Final Evaluation of Hurricanes Operation 2004

FINAL EVALUATION

OF HURRICANES OPERATION 2004

Cayman Islands, Cuba, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago

Prepared for:

IFRC Secretariat Evaluation Department

Prepared by:

Teresa Gamarra Sheila Reed John Wilding

Final Report August 2005

Table of Contents i Map of the Hurricane Affected Areas ...... ii Acronyms ...... iii Executive Summary...... v 1 Evaluation Background...... 1 1.1 Evaluation Purpose and Motivating Factors ...... 1 1.2 Users of the Evaluation ...... 1 1.3 The Evaluation Team ...... 1 1.4 Work Schedule and Statement of Work...... 1 1.5 Constraints Experienced...... 2 1.6 Multi-Method Approach ...... 3 1.7 Triangulation and Bias Reduction Methods ...... 3 1.8 Incorporation of Gender and Vulnerable Group Perspectives...... 4 2 The Hurricanes and the Context and the Impact...... 5 2.1 The Hurricanes...... 5 2.2 The Context and the Impact ...... 6 2.1 The Involvement of the Federation in the Americas (Latin America and the Caribbean).. 8 2.2 The Appeals ...... 8 3 Evaluation Findings ...... 10 3.1 Relevance and Appropriateness...... 11 3.2 Effectiveness ...... 17 3.3 Efficiency ...... 24 3.4 Sustainability/Connectedness ...... 24 4 Recommendations...... 26 Country Reports...... 35 Cayman Islands...... 35 Cuba...... 42 Grenada...... 52 Haiti ...... 70 Jamaica ...... 91 Good Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop: Hurricane Ivan...... 102 Annex 1: Terms of Reference ...... 107 Annex 2: Inception Report ...... 111 Annex 3: Community Survey Instrument...... 115 Annex 4: Persons Consulted ...... 116 Annex 5: Documents Consulted ...... 119

Map of the Hurricane Affected Areas

Charley: 9 – 17 August Frances: 25 August – 15 September Ivan: 2 – 24 September Jeanne: 13 September

Acronyms

ALNAP Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance BRCS British Red Cross Society CCORC Caribbean Cooperation of the Red Cross (National Societies) CDERA Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Relief Agency CDPT Community Disaster Preparedness Training CDRT Community Disaster Response Team CIRC Cayman Islands Overseas Branch of the British Red Cross CRC Cuban Red Cross DREF Disaster Relief Emergency Fund DFID Department for International Development (United Kingdom) DMC Disaster Management Coordination Division (IFRC Secretariat) DMIS Disaster Management Information System ECHO Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean EOC Emergency Operations Center ERU Emergency Response Unit FACT Field Assessment and Coordination Team FRCS French Red Cross Society GRCS Grenada Red Cross Society HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus HNRCS Haitian National Red Cross Society IAC Inter-American Conference IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies JRC Jamaican Red Cross MOU Memorandum of Understanding NEMA National Emergency Management Office (Trinidad and Tobago) NERO National Emergency Relief Office (Grenada) NGO Non-government Organization NIT National Intervention Teams NS National Societies OCHA United Nations Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs OECD DAC The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Co-operation Directorate ODPEM Office for Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (Jamaica) OFDA The Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance ONS Operating National Societies PADRU Pan-American Disaster Response Unit PAHO Pan American Health Organization PNS Participating National Societies RD Regional Delegation RFU Regional Finance Unit RRU Regional Reporting Unit RIT Regional Intervention Team RLU Regional Logistics Unit

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UNDAC United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund USAID United State Agency for International Development VCA Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment

A Final Evaluation of International Federation of the Red Cross Hurricane Operations 2004

Cayman Islands, Cuba, Grenada, Jamaica, Haiti, and Trinidad and Tobago

Undertaken by Teresa Gamarra, Sheila Reed, and John Wilding, March to April 2005

Final Report August 2005

(The views expressed in this report represent those of the authors.)

Executive Summary

Background

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies launched appeals and requests for assistance to respond to the effects of Hurricanes Charley, Ivan and Jeanne in August and September of 2004. Hurricane Charley destroyed or damaged 90,000 houses in Cuba. Hurricane Ivan devastated Grenada, destroying or damaging 90% of the homes, damaged 34,000 homes and destroyed 5,000 in Jamaica, and damaged 80% of homes in the Cayman Islands. The floods resulting from Jeanne killed 3,000 in Haiti and affected 300,000 people. The Regional Delegation in Panama, PADRU, the Sub-regional office in Trinidad and Tobago and the National Societies implemented operations to respond to the disasters.

Evaluation Terms of Reference, Team and Methodology

IFRC wishes to provide Secretariat management and the National Societies with lessons learned and good practices on the subject operations. The criteria for the evaluation are Relevance and Appropriateness, Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Sustainability. Three people formed the evaluation team, two external evaluators and one ONS staff. The methodology for the evaluation included a document review, structured key informant and focus group interviews with communities, volunteers, donors, government organizations and NGOS and a lessons learned workshop. Major constraints to the analysis were insufficient time in the countries visited, exclusion of some countries from data collection visits and a TOR which asked for investigation into numerous aspects of operations for which time was not allocated.

Main Findings

Relevance/Appropriateness

Federation humanitarian relief efforts during the hurricanes operations have saved many lives and prevented chaos and suffering. The heroic efforts of Secretariat and National Society staff and volunteers working in the Americas deserve profuse praise. Their overall efforts have been effective and dedicated.

Issues regarding relevance were found due to the time delays in some countries between disaster and delivery, weaknesses in assessment, problems in targeting during distribution, and weaknesses in coordination which ultimately affected the quality of services provided to the affected people. Coverage of the most vulnerable people was uneven and inadequate. People who received assistance found emergency relief assistance very helpful but for many, longer term needs were not met with the result that they had not fully recovered. Due to loss of livelihoods and damages to their homes, some have suffered permanent regression of their development status. Relative to their pre-disaster situation, a significant number of vulnerable people (particularly in Haiti and Grenada) lack adequate shelters, livelihoods, and/or reserves of resources, and face diminished prospects for protecting themselves from harm in the next disaster.

Effectiveness and Efficiency

The Secretariat in Geneva generally played its role well in support and coordination with the exception of some decisions regarding roles and deployments. Strains were placed on reporting lines and communication at the regional level due to the management of the multi-country Ivan appeal. Authority was fragmented at times between PADRU and the Regional Delegation. The operations did not have sufficient MOUs and consultations between the NS and the delegates which caused tensions. The difficulty in getting reliable budgetary figures on a timely basis resulted in over or under-spending. Information gathering for donors and the public proved to be very challenging. International standards ranking indicated several areas of concern. The response teams were generally very effective but fell short of integrating themselves with the NS. The DREF was aggressively used but would be more effective if pre-approved for larger amounts.

Sustainability/Connectedness

Despite receiving training and equipment and other material goods, the NS staff members often were left out of management processes undertaken by the FACT and other international visitors, resulting in strains on communications and relationships. Support for short term activities related to long term recovery issues such as livelihoods and mental health was not adequate.

Recommendations

1. The Federation should intensify strategic focus and direct more human and material resources to enhancing preparedness by the communities, National Society staff and volunteers and disaster response teams. 1.1 Develop, consolidate, expand and update community disaster preparedness programs improving their impact at the community level through the development of an integrated approach. 1.2 Enhance distribution preparedness 1.3 Enhance monitoring and evaluation capacity

2. The Federation should intensify strategic focus and direct more human and material resources to support coordination and collaboration mechanisms with other assistance organizations, governments, and communities to target the affected people according to need in all affected areas and through all phases of the emergency. 2.1 Integrate and improve assessment mechanisms and tools, needs analysis and formulation of plans of action 2.2 Design short term recovery activities as a precursor to mitigation, prevention and development actions and integrate them with activities of others to improve the resiliency of people to disaster.

3. The Federation should intensify strategic focus and direct more human and material resources to support volunteer management as it pertains to disaster management.

3.1 National Societies should put into place a volunteer support system and volunteer management system as part of the system of human resource development.

4. The Federation should increase strategic focus and direct more human and material resources to reviewing issues relevant to principles of capacity building and consultation.

4.1 The Secretariat and National Societies should review objectives to building a common capacity.

5. The Federation should reexamine the roles and responsibilities assigned at each level and office of the organization for each phase of the disaster response, standardize them, and clarify them on a regular basis to all staff and volunteers. In addition, the staff or volunteers who accept the responsibilities need to have the skills, knowledge and experience required to carry out their roles.

5.1 Integrate and optimize the use of instruments and mechanisms of the National Societies’ and the Federation Secretariat’s response systems.

6. The Federation needs to apply strategic focus and devote more human and material resources to streamlining administrative procedures, including financial accounting, funding approval processes, reporting, and improving cost effectiveness.

6.1 Improve financial management tools. 6.2 Improve information collection and dissemination 6.3 Take practical steps to improve cost-effectiveness

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General Indicators. Sources: TOR Performance Indicators Workshop Evaluation and Sphere “Standards Common to All Sectors” Ranking Ranking 1. The Red Cross Federation distinguishes itself by its values and 3.7 3.5 principles. 2. The Red Cross is known to stand on the side of vulnerable people. 3.8 3.6 3. The Red Cross has adequately trained volunteers and community 3.0 2.5 based preparedness mechanisms in place. 4. The disaster response met basic needs of affected people (food, 3.6 2.5 water, shelter) 5. The beneficiaries of Red Cross assistance were satisfied with 3.6 2.7 services received. 6. There were no extenuating circumstances regarding Red Cross 3.4 3.0 quality or quantity of assistance, such as long lines or tensions with communities. 7. There were no epidemics or disease outbreaks. 4.5 4.5 8. Other organizations know with clarity what the Red Cross does and 3.8 3.0 how it operates in emergencies. 9. The Red Cross is known for substantial work in health and care. 3.0 3.0 10. The National Societies meet all of the above standards. 2.9 2.0 11. The National Societies are known as being credible and effective. 3.5 2.5 12. National Societies are partners of choice for governmental 4.0 3.0 organizations, international organizations, civil society and private sector. 13. The Federation acts as one organization to maximize the full 3.0 2.2 potential of its global reach and resources. 14. All participating and host National Societies feel equally valued 2.9 1.8 and respected contributors. 15. The Red Cross/Red Crescent is seen as the “heartbeat of 3.8 3.2 humanity” and is a welcoming space for all people who want to help or be helped without discrimination. . 16. Relief assistance provided by the Federation has reduced future 2.6 2.0 vulnerabilities to disaster. 17. The humanitarian imperative is respected above all - to provide 3.7 3.9 assistance to the most vulnerable without partisan or political motives. 18. Aid priorities are based on a thorough assessment of the needs of 3.4 3.0 the disaster victims and the local capacities.

1. Poor – This standard not observed or could not be met 2. Fair: This standard was minimally observed and met. 3. Good: This standard was observed and partially met. 4. Very Good: This standard was observed and well met. 5. Excellent: This standard was met in its entirety.

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1 Evaluation Background

1.1 Evaluation Purpose and Motivating Factors

This evaluation is the final evaluation of the hurricane response operations undertaken by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies for Hurricanes Charley, Ivan and Jeanne which affected the Americas from August to September 2004. It aims to provide Secretariat management and the respective National Societies with lessons learned and recommendations on systemic and generic issues pertaining to disaster operations. It strives to improve disaster response and disaster management mechanisms.

The main objectives of the evaluation are:

§ To assess the relevance of the programme design in relation to the needs of the beneficiaries; § To review the effectiveness of the disaster response tools and systems; § Assess the coordination mechanisms with the various components of the Federation and external stakeholders

1.2 Users of the Evaluation

Anticipated users of the evaluation include: · The Federation Secretariat including Geneva and the field · Participating National Societies · Operating National Societies · Communities · Government organizations involved in relief and recovery · Donors and NGOs

1.3 The Evaluation Team

Three people form the evaluation team. Teresa Gamarra is a staff member of the Paraguay Red Cross and has served on an UNDAC team. Sheila Reed, the team leader, is a humanitarian crisis and disaster operations analyst with 19 years of experience. John Wilding has 19 years of experience working with ICRC, the Federation and as a consultant in humanitarian action.

1.4 Work Schedule and Statement of Work

Sheila Reed and John Wilding initiated the evaluation and conducted interviews with Secretariat staff in Geneva from March 16 – 19. They met Teresa Gamarra in Panama and spent two days interviewing Federation staff in Panama. The team then split. Wilding and Reed visited the Sub-regional office and the National Red Cross Society during the course of one day in Trinidad and Tobago. Reed and Gamarra conducted a week-long study in Jamaica (March 25 – 31) while Wilding visited Haiti. The team reunited in Grenada on April 1 and facilitated a one-day lessons learned workshop and conducted interviews there (April 3-8).

The Secretariat, the Grenada Red Cross and the Jamaica Red Cross and volunteers kindly transported and provided other support for the team.. The support of all the offices and the kindness of the staff is greatly appreciated.

The TOR and workplan are provided in the annexes to this report. The inception report made a strong argument for adding two days to the Jamaica and Haiti studies since the visits were scheduled during the Easter holidays which are rigorously observed in both countries. It was out of the question to conduct interviews on Good Friday and Easter Sunday and Monday. Since the Grenada visit involved workshop preparation, an extra day was requested for Grenada. The Evaluation Department kindly secured permission for these days and they were critical to the study.

1.5 Constraints Experienced

The team experienced several constraints to data collection and analysis.

1. Limitations on depth of analysis. The TOR offered 20 broad questions in addition to indicators and overarching objectives. The team attempted to address all aspects of the TOR in each of the concerned countries but time and information constraints limited the depth of the team’s response. Several questions in the TOR were clearly beyond the resources allocated to this evaluation. These included what would amount to an in-depth study of information management, a cost-benefit analysis, and assessing compliance to the numerous Sphere standards and IFRC SOPs, among others.

2. Time gap between the disasters and the evaluation. A period of six months had passed between the onset of the emergencies and the study. Memories of staff and affected people were weak at times regarding the events of the past and many staff had moved on. Phone interviews were conducted to the degree possible with departed staff.

3. Limitations on data collection. The TOR covered six disaster operations and management by two regional offices and the Geneva Secretariat. There was clearly a need to spend adequate time in the countries to understand the strategies involved in the disaster operations. Visits to Cuba and to the Cayman Islands and Tobago were not included. Phone interviews were conducted with Red Cross staff in Cuba, the Cayman Islands and Tobago. However, the informants in the community including the volunteers and affected people were critical to the team’s understanding of the effectiveness of the operations. These interviews did not take place in the Cayman Islands, Cuba and Trinidad and Tobago and seriously limited the depth of analysis for those countries.

4. The organization of the lessons learned workshop. The organization of the one day workshop in Grenada was problematic. While the workshop produced good data for the evaluation, participants were understandably very frustrated at having only one day allocated to discussion of complex operations over a six month period. The workshop had originally been planned for 2 – 3 days by the Grenada and Sub-regional offices. The evaluation team perceived that it had little control over the arrangements made by the Geneva and the Sub- regional offices, but certainly would have recommended that more time be allocated for participants to discuss their concerns and satisfactorily conclude the planned exercises. 2

In addition, the workshop participation was not representative of the concerned countries and offices. Missing were Haiti, Cuba, and the Cayman Islands, as well as representatives of PADRU. Participants said that participation from the Sub-regional office was important, given the close management relationships, but only two staff members attended.

1.6 Multi-Method Approach

The evaluation team employed a diversified methodology, including both participatory and gender aware approaches. In addition, all major findings were triangulated, using three or more sources. The following tools and methods were used. Document Review. Documents were reviewed as they became available, although time prohibited an exhaustive document review. (See Annex 5 for a list of documents consulted.) Key Informant and Focus Groups interviews. Sampling was purposive. The team found it most useful to ask interviewees to discuss the chronology of their involvement in the disaster operation and/or their experience as affected persons. Interviews included 88 staff and volunteers, visits to 24 communities and telephone interviews with approximately 8 people. Focus Group Interviews. A “Community Questionnaire” was created to guide focus group discussions with affected people and beneficiaries, including questions related to satisfaction with the assistance received, the status of their recovery and future disaster preparedness, as well as their recommendations. The results were tallied and synthesized. Lessons Learned Workshop. The workshop mentioned above was held on April 4 in Grenada and despite its constraints provided valuable insights into the good practices and issues faced by the NS and the delegates who attended. The proceedings of the workshop can be found in the annexes. Other Methods. Direct observation was used to judge differences in standards of living among vulnerable people and progress in repairing houses and restoring livelihoods.

