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Evolution of Pro-Chavez Armed Civilian Groups in Venezuela

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Evolution of Pro-Chavez Armed Civilian Groups in Venezuela ORGANIZACION DE VENEZOLANOS EN EL EXILIO, INC. (ORGANIZATION OF VENEZUELANS IN EXILE) 2758 W 71st Place, Hialeah, Florida 33016, USA Phone: (305) 718-8377 – Cell.: (786) 319-8815, (305) 300-7592 e-mail: [email protected] – websites: http://www.orvex.org, http://www.ruedalo.org ________________________________________________________________ EVOLUTION OF PRO-CHAVEZ ARMED CIVILIAN GROUPS IN VENEZUELA Released on December 8, 2010 _________________________________________________________________ The author of this report, Elio C. Aponte, acting as President of the Organization of Venezuelans in Exile (ORVEX) has made every effort to ascertain the accuracy of the sources contained herein which are products of his own research, and it is supplied solely for the purpose of supporting an asylum or immigration claim. This report cannot be sold or used in any other way without the written and express consent of the author. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 December 8, 2010 This report highlights the evolution of pro-Chavez armed civilian groups in Venezuela from 2001 until today. Evolution of Pro-Chavez Civilian Armed Groups in Venezuela Since the creation of the so called “Bolivarian Circles” in June 2001, until our days, the pro-Chavez armed civilian groups have been evolving, becoming more sophisticated and lethal. The forerunner of the current “Bolivarian Popular Militia”, including the Francisco de Miranda Front, the so-called “Colective Groups” and the “Death Squads”, were the so called “Bolivarian Circles”, also known by the Venezuelan opposition as the “Terror Circles” They were created in June 2001 (*1), and sworn on December 17th of that year. They became the rebirth of the Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement 200 (“Movimiento Boliviariano Revolucionario 200”), also known as MBR-200 for its acronym in Spanish. The MBR-200 was an underground movement created by Hugo Chavez in the 80’s while he was still a student at the Military Academy of Venezuela (known as “AMV” in Spanish), in order to conspire to overthrow the democratic government of those years and to establish a so-called Bolivarian Revolution inspired in Fidel Castro’s Revolution. In the month of June, 2001, Chavez announces in the National Assembly (Venezuelan Congress) the rebirth of the MBR-200 in order to create the Bolivarian Circles. (*1) 2 On May 11, 2007, the “Bolivarian Circles” publicly declared that they will not join Chavez’s PSUV, United Socialist Party of Venezuela (“Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela” in Spanish) (*2) since they consider themselves to be “Bolivarians” instead of “Socialists”; in other words, they claimed at that time that the ideology of the Bolivarian revolution has shifted from that of the “Tree of the Three Roots”, which was based upon the three 19th century Venezuelan historic figures of Ezequiel Zamora, Simon Bolivar and Simon Rodriguez a.k.a. Simon Robinson, to a Russian and European ideology based upon the ideas of Trosky, Granchi, Marx and Lenin. Nonetheless, the original “Bolivarian Circles” seemed to have experienced a complete transformation, and now they have joined Chavez’s PSUV party, but they are now involved in political and electoral activities (*3) instead of violent ones as these have been delegated to more sophisticated, better organized and more lethal organizations, which will be mentioned later. Even though “Bolivarian Circles” are no longer involved in violent activities, the term “Violent Circles” that came from them continues to be widely used among common citizens when they refer to current pro-Chavez civilian armed groups. This is so due to the high psychological impact left by members of the “Bolivarian Circles” on April 11, 2002, when 21 persons were killed and almost 100 injured during a mega demonstration carried out by more than 1 million persons that marched towards the Presidential Palace of Miraflores, requesting Chavez’s resignation. Images of members of the Bolivarian Circles shooting on top of the Llaguno Bridge (*4) were shown that day on TV around the globe. The so-called “Gunmen of the Llaguno Bridge” were members of the Bolivarian Circles. April 11, 2002. (*4) 3 General Lucas Rincon demanded the resignation of Hugo Chavez right after midnight for the events of April 11, 2002, and Chavez did resigned (*5). Surprisingly enough, three days later, Chavez returned to power. With funding coming directly from the state-owned oil company PDVSA, new “social” organizations have been created in which young Venezuelan men and women have been recruited, among them, the so called “Energy Tables” (“Mesas de Energía” in Spanish) and the “Territorial Guard” (“Guardia Territorial” in Spanish), who are trained in the use of weapons in order to fortified what Chavez has called “new social structures of popular power” (*6). The violent function of these groups against opposition members is being disguised by their apparent social function in which they seemed to be involved