notably the PNȚ. This was useful for debating positions and determining courses of action.

Many of these groups also organized events to preserve democratic Romanian culture while in exile. Some notable exiles in this group include Georges de Serdici of the

PNȚ in exile in London and Sweden, Brutus Coste of the Truth about Romania

Committee (TARC) in New York, and Ion Raţiu and Horia Georgescu of the British-

Romanian Association (ACARDA) in England. Serdici worked to keep his political party alive for its eventual return to a democratic Romania. Coste used TARC to speak out against MFN renewal and the state of human rights in Romania yearly, as he was the most respected Romanian exile to the U.S. Congress. Raţiu and Georgescu used

ACARDA and their political influence in Britain to influence culture and politics. They

9 all had contacts inside Romania who shared information with them about their experiences.

The third chapter discusses the role of the Romanian Service of RFE. The United

States used RFE as a tool of cultural diplomacy. RFE began as a forum for Romanian exiles. It eventually evolved into a legitimate alternative to state run news. Dissidents and political prisoners in Romania often used RFE as a means to inform the West of their plight and generate pressure for their eventual release. Exiles considered themselves to be strong stakeholders in the Romanian Service because the organization was run by

Romanians for Romanians. They also considered the Romanian Service as an extension of their role as the official voice for Romanians. Even though RFE was enormously popular in Romania, there were many critics within the exile communities who claimed that many people involved were soft on communism or were working with the Securitate.

This reflects some of the tensions and divisions within the exile community.

As this thesis will show, the culture of Romanian exiles developed into working to combat communism and lessen Romanian suffering, as well as serving as the voice of and preserving democratic Romania. These individuals never gave up hope that communism could be overthrown. However, in the ages of détente and differentiation, they were resigned that it could take a long time to occur. When it became evident that their political activities could not achieve regime change, this group of Romanian exiles decided to diversify their goals. This included focusing on humanitarian aid and preserving democratic, Romanian traditions. They allied with the neoconservative wing of the U.S. Congress to focus more on humanitarian victories, raise awareness in the

West of what they considered to be the truth about Romania, and find means to provide a

10 threat to or weaken Ceaușescu. Exile groups were most successful in their advocacy for individuals and in providing an alternative viewpoint in the Western media.

Romanian exiles expressed the democratic, Romanian point of view to the West via government leaders and published writings. They also preserved the historical political parties, such as the PNȚ, which continued to function in exile. They preserved the memory of martyrs such as Maniu. They continually shared Maniu’s story and named organizations and awards after him. Additionally they worked as a foil against Ceaușescu and for humanitarian causes in Romania by working with the neoconservatives in

Congress. Members and colleagues of the PNȚ worked together throughout the Cold War in various combinations to achieve their goals.

CHAPTER 1

HUMAN RIGHTS IN ROMANIA AND RELATIONS BETWEEN ROMANIA AND THE WEST

Ceaușescu the “Maverick”

In 1965, the Romanian Communist Politburo elected Ceaușescu to succeed

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej as the new General Secretary of the Romanian Communist

Party. He spent his first two years in office consolidating his political power and securing popular support. He continued Dej’s de-Stalinization program and imposed rapid industrialization and relatively liberal economic policies while pursuing a seemingly autonomous foreign policy from the Soviet Union. Ceaușescu’s economic and military independence proved to be popular with Romanians, who disliked their “Soviet overlord.”1 Indeed there seemed reason for optimism regarding the new regime. The regime no longer jammed foreign radio broadcasts, released many political prisoners, and there was greater freedom in publishing. Ceaușescu played up nationalist elements within communism, which helped connect Romanians to their government and relaxed internal suppression. Ceaușescu denounced the abuses of the Securitate, gave more power to the courts, and limited the amount of time a prisoner could be held without charge to 24 hours.2 At the same time, standards of living began to rise as people purchased Romanian

1Dennis Deletant, Romania Under Communist Rule (Iasi: Center for Romanian Studies, 1999), 106.

2 One aspect of his consolidation of power was the rehabilitation of Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu. Ceausescu’s denouncement of the Securitate was a strategic move in an effort to discredit and remove former head Alexandru Drăghici from power. Drăghici was responsible for Pătrășcanu’s execution and Ceausescu’s

12 made appliances such as cars, televisions, refrigerators, and vacuums. Some Western shows were broadcast on television, one of the most popular being “the Saint,” whose effect on the populace historian Dennis Deletant describes as emptying the streets of

Bucharest for an hour each Saturday night. The state also allowed the Western company

Pepsi-Cola to open a bottling plant in Romania, symbolizing the new relations between

Romania and Western capitalist nations. The state erected new housing and apartments to accommodate all of the new factory workers moving to the city for employment. This era was the peak of the Romanian standard of living and economic growth. Ominously, these trends would not last.

In addition to domestic changes, Ceaușescu continued to reform Romania’s foreign policy. Ceaușescu advocated for polycentrism within the Eastern Bloc as a way to devolve his decision-making and power away from the Soviet Union.3 He also turned away from the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), which was the union of Soviet bloc regimes for economic development. He also worked towards economic integration with first and third world nations. To connect with Western nations,

Ceaușescu labeled Romania as a developing country, thereby affiliating with other developing nations with various economic models, especially in the United Nations

(UN). Similarly, within the UN, Ceaușescu advocated for the sovereignty of all nations and pushed for internal solutions to internal problems instead of external intervention.

main rival for party supremacy. Blaming Drăghici for all Securitate abuses, particularly Pătrășcanu’s execution, insured widespread support throughout the Communist Party and ultimately led to Drăghici’s exclusion in 1968.

3Polycentrism was a term coined by Palmiro Togliatti and used by many Communist regimes after Joseph Stalin’s death.

This was as an implicit message to the Soviet Union and the United States.4 Ceaușescu used Romania’s membership in the UN as a forum to display his independent foreign policy from the Soviet Union, which gained him support and prestige internationally.

These changes made Western nations eager to exploit this fissure within the Communist bloc pursuant to their own foreign policy goals.

Standing on the balcony of the Romanian Communist Party’s (RCP) Central

Committee building, Ceaușescu publicly condemned the 1968 Soviet invasion of

Czechoslovakia to a huge crowd roaring with approval. This helped make him a

Romanian national hero and marked the complete consolidation of his power.5 This public rejection of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, combined with Ceaușescu’s liberalization policies and nationalistic rhetoric, marked this event as the height of his popularity in Romania. This also proved to be the apex of Ceaușescu’s liberalization policies as he continued his outreach policy to the United States and Western Europe.

After this, he slowly began restoring the censorship that he loosened at the beginning of his rule.

This denunciation also increased his popularity abroad, particularly in the United

States. The years 1969-1977 marked the closest period of relations between the United

States and Romania. In August 1969, U.S. President Richard Nixon made an official state visit to Bucharest, which was the first time an American president had visited Romania

4Robert Weiner, Romanian Foreign Policy and the United Nations (New York: Praeger, 1984), 13. Ceaușescu advocated for dismantling the idea of dividing Europe into East and West when it came to trade relations within the UN Economic Commission for Europe. Instead, he wanted each member nation to be treated equally as autonomous, sovereign states.

5Mary Ellen Fischer, Nicolae Ceaușescu: A Study in Political Leadership (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1989), 145. This moment marked the height of his popularity. His failed attempt to replicate it on December 21, 1989 marked the beginning of his downfall, which ended in his execution four days later.

14 since the installation of the communist regime. 6 After the visit, many Western news outlets portrayed Ceaușescu as a maverick in foreign policy and “the only trustworthy

Communist leader.”7 Ceaușescu exploited this positive press to further justify his rule within Romania and to label dissenting voices as traitors to the nation. He also used high- level visits with American presidents to further legitimize his cult of personality by showing the Romanian people his power and importance on the world stage. Romanian exiles did not trust Ceaușescu or believe that his reforms were sincere. They spoke out against Ceaușescu and his regime in letters, newspapers, and on RFE. However, his newfound international popularity proved to be an obstacle for exile activism.

One of Ceaușescu’s most prominent foreign policy objectives was to become a major player on the world stage. This would give him greater autonomy from the Soviet

Union. He established official ties and communications to nations such as China, Israel, and Vietnam when the Soviet Union or the United States did not.8 Romania had remained neutral during the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s and Ceaușescu was part of the

Romanian delegation that visited China in March 1964. Ceaușescu continued Romania’s role of serving as a mediator in talks between the rival superpowers. At the same time, by accepting Ceaușescu’s invitation to visit, Nixon hoped to use Romania as an intermediary to re-establish relations with China, which occurred in 1971.9

6Nixon made a visit two years earlier and his warm reception left a positive impression.

7Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for all Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 203.

8 Romania was the first Eastern bloc nation to establish ties to West Germany and the only one to maintain relations with Israel after the Six Day War in June 1967. Also in 1967 Ceaușescu agreed to serve as an intermediary in negotiations between the US and the communist government in Hanoi, Vietnam. He passed messages between the two until the Tet Offensive in 1968 put a stop to all communications.

9Joseph Harrington and Bruce Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians: Fifty Years of American-

To reward Ceaușescu’s independence from Moscow and his desire to establish relationships with the West, Romania became the first Warsaw Pact nation to join

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1971, the International Monetary

Fund (IMF), and World Bank in 1972, and gain preferential trade from the European

Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. Additionally, the Nixon Administration made a commitment to seek MFN for Romania in 1969 and in 1973, Ceaușescu and Nixon made a joint statement confirming it. At UN General Assembly meetings, the US Secretary of

State would meet with the Romanian Foreign Minister as a means to demonstrate

Romania’s independent voting record from the USSR, as well as the special status that

Romania held among Eastern European nations. At the same time, Ceaușescu continued to expand his popularity in Western Europe.

Ceaușescu signed accords with several Western European nations during the

1970s, which were always made public in order to demonstrate his power and connections to the Romanian people. For example, Romania signed many trade agreements with Britain in the 1970s. Britain was able to export goods to Romania, yet the balance of trade was uneven in Romania’s favor. During this time Members of

Parliament (MP) visited Romania and praised Ceaușescu, his foreign policy, and the

Romanian people.10 Additionally, media reports in major British newspapers such as The

Guardian often praised his domestic policies, including the official end of censorship in

Romania. However, they did not note the difference between statements and practice.

Romanian Relations, 1940-1990 (Boulder and New York: East European Monographs; Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1991), 290.

10Whereas most MPs stuck to praising foreign policy, MP David Steel was one of the few to praise Ceaușescu’s domestic policies.

Pictures of Ceaușescu meeting with Harold Wilson and Margaret Thatcher of Great

Britain, Charles de Gaulle of France, and Willy Brandt of West Germany, in addition to

Presidents Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter were circulated in both Romania and their respective countries. Also, Wilson publicly referred to Ceaușescu as one of “only two or three people in the world [that] posses a vision and understanding of things.”11

Theses attitudes hindered the actions of neoconservative members of the U.S. Congress and the Romanian exile community.

While Ceaușescu ingratiated himself to the U.S. and Western Europe, he simultaneously began to restrict freedoms and human rights for the Romanian people. He used his new international prestige to justify the economic and personal sacrifices

Romanian citizens were forced to make for industrialization and modernization. He simultaneously further legitimized and cemented his cult of personality. One method was to diminish the role of the Orthodox Church. The state discouraged people from attending by not observing church holidays and scheduling Communist party activities on Sundays.

As the years passed, Ceaușescu tried to replace the church as the center of Romanian worship with his own personality cult. Ceaușescu was characterized as infallible with all

Romanian success attributed to him and personal failure as the result of not following him. Since religious freedom in Romania was an important issue for American policymakers and lawmakers, Ceaușescu’s actions would cause problems in the future.

Ceaușescu’s demographic policies encapsulate Romania’s human rights problems.

To address the declining birth rate, Ceaușescu banned abortion, taxed childless adults, and encouraged couples to have multiple children by offering rewards. The state

11Mark Percival, “Britain’s ‘Political Romance’ with Romania in the 1970s,” Contemporary European History 4, No.1 (March 1995): 14. In a June 7, 1978 interview with Romanian news agency Agerpres, James Callaghan referred to Ceaușescu as a “world statesman.”

17 demanded that families produce at least four or five children, politicizing demographic policy as a way to build socialism in Romania.12 Modern contraception methods were absent in Romania, making abortions the primary method of family planning. Many sought out illegal abortions, which led to a high maternal mortality rate. Yet as the state demanded that citizens reproduce to increase the population, they did not supply enough food, milk, or other staples of survival for these children. The state released a publication of the ideal diet of a pregnant woman in order to produce a healthy child and contribute to society, but it was impossible for most people to obtain a fraction of the items on the list. People could not afford to take care of these increasing numbers of children, especially since there was a scarcity of vital resources such as food and heating, which led to a high infant mortality rate with many sent to state run orphanages.

Ceaușescu’s natal policy touched the lives of every Romanian adult and brought the state into intimate contact with its citizens.13 Ceaușescu ran a paternalist state that denied adults control over their bodies and reproduction, leading many to fear intimacy because it could lead to unwanted and unaffordable pregnancies. He was obsessed with increasing the birthrate in Romania, and set numbers and goals for the population to attain, using statistics, electoral lists, and demography while monitoring the citizenry through regional and local police to ensure compliance. The state held doctors and nurses personally responsible for meeting these goals and the government imposed monetary penalties on those that did not meet them.14 This exemplifies the dehumanization of

12Gail Kligman, The Politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction in Ceaușescu’s Romania (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), 9.

13Ibid., 2.

14Ibid., 69.

Romanian citizens as an extension of the state and its influence on daily life. This policy was a precursor to Ceaușescu’s future and larger scale social engineering projects that would further violate human rights.

However, Ceaușescu’s abortion ban differed from Soviet natal policies and was therefore well received in the West, especially the United States. The U.S. portrayed him as not only a maverick for contradicting the Soviets, but also as an illustration of family values.15 Leaders and legislators viewed these policies as anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, and anti-Soviet, thereby externally legitimizing this aspect of his rule.16 However, what

Westerners did not know was that the Romanian state encouraged promiscuity as a means to increase the birthrate, flying in the face of ideas of traditional family values and morality. This highlights the widening gap between Ceaușescu’s actual policies and distorted image in the West.

In 1971, Ceaușescu visited China and North Korea and was subsequently influenced by Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung. This marked a major turning point in his rule, especially in regards to human rights in Romania. He was particularly impressed by

Mao’s Cultural Revolution’s achievements as well as the public adulation for Kim and the complete control he possessed over North Korea. Ceaușescu reveled in the marches, dances, songs, and banners dedicated to the leaders of these countries. In North Korea, a chorus sang the Romanian national anthem in perfect Romanian to honor their guest.

Ceaușescu returned to Romania with the desire to increase his cult of personality and to establish a system of dynastic communism in Romania. This led to severe violations of

15Ibid., 59.

16Ibid., 114.

19 human rights that would bring him into conflict with Romanian exiles and the US government.

His July Theses of 1971, which consisted of seventeen proposals, are often described as a mini-cultural revolution to maintain ideological control over the population. These proposals aimed to strengthen party control over all aspects of

Romanian life and strengthen the ideology of all members and leaders of the RCP. They also increased censorship of art and ideas to ensure that writing and theater would be used to promote socialist ideals and interests. Ceaușescu attempted to re-make

Romanians into a new breed of socialists. In order to do this, the state instituted a system of disciplining and monitoring the populace.17

Ceaușescu created a climate of fear that revolved around the Securitate, the

Romanian secret police. The Securitate employed an extensive network of informers and wiretapping to monitor everyone. Hidden microphones were all over the country, especially in Bucharest. Citizens did not know when they were being watched and were afraid of the consequences of behaving in a non-state approved manner. This randomness helped create widespread paranoia. Romanians had to carefully consider how the

Securitate could interpret and record everything they said aloud. Prominent Romanian citizens were the most closely watched by the Securitate. Dissident writers such as Paul

Goma, Dorin Tudoran, and Dumitru Țepeneag were isolated by the same community of writers they once belonged to, out of fear of association. The government harassed and intimidated writers and dissidents until they were allowed to immigrate to Paris, where a number of exiled Romanian writers lived. Ceaușescu even revoked Țepeneag’s

17Kligman, Duplicity, 13.

20 citizenship by a Presidential decree, thereby forcing him into exile in Paris. These writers, along with other vocal anti-communist exiles, continued to experience harassment even while abroad. In December 1971, Ceaușescu passed a law prohibiting the broadcasting or publishing abroad of any material that outsiders could potentially use against the state. He also forbade Romanian citizens from having contact with foreign radio stations, particularly RFE, or newspapers that he deemed as hostile to Romania. By the 1980s even meeting with foreigners constituted a crime. As the population grew more discontented, the regime imposed increasingly repressive measures, using censorship and police surveillance to reinforce the regime.

For the next decade and a half, Ceaușescu’s wife, children, and other relatives were given prime positions throughout the government and society. This was also a means to prevent any internal liberalization or unrest in Romania that was occurring in neighboring Eastern bloc nations.18 Robert Weiner described Ceaușescu’s rule as “a neo-

Stalinist personality cult, buttressed by one of the most pervasive secret police forces in all of Eastern Europe.”19 His level of personal power and control had not been seen in

Eastern Europe since the decline of Stalinism. Ceaușescu created a paternalist state in which the needs of the citizens were defined by what benefited the state. He wanted to create a new Romania where individualism was non-existent and citizens were completely dependent on the state. Disagreeing with Ceaușescu and the party would label a person as a traitor to the nation, stressing the need for unity to combat outside interference. In 1974 Ceaușescu created the office of President of Romania for himself,

18Tismaneanu, Stalinism, 206.

19Weiner, Foreign Policy, 6.

21 while dressing the part of a monarch, holding a scepter.20 Mary Ellen Fischer likened the elaborate, televised inauguration ceremony to that of a royal coronation.21 Despite this growing neo-Stalinism, the U.S. Congress granted MFN status to Romania in 1975 as a means to reward Ceaușescu for his foreign policy and attempt to influence his domestic policies on human rights.

The Second Age of Neo-Conservatism in the United States

The White House and State Department were more interested in defeating the

Soviet Union than in protecting the human rights of Romanian citizens. They hoped to use Romania to weaken the Soviet Union. At first, Ceaușescu’s independent posture was attractive to many in Congress. At the same time, the second age of neoconservatism rose from right-wing members of the Democratic Party who were unhappy with George

McGovern’s policies and his defeat for the Presidency. They created a faction in 1972 called the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM). They wanted to restore American morality and dignity following the Vietnam War, and attempted to do this through advocating foreign policy that emphasized human rights and freedom. They also wanted to reaffirm American values and strengthen the defense of the nation, which was

“incompatible with accommodation with the enemy” which was the Soviet Union.22

Since CDM affiliated Congressmen were opposed to many of President Carter’s policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, they worked to pass legislation that would give them

20Photograph of Nicolae Ceaușescu March 15, 1984, Horia Georgescu Papers, Box 12, Hoover Institution Archives.

21Fischer, Ceaușescu, 2.

22Justin Vaïsse, Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 279. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Senator Daniel P. Moynihan were members of the CDM.

22 influence over U.S. foreign policy decisions.23 They also made internal human rights issues in Eastern Europe a matter of U.S. foreign policy. This excited Romanian exiles that hoped this could lead to positive changes in Romania.

Neoconservatives and exiles held the same beliefs and used the same rhetoric in their criticisms of communist Romania. Subsequently, Romanian exiles worked to form alliances with this congressional faction. The CDM, like Romanian exiles, opposed détente with the Soviet Union and believed in withholding aid from the totalitarian, expansionist nation with a poor economy. The CDM’s “vision contained five main elements: defense of democracy, promotion of human rights, assertion of American military power, support for Israel, and decreased emphasis on the United Nations and multilateralism.”24 Their biggest ally was the hawkish U.S. Senator Henry M. “Scoop”

Jackson of Washington, who was an uncompromising anticommunist as well as a supporter of Israel and any threatened democratic nation.25 He was also critical of the

UN, unsupportive of SALT treaties, and supportive of antimissile defenses. Jackson became the leader of the Democratic Party’s neoconservative wing. The success of détente between the U.S. and Soviet Union angered Jackson. He wanted to weaken détente and place the “ideological issues of values, democracy, and human rights back at the center of U.S.-Soviet relations.”26 As a result, Jackson would play a large role in the political relationship between the United States and Romania.

23Very few members of CDM gained high-level positions in the Carter administration, since he did not get along with Scoop Jackson and owed little to this faction of the party.

24Vaïsse, Neoconservatism, 136.

25Ibid., 110. 26Ibid., 116.

Romania’s Most-Favored-Nation Status

The Soviet Union’s implementation of an emigration tax on all citizens who wanted to permanently re-locate led to Jackson’s efforts to tie MFN status to emigration.

Senator Jackson and Representative Charles Vanik of Ohio co-authored an amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, which tied the granting of non-discriminatory trade, known as

MFN status, to freedom of emigration. They designed the amendment to prevent trade with the Soviet Union. They believed that hindering U.S. economic aid to the Soviet economy would further weaken the USSR, which might encourage internal dissent and protest. In addition, Jackson was concerned about Jewish emigration in Eastern Europe, especially from the USSR, for both personal and political reasons. The Jackson-Vanik amendment would encourage higher rates of Jewish emigration from Eastern bloc nations since MFN would be tied to economic interests. This proved to be successful in Romania.

After Gerald Ford became President, Jackson and Henry Kissinger finally agreed to a compromise between Congress and the State Department. The bill passed with the amendment, but also gave the White House the power to recommend a waiver to the requirements. Section 402 stated that the amendment “prohibits the granting of MFN treatment, government credits, or investment guarantees, or any negotiation of a commercial agreement with any communist country if that country does not allow its citizens the freedom to emigrate.”27 However, the U.S. President could “waive this prohibition for limited periods of time if he determines that doing so will promote freedom of emigration.”28 Congress then had the option to introduce and approve a

27Senate Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance, Continuing Most-Favored- Nation Tariff Treatment of Imports from Romania, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976, 125.

28Ibid., 125.

24 disapproval resolution on the Presidential waiver. In this way, the executive and legislative branches could circumvent legislation and policies on human rights when it benefitted U.S. foreign policy and economic goals. Its successful passage introduced the issue of human rights into U.S. foreign policy, which would prove to be a crucial feature of relations between the U.S. and Romania until 1988. 29 With Congress’ attempt to influence U.S. foreign policy, Jackson successfully undermined détente with the Soviet

Union and unintentionally created a way for Romania to gain MFN status.

The Romanian desire for friendship and cooperation with the United States ignited conversation in Congress as to the possibility of offering MFN status to Romania.