1.7 Triangulation and Bias Reduction Methods

All findings are triangulated (using three or more sources) to mitigate bias. The evaluators tried to mitigate the following biases in their research design: Red Cross Bias. The majority of assistance organization interviewees were staff and volunteers of the Red Cross. Many National Societies receive bilateral funding and there were many national and international assistance actors. The evaluators attempted to include as many non- Red Cross actors as possible, particularly government and donors, but the time was limited to do this. Road and Key Informant Bias. The team attempted to select interviewees in the communities who were living in more impoverished areas, for example, off the main roads. The team attempted to select people who were less likely to have been interviewed by others and less likely to have strong political biases.

Memory Bias. People interviewed were asked to recall events taking place 6 months earlier. Information Bulletins reports were cross checked in order to confirm times and dates and witness reports triangulated with other witnesses.

1.8 Incorporation of Gender and Vulnerable Group Perspectives

We found that community members were interested in and willing to discuss the issues raised in the evaluation. In most cases, the gatherings included both men and women and people of different age groups. Efforts were made to encourage women and the elderly to participate in the discussion and questions were directed to them specifically.

2 The Hurricanes and the Context and the Impact

2.1 The Hurricanes

The responses to the following three hurricanes were the subject of this evaluation. Another hurricane that had an impact in the Caribbean in 2004 was Francis. (The information in this section is summarized from the US National Weather Service.)

Hurricane Charley.: A tropical wave emerged from western Africa on 4 August, forming a tropical depression by the morning of 9 August, centered south-southeast of Barbados. Late on 9 August, the depression moved into the southeastern Caribbean Sea. The depression strengthened into Tropical Storm Charley early on 10 August. Fairly steady strengthening continued while the storm moved into the central Caribbean Sea, and when Charley approached Jamaica on 11 August, it became a hurricane. The center passed about 35 n mi southwest of the southwest coast of the island on the evening of 11 August. The hurricane then turned northwestward, and headed for the Cayman Islands and western Cuba. It continued to strengthen, reaching Category 2 status on the morning of 12 August, just after passing about 15 n mi northeast of Grand Cayman. The eye of the hurricane crossed the south coast of western Cuba very near Playa del Cajio just after midnight on 13 August. Charley strengthened just before it hit western Cuba. Cuban radar and microwave imagery suggests that the eye shrank in size and surface observations from Cuba indicate that the maximum winds were about 120 mph as it crossed the island. By 2 am EDT, the eye was emerging from the north coast of Cuba, about 12 n mi west of Havana.

Hurricane Ivan. Ivan developed from a vigorous tropical wave that moved off the coast of Africa on 31 August. The system quickly strengthened and became a tropical depression on 2 September; a Tropical Storm on the 3rd; a Hurricane early on the 5th and a Major Hurricane later that same day. Ivan moved westward for the next several days and passed over the southern islands where it caused considerable damage especially on Grenada. Ivan then moved west- northwestward across the southern Caribbean passing just north of Venezuela and the Netherlands Antilles. Ivan reached a rare category 5 while over the Caribbean Sea early on 9 September as it moved toward Jamaica, when it weakened to a Category 4. The center moved slowly westward just south of the island. Ivan briefly regained category 5 status on 11 September when it was south of the Cayman Islands. Ivan inflicted considerable damage and loss of life on Grand Cayman Island. Ivan’s strength diminished but it regained Category 5 for the third time. Western Cuba was hit but was spared the brunt of the hurricane as the small eye moved through the Yucatan Channel.

Hurricane Jeanne. Jeanne formed from a tropical wave that moved from Africa to the eastern tropical Atlantic Ocean on 7 September, forming a tropical depression on 13 September as it approached the Leeward Islands. The cyclone strengthened to a tropical storm on 14 September and moved slowly over the Virgin Islands and the center moved inland over southeastern Puerto Rico on 15 September when maximum sustained surface winds reached 70 mph. The center moved across Puerto Rico, then inland at the eastern tip of the Dominican Republic. Jeanne was a Category One hurricane while over the Mona Passage and during the Dominican Republic landfall, but then weakened over the rough terrain of Hispaniola. By the early afternoon of 17 September, the cyclone briefly weakened to a depression and moved over

Atlantic waters just north of Hispaniola. On 18 September, Jeanne’s slow forward motion across the Caribbean motion contributed to torrential rainfall along its path. These rains and resultant fresh-water flooding and mudslides caused thousands to die in Haiti. The approach of Hurricane Ivan over the Gulf of Mexico and inland placed Jeanne in a weak steering flow that persisted for five days. Jeanne first moved slowly northward over the southeastern Bahamas as a tropical storm and then strengthened to a hurricane with 100 mph winds by the time it completed this loop on 23 September. Continuing westward, Jeanne became category 3 and the center moved over Abaco Island and then Grand Bahama Island in the northern Bahamas.

Hurricane Forecast for 2005. Tropical storms graduate to hurricanes when their sustained winds reach 74 mph or more. Fed by warmth and moisture, they generally only form over oceans where the sea surface temperature is above 79 degrees Fahrenheit (26 degrees Celcius). The North Atlantic hurricane season occurs to between June and November, and the majority of hurricanes develop in the Caribbean and the Americas between August and October. The predication for hurricane season 2005, which is expected to be almost as severe as 2004, includes: · 13 Named Storms · 7 Hurricanes · 3 Intense Hurricanes

2.2 The Context and the Impact

A series of extreme climatic events hit the Caribbean in 2004, affecting more than a dozen countries. Such events have exposed the different degrees of preparedness and resilience of the countries, and illustrate how vulnerability to hazards varies with level of development. Resilience to these events and sustainability of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery measures are linked to environmental conditions as well as to organizational and economic policies. The Cayman Islands, a relatively wealthy country, sustained serious damages from Hurricane Ivan but was able to recover quickly, while Haiti bears the burden of repeated crises.

Table 1: Relative Developmental Status of Countries Studied (Sources: CIA World Factbook and ECLAC reports)

Country Population GDP Infant mortality Literacy Income % below HIV rate in poverty population Cayman 43,103 $35,000 8.41/1000 98% Tourism, banking, Islands NA* NA construction, agriculture Cuba 11,308,764 $2,900 6.45/1000 97% Sugar, remittances NA HIV: 0.1% petroleum, tobacco, citrus, coffee Grenada 89,357 $5,000 14.62/100 98% Tourism, fruit, cocoa, 32% NA nutmeg, textiles Haiti 7,656,166 $1,600 78.38/1000 52.9% Subsistence farming, 80% HIV: 5.6%. coffee, fruit Jamaica 2,713,130 $3,900 12.81/1000 87.9% Tourism, remittances,

19.7% HIV: 1.2% bauxite, agriculture Trinidad and 1,096,585 $9,500 24.64/1000 98.6% Petroleum, natural gas, Tobago 21% HIV: 3.2% tourism, agriculture * NA = Figures not available

Table 2: Impact of Hurricanes on Countries Studied and IFRC’s Immediate Response1 (Sources: IFRC Bulletins and ECLAC reports)

Country Casualties/ Damages IFRC Appeal: Federation Direct Assistance to Affected Affected People Coverage Countries Coordinated by PADRU Cayman 35,000 (83% of $5.6 million 1,000 families 1 Health Delegate (DR Panama) Islands the population) agriculture (Ivan) Housing: 80% Humanitarian Aid Sent $429 million 2 Charter Humanitarian Aid commerce Cuba NA 70,000 houses 3,000 families *No IFRC Presence (Charley) (Charley) damaged 1 DM Delegate PADRU (Ivan); 1 Logistic Delegate Cuba NA 20,000 houses 17.6% PADRU; 1 Info. and Reporting Delegate sent before (Ivan) damaged; Ivan hit; Ericsson Volunteer, 1 RIT 1000 Humanitarian Aid Sent (Charley & Ivan) destroyed 1 air freight 2 sea freights Grenada 37 deaths $667m. direct 10,000 2 DM Delegate (PADRU) (Ivan) 85,000 – 90,000 $91m. indirect families. 1 IT Regional Coordinator (DR Panama) affected 90% homes 1 Telecom Delegate (PADRU) 1 Watsan Officer (RITs) 1 RFU Finance Delegate (DR Panama) 4 Regional Intervention Team members FACT Information Delegate 1 logistics ERU Humanitarian Aid Sent 4 Charter Humanitarian Aid 2 Land Cruisers Haiti approx. 3,000 estimated 80 to 10,000 1 DM Delegate (Jeanne) deaths; 90% crop families 1 Health Delegate 300,000 severely losses in 2 Logistics Delegates (PADRU) affected eastern part of 1 WatSan Delegate North-west 60% 2 IT & Telecom Delegates 1 Info. And Reporting Delegate Department 1 Logistics ERU Team 1 WatSan ERU Team 1 Emergency Field Hospital ERU Team 1 FACT Team 1 finance delegate Humanitarian Aid Sent 3 Charter Humanitarian Aid 2 sea freights with 19 containers of relief supplies. Jamaica 15 deaths 8% GDP 7,500 families 2 Logistic Delegates (Canadian RC) (Ivan) $580 m. (food and non- 2 Info. and Reporting Delegates (one sent from Haiti 100,000 affected 34,000 houses food) and one from Haiti) damaged, 3,000 families. 1 Finance Delegate (DR Panama) 5,000 Shelter assist 2 WatSan Delegates (PADRU and FACT) 1 FACT Team

1 The table only reflects the direct assistance provided to countries, not the reinforcement of the structures (PADRU, the RRU, the Trinidad and Tobago sub-regional office and the Americas department in Geneva) which is crucial to ensure an effective response. The DREF allocations which were a part of the direct assistance to countries are not included. 7

destroyed 1 RFU Support (DR Panama) 1 Telecom Delegate FACT (Geneva) 1 Logistics ERU Team Humanitarian Aid Sent 3 Charter Humanitarian Aid / RLU 2 Nissan Xtrel Trinidad and 1 death Millions in Tobago damages to (Ivan) Tobago

2.1 The Involvement of the Federation in the Americas (Latin America and the Caribbean)

The Federation is striving to build more effective disaster management throughout its membership to reduce vulnerability and empower National Societies (NS). A disaster management strategy based on the Federation’s “Strategy 2010” has developed mechanisms and tools that allow NS to implement a coordinated response. In April 2003, all 35 NS of the Americas agreed to a “Santiago de Chile Commitment” which set out specific objectives for the development of an integrated disaster management system.

The Pan American Disaster Response Unit (PADRU), located in Panama, is an operational unit incorporated into the Federation Secretariat’s Regional structure. Its role and function are included in the Plans of Action of the Regional Delegations in Panama and Lima and their sub-regional offices. PADRU was evaluated in 2004 and its role in disaster response reaffirmed. A sub-regional office was established in Trinidad and Tobago to serve the English speaking countries of the region.

2.2 The Appeals

The Hurricane Ivan Appeal: Revised Appeal no 21/04 had the following objectives:

Emergency relief (food and non-food) Objective 1: 21,500 vulnerable families, or 107,500 persons (10,000 families in Grenada, 7,500 families in Jamaica, 1,000 families in the Cayman Islands, and 3,000 families in Cuba), will have benefited from the provision of food and non-food items to assist them in recovering from the effects of the hurricane.

Objective 2: 300 vulnerable beneficiary families in Grenada will have benefited from a food vouchers program that will assist them in recovering from the affects of the hurricane.

Shelter Objective: 20,000 vulnerable families (13,000 families in Grenada, 3,000 families in Jamaica, 1,000 families in the Cayman Islands, and 3,000 families in Cuba) have been able to return home as a result of the provision of shelter materials including tarpaulins and zinc roof sheeting.

Water and Sanitation Objective: The water and sanitation needs for 17,000 vulnerable families (10,000 families in Grenada, 3,000 families in Jamaica, 1,000 families in the 8

Cayman Islands, and 3,000 families in Cuba) have been assessed, and a plan has been developed to deliver the planned assistance in this sector.

Psychosocial support Objective: Vulnerable families will have benefited from psychosocial support to assist them in recovering from the effects of the hurricane.

Strengthening of preparedness and response Objective: The capacity of the Grenada Red Cross Society, the Jamaica Red Cross, the Cayman Islands branch of the British Red Cross, and the Cuban Red Cross and vulnerable communities in disaster response and preparedness will have been strengthened.

The Hurricane Jeanne Appeal for Haiti, 22/2004 had the following general objectives (Please see country specific objectives in the country reports):

Non-food Items Objective 1: 50,000 beneficiaries (10,000 families) will have benefited from the provision of non-food items delivered through secure distribution centers.

Food Objective 2: 1,400 families (7,000 people) will have benefited from the provision of food items delivered through secure distribution centers.

Shelter Objective: 15,000 beneficiaries (3,000 families) will have benefited from the provision of shelter materials delivered through secure distribution centers.

Health Objective 1: To rehabilitate Gonaïves’ only referral hospital (La Providence) serving the primary and secondary health care needs of the population.

Water and Sanitation Objective 1: To provide 450,000 litres in accordance with WHO water quality standards, affording 30,000 people (6,000 families) in Gonaïves with 15 litres per person per day.

Objective 2: To improve the transport and storage capacity at household level of clean water for 50,000 people (10,000 families).

Objective 3: To supply the Gonaïves field hospital and living compound with sufficient water in accordance with the WHO standards for quality water.

Objective 4: To provide materials and technical assistance in latrine reconstruction for 1,000 families living in areas where the risk of uncontrolled disease is high.

Support to the National Society Objective 1: To reinforce the HNRCS with its mandate to respond to catastrophes within a country with a fragile political context and during the hurricane season.

3 Evaluation Findings

The following represents a summary analysis of findings from all countries. An individual report on each country is found in the annexes. The data is analyzed from interviews with approximately 90 staff (and volunteers) from the Red Cross and government, international and national organizations and in 24 communities where interviews took place, along with the document review. (Please see the annexes for “Community Interview Analysis,” Persons Consulted”, and “Documents Consulted”). The evaluation team has pledged confidentiality to all interviewees and does not identify them directly unless explicit permission was given.

The summary of evaluation findings presents an analysis of strengths and weaknesses followed by details provided through interviews. Readers are encouraged to read the country reports in the annexes for more details and to refer to the lessons learned workshop proceedings “Good Practices and Lessons Learned – Hurricane Ivan Response” in the annexes. The background information had to be restricted due to page limitations imposed by the TOR.

The following strengths and achievements are mentioned in this section of the report. · Relief items pre-positioned by PADRU and the NS, including those flown in and distributed from reserve stock were generally relevant and appropriate. · The use of national, regional and international teams to save lives and livelihoods was very effective. · Hurricane Ivan (21/04) joint emergency appeal was a good idea in terms of its regional focus and multi-country clout. · The IFRC Haiti revised appeal (22/04) of 5th.October 2004 made a very accurate assessment of needs and presented a well structured appeal. · Red Cross distribution systems were generally praised by citizens and other relief organizations as being fast and well organized. The systems performed remarkably well given constraints. · Both the Grenada and the Jamaican Red Cross Societies had developed good relationships with national emergency response organizations. NS staff and FACT members generally attended coordination meetings regularly. · The Red Cross volunteers demonstrate a commendable degree of knowledge and skills. They have generally all participated in various forms of training and some are very well trained through the Community Disaster Preparedness Training (CDPT) · The efficacy of PADRU was certainly demonstrated in its performance in the 2004 hurricane season. · The Regional Reporting Team (RRU), a unit covering the whole of the Americas, was commended for its unceasing energy to collect information in the disasters. · The RITs are effective in terms of their roles as well as cost effective and culturally sensitive. RIT members said that they were well trained through PADRU and that their deployment to the disaster affected area was generally efficient. · The ERU’s generally received high marks for their performances. Their specializations allowed them to focus on achieving goals quickly and they set good management examples for NS. They were especially effective when deployed at the same time as the FACT. · The FACT members were deployed early in Grenada and Jamaica, an achievement for which the Secretariat is justifiably proud.