in community projects (*7). Young men and women, civilians, are trained in the used of weapons for the so called “Energy Tables” and “Territorial Guard”. (*6) There is a more dangerous, lethal and elite type of group created by Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro on June 23, 2003, in La Habana, Cuba, called the “Francisco de Miranda Front” (*8), and its mission is to build a “revolutionary state” in Venezuela, which is a synonymous of a “Socialist-Cuban like state”. From 2003 until 2007 there were 12 training camps in Cuba, each with a number of close to 1,000 young men and women from 4 Venezuela, who spend a weekend in order to receive ideological indoctrination and advance Chavez revolution (*9). These groups are the forefront of the revolution, and they are not only involved in every one of the Social Missions created by Chavez, but they are also known by their brutal and cruel behavior against opposition members inside public universities, according to credible testimonies of witnesses. On April 29, 2009, Hugo Chavez declared on “chained” National TV (“cadena” in Spanish), that the “Francisco de Miranda Front” was going to be “acquitted by history” (*10). Moreover, there have been credible reports about the “Francisco de Miranda Front” involvement in the internal affairs of other Latin American countries such as in Honduras in order to defend President Manuel Zelaya, a pro-Chavez ruler, after being deposed for trying to illegally change the constitution of that Central American nation in 2009 (*11 and *12). A group of almost 1,000 young Venezuelan men and women, civilians, receive ideological indoctrination during a weekend at a training camp in La Habana, Cuba. (*9) Besides the violent groups directly financed by Hugo Chavez, there are other groups that are not directly organized by the Chavez government but receive its support and protection. These groups are divided in four categories: 1) “Colectivos” (collective groups), 2) Urban guerrilla, 3) Country side guerrilla, and 4) Death squads. The so called “colectivos” are armed independent groups, formed by local neighbors, which are disguised as “social groups”. There are around 500 hundred of those groups 5 through Venezuela, and they persecute and kill opposition members. Political motivated murders committed by these groups are registered as common crime murders, and so far it remains unknown what percentage of the 160,000 murders during the almost 12 year rule of Chavez were carried out for political reasons. The “collective” group with the highest media exposure has been the “Little Stone Collective” group (“Colectivo La Piedrita” in Spanish), whose leader, Valentin Santana, has even been interviewed by the BBC of London (*13). These “collective” groups have received training in camps by FARC members in Venezuela, as it has been corroborated by the e-mails found in the PC’s of late FARC terrorist Raul Reyes (*14). Therefore, it is presumed that “collective” groups have also received paramilitary training in Venezuelan camps along with members of international terrorist organizations such as ETA (*15) and Islamic groups as Hamas and Hezbollah (*16). Another well known member of “La Piedrita” collective group is Mrs. Lina Ron (*17). Members of the “Collective” group “La Piedrita” standing in a street of Caracas. In the back, the following can be read: “La Piedrita, Honor and Glory. Raul Reyes. FARC-EP”. (*18) There are at least two known urban guerrilla groups that are more lethal since they use heavy army weaponry. One of them is the “Nestor Zerpa Cartolini” Combat Tactical Unit, which is considered a radical wing of the Venezuelan Tupamaro group (*19), and the other group is known as “Carapaica” (*20). Both of them operate in the “23 of January” Barrio of Caracas. 6 Members of the “Nestor Zerpa Cartolini” Combat Tactical Unit. (*19) Members of the “Carapaica” Urban Guerrilla Group. (*20) 7 The “Bolivarian Liberation Front” (“Frente Bolivariano de Liberación” in Spanish), also known as “FBL”, is a known country side guerrilla group that which has been reported to be operating in the states of Apure, Lara, Trujillo and Portuguesa, in the south western region of Venezuela (*21). They are responsible for kidnapping and murdering civilians, and recruiting children. Members of the “Bolivarian Liberation Front” (FBL). (*21) There are other lethal groups known as “death squads”, formed by armed civilians as well as by police and/or military agents disguised as civilians, who are financed and protected by local chavista majors and governors. There have been credible reports about killings and other violent and brutal acts committed by these death squads against members of Chavez’s opposition. In summary, there are three types of pro-Chavez armed civilian groups: 1) Those directly created, organized and funded by Hugo Chavez and his government. 2) Those independently created and organized as gangs, called “Colectivos”, which are self financed through crime, kidnapping, drug trafficking and killing by hire, and which enjoy complete support and protection from the Venezuelan Government since they defend the political project of Hugo Chavez.
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