Congress granted Romania MFN status on August 3, 1975, after approving President

Ford’s waiver since their emigration practices did not meet the criteria set forth in

Jackson-Vanik. By granting MFN status to Romania, the White House, State Department, and Congress hoped to encourage and reward Ceaușescu’s “maverick” behavior, causing further problems for the USSR. Neo-conservative representatives and senators fell into two camps, the first being those who supported Jackson-Vanik as a means to promote human rights through emigration, and the second who argued that it did not go far enough in promoting human rights. Despite their reservations, many from the second group did not initially vote to override the Presidential waiver because they hoped to use MFN as a means to expand human rights further than emigration. They would later regret this decision as it became politically difficult to remove MFN. One of the most notable skeptics was Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina. Since he believed Romania needed

MFN more than the U.S. did, he made an impassioned statement in support of using it as

29Vaïsse, Neoconservatism, 118.

25 a means to reform Romania’s internal practices. Helms was less concerned with the number of people emigrating and more with a change in emigration practices. Helms and other neoconservative Congressional representatives would continually voice these concerns throughout the MFN period.

To show good faith, Romania participated in the Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki, Finland in 1975. Its outcomes served as a rallying point for anti-communist Romanian exiles. This also marked the first time an international agreement contained a section on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms that included the freer movement of people, ideas, and information. Ceaușescu signed on to the non-binding Final Act of the Helsinki Accords that included a section on human rights, in which Article VII was titled “Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.” Part of the text stated that,

The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development.

Ceaușescu’s signing of a document with strong language on increasing human rights and personal freedoms signaled hope for renewed liberalization for many Romanian citizens.

Yet, Ceaușescu’s subsequent actions quickly demonstrated that his signature was an empty promise. Exiles regularly used this hypocrisy as grounds for revoking MFN.

Ceaușescu’s signature on the Helsinki Accords, even though they were non-binding, provided fodder for exiles to refer to when making their case for human rights in

Romania. Neoconservative Congressmen Jackson, Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, and Bob Dole of Kansas were on Congressional committees that monitored the Helsinki

Accords and therefore were frequent recipients of exile correspondence.

After the first year of MFN, neoconservatives in Congress were concerned that it was supporting the violation of human rights in Romania. Many testified during the MFN hearings in support of revoking the status. This marked the beginning of the conflict between the White House and neoconservatives in Congress. Exiles continued to lobby

Congress and submit testimony, thereby pressuring the latter. When President Ford recommended the waiver for MFN to Congress again in 1976, the reaction from the neoconservative wing differed from that of the White House and State Department.

While Ford and other Western leaders praised Ceaușescu for being a “maverick” in the

Eastern Bloc, neoconservative Congressional Representatives denounced his Stalinism and human rights violations. This echoed the arguments of Romanian exiles. However, instead of voting against the Presidential waiver, many of the skeptical neoconservative members of Congress reluctantly voted to continue MFN in order to determine its effectiveness in creating change. At the same time, exiles were concerned that the benefits MFN gave to Ceaușescu were greater than any influence Congress could have on human rights. Neoconservative legislators voiced their concerns during the Congressional hearings. Then, Senator Helms submitted a resolution to discontinue MFN in order to place pressure on Ceaușescu to change his policies. Representatives accused Ceaușescu of minimum compliance with Jackson-Vanik without making real reforms in emigration policies. On September 8, 1976, Representative Robert F. Drinan of Massachusetts opposed the extension despite an increase in emigration levels to the US because he

27 believed that Romania was not making adequate progress towards establishing freedom of emigration.

Drinan cited the over 500 applicants that did not receive permission to emigrate in his testimony. He also cited the harassment of 22 applicants by the government. He then expressed concern for the decrease in emigration numbers to Israel from 3,700 in 1974 to

2,140 in 1975. In the first four months of 1976 only 747 Jewish Romanians immigrated to Israel, leading the Senate to project that the total number would be similar to the 1975 figures. Since the number of emigrants decreased from the time that Congress issued

MFN, the statistics supported Drinan’s argument that MFN did not have an impact on emigration numbers and therefore should no longer be offered to Romania. In addition, the total number of emigrants in 1975 was 10,701 but in 1976 the number dropped to

9,336, further validating Drinan’s argument. A small group of representatives signed on to Drinan’s statement expressing their deep concern over Romanian emigration practices.

They insisted on monitoring the emigration situation over the next year to ensure

Romanian cooperation and progress.30

Representative Ed Koch of New York echoed Drinan when he expressed concerns about the total number of Jewish immigrants. However, he continued to support MFN.

Koch sought to assuage Romanian concern and confusion over MFN’s purpose by expressing these views in an October 7, 1976 RFE interview with Liviu Floda. Koch explained his reservations directly to RFE listeners and focused on the lack of progress in

Romanian emigration and human rights. He also explained his rationale for using MFN extension as a means of helping people emigrate while simultaneously using the next

30Senate Subcommittee, Most-Favored-Nation, 1976, 4.

28 year to apply pressure to the Ceaușescu regime to make progress in emigration and the treatment of ethnic minorities.

Additional representatives used the language of human rights in expressing their concerns over continuing MFN. Representative Larry McDonald of Georgia declared that the United States used to be “the greatest bulwark of freedom and human rights in the world,” but expressed disappointment how the U.S. had become less so over the past decade. 31 He cited U.S. support of Ceaușescu, despite his human rights record, as proof of this decline. McDonald described the persecution of Romanians, including the lack of freedom of artistic expression, harassment of citizens who made contact with foreigners, low wages, and long lines for food. McDonald was also concerned that Hungarian and

German minorities were treated as second-class citizens who were forced to assimilate into the dominant Romanian culture. Representative Jack Kemp of New York supported and reiterated McDonald’s concerns. He stated the imperativeness of the U.S. maintaining a strong position as a defender of human rights internationally. He worried that the U.S. would lose the “respect and devotion of the hundreds of millions of people who live deprived of their most sacred right: self-determination and freedom to decide their fate individually and as a community.”32 Kemp also argued that fundamental human rights should and could be the true aim of Jackson-Vanik with emigration coming in second. With each passing year, an increasing number of neo-conservative members of

Congress adhered to this idea. As a result, Kemp’s words resonated with Romanian exiles

31Ibid., 36.

32House Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, Extension of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment to Romania, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976, 237.

29 since they shared the aspiration for the U.S. government to focus on human rights in general and not just on emigration.

Congressional criticisms carried into the hearings the following year. Several

Romanian exiles submitted written testimony critical of Ceaușescu. Senator Abraham

Ribicoff of Connecticut pointed to the fluctuations in monthly Jewish immigration numbers to Israel. He also accused Romania of devising a lengthy application procedure to discourage applicants. He joined Senator Carl T. Curtis of Nebraska and Senator James

L. Buckley of New York in objecting to the treatment of Hungarian and German minorities in Romania. Curtis cited a New York Times article from May 30, 1976, which stated that official repression of ethnic minorities in Romania increased from 1975 to

1976. Senator Thurmond echoed many political Romanian exiles when he called the

Romanian regime “one of the most Stalinist and rigid regimes in the communist bloc.”33

Exile and neoconservative language were once again the same.

Additionally, in 1977 neo-conservative members of Congress began to voice concern for human rights outside of the scope of Jackson-Vanik. Two years of MFN had not produced the desired effects. As a result, they began to discuss withholding MFN as a means to produce changes. Koch, Representative Christopher Dodd of Connecticut, and

Representative Dante Fascell of Florida, among others, discussed the crackdown on dissidents during the past year. They cited dissident Paul Goma’s arrest, beatings, and labor camp assignments.34 They did not believe that their warning to Ceaușescu the previous year produced a positive effect on freedom of emigration, minority rights, or

33Senate Subcommittee, Most-Favored-Nation, 1976, 136.

34Senate Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance, Continuing Most-Favored- Nation Tariff Treatment of Imports from Romania, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, 109-111.

30 human rights in general. Ceaușescu’s lack of credibility led them to question the validity of any assurances he made to President Carter. Senator Daniel P. Moynihan of New York accused the Romanian government of doing the bare minimum to comply with U.S. standards and questioned if they made any real steps toward freedom of emigration.35 As a result of their findings, Dodd, Koch, and Drinan introduced legislation to suspend MFN on the basis of promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms. They surely believed that the only way to promote freedom of emigration in Romania was by withholding

MFN. Fifty other Congressional representatives signed onto a letter to President Carter supporting the revocation of MFN. They stated that emigration reform was not enough and that the U.S. should worry about the human rights conditions of the Romanians that remained.

When Romanian groups did not apply to give testimony or were rejected from doing so, they submitted official written statements for publication in the records for

Congressional consideration. The official printed record of both the House and Senate hearings regularly included over 200 pages of letters from Romanian born refugees,

émigrés, and exiles pleading for help from Congress. Their reasons for supporting revocation of MFN included human rights abuses by the government, problems for minority groups, and pleas for help with family reunification. They also included several statements from hunger strikers. As Congress shifted their focus from emigration numbers to broader human rights issues, they began to increase their contact with

Romanian exiles. Their accounts provided evidence of the futility of MFN in promoting human rights.

35In the House hearing, McDonald discussed how Goma was released from prison right before the MFN hearings.

At the same time there was increasing coverage in the American media on the human rights abuses in Romania. Exiles were hopeful that Congressional rhetoric and critical articles could help end MFN and other financial benefits. For example, in the May

30, 1977 edition of The New York Times, Paul Hoffman wrote an article about

Ceaușescu’s treatment of Goma and the Baptists in Romania with the headline “Rumania is Not Quite the Maverick it Appears to Be.”36 The contents of the article mirrored exile criticisms. As a result, the article was widely circulated among the exile community.

Exiles sent copies to members of Congress as further proof that MFN was not positively affecting change in the human rights situation. Articles in major, respected publications served to strengthen the exile’s claims.

President Carter announced in his 1977 inaugural address his commitment to human rights worldwide. This encouraged Romanian exiles that worked towards the same goal. As a result, members of Congress, led by Congressman Donald Fraser of

Minnesota, continued to push for legislation that would force the U.S. to consider human rights violations in worldwide foreign policy. For Romania, this meant that investigation into its emigration practices would also call into question their policies on other aspects of human rights. This would prove to be a source of tension between the two nations, especially during MFN renewal hearings. During the first year of President Carter’s term, the White House also sought to expand trade relations with more of Eastern Europe. Up until then, human rights only focused on emigration, but President Carter agreed to give preferential status to countries with less restrictive regimes and ones who acted

36Paul Hoffman, “Rumania is Not Quite the Maverick it Appears to Be,” The New York Times, May 30, 1977.

32 independently from the Soviet Union. This policy of differentiation worked to the advantage of Romania based on their perceived independent foreign policy.

Subsequently, in February 1978, President Carter finally defined U.S. human rights policy in Presidential Directive 30. It stated that the United States would not support governments that grossly violated human rights and would financially reward countries that took measures to improve them. Carter recommended the waiver for MFN status to Romania each year of his Presidency, despite the numerous known human rights violations. He believed it could be used as leverage to influence human rights policies in

Romania. When Ceaușescu visited the U.S. in 1978, he maintained that human rights were an internal affair and that no country should interfere in another’s domestic issues. 37

He even pointed out the civil rights issues that faced the United States. He wanted to show that no country was perfect in their human rights record, and therefore had no authority to dictate others behavior. When pressed on his record, Ceaușescu stressed that his goals for the Romanian people included economic equality and for citizens to live improved and more dignified lives.

MFN remained the symbol of the special relationship between the two nations, even as visits between Ceaușescu and U.S. Presidents stopped. In 1978, President Carter recommended the extension of MFN and neither house of Congress voted on a disapproval resolution. Individual members of Congress expressed concern over the harassment of emigration applicants, which included lost jobs and being kicked out of

37Bucharest subsequently published a propaganda book translated into English detailing the events of the trip.

33 universities. 38 However, the majority of Congress was satisfied with the rates of emigration even as they expressed concern as to how long it took for each case to be resolved. Congress was well aware of the Romanian pattern of speeding up the granting of exit visas the closer it got to the MFN renewal date. However, Carter, the State

Department, and several members of Congress used this pattern as proof that MFN provided the U.S. with leverage over human rights in Romania. Carter’s continued speaking out on the importance of human rights while continuing to recommend

Congressional approval of MFN, disheartened Romanians at home and abroad. They viewed Carter as a hypocrite.

Members of Congress continued their attempts to tie MFN renewal to other human rights issues. They were unsuccessful in achieving this for most of the MFN period. As this became increasing clear to Western legislators, Ceaușescu’s human rights practices drew the ire of a growing number of members of Congress. They felt that emigration numbers were not high enough and the human rights conditions too poor to elicit the benefits of MFN. The divide in Congress was highlighted in a 1978 meeting between Romania dissident Paul Goma and members of Congress. Fascell expressed concern that Romania needed to do more to improve human rights while Millicent

Fenwick argued that emigration numbers had risen, thereby fulfilling the terms set forth by Jackson-Vanik.

From 1978-1980, members of the CDM organized “demonstrations of support for

Eastern Bloc dissidents.”39 In addition to inviting dissident voices to speak to Congress,

38Congressman Dante Fascell invited Paul Goma to a CSCE Commission meeting on October 12, 1978 to discuss Goma’s experiences in Romania. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.

39Vaïsse, Neoconservatism, 133.

34 they also created human rights awards that were awarded at a banquet to groups, such as the Yuri Orlov group and Amnesty International, which worked on behalf of human rights in Eastern Europe. These events were broadcast over RFE, Radio Liberty (RL), and

Voice of America (VOA).40 Dissidents in Warsaw Pact nations rallied around the human rights language in the Helsinki Accords and demanded that their governments comply.

U.S. neoconservatives integrated these same human rights issues into foreign policy debates. Despite these developments, Ceaușescu continued to curry favor with the U.S. government by remaining silent on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

Ceaușescu was a vocal supporter of national sovereignty, but did not want to anger the

USSR because he was afraid that they would not hesitate to invade Romania. To avoid confrontation, Romania was the only nation absent from a Warsaw Pact meeting where all member nations signed a statement of approval of the war in Afghanistan.

Romanian exiles shared the same political views on communism and human rights as the neoconservative wing of Congress.41 They were excited about the election of

President Ronald Reagan in 1980. They too wanted the U.S. to have a tougher stance against communism in Eastern Europe as well as the expansion of human rights. They were skeptical of the U.S. issuing MFN status to Romania because they did not believe that Ceaușescu’s regime deserved this economic reward. However, they were pleased by the prospect of increasing emigration from Romania and family reunification.

Consequently, the issue of MFN renewal would remain one of the central features of the

40Ibid., 144.

41Particularly, the group of exiles associated with the PNȚ.

Romanian exile culture of political activism. They continued their letter writing, lobbying, and testimony in Congress.

The Decline in Romania’s Relations with the West

Unhappy with Carter’s foreign policy, many CDM members threw their support to Ronald Reagan. They appreciated his tough talk against the Soviet Union by calling it an “Evil Empire” and his commitment to restoring the military strength of the United

States. Reagan’s victory pleased Ceaușescu because he believed that Republican presidents held a more favorable view of Romania.42 After Reagan took office in 1981, it was clear that his administration’s position on human rights differed from that of

Carter’s. His administration stated that the greatest threat to human rights worldwide was the spread of communism. Therefore the new administration was less concerned about the internal policies of repression in countries like Romania. As a result, the U.S. would use the policy of differentiation towards the Eastern Bloc. This attitude combined with

Reagan’s tough stance on the USSR helped Ceaușescu retain MFN by appealing to the

President through his independent foreign policy stance. However, by 1983 Ceaușescu’s prestige on the international stage as a world statesman began to decline because of

Romania’s poor economy and increasingly abysmal human rights record.

At the same time, Congressional human rights concerns expanded past emigration numbers and into the improved treatment of ethnic minorities and religious groups.

Members of groups representing ethnic Hungarians and Jewish Romanians used the MFN hearings as a forum. They pushed for increases in Jewish emigration to Israel and better treatment of the large Hungarian minority in Transylvania. Hungarian-Transylvanian

42Harrington & Courtney, Tweaking, 481. Both Nixon and Ford visited Romania, but Carter never did, even though Ceaușescu visited the US under his tenure.

36 groups provided extensive testimony before Congress on the poor treatment and repression of ethnic minorities from the Romanian government, which they described as cultural genocide.43 In response to Hungarian claims of mistreatment, some Romanians described Hungarian cruelty towards them during WWII. Although these Romanians were united with their Hungarian counterparts in their hatred for Ceaușescu, nationalism and rivalries between the two nations crept into their arguments against MFN renewal.

Romanian exile groups were infuriated because they felt that the plight of the majority of ethnic Romanians was ignored in favor of minority groups.44

The 1981 Senate hearings marked a shift in the role that ethnic Romanian exiles played in the MFN hearings. It was the first time ethnic Romanian exiles testified in person before Congress.45 Members of Congress used testimony from ethnic Romanian exiles to expand their influence on Romanian human rights on more than emigration numbers. Exiles spoke in regards to human rights violations, the non-existence of

American First Amendment Rights in Romania, and the plight of political prisoners in labor camps and psychiatric hospitals. The witnesses voiced the plight of all Romanians, not just ethnic and religious minorities, before Congress. Submissions to the written communications section of the hearing reinforced the testimonies of the public witnesses.

Amnesty International, a well-known human rights organization, submitted a document about official state limits and punishments on political, religious, and social expression.

43Senate Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance, Most-Favored-Nation Status for Romania, Hungary, and China, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, 28-39, 84-88. These groups included the Center for Russian and East European Jewry, Committee for Human Rights in Romania, and Dr. Michael Szaz from the American Foreign Policy Institute.

44The exile group The Truth About Romania Committee (TARC) was particularly vocal.

45This included Dr. Dimitrie Apostoliu from the exile group American-Romanian National Committee for Human Rights, and exiles Aurel Marinescu and Father Florian M. Galdau.

The Romanian National Council, a Romanian exile group, protested MFN renewal as further strengthening the communist system in Romania.46 Finally Coste reiterated that

Romania was the “most faithful imitator of Stalin’s economic model” and that the only way this system could be reformed was through the “pressure of necessity” and the absence of financial support from the West.47 The groups providing testimony and written statements against the renewal of MFN presented a shared view of the human rights abuses of all Romanians for Congress to consider. In this way, the anti-MFN faction of Congress worked with Romanian exiles to achieve their goal of expanding human rights under Ceaușescu.

In 1982, both houses introduced resolutions to disapprove the President’s waiver for the first time. However, Senator Jackson remained one of the most powerful neoconservative voices until his death in 1983. His letter supporting the renewal of MFN for Romania was enough to ensure the demise of the disapproval bills. Jackson was pleased with the emigration levels since MFN was first granted. The total number of emigrants in 1982 was 24,374, more than double the total number of 10,701 in 1975. He continued to use anti-Soviet, neo-conservative language in support of the West continuing to encourage Romanian independence from the Soviet Union and their shared interests with the U.S. on international matters. Jackson still believed that American interest in Romania would further embolden them against the Soviet Union. Senator Dole

46The Romanian National Council was founded by Nicolae Penescu, the Secretary General of the PNȚ until his death in 1981.

47Senate Subcommittee, Most-Favored-Nation, 1981, 297. Coste was Secretary General of ACEN from 1954-1965 and founded TARC in 1973.

38 reluctantly sided with Jackson, despite his concerns about the harassment of future emigrants and the lack of religious freedom.

However, Senators Helms, Moynihan, William L. Armstrong of Colorado, and

George J. Mitchell of Maine all dissented with Jackson and Dole. They stated that MFN extension would not produce the desired effect. Because of the appalling state of human rights, increased emigration numbers were no longer enough to warrant MFN. They cited

RFE and Amnesty International reports on the use of prisons, labor camps, and psychiatric facilities for dissidents, obstacles for emigrants, the harassment of religious groups, and the general “deprivation of human rights and civil liberties.”48 They even penned a letter to Presidents Reagan and Ceaușescu voicing these concerns using the language of human rights and anti-communism. The Washington Post publicized the letter and Reagan’s response. Reagan officially stated that although he had reservations and was “gravely concerned” about Romanian emigration practices, he would recommend the waiver. However, Reagan strongly cautioned that Romania must make changes or risk losing MFN in the future. This was “the strongest high level U.S. criticism in recent years of the internal policies” of Ceaușescu’s regime.49 Regardless of this increasingly strong and widespread congressional stance on Ceaușescu’s human rights abuses, Congress couldn’t get enough votes to veto Reagan’s waiver.

48Senate Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance, Review of the President’s Decision to Review Most-Favored-Nation Status for Romania, Hungary, and China, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 1982, 156.

49Ibid., 159.

At this time, Ceaușescu grew tired of the outside demands on his regime and began to pay off all foreign debts.50 This would result in some of the worst human rights violations of his regime that would make it impossible for the U.S. to rationalize MFN.

He simultaneously instituted austerity measures that resulted in food rationing, shortages, and reduction in the use of electricity and heating. As a result, U.S. exports to Romania fell and the imbalance in trade between the two nations grew. Energy shortages increased each year and gradually resulted in state rationing. Additionally, the scarcity of goods dramatically increased which produced an underground, illicit economy in order for people to obtain basic material items such as food.51 Romanian citizens spent most of the day in lines that lasted for several hours for food, gasoline, and other supplies, while diets and meals were planned and prepared around rationed supplies. Romanian citizens planned their days around the limited availability of water, heat, and electricity as determined by the state. The winter of 1984-1985 was particularly harsh, yet many

Romanians had no access to heat, running water, or gas. Many elderly and children succumbed. Ceaușescu appointed a team of doctors to formulate a reduced calorie

“scientific diet” for Romanians to follow. It reduced meat, cheese, and other hard to find items. However, as human rights worsened in Romania, it became more difficult for

Congress to remove MFN since it would have taken away American leverage on human rights improvement, as well as cut jobs for Americans.

Quality of life in the 1980s was quite the reversal of the economic outlook and standard of living from the late 1960s. At the same time, his cult of personality grew,

50Much of the debt resulted from industrialization.

51This illicit economy also included childcare, extra maternity leave, and illegal abortions.

40 which celebrated Ceaușescu and his family. The state extolled the quality of life in

Romania calling his rule the “Golden Era.” The media celebrated each anniversary of an important day in Ceaușescu’s career and he had to be quoted in every published book.

Propaganda represented a life that was in direct contrast to the reality of daily life. The

Romanian people lived two different yet simultaneous realities, a public life that was stagnant and formal and a private life that was dynamic and informal.52 Many people stayed home as often as possible and only went out when necessary. Author Stelian

Tănase described this era as people living without hope as fiction replaced reality.53

Despite all of this, Ceaușescu continued to enjoy a close relationship with the U.S. and

Western Europe. However, Western leaders repeatedly threatened to confiscate

Romanian trade benefits if human rights did not improve. These threats were mostly ignored since each year Romania retained its MFN status and membership in international organizations, thus proving what exiles had claimed since 1975.