· The NS all expressed appreciation in the Grenada workshop regarding the expertise and hard work provided by FACT members. · A significant amount of coverage of the disaster and operations was actually achieved through multiple national and global media. · The effects of IFRC’s effort to develop and promote principled approaches was evident in the operations. · We commend the excellent analysis of needs and development of strategic goals that has been done thus far within the Federation.

3.1 Relevance and Appropriateness

This criterion is concerned with assessing whether the operations met needs and respected priorities of the citizens and were appropriate in the context of the disaster.

The team found that relief items pre-positioned by PADRU and the NS, including those flown in and distributed from reserve stock were generally relevant and appropriate. The team also praises the effective use of national, regional and international teams to save lives and livelihoods. However, the team found issues of relevance and appropriateness due to the time delay between disaster and delivery, weaknesses in assessments, distribution and acceptance of relief items, and coordination which ultimately affected the quality of services provided to the affected people.

The Appeals The Hurricane Ivan Appeal (21/04) covered four countries (the Cayman Islands, Cuba, Grenada and Jamaica). While the combined emergency appeal was a good idea in terms of its regional focus and potential multi-country clout, it did not best serve the goals of the organization or the priorities of the people, nor fully address the needs for capacity development for the following reasons. (See the Plans of Action in the country reports.) · The appeal covered four countries which had sustained various levels of impact and had different NS capacities. The countries had different budgets and managerial reporting line requirements that varied due to language differences as well as having one with special arrangements for oversight management, in the case of the British Red Cross oversight of the Cayman Islands operations. (See more on management under “Effectiveness”, below.) · The budget holder for the multi-country appeal was initially the head of PADRU but was changed to the Operations Manager in the Sub-Office. While country budgets were developed, they did not appear in the financial monitoring system. (See Financial section below, under “Effectiveness”.) · The appeal attempted to cover emergency response and reconstruction needs based on assessment data obtained in the emergency phase. This could be considered a disastrous mistake given the inadequacy of the repair and reconstruction assistance, particularly in Grenada. · The appeal did not include, or an appeal was not made for, Trinidad and Tobago which was affected by Hurricane Ivan and has a National Society with numerous capacity development needs.

· The appeal was laden with complex capacity development add-ons that ideally speaking were not realistic given the time frames and the human resources needed to plan and implement them. The reality of funding and the pique of interest motivates their inclusion post-disaster but stretches staff who must manage a complicated emergency response operation plus arrange and attend workshops, deal with technical consultants, etc. The Sub-regional Office was tasked with implementing at least 8 workshops in a six month period which it somehow managed to achieve. · For reasons mentioned in the point above, as well as limitations in human resources to carry out the various services required (tracing, HIV education, food aid, psychosocial support, etc.) the scope of activities might have been reasonably dealt with in nine months but not in six.

The IFRC Haiti revised appeal (22/04) of 5th.October 2004 made a very accurate assessment of needs and presented a well structured appeal which, unfortunately (particularly in the case of ECHO for Gonaives Town) was not supported. A request for assistance (20/04) was launched for Cuba which was affected by Hurricane Charley on August 13, and received a weak response. The Cuban operation for Ivan only attained 17.6% percent of its goal and the targeted number of families was reduced from 5,000 to 3,000.

Assessment Initial assessment methodology was generally weak in Grenada and Jamaica and resultant weak data analyses were used as a tool for planning and as a foundation for appeals. The assessments were not updated as required to reflect the emerging needs. The various sources of assessment data and methodologies indicate that a more coordinated effort is required to collect data using agreed upon formats and methods and to produce assessments regularly.

Weak assessments in Jamaica resulted in management problems, reduced cost effectiveness and inadequate assistance in some sectors and duplication in others. In Grenada, assumptions that everyone was in equal need promoted a strategy which did not target the most vulnerable people. In Haiti, despite a good initial assessment, the data had become almost irrelevant by the time distributions commenced. Without reliable and timely assessment data, greater reliance was placed on what the planners think is needed, what is in stock and can be obtained, what has been provided in other emergencies, and/or “off the shelf” projects.

The government’s efforts to conduct assessments in Grenada and Jamaica were generally well supported by the Red Cross. In both the Cayman Islands and Cuba, government assessment data was used. The Cayman Islands Overseas Branch of the British Red Cross, lacked resources to participate in the assessment. The Cuban Red Cross is assigned a geographical area by the government in which to provide assistance. The UN conducted a rapid assessment following Hurricane Ivan in Cuba and published the results on September 15. It is not known whether UN estimates agreed with government assessments. The CRC and PADRU delegates later conducted a more in-depth assessment in the assigned areas: Pinar del Rio and La Habana.

There were numerous obstacles to data collection in Grenada and Jamaica such as blocked access, shortage of time to reach remote populations, inadequate human and material resources

to accomplish the task, etc. However the main obstacles were the capacity to plan and implement a reliable survey and the lack of consolidation of data which was stored in various places. The methods used did not provide an accurate picture of need, assistance priorities, and identification of the most vulnerable people.

Data was often collected by volunteers who in coordination with people from other agencies, go house to house to view damages and talk with residents. Other methods used were drive throughs and flyovers. Damage analysis, however, was highly subjective and relied on visual inspection of damage and/or checklists of material losses. Assessments did not include enough data on loss of social capital and impact on livelihoods or consideration of assets. This limited data resulted, for example in Jamaica, in people who had lost roofs receiving the complete range of assistance while others who had not lost roofs received limited assistance.

Due to lack of reliable numbers, staff and volunteers proceeded without clear understanding of numbers in need and what was needed. Although the budgets were updated and changed, the numbers and the activities remained the same. The systems proceeded to distribute what they had rather than refine the data and planning. For example, food items continued to be distributed in Jamaica four months after the disaster when funds may have been better used to help people repair their houses or regain their livelihoods.

Distribution Red Cross distribution systems were generally praised by citizens and other relief organizations as being fast and well organized. The systems performed remarkably well given constraints. The ERUs contributed significantly to the efficiency of warehousing and customs clearance in Jamaica and logistics in Grenada. Volunteers need help especially in rural areas to have access to critically needed items closer to their towns, to have access to lists for distribution that are approved by the NS and the community leaders, to have the means to seek and find people who need assistance, and to have assurances of protection against political (whether from community or national leaders) influences on distributions.

The Cayman Islands, Grenada and Jamaica all suffered damages to distribution systems and to the NS headquarters and other offices. In Grenada, port clearance procedures had to be established for large quantities of relief items. The GRCS had to relocate its warehousing after the first week due to problems and inadequate space in the government warehouse areas. The operations were initially plagued with shortages of vehicles. Distribution of food aid in Haiti occurred so long after the disaster that it could only be considered irrelevant while non-food items retained only partial relevance to people who had to find other resources to survive.

It is likely that some problems in distribution could not have been foreseen due to the huge unexpected impact of the disasters and in the case of Grenada, no experience for more than 40 years in major disaster response. Some problems noted included: · Both Grenada and Jamaica received vast quantities of un-requested food and non-food items from concerned donors including other National Societies. The storage and distribution of these items were a large headache and expense and in many cases they served no priority needs.

· The GRCS was not prepared for food distribution and was challenged in implementation, however, all actors coordinated to make the system work. · Distribution in the early days was chaotic and although generally organized well in the warehouses, was subject to demand pressures (individual and political) once trucks reached the community · The overwhelming demands for assistance and the inability to selectively target people resulted in shortages of supplies · The community interviews indicated that distributions did not always reach the most vulnerable particularly if they lived off the main roads and some distance from the center of towns. · There were vast overestimates for some relief needs, such as for watsan in Grenada and Jamaica whereby huge stockpiles of jerry cans and/or water purification tablets remained in stock.

Coordination Early coordination (in the first three months) did not result in coverage of all affected people and targeting the most needy, by the government and the humanitarian organizations. Later coordination (after three months) improved and has resulted in strategic partnerships for recovery but not adequate coverage of needs. The NS staff and FACT generally participated in the coordination systems that existed, whether led by government or the UN, but those systems were marginally effective. The FACT, ERUs, and RITs may have been more instrumental in helping government to ensure coverage.

In Grenada, early coordination was severely hampered by lack of communication and transportation. The National Emergency Relief Organization (NERO, now NRD) was virtually incapacitated and a CDERA team arrived immediately to assist NERO to set up an EOC (Emergency Operations Center). . The NS and the IFRC staff made efforts to coordinate by sending reports and lists. UNDP and OCHA were not present. The GRCS had well developed relationships with NERO and GRCS staff supported the EOC. In Cuba, the Civil Defense assumes coordination responsibilities in the initial stages of the emergency and the Foreign Cooperation Minister (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) takes over during the assistance and rehabilitation stage and assigns working areas for all assistance organizations.

In Jamaica, the JRC enjoys a good relationship with the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (ODPEM). Through its strong network, the JRC was able to facilitate the coordination by the FACT with actors in the government and other organizations. In partnership with ODPEM, UNDP was responsible for the coordination of the international relief effort but it was spread too thin. Due to poor coordination and information sharing, agencies targeted similar groups of beneficiaries and provided some with similar types of assistance.

In Haiti, coverage and timeliness of assistance were exceptionally poor and family and community support mechanisms were the main methods of survival. The results of the community interviews in both Jamaica and Grenadas indicate that coverage of the needs in the affected areas was uneven with some of the more vulnerable people being missed entirely and that duplication occurred in some cases. The galvanized roofing survey undertaken in late October in Grenada found that up to 50% of people had been missed in some areas. While the

designated responsibility of emergency coordination lies with NERO, ODPEM and supporting organizations such as UNDP and OCHA, the ethical responsibility to see that coordination happens lies with all actors in the emergency response. Actors might have worked together to undertake assessments to understand the needs of thee most vulnerable people and find those who did not receive needed assistance..

Volunteers The Red Cross volunteers demonstrate a commendable degree of knowledge and skills. They have generally all participated in various forms of training and some are very well trained through the Community Disaster Preparedness Training (CDPT). What they need the most is support from the National Societies to perform effectively. The Inter-American Conference (IAC) Plan of Action 2003 – 2007 supports the establishment of volunteer support and management systems. These must be put into place as soon as possible given the vulnerability of the region and the reliance on volunteers to implement response mechanisms.

The volunteers are the ultimate eyes, ears, hands and feet of the operations. They are largely responsible for the initial assessment of needs. They put relief goods into the hands of the affected people. They provide direct services such as first aid. Despite the elaborate tools and preparedness measures found at “higher” levels”, the entire system cannot be considered effective if it does not ultimately succeed in reaching the most vulnerable people in a timely manner, and providing coverage in a coordinated fashion. Volunteers are the key link to completing this process successfully.

Volunteers reported the following problems as those affecting their abilities to perform as volunteers and their desire to remain volunteers: · They themselves and their families needed assistance but were asked to wait for help; certain volunteers received help while others did not; some were in a crisis and some were living in shelters · There was very little time to do the assessments and not enough volunteers · Volunteers in some places lacked rain boots and raincoats and could not work in heavy rain conditions · They were faced with lack of food and non-food items for immediate distribution and for shelters if they were in remote areas · They had to face thousands of people who were clamoring for assistance and they did not have enough training on how to manage distributions and ensure security · The amounts of food and non-food items did not meet the assessed needs · They experienced a sense of powerlessness to achieve goals in assisting the community · They were receiving orders from various sources and the lines were unclear · Most volunteers did not participate in management meetings or interact with management

Affected People The evaluation findings indicate that IFRC’s accountability to affected people needs to be strengthened. Emphasis on upward accountability is reflected in reporting numbers of items distributed and focus on provision of goods in plans of action. More focus needs to be placed on monitoring satisfaction with the services and items provided and the progress that people are making toward their recovery, which is an important indicator of resiliency to disaster. This can 15

be accomplished through intensive focus on impact at the community level by ensuring that baseline surveys such as the VCA are conducted in advance of emergencies so that relative vulnerability is understood. Monitoring mechanisms should be agreed upon with communities including forms that will be used and participatory techniques.

Evaluations should take place much earlier in the emergencies (than this one, for example). Evaluations can be in the form of real time evaluations or participatory evaluations with NS staff, volunteers, and communities. Plans of action should include indicators that express progress toward longer terms goals such as regaining livelihoods or economic status and perceptions about levels of preparedness. Plans were in process to conduct a real time evaluation of the Ivan operation, however, the tsunami disaster in Southeast Asia in December diverted resources to that response.

Disaster preparedness. The level of disaster preparedness in communities was poor. Community members lacked adequate emergency shelters and many shelters were not resistant to hurricanes. During the hurricanes, many people stayed in their homes which did not offer adequate protection. In both Grenada and Jamaica, warnings for Ivan were not taken seriously by many people until the last minute when it was too late to protect livelihoods and themselves. In Haiti, extreme poverty and poor government support for disaster preparedness leaves people extremely vulnerable. This evaluation strongly endorses the recommendation made in “Reducing Risks and Improving Coordination” (2004) by the Inter-American Conference of the Red Cross in Santiago Chile, (April 2003) for stronger preparedness on the part of communities. This is extremely critical to protect people who still do not have permanent roofs and in view of the upcoming hurricane season which is predicted to be as violent as in 2004.

Satisfaction with relief assistance. The results of the community surveys can be seen in detail in the attached reports on Grenada, Haiti and Jamaica. In general, the following observations are made regarding assistance people received. · Assistance was uneven in terms of geographical coverage and coverage within communities both for emergency relief food and non-food and for shelter · Assistance was not always timely, meeting immediate needs for food, water and shelter · Affected people perceived that they did not receive food or non-food items because they missed distributions that were not close to their homes, were not home at the time, were undeserving, were less favored politically, that nothing was left for them, were unlucky or were reticent to ask for help. · The majority of the affected people interviewed, although usually recognizing the Red Cross and appreciating assistance, did not make strong identification of it as a protector of vulnerable people. They tended to see all organizations together in terms of how fair assistance had been and whether collective assistance had helped them to recover and for most part they were not satisfied. · The majority of persons interviewed still lacked components such as roofs, mattresses and other larger household good and services that they could not afford to pay for or replace · A significant number of interviewees had lost their jobs and livelihoods and their incomes had not been restored to pre-disaster levels.

· The team did not find any families that had received psychosocial support although many might have needed it.

Sufficiency of recovery assistance: The area that poses the greatest degree of concern with regard to vulnerability is the insufficiency of recovery and reconstruction assistance. Some families having survived the hurricane and its aftermath are generally more vulnerable if they do not have a roof, have not properly replaced their roof (as is the case with many families and it deceptively appears safe), if they lack the hurricane straps on the rafters, and if they do not have the proper bracing on the walls, windows and doors.

In Grenada, an evaluation of needs for galvanized roofing was methodically done in October to November. However, the galvanized material was extremely rare due to demand and it was finally delivered late in 2004. The roofing process requires a great deal of time in order to properly prepare the rafters. USAID contractor PADCO estimates that by the start of the 2005 hurricane season, many homes will not be hurricane resistant.

IFRC supports livelihood development in oth er countries, such as Ethiopia, and the Santiago document “Reducing Risks and Improving Coordination” recommends design of rehabilitation projects to improve living conditions of affected people as a precursor to disaster mitigation. Projects to promote livelihoods are underway by numerous organizations. They might have started sooner when people had cleaned up their yards and could effectively start gardens and raising small stock. The GRCS has offered a voucher program to assist the most dramatically poor which is appreciated by them but is not a substitute for activities contributing to long term self-sufficiency. (See more discussion on livelihoods in the “Sustainability” section.).

3.2 Effectiveness

This criterion is used to assess the extent to which IFRC’s programs achieved their purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs. Implicit within the criteria of effectiveness is timeliness. Issues of resourcing and preparedness should also be addressed under effectiveness.