Throughout the 1980s, the Western press increased their critical coverage of the

Ceaușescu regime. Romanian exiles circulated these articles among themselves and also sent copies to the White House, State Department, and members of Congress to prove their claims. The New York Times ran an article on April 24, 1983 disclosing Ceaușescu’s policy of confiscating and banning all typewriters from the Romanian public. In The

Times of London, Bernard Levin also published a piece on October 17, 1985 about banning photocopiers and typewriters for use by private citizens as a means of control.

The same story appearing in two high profile publications, demonstrates the widespread

52Kligman, Duplicity, 40.

53 Stelian Tănase, At Home There’s Only Speaking in a Whisper: File and Diary Recording the Late Years of the Romanian Dictatorship (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2007), 38.

41 knowledge of the realities of the Ceaușescu regime. Beginning in 1984, The New York

Spectator published a series of articles on the Ceaușescu regime that mirrored the arguments employed by exile groups. They characterized his independence from Moscow as irrelevant since other nations had not followed suit, and did not excuse his repressive and nepotistic regime. In June of 1985, both The New York Times and The Wall Street

Journal reported on Romanian bibles recycled into toilet paper.54 As major media publications echoed the criticism of the exiles, more members of the State Department and Congress began to visit Romania to observe the situation.

In 1985, State Department Counselor Edward Derwinski met with Ceaușescu and

Romanian Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei to raise American concerns about the human rights and emigration situation in Romania. Vice President George H.W. Bush and

Secretary of State George Shultz also visited. The Reagan administration repeatedly tried to warn Ceaușescu of what needed to change in order to keep MFN, but Ceaușescu did not want the world to see him as someone making concessions to external influences and foreign powers. Ceaușescu actually interpreted these meetings as good international press for himself and Romania, further demonstrating the continued special relationship between the two nations.55 It was more important that these meetings were held and documented, than the actual business discussed or agreements made. Regardless of how clearly the U.S. expressed their concerns to Ceaușescu, as long as meetings were held and

MFN was renewed, Ceaușescu felt little need to do anything but the bare minimum to

54Harrington & Courtney, Tweaking, 536. For the specific articles see Flora Lewis, “Foreign Affairs; Thornes in Roses,” New York Times, June 7, 1985; and Peter K. Keresztes, “The Bible as Romanian Toilet Paper,” Wall Street Journal, June 14, 1985.

55Roger Kirk and Mircea Raceanu, Romania vs. the United States: Diplomacy of the Absurd, 1985-1989 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 25.

42 preserve his relationship with the United States. However, the results of Shultz’s visit to

Romania highlighted to the U.S. that if diplomacy failed to change human rights policies in Romania, then the relationship between the two nations would continue to deteriorate.

This disconnection characterized the relationship between the two nations in the 1980s.

As relations between the U.S. and Soviet Union improved, Congress increased their push for the requirements of Jackson-Vanik to be tied to other human rights issues besides emigration. In May 1985, Senator Dole and his wife Elizabeth traveled to

Romania, where Ceaușescu wined and dined them. He showed them the progress that

Romania had made and promised to allow Father Gheorghe Calciu and the writer Dorin

Tudoran, two well-known dissidents, to immigrate to the United States. When Dole returned to the US, he made favorable remarks to Congress. Representatives Tony Hall of

Ohio, Christopher Smith of New Jersey, and Frank Wolf of Virginia were skeptical and visited Romania in July 1985 to witness the human rights situation in order to report their findings to Congress. Ceaușescu did not meet with the trio because he perceived them as too critical of his regime. Since Ceaușescu did not make any improvements after their visit, on October 22 the three introduced a bill in the House to suspend MFN for six months, with renewal contingent upon progress on human rights and religious freedoms.

The Senate introduced an identical bill on November 1. This coincided with an increase in the Western press coverage of the persecution of ethnic minorities, particularly

Hungarians and Germans. As White House foreign policy goals shifted it became increasingly difficult for Ceaușescu to maintain his once favorable image. Additionally, the White House and State Department found it increasingly difficult to rationalize MFN renewal.

Consequently, President Reagan increased pressure on Ceaușescu by including remarks on religious persecution in Romania for the first time in speeches and writings.

His administration wanted Romania to retain MFN status, and hoped this pressure would lead to improvements in human rights. This same year, Congress overwhelmingly opted to debate Romania’s entire human rights record instead of only focusing on emigration.56

The treatment of ethnic minorities, the need for more bibles for Romanian Protestants, religious freedoms, and human rights in general were quickly becoming more important to Congress as they attempted to alter Jackson-Vanik to link these issues to MFN renewal. However, Ceaușescu rejected President Reagan and Congress’ concerns.57

Simultaneously, Ceaușescu’s megalomaniac vision of transforming Bucharest would prove too destructive for the White House to ignore.

Beginning in the 1970s and accelerating in the 1980s, Ceaușescu introduced a policy called systemization in which all people would live equally. This program was one of the most outrageous and repugnant to the international community. Ceaușescu hoped to eliminate all remnants of individualism in Romania. This included the deliberate destruction of historical monuments and villages in exchange for bloc apartments and the resettlement of people across the nation.58 Rumors of what was to be demolished or

56It was still important, especially when it concerned the families of high profile defectors. One notable case was that of Napoleon Fodor, the former head of the Romanian commercial office in New York. His wife and child were not allowed to immigrate to the US after his defection since Ceaușescu personally handpicked him for the job. This defection was also a personal betrayal, similar to that of Pacepa. Ceaușescu also would not allow Pacepa’s daughter and her husband to emigrate under any circumstances.

57After Ceaușescu received a letter from President Reagan outlining these concerns, he responded that special interest groups artificially created the claims of human rights abuses, that religious freedom was greater in Romania than in much of the world, that there were enough bibles in Romania, and new emigration procedures did not need to be written.

58The 1977 Bucharest earthquake destroyed and demolished many structures, which helped Ceaușescu justify the destruction of homes for his systemization project. The government claimed to want to clean up

44 spared created fear and uncertainty among residents regarding the status of their homes.

By changing how people lived and related to one another, Ceaușescu’s social engineering project would fundamentally alter all aspects of rural life. He disproportionately targeted communities of ethnic minorities. This was partially a plan to modernize the nation, but it also symbolized the destruction of all local cultures to be replaced by Ceaușescu’s vision of Romania’s future. Romanian exiles used the information they receieved from their

Romanian contacts about systemization to inform the West of its destructive effects.

Ceaușescu’s systemization program offered an easy target for Westerners to criticize his megalomania. News stories on systemization started to surge in 1985 and a letter about the program was broadcast on RFE in October 1986. Western media cited some of the historical buildings that had been razed under the program, which had been listed in the Bibliographical Index of Feudal Monuments in Bucharest published by the

Romanian Academy in 1961, as proof of the regimes disregard for Romania’s cultural history during a time of economic uncertainty.59 Prince Charles of Great Britain was one of the most outspoken critics.60 Americans were outraged by the 1986 demolition of a

Bucharest synagogue and the main Seventh Day Adventist Church.61 Exiles contributed

the rubble quickly and labeled structures slated for destruction as “houses and streets in a state of imminent collapse.” It was difficult to know which buildings were targeted out of necessity.

59Corneliu Vadim Tudor responded to Western criticisms of the systemization program in the January 10, 1986 edition of Săptămîna claiming that these buildings were in areas in need of renewal and were never on the list of protected monuments and buildings. Romanian dissidents claimed that all buildings slated for destruction were removed from these lists in advance. These events were referenced in the RFE Situation Report on February 24, 1986 by Dan Ionescu. Tudor was a pro-Ceaușescu journalist who was one of the editors of the weekly publication Săptămîna. He became an extreme nationalist politician after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

60Robert Duff, “How We Can Help the Romanians,” The Sunday Telegraph, May 7, 1989.

61In 1988, Western European nations formed the group Operation Romanian Villages, in which Romanian villages were adopted and sent aid. News of the campaign was broadcast on the BBC and RFE.

45 to the anti-systemization movement in any way that they could. In order to create a sense of urgency for international intervention in Ceaușescu’s domestic policies, exile Dinu C.

Giurescu, published a work titled The Razing of Romania’s Past. It is a collection of

Giurescu’s pictures of Bucharest showing buildings before and after systemization and neighborhood and buildings in danger of destruction.62 This exemplifies the exile role of providing sources of evidence of Ceaușescu’s actions to the world.

At the same time, a major disagreement on U.S. policy towards Romania emerged in the State Department. Senator Helms’ recommendation and support for David

Funderburk, a former Fulbright Fellow to Romania, helped lead to his appointment as

U.S. Ambassador to Romania from 1981-1985. He was a self-proclaimed Reagan conservative, supporter of traditional values, and a staunch anti-communist. He eventually resigned from his position because of his hatred of the Ceaușescu regime and

U.S. support of it. Before his resignation, he recommended to President Reagan and the

State Department to revoke MFN and reduce ties to Ceaușescu. He wrote a book called

Pinstripes and Reds chronicling the problems in Romania. He became an outspoken critic of Ceaușescu and U.S. policy towards Romania. He also testified before Congress during

MFN hearings. In his work, he often used the neo-conservative language of anti- communism such as “evil empire” and “policy of Soviet deceit.” He also became a key ally of Romanian exiles who wanted the U.S. to revoke MFN.63 Exiles pointed to his position and work to further substantiate their claims. Funderburk explained how MFN

62Giurescu was also one of the signatories on a letter sent to Ceaușescu on October 21, 1985 against the destruction of monuments.

63He was critical of the U.S. State Department and referred to the leadership elite as “slaves to the policy of differentiation.”

46 and high-level U.S. visits to Romania gave tacit approval of Ceaușescu’s regime.

Romanians did not understand this because he was a dictator, which tarnished the image of the U.S. in their eyes. He placed part of the blame for the poor conditions on U.S. support of Ceaușescu. As part of his efforts to publicize the plight of Romanians, on May

15, 1985, The Washington Post published an interview with Funderburk, which was highly critical of Ceaușescu and the positive relationship between the two nations. This is notable because an experienced government official spread and substantiated long- standing exile accusations in a well-respected newspaper with a wide circulation.

By 1986, even the State Department realized that the human rights situation was so poor that Ceaușescu’s independent foreign policy could no longer justify its MFN status. However, the State Department favored renewing MFN as a humanitarian act as it allowed Romanians to emigrate and be released from prison. Derwinski testified that

MFN was the only means the U.S. had to influence Ceaușescu. Witnesses testifying on behalf of the State Department spoke of verbal concessions on increasing the printing of bibles, the release of several political prisoners, and the emigration of high profile

Romanians. However, members of Congress and exiles dismissed this as a show to assuage U.S. concerns and did not reflect substantive change.

Meanwhile in Congress, Representatives and Senators increased their opposition to MFN. Their language and arguments echoed Romanian exile groups like TARC in their pleas before Congress. The exile language of human rights became increasingly commonplace among Congressional debates. Representative Hall introduced a bill to temporarily suspend MFN until the Ceaușescu regime could demonstrate an improvement in its human rights record. He specifically mentioned religious persecution and

47 harassment, while accusing Romania of coasting on its image for too long.

Representatives Smith and Wolf echoed Hall’s sentiments, calling MFN a one-way street that failed to economically benefit the United States.

Funderburk, exiles, and members of Congress used the same language and stories to gather support for MFN revocation. Funderburk testified before Congress on the state of human rights in Romania. He discussed how Bibles were used as toilet paper, the demolished churches, the murder and incarceration of priests and religious believers, the registration of typewriters to enforce censorship of ideas, and the persecution of those who applied for emigration. Congressional Representatives and Senators quoted excerpts from defector and former Securitate General Ion Mihai Pacepa’s upcoming book and article in The Wall Street Journal entitled “Ceaușescu: American’s Most Favored

Tyrant.”64 The combination of Funderburk’s testimony and Pacepa’s stories about

Ceaușescu provided much for Congress to debate. Senator Paul Trible Jr. of Virginia repeated exile charges that Romanian independence from the Soviet Union was a myth.

Hall, Smith, Wolf, and Trible all testified to support denying MFN for six months, which was opposed by the State Department. Some Senators, like Philip Crane of Illinois, one of the most vocal opponents of MFN, accused Ceaușescu of ordering assassination attempts of regime critics and described Romania as a “police state.”65 Crane also used information from Funderburk’s book to reinforce government repression of religion,

64When General of the Securitate Pacepa defected to the United States in 1978, the U.S. government gave Ceaușescu assurances that they would not publicly exploit the defection for political gain at Ceaușescu’s detriment.

65David B. Funderburk, Pinstripes and Reds: An American Ambassador Caught Between the State Department and the Romanian Communists, 1981-1985 (Washington D.C.: Selous Foundation Press, 1987), xi.

48 oppression of dissidents, and support of international terrorism as reasons for the U.S. to cut ties.

Pacepa’s book Red Horizons was published in 1987 and he held a press conference to promote it. Ceaușescu was furious since he did not believe that Pacepa could do these things without the consent of the U.S. government. RFE broadcasted excerpts of the book, which signaled to Ceaușescu that the U.S. was under the influence of persons and groups hostile to him and Romania as the only explanation for the U.S. allowing it to be broadcast. The publication contributed to Ceaușescu’s decline in international popularity and prestige. Its broadcast on RFE caused a sensation and provided proof of Ceaușescu’s criminal behavior to much of the populace.66 Additionally,

Congress used the book as further proof of mistrust of Ceaușescu.

In July 1987, the House attached an amendment suspending MFN for six months.

The most vocal supporters were Hall, Tom Lantos of California, Armstrong, Smith, and

Dodd. Representative Christopher Smith of New Jersey cited an Amnesty International report that Romania violated internationally recognized human rights including freedom of expression, the right to immigrate or travel internationally, the right to a fair trial, and absence of torture or cruel and inhuman treatment.67 Smith also hoped that this suspension would provide an incentive to Ceaușescu to improve his human rights record.

The group Free Romanians in Paris provided oral testimony to Congress describing all

66Many, including Deletant, have insinuated that the CIA helped Pacepa write this book to help discredit Ceaușescu. Many Romanian scholars also call its historical accuracy into question.

67House Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, U.S.-Romania Relations and Most Favored Nation Status for Romania, 100th Cong., 1nd sess., 1987, 13.

49 aid to Romania as harmful because it is perceived as support for Ceaușescu.68 Wolf cited the bulldozing of churches and synagogues, persecution of Hungarians, and selling of arms to Libya and Syria as reasons to suspend MFN. Afraid that the Senate would follow the House, Ceaușescu approved the printing of 4,000 Bibles, released some political and religious prisoners and increased emigration approvals to demonstrate good faith in the wake of the amendment to the trade bill, but it was no longer enough to assuage

American concerns of human rights abuses. Rep. Gilman and others believed that

Romania only improved human rights around MFN renewal hearings and stated that this did not dupe Congress. Ceaușescu’s actions were not enough to stop the Senate from attaching their own amendment to the trade bill. However, MFN was once again renewed on humanitarian grounds. According to a Wall Street Journal editorial, Reagan chose

State Department support over bi-partisan Congressional opposition, placing him at odds with his own Party.69

In the 1980s, non-Romanians in the United States and Western Europe joined the protests against the Ceaușescu government and plight of Romanians. In addition, Western governments and media began to change their attitudes on the Ceaușescu regime. As conditions worsened, unrest grew in Romania, which was widely reported in the Western media. In response to wage cuts and layoffs, workers in Brașov rioted against the

68Lantos questioned if ending MFN would increase or decrease U.S. leverage in regards to improvements in the deteriorating human rights situation. He was also worried that the State Department and members of Congress were satisfied with Romanian emigration levels, while ignoring the larger scale human rights violations, calling it a perversion of the intention of Jackson-Vanik.

69Rozanne L. Ridgeway of the State Department held fast that MFN was the only leverage the U.S. possessed over human rights in Romania and that negotiations with Ceaușescu made progress. She also discussed Pacepa’s description of the Horizon plan, stating that the State Department had no evidence of Romanian recruitment of spies among the Romanian exile population. The State Department continued to tout Romania’s refusal to participate in Warsaw Pact war exercises, criticism of Soviet policies towards Afghanistan and arms control, as well as Romanian participation in the 1984 Olympics. They recommended a Presidential veto of Congressional recommendation to suspend MFN.

Ceaușescu regime in 1987. Former university professor, Doina Cornea distributed leaflets supporting the Brașov protesters. She had already gained notoriety for writing anti-

Ceaușescu letters that were broadcast on RFE. Cornea also wrote a series of critical open letters to Ceaușescu, denouncing the atomization and homogenization of Romanian life, which were broadcast on RFE. Veteran communist and university professor Silviu

Brucan granted an interview to two Western journalists in his home and gave them a statement criticizing Ceaușescu and the living conditions in Romania, that were subsequently broadcasted on RFE, BBC World and Romania, and VOA. Cornea and

Brucan were subsequently placed under house arrest and monitored by the Securitate.70

Their treatment highlighted Romanian human rights abuses to Western legislators and journalists. Emboldened by Cornea and Brucan, ordinary citizens began to post anti-

Ceaușescu writings around the country, resulting in more arrests. Reports on Ceaușescu’s abysmal human rights record and a poor economic performance that provided little economic benefit to the U.S. began to detract from Ceaușescu’s prestige as a world statesman.71

Relations with Romania further deteriorated as Mikhail Gorbachev instituted his policies of glasnost and perestroika. This opened up relationships and dialogue with the

West while working to reform communism in the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union became more open to the West, the U.S. needed Ceaușescu less. He became increasingly oppressive and the lives of Romanian citizens worsened. By 1988, even Deputy Secretary of State, John C. Whitehead, publicly criticized the general repression in Romania while

70Brucan was eventually allowed to travel to the U.S. in the hopes that he would not return. However, while there he granted interviews to RFE and VOA criticizing Ceaușescu and his disastrous policies.

71Weiner, Foreign Policy, 188-189.

51 bemoaning Ceaușescu’s unwillingness to listen or cooperate on human rights issues in

Romania. He also lamented Ceaușescu’s misunderstanding of how important human rights issues are to the United States.72 Throughout the 1980s, an increasing number of mainstream magazines and newspapers reported on Ceaușescu’s human rights violations.

Romanian exile groups had referred to Ceaușescu as a Stalinist dictator for decades, but this label was not regularly echoed in print media until the late 1980s.73 This was very different from the earlier articles labeling Ceaușescu as a maverick.

Ceaușescu valued the special relationship between the two countries, but would not accept U.S. interference in internal Romanian affairs. The United States increasingly pushed this as the grounds necessary to continue the relationship. When Americans visited Romania in an official capacity, they returned depressed by the state of Romanian life. Many statesmen and lawmakers held onto hope that they could use MFN as leverage to influence the lessening of human rights abuses. Ceaușescu surrounded himself with

“yes men” who owed their political power and positions to him. They made sure to shield

Ceaușescu from negative and critical comments from abroad, as well as any internal dissatisfaction. He enjoyed having “direct contact with the masses” by personally visiting provinces and meeting with local party leaders.74 Romanian ambassadors stationed abroad had the task of providing quotes from foreign rulers of Ceaușescu’s greatness to be used in state propaganda. As his Stalinist personality cult increased and expanded, he only saw assemblies favoring him, his rule, and his family. Anti-Ceaușescu

72Henry Kamm, “U.S. Envoy is Critical of Rumania on Rights,” The New York Times, February 7, 1988.

73In the August 21, 1989 issue of Newsweek, Ceaușescu appeared on the cover with the headline “The Last Stalinist.”

74Gilberg, Modernization, 86.

52 demonstrators were arrested. Consequently, Ceaușescu maintained a distorted view of how Romanians and Westerners perceived him and did not understand why the US made such a big deal about the human rights situation. He believed plotters who were hostile to

Romania, wanted to overthrow Ceaușescu, and redraw Romanian borders planted any criticisms.

Congress never had the chance to deny Ceaușescu MFN renewal since he voluntarily gave it up in 1988. Tired of U.S. pressure on the internal human rights policies in Romania, Ceaușescu stated that he would renounce MFN status as long as it was tied to Jackson-Vanik. He hoped to continue a close political and economic relationship with the U.S. and wanted MFN granted to Romania based on trade agreements, without any restrictions tied to emigration or human rights. Also, since the

White House made it clear that Romania was going to lose MFN, Ceaușescu took this as an opportunity to save face by renouncing MFN instead of having it taken away. Amid

Congressional hearings on the status of Romanian refugees in Hungary and protests held outside Romanian government buildings in the U.S., MFN for Romania expired on July

3, 1988. Ceaușescu believed that Reagan was an idealistic anti-communist who wanted to destroy the system instead of co-existence. He looked forward to regime change after the

1988 election.75 Both sides worked to figure out what the relationship between the two nations would look like, but by October attempts to salvage the relationship ended on both sides. Nothing came of Romania’s outreach to the Bush administration, as the U.S. wanted nothing to do with Ceaușescu as long as he resisted making changes in improving

75Ibid., 225.

53 the condition of Romanians. In the summer of 1989, Congress passed economic sanctions on Romania, but the White House refused to enforce them on humanitarian grounds.76

In the end, Ceaușescu, neo-conservative Congressmen, and Romanian exiles were unable to directly influence the White House or State Department’s position on MFN.

Congress also was unable to get enough votes to veto the Presidential override. All parties placed pressure on the executive branch, but U.S. policy towards Romania was never based on the interests of Romania but rather against the interests of the Soviet

Union. As long as the U.S. benefitted from giving Romania MFN, human rights issues could be overlooked if it fit the broader foreign policy goals of the Cold War, part of which was to weaken the Soviet Union. As relations with the Soviet Union improved under Gorbachev, members of Congress and the media continued to push Romania on the human rights issue.

The push for human rights and democracy reached a fever pitch at the end of

1989. Dissident pastor Lazslo Tokes preached on these subjects. His subsequent persecution led to significant protests. These protests would spread throughout Romania and became the Revolution of December 1989.

76Ibid., 246.

CHAPTER 2

ROMANIAN EXILE CULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE

Political Activism and Advocacy and Humanitarian Aid

After the Soviet Union installed a communist government in Romania, a large group of citizens fled to exile in the West. They developed an exile culture that grew from their life experiences. Their shared experiences shaped their goals, which evolved over time. This chapter profiles exiles from the first wave of Romanian émigrés during the Cold War. This group included members of the National Peasants’ Party (PNȚ),

National Liberal Party, Socialists, and fascist Iron Guard members and sympathizers.1

These groups’ ideologies and activities covered a wide political spectrum and over time fractured into several smaller groups. The PNȚ had the largest number of refugee politicians because of the persecution of the party and imprisonment of its leaders. These men lost their status, wealth, and opportunity because they were from an upper class.

Maniu, the party’s leader, became a cult-like figure for members of the Romanian expatriate community, particularly those with ties to the PNȚ. Exiles named organizations after him and often invoked his name and legacy in formal and informal documents and speeches. He represented the epitome of democracy and anti-communism because of his challenges to the communist government and subsequent show trial.

1Marius Petraru, “The History of the Romanian National Committee: 1947–1975,” in The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare: Cold War Organizations Sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe/ Free Europe Committee, ed. Katalin Kadar-Lynn, 130 (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2013).

Their experiences with the Securitate taught them to fear infiltration of their own groups and RFE. This fear permeated their beliefs and activities. This also led to the initial wave of exiles in the 1940s and 1950s forming an insulated group made up of elites. Some of the highest profile members of this group included Coste, Serdici, Rațiu and Horia Georgescu. This faction of Romanian exiles developed a shared culture of political action and humanitarian aid. They used their status and connections to advocate for regime change and an end to human rights abuses in Romania. They also worked to preserve their version of democratic Romanian culture in exile through newspaper publications, group meetings, and cultural events. Additionally, they applied these democratic values through their political actions of letter writing to media outlets and government representatives, as well as testifying before Congress during MFN hearings.

These politically active exiles lived within two cultures, their adopted host country and home of Romania.

In the early days of the Cold War, exile groups received funding from the U.S. government. At this time they had a greater direct influence in the United States and

Western Europe than they would during the ages of détente and differentiation. This was also when their goals most aligned with Western foreign policy. Their influence established a precedent that Romanian exiles attempted to build upon in future years.

The FEC founded ACEN in 1954 to serve the cause of the liberation of captive nations from the Soviet Union. They provided a source of information on the satellite states and served as a forum for promoting courses of action to help émigrés advocate for themselves. ACEN established Captive Nations Week in 1959 as a means to raise the profile of communist satellite states in the Western consciousness. Once the U.S.

56 government gave up on the idea of governments in exile, ACEN and its members served as representatives for anti-Communist activity.

ACEN had little impact on the foreign policies of Western nations but was a successful propaganda tool. RFE often broadcast news of ACEN’s activities and U.S. support of the organization. RFE used these broadcasts to demonstrate the threat that

émigrés posed to communist rule. In its publications, ACEN described the functions of exiles from the Soviet satellite states.2 They chiefly served as a source of information on and a connection to their home countries to Western nations. Romanian exiles continued to fulfill this role throughout the entire era of communist rule.

After the failed Hungarian Revolution in 1956, U.S. foreign policy and exile interests began to conflict. Once it became clear that Western nations were unwilling to provoke the USSR with anything but verbal support for independence for the captive nations, the goals of ACEN and Western foreign policy began to diverge. In the 1960s and 1970s, ACEN opposed détente, calling it a form of appeasement of the USSR. Most people viewed the group as old-fashioned with a “1950’s mentality” that was incompatible with the realities of the present world. However, exiles were encouraged when neoconservatives in Congress expressed the same view of détente and used the same language during the MFN period. As a result, a strongly conservative ethos persisted in the Romanian exile community. Because of the decline in their influence, older exiles diversified their goals in the ages of détente and differentiation out of necessity, especially since younger exiles were less politically active. This can be

2Report on the Assembly of Captive European Nations and the National Committees or Councils in Today’s World January 28, 1972, Register of the Comitetul National Roman Records, 1945-1975, Box 13, Folder 15, Hoover Institution Archives.

57 explained by younger exiles not experiencing the parity of loss as the older generation.

Exiles took advantage of the opening created by neoconservative members of Congress.

They pushed for human rights reform and the revocation of MFN in addition to eliminating communist rule. This shaped the nature of exile activities throughout the communist period.

The activities of Romanian exile organizations during the MFN period can be categorized into 1: political action, 2: cultural preservation, and 3: humanitarian aid.

Political action involved organizing and participating in demonstrations in world capitals against human rights abuses in Romania and democratic letter writing campaigns to world leaders. They also participated in Congressional hearings against MFN renewal,

Captive Nations Week activities, seminars and conventions of groups who wanted to reform Europe, and protested the loss of territory after WWII. Cultural preservation and expansion activities included creating art and literature, participating in intellectual and academic pursuits, religious activities, creating and distributing newspapers, establishing cultural centers and Romanian publishing houses, and writing in and speaking the

Romanian language. Dr. Alexandru Bratu was the President of the Romanian National

Council of North America, which Nicolae Penescu founded. Penescu was the last

Secretary General for the PNȚ to be nominated in Romania. He founded the Council in

1978 as a means to fight communism and preserve Romanian culture. As a result, Bratu worked closely with the PNȚ in exile. Bratu recommended that Romanians join the exile communities and “participate in the Romanian cultural-commemorative festivities in exile” to preserve their ethnic heritage.3 RFE complemented cultural preservation by

3Politics and Romanian Cultural Activities in Exile May 6, 1984, Alexandru Bratu Papers, Box 2, Hoover Institution Archives.

58 offering programs on art, sport, culture, and entertainment that involved Romanians at home and abroad. RFE also had a weekly program on exile cultural activities.

Humanitarian aid directly helped Romanians at home and abroad. Groups like Romanian

Welfare Inc. collected funds from their members to help support exiles who were unable to find work or who were aging. Groups like TARC, the PNȚ in exile, and ACARDA lobbied Western governments to reunite families and increase human rights in Romania.

They also directly sent aid to Romanians. For example, because of concern for their fellow Romanians during the floods of 1970, exiles sent aid through Western charities, and not directly to the Romanian government, much to Ceaușescu’s chagrin. In addition to work and family, exile activities developed into an essential facet of life and identity.

Romanian exile groups and publications existed in every country where they resided, most notably Great Britain, the United States, and France. There were also high profile groups in Germany, Sweden, and Australia. Many exiles, especially members of the PNȚ, felt that they would have held positions of power in Romania had the USSR not installed a communist government. Therefore, they felt it was their duty to become anti-

Communist fighters to save their country and hopefully return one day. These actions initially functioned as a means to process their sense of loss and as an expression of their egos. However, over time this developed into a feature of their shared culture. They also served as spokesmen for their compatriots in Romania whose voices were suppressed.

However, there was not a single group that emerged as a leader or facilitator of the myriad of groups.

Romanian exiles and neoconservative U.S. Congress members often used similar rhetoric in their speeches and correspondence. Scoop Jackson Democrats and exiles were

59 opposed to détente and isolationism. They equated these policies with appeasement and finlandization, a term used to describe the submission to Soviet domination. Exiles and neoconservatives equated détente with weakness. Commentary magazine became a platform for neo-conservatism in the 1970s and Senator Moynihan was a regular contributor. In the publication, authors regularly “attacked ‘appeasement,’ the

“Findlandization” of the West, the pusillanimity of Europe, and other such targets.”4

Serdici described détente as Western governments being “soft on communism” and not understanding that “the Soviet structures are rigid and allow no diversions. The KGB and the various local security forces see to it constantly and most attentively. What all these pinko liberal pundits forget is that the Soviet Union and its captive countries do not function like Belgium, France, or Scandinavia.”5 Serdici argued that détente was ineffective on a totalitarian state such as the USSR and the only possible method to defeat them was hardline anticommunism. Many members of Congress shared these sentiments.

Because their ideas and language contained features of American neoconservatism, exiles tended to favor the conservative parties in the U.S. and Great

Britain. However, the attitude and rhetoric of a nation’s leader on human rights and anti- communism made the largest impact on which candidate or party to support. Exiles connected most with politicians and leaders who were strongly anti-communist, pro- democracy, and pro-human rights. Rațiu supported Prime Minister Thatcher and Serdici supported President Reagan because of their strong anti-communist rhetoric.

4Justin Vaïsse, Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 122. In the appendix on pg. 284, Vaïsse lists the key words associated with the Second Age of Neoconservatism as: culture of appeasement, findlandization, nuclear war, Vietnam syndrome, human rights, silent majority, quotas, primaries, and economic growth.

5Georges Serdici “Radio Free Europe Under Reagan-Just How Anti-Communist Should It Be? Georges de Serdici Papers, Box 10, Folder 7, Hoover Institution Archives.

During the MFN period, many Romanians hoped that Ceaușescu would move in the more open direction of the neighboring satellite nations. Instead, he reverted back to

Stalinist era behavior. At the same time, Romanians and exiles no longer believed that the

U.S. or the West would overthrow communism and liberate their country. Instead, exiles hoped that these nations, especially the U.S., would help weaken the communist regime by other means, such as pressing leadership on human rights and weakening the economy. They hoped that the Western regimes working with Ceaușescu could influence his internal behavior with sticks and carrots. This is why so many exiles took umbrage with MFN, as it strengthened Ceaușescu without offering enough relief to Romanians.

For this reason, exiles aligned themselves with the neo-conservative, anti-Communist congressional representatives. They requested to testify at MFN hearings, wrote letters to

Congressional representatives and members of the State Department, and organized meetings with recent dissidents, refugees, and exiles.

After the Helsinki Final Act, the exile’s main political actions involved informing

Western governments and peoples about human rights abuses in Romania. They hoped this would ease the pain of Romanians and influence changes in foreign policy. Many exiles used the political and media connections that they developed over the years to meet with high-level lawmakers and diplomats and publish in major media outlets. The

Securitate successfully removed voices of internal dissent by granting dissidents passports to emigrate or placing them in prisons or psychiatric hospitals before they could make a name for themselves abroad. The Ceaușescu regime tightly controlled their borders and other channels of communication, making it almost impossible for dissidents

61 to speak directly to Western press.6 As a result, exiles played a vital role in sharing

Romanian grievances with the outside world. Their convictions led exile groups, especially the PNȚ, to vocalize their outrage of the hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy that stated the importance of human rights around the world, yet overlooked them in

Romania.

Georges Serdici and the PNȚ in Exile

The legitimacy of the PNȚ in exile stemmed from its role in Romania before the

Dej regime solidified its power in 1947. In 1926, the National Romanian Party of

Transylvania and the Peasant Party joined to form the PNȚ. It supported the preservation of Romania’s post-WWI territorial borders and the development of Romanian nativism.

Maniu led the conservative, national wing. He was focused on conciliatory relations with the Soviet Union and Hungary, advocated for democracy and anti-tyranny, and free elections for all political parties. Many members came from the urban petty bourgeoisie, small country landowners, working classes, and Western elite.

During WWII, the PNȚ opposed the fascist government and Maniu helped negotiate Romanian surrender to the Allies. Maniu tried to get assurances of protection from the Soviet Union, but was unsuccessful. It is widely believed that the PNȚ would have won the 1946 election if the results had not been rigged in favor of the Romanian

Communist Party and its allies. Additionally, because many of the party leaders and party elite were members of the bourgeoisie and Western oriented, they suffered from the establishment of a communist government in Romania. Penescu was the last Secretary

General for the PNȚ to be nominated in Romania. Penescu, Maniu, and the other party

6 Some dissidents, most notably Doina Cornea and Dan Petrescu, managed to give interviews while under house arrest or surveillance in the late 1980s. They are mentioned in more detail in Chapter 3.

62 leaders were arrested and sent to prison in 1947. At this time, many Romanians escaped and moved to the United States and Western Europe.

Serdici’s father Vasile was a landowner and one of the leaders of the PNȚ who worked very closely with Maniu. 7 Serdici was also one of the defense attorneys during the 1947 trial of Maniu, Serdici’s father, and other leaders of the PNȚ. The trial served as a government indictment of Maniu, the PNȚ, and the United States. The new communist government imprisoned members of the party or sent them into exile. Pro-democracy and anti-communist exiles, including Serdici, created a cult-like reverence for Maniu, consistently invoking his name, image, memory, and experience in their speeches, writings, and publications. Many of these men had known and worked with Maniu and characterized him as a martyr for their cause since he died in prison. He became the representation of Romanian democracy.

Serdici fled Romania in 1948 and lived in Sweden for ten years. While living in

Sweden in the 1950s, he was a freelance correspondent for RFE and worked with the

CNR. He then split his time between London and Geneva, making a living as a businessman. He used his spare time to fight communism in Romania and preserve the

PNȚ as a political party in exile until they could return to a democratic Romania. Serdici, with his status and connections in the exile community, played a key, high profile role in shaping the political nature of exile culture.

Serdici’s Contributions to Shaping Exile Culture

Romanian exiles founded newspapers and newsletters to keep members connected to one another and informed of the activities back home. Serdici contributed several

7Vasile Serdici was an official witness at the royal wedding of Crown Prince Carol in 1918.

63 articles to these publications and was close friends with many of the distributors.

Ceaușescu was concerned about their constant criticisms of his regime. He worried that

Romanian exile activities would interfere with his relationship with Western governments. A common tactic was for government representatives to meet with exiles while abroad. They attempted to use their influence to pressure exiles into refraining from anti-Ceaușescu activities. They wanted to stop criticism from the exile community in the

Western press and governments since it could hamper trade deals for Romania. They often tried to convince the exiles that the Romanian government was serious about lessening repressions and opening up to the West. Members of the Ceaușescu government contacted Serdici, since he was a vocal and well-connected figure in the exile community, and hoped to use him for their own goals. Romanian Ambassador to the

United Kingdom, Adrian Afrim, met with Serdici several times. Serdici made sure to document the content of their conversations and sent it to his friend and colleague Rațiu, as a way to keep the general exile community aware of this contact.8 Exiles were aware that the Ceaușescu regime was monitoring their activities from afar, which added to their suspicion of newer exiles. Serdici made it clear to Afrim that his circle of Romanian exiles kept their Romanian citizenship and did not become citizens of their adopted countries. He also maintained an open door policy with any Romanian, even members of the Communist government since they are countrymen, regardless of their political differences, because his goal was to help the Romanian people. This desire to aid his compatriots would continue throughout the years of exile.

8Letters from Serdici to Ion Rațiu June and July 1967, Georges de Serdici Papers, Box 2, Hoover Institution Archives.

Afrim continuously tried to reassure Serdici that the Ceaușescu government was serious about maintaining an independent foreign policy from the Soviet Union in the hope it would limit criticisms of the Ceaușescu regime in the West. Afrim also repeatedly complained of the negative articles that appeared in Rațiu’s Free Romanian Press (FRP) newsletter. He hoped that Serdici would use his influence with Rațiu to put a stop to these articles. He tried to convince Serdici that Romanian exit visas were not blocked from

Romania, but instead from Britain. He also maintained that Ceaușescu and Romania were different from the earlier days of the revolution under Dej. Afrim was unable to convince

Serdici and exiles continued to openly criticize Ceaușescu. These types of interactions encouraged exiles to continue their work of exposing what they considered to be the truth about Ceaușescu in their written materials. They served as spokesmen abroad for their countrymen.

In addition to creating their own material, Romanian exile advocacy in the United

States and Western Europe regularly consisted of monitoring news stories on Romania in

Western newspapers and magazines. Serdici maintained an extremely active letter writing campaign in Western news organs as a means of pressuring the Communist regime. He praised publications that expressed views consistent with that of Romanian exile groups and criticized those that did not. In his various letters to the editors of major newspapers and magazines, Serdici described Romania as the “Trojan Horse of the Soviet Union” to illustrate a widely held exile belief that Ceaușescu was not the maverick that the West portrayed. He believed that Ceaușescu’s actions were either approved by the Soviet

Union, or harmless enough as to not provoke them. Specifically, Serdici referred to the results of trade with Romania as helping “Communist Romania to acquire sensitive U.S.

65 high technology items . . . He is constantly consulting the USSR ambassador in Bucharest

. . . all sensitive U.S. high technology items are immediately passed on to the Soviets.”9

Serdici believed that Ceaușescu’s independent rhetoric was a ruse to infiltrate the West for the Soviet Union. Serdici used this rhetoric when he wrote to the International Herald

Tribune on December 2, 1975 protesting an article titled “Romania’s Trumps in Defying

Russia.” It repeated Ceaușescu’s propaganda that he had an escape plan to establish a government in exile in China in case of Russian invasion. Serdici responded with,

The cold frightening reality of Ceaușescu’s Romania is that it is the “Trojan Horse” of the Soviet Union and worldwide communists . . . Ceaușescu has said and done a lot of things which at face value appear contrary to Soviet position and policies . . . Ceaușescu hasn’t done one single thing without the connivance of the Russians . . . This makes them trust and treat Ceaușescu and his people in a way they wouldn’t trust or treat the Soviets . . . This is how Ceaușescu advances the interests of his true masters and why he and his cronies are so dangerous.10

Serdici did not believe that Romania faced any retribution from Moscow since the two nations were working together. Furthermore, in a 1978 letter to the Daily Telegraph,

Serdici criticized journalists for repeating Bucharest’s propaganda about its foreign policy stating, “Ceaușescu is no maverick at all but rather the willing puppet of the KGB.

In fact, Romanian of today could easily be described as the Trojan Horse of the Soviet

Union.”11 He referenced Pacepa’s recent defection and hoped that his testimony to the

CIA would paint a different picture than the one often repeated in the press. Serdici was

9Letter to Ronald Reagan January 27, 1988, Georges de Serdici Papers, Box 8, Hoover Institution Archives.

10Letter to the Editor of the International Herald Tribune December 2, 1975, Georges de Serdici Papers, Box 3, Folder 5, Hoover Institution Archives.

11Letter to the Editor of The Daily Telegraph August 9, 1978, Georges de Serdici Papers, Box 4, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives.

66 disappointed when this did not occur. Pacepa’s story was not released to the public until

1987 near the end of Ceaușescu’s relationship with the U.S. and the West.

Similarly, in 1979, Serdici responded to an article in Time Magazine that was critical of Ceaușescu’s nepotism. The article described the high status of many of

Ceaușescu’s relatives throughout the country, which Serdici praised. However, at the end of the article, the author mentioned Ceaușescu’s independence from Moscow, which elicited a correction stating, “There are no mavericks in the Soviet empire . . . Ceaușescu is nothing else but one of the most successful creations of the KGB, and that all his . . . independent statements . . . tours around the world . . . designed by the KGB to fool naïve politicians and reporters.”12 Serdici responded to these articles because they were indicative of a larger problem. Publications covered negative aspects of Ceaușescu’s regime while also portraying him as different from the rest of the Soviet bloc. In the same letter he praised the magazine for advocating strengthening the CIA as “more than timely and proves once again that you are responsible journalists.”13 Serdici strongly believed that the CIA needed to be more powerful in order to face the KGB. Serdici was an advocate of the CIA using covert action in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This reflected his outdated mentality that aligned with the height of Cold War tensions before détente.

Additionally, Newsweek published one of his letters in the December 19, 1983 edition regarding a short article that discussed the possibility of increased trade with

Romania in addition to MFN. In it, Serdici criticized MFN as a mistake asserting that,

12Letter to the Editors of Time Magazine April 30, 1979, Georges de Serdici Papers, Box 4, Folder 2, Hoover Institution Archives.

13Ibid.

“ . . . Romanians live in abject misery and whatever can be done to better their way of life should be done. But any trade increase . . . must avoid the sales of high-technology products and be strictly linked with human rights. Otherwise, the United States will only be helping one of its fiercest enemies.”14 Serdici protested any Western actions that bolstered Ceaușescu without aiding the plight of ordinary Romanians. These publications helped expose the public to Serdici’s views on Ceaușescu, MFN, and the Soviet Union by allowing him to share an alternative viewpoint.

Serdici had enjoyed some success in influencing Eisenhower's foreign policy plank in the 1952 election, and this led him to overestimate his later influence. 15 Serdici believed that a tough stance on Eastern Europe would once again ensure a victory in the

1980 election. Serdici supported Texas Governor John Connally and used his connections to send Connally a letter with his ideas on Eastern Europe. He also sent proof of his correspondence with Eisenhower to demonstrate that his ideas were effective. To expose the truth about the Soviet Union, he also sent Conally a copy of Tufton Beamish’s The

Kremlin’s Dilemma as a means for understanding the true nature of the Soviet Union.

Serdici sent several copies of this book to American politicians and his American friends.

In this way, Serdici was fulfilling his duty of spreading what he believed to be the truth about Romania. He could not allow references to the regime’s independent foreign policy to go unanswered. Regardless of the outcome, Serdici never stopped using his connections to make his voice heard.

14“Trading with Romania” Newsweek Letter to the Editor December 19, 1983, Georges de Serdici Papers, Box 9, Folder 41, Hoover Institution Archives.

15Eisenhower used Serdici’s views on Eastern Europe in his foreign policy plank at the height of the Cold War. Serdici believed this tough rhetoric helped Eisenhower win the election.

Serdici’s outreach increased when he became the Secretary General of the PNȚ in

1982. Penescu survived his time in prison and immigrated to France with the help of

Charles de Gaulle. While in exile, he took his role as Secretary General seriously, and worked to rebuild the PNȚ with Serdici and other members who had escaped Romania.

Penescu also founded an exile activist group called the Romanian National Council.

Serdici’s role within the PNȚ made him the natural choice to succeed Penescu. During the MFN period, Serdici’s largest contribution to the exile community was helping to keep the PNȚ alive. Since the PNȚ was one of the largest and most important political parties before the communist era, Serdici and other party leaders in exile hoped the party would one day return to Romania and take back its rightful place at the head of Romanian politics. Serdici acknowledged that it would take time to eliminate communism and establish democracy in Romania, but worked to keep hope alive for the future. In the years following the Helsinki Conference, this made up a large portion of exile work.

After Penescu’s death, the PNȚ appointed Serdici as the next Secretary General.16 One of his chief goals was to bring together different factions in the exile community.17

Unfortunately, he was ultimately unsuccessful in achieving this.

During his tenure as Secretary General from 1982-1990, Serdici stressed that the party was not an exile group, but rather a legitimate, Romanian, democratic political party that had members both in and outside of Romania. As a method of establishing

16Penescu received a mysterious package that contained a bomb; he died from his injuries a month later. Paul Goma received the same package the same day, but called the police instead of opening it. It is widely believed the Securitate attacked them for their anti-Ceaușescu activities.

17Ironically, after Serdici was elected Secretary General over Rațiu, there seemed to be a rift between the two. I did not find any communications between the two in the archives after this point. Also in a letter dated January 27, 1988 to Funderburk, Serdici ridiculed Rațiu’s organization the World Union of Free Romanians. This is indicative of the splits within the exile community that helped prevent them from making more meaningful change. Each group talked about working for unity, but was unable to do so.

69 himself as an authority on Romanian issues, he regularly maintained that if free and democratic elections were to be held in Romania that the PNȚ would win. Serdici stressed his elevated status within the exile community, since he was the lead representative of the PNȚ, the party of Maniu. In this role, he had a pulse on the hopes, desires and opinions of much of the Romanian population. He also had numerous contacts inside Romania, most notably Corneliu Coposu a member of the PNȚ who spent several years in a communist prison. Coposu provided considerable information to

Serdici and other exiles upon his release. As such, Serdici wanted his party to have a closer relationship with RFE and to broadcast stories that fit with the party platform.