Management Due to language differences the managerial responsibility for the Hurricane Ivan appeal was split such that the English speaking countries were covered by the Trinidad-based Sub-Regional Office and the Cuba appeal managed by the Panama Regional Delegation.. A Sub-regional Operations Manager was assigned to the Sub-regional office. The Sub Regional Coordinator, who had been a key guide to navigating through the politics of the regional system left suddenly due to family reasons. The Sub-regional Operations Manager, who was new to the region and accepted the job after she reached the region, relied on the Head of PADRU and the Head of the Regional Delegation for guidance but these actors often did not see eye to eye. The Director of the Cayman Islands Branch reported to London BRCS but was also drawn into the regional management structure.

Because of the multi-country nature of the appeal, strains that might not have been evident in a single country appeal, were placed on management and reporting lines. In addition the country

operations varied in terms of the capacities of the NS and the nature of the support that was provided by the Secretariat. It was difficult to distinguish who was the ultimate authority. From an island perspective, the management was fragmented and unclear between the two key actors: PADRU and the Regional Delegation.

At the Secretariat in Geneva, the procurement, logistics, systems operated fairly effectively to support PADRU. A mobilization table was produced which was very helpful. Problems that were mentioned included: · Delays in making purchases and in securing funds (over 50,000 CHF) when procurement risks had to be factored in (settling on numbers based on best guess assessments); as requests for purchases increased, delays became longer. · Problems with the logistics tracking software which took a lot of energy to deal with.

The Geneva-based Secretariat supported regional management which was largely successful due to previous efforts to decentralize it, PADRU’s pre-positioning of human and material resources in the region, significant amounts of supplies, framework agreements with regional suppliers, etc. The Secretariat played its intended role in support and coordination with some exceptions regarding placement of delegates and their roles. Two positions were opened for relief delegates for Grenada and two persons were recruited, however, one person accepted the Operations Manager position, as described above. The creation of the role of the Sub-regional Operations Manager caused controversy and stress for the person in it as well as others who had difficulty with reporting lines. Although the Secretariat in Geneva had issued clear instructions regarding reporting lines to involved staff, those interviewed found the lines of authority and reporting structures to be confusing. The needs of the PNS to be involved seemed to take precedence over the established roles and decisions taken by people already in the operation, as in the BRCS involvement in agricultural rehabilitation in Grenada.

In what many regard as a “big mistake” the operations lacked sufficient MOUs or agreements between the Secretariat and the NS. MOUs had been under discussion, however, they were either signed very late or not at all. Roles and responsibilities and ground rules or SOPs were not clear and resulted in fragmentation of teams, tensions, and unresolved arguments over who should be doing what. The NS’s involvement in management largely ceased in Grenada and Jamaica.

Financial Management There are fundamental weaknesses in IFRC’s financial accounting performance at the regional level. While there does not appear to have been misuse of funds, Budget Holders (fund managers) were often not aware of their own funds’ financial status on an ‘up to date’ monthly let alone on a daily basis. The reasons for this situation are as follows: 1. Rapid staff turnover and poor handover procedures have allowed those delegates who have not rigorously recorded information during their mission to leave the operation without any means for their replacements to ‘catch up’ on the audit (record) trail. 2. PADRU has not been efficient at logistical, distribution and purchases reporting such that it has proven to be extremely difficult for the Regional Finance Unit (RFU) to actually find supporting documentation for the payment of invoices.

3. In order to make financial reports (for example, to donors), some ‘unsupported’ costs have been budgeted to Administration. The result is manifested in one operation where the 2004 accounts show that approximately 60% of costs are Administrative rather than Relief. Furthermore, substantial funds have been charged to operations for which funds were not destined – for example, costs have been posted to the Cuba Hurricane Operation from funds destined for (eg.) Dominican Republic Telephones.

The operational result of this situation is that managers are prone to under-spending (as in the case of the Haiti Hurricane Jeanne appeal, 22/04) or run the risk of overspending as in the case of PADRU (see below). The risk is that a donor audit may pick up on Point 3, above, and require payback of unsupported costs.

The concept of PADRU has been supported through evaluation of its functions and the efficacy of the organization was certainly demonstrated in its performance in the 2004 hurricane season. PADRU’s core funding was initially provided by, inter alia, the Norwegian and Irish Governments, but after two years the Irish Government ended its un-earmarked support. On ECHO’s initiative, its funding of PADRU has been proposed and a contract for a 500,000 Euro contribution towards the PADRU appeal has now been signed.

An institution like PADRU which includes preparedness for disaster response in its mandate cannot operate confidently or efficiently on a weak or short-term financial footing and the requirement for ongoing support for core staff will remain a challenge. Efforts need to be made to secure the underwriting of PADRU’s core funding by a committed donor over a longer time period of three to five years.

Standards The effects of IFRC’s efforts to develop and promote principled approaches was evident in the operations. Some NS such as the Jamaican Red Cross regularly recite core principles at the start of their meetings. Many criticisms of the operations were based on interviewees’ perceptions that core principles were not upheld. The results of the “Lessons Learned and Good Practices - Hurricane Ivan Response” as well as interviews indicate more work needs to be done by the Movement to inculcate the principles and by staff to embody the principles.

One area of contention is whether some core principles can be observed in the early emergency response. For example, consultation (including needs assessment and monitoring) with affected people is a core standard of IFRC, the Sphere Common Standards, and the HAP-I standards, yet it is a common criticism in evaluations including this evaluation that this step is bypassed or taken lightly. People in Aid standards also advocate for consultation with staff. In particular, those in decision-making roles, such as NS management, FACT, RITs, and ERUs as well as other Secretariat staff, should act as role models for all other actors by encouraging consultation and participating themselves in regular visits to the communities and consulting with volunteers. The effects of such actions would produce exponential results in terms of promoting principles. Protocols or SOPs should be developed that ensure consultation by all response teams. Through training and discussion, strategies should be developed to support means to put the principles into action.

The following principles in particular require strengthening.

· Dedication to capacity development for all, particularly communities and volunteers, helping NS to meet the standards · Urging the Movement to act as one organization to maximize its potential · Demonstrating that all participating and host NS should feel equally valued · Using relief assistance to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster · Meeting basic needs for food, water, health and shelter for people who are in need · Consulting with the communities and monitoring assistance so that their satisfaction will be increased · Removing all partisan and discriminatory influences · Basing priorities on needs assessments and local capacities.

(See standards ranking matrix in the executive summary.)

Response Teams and Delegates The combined efforts of the RITs, FACT and ERUs contributed significantly to saving lives of the hurricane affected people and sustaining them during the emergency. The skills and expertise of the RITs should be tapped more frequently to allow them to take on additional management tasks, and to take early planning and implementing roles in recovery initiatives. All Federation staff should be aware of the significant potential of the RITs and their roles in emergency response. The FACTs, RITs and ERUs would enhance their effectiveness by increasing skills in coordination, collaboration and consultation.

Regional Intervention Teams: The RITs were deployed to Grenada (4) and Cuba (1). The RIT members were generally effective in performing their roles. Due to their location in the region, their deployment was cost effective and culturally appropriate, given the close bonds between NS in the Caribbean. RIT members were well trained through PADRU and their deployment to the disaster affected area was generally efficient.

Once in Grenada, RIT members, some of whom were very experienced in disaster management and technical areas, met with frustration with regard to their roles and said that they could have taken on additional responsibility and assumed more decision making power. RIT members found that FACT members were not adequately briefed on the role of the RITs. For some FACT members, the concept of the RITs seemed to be entirely new. In Grenada, RIT members faced tensions over uncertainties regarding their contractual arrangements which they had believed were in place prior to deployment but apparently were not.

At the end of the emergency operations when their relief support roles were less needed, RIT members were asked to take roles in recovery programs but some met with only limited success. For example, in Grenada, the British Red Cross took over an agricultural development project originally undertaken by a RIT. Additionally opportunities were lost to use RIT expertise early on for short term livelihood development. The satisfaction of the RIT members with their roles in the response depended highly on the person who they reported to in the operation.

Field Assessment and Coordination Teams: The FACT members were deployed early in Grenada and Jamaica, an achievement for which the Secretariat is justifiably proud. In Jamaica and Grenada part of the team arrived before the hurricane struck allowing time for cooperative planning with the NS. In Grenada where NS headquarters were destroyed, staff from PADRU and the Sub-regional office were on the first plane and provided vital support for the NS before the FACT arrived. The NS all expressed appreciation in the Grenada workshop regarding the expertise and hard work provided by FACT members.

Notwithstanding the many accomplishments of the FACTs, some issues must be mentioned: · Some of the FACT members were not experienced in the region nor in FACT SOPs · Some lacked the skills needed to navigate the complexities in relationships with the NS and with other members of the response network · The need for FACT expertise was not always gauged properly, the late arrival of a wat/san delegate in Grenada and inadequate attention to wat/san issues · Documentation was weak regarding why decisions had been made, for example, analyses of assessment data was not used to support Plans of Action. This caused confusion and uncertainty for incoming delegates · TORs were not developed or else not presented to the satisfaction of the NS; roles and responsibilities were not clarified to all members of the NS · The international and NS systems fell quite short of being integrated and NS staff were bypassed in terms of decision making, communication and information sharing; Team work was not satisfactory · The FACT rarely visited communities or volunteers to speak with them about issues · The FACT did not help as much as it should have to compensate for weaknesses in coordination by the government and international counterparts.

Emergency Response Units: The ERUs involved in the responses included the British Red Cross Logistics Unit in Grenada and the British Logistics, French WatSan, Spanish team, Norwegian Hospital and Canadian Medical Units in Haiti and a Logistician for one week in Jamaica. The ERU’s generally received high marks for their performances. In Grenada, where transport was severely hampered, the logistics ERU helped to streamline the operation. In Jamaica, the ERU member helped to run the warehouses and expedite customs clearance. In Haiti, rapid mobilization of the ERU enhanced effectiveness. Most ERU members operated self- sufficiently but those that did not presented a substantial drain on other delegates time and resources.

In general, ERU member’s specializations allowed them to focus on achieving goals quickly and they set good management examples for NS. They were especially effective when deployed at the same time as the FACT teams. As with the FACT, the ERU members did limited direct capacity development and staff and volunteers recall little interaction with them regarding decision making.

International Delegates: Handover procedures were problematic due to the departure suddenly of people from their positions and the relatively short times, such as less than three months, that they stayed in the jobs. The lack of handover requirements or non-observance of these requirements left incoming staff with many questions on how to proceed and how decisions had

been made. Delegates describe needing and seeking help to carry out their duties but some were unable to find it, causing them extreme stress. Some interviewees felt that international staff stayed too long in their positions when NS staff might have taken over.

Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) The DREF is a very useful tool which provides seed capital for operations and should ideally be released within 24 hours of the disaster. The DREF was generally employed aggressively to pump funds rapidly into the system. The amounts allocated through the DREF were: 100,000 CHF for countries affected by Hurricane Charley, 300,000 CHF for countries affected by Hurricane Ivan and 150,000 CHF for countries affected by Hurricane Jeanne. The team asked the opinions of management interviewees regarding their experiences with the DREF. Many agreed that the constraints to realizing the ultimate effectiveness of the DREF are: · Insufficient amounts relative to the needs in major emergencies · While the Secretariat aggressively approved the DREF request form, the funds were not available for use in the field for a couple of days. There is a considerable time lag between approval at Secretariat level and actual transfer/availability of “ready to use” funds at the field level.

A “preparedness” DREF that is already approved and in position in the region was mentioned as an alternative to the present arrangement.

Information Management The Information Bulletins (and Operations Updates) are excellent tools for offering real time situation reports, giving donors confidence and disseminating information to the public. The Regional Reporting Unit is commended for its unceasing energy to collect information in the disasters. The RIT member was helpful in collecting distribution information from Cuba. There were a number of constraints to production of the bulletins and reports. The quality of reporting varied between countries, with many countries not reporting distribution data in a timely fashion. Nevertheless, the Federation was able to produce at least 15 information bulletins, 3 emergency appeals, 1 request for assistance, 8 operation updates, and 50 DMIS field reports by the end of October.

Some issues that were identified in information management include: · Seconded PNS staff who were inappropriately placed due to lack of strong English skills or unaccustomed to working in disaster conditions · Uncertainties about deployment of information officers and need for commitment of funds, identification of people to go, and criteria for deployment · Difficulties in preparing applications for assistance from ECHO – lack of support from Geneva for this · Slow information flow to the Regional Reporting Unit which constrains the timely publication of the information bulletins · Discontinuation of capacity development for reporting · The information always seemed to go up and not down · Tendency of delegates and NS to regard reporting as bringing more work rather than being an asset to institutional memory.

The DMIS provides a wealth of information for humanitarian practitioners. However, it was not easy to access for some of the NS staff. It provides generic tools but in practice, the use of the tools would require guidance from experienced persons. In terms of assessment, for example, examples of several forms are provided which give staff and volunteers some ideas. However, it would be up to the NS and governments to collaborate on a format that will serve the national needs. Country reports that specify progress and problems are not available on the DMIS. This would be a useful service so that national Societies can learn from each other. The monitoring reports are not easy to access as their numbers must be guessed and the number of reports depends on the willingness of people to write them on the internet.

Communications and Visibility The team was aware of a critical review conducted among Secretariat staff prior to the evaluation regarding media and public relations management in the subject hurricanes operations. A discussion paper which detailed the issues was not provided to the team despite two requests. Had this been provided along with a stronger briefing in the Geneva Secretariat, more analysis might have been possible. Time allowed for the evaluation was clearly insufficient to investigate public relations in detail and it was not called for in the TOR.

Weak communications during the response was attributed to some of the issues in information gathering described above, including the placement of inexperienced and inappropriate staff, In addition there is insufficient representation of reporting staff and insufficient training for staff on the importance of and procedures for reporting in the sub-regional office, in PADRU, as well as on FACT and other response teams. Stronger technical preparation is clearly needed and placement of special teams such as information and reporting ERUs during the emergency. On the other hand, public relations achievements were publicized by IFRC in its “Hurricane Season 2004” presentation which mentions 30 international media sources that were used in the first two months.

In general, visibility of the Red Cross in each country visited was good in terms of preparedness in that signs and educational messages were posted in public places. In the Cayman Islands, where an emergency public health campaign was conducted, it would have been very useful to have messages printed in advance as it was difficult to do so during the emergency. A big issue in local visibility, considered very important by the National Societies, was the repeatedly expressed need for volunteers to have the appropriate t-shirts and other items that identify them as volunteers. Volunteers in Grenada found that they were turned away by security guards if they had not received the correct t-shirt.

There was only one question in the TOR related to “cooperation and coordination with the national and international media.” According the IFRC Code of Conduct, cooperation with media means that both parties ensure recognition of the dignity of the affected people. Coordination with media should ensure that coverage is provided relative to needs and competition is avoided where it detrimental to services provided. At the national level, visibility through newspapers, radio and television was generally good in Jamaica, where the NS had formed relationships with various media. In Grenada, not enough information was given in the early emergency phase to the public regarding distributions. In the Cayman Islands, media did

not truthfully portray the destruction, and in Cuba, there were logistical and political constraints to effective information collection and dissemination

A number of constraints to more effective coordination with the media were mentioned by interviewees: 1. Inexperienced staff who were not ready to take on the media management role in a disaster 2. Limited National Society capacity to be assertive with getting media attention and effective in communication with media 3. Lack of knowledge on the part of staff and volunteers of the types and degrees of media coverage that was actually achieved 4. Incomplete adherence to communication plans which had been elaborated for Cuba and Jamaica.

3.3 Efficiency

This criterion measures the outputs, qualitative and quantitative, in relation to the inputs. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving the same outputs, to see whether the most efficient process has been used.

The team was not able to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the hurricane operations. The goals of saving lives and livelihoods were largely attained. While no price can be placed on the social costs of the disaster, relief and recovery assistance undoubtedly reduced social suffering. The discussions above point to numerous areas where efficiency can be improved. Theoretically an effort which is not well coordinated among all actors cannot be considered cost effective.

3.4 Sustainability/Connectedness

This criterion refers to the need to assure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account. The implementation strategy should be coherent (root causes to immediate needs) and coordinated within the Federation and National Societies and with the activities of other actors.