Furthermore, since the PNȚ operated as a political party in exile, they could not update the statutes, thereby preserving the party structure for return once Romania was finally liberated. Its exiled leaders focused on keeping the party operational and visible. They used their influence to help Romanians through humanitarian actions and efforts to influence the foreign policy of the U.S. and other world leaders. As members of the permanent delegation to the PNȚ died, Serdici recruited members of the exile community to join the party leadership in exile. The group also attempted to reach out to Hungarian exile groups, putting aside their differences over Transylvania in order to work together against communist rule. While Serdici was successful in minor outreach measures to these groups, he was unable to put together a large enough coalition to garner the level of influence he wanted.

Additionally, Serdici often wrote and distributed statements to key Western politicians and members of the Romanian exile community in his official capacity. This

70 remains a common tactic of exiled leaders.18 On December 17, 1982, Serdici released an official PNȚ statement of support to Lech Walesa in Poland in the face of government suppression. He used this event as a springboard to discuss Ceaușescu’s Kremlin approved stranglehold on Romania. On September 13, 1982 Serdici sent a letter of support to President Reagan for the U.S. embargo on materials for the construction of a pipeline in the Soviet Union. Serdici stressed his appreciation for Reagan’s firm stance against the Soviet Union and any action that might help weaken the superpower. He thought it might lead to a Soviet withdrawal from the satellite nations. Although initially encouraged by Reagan’s tough talk on communism, Serdici became upset by the policy of differentiation and thaw with Gorbachev. He looked for other potential Presidential candidates to reach out to and attempt to influence on matters of anticommunism and

Romania.

Serdici attempted to use his connections and status in the West to affect political change in Romania. He believed the role of Eastern European exiles was to

a) keep the world informed on the true situation in their homeland, b) to expose to the world’s public opinion the illegal and criminal actions done by the oppressors in their homelands, c) to fight for the recognition of the rights of their oppressed nations, d) to keep alive the true traditions of their nations, and e) if possible, to act even on their own homelands political arenas.19

As a result, he developed a plan for “national action,” in which Romanian exiles worked to expose Romanian citizens to Western ideas and ways of life. For example, he attempted to coordinate with Western publishers to prepare non-political descriptions of

18For example, the son of the Shah of Iran, heir to the throne in exile, released one of his official statements regarding Iranian elections in 2016 and continues to do so regarding major events that concern Iran.

19Letter from Serdici to Mr. Victor Cornea October 28, 1967, Georges de Serdici Papers, Box 2, Folder 11, Hoover Institution Archives.

Western supermarkets in the Romanian language in order to get people to want them.20

Serdici believed this would help recruit Romanian citizens to combat the communist regime from the inside using information from the outside. Serdici believed that informing Romanians about life in the West would inspire them. This was a method of combating communist propaganda about the evils of the capitalist West by showing readers the advantages of free market economics in a practical way. RFE employed similar methods with its programming.

Serdici was personal friends with Director of Central Intelligence William E.

Colby, and used this connection to bend the ear of powerful Americans such as Vice

President Bush. Serdici also used this connection to revive his idea of a covert, anti- communist organization with handpicked exiles from all of the satellite nations to act against the KGB. He spoke of this idea to high-level guests at dinner parties, including

General Vernon Walters and sent them letters explaining why under President Reagan, the time was finally right to organize.21 At the time, Serdici was excited about Reagan’s rhetoric against the Soviet Union and the arms race. He felt that under Reagan, real change would finally have a chance to occur in Romania. However, despite their tough talk, the State Department under President Reagan would never have approved such an organization.

Funderburk’s Pinstripes and Reds validated Serdici’s actions and beliefs since it confirmed everything he had been saying about Romania for decades. Serdici sent copies

20Letter from Serdici to Ion Rațiu November 13, 1964, Georges de Serdici Papers, Box 2, Folder 8, Hoover Institution Archives.

21Letter Serdici to William E. Colby, June 11, 1981, Georges de Serdici Papers, Box 3, Folder 5, Hoover Institution Archives.

72 of the book to Presidents, Congressmen, and anyone else who he felt could use the information to create change. He hoped that the book would help legitimize exile arguments and produce action. Members of Congress took note and responded, especially since Funderburk regularly testified during MFN hearings, but members of the State

Department did not. Serdici’s letters to Reagan criticizing the policy of differentiation and extolling Funderburk’s book were directly forwarded to Jack Seymour from the State

Department for reply. Although the State Department did not take his advice, Serdici did warrant a reply. In 1988, Seymour informed Serdici that Ceaușescu gave up MFN as a means to avoid human rights scrutiny.22 Serdici, pleased by these events, began to relent on his tone towards differentiation and pushed for further U.S. interference in human rights expansion in Romania.

During his tenure as Secretary General of PNȚ from 1982-2000, Serdici was aware that many considered him to be a “crank” because of his colorful language and old-fashioned insistence of Western intervention in Romania. However, it did not discourage him from continuing his work, especially since he also received many words of encouragement from high level Americans who agreed with him. Serdici sent appeals to Western leaders asking them to aid in the liberation of Romania and the other nations under the Soviet yoke. Because of the politics of détente and differentiation, his efforts were bound to be unsuccessful. Serdici expressed hope that the end of MFN would lead to more cooperation from the U.S. in denying U.S. technology and economic investment in Romania that benefited Ceaușescu but not the Romanian people. Despite these later setbacks, Serdici was at the center of shaping Romanian exile culture, particularly with

22Letter from Jack Seymour March 2, 1988, Georges de Serdici Papers, Box 7, Folder 8 Hoover Institution Archives.

73 members and supporters of the PNȚ. His work in fighting communism extended over several decades with every high profile Romanian exile of the era. His methods influenced and enhanced the work of his colleagues.

Brutus Coste

Professor Coste was a vocal and staunchly anti-Communist member of the

Romanian exile community and the embodiment of exile political culture. 23 His work with ACEN, TARC, and dissident Paul Goma illustrates the influence that Romanian exiles could have on political action within the exile community as well as in Western governments and culture. His successes encouraged other exiles, such as Serdici, to keep up their activities and served as a model for their culture of political action. He served as the Secretary General of ACEN for eleven years before being voted out of office. Coste rejected the Johnson administrations’ policy of détente and “building bridges” with communist nations in Central and Eastern Europe. He believed it was too soft on communism and solidified communist control. Coste’s attitude caused conflicts with the

FEC and other representatives in ACEN. Coste and his supporters accused the FEC of placing pressure on ACEN to remove Coste for his outspoken anti-communist views and not conforming to détente. He publicly stated that he would not have accepted the role even if it were offered back to him because of this divide. Coste wanted to end communism and was not satisfied with only improving the quality of life of those trapped in the Soviet sphere. However, over time he adapted and tirelessly worked as an advocate for the improvement of human rights in Romania.

23Coste taught International Relations at Fairleigh Dickinson University in New Jersey for ten years.

Coste’s Contributions to Shaping Exile Culture

As American concerns about Romania shifted towards human rights, Coste added humanitarian aid to his work on foreign policy. He was well connected and wanted to use his influence by any means. In 1973 he formed TARC and served as the organizations’ spokesman. TARC was an association of Romanian-Americans who were “dedicated to the task of disseminating the truth about conditions in Romania and voicing, in the Free

World, the freedom aspirations of the Romanian people, and calling for compliance with basic human rights as a precondition for granting Most-Favored-Clause status to non- market countries.”24 This meant that Coste and TARC would use their experiences and connections to inform the world of Romanian news suppressed by the regime.

Additionally, he would use this information to advocate for human rights and the end of

MFN in Congress. Because of Coste’s affiliation with ACEN, he was one of the most trusted and credible Romanian exiles in the U.S. Congress. His correspondence was published yearly during the MFN hearings.

A common feature of Romanian exile groups was their claim that Ceaușescu’s independent foreign policy from Moscow was actually a charade supported by the Soviet government. In June of 1975, President Gerald Ford received Ceaușescu as a guest at the

White House. TARC sent a letter to President Ford on behalf of the Romanian people who still lived behind the Iron Curtain. It asked him to consider the possibility that

Ceaușescu was not working independently from Moscow, but that his independent words and gestures were welcomed because it fit into their European strategy. TARC also asked

Ford to consider not attending the European Security Conference in the summer and that

24Statement by Brutus Coste July 19,1979 before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance of the U.S. Senate, Brutus Coste Papers, Box 33, Hoover Institution Archives.

75 if he did, to reject any deals that would solidify the borders in Eastern and Central

Europe. Coste was strongly against the Soviet occupation of lands that belonged to

Romania prior to the end of WWII and hoped that they would one day be returned. Coste wrote, “If the U.S. and her European allies cannot honor their wartime and postwar pledges toward the captive nations, they should at least refrain from making their chains heavier.”25 Coste used this strong and emotional language to convince Ford to make decisions that would lessen the human rights violations of Romanians.

In addition to human rights advocacy, Romanian exiles were often concerned with issues of nationalism such as national borders and the treatment of ethnic minorities in

Romania. Nationalist politics even worked their way into the MFN debate, straying from the main issue of Ceaușescu’s emigration policy and human rights abuses. In the

September 14, 1976 House Hearing before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, Coste submitted an almost identical statement to one in the corresponding Senate hearing. However, he addressed the frequency of testimony by the

Hungarian group Committee for Human Rights in Romania before the House during the

MFN discussions. He contended that the inclusion of this group, whose sole purpose was to revive the debates over which country should control Transylvania, was detrimental to the overall cause. Coste contended that the fate of ethnic minorities in Romania were no different than that of ethnic Romanians. Groups like the Committee for Human Rights in

Romania hurt the overall cause of promoting human rights by splintering groups who should be working together against the Romanian and Hungarian governments.26 Not

25Coste letter to Gerald Ford 1975, Brutus Coste Papers, Box 10, Folder 17, Hoover Institution Archives.

26House Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, Extension of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment to Romania, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976, 307-308.

76 even the Ceaușescu regime could undermine the border disputes between Romanians and

Hungarians. The issue was so divisive that RFE did not broadcast stories about the treatment of minority groups in Romania out of fear of fanning the flames of nationalism and ethnic hatred, despite the pressure from exile groups to do so.

Coste also challenged the Jackson-Vanik waiver for Romania because he, like many in Congress, believed a liberal emigration policy was an insufficient reason to grant

MFN. Even as emigration numbers increased, many families were still kept apart.

Romanians continued to carry out hunger strikes in front of the UN for family reunification. Coste echoed many neoconservative Congressional representatives by arguing that MFN should be contingent on the expansion of human rights in Romania.

Coste published his yearly statement on behalf of TARC for the 1979 hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance, regarding President Carter’s waiver for the fourth year in a row. His arguments mirrored those in the exile community and in the neoconservative faction of Congress. He argued that Ceaușescu’s maverick behavior was anything but, and did not warrant MFN. He outlined the instances of Ceaușescu’s independent foreign policy and offered alternative interpretations for each action. He also noted how the Soviet Union was either able to ignore it because of Ceaușescu’s control at home, or how they would benefit from each action. Coste also stated that Romania merely played the role of independent foreign policy within the greater Soviet sphere, often putting forth agreements that reiterated earlier Soviet agreements with the West. He also suggested that Romania was a pathfinder for the Eastern bloc nations. By joining groups like GATT and IMF first, they were testing the waters for other satellites to join without abandoning communism.

In addition, he was concerned that the U.S. was using MFN for purposes other than facilitating emigration, which violated the agreement. Coste explicitly condemned the White House’s motives in issuing MFN to Romania as a method of encouraging

Ceaușescu’s independent foreign policy from the Soviet Union, instead of enforcing freedom of emigration and reducing human rights abuses in Romania because it led to further Romanian suffering. Neoconservative Congressmen who opposed MFN renewal often echoed these claims during MFN hearings. Coste noted the changes in the White

House’s tone towards the Ceaușescu government in Carter’s warning that accompanied the recommendation for a waiver. Coste claimed the tone as moving from strong in 1977 to mild in 1978 and bordering on praise in 1979. In contrast, the majority of Romanian exiles and refugees felt and expressed otherwise, based on their experiences. He also warned that Ceaușescu was using his “posture of independence” as a “substitute for internal reforms.”27 The Romanian National Council supported Coste by also submitting a statement to call into question Romanian emigration practices. They added additional proof that the Romanian government was out of compliance, claiming that 80% of refugees within the last ten years were privileged members of the RCP who had victimized many innocent Romanians. They believed this subverted the intention of MFN and were willing to submit a list of names as proof.

As a means to gather further support for defeating the MFN proposal, Coste brought up the issue of changes in the types of Romanian citizens allowed to immigrate to the United States. Coste claimed that at first, Romanian exit visas were mostly issued to two groups, for family reunification purposes and to ethnic minorities. Coste

27Statement by Brutus Coste July 19,1979 before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance of the U.S. Senate, Brutus Coste Papers, Box 33, Hoover Institution Archives.

78 acknowledged that the Ceaușescu regime was meeting the emigration requirements of

Jackson-Vanik by increasing the number of Romanian immigrants to the United States at a rate that the White House and Congress deemed satisfactory. The total number of

Romanian immigrants jumped from 9,336 in 1976 to 17,810 in 1977. The total number increased again to 19,780 in 1978. However, Coste claimed that Ceaușescu reached these numbers by increasingly issuing exit visas to single males aged 25-45 with criminal records. Coste argued that in 1978, even though Ceaușescu satisfactorily increased emigration numbers, there were still many families awaiting reunification with loved ones. He also claimed that Romanian immigration to Israel declined every year once the

U.S. deemed that Ceaușescu met his obligation and reissued MFN for the following year.

Furthermore, he went on to describe the Romanian governments’ harassment of citizens who applied for emigration to the United States.

Similar to the neoconservative wing of Congress, Coste pushed for expanding accountability on human rights to more than emigration. He referenced the Amnesty

International report that described the use of psychiatric treatment, forced labor, and fines as a means to punish any perceived dissenters quoting, “since the beginning of the 1970s a distinct pattern of persecution has become apparent, and the number of persons confined to forced labor camps or psychiatric hospitals or imprisoned for political reasons, has significantly increased.”28 Since religious freedom was an important issue to members of Congress and Romanians, he chronicled the repression of churches and imprisonment of known believers from a variety of denominations. Coste wrote, “Father

Gheorghe Calciu-Dumitreasa-the highly esteemed Romanian Orthodox priest-is still

28Senate Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance, Most favored nation status for Romania, Hungary and China, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, 298.

79 service a ten-year conviction for being a tremendously eloquent preacher . . . The true leaders of the neo-protestant group have all been expelled from Romania during the last year.”29 Coste also discussed the imprisonment of the founders of the Free Trade Union of the Working People of Romania (SLOMR) stating the organization “was suppressed within days after its establishment, in February 1979. All its leaders . . . were placed under arrest. (Ionel) Cană was given a five-year prison term; the others simply disappeared.”30 Coste demonstrated that Ceaușescu imprisoned church and union leaders, a common tactic of totalitarian regimes. However, the U.S. repeatedly granted MFN status, which Coste believed was undeserved. Every year he told Congress that MFN should be withheld until Romania made significant changes in its human rights record.

Coste continued his political action by writing letters to various members of

Congress and asking for their support in discontinuing MFN. Senators Alfonse D’Amato of New York and Helms replied to Coste outlining their support and promising to use their influence in Congress. In his response, D’Amato stated, “I am not now in favor of continuing MFN status for Romania. President Ceaușescu’s government must take positive steps toward the elimination of human rights violations . . .While I am not a member of the Subcommittee, I will be monitoring the situation closely.”31 Helms thanked Coste for his “efforts to call attention to the plight of the Romanian people who have now endured decades of oppression under communism.”32 Helms demonstrated his

29Ibid.

30Ibid.

31Letter from Senator Alfonse D’Amato to Brutus Coste, August 3, 1982, Brutus Coste Papers, Box 3, Hoover Institution Archives.

32Letter from Senator Jesse Helms to Brutus Coste, June 17, 1982, Brutus Coste Papers, Box 3, Hoover Institution Archives.

80 distaste for MFN by writing, “If these nations were forced to live on the proceeds of their socialism, we would soon see many salutary changes in these governments which are never going to take place as long as they are being subsidized by the West.”33 Coste’s role in ACEN gave him credibility with members of Congress. As a result, they were often willing to personally respond to Coste.

Romanian groups also used MFN renewal as a means to bring attention to individuals who wished for family reunification outside of Romania, but had not been granted permission from the Romanian government. Groups, including TARC, submitted letters from family members in the West and in Romania, pleading their cases for

Congressional aid in convincing the Romanian government to issue visas. RFE also broadcast personal pleas. Romanian exile groups were most likely to succeed in this area since emigration numbers were of particular concern to the U.S. Congress. They were able to use MFN renewal hearings and RFE to put pressure on the Ceaușescu regime to issue visas. Individuals and exile organizations aided in family reunification by assisting applicants in contacting members of CSCE, specifically reaching out to Senator Dante

Fascell, who was chairman of the committee. There was an official CSCE form applicants could submit for consideration. This was another means for exiles and members of Congress to work together for humanitarian aid.

TARC and Paul Goma

Coste’s influence with the neoconservative wing of Congress is well illustrated by his ability to set up and facilitate meetings with Paul Goma on behalf of TARC. He utilized Goma for his political actions and to advocate for humanitarian aid. Paul Goma

33Ibid.

81 was a Romanian writer who joined the RCP after Ceaușescu’s condemnation of the 1968

Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. However, he grew increasingly disenchanted with

Ceaușescu’s human rights policies, particularly those regarding freedom of speech.

Inspired by the “Charter 77” movement in Czechoslovakia, he wrote a letter to founding member Pavel Kohout expressing solidarity. Then, in February 1977 Goma was part of a group of eight that wrote an open letter to the nations participating in the CSCE Belgrade

Conference, who were about to meet to discuss the progress in the implementation of the

Helsinki Accords. This letter revealed the human rights abuses in Romania that violated the Constitution, such as the lack of civil liberties, free speech, and freedom of assembly.

Approximately 600 Romanian workers and intellectuals eventually signed this letter.34

Goma and his associates hoped that this letter would encourage the other signatory nations to place pressure on Ceaușescu to improve human rights.35 Goma also sent

Ceaușescu a letter addressed to the Royal Palace in Bucharest, urging him to support the

Charter 77 movement in the same manner that he expressed support in 1968.36 The RCP expelled Goma from the party and he was confined to house arrest. Even though the

Bucharest earthquake of 1977 overshadowed the Western media coverage of this letter, neoconservative Congressmen who were concerned about human rights in Romania took note of this incident. The subsequent imprisonment of Goma and his group, combined with discrimination against religious leaders, the violation of freedom of association, and

34Paul Goma Background Information, Brutus Coste Papers, Box 23, Hoover Institution Archives.

35Vladimir Tismanaeu claims that most of these signatories were hoping to receive a “Goma Passport” by signing on, in which being associated with a dissident movement would expedite the emigration process.

36 The definitive work on Goma’s 1977 activities is Paul Goma, The Color of the Rainbow 77; Code Name “The Bearded One” (Iași: Polirom, 2005).

82 the imprisonment of historian Vlad Georgescu, led to the inclusion of human rights language in the relief aid bill.37

Coste and Goma had worked together for several years and organizations like

RFE held both men in high esteem. Romanian exiles used RFE as a tool to connect with

Romanian dissidents and to show Romanians this connection existed. Exiles believed that this could provide hope. RFE openly and regularly supported emigration and family reunification on the air. RFE broadcaster Liviu Floda often reported on family reunification issues, hunger strikes, and protests. On March 4, 1977, Floda broadcasted an interview between Coste and Goma for the RFE audience. He broadcasted another interview between Coste and Goma during their U.S. and Canada tour the next year, a period where Goma made the right to emigrate a central piece of his human rights advocacy. Goma stated that he did not want to personally emigrate until all Romanians were allowed to do so. Ceaușescu offered emigration as a means to shut down dissident activities. However, he would then publicly condemn Romanians who left the country and criticized his regime once they were in the West. In 1978, Goma began to criticize the U.S. and Western Europe for only pressuring Romania on emigration since Romania, like the USSR, only focused on human rights issues that other nations pressed them on.

Therefore he argued that if Western governments would press other issues, then more progress could be made.

In May 1977, Ceaușescu arrested several human rights activists, including Goma.

In response, Romanians in New York picketed outside of the UN when a six-member

37Joseph Harrington and Bruce Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians: Fifty Years of American- Romanian Relations, 1940-1990 (Boulder and New York: East European Monographs; Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1991), 420.

83 delegation from Bucharest visited. TARC provided slogans for the signs and reported on the situation. TARC also encouraged U.S. citizens to write to their elected representatives to demand that economic aid only be supplied to Eastern European nations when they observed human rights. Coste used this tactic to bring additional credibility to their cause by demonstrating that there was American support outside of exile groups.38 After his release from prison, Goma immigrated to Paris in November for his safety on what became known as a “Goma passport.” Romanians learned that high profile dissent could lead to emigration. Upon his arrival as an exile in Paris, Goma gave a press conference in which he discussed specific human rights abuses in Romania, such as forced labor camps and interning dissenters in psychiatric hospitals. Doctors used methods such as threats, injections of drugs, beatings, and electric shocks in the process of re-education.39 He also stated that Ceaușescu’s use of national independence and patriotism were a decoy for him to do whatever he or the Soviet Union wanted. Goma validated Coste and Serdici in his indictment of Ceaușescu as a puppet for Leonid Brezhnev.

TARC rallied around Goma as a means to reach their goals, since he was the most vocal and high profile Romanian dissident. Coste worked hard to promote Goma and his dissident work in Romania and Paris. In October and November of 1978, Coste organized a tour of the United States and Canada for Goma, co-sponsored by the International

Freedom to Publish Committee of the Association of American publishers and the

38“Human Rights Activists Arrested in Romania,” TARC, 2/19/77, Brutus Coste Papers, Box 23, Hoover Institution Archives.

39Amnesty International Briefing Romania (Nottingham: Amnesty International Publications, June 1980), 14.

International League for Human Rights.40 While setting up the itinerary, Coste reached out to universities and members of government. In these letters Coste characterized

Goma as

. . . a valiant fighter for the rights of man . . . almost one fifth of his 42 years were spent in the horror of communist prisons for the ‘crime’ of having made critical remarks about the Soviet-imposed regime of his country . . . For a large segment of the people of Romania Paul Goma has become a symbol of their freedom aspirations. This prompts us to respectfully ask you to receive Goma.41

Goma used his personal experience to inform the U.S. Congress and American public on the nature of political opposition in Romania. He described the consequences by stating,

“the signers of the open letter addressed to the Belgrade Conference were denounced publicly over the State TV by Ceaușescu, the Chief of State himself, as traitors to their country who sold out to foreign espionage agencies. The security police harassed them, beat them up and assigned them to mental institutions.”42 He also wanted to dispel the myth of Romanian independence from the Soviet Union stating, “The fact that Rumania has no Soviet troops on its soil does not mean that the Soviets have no influence over it . . . waving the flag of nationalism does not mean that Rumania is an independent national entity.”43 The combination of Coste and Goma generated a lot of interest in the

West, particularly with neoconservatives. Their itinerary included speaking dates at universities around the country, interviews with RFE and print media, and meetings with

40In 1977, Coste advocated on behalf of Goma to the US government when he was imprisoned

41Letter from Brutus Coste to Vice President Walter Mondale, August 4, 1978, Brutus Coste Papers, Box 23, Hoover Institution Archives.

42Human Rights in Romania Statement by Paul Goma, New York, October 19, 1978, Brutus Coste Papers, Box 23, Hoover Institution Archives.

43Exiled Writer Describes Oppression in Rumania, AFL-CIO News, Washington D.C., October 14, 1978, Brutus Coste Papers, Box 23, Hoover Institution Archives.

85 government officials. Universities in Ithaca, Bloomington, Columbia in New York, and

Stanford in California invited him to speak. This was reminiscent of Scoop Jackson and the CDM inviting Solzhenitsyn to speak to the Senate prior to the Helsinki summit of

1975.

Goma used his high profile dissident status and intimate knowledge of life in

Romania to inform and influence members of Congress and the State Department. On this trip, Goma met with members of the State Department and Congress, including

Jackson. On October 12, 1978, Congressman Fascell invited Goma to a meeting with the

CSCE Commission, who had used and published Goma’s writings. Members of

Congress, including Millicent Fenwick who was instrumental in the Helsinki Conference and the creation of CSCE, as well as members of the press and the State Department attended the event. Goma credited RFE and the Western press for providing the momentum for a Romanian protest movement, which resulted in his exile and that of many of his colleagues.44 Goma stressed that human rights simply do not exist and therefore, “In Romania these rights exist only in writing; they are never practiced or observed.”45 He discussed his arrest, imprisonment, and torture for asking for the enforcement of Romanian laws that promote human rights and the agreements made at the Helsinki and Belgrade Conferences.46 He did not advocate for regime change, demonstrating the consequences for any level of dissidence. Goma described this form of harassment as “limited freedom” in place of imprisonment for those who “have opinions

44Paul Goma, Informal Transcript, 10/12/78 Meeting CSCE Commission, Brutus Coste Papers, Box 23, Hoover Institution Archives.

45Ibid., 1.

46Ibid.

86 that are different from official political opinions, or for their religious beliefs, or for simply disagreeing with higher officials.”47 He also discussed how labor strikes were forbidden. He echoed other exiles by stating that Western support and Ceaușescu’s maverick image hurts the Romanian people. This support strengthens his internal policies, since “having an image of independence abroad means having a complete dictatorship at home.”48 He conveyed the message that even though the Romanian people did not expect liberation by the West any longer, they now asked that the West at least stop helping Ceaușescu with trade, credits, and other types of aid. Goma was the physical embodiment of exile and neoconservative arguments against MFN.

During the question and answer session members of the State Department and

CSCE were particularly interested in the regime’s use of psychiatric hospitals, the impact of the Helsinki Final Act on the Romanian people, religious freedoms, and how the US could help dissidents in Eastern Europe. Goma reiterated that the Romanian people understood that the only way they could achieve success with opposition movements was for the Western world to be informed. He also stressed the influence that RFE had in all parts of society, since everyone listened, including RCP members and the police. For example, there were cases of people in power being criticized for abuses on RFE who were forced to change their behavior after the exposure.49 Additionally, Goma emphasized that Western support for Ceaușescu that did not translate into aid for the

Romanian people was confusing, frustrating, and hurt the dissident movement by

47Ibid., 2.

48Ibid., 4.

49Ibid., 13.

87 discouraging people from joining. Most Romanian people were unwilling to risk persecution and imprisonment for a movement that lacked outside support and was unlikely to succeed. Goma also echoed Jackson and other neoconservative members of

Congress in stating that MFN renewal should be tied to more aspects of human rights than just increased emigration. Goma highlighted that the Romanian people were disillusioned with the lack of results from the Helsinki and Belgrade Conferences.

Goma’s words had an impact of Fascell and many like-minded congressional representatives, since they often wanted to tie MFN to more than emigration. In fact, prominent Romanian exiles sent direct appeals to Fascell to use his influence in family reunification issues. Fenwick, who helped Romanian families reunite in the U.S. and visited Romania to check the situation for churches, debated Goma and his translator

Nicholas Dima on the various states of religious freedom for each group. Fenwick stated,

“I spoke to Roman Catholics and Protestants and to Rabbi Rosen in Romania awhile back, and as far as I can see, they can have their schools, catechisms, anything they want.”50 Goma replied that, “It is only for show. The government controls the church.

Churches are open, but there are many other ways to discourage people from going to church.”51 Goma’s and her experiences differed, making it difficult for her to accept his point of view. This exchange replicated the split in opinion and ongoing debate on

Romania and MFN in Congress.52

50Ibid., 10.

51Ibid., 11.

52This meeting was covered in the October 13, 1978 edition of the Washington Post, helping to spread Goma’s message to more of the American public.

Some Romanian exiles, Westerners, and Hungarians criticized Romanians as being cowards for not organizing a strong opposition or working to create a civil society.

The government suppressed Goma’s movement, one of the largest attempts by a

Romanian intellectual to oppose Ceaușescu, further demonstrating that attempts to stand up to his government would amount to little more than self-destruction, or if lucky, a ticket to emigrate to the West. Furthermore, Western support of Ceaușescu gave credence to the government, making opposition movements “uninteresting” or “unworthy” of support to the average Romanian.53 Additionally, in the 1970s Western governments and media often did not help to “amplify” dissident Romanian voices in the West as to not ruin Ceaușescu’s maverick image. This generated further obstacles for Coste and his colleagues in their political actions.

Ion Rațiu and Horia Georgescu

Rațiu was chairman of ACARDA and both the founder and editor of the FRP. He also used his organization to reach out to Western diplomats and regularly worked with

Serdici and Coste on political actions. His organization had a significant impact on the political culture and cultural activities of Romanian exiles. Rațiu became a refugee in

1940 when the Nazis and Romanian Iron Guard seized power. Rațiu married into British high society and became a wealthy shipping magnate. This status allowed him access to the most powerful British leaders. Rațiu was a Romanian nationalist, proud of the Latin origins of Romania and an admirer of the Dacians. He wanted a return to the 1918-1940 borders, which he referred to as the only time Romania was united as a nation and lived as one. He even published a map of Romania including the “lost provinces” of Bukovina

53Verdery, Ideology, 311.

89 and Bessarabia, which was featured in much of his work. One of Rațiu’s closest colleagues was Horia Georgescu.

Before the communist takeover of Romania, Georgescu served as a diplomat in the Romanian Foreign Office. He moved to England in 1948 and became a journalist and diplomatic correspondent for Agence France-Presse in London. This allowed him to work within the world of diplomacy that he was so familiar with, but as an impartial journalist and observer. His polemic work was part of his human rights crusade during his free time and in retirement. He used his knowledge of journalism and writing skills as a means to fight against communism in his home country. In an attempt at unity, he became the

London representative for the Paris based League for the Defence of Human Rights in

Romania. Georgescu was one of the most prolific and polemic letter writers in the exile community.

Rațiu and Georgescu’s Contributions to Shaping Exile Political Culture

Founded in 1965 by Rațiu and Georgescu, ACARDA worked “to promote and defend Romanian traditions and long-term interests.” Specifically, they used their organization to advocate for the return of the “lost provinces.” They also used it to focus on what the future of Romania would look like once communism ended. ACARDA also served as a way to build and maintain connections between Romanians living in England and throughout the world. They worked to “organize meetings, lectures, discussion groups . . . to discuss cultural, social, economic, and religious problems” connected to

Romanian interests either directly or indirectly. They also organized social events for

Romanians and their friends of other nationalities to meet and “to intervene through the press . . . whenever Romanian culture, civilization, religion, and ethnic structures are

90 affected.”54 ACARDA was also a means of celebrating Romanian culture for the exiles.

They frequently held dinner dances to celebrate key Romanian dates and historical events, such as the unification of Moldavia and Walachia. In this way, ACARDA preserved Romanian culture abroad while in exile in the hopes of an eventual return. This was especially vital as Ceaușescu attempted to replace Romanian culture with his cult of personality.

ACARDA regularly pressed the issue of the illegal Soviet annexation of

Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina following the end of World War II. ACARDA issued a publication commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the 1918 reunification of

Romanian with Bessarabia that described why the area should be considered part of

Romania and not a separate country. Rațiu and Georgescu regularly wrote letters to the editor of prominent publications who published articles on the Soviet Republic of

Moldova that failed to mention its connection to Romania. The issue of resolving

Romania’s borders was and continues to be a key piece of Romanian identity.

As an extension of his work with ACARDA, Rațiu published a book entitled

Contemporary Romania in which he outlined the history of communism and Russian intervention in Romania.55 Rațiu’s purpose was to have a scholarly work that exposed the truth about Ceaușescu to the world amidst the official false propaganda. He indicted

Ceaușescu as not a maverick but a hard line communist, which was illustrated by his July

Theses. This document outlined the propaganda campaign to replace all elements of

54The Statutes of the Cultural Association of Romanians in England, Horia Georgescu Papers, Box 12, Hoover Institution Archives.

55Ion Rațiu, Contemporary Romania: Her Place in World Affairs (London: Foreign Affairs Publishing Co., 1975).

91 intellectual, social, and cultural life with Ceaușescu centered, Romanian communist principles. Rațiu described Ceaușescu’s goal “to re-instill communist dogmatism and discipline in all sectors of society.”56 He cited Ceaușescu’s “gradual retreat from Prague” as banning Western media and entertainment, creating a new version of “the Hora,” a traditional Romanian dance, which was now dedicated to Ceaușescu, and ordering the publication of a new historical volume that eliminated any mention of anti-Communists such as Maniu as proof.57 He also stressed that Romania was firmly in the Soviet camp, despite Western impressions otherwise. Foreign policy and espionage was only conducted with the approval of the Soviet Union like a vassal state, which was nothing new to Romania. This theme would emerge in Congressional hearings as reasons to deny

MFN. Rațiu extolled the achievements of the Romanian exile communities as united against communism. He warned that exiles were perceived as threats and were therefore targets for the regime for the following purposes: repatriation, direct support for the

Romanian government, neutralization, and turning them into collaborators. This vigilance led to Romanian exiles reporting to one another when contacted by Ceaușescu’s representatives.

Additionally, Romanian exiles were preoccupied with ensuring that the West portrayed their version of accurate Romanian history. It was especially important to these men that the West acknowledge the role that the Soviet Union played in the set up of the communist government in Romania. Also, they often brought up the deals made at the

Yalta Conference that led to Soviet takeover of Romania and neighboring countries.

56Ibid., 62.

57Ibid., 68.

Georgescu was committed to enlightening the West of Romanian democratic traditions.

The Times of London published Georgescu’s letter to the editor which was critical of a piece that described Romania’s independent foreign policy and described Romanians as only knowing autocratic rule. 58 Georgescu chided the author by stating, “This shows a crass ignorance of the history of modern Romania, which, since her independence a hundred years ago, has striven to adopt the French and British institutions.”59 This refers to the Romanian Constitution, adapted from the Belgian Constitution, which was adopted in 1866 and modified in 1923. This document established a constitutional monarchy.

Romanian political parties particularly struggled to establish a parliamentary democracy during the 1920s, culminating in the election of 1928, which was the most democratic in

Romanian history at the time.60 This collapsed during the Great Depression and rise of fascism in the 1930s. Georgescu and his colleagues strongly believed in democracy and idealized this era of Romanian history. They were the heirs to the beginnings of democracy in Romania that were interrupted by the fascist and communist regimes. They wanted to inherit what they believed to be their rightful place in government and continue the work of developing democratic traditions in Romania. They discussed the Romanian democratic tradition as a means to legitimize their work in fighting communism. This emerged as a repeated theme in his correspondence with government officials and newspapers.

58Letter to the Editor The Times of London September 5, 1975, Horia Georgescu Papers, Box 12, Hoover Institution Archives.

59Ibid.

60Keith Hitchins, Rumania 1866-1947 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 414.

ACARDA used the outcomes of the Helsinki Conference to reach out to the

British media and government leaders. They worked to place pressure on government leaders directly and through the media. In a letter to the editor for The Times of London,

Georgescu declared that Romanian citizens in Britain and the Commonwealth would make their views of Ceaușescu known to top leaders Wilson, Thatcher, and Selwyn

Lloyd who were planning to visit Romania.61 To coincide with Georgescu’s letter, Rațiu wrote Prime Minister Wilson a letter critical of his upcoming visit to Romania so soon after the Helsinki Final Act that solidified the USSR’s annexation of Bukovina and

Bessarabia. Rațiu was committed to fighting for the re-annexation of the provinces lost after WWII. Rațiu argued that the visit would further demoralize Romanians into thinking that communism was permanent and there was nothing to fight for because of

Britain’s support of Ceaușescu.62 He urged Wilson to use this visit as a means to ensure that Ceaușescu followed through on the human rights language in the Helsinki Final Act.

He also asked Wilson to request that Ceaușescu cease selling Romanians who wished to emigrate, giving compensation for political prisoners, and allowing more freedom of movement and ideas for Romanians and exiles. Rațiu described the intimidation tactics that the Securitate used against the exile communities. They sent propaganda and agents posing as religious or cultural representatives to apply pressure or blackmail exiles since

Ceaușescu was constantly worried about exile interference.

61Horia Georgescu, Letter to the Editor The Times of London, September 5, 1975, Horia Georgescu Papers, Box 12, Hoover Institution Archives.

62Letter from Ion Raţiu to Harold Wilson 1975, Georges de Serdici Papers, Box 10, Folder 8, Hoover Institution Archives.

In a 1975 letter to Wilson, Rațiu stressed Romanian disapproval of détente unless it was being used to Westernize Romania in order to defeat the communist dictatorship.63

On June 12, 1975, Rațiu drafted another letter on behalf of ACARDA to Wilson ahead of

Ceaușescu’s upcoming visit to London.64 Rațiu reiterated the lack of freedoms and human rights in Romania. He stressed that Ceaușescu’s government was above the law and used the Securitate to remain in power. He also described Ceaușescu’s personality cult as surpassing Stalin’s. He asked Wilson to use his influence at the meeting to convince Ceaușescu to allow family reunification, which was a regular exile request in their communications. Rațiu used democratic language in his closing when declaring, “as

Romanians, we wish to re-state our belief in the free institutions which made us choose to live in this country in the first place, and to re-dedicate ourselves to the ideal of a democratic Romania where dignity of man will once again prevail.”65 On the same day,

The Daily Telegraph published a short article in the London “Day By Day” section criticizing Wilson for meeting with Ceaușescu and announcing Rațiu’s plans to head a delegation from ACARDA to directly hand the letter to Wilson. This campaign exemplifies ACARDA’s political action strategy.

Rațiu proceeded to contact Margaret Thatcher about her upcoming visit to

Romania. He urged her and Wilson to reconsider the visit or at least use the occasion to advocate for human rights in Romania and place pressure on Ceaușescu. Thatcher sent a respectful reply, informing Rațiu that she repeats her remarks from the Helsinki

63Ibid.

64Letter from Ion Raţiu to Harold Wilson June 12, 1975, Georges de Serdici Papers, Box 10, Folder 8, Hoover Institution Archives.

65Ibid.

Conference to Communist leaders whenever she meets with them. Specifically that she evaluated communist governments on a case-by-case basis as to whether they were following détente policies or just giving lip service. Her personal response demonstrates

Raţiu’s high level connections in Britain as well as Thatcher’s sympathetic stance to the democratic Romanian plight. Michael Sullivan from the Foreign Office also wrote to

Rațiu, informing him that Britain’s positive stance on human rights had been communicated to the leaders of Eastern Europe. A few years later in 1980, Georgescu received a response from the Eastern European and Soviet Department of the British

Foreign and Commonwealth Office assuring him that office representatives press the issues of human rights on their Romanian counterparts. Receiving regular personal responses from such high levels in the British government demonstrates the status that

Rațiu and ACARDA held in Britain. These interactions further encouraged exiles in

Britain and throughout the West to continue their political actions. Their replies communicated to exiles that there was a possibility of future influence.

Additionally, on September 1, 1983, ahead of Vice President Bush’s visit to

Romania, Rațiu and Georgescu wrote a letter requesting that Bush use his influence to address certain human rights violations in Romania. Bush sent a response stating that his visit could only benefit the Romanian people and he felt that the U.S. had been able to use its influence in Romania, especially regarding emigration. Once again, direct replies from the Vice President of the United States further encouraged ACARDA in their political advocacy.

Rațiu was also the director of the FRP, a weekly newsletter that published news from Romania and served as an open forum for discussions on exile issues. It was widely

96 distributed in exile circles and fueled democratic action within the exile community. For example, the FRP published several articles on two notable ongoing conversations on the crisis of the CNR and the debate on whether or not to create a Romanian National

Congress as a replacement. The FRP printed opinion pieces from different points of view and letters from readers. He also used this publication as a method to expose Ceaușescu, hoping to influence the attitude of British officials and the public. Rațiu would send translated copies of the newsletters to MPs, ministers, and officials, especially surrounding visits between Ceaușescu and British leaders. In addition, when the press published articles that were favorable to Ceaușescu, such as describing the flourishing of churches in Romania, Rațiu would send letters to the editor to refute.

Rațiu also used the FRP as a means to collect exile signatures for an Open Letter to the President of the United States. The U.S. increasingly echoed Ceaușescu in stating that the treatment of citizens was an internal affair, not an international one. The letter responded to this by asking the U.S. to work with the international community to improve human rights in all countries, instead of supporting the idea that each nation was responsible for their internal policies. The letter employed human rights language and was critical of the U.S. appeasement of oppressors instead of supporting the oppressed.

Similarly, more international agreements were concerned with protecting human rights worldwide. Exiles, like neoconservatives, were dismayed that the U.S. was not taking the lead on this, especially in regards to communist nations.66 Rațiu and ACARDA coordinated this campaign to apply pressure from exile groups and the media on Wilson to obtain concessions from Ceaușescu. He stressed the falsehood of Romanian

66Open Letter to the President of the United States, European Association for a Genuine Détente, Georges de Serdici Papers, Box 10, Folder 8, Hoover Institution Archives.

97 independence from the Soviet Union and portrayed Ceaușescu as a brutal dictator. Rațiu failed to understand why Western leaders like Wilson would make state visits to Romania and trade with the Bucharest government, when they refused to do so with dictators in other countries such as Chile.

In 1977 ACARDA organized two major political events within the exile community. Rațiu used these events to demonstrate his leadership in fighting human rights abuses and communism in Romania. ACARDA organized an approved protest demonstration against Ceaușescu during his official state visit to Britain. Right before

Ceaușescu arrived, a police bus parked in front of the demonstration so that the protest was not viewable. When Rațiu climbed over the barriers to continue his protest, he was arrested and later found guilty of obstructing the police. Additionally, on April 4, 1977,

ACARDA arranged a conference for Romanians around the world, which Serdici was invited to, to discuss the impending Belgrade Conference on European Security and

Cooperation. These events served to further the exile cause and increase participation and unity.

Funderburk served as an ally to Romanian exiles in spreading their message to the

West. Rațiu read Funderburk’s manuscript and gave him notes on what became

Pinstripes and Reds, which became a staple of exile reading and recommendation. He told Funderburk that the Soviet Union and its allies surrounded Romania, who would be unable to break free even if they wanted to, suggesting that Romania can only act independently as long as the Soviets are willing to tolerate it.67 As a result, Funderburk

67David B. Funderburk, Pinstripes and Reds: An American Ambassador Caught Between the State Department and the Romanian Communists, 1981-1985 (Washington D.C.: Selous Foundation Press, 1987), 42.

98 repeated the theory expounded by many Romanian exiles that the USSR actually supported Romania’s independence from Moscow to benefit from Western technology and use Romania as a go-between for the Soviets with other nations.68 He pointed out that Romania’s seeming independence was allowed because their actions never threatened vital Soviet interests. This book highlighted Romania’s ties to arms deals with second and third world nations, funding Marxist-Leninst guerilla groups and international terror, commercial and military exchanges with the Soviets, and targeted assassination attempts of exiles. Much of his accusations mirrored those that Pacepa would make in

Red Horizons that same year.

Frustration with Western support of the Romanian economy and Ceaușescu’s positive image actually united some of the different exile groups into forming one collective group called the World Union of Free Romanians, spearheaded by Coste and

Rațiu. When Rațiu and Coste formed this organization, they were attempting to bring together the exile groups in the hopes of gaining a stronger voice in U.S.-Romanian foreign affairs. Rațiu left his position and the General Assembly of ACARDA chose new members of the Executive Committee. Rațiu was named the Honorary President and

Georgescu left the Executive Committee. As Rațiu continued his work with the Union of

Free Romanians, he began to publish an English language newspaper called The Free

Romanian that addressed Romanian and other Soviet bloc nation affairs. This way he could spread exile views outside of their inner circles.

68Funderburk, Pinstripes, 41.

Rațiu and Georgescu’s Contributions to the Exile Culture of Humanitarian Aid

During the shortages of the 1980s, a large wave of Romanians attempted to flee to the West. However, many needed financial assistance to survive. ACARDA organized a fundraising campaign to set up a refugee fund to aid those that made it to Great Britain.

At the same time, in 1981, AI took up the cause of releasing two Romanian workers from prison for demonstrating in support of their right to emigrate. When ACARDA learned about the letter writing campaign, they recruited their members and sympathetic groups, like the British Trade Union Congress, to join in. This pressure proved to be successful.

The two were released in June 1982, showing the influence exiles had on humanitarian missions when they partnered with other groups.69 This also highlighted the elusive need for unity among exiles that leaders such as Rațiu and Serdici continuously attempted.

Additionally, Romanian exiles placed pressure on high status Westerners to free political prisoners and improve the human rights of Romanians. They often brought the plight of individuals to the attention of Western leaders and legislatures for further investigation. These exiles shared the concerns of Western religious leaders and members of the American Congress on the state of religious freedom in Romania. Exiles used this knowledge to appeal to Congress on religious freedoms as a means to influence the implementation of human rights. To increase visibility, Rațiu wrote articles on the status of the Uniate Church in Romania for The Tablet, an international publication about the

Catholic Church.70 Georgescu also petitioned the religious community to aid political

69Ion Rațiu, Free Romanian Press, June-July 1982, Vol. xxvii No 6/7, 7.

70 The Uniate Church represents a part of the Orthodox Church in Transylvania that united with Rome in order to gain political and civil rights for Romanians under the Habsburg Empire. Rațiu’s family was heavily involved with the Church and regional political battles during this era.