Strategic Partnerships A number of strategic partnerships served to strengthen operations but they were neither sufficient in number nor strong enough to address emergency and recovery needs. Partnerships were very productive between the GRCS and the British Red Cross on livelihoods, housing and roof repairs (GRCS with the French Red Cross, USAID PADCO, NRD, UNDP, etc.) but it is not evident that organizations collaborated during earlier stages when funds were secured to seek coverage of livelihood and reconstruction needs. Stronger linkages to livelihood and reconstruction activities need to be made in the early stages of emergencies.

The NS in Jamaica and Grenada have developed strategic partnerships but some MOUs are lacking as guidelines for how these partnerships will operate in emergencies. The lesson learned workshop and interviewees identified lack of MOUs with government, other assistance organizations and the private sector as a problem.

Collaboration for Housing Repair and Reconstruction. In Grenada where 10,000 houses must be rebuilt, and a fledgling ministry, the Agency for Recovery and Development (ARD), has been established to oversee housing issues, serious issues are unresolved on land tenure which are a constraint to rebuilding houses. Many people do not have titles to the land where their houses rest although they have paid rent, some for 30 or 40 years, to landowners. Repairs, however, are possible without titles and being undertaken by the GRCS in partnership with the French Red Cross and the high quality of their inputs widely praised. Good coordination is evident six months after the emergency but combined efforts to replace dangerous or missing roofs and unsafe houses cover only a small percentage of the needs. UNDP wished to collaborate to collect baseline data through Red Cross Vulnerability and Capacity Analysis (VCAs) in Grenada in 6 towns to support its initiative to rebuild settlements. This type of collaboration should be expanded. The organizations coordinate through regular meetings but more intense collaboration will be needed for sustainable resolution of land tenure issues.

Collaboration for Livelihood Support: The Ivan appeal covered a few start up linkages to livelihood restoration activities for Jamaica and Grenad a. These included a school feeding program in Jamaica and preliminary planning for agricultural recovery and a voucher program in Grenada. Aside from housing concerns, the team found that affected people worried the most about restoration of their livelihoods indicating that stronger connections need to be made in earlier stage of the emergency to support livelihoods, either by drawing in PNS and donors to develop projects or by including more connectors to livelihoods in appeals. Fisherman needed help to replace lost equipment and to restore traditional fishing areas. The British Red Cross is supporting an agricultural recovery program in Grenada by providing advice and oversight through periodic visits to the island, but otherwise has entrusted the GRCS to implement the program, an arrangement which is efficient and has worked well.

Psychosocial Support. A short term need related to longer term recovery is psychosocial support, which should receive adequate support and attention from the Federation, building on the NS expertise. The lessons learned workshop output suggested that psychosocial activities did not receive enough funding and were not implemented on a timely basis after the emergency. Following most disasters, more than 60% of affected people will experience mental health problems. Preventive treatment is needed so that depression and other symptoms will not lead to psychiatric disorders. In Jamaica, the psychosocial support program was highly regarded by all who received services, including volunteers and communities. The JRC also assisted other NS with implementing psychosocial support, such as the Cayman Islands. The GRCS later developed a community based program to support coping strategies and disseminate knowledge regarding stress reactions and management to 800 affected individuals.

Capacity Building The Hurricane Ivan appeal supported capacity building in various ways. In Grenada, support was received for telecommunications and development of the Grenville branch. In Jamaica, eight workshops were held in various aspects of disaster preparedness. In Cuba, generators were distributed to CRC branch offices.

Key issues in this evaluation which are relevant to questions posed in the TOR regarding standards and principles, concern the use of local capacities and coherence in emergency operations. While a great deal of appreciation was expressed, the team was concerned about the intensity of negative feelings on both the part of delegates and NS staff and volunteers that emerged in the workshop and through interviews, six months after the disasters. There were differing views on whether SOPs had been followed from people who participated in the same operation. There were differing perspectives on the degree of consultation that had taken place on the part of delegates and NS staff. Issues in capacity development for NS were as follows: · Appeals were launched without sufficient consultation with the NS · Decisions were often made without consultation · There was little respect paid to the NS and its local expertise · There was a perception of two separate operations both in Grenada and Jamaica

Of particular concern is the manner with which delegates and NS approach each other in emergency operations. If the parties experience tensions over roles and responsibilities, transparency and collaboration will be adversely affected. The influence is seen in both the way the NS are viewed by delegates and vice versa. The document “A Change Strategy for the Secretariat” developed in 2003 offers excellent guidance. It is suggested that the issues raised in this document be reviewed. One also has to examine the meaning of capacity and who should be developing it in whom – it is not a one way street. NS capacity should be tapped to strengthen delegation capacity.

The question of whether the emergency phase of the operation proactively addressed strengthening of the local disaster preparedness and disaster response capacities is a tricky one in Jamaica and Grenada. The emergency response left equipment, training, warehouses, new offices and stockpiles of reserves. But the general feeling of NS staff was one of being marginalized in management processes by the FACT and other international visitors.

In Haiti, capacity development was virtually impossible at the Gonaives Branch level, as it was operationally dysfunctional due to a rift within the National Society. The IFRC has not built the necessary links with the NS and to do so would require maintaining a permanent delegation. The organizational development of the NS down to branch level is of paramount importance. The short-term dropping-in of foreign delegates represents a set-back to the NS, not development. There are very good volunteers in HNRCS but they need better role models without which they will disappear.

4 Recommendations

We make the following recommendations with total consideration of the significant achievements of the Federation members in saving lives and providing recovery assistance during hurricane season 2004 in the Caribbean and the Americas. We recognize and congratulate all actors in the response operations, including the Federation members, governments and communities, for their hard work and heroic efforts. We applaud the donations which made the enormous relief efforts possible. We also recognize that the Federation is one actor of many responsible for addressing the needs of vulnerable people.

We make the following recommendations in view of the lessons learned as well as the good practices. There are numerous good practices cited in the evaluation. Evaluation recommendations tend to focus on solving problems so that the constraints to effective humanitarian assistance can be overcome. However, we also recommend that good practices be continued and strengthened. We recognize that the Red Cross has developed strategies to address some of the recommendations and that this evaluation provides some indication of where the Red Cross stands in terms of progress on these strategies.

We have reinforced several relevant recommendations found in the “Review of Major operations in the Americas: Hurricane Georges, Hurricane Mitch and Venezuela Floods” (January 2001) and “Evaluation of PADRU” (July 2004) as well as strategic objectives based on national society recommendations derived from the Inter-American Conference of the Red Cross in Santiago Chile, April 2003, “Reducing Risks and Improving Coordination” (2004). In doing so, we commend the excellent analysis of needs and development of strategic goals that has been done thus far within the Federation and urge that these ideas do not remain in document form but are actualized rapidly through the strategic placement of resources. We also note considerable progress in addressing recommendations from previous evaluations.

The recommendations made below are all deemed to be “do-able” with the shifting of resources and targeting them where they will improve effectiveness. In our opinion, if following the recommendations requires adjusting policy and influencing attitudes and funding preferences, then efforts should be made to do so. In view of the predictions for another severe hurricane season in 2005, we urge action on these recommendations as soon as possible

This evaluation found that communities were not sufficiently prepared for disasters and due to their insufficient recovery, some people are now more vulnerable to the 2005 hurricanes. Disaster response teams and NS staff and volunteers should be better prepared to deal with issues in distribution which hamper effectiveness and be prepared to put into place effective monitoring and evaluation systems to identify problems and people who have been missed in distributions.

1.1 Develop, consolidate, expand and update community disaster preparedness programs improving their impact at the community level through the development of an integrated approach. 1.1.1 Urgently within the next two months, working through the community networks, identify shelters and safe homes for the 2005 hurricane season, particularly to protect people with tarps replacing all or part of a roof, with roofs that have been improperly replaced, with roofs that are in disrepair and have not been replaced, and with homes that are structurally unsound. 1.1.2 Accelerate the pace of Community Disaster Response Team (CDRT) training in countries where it has been successfully piloted (Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines) and replicate it in others. 27

1.2 Enhance distribution preparedness 1.2.2 Accelerate training for volunteers in distribution management (see “Recommendation 3” below) including record keeping, information sharing, crowd control and security. 1.2.3 Hire more paid, full time and well trained staff, in branch offices or those with oversight of rural communities, responsible for monitoring and evaluation, volunteer support, and preparing for emergencies. 1.2.4 Increase stockpiling of relief goods closer to distribution sites 1.2.5 Extend logistics links to include the physical act of handing over of goods and services to the most vulnerable people. 1.2.6 Establish MOUs among PNS and ONS regarding donations to ensure that they meet priority needs and are accompanied by funds for their storage and distribution. 1.3 Enhance monitoring and evaluation capacity 1.3.1 Develop a strategy for monitoring which includes community participation. Train and enable communities, staff and volunteers, RITs, NITs and multi sector and multi organization teams to conduct regular monitoring. 1.3.2 Conduct real-time evaluations and participatory evaluations of distributions early in the emergency to help determine where problems occur and to suggest potential solutions. Train and enable communities, staff and volunteers, RITs, NITs and multi sector and multi organization teams to plan and participate in evaluations.

This evaluation found that coordination to ensure coverage of mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery needs among the affected people was inadequate. This weakness resulted in a significant number of people who have not fully recovered and some have suffered permanent backsliding of their development status. Relative to their pre-disaster situation, a significant number of vulnerable people (particularly in Haiti and Grenada) lack adequate shelters, livelihoods, and/or reserves of resources, and face diminished prospects for protecting themselves from harm in the next disaster 2.1 Integrate and improve assessment mechanisms and tools, needs analysis and formulation of plans of action 2.1.2 Use joint assessments and collaborative mechanisms to develop a data base upon which to plan distribution of goods and services, including location of vulnerable households and indicators of health and sustainable livelihoods. In collaboration with other organizations, accelerate the pace of Vulnerability and Capacity Assessments

(VCA) in the communities and ensure that this analysis is regularly updated and applied to planning for emergency distribution. 2.1.3 Establish a consensus among NS and other organizations on standard content and formats for needs and damage assessment including questions relating to livelihoods and reserves or coping mechanisms and psychosocial needs. 2.1.4 Strengthen the integration and training of national, regional and international teams and facilitating the inter-institutional exchange of assessment information. 2.1.5 Develop separate Plans of Action for each phase, relief, recovery and rehabilitation, for example, such that assessments are conducted and repeated for each phase. 2.1.6 Enhance capacities to develop Plans of Action which effectively link response, relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction and realistically describe capacities and resource needs as well as activities of other actors for each phase. 2.1.7 Expand objectives to include qualitative indicators relative to satisfaction of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries 2.2 Design short term recovery activities as a precursor to mitigation, prevention and development actions and integrate them with activities of others to improve the living conditions of the beneficiaries. 2.2.1 Intensify promotion with governments and other assistance organizations, plans and standards for reconstruction as well as community based risk reduction programs. Share training to a larger degree in the use of VCA tools. 2.2.2 Allocate adequate resources to fill gaps in a timely manner in reconstruction and livelihood rehabilitation programs and using systems such as food vouchers to assist the most vulnerable 2.2.3 Support training for local authorities, volunteers and communities in recovery planning and encourage community leadership in this regard. 2.2.4 Advocate with donors and authorities regarding responsibilities toward affected people and the importance of their full participation. 2.2.5 Establish a coordinated plan through national emergency offices for coverage of all areas in the country and all sectors by all potential actors.

3. The Federation should intensify strategic focus and direct more human and material resources to support volunteer management as it pertains to disaster management.

This evaluation has determined that the Red Cross volunteers are not adequately supported by the system to carry out their critical roles. They are called upon to perform herculean tasks with a minimum consideration of the impact they themselves have suffered from the disaster, the pressures they must face within communities in terms of resource allocation, and the pressures they face within the volunteer system itself in terms of definition of their roles and reporting structures.

3.1 National Societies should put into place a volunteer support system and volunteer management system as part of the system of human resource development. 3. .1.1 Create or intensify focus on a plan for development of the disaster management capacity of volunteers, including increasing CDRT development 3.1.2 Increase the number of volunteers through a well planned approach that provides incentives through training and community cohesiveness; continue to develop the youth potential 3.1.3 Develop fair policies to help volunteers to meet their own needs and that of their families when they have suffered from disasters so that they can operate effectively in their roles 3.1.4 Increase psychosocial support to volunteers before, during and after emergencies 3.1.5 Provide training for volunteers based on an assessment of training needs and problems encountered (lessons learned) in emergency response. 3.1.6 Enhance training for volunteers in VCA, distribution management and providing psychosocial support 3.1.7 Support volunteers by placing well trained paid staff in strategic positions to carry out full time planning, monitoring and evaluation. 3.1.8 Provide volunteer kits (pre-positioned) to all volunteers at the onset of an emergency and to those who sign on after the emergency as soon as possible so they are protected and identifiable for visibility and security reasons. The kits should include personal equipment such as boots and rain jackets that they need to carry out their work. 3.1.9 Support volunteers to understand their roles and responsibilities in the emergency response including the need to develop their own capacities by learning from more experienced people.

4. The Federation should increase strategic focus and direct more human and material resources to reviewing issues relevant to principles of capacity building and consultation.

This evaluation found that a sense of narrow mindedness exists (ranging from subtle to overt) about what capacity means. This example is passed through the system from the Secretariat in its relationship with regional and sub-regional and PADRU offices, to the international societies and delegates in their relationships with national societies, to national societies in their relationships with volunteers and to volunteers in their relationships with communities. The examples set are promulgated by unfavorable perceptions of status and (unfairness of) privileges held by those at other levels. There seems to be limited visible recognition that capacity building must take place in many ways, up and down and throughout the system, and involves sharing of processes as well as material resources.

This evaluation found that the participatory decision making and information needs of the staff and volunteers in the National Societies were (ranging from partially to a greater degree) by-

passed by international teams and delegates and that the international and national players (ranging from sometimes to often) functioned separately in terms of management systems.

4.1 The Secretariat and National Societies should review their objectives to building a common capacity.

4.1.1 Undertake a comprehensive reflection exercise at all locations to ascertain what capacity building goals are in an emergency response. This reflection should be based upon whether enough trust, time and resources exist to permit actual capacity building according to stated goals and objectives. Questions to be answered include · Are international actors capable of the required amount (usually defined in the Plans of Action) of capacity building of the National Societies during the emergency response? · Do National Societies take the opportunities for “upward’ capacity building as well as “downward.” · How do Federation member staff and volunteers view capacity building - as provision of material goods, training events, and/or examples set by experienced persons in terms of interpersonal communication skills, community interactions, etc? · Should the international operations management system override national societies’ systems for the higher purpose of achieving disaster response goals and objectives, if necessary? · Should the strategies be re-written to reflect what can truly be achieved and what is more effective in order to avert expectations (misperceptions)? 4.1.2 Set out capacity building goals, objectives and activities clearly on paper in the Appeals and Plans of Action and modified through an evaluative process as the operation proceeds. 4.1.3 Develop capacity building objectives on a fair appraisal of National Society capacity determined ahead of disasters and testing the system using various disaster response scenarios 4.1.4 Respect current capacity building policy which is based on numerous guidelines and principles. Until and unless they are modified, these guidelines should be respected and actualized through behavior that is of a high professional quality and shows compassion toward others. 4.1.5 Target simpler more cost effective ways of developing common capacity in the emergency response phase, such as setting good examples, sharing culture, greeting and meeting regularly, establishing respectful lines of communication, management and decision making, communicating to everyone, taking time to negotiate and establish teams (a phased process), etc.

In addition, the staff or volunteers who accept the responsibilities need to have the skills, knowledge and experience required to carry out their roles.

This evaluation found that a considerable degree of confusion and resentment occurs when roles and responsibilities (and structural relationships) are not clarified both on paper and in discussion. Many of the management issues identified in the evaluation could be attributed to certain “root causes” when staff deterred from their roles, did not have well defined roles in writing, or did not clarify their roles with others initially and as they evolved. Further, some roles were assigned to people who did not have the needed level of skills or experience (whether cultural or technical) to implement them.