100 prisoners. The Church Times published his letters that documented specific cases of political prisoners in Romania. He also communicated with the office of the Archbishop of Canterbury. In 1982, ACARDA sent a memorandum on the state of religion in

Romania to the Archbishop’s office and continued communication in advance of his 1984 visit to Romania. ACARDA was aware that the White House and Congress were particularly concerned about the fate of Father Calciu, a high level political and religious prisoner. Exiles had advocated on behalf of him for several years. ACARDA asked the

Archbishop to use his status and position to place additional pressure on Ceaușescu to release Calciu. In response, the Archbishop assured ACARDA that he would raise the issue on his visit. After years of pressure, Calciu was finally released in 1985 and subsequently moved to the US.

Georgescu, like Serdici, was a prolific letter writer and watchdog of the Western

Press on issues concerning Romania. He praised publications for exposing the truth about

Romanian human rights abuses, but also protested points of view he disagreed with or viewed as dangerous. Rațiu described this action as an “intervention” when the democratic Romanian point of view needed to be publicly expressed. For example,

Rațiu’s letter to The Times of London, published in the June 4, 1984 edition, pointed out that the Danube-Black Sea Canal project began thirty years earlier, using political prisoners as slave labor, and cost thousands of lives.71 This letter was used as a means to counteract any positive press concerning this project’s completion for Western audiences.

Georgescu’s letters were published regularly in The Times of London and The Economist.

Georgescu, while willing to acknowledge the plight of ethnic Hungarians and Romanian

71Letter to the Editor by Ion Raţiu in The Times of London June 4, 1984, Horia Georgescu Papers, Box 9, Hoover Institution Archives.

101

Jews in Romania, was always quick to point out information that he considered to be propaganda. He continually stressed that all people in Romania suffered, regardless of their ethnic or religious backgrounds, contrary to many articles that focused on the

Hungarian and Jewish minorities. ACARDA leaders President Iolanda Stranescu and

Vice President George Ross joined Georgescu in writing letters that emphasized their argument that Jewish Romanians sought emigration as the only means of dealing with the oppressive Ceaușescu regime. Additionally, this group was able to do this with outside pressure from the U.S. government. They wrote that emigration was a privilege that other groups within Romania, especially ethnic Romanians were not allowed to have. They felt minority groups often primarily benefited from MFN related emigration.72 This served to increase exile commitment to political and humanitarian work.

Romanian exiles did not work alone or only within their networks. They reached out to organizations and people that could aid them in their cause. Prisoners, dissidents, and exiles understood that the key to survival as a political prisoner was Western media coverage of your case. In early 1986, Georgescu wrote letters to Caroline Moorhead of

The Times of London advocating that she cover Radu Filipescu in her Prisoners of

Conscience column to raise awareness of his case in England and the West. Amnesty

International had already covered Filipescu in its letter writing campaigns and coverage in her column would increase the pressure on Bucharest. As a result from Western pressure, he was released in April. Amnesty International took up the cases of several political prisoners in Romania and published a briefing. Georgescu used Amnesty

72Letter to the Editor by ACARDA in The Times of London 10/2/1985 & 10/8/1985, Horia Georgescu Papers, Box 9, Hoover Institution Archives.

102

International’s work in his humanitarian campaigns, just like Coste did in his statements to Congress on his opposition to MFN.

Many exiles died before the collapse of Ceaușescu’s regime in 1989. Coste died in 1984, as did Georgescu in 1988. They were both denied the opportunity to return to

Romania in the post-communist world. Serdici died in London in 1994.73 Others were able to return and some were able to gain political power in the new Romania. Coposu had clandestinely resurrected the PNȚ in the 1980s and affiliated the party to the

Christian Democrat International. When Raţiu returned to Romania, he helped start a new version of the PNȚ with Coposu. They named it The Christian-Democratic National

Peasants’ Party. It was the first party founded after the fall of communism and still exists to this day. However, it never achieved the same popularity as its predecessor especially since the parties that grew out of the revolution gained the most power in the 1990s.

73I have not been able to find any information on him or his activities after 1990.

103

CHAPTER 3

RADIO FREE EUROPE AND THE ROMANIAN SERVICE

Tool of Western Diplomacy and Forum for Romanian Exiles

RFE contained some of the most high profile exile voices. It was the medium in which exiles could have their greatest impact on the daily lives of the Romanian populace. The Romanian Service served to transmit exile culture and news, while also counteracting Romanian propaganda by broadcasting stories from the free press about

Romanian politics, economics, and society in the context of international news. RFE served to keep Romanians connected with the world. It was also a tool for pressuring

Ceaușescu on human rights and facilitating humanitarian aid. The organization’s goals and structures evolved with the Cold War.

RFE also was an important part of implementing American cultural and public diplomacy. The radios fulfilled two of the five components of public diplomacy: cultural diplomacy and international broadcasting.1 At the beginning of the Cold War, many viewed Soviet satellite state regimes as weak and temporary. As a result, the initial goal of RFE and RL was to influence regime change in countries by broadcasting news and stories about those targeted countries. They also utilized exiles to create programming.

RFE established headquarters in Munich, Germany since it was located near the occupied

1Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the US Information Agency (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), xviii.

104 nations. It was easier and quicker for recent exiles to bring recent censored newspapers in as source material.

Early leaders of the National Committee for a Free Europe, later named the Free

Europe Committee (FEC), were anti-communists such as George F. Kennan, Allen W.

Dulles, Frank Wisner, and DeWitt C. Poole. They created RFE and intended to use the station as a tool of U.S. cultural and political diplomacy. The board of directors was comprised of private citizens, but funding came from organizations that were secretly fronts for the CIA. Both the CIA and State Department controlled the organization, but the CIA was more focused on funding than content.

The FEC established the Romanian Service in July 1950. The guidelines for stories generally included complete home service broadcasting, subjects important for the people presently living in the country, reports on the problems of communism, descriptions of open democratic societies, and information about the life of exiles. The political rhetoric focused on liberation instead of U.S. foreign policy. Exiles like Coste and Serdici approved of this type of programming that could influence the populace into revolting for regime change to a democratic system. In the early years, RFE augmented their radio broadcasts with balloon drops of propaganda leaflets. These aggressive tactics reflected the politics of the early Cold War era. Serdici led a group of exiles that were critical of the station in future years when it moved away from this type of aggressive programming.

RFE was also an important part of transmitting exile culture and the nature of the broadcasts changed with the times. RFE utilized many exiles as radio hosts that at first were given free reign to communicate with their countrymen. Former diplomats and

105 exiles created initial programming that was militant and polemic. The tone aimed to combat the rhetoric of the openly Stalinist nature of the Romanian regime. At the time,

CIA specialist Paul B. Henze described this as giving them something to keep them busy.

However, RFE would expand into more than that and become one of the most important and trusted media sources for exiles and citizens trapped behind the Iron Curtain.

In the Winter 1950-1951 edition of Public Opinion Quarterly, where Poole was the first editor in chief, Professor Brutus Coste published an article about how radio propaganda could be used for what he called “Operation Morale.” He insisted that people in Eastern Europe were already sold on the greatness of the United States, but they needed more information on the nature of democracy. Coste reflected the age in his belief that radios should be used to covey a message of Western strength, determination, and the inevitability of the collapse of communism. By focusing on the activities of exiled leaders, the Romanian Service demonstrated the preservation and future of political parties in exile.2 Coste maintained that listeners in Romania wanted to listen to broadcasts that were worth the risk of getting caught and RFE shouldered the responsibility to create and broadcast such content.

However, the nature of RFE programming began to change after their coverage of the failed 1956 Hungarian Revolution. They faced heavy criticism for their incendiary rhetoric, which led revolutionaries to mistakenly believe that foreign aid was forthcoming. Communist governments worked to fan the flames of blame onto RFE for the debacle to discredit the increasingly influential organization. Additionally, in the early 1950s, most exiles came from the upper economic and intellectual classes, but

2He also discussed including a prayer on Sundays for the end of communisms, ridicule and satire of the communist regimes, and broadcasts on culture.

106 beginning around 1956, more members from the middle and working classes emigrated.

This group included more with journalism experience that RFE could utilize for the increasingly professional broadcasts.

Simultaneously, the U.S. State Department and Committee on Radio Broadcasting issued guidelines on subjects and language to avoid, rather than writing scripts. They also stressed that RFE should be seen as a European station instead of an American or exile station.3 This helped lead to an overall change in tone, promoting constructive criticism while avoiding alienating listeners and excessive polemics. This marked the beginning of a new policy of gradual reform, focusing on evolution and not revolution.4 However, many members of the Romanian Service and other exiles vocally disagreed with these changes that continued into the following decades.

Changes in the Tone and Purpose of RFE Broadcasts

In the 1960s, RFE reflected U.S. foreign policy by promoting a positive attitude towards reform communism. A 1964 directive stated that RFE programming was designed to help achieve the FEC’s long-term objectives in Eastern Europe and that no amount of exile input would change this. They also did not want RFE to be seen as an official mouthpiece for any nation or its foreign policy goals. However, since RFE content was created by exiles, they felt ownership over the organization. When

Ceaușescu came into power, the Romanian Service pointed out his shortcomings, while

RFE and Western governments saw Ceaușescu as an improvement over Dej and his neighbors. This often put the service at odds with its supervisors. However, as Ceaușescu

3Arch Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 119.

4Hugh Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 50.

107 expanded freedoms in the mid to late 1960s, Noel Bernard, director of the Romanian

Service, began to change the tone of the programming to comply with the directive.

Bernard was committed to broadcasting content to counter Romanian propaganda, but was cautiously optimistic about the positive changes coming out of Bucharest. At the same time Romanian listenership began to increase and RFE became so popular that

Ceaușescu and the Securitate became obsessed with it.

In 1967, Ramparts magazine revealed to the public that the CIA was funding

RFE. This led to media frenzy and debates in Congress for several years. In response, the

Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations suggested creating the Board for

International Broadcasting (BIB) as the parent body to maintain RFE and RL under a congressional grant. Congress created BIB in 1973 to serve as an intermediary between the government and private corporations and in 1975, RFE and RL were fused into one organization. After 1973, RFE was no longer affiliated with the CIA and instead was openly funded by the U.S. Congress through BIB. However, Congress wanted much more influence in management and content than the CIA. This amounted to nothing short of espionage for Ceaușescu and other communist regimes.

As funding moved away from the CIA to the public, the focus and primary mission shifted further from exile affairs to professional broadcasting. RFE had to follow

U.S. international media policies. Exile affairs and culture remained a part of the programming, but was not the central focus. At the same time, the goals of the United

States Information Agency (USIA) changed in the 1970s. Programs of international communication were used to facilitate a dialogue as a long-range process with cumulative results instead of immediate. Content emphasized depth and quality, produced by the

108 application of professional knowledge and research.5 RFE changed their goals in a similar way, reflecting the shift in attitudes of the time. In this way, public diplomacy connected the jurisdictions of communication and foreign policy.6

The U.S. Government attempted to use RFE to promote gradual systemic changes in communist countries and influence the behavior of those regimes into a more liberal and national direction. RFE was no longer a tool to inspire revolutionaries to bring about regime change. Also, after the U.S.’s failure to intervene in Hungary in 1956, people living under the Iron Curtain were generally less likely to start a revolution based on content from a Western radio station. They knew that they would not receive material support from the West. The 1968 Prague Spring tested RFE, but they urged restraint in programming, afraid of a rehash of the problems of 1956. This change in coverage reflected the changes in RFE’s goals.

When domestic repression increased beginning in 1969, the Romanian Service increased its criticisms of Ceaușescu, in direct conflict with its directives. This only increased RFE’s popularity among Romanians. The Ceaușescu regime continued to regard it as something dangerous and threatening to its power. As a result, by the 1970s, the State Department took more of an interest in the content of RFE broadcasts. They enlisted diplomats in Eastern European embassies to monitor the content and ensure alignment with détente, especially in Romania and Poland as those services tended towards polemics and criticisms. The Research Staff of the Romanian Service prepared situation reports that summarized the news stories from Romanian publications and

5Cull, US Information Agency, 335-336.

6Ibid., 496.

109 media. These reports detailed the major Western news stories of the day and whether or not the Romanian media reported on them. If it was covered, the reports summarized how it was covered and how it differed from the free press coverage.

RFE broadcasting guidance focused on the Romanian Service’s role in encouraging Bucharest’s independence from Soviet control and the expansion of the relations between Romania and the West. In this way, RFE could inform the Romanian audience of the developments of foreign policy between their government and the West.

During this time the CIA’s Covert Action Staff served as the intermediary between the

State Department and RFE and often favorably evaluated the Romanian service.

On June 9, 1970, RFE Director Ralph E. Walter issued a directive to all broadcasting directors regarding the tone and content of RFE broadcasts. Criticism was to be calm, selective, and lack a belligerent tone, while always offering constructive advice to improve the situation. Walter echoed the 1964 directive that all commentary was to be accurate, sound, and reasonable and should avoid “vituperation, vindictiveness, and excessive or petty polemics.” RFE was now a source of news, not propaganda, which

Romanians received enough of from state run media. In 1971, Walter required prior approval of the Romanian service before any sensitive political broadcasts.

Even though exiles communicated with friends and relatives in Romania, RFE would not use insider information from Romanians that was unverifiable. They feared distortion and did not want to use unreliable information that could result in unfair attacks on people or institutions. However, if information came from a reliable, yet unverified source, RFE would leak the information to other media sources. In this way, RFE could report on the matter and reference other notable media sources. Expectations and

110 directives that came from U.S. foreign policy and station directors did not always match the expectations of Romanian listeners in Romania and abroad. Nevertheless, the

Romanian Service, which was led by exiles, continued to broadcast exile opinions and news.

The RFE Romanian Service in the 1970s

The Romanian Service regularly violated official RFE policy. Bernard was particularly known for his personal on-air invectives against Ceaușescu, which often violated RFE content guidelines. A 1974 memo described the U.S. policy of supporting

Ceaușescu’s independent posture from the Soviet Union and directed Bernard to tone down the polemics towards the Ceaușescu family and their cadre. They also asked

Bernard to lessen human rights abuse stories in order to maintain goodwill with

Ceaușescu. However, in addition to Bernard’s own criticisms on Ceaușescu’s personality cult, the Romanian Service continued to broadcast stories on religious persecution and family reunification. RFE issued citations for policy violations, yet Bernard was never fired or demoted from his position. Arch Puddington, characterized Bernard’s personal tone as “biting, personal, and sarcastic” which was a source of tension between RFE and the State Department.7 Even though Bernard apologized for his policy violations, he openly remained committed to criticizing the regime and its policies when warranted.

Exiles that remembered the early days of RFE approved of his criticisms and encouraged more. Bernard’s work on RFE could not possibly satisfy every group that had a stake in its programming since each group’s aims conflicted with one another.

7Puddington, Radio Free Europe, 239. Puddington was a young activist with the neoconservative group Social Democrats USA (SDUSA) before working for RFE

111

An interview with Valerian Trifa, the Archbishop of the Romanian Orthodox

Church and former Iron Guard member, led to a federal investigation of Bernard’s leadership. It yielded that Bernard was a good journalist but a bad manager, and that he attempted to hire questionable staff members that were known to members of the broadcast team and listeners in Romania to be related to high level communists or informers.8 Exiles monitored the developments at RFE and were incensed to hear communists and informers on RFE. When Bernard hired known communists like Henry

Baranga and Ivan Denes, high-level broadcasters such as Georges Cioranescu either resigned or submitted petitions for their dismissal. This demonstrates that the Romanian

Service also had internal oversight provided by the RFE staff. They recognized the importance of the station to Romanians and were willing to go over the head of Bernard for the good of the station, its reputation, and the needs of the listeners.

In February 1977, RFE broadcasted Paul Goma’s letter “To All 35 Governments that Signed the Helsinki Act,” criticizing Ceaușescu’s human rights violations. The letter was later signed by hundreds of Romanians as a sign of protest.9 After this embarrassment, Bucharest established a separate branch of the Securitate known as

“Ether” to track and deter Western radio broadcasts. The act of listening to RFE became a punishable crime. Since RFE was considered a destabilizing outpost of the CIA, the

Securitate worked to curb its influence and contacted broadcasters to lessen their criticisms of the Ceaușescu family. RFE did not have the power to influence Ceaușescu

8Report of Findings- Trifa Interview on RFE Romania 2/19/1980, Liviu Floda Papers, Box 42, Hoover Institution Archives.

9However, many of the signatories were more interested in gaining a Goma passport, than becoming part of a dissident movement.

112 in the manner that the State Department hoped. However, it did have considerable influence on the attitudes of its Romanian listeners. Exiles were aware of this power, which is why they monitored RFE so closely.

RFE also proved to be a useful tool for dissidents who wanted to escape Romania.

The key to a dissident obtaining approval to emigrate instead of languishing in prison was to become known abroad, especially in Western Europe and the United States. If a person was not known abroad, then they did not exist. For a dissident, having ones story of state repression broadcast on RFE was a means to get your name out in the media and known to lawmakers in other countries.10 Ceaușescu often allowed dissidents to emigrate, not just to placate Western governments but also to stop the spread of dissent in Romania.

This practice increased after Romania allowed Goma, the most famous Romanian dissenter in the West, to immigrate to Paris in 1977. That same year, Liviu Floda ran a series of broadcasts on the imprisonment of Dr. Alexandru Bratu between 1974-1976, highlighting the continued plight of political prisoners in Romania, despite their positive relations with the United States.11 Western interest in Bratu’s case led to his release from prison and he eventually immigrated to the United States. Once in the U.S., Bratu used his personal experiences to fight against communism in Romania.

Human Rights and the Romanian Service

During the MFN years, the Romanian Service participated in transmitting exile culture by covering stories directly related to human rights and humanitarian aid. Hunger strikes in front of the UN were a popular form of protest against Bucharest’s refusal to

10Radu Filipescu, Cold Waves, DVD, directed by Alexandru Solomon (Bucharest, Romania: Hi Film Productions, 2007).

11Broadcast August 1, 1977, Liviu Floda Papers, Box 6, Hoover Institution Archives.

113 allow family reunification. RFE often broadcast stories about these hunger strikes to show Romanians that their family had not given up on them. They also broadcasted interviews with participants in demonstrations and hunger strikes outside of the UN.

Reporters interviewed Americans on the street, broadcasting those that criticized the

Bucharest regime and supported family reunification to show American support. The

Romanian Service also broadcasted American values while informing the Securitate, and therefore Ceaușescu, that individual Americans had an unfavorable view of his methods.

The Romanain Service worked for the same goals as exiles such as Serdici, Raţiu, and

Coste during the MFN period. These broadcasts aimed to help Romanians in humanitarian ways by ameliorating suffering. The Romanian Service worked against the communist regime and religious persecution and in favor of family reunification.

Additionally, the Romanian Service broadcast the locations and dates of

Romanian official visits. During Ceaușescu’s 1978 state visit to the U.S., they reported on the protests in New York. RFE also informed Romanians of Western knowledge of the widening gap between Ceaușescu’s repressiveness at home and independent foreign policy. However, listeners did not understand why the U.S. was still willing to honor him.

Ceaușescu was incensed by this type of reporting during the highest honor of an official state visit.

Floda was a prolific broadcaster for RFE. From 1974-1989 he helmed several stories about hunger strikes and family reunification. He facilitated direct appeals from

Romanian exiles to their loved ones in Romania. He also interviewed several exiles that served time in communist prisons and psychiatric facilities. The Romanian Service broadcasted stories of persecution and torture to listeners in Romania. In addition, he

114 aired numerous stories on Romanian arts, sports, and culture in the United States. Floda covered Romanian actors, singers, sports stars, and artists who were successful in the

U.S. and worldwide. In this way, Romanians could take pride in the success of their countrymen who had managed to leave. Floda also broadcast stories on American and international news as a means to inform Romanians of events that were not covered in

Romanian media. By reporting on American news and culture, Floda exposed Romanians to the American way of life. This offered Romanians a means to compare and contrast their own experiences. Monica Lovinescu, another high profile broadcaster, also expanded her stories. Her show began with a focus on culture but as the human rights situation deteriorated, she added social and political analysis.

The stories on the Romanian Service were a constant source of humiliation for

Ceaușescu. He worried they would interfere with his positive relationship with Western nations or lead to revocation of MFN. As a result, many exiles were obsessed with the idea that spies had infiltrated RFE. At the same time, CIA agents were also worried that communist spies had infiltrated RFE. Older correspondents were usually suspicious of new correspondents, especially ones who had recently left Romania, often testing them to find out more about their personal political beliefs. This suspicion only increased once the Securitate managed to place a female agent at RFE who sent photos of letters mailed in by Romanian citizens back to Bucharest for handwriting analysis. She was eventually discovered and fired, however this did not stop the Securitate from attempting to install spies at RFE. The 1980s would see an increase in the amount of programming. In the

1960s, programming aired for six hours a day and in the 1980s it expanded to twelve.

115

The RFE Romanian Service in the 1980s

RFE employees were the targets of several attacks as well as harassment and threats. Emil Georgescu’s show was a combination of news and satirical commentaries on the Ceaușescus. He often spoke out against the personality cult and the Securitate.

Ceaușescu’s hatred of Georgescu led to constant harassment and several attacks on his life. A few weeks after Goma moved to Paris, Monica Lovinescu was severely beaten in front of her home. Goma announced that this was intended as a warning that the

Securitate could reach him, even outside of Romania. Goma, Nicolae Penescu of the

PNȚ, and Serban Orescu were all high profile exiles and active in advocating Romanian human rights and contributed content to RFE. In February 1981, all three received hollowed out copies of the works of Nikita Khrushchev containing explosives. The most notable attack on RFE was the bombing of its headquarters in Munich by Carlos the

Jackal and his team in 1981. It is widely held, but has not been proven, that the Romanian government hired them, even though no one from the Romanian service was killed or injured. Additionally, both Bernard and his successor Vlad Georgescu received numerous threats on their lives and both died from cancer at relatively young ages, leading many to assume that this was more than a coincidence.

After President Reagan took office, the tone from Washington switched from détente back to hardline anti-communism. This led to more funding of RFE and other methods of public diplomacy to broadcast a series of restrained, anti-Communist polemics. This fit well with the tone of the Romanian service. For example, Vlad

Georgescu broadcasted an English translation of “A Letter to the Service from a Member of the RCP Central Committee” on the June 21-22, 1982 editions of Domestic Bloc. The

116 author wrote of his disillusionment with the Ceaușescu regime by discussing the sordid history of the first two governments in communist Romania and how Ceaușescu had erased that history. He also shared how Ceaușescu faked economic numbers to look better than they were, his lack of education, the reduction in social benefits, and compared Ceaușescu to Stalin. He was not upset with communism as a system, but instead upset with Ceaușescu for his corruption of Marxist-Leninist values. This broadcast illustrated how RFE exposed Ceaușescu’s corruption and treatment of his subjects. However, for many exiles this type of programming just was not critical enough. They wanted the same kind of programming critical of communism as a system that was broadcast prior to the Hungarian uprising in 1956. Despite this, in 1982, Coste submitted a transcript of this program to the U.S. Senate during the MFN renewal hearing. Since this showed that even party members were fed up with Ceaușescu, he hoped to use the information to influence Congress’ decision on MFN renewal.