5.1 Integrate and optimize the use of instruments and mechanisms of the National Societies’ and the Federation Secretariat’s response systems. 5.1.1 Fine tune protocols for activation, deployment and entry into a disaster response operation and specify lines of coordination and communication 5.1.2 Design a template MOU between NS and the Secretariat regarding operations that can be modified for each emergency. Sign it expeditiously and review it periodically. 5.1.3 Ensure that TORs are developed for each deployment (FACT, RIT, NIT, ERU, consultant, etc.) and that the TORs are presented to the NS prior to arrival; Consult on TORs as they evolve. 5.1.4 Advise the NS regarding activation by providing a professional profile of the people who will be deployed 5.1.5 Establish ground rules between the NS and response teams for integration at the start of an operation and review progress periodically in open discussion forums. These guidelines should set out how decisions will be made, by whom and through what consultative process. 5.1.6 Coordinate and facilitate relationships with other similar response mechanisms, such as UNDAC, OFDA’s DART, CDERA and PAHO teams, etc. and share functions and information where possible. 5.1.7 Increase the amount allowable in the DREF and use preparedness DREFs which are pre-positioned and pre-approved. 5.1.8 Find funding for a core group of PADRU staff to support continuous preparedness and response in the Americas and Caribbean 5.1.9 Clarify and enforce the lines of responsibilities and hierarchal discipline among the Geneva/PADRU/Regional Delegation and FACT/Country Delegation 5.1.10 Support all staff and volunteers deployed to an emergency with counseling and assistance to perform their duties and psychosocial support. 5.1.11 To help develop realistic guidelines for deployment, all deployed staff and volunteers should be required to write a Lessons Learned paper to reflect upon their experiences and share their ideas for improvement

5.1.12 Establish guidelines for handover which includes detailed “Get up and go” forms that need to be filled out before departure for those who follow; categorizing all documentation if it has not been done already and writing the lessons learned memo described above; allow sufficient time for the handover process to be supportive for the incoming staff. 5.1.13 Create and use professional profiles for staff on rosters to fill FACT, RIT and ERU positions. 5.1.14 Select a Team Leader from the NS to avoid issues of a handover 5.1.15 Assign responsibility for continuous financial oversight so that controls are not lost. Example FACT member profile: · Previous experience in the region, and preferably in the country · Fluency in the language of the country · Previous experience and training in disaster management and demonstrated understanding of potential needs in each phase of the disaster and recovery response; and in each administrative and logistical step required to reach the most vulnerable people. · Proven abilities to communicate effectively and negotiate sensitively · Proven abilities to develop productive working relationships with NS counterparts, government staff, international staff and communities. · Proven abilities to conduct community surveys, participatory rural appraisal and similar techniques for assessing vulnerability and capacities · Experienced as a team leader as well as a team member · Experienced in assuming coordination responsibilities with NS, governments and in national and international emergency coordination forums · Experienced in conducting country-wide needs analyses in coordination with other organizations · Able to develop a TOR for the job, revise it as needed and disseminate information on the required duties to the national/international team · Understands the importance of timely information dissemination to inform donors and the public.

6.1 Improve financial management tools.

6.1.1 Separate country budgets even if an appeal covers several countries and assign separate Budget Holders for each 6.1.2 Use a computer program that permits faster access to daily financial records 6.1.3 Conduct training on financial management to avoid misrepresentation of expenditures 6.1.4 Establish procedures to by pass normal requirements (Geneva) for purchases

6.2 Improve information collection and dissemination)

6.2.1 Conduct regional training and awareness raising on information collection procedures for the Information Bulletins and Operations Updates and their importance as an accountability mechanism. 6.2.2 Develop criteria for deployment of an information delegate 6.2.3 Develop reporting and information ERUs 6.2.4 Obtain capacity building assistance from Geneva to complete ECHO reports 6.2.5 Use the log frame format to consolidate information so that progress can be measured and lack of progress explained 6.2.6 Provide a chronology in the Information Bulletins and Operations Updates so that people can see clearly how the operations have unfolded 6.2.7 Enhance user friendliness of the DMIS 6.2.8 Clarify and simplify reporting formats for tracking distributions

6.3 Take practical steps to improve cost-effectiveness

6.3.1 Enhance training and increase responsibilities for RITs 6.3.2 Promote NS capacity development in a coordinated fashion to eliminate international cost burdens 6.3.3 Make investments in strengthening NS distribution systems and volunteer management capacities to avoid duplication 6.3.4 Use alternative training methods such as coaching and apprenticeships more effectively 6.3.5 Share team functions where possible, with other organizations with similar teams, such as UNDAC, DART, CDERA, PAHO, etc. 6.3.6 Compact length of stay of international personnel to the time required and expeditiously handover responsibilities to the NS 6.3.7 Use regional monitoring mechanisms to cover accountability requirements through periodic visits by Sub-regional, Regional or PADRU staff to the affected countries after the initial emergency stages.

Cayman Islands

Introduction

The Cayman Islands were colonized from Jamaica by the British during the 18th and 19th centuries. Administered by Jamaica since 1863, they still remain a British dependency after 1962 although Jamaica has become independent. The Cayman Islands is home to 43,103 people (July 2004 est.) and is composed of 8 districts.

Since there is no direct taxation, the islands are a thriving offshore financial center. A stock exchange was opened in 1997 and more than 40,000 companies were registered as of 1998. Tourism is also a mainstay, accounting for about 70% of GDP and 75% of foreign currency earnings. About 90% of the islands' food and consumer goods must be imported. The Cayman Islands enjoy one of the highest outputs per capita (GDP per capita $35,000 – 2002 estimate) and one of the highest standards of living in the world. This picture is somewhat deceptive as the Caymans are host to thousands of immigrants who provide services and have a relatively low standard of living. Native Caymanians have a lower standard of living than the numerous foreigners who have second homes on the islands.

The Cayman Islands Red Cross is a Branch of the British Red Cross Society (BRCS). Prior to Hurricane Ivan, there were 3 full time and 1 part time staff and after the hurricane, there are 2 additional part time staff. The volunteer force has about 80 active volunteers and approximately 150 worked during the emergency. The CIRC cooperates with the National Hurricane Committee (NHC) which is composed of civil servants from various ministries and the Department of Child and Family Services.

The Cayman Islands has not been affected by a hurricane on the scale of Ivan recently. Prior to Ivan, Hurricanes Michelle in 2001, Gilbert (category 4) in 1988 and Katrina (category 1) in 1981 affected the island. The levels of preparedness by most actors were generally weak. According to the UNDP ECLAC report (Dec. 2004), the entire territory of Grand Cayman suffered the impact of hurricane Ivan while Cayman Brac and Little Cayman sustained losses of a lesser extent. Power was out for as long as three months in some areas and water supply was cut off for 3 weeks.

The total damage in the commerce sector has been estimated at $463.4 million, of which, $429 million or over 92% is attributed to direct damage. Damage and losses in the agriculture sector, including livestock and fisheries were estimated at roughly $5.6 million. Traditional farm production is the livelihood of about 1,200 families, most of them Caymanian.

Major issues in Cayman Islands Red Cross Response

The IFRC included the Caymans in the four country Hurricane Ivan appeal (21/04) with the objective of assisting 1,000 families with non-food items. The CIRC distributed the items received from PADRU on two planes shortly after receiving them. (See Chronology at the end of this section.) In addition a health delegate from the Regional Federation in Panama came with the second plane to work on a public health campaign due to the incursion of sea water on the island and subsequent overflow of sewage. A staff member from the BRCS also assisted with the operations.

The CIRC has engaged in lessons learned exercises including one within its own organization and one in London with the BRCS. The CIRC has set out an action plan to address a number of the problems and enhance preparedness. Some issues have already been addressed with the BRCS, such as the development of a checklist to facilitate work with the Federation. The CIRC did not attend the April 4 Grenada workshop and evaluators did not visit the Cayman Islands. Interviews were conducted with CIRC and IFRC staff engaged in the response by telephone or in other locations.

Preparedness Shelter Management: The capacity of the CIRC-managed shelter was 75 - 80 persons but the shelter ultimately had to accommodate 139 persons. Food and water was provided and people found the shelter to be safe and clean. However, volunteers felt that some of the shelter rules were not or could not be enforced. Furthermore, there were not enough shelters and some were not suitable for a category 5 hurricane. One large shelter had to be evacuated.

Branch Office and Pre-positioned Supplies: The CIRC building is located in one of the most low-lying areas in Grand Cayman that normally floods during the heavy rains. All Red Cross vehicles that were parked outside the building were destroyed due to salt water entering the engine. The 4 containers positioned round the island were well stocked, however, most of the items could not be utilized due to the seawater intrusion.

Management From the beginning of the Ivan Operation, the Branch felt that there was little coordination between the Federation and the BRCS and that it was stuck in the middle. An appeal was launched on behalf of the CI and a budget was put in place, without consulting the Branch, by Federation members in Panama.

It was understood that a focal point in the BRCS was to be put into place to be the point of contact during hurricane season, but this did not seem the case after Hurricane Ivan. The Branch received phone calls from staff members of the Federation and BRCS who wanted to help, but there was no coordination with/from the BRCS Desk. The CIRC felt that the IFRC and the

BRCS assumed that the Branch was fully operational, when in fact the office had been seriously damaged and staff and volunteers also severely affected. There were disagreements on who was going to pay for the relief items from Panama. The IFRC felt it was the BRCS, however the BRCS felt it should come out of the appeal.

The Branch received several international personnel during the Ivan Operation, some of whom were not even asked for by the Branch, with no clear understanding of their TORs. Sometimes, these individuals placed a logistic/administrative burden on the Branch and others were not very familiar with the national context in which the Branch worked. The international Delegate in charge of the emergency response team in Jamaica took responsibility for Federation coordination of the operation managed by the CIRC within the 4 country emergency appeal but this support appeared to mainly deal with accounting. The Branch was not very clear on what resources are available for request after a disaster, and certain decisions had to be made on the spot. The Branch has since received a list from BRCS regarding the available resources.

Assessment data collection and analysis The Regional Delegation had carried out a VCA in the Caymans a few weeks earlier. The CIRC did not undertake a general needs assessment for the non-food items. Numbers in need were approximated by the CIRC, PADRU and the BRCS from government estimates and estimates of capacity for distribution. The volunteers and civil servants were not capacitated to conduct a needs assessment.

Distribution issues CIRC staff and volunteers felt that distribution at the 12 centers went generally well. Some items distributed were redundant and there were not enough supplies to meet the needs at all centers. In addition, some affected people showed up twice at distribution centers or collected from several centers. The CIRC tried to help everyone given the impact and according to need but some people used the organization as a place where they could come to for general supplies. Even though trucks were made available to transport relief items to the various centers, transportation was a big problem. Due to the sea surge, several CIRC staff and volunteers lost their vehicles which made moving around the island very difficult.

The Branch received its first shipment from PADRU 3 days after the hurricane. At the distribution centers, it became apparent that most of the flashlights (880) did not work. This caused problems for local branches as rumors started spreading that the CIRC was distributing inferior goods. Twenty RC bibs were sent with the first plane and as more volunteers joined the operation the Branch requested more bibs (100) but they had not been received 3 months later.

The Health Delegate sought to design a health campaign however, the campaign became less needed as time went on. The impact would have been greater if there had been some preparedness such as pre-printing of materials. Nevertheless, the Branch conducted a health and safety campaign in early November and received some pamphlets and posters from the Federation in Panama to support this campaign. Unfortunately, the colors of the symbol of the red cross varied from yellow to red, which caused a bit of confusion as members of the public received the information.

Family reunification activities succeeded in identifying immigrants who wanted to return home and the Costa Rican Red Cross assisted with the return of 50 people to Costa Rica. Psychosocial counseling was undertaken by the Jamaica Red Cross but not until October. Teams should be pre-positioned ahead of hurricane season to avoid delays in providing the service.

Coordination Among Assistance Actors The NHC recognized the CIRC as the main NGO in the Cayman Islands during the Hurricane Ivan Operation. The only other NGO was PAHO. The NHC felt that the CIRC was able to mobilize the little resources it had to receive and distribute substantial quantities of relief supplies. The NHC felt that the event highlighted the international recognition of the Red Cross.

The island-wide operation was hampered by lack of a preparedness and operational plan on the national level. Information management was weak and resulted in rumors. Priority was not given to emergency relief workers at fuel pumps. There were not enough trucks to transport incoming goods. There was no designated warehouse for relief items. The customs warehouse was filled to capacity the day after the storm with personal relief items, and as a result, relief items for the Cayman population were rushed out of the packing area just to create space. There were insufficient numbers of police to help with security at different locations, especially the shelters. (The Federation conducted a basic Logistics workshop in Grenada in December, the first one of its kind in the region.)

Volunteer Preparedness Volunteers worked as a team and attempted to find those in the most need. Volunteers felt that a better structure would help them to organize themselves. Several conflicts occurred at the distribution centers between RC volunteers and government employees. There were not enough volunteers in the shelters and in other key areas that could administer first aid. The kits sent to the shelter were too small to support shelters hosing more than 200. It was felt that during and immediately after the storm, there was a lack of communication between CIRC headquarters and the volunteers within the various shelters, some of this due to having only one the 3 major telecommunication companies working.

Recovery Assistance The Branch sought to participate in the recovery efforts organized by the government but was not able to find support to do so. The Sub-regional office indicated that the plastic sheeting was a token of recovery assistance in addition to the repairs made to the Branch office. A number of people lost jobs in the service sector and did not have insurance. A number of people have not repaired their roofs.

Media Management Before Hurricane Ivan hit Grand Cayman, all eyes had already been on Grenada, and the world was not focusing on the category 5 hurricane about to hit the Cayman Islands. The Branch was disturbed about the way that the messages regarding the impact on the CI were brought to the attention of the media. Several reports were written after the hurricane and the international media chose certain words like the island was “spared” or “fine”, which was certainly not the case.

Cayman Islands Lessons Learned · The CIRC needs to work more closely with the NHC to ensure that the public is well prepared. More information is needed on what to take to shelters, shelter rules and generally how to prepare for any disaster. · The government should pre-position disaster supplies before the storm. Agreements should be made with suppliers, transporters, contractors, in Miami or within the Caribbean, or locally before hurricane season, so that once a hurricane hits, it becomes procedure as opposed to chaos. · A National Disaster Office should be established with a much bigger EOC · MOU’s should be established with private sector for use of their buildings as shelters. · The number of shelters must be increased. Any buildings constructed should be able to with stand category 5 winds, so that they could be used during a storm to protect people. · The participation of Civil Servants in the response was appreciated but they need training beforehand in specific roles and categories. · Containers need to be strapped down and there should be a rule about this. There were 20ft and 40ft containers lying all over after the storm and some posed great threats to shelters and humans.

Other Recommendations: Cayman Islands Preparedness · Stock and order items that people will need (The BRCs has secured funding to help with more pre-positioning in PADRU for its overseas territories .) · Work with the government to identify other buildings that can serve as shelters (private sector) · Pre-registration of vulnerable citizens · Liaise with Transportation Department for RC cars to be parked at strategic locations to avoid flooding · Container will be raised 2/3 ft off the ground · Containers must be cleaned and re-stocked with relief supplies · All generators must be maintained and checked monthly · More workshops/trainings are encouraged; More training on RC principles · Support and use volunteers during the planning stages

Management · A single country appeal is vital to highlight the actual situation in the country, the NS capacity, and to make a clear statement of needs. · Clear guidance must be forthcoming from the BRCS Desk after a disaster and coordination of budget with regard to appeals and other information. · Appoint a focal person in the Branch who will disseminate information and give regular operation updates to the Federations/BRCS. · Staff from IFRC sent to support the Branch during an emergency should be more familiar with the local context and capacity of the Branch to support visitors - pre-hurricane season visits are encouraged. · The Branch should be aware of anyone visiting and objectives of the visit should be clear and attainable.

Assessment · Train staff and volunteers in rapid needs assessments · Conduct a needs assessment in the immediate aftermath of the emergency and update the findings periodically. · Use results of the VCA; discussion of results with CIRC: · Assessment should cover immediate emergency as well as recovery needs.

Volunteer Support · Ensure that all volunteers, especially those that will be in shelter are trained in First Aid · Order bigger first aid kits or ensure that all shelters have enough kits to support the numbers · All volunteers should be trained in Shelter Management · Hold regular meetings with government officials who will be participating in the recovery process to clarify the role of RC volunteers. · Ensure that volunteers are trained in disaster preparedness · Ensure that all volunteers working in the shelters and other key areas are given Motorola radios and are trained on how to use them.

Chronology of Hurricane Response Activities Cayman Islands for Hurricane Ivan, 2004 (Sources: IFRC Information Bulletins and Evaluation Interviews)

Date Events/Issues Response/Comments Sept 6 Ivan gains strength and moves from east of Barbados Cayman Islands is not mentioned as a potential hit. steadily west. Sept 7 Ivan turns into a category 3 storm and hits south of Cayman Islands strike is still not forecasted. PADRU Barbados and Tobago; strengthens to a category 4 and SRO staff arrive in Grenada just after the storm and hits Grenada directly passes Sept. 9 Ivan develops into a category 5 Hurricane watch for Cuba, Jamaica and Cayman Islands, 2 FACT members arrive in Jamaica Sept 10 Ivan continues toward Jamaica; passes south of the IFRC issues a preliminary appeal to be adjusted based and 11th Island on Sept 11th on actual needs Sept 12 Ivan brings winds of 240 km/hr and heavy rains to The Appeal is broadened to include support for 1,000 to 15th the Cayman Islands on Sunday the 12th , flooding families in the CI through distribution of relief goods, parts of Grand Cayman and disrupting the sewer including hygiene kits and jerry cans and food for those system, causing one death. Shelter occupants in the remaining in shelters Bodden Town Civic Center were evacuated when shelter collapsed. Sept. 15 National Hurricane Committee held a meeting which Assessments conducted by government indicated that is held on a daily basis for several weeks afterwards. 15 – 20% of the houses have been totally destroyed An ad-hoc Cayman Islands Recovery committee has with the worst damage in the Breakers. Water supply been convened and the Ministry of Public Works restored at the hospital; medical supplies urgently looks for contractors; Environmental Health Dept required. The CIRS is liaising with government and clearing debris; isolated looting; electricity out in the police. part of the island Sept 17 Registration takes place in shelters and those not in Airlift scheduled for the 16th is rescheduled for the 17th shelters but in need are encouraged to register. bringing blankets, hygiene kits, plastic sheeting, kitchen sets, a generator and jerry cans. A health delegate arrives from Panama Regional office. Sept 19 Estimates of 80% housing damage; water system Volunteers are working despite being affected to 20th restored in Georgetown but out in the rest of the themselves; distribution of blankets (2,700); hygiene

island, no electricity; Social workers and teachers kits (910); kitchen sets (910); plastic sheeting (910); assist with selection of beneficiaries; Population jerry cans (371); flashlights (880) and batteries (1,760); advised of RC distribution by radio; 12 trucks provided to 900 families through 12 distribution provided by municipal authorities centers Sept. 20 High risk of contamination of water due to overflow CIRC plans to provide disinfectant and protective of sewage and septic tanks. Disinfectant and gloves; is monitoring the water and sanitation cleaning materials needed to clean houses; The conditions; Posters and leaflets with key health incidence of water borne disease is rising; Foreigners messages will be produced; The CIRC will assist settled in the country may require assistance to expatriate community to communicate with the communicate with their families, particularly the families; plans assessment for psychosocial support; Costa Ricans the only presence of international organizations on the island is PAHO. Sept. 24 Local water bottling plants supplying water to The Costa Rican Red Cross team deployed to assist in customers; food water and ice being distributed by family linking has returned to CR with 50 nationals. the government; the Cayman Islands Department of Governments of Honduras, Jamaica and Nicaragua Children and Family Services is carrying out a house send boats and planes to help with the return. The to house needs assessment. CRRC provides supplies to the CIRC. Sept 24 Some families targeted by the CIRC did not receive A distribution is scheduled to reach 1,000 families. non-food items because the supplies ran out Sept. 24 CIRC capacity for psychosocial support may be A tentative Plan of Action drawn up by the Federation supported by professional health care workers and CIRC focuses on replenishing relief supplies. Plan of action developed for psychosocial support for affected people and volunteers Sept, 24 Federation Regional Delegate and the British Red The team is working closely with PADRU in particular Cross Health Delegate are in country the Regional Logistics Unit Sept. 24 Less than 800 remain in shelters; need for more An additional 1000 sheets will arrive from PADRU; plastic sheeting; diarrhea disease increasing; 520 sheets have been distributed from DFID; CIRC Mosquito Control Programme doing aerial spraying; producing key health message materials: Awareness Very few requests for tracing due to cell phone campaign materials are being produced in Panama. access Sept. 29 State of Emergency lifted; heavy rains exacerbate Based on assessment done by Dept of Child and relief efforts; duty waived on generators; CIRC Family service, the RC will help address roofing needs: distributes clothing through its thrift shop, sorted by PADRU flight arrives with plastic sheeting, hygiene RC volunteers; Expert sought by CIRC and BRC to wipes, heavy gloves, jerry cans, plastic basins, bleach, guide psychosocial services; CIRC wishes to flashlights and batteries: CIRC communicating to the replenish containers with adequate goods to meet an public on the radio; Articles appearing in major Ivan strength storm and to repair damaged containers newspapers. Oct. 14 National Recovery Fund established to raise funds CIRC completes distribution of relief items from for reconstruction, CIRC needs to identify PADRU but continues with other household items from warehouse space for galvanized roofing; the CIRC is other sources: 1,900 plastic sheets were provided; working with social and reconstruction agencies to Wat/san activities focus on health and hurricane safety identify beneficiaries for the roofing project. initiatives: A psychosocial support team from Jamaica will carry out counseling Nov. 19 The government seeks help with recovery activities CIRC is not able to obtain support for long term to support homeless and jobless. community recovery activities Jan 2005 Work is initiated on repairs to the CIRC headquarters Numbers are reported to be 1,000 families served from which is covered by insurance. Federation funds March 4 The operation in the Cayman Islands has been -5 2005 completed, both emergency and rehabilitation. All relief items have been distributed and repairs have been made to the branch headquarters.

Cuba

Introduction

Cuba, home to 11 million people, is a relatively poor country with a GDP of $2,900 and has 14 provinces. The country is now slowly recovering from a severe economic recession in 1990, following the withdrawal of former Soviet subsidies, worth $4 billion to $6 billion annually. The average Cuban's standard of living remains at a lower level than before the depression of the 1990s. The government reluctantly allows a large dollar market sector, fueled by tourism and remittances from Cubans abroad. Cuba was affected by two major hurricanes in 2004, Hurricane Charley, a Category 3 storm which hit on August 13 and Hurricane Ivan, a category 5 storm which made landfall on September 13.

The IFRC issued a request for assistance (Appeal 20/2004) on September 8 for CHF 2,419,000 to assist 5,000 families affected by Charley. The donor response to this appeal was very weak. The Federation ultimately provided support to the Cuban Red Cross to assist in 11 provinces.

A short time after the Hurricane Charley appeal was issued, Cuba was struck by Hurricane Ivan which affected some of the same provinces as Charley, notably La Habana. However, Pinar Del Rio suffered the worst damage. The IFRC included Cuba in the four country appeal No. 20/04, September 8, 2004, requesting assistance for 5,000 families. Again, the percentage of the appeal received was very weak, 17.6% of the total requested amount ($ 1,576,163) for 6 months.

The Cuban Red Cross, unified a single operation to respond to the effects of both hurricanes (Charley and Ivan), based on the Plan of Action for the Ivan , elaborated by the PADRU delegate jointly with the National Societies.

Hurricane Charley On 13 August 2004, Cuba was severely impacted by the passage of Hurricane Charley which hit at 12.15 hours in the region of Punta Cayama, between Guanimar and El Cajío, on the south coast of the Province of La Habana. Hurricane Charley hit the Provinces of Ciudad de la Habana and La Habana with fierce winds of 170 kph and squalls of over 200 kph. The passage of the storm resulted in flooding of low-lying areas of the south coast, in particular in the Province of

La Habana. In anticipation of the storm, the Civil Defence ensured evacuation of 215,532 people from high-risk areas, of whom 35,794 took refuge in temporary shelters, whilst the remainder stayed with families and friends. As a result of the passage of Hurricane Charley, over 70,000 homes incurred damage and thousands of hectares of crops were spoiled. Early reports indicate that around 8,000 trees were uprooted and 95 per cent of sugarcane, bean and banana crops have been seriously affected. The electricity, water and telephone networks were also severely affected. In addition, in the two Provinces, 798 schools and 312 health centers were damaged.

The Province of La Habana was the most severely affected by the Hurricane. Cuban Red Cross (CRC) volunteers continue to assist those who were evacuated, of whom 852 remained in shelters as of 25 August. The Cuban authorities undertook preventive measures to avoid the outbreak of disease, given the damage to health centres. Red Cross volunteers worked to support these government initiatives. In the Province of Pinar del Río, telephone communication was interrupted over an eleven day period, although, overall, the Province was less affected by the passage of the Hurricane.

Hurricane Ivan A majority of the country was affected by winds and floods caused by the hurricane; different intensity of damages were reported on infrastructures and roads all over the island. It is estimated that damages caused by Ivan hurricane were worse that those caused by Isadore and Lili two years ago. The most affected provinces were Pinar del Rio, La Habana and the special Municipality of the Isla de la Juventud. Civil Defense information indicates: · 2,492 temporary shelters · 1,725 Centers for food elaboration · 206,122 mobilized people, 6,103 of them from the Cuban FAR. · 14,916 transportation vehicles utilized · 1,330 machinery · In total, 1881,396 Cubans were evacuated (17% of the Island population), 78% of them stayed with family or friends, the rest were evacuated in temporary shelters. · 8,026 tourists were evacuated to safer places · 359,644 students went back home · In total, 2,266,066 people were protected · More than 200,000 tons of food were protected in big warehouses or other safe places · A number of 1,090,160 animals were protected · Crops and 1,200 crop houses were collected and dismantled · More than 2,000 health and sanitary brigades were mobilized to risk zones and temporary shelters.

Operations - Hurricane Ivan Immediately following the impact of Hurricane Charley, delegates from the Pan American Disaster Response Unit (PADRU) and the Lima Regional Delegation were deployed to Cuba. These delegates worked with personnel from the Cuban Red Cross on damage and needs assessments, beneficiary surveys and on the design of a communications strategy for the operation. Damage and needs assessments and a beneficiary survey were carried out in jointly with state and local authorities. The National Society also participated in evacuation efforts, provided care to families staying in temporary shelters, provided first aid to sick and injured

persons and provided psychosocial support to persons affected by the hurricane. In addition, the CRC distributed food to beneficiaries and informed the affected population about rules of conduct to be observed in these circumstances.

When the aid of the IFRC was accepted, it was clarified that the assistance should be directed to the reconstruction of houses affected by the Ivan hurricane. The Civil Defence which is the means of government responsible for disasters in that country assigned two zones to the CRC, Pinar del Rio and Habana Zone.

Hurricane Ivan Appeal (21.04)

The Plan of Action (September 2004) set out the following objectives Global objective of the operation: Improve life quality of people affected by Ivan hurricane, allowing them to go back to a normal life and home, at the same time in which the capacity of affected communities and National society is strengthened.

Specific objectives classified by factors.

Objective 1: Assure the existence of adequate houses for 3,000 through the reconstruction of their houses with partial affectation or total roof damage.

Objective 2: Assure a return to normal life to 3,000 families providing basic home supplies.

Objective 3: Strengthen institutional capacity of the National Society assuring response capacity, monitoring and evaluation.

Objective 4: to support and to develop the Preparation Program for disasters in the communities in the affected provinces.

Objective 5: That the general population, other organizations as well as all components of the Movement get to know the labor that the Cuban Red Cross has developed and is still carrying out in affected zones regarding the passage of Ivan hurricane.

Assessment Issues The CRC does not conduct a community-based evaluation. CRC volunteers do not make damages evaluation. The Civil Defence carries out the assessment on its own and does not allow other entities or organization to approach the place of the disaster. The process (1 week) never offers exact numbers, just approximations.

Distribution issues The first ship bringing assistance, arrived to Cuba on October 28th, but for customs procedures, the freight was just taken from there on December 4th. Excessive bureaucracy did not allow the freight to be taken out earlier; later, transportations problems arouse making it even more difficult to dispatch the goods.

For the assistance to affected communities, there were established criteria to select the beneficiaries including damages to houses and whether the roof was partially or totally damaged. Other criteria are the number of people inhabiting the house (if more than four people) and identification of people with “social cases” such as those with physical or mental incapacities, the elderly or ill. Regarding social cases, the commission is in charge of taking them to their houses having the necessary documentation required by the case.

Other beneficiaries must approach to warehouses where supplies are stored and take them just after going through all administrative requirements. The carrying of supplies is in charge of the beneficiary who must beforehand look for a way of transportation in the zone (which is hard to find) and in the other hand fuel expenses are very high causing that arrival of supplies to the houses be delayed. The operation is still being implemented and is expected to be completed in June 2005.

Coordination issues In its supporting role to government, the CRC is closely coordinated with Civil Defense and once international support (Federation and others) is incorporated, the Cuban Foreigner Cooperation Ministry gets in the process of coordination. Civil Defense assigned to CRC the task of assisting two geographic areas which are Pinar del Rio and La Habana zone.

In each geographic zone affected, there was an Organisational Committee working, composed by the Municipal CRC, Members of the Government, and Representatives of the Housing Ministry and the Representative of the Local Municipality. The function of this commission is to verify the condition of houses and families; and from this take decisions regarding the assistance to these groups. The CRC is involved in this commission and in that way assuming decisions taken by this means.

At an operative level, the IFRC staff who is responsible (RIT member) is internally coordinated with the general director of the CRC and Ministry of the Foreign Cooperation of Cuba, who are in charge of the of the Operation development national transmission to other means. At the same time the RITS delegate reports the development of the mission to the office or the RD in Panama. On the subject of the results, they are remitted to the DPP of the Regional Delegation in Panama and to the information charge; financial reports are sent to the finance manager. In terms of frequency, reports are submitted every thirty days.

Response Team Management and Capacity Development Issues

During Ivan there were three delegates; from PADRU, DM Watsan, Telecommunication and Logistics and Information (from the Regional Delegation in Lima). The leader of the mission was the Watsan delegate of PADRU. Since the impact of the hurricane was not very strong on Cuba, there was a necessity to return two delegates to Panama, but the team leader stayed as well as the information delegate to support the NS. When consulting and coordinating, the team leader made a Plan of Action for response to the situation, basically to support the rebuilding of roofs and the distribution of domestic equipment and mattresses. The proposal for assistance with food and hygiene kits was not included by a suggestion made by the CRC. In the plan of

action a communication component was included as well as for information for operation and the delegate worked on a communication plan for hurricanes applicable to all NS affected.

The delegates’ team contributed the general framework to facilitate the response under the close collaboration of authorities and technicians of the CRC. The mobilization to fields of the team leader and members of the CRC was possible just three days after the hurricane impact on Cuba, once the Government’s authorization arrived.

In order to support in the coordination of the operation in Cuba, in October PADRU activated a RITs member, supported by the Regional Delegation of Panama, who was assigned by the National Society of the Colombian Red Cross. The request was made by telephone by PADRU in coordination with the Regional Delegation, but none of them (PADRU or the Regional Delegation in Panama) could make of this a formal request since the Colombian Red Cross depends on the RD in Lima and no one knew who was supposed to make the official request to the Colombian RC in regard to the delegate.

On November 14th the delegate arrived in Panama for initiating the mission as well as the TOR and the required documentation. Due to the existing bureaucracy within the Cuban Government and the visa request for the RITS delegate, the mission was delayed, although the delegate finally eventually obtained a provisional visa for entrance and work in the country.