At the same time, the Romanian Service began to report on dissent from

Romanian writers and labor strikes. Dissidents used RFE to expose Ceaușescu’s actions to Romanian citizens and discredit him with Westerners. Two of the most high profile open dissenters in Romania were Doina Cornea and Dan Petrescu. Cornea’s letter of protest was broadcast on RFE in August 1982. As a result, the government imposed limits on Cornea’s academic freedom as a college professor in Cluj.

Exiles also acted as a conduit between Romania and the Western press. While in

Paris, Romanian exile Mihnea Berindei of the League for Defense of Human Rights in

Romania connected Petrescu with Western journalists as an official source within

Romania. The 1987 Brașov strike had sparked interest in the internal situation in

117

Romania, giving Petrescu the opportunity to share his radical views with the media. He advocated the end of communism, not just the removal of Ceaușescu, as the only solution to improve society. However, most of his articles and stories were broadcast on the

Romanian service of RFE with little of the content making its way to the general Western media. Berindei and his group also played a role in keeping up Petrescu’s profile on RFE to avoid his disappearance.

As a result of the negative press, a 1985 Ether report from the Ministry of Internal

Affairs set out a plan for reducing the influence of RFE. It included preventing information from reaching RFE by identifying sources and denying them visas to travel to Romania. It also used influence and disinformation to encourage hostile exiles to renounce sending slanderous information to the station, which proved to be unsuccessful.

However, the Romanian Service continued to cover major stories in Romania that

Ceaușescu found distasteful.

In the late 1980s, the Romanian Service broadcasted numerous pieces of dissidents criticizing Ceaușescu’s regime. In October 1986, they broadcasted a letter against systemization. Then in 1987, they broadcasted interviews with Silviu Brucan, who declared that there was a rift between workers and the Communist Party. He provided detailed information on the causes and course of the 1987 Brașov riots. As a result, the Romanian government placed Brucan under house arrest.

Ceaușescu found the broadcast of installments of Pacepa’s exposé Red Horizons over the Romanian Service in 1988 to be intolerable. Then in March 1989, RFE broadcasted the Letter of the Six, in which a group of notable communists including

Brucan offered a left wing criticism of Ceaușescu but not communism. They wanted to

118 move away from “socialism in one family” and reform Romanian communism. A group called the National Salvation sent letters of protest to Ceaușescu that the Romanian

Service broadcasted on August 27 and November 8 in 1989. By broadcasting dissent and protests coming out of Romania, the Romanian Service played a role in informing the

Romanian public of the weakening of Ceaușescu’s regime. These criticisms and protests would also play a role in the Romanian Revolution in December 1989.

Exile Criticisms of the Romanian Service

As the Romanian Service and the Romanian media battled it out with irony, insults, allegations, and protochronism, sections of the Romanian exile community also battled with RFE. Romanian exiles felt ownership and as a result, often attempted to shape the tone and content of RFE’s programming. Whereas the Romanian government and media criticized RFE for being too anti-Ceaușescu, exiles criticized RFE for not being anti-communist enough. Distrust of more recent exiles led to a coordinated attack on Vlad Georgescu, who took over after Bernard died. Their disagreements with RFE became an extension of their work to fight communism. It was also a widespread and frequent discussion among exiles.

Serdici, Adrian Chintescu, President of the Romanian Community in France, and

Alexander Ronnett, National President of the Romanian-American National Congress,

Inc. all wrote letters of support and congratulations to James L. Buckley when he became

President of RFE/RL.12 They were excited since they viewed him as a person who might be more open to their ideas and suggestions. They expressed hope that Buckley would fire the communists in the Romanian Service. However, Buckley defended his attacked

12Letters to James Buckley February and March 1983, Georges de Serdici Papers, Box 10, Folder 7, Hoover Institution Archives.

119 employees, particularly Vlad Georgescu. Buckley upheld Georgescu’s credentials because of his background and the vitriolic content of his broadcasts. Before joining

RFE, Georgescu, a historian and dissident, spent time in prison for sending anti-

Ceaușescu essays for publication abroad.13 American interest in his case allowed him to travel to the U.S. and apply for asylum. However, for many members of the Romanian exile community, regardless of the polemics and criticisms aimed at Ceaușescu, past affiliations with the communist regime made him unfit for broadcast. In letters to RFE’s leadership, Serdici protested that there was little information about the time Georgescu spent in jail in Romania.14 This diverged from the great amount of knowledge of other

RFE broadcasters such as Max Banus, Ioan Ioanid, and Viorica Steripol. He argued that this proved Georgescu had been a high level communist and should not run the Romanian

Service.

Older exiles felt contempt for any Romanian that collaborated with the communist regime. However, this limited worldview does not take into account personal preservation. It was much too ideologically pure and not realistic for the majority of people to follow, especially those who came of age under a communist system. Exile prejudices against Georgescu and others who acted similarly influenced their opinions and actions. At the same time, exiles deeply trusted the power and influence of RFE.

Romanians lived lives surrounded by propaganda. RFE was a means to receive news from a free press. However, this group of exiles and their contacts inside Romania were

13The New York Tribune, which was run by the ultra conservative Unification Church, printed a series of articles and opinion pieces about Georgescu in 1984.

14He accused Georgescu not only of being a communist, but also of collaborating with the Securitate and being a favorite of the communist regime. Serdici also believed that the Securitate sent Georgescu to the U.S. for an unidentified mission.

120 concerned about perception as much as they were truth. Georgescu may have been acting in good faith, but according to this group, if the populace perceived him as an untrustworthy communist, then his work was not useful. This was one of the guiding principles of their criticisms.

Because of his knowledge and connections, Serdici worked as a self appointed watchdog over the Romanian Service. He believed that the station was one of the most important tools in fighting communism. This was another facet of his contribution to the

Romanian struggle. In addition to broadcast content, Serdici was critical of their employment of former communists. He described them as spineless opportunists and collaborators of the communist regime. Serdici contacted several heads of RFE over the years to express his disapproval of employing recent immigrants from Romania as broadcasters and leaders of the Romanian Service. The anger and vitriol Serdici used to describe them stemmed from his and his fathers’ experiences in Romania. Serdici fled

Romania rather than live by the rules of the communist government and his father died in a labor camp. Serdici could not understand people who did not defect immediately, but instead cooperated with the system in order to get ahead. He believed former communist defectors had a place within the exile community and RFE, but not in high profile or visible positions to listeners in Romania. Not only could he not overcome his hatred of communism but he also worried it confused Romanian listeners as to why former collaborators were broadcasting on a medium controlled by the US government. In fact,

Serdici wished that they could work in a separate building, away from any confidential documents because they were untrustworthy. He was not alone in this assessment as

Chintescu echoed these sentiments in his letter to Buckley.

121

Serdici used his connections to express his views in the Western media. In 1983,

Serdici penned an essay in response to a Christian Science Monitor article titled “Radio

Free Europe Under Reagan-Just How Anti-Communist Should It Be?”15 He argued that

RFE’s tone historically mirrored the foreign policy objectives of the era. This was because RFE was more than a news source but also a tool of the CIA and U.S. government. Since Reagan was the strongest anti-communist President since the 1950s,

Serdici wanted members of Congress and the BIB to advocate for a shift in tone to reflect his rhetoric. He wanted information broadcast about life in the U.S. and West that demonstrated the freedom and democracy that Romanians could aspire to. This would encourage dissidence, which would help weaken the communist system over time. Since

RFE broadcasted to Romania and not the United States, the programming should reflect the desires of the Romanian listeners and inform them more of the activities of

Romanians in exile. Serdici also wanted RFE to work closely with and broadcast more information of the work of national political organizations like PNȚ and CNR.

Serdici wrote a series of letters to Buckley and the Vice President, Jay W. Gildner in 1983 about Georgescu. In February 1983, Georgescu contacted Serdici about participating in a segment on commemorating Ion Mihalache, one of the founders of the

PNȚ. Georgescu acknowledged the recent interest and discussion on the PNȚ, and wanted Serdici to share the party’s recent activities for listeners. This was the type of programming Serdici had advocated for decades.16 Georgescu was more willing to

15Georges Serdici “Radio Free Europe Under Reagan-Just How Anti-Communist Should It Be?” Georges de Serdici Papers, Box 10, Folder 7, Hoover Institution Archives.

16Serdici was surprised that RFE approached the PNȚ, since their efforts to have stories broadcast about their views on foreign affairs had been rejected in the past because of internal guidelines.

122 broadcast on this topic because of the Reagan administration’s approval of more critical programming. Yet, Serdici refused to participate out of principle. Serdici could never forgive any member of the communist party, who Serdici described as the scum of the

Romanian nation. Serdici wrote to Buckley expressing his desire to participate, but had no interest in working with someone he considered to be a communist opportunist.

Serdici characterized former communist collaborators as the “lowest form of human being” and did not “want to have anything to do with any such people”17. He was willing to miss out on the chance to do the work he aspired to. It was clear that as long as

Georgescu was broadcasting for RFE, Serdici and his colleagues would continue to closely monitor the broadcasts.

After a meeting with Gildner, Serdici transcribed their discussion and sent it to

Buckley.18 Serdici articulated that RFE was one of the most popular stations in Romania, which made the PNȚ a stakeholder in its content. He included a list of twelve communists employed by RFE, including Georgescu, and offered an alternative list of qualified Romanians to take their place. He also attached two articles about RFE by his colleagues Rene Theo, editor-director of the exile publication BIRE, and Mihai Korne.

Korne reiterated and detailed the same vision for RFE’s programming as Serdici. Korne laid out the following proposed programming changes to

reduce antagonism between various nations; discuss social, economic, and cultural problems of several countries together; show the absurdity of the military build-up and to develop in Central and Eastern Europe an antimilitaristic feeling; teach history of each separate nations, common

17Letter to James Buckley March 22, 1984, Georges de Serdici Papers, Box 6, Folder 3, Hoover Institution Archives.

18Letter to James Buckley, Georges de Serdici Papers, Box 6, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives.

123

history of Europe and the U.S. history together with detailed explanation of the ideas expressed by the Founding Fathers and the U.S. Constitution.

By focusing on educating listeners on democratic principles, RFE could offer a viable alternative to communism. They hoped to encourage the Romanian people to create their own dissident movements like those that existed in neighboring countries. Korne criticized the current types of programming on RFE that concentrated on legislation, cultural aspects, and economic measures, while continuing to describe Romanian foreign policy as independent. Because exiles did not believe that their foreign policy was independent, RFE was reinforcing the propaganda spread by the Ceaușescu regime.

After being rebuffed by Gilder and Buckley, in February of 1984, Serdici contacted Frank Shakespeare, Chairman of BIB to express his views on the Romanian

Service, but to no avail.19 Serdici continued to overestimate his influence on RFE policies. However, there was nothing that anyone could say or do that would dissuade him from his work. RFE was too important.

It is clear from Serdici’s letters that he was in touch with members of the PNȚ, such as Corneliu Coposu, who remained in Romania. In this way, he could verify news that traveled to the exile circles. Serdici based many of his criticisms of Georgescu on this information. Exile criticisms were so prevalent that they eventually reached

Congress. Senator Alan Cranston of California investigated exile claims by I. Paunescu of Munich about the Romanian Service. In response, Walter R. Roberts, Executive

Director of the Board for International Broadcasting castigated the allegations against the

19He stated that the PNȚ would like to work directly with the BIB to improve the Romanian service than to attack the organization through the media. Serdici also criticized the contradiction of continuing State Department policy of détente, despite the anti-communist rhetoric of the Reagan administration. He asked the BIB and RFE to revise its official protocols and policies that aligned with the State Department’s position when exiles like Serdici provided new information.

124

Romanian Service leveled by Romanian exiles, stating that the organization had been reviewed regularly and its programming was deemed to be irreproachable, especially since known dissidents like Eugene Ionesco and Paul Goma had participated in broadcasts and the high listenership in Romania.20 Exiles reached out to anyone who they thought could aid them in shaping RFE back into the anti-communist crusade that it once was.

20Letter from Roberts to Cranston May 22, 1978, Georges de Serdici Papers, Box 10, Folder 7, Hoover Institution Archives.

125

CONCLUSION

The shared experiences of these Romanian exiles developed into a shared culture.

They started out working to combat communism in Romania. They also took it upon themselves to serve as the voice of democratic Romania and to preserve its principles in exile. Over time they also worked to lessen Romanian suffering.

Even though this group integrated with their host countries, they never stopped viewing themselves as Romanians who needed to help their compatriots in any way that they could. This facilitated the development of the political nature of their culture. They worked with neoconservative Congressional representatives to push for human rights in

Romania through MFN hearings, letter writing, and meetings. These activities provided hope and focus for Romanians who were devastated by the state of their home country.

They felt that they had a duty to commit a portion of their life’s work to do whatever they could to help those left behind. They were also committed to preserving their pre-Cold

War language, political parties, history, culture, and heritage for the end of communism and their eventual return to Romania.

Exile activities placed pressure on Ceaușescu. Despite Ceaușescu’s position with

Western governments, he worried about the impact that the exiles could have. This is why the Securitate attacked notable exiles or sent government ministers to meet with exiles and try to influence their activities. In an interview with John Paul Wallach of the

Hearst Newspapers Group, when asked about the treatment of ethnic and religious

126 minorities in Romania, Ceaușescu blamed expat propaganda for the lies being spread in the United States. Ceaușescu maintained that his regime had actually made progress towards equality.

There has been more recent interest in and work on Eastern European exile groups. This project is significant because it adds to the body of knowledge on this topic.

It provides analysis and understanding on a specific group: first wave Romanian exiles with ties to the PNȚ, during the Cold War. It explores and analyzes their shared background and demonstrates the shared culture that developed. This analysis provides insight on the effects of exile on this particular group. It also demonstrates that exiles can have influence on members of their host government. They were not able to influence changes that contradicted foreign policy. However, by participating in their host country’s democratic system, they made connections with government officials, such as legislators, in order to express their point of view. Some legislators actually took under advisement and even used their criticisms and evidence in their decision-making.

However, there are several related avenues for further research. There are several other smaller Romanian exile groups. Their members, work, goals, and culture could be analyzed for a comparison. Additionally, further research on exile groups from satellite nations such as Hungary and Poland would yield further comparisons. This would also reveal more in depth information on the effects of exile on individuals and groups.

Furthermore research on exile groups from different eras and regions would produce further understanding. For example, studies on more recent exile groups, such as people from Middle Eastern countries such as Iran, Afghanistan, or Syria, would provide further insight into the effects of exile.

127

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Andronescu, Șerban C. Who’s Who in Romanian America? New York: Andronescu- Wyndhill, Ltd., 1976.

Coste, Brutus. “Propaganda to Eastern Europe.” The Public Opinion Quarterly 14, no. 4 (Winter 1950-1951): 639-666.

Deletant, Dennis and Mihail E. Ionescu, eds. Romania and the Warsaw Pact 1955-1989, Selected Documents. Bucharest: Politeia-SNSPA, 2004.

European Integration Consortium. Labour Mobility within the EU in the Context of Enlargement and the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements. Country Study Romania, prepared by Anna Iara. The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, 2007.

Freedom House. Romania: a Case of “Dynastic” Communism. New York: Freedom House, 1989.

Funderburk, David B. Pinstripes and Reds: An American Ambassador Caught Between the State Department and the Romanian Communists, 1981-1985.Washington D.C.: Selous Foundation Press, 1987.

Giurescu, Dinu C. The Razing of Romania’s Past. New York: World Monuments Fund, 1989.

Goma, Paul. “The Rumanian Labyrinth.” Index on Censorship 7, no. 6 (November- December 1978): 41-43.

Kirk, Roger and Mircea Raceanu. Romania vs. the United States: Diplomacy of the Absurd, 1985-1989. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994

Maxwell, Robert. Nicolae Ceausescu: Builder of Modern Romania and International Statesman. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1983.

Pacepa, Ion Mihai. Red Horizons: The True Story of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescus’ Crimes, Lifestyle, and Corruption. Washington D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1987.

128

[Romania]. President Nicolae Ceausescu’s State Visit to the U.S.A.: April 12-17, 1978. Bucharest: Meridiane, 1978.

Schopflin, George, ed. Censorship and Political Communication in Eastern Europe: A Collection of Documents. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983.

Steele, Jonathan, ed. Eastern Europe Since Stalin. New York: Crane, Russak, & Co, 1974.

Tănase, Stelian. At Home There’s Only Speaking in a Whisper: File and Diary Recording the Late Years of the Romanian Dictatorship. Boulder: East European Monographs, 2007.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance. Continuing Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Treatment of Imports from Romania: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance. 94th Cong., 2nd sess., September 8, 1976.

———. Continuing Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Treatment of Imports from Romania: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance. 95th Cong., 1st sess., June 27, 1977.

———. Most-Favored-Nation Status for Romania, Hungary, and China: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance. 97th Cong., 1st sess., July 27, 1981.

———. Review of the President’s Decision to Review Most-Favored-Nation Status for Romania, Hungary, and China: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance. 97th Cong., 2nd sess., August 10, 1982.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Ways and Means. Extension of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment to Romania: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means. 94th Cong., 2nd sess., September 14, 1976.

———. Committee on Foreign Affairs. United States-Romanian Relations and Most- Favored-Nation Status for Romania: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 100th Cong., 1st sess., July 30, 1987.

129

Archival Materials

Alexandru Bratu Collection. The Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Stanford, CA.

Baron Georges de Serdici Collection. The Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Stanford, CA.

Brutus Coste Collection. The Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Stanford, CA.

Comitetul National Roman Records, 1945-1975. The Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Stanford, CA.

The Eastern European Oral History Project. The Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Stanford, CA.

Horia Georgescu Collection. The Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Stanford, CA.

Liviu Floda Collection. The Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Stanford, CA.

Secondary Sources

Behr, Edward. Kiss the Hand You Cannot Bite: The Rise and Fall of the Ceausescus. New York: Arcade Publications, 1991.

Boia, Lucian. History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness. Translated by James Christian Brown. Budapest: Central University Press, 2001.

———. Romania: Borderland of Europe. Translated by James Christian Brown. London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2001.

Braun, Aurel. Romanian Foreign Policy Since 1965: The Political and Military Limits of Autonomy. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978.

Brucan, Silviu. The Wasted Generation: Memoirs of the Romanian Journey from Capitalism to Socialism and Back. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.

Cimdina, Ausma and Jonathan Osmond, eds. Power and Culture: Hegemony, Interaction, and Dissent. Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2006.

Cull, Nicholas J. The Cold War and the US Information Agency. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Cummings, Richard. Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe 1950-1989. Jefferson: McFarland, 2009.

130

Deletant, Dennis. Ceausescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania 1965- 1989. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995.

———. Romania Under Communist Rule. Iasi: Center for Romanian Studies, 1999.

Filipescu, Radu. Cold Waves. DVD. Directed by Alexandru Solomon. Bucharest, Romania: Hi Film Productions, 2007.

Fischer, Mary Ellen. Nicolae Ceausescu and the Romanian Political Leadership: Nationalism and Personalization of Power. New York: Skidmore College, 1983.

———. Nicolae Ceausescu: A Study in Political Leadership. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1989.

Fischer-Galați, Stephen. The New Rumania: From People’s Democracy to Socialist Republic. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967.

Gallagher, Tom. Modern Romania: The End of Communism, the Failure of Democratic Reform, and the Theft of a Nation. New York: New York University Press, 2005.

Gilberg, Trond. Modernization in Romania Since World War II. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975.

Graham, Lawrence S. Romania: A Developing Socialist State. Boulder: Westview Press, 1982.

Harrington, Joseph and Bruce Courtney. Tweaking the Nose of the Russians:Fifty Years of American-Romanian Relations, 1940-1990. Boulder and New York: East European Monographs; Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1991.

Hitchins, Keith. Rumania 1866-1947. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.

Ionescu, Ghita. The Break-Up of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1965.

Johnson, A. Ross and R. Eugene Parta, eds. Cold War Broadcasting: Impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: A Collection of Studies and Documents. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010.

———. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2010.

Kligman, Gail. The Politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction in Ceausescu’s Romania. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998.

Kovrig, Bennett. The Myth of Liberation: East-Central Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics since 1941. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.

131

Mickelson, Sig. America’s Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. New York: Praeger, 1983.

Nekola, Martin. “The Assembly of Captive European Nations: A Transnational Organization and Tool of Anti-Communist Propaganda.” In Transnational Anti- Communism and the Cold War: Agents, Activities, and Networks, edited by Luc van Dongen, Stephanie Roulin, and Giles Scott-Smith, 96-112. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014.

Neubauer, John and Borbala Zsuzsanna Török, eds. The Exile and Return of Writers from East-Central Europe: A Compendium. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009.

Pavel, Pavel. Why Rumania Failed. London: Alliance Press, 1944.

Percival, Mark. “Britain’s ‘Political Romance’ with Romania in the 1970s.” Contemporary European History 4, No.1 (March 1995): 67-87.

Petraru, Marius. “The History of the Romanian National Committee: 1947–1975.” In The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare: Cold War Organizations Sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe/ Free Europe Committee, edited by Katalin Kadar-Lynn, 121-198. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2013.

Petrescu, Cristina. "‘Free Conversations in an Occupied Country’: Cultural Transfer, Social Networking, and Political Dissent in Romanian Tamizdat." In Samizdat, Tamizdat, and Beyond: Transnational Media During and After Socialism, edited by Friederike Kind-Kovacs and Jessie Labov, 107-136. New York: Berghahn Books, 2013.

Puddington, Arch. Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000.

Ratesh, Nestor. “Radio Free Europe’s Impact in Romania During the Cold War.” In Cold War Broadcasting: Impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, edited by A. Ross Johnson and R. Eugene Parta. 205-228. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010.

Rațiu, Ion. Contemporary Romania: Her Place in World Affairs. London: Foreign Affairs Publishing Co., 1975.

Richmond, Yale. Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003.

Shafir, Michael. Romania: Politics, Economics, and Society, Political Stagnation and Simulated Change. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1985.

132

———. "Romania's Foreign Policy Under Dej and Ceausescu." In The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: A Handbook, edited by George Schopflin, 364-377. London: Miller, Blond and White, 1986.

Siani-Davies, Peter. The Romanian Revolution of December 1989. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.

Staar, Richard F. Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977.

Tismaneanu, Vladimir. Stalinism for all Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.

Urban, George R. Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy: My War Within the Cold War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997.

Vaïsse, Justin. Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010.

Verdery, Katherine. National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu’s Romania. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

———. What was Socialism and What Comes Next? Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.

Weiner, Robert. Romanian Foreign Policy and the United Nations. New York: Praeger, 1984.

Wilford, Hugh. The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008.