On December 27th, being already in Cuban territory, the delegate starts the mission. The coordination was jointly held by PADRU and the Regional Office from Panama. The General Secretary of the CRC nominates the counterparts for the RITS delegate. According to interviewees, the support to National Society of the CRC was effective and appropriate, always taking into account all decisions made by this NS and its national associations regarding the operation.

Volunteer Issues: The CRC has a large number of volunteers, 22.000 people approximately. The government obliges citizens to volunteer as a means of contributing to the community. The CRC is considered and auxiliary to the government in all its functions. It is coordinated with Civil Defence and has a clear description of its roles in emergencies and disasters. The CRC automatically knows what to do (support for search and rescue, first aid, shelters management, etc.) and all planning during the assistance stage contribute to recovery including reconstruction of houses and other aspects referred to infrastructure and services.

Regarding operational issues, the CRC volunteers are still assisting families of the established zones in the Plan of Action. This work is jointly developed with the Organizational Committee of each affected locality.

Financial management issues

The Cuban Government did not request international support. The CRC requested support from other National Societies. The CRC makes reports to the public on donations and services provided to the communities. The Cuban Government determines where the CRC is going to

work in all the situations and not only for disasters. The international coordination is feasible only with consent of the government.

For implementation of the Plan of Action, the amount received through the Appeal No. 20/04, launched on 8 September 2004, amounted to USD 1,905,168 just 17.6 % of the requested amount was received making it difficult the development of the operation and all of its activities, for the response to Hurricane Charley.

Lessons Learned From Cuba

None of the CRC members or delegates mobilized to Cuba participated in the Grenada workshop (April 2005) thus the valuable lessons learned were not recorded as a part of this exercise.

Difficulties

· Communication problems occurred among the RD of Lima and Panama, regarding the delegate deployment responsibilities · Late decision of the CRC of accepting a delegate to support the operation. Excessive bureaucracy from the visa procedures and acceptation of the IFRC personnel; as well as the difficulty to take supplies for humanitarian assistance out of customs · The CRC cannot take any kind of decision; everything must be first discussed with the government which is a fact that delays the development of the operation. · The Cuba and European Union relations break up, which made even more difficult the procedures of the operation, taking into account that the Cuban Government demanded and imposed conditions for assistance which had to be resolved by the EU. The conditions imposed by Cuba were: · No kind of visibility of the EU allowed (allowance for the CRC and IFRC) · No kind of evaluation from the EU allowed (allowance for the IFRC) · The late mobilization of the information delegate, a fact that made collection of information difficult, which is a structural problem. The other situation is that the international media was not very involved, since the eye of the hurricane was not in Cuba.

Recommendations:

§ Establish a person to act as permanent link in the office of the RD in Panama who can handle all demands taking into account that in Cuba, communications are very hard to be established and connections can take even 4 to 5 hours. § Regarding the NS, there should be work on the awareness of the importance to better use opportunities for communication, as well as the utilization of the services of Information Delegates to support the publicity for the CRC in mass media.

Cuba - Logical Framework of the Plan of Action

Global objectives of the operation

Improve life quality of Ivan hurricane casualties, allowing them to return to life and normal livelihood at the same time that affected communities and National Societies capacities are strengthen.

Specific Objectives by Section

Objective 1: Assure adequate home for 3,000 families through house reconstruction which have partial or total roof affectation.

Actions: Identification of Zone and specific beneficiaries, coordinating with local authorities of the Government.

Materials acquisition (zinc sheets y nails) Sheets and nails delivery

Support for roof reconstruction

Indicators 1.1.1 A census would be done for the operation’s benefited people. 1.1.2 Materials World be purchased and delivered to beneficiaries in a pre established time

1.1.3 Volunteers would support reconstruction work - 5000 roof would be reconstructed

Expenses and needed resources: Human resources, reconstruction material, logistic, needed agreements. Monitor transportation.

Objective 2: Assure a return to normal life for 3,000 families, providing determined basic resources for the house.

Actions Beneficiaries identification through census Coordination with other authorities of the Government Supplies purchase Supplies distribution

Indicators 3,000 beneficiated families would be identified Home supplies would be acquired and delivered to beneficiated families.

Expenses and needed resources: Lingerie, sheets, towels, mattresses, kitchen kits, kerosene stoves, warehouses, logistic y needed agreements.

Objective 3: to strengthen the institutional and National Society capacity assuring response capacity, monitoring and evaluation.

Actions Identification, purchase and installation of two HF and VHF radio equipments at the branch of La Habana Province. Equipment of nine rescue and assistance tools (one per selected municipality) composed by 30 people each. Equipment of three informatics tools to the branch of Habana Province, Pinar del Rio Province and for Evaluation group of the National see. Volunteers’ visibility according to established norms.

Indicators La Habana Province Branch would have radio communication Each of the selected Municipalities count with a response and rescue group properly equipped. 48

The CRC would count with informatics equipments at the branch of La Habana Province and at the disasters department of the centre see. CRC volunteers and materials would be properly identified Higher mobility and proper monitoring of projects at fields and custom coordination

Objective 4: promote and develop the preparation program at affected provinces for disasters at the communities

Activities: Selection of Communities to be benefited Selection and preparation of facilitators 4.1 Handing of bibliographic material (re-edition and printing of 10,000 communitarian guides and 500 manuals for facilitators) 4.2 Sketching and presentation of a TV spot about the Communities preparation for disasters. 4.3 Evaluation and control

Indicators 4.1.1 Municipalities already count with selected communities for being the most prone to disasters and they do not count with enough preparation to face them. 4.2.1 There are enough facilitators from the Red Cross and neighbors to selected communities with sufficient knowledge to offer preparation courses for communities in case of disasters 4.3.1 The facilitator and direct beneficiary count with a bibliographic reference which allows them increase their knowledge. 4.4.1 Mass media, especially television transmits ideas to the population, behaviors and actions necessaries to efficiently face natural phenomenon. 4.4.2 CRC increases its acknowledgment level and its image for communities. 4.5.1 arranged activities were developed at the stated time.

Objective 5: Get the general population, other organizations as well as all components of the Movement know about the work that the CRC has and is carrying out at affected zones by the passage of Ivan hurricane. For this reason it is going to be activated a network of CRC friend journalists as well as all those CRC volunteers prepared at the distance course of communication, based on existent alignments in the contingency plan in information issues

Activities 5.1 Notes elaboration on activities for its publication in each bulletin of the CRC. 5.2 Elaboration of at least two Web articles of the NS and the Regional Federation Web. 5.3 Create and elaborate photographic files of the activities of the CRC as a response to all these disasters for its usage in the bulletin, the Web, information, photo galleries in the Web, etc. 5.4 Publication of at least ten journal articles in different magazines and newspapers of national and local distribution 5.5 At least ten radial interviews about the disaster and at least two TV reports.

Indicators

5.1.1 A note about activities of the CRC would be elaborated as a response to Ivan hurricane in each bulletin of the CRC. In this way all filia to CRC would know about the work developed. 5.2.1 Once the operative is finished, at least two articles would be published in the Web page of the NS and at the Federation Regional (www.cruzroja.org). All NS and the Federation know about the labor of the CRC in response to Ivan hurricane. 5.3.1 A photographic file would be created showing the NS activities and it would be spread through a photo gallery in the Web page of the NS and the Federation. 5.4.1 Once the operative is finished at least ten articles would be Publisher in magazines and newspapers being it nacional and local to show the general work developed by the CRC. 5.5.1 Once the operative is finished at least ten radio interviews about the disaster and two TV reports would be done, showing the general labor of the CRC.

2Implementation grade of the operation

Shelter

Objective 1: 5,000 beneficiary families (25,000 people) will be able to return to their homes as a result of the replacement or repair of damaged roofs.

Through PADRU, the following shipments were sent to Cuba: § One shipment was sent on 30 October 2004 and arrived in the CRC warehouse on 29 November 2004 carrying 20 generators and one box of accessories for the generators. § One shipment was sent on 21 October 2004 and arrived in the CRC warehouse on 7 December 2004 carrying 3,351 0.27 mm zinc sheets and 1,732 0.31 mm zinc sheets. A total of 13,351 zinc sheets have been distributed to 338 families in Cuba to date, providing much needed shelter assistance. § One shipment was sent on 21 October 2004 and arrived in the CRC warehouses in the affected areas on 18 December 2004 carrying 4,134 zinc sheets and 67 boxes of roofing nails. § One shipment was sent on 21 October 2004 and arrived in the CRC warehouses in the affected areas on 4 January 2005 carrying 4,134 zinc sheets and 66 boxes of roofing nails. § Given the results of ongoing needs assessments, families in the municipality of Alquizar have been added to group of beneficiaries targeted for this component of the appeal. To date, only 338 families (1,200 beneficiaries) have received roofing materials. Additional support for this relief operation is needed to ensure that the needs of all the most seriously affected beneficiaries are met.

To date, zinc sheeting has been distributed as follows: La Habana Province—Municipality of Guira de Melena (32,000 inhabitants) Community Sheets delivered Number of Total Roofs completed families beneficiaries Ubaldo Díaz 1,698 40 137 10 Niceto Pérez 1,086 28 113 6 Vivian Alonso 1,006 29 87 6 Cajio 947 27 100 8 Gabriel 1,011 37 130 -- Junco 1,010 29 106 6

La Habana Province—Municipality of Alquizar (29,000 inhabitants) 6,593 zinc sheets have been distributed.

Emergency Relief (Non-food items)

Objective 1: 5,000 beneficiary families (25,000 people) will have benefited from the distribution of non-food items.

This objective seeks to provide non-food relief items to vulnerable beneficiaries that lost all their belongings as a result of the hurricane. Items to be distributed are as follows: sheets, towels, mattresses, kitchen kits and kerosene stoves which will help people resume their normal lives. Unfortunately, no distributions have been carried out to date because of a lack of funding for this emergency operation.

Strengthening of response capacities

Objective 1: Both Cuban Red Cross branches in the Province of La Habana and the targeted communities will have been strengthened. Progress/Achievements (activities implemented within this objective)

2 According to document of operation update IFRC – 24 january 2005 50

A total of 20 generators have been distributed to and installed in the following branches of the Cuban Red Cross: Community Generators Pinar del Rio 2 Santiago de Cuba 3 La Habana 1 Villa Clara 1 Granma 2 Sancti Spiritus 1 Guantánamo 1 Camagüey 2 Cienfuegos 1 Holguín 3 Ciego de Ávila 1 CRC headquarters 1 Held in reserve 1 Total 20

Objective 2: To further the community-based disaster preparedness programme in the Province of La Habana.

The Cuban Red Cross’ disaster preparedness programme is currently being implemented and plans have been drawn up to publish the Community Disaster and Emergency Guide and the Facilitators’ Manual. It is planned to train Red Cross community facilitators who will work with the communities in the areas of risk mitigation and disaster preparedness. Mitigation information and education will be provided to families in order that they are in a position to make their roofing more resistant to hurricane-force winds. In addition, work is being done by national health authorities and the Cuban Red Cross to promote health and hygiene measures. These efforts have ensured that there were no outbreaks of disease following the hurricane.

Grenada

Introduction

Grenada is one of the smallest independent countries in the western hemisphere. It has a population of approximately 89,000 in 6 parishes Saint Andrew, Saint David, Saint George, Saint John, Saint Mark, Saint Patrick, as well as the separate island of Carriacou, and 1 dependency, the separate island of Petit Martinique. Grenada was seized by a Marxist military council on 19 October 1983. Six days later the island was invaded by US forces and those of six other Caribbean nations, which quickly captured the ringleaders and their hundreds of Cuban advisers. Free elections were reinstituted the following year

Grenada relies on tourism as its main source of foreign exchange, especially since the construction of an international airport in 1985. Strong performances in construction and manufacturing, together with the development of an offshore financial industry, have also contributed to growth in national output. Approximately 32% of the population lives below the poverty line.

The Grenada Red Cross Society (GRCS) was established in 1981 but had operated as a branch of the British Red Cross since 1955. In 2000, the GRCS created a mission statement and uses the IFRC Strategic Plan of Action. There were 7 staff prior to Hurricane Ivan and approximately 1,950 volunteers including 1,500 youth volunteers. The GRCS has a disaster relief and preparedness plan, works closely with the government emergency office (National Emergency Relief Office – NERO) and had a 12 meter container of emergency relief supplies.

On September 7, 2004, Hurricane Ivan which had strengthened into a category 4 hurricane as it hit Grenada on Tuesday evening, bringing sustained winds of 220 km per hour. Several hundred people from low-lying area of Saint George’s, the Grenadian capital, were evacuated in anticipation of potential flooding. At least 39 people died and approximately 90 percent of the country’s homes sustained damage. Water, electricity and telephone services were all cut off. Approximately 60,000 people were in need of assistance and there are approximately 5 thousand people accommodated in 145 official and ad hoc shelters.

The hurricane caused structural damage to nearly every major building in the Grenadian capital of Saint George’s, including the island’s emergency operations centre, prime minister’s residence, several schools, the main hospital and a nearby prison. Also among the damaged buildings was the Grenada Red Cross Society headquarters. Given the situation of chaos following the hurricane strike, there were major problems of looting. In response, a dusk-to- dawn curfew was put into effect and the Regional Security System was brought in to support local law enforcement authorities.

The IFRC issued an appeal (21/04) for Hurricane Ivan including Grenada. In total __ of the requested funds were received. The planned beneficiaries numbered 10,000.

IFRC Initial Supporting Presence 2 DM Delegate (PADRU) 1 IT Regional Coordinator (DR Panama) 1 Telecom Delegate (PADRU) 1 Watsan Officer (RITs) 1 RFU Finance Delegate (DR Panama) 4 Regional Intervention Team (RITs) 1 Logistic ERU Team 1 FACT Team 8 SRO – Trinidad and Tobago

Humanitarian Aid Sent 4 Charter Humanitarian Aid / RLU 2 Land Cruiser

The Final Plan of Action (November 2004) set out the following objectives.

Objective 1. Vulnerable families (10 000) will have benefited from the provision of food and non food items to assist them in recovering from the effects of the hurricane.

Objective 2.: To provide most vulnerable individuals (250) with supplementary food assistance for 2 month period and stimulate economy in community based markets.

2) SHELTER Objective: 10,000 families in Grenada will be able to return home as a result of the provision of temporary shelter materials including tarpaulins and galvanized aluzinc roof sheeting.

3) WATER & SANITATION Objective: The water and sanitation needs for 10,000 families in Grenada, have been assessed and a plan has been developed to deliver the planned assistance in this sector.

III) REHABILITATION PHASE

1) PSYCHO SOCIAL SUPPORT PROGRAM

Objective: Community based program to provide coping strategies to and disseminate knowledge regarding stress reactions and management to affected individuals (800) to assist in recovering from the effects of the hurricane.

2) LIVELIHOOD/AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY

Objective: Phase 1: Provide agriculture inputs, including seeds, tools and fertilizer to small holding farmers (450) to reestablish household food security and contribute to local market economy. Project to be conducted in phases; Phase 1 as in kind contribution from British Red Cross.

IV) GRCS CAPACITY BUILDING

RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

1) Rebuilding of the GRCS HQ

2) Development of the Grenville Branch - Objective: Support the development of the Grenville (second largest city of the country) branch through the already existing network of local volunteer, GRCS will established itself in a long term strategy to strength it presence by a more wide coverage of the territory.

STRENGHTHEN THE GRCS IN DP CAPACITIES

Objective: The capacity of the Grenada Red Cross Society and vulnerable communities in disaster response and preparedness will have been strengthened.

Objective: The GRCS is able to manage it own storage capacity and is familiar with basic logistic and distribution procedure.

1) Disaster Preparedness Objective: In order to better prepare vulnerable communities for disaster, community-based disaster preparedness initiatives are planned, promoting education in risk mitigation and preparedness measures. Training will take place initially at national society level and facilitators based in vulnerable communities will be identified for training and replication of knowledge.

Hard Ware component: Objective: The capacity of the GRCS will increase in term of immediate response to disaster.

Objective: The capacity of the Grenada Red Cross Society in telecommunications will be enhanced through technical training in the use of equipment. A sat phone network will improve the early warning system reducing the vulnerability of the most isolated areas. Grenada will be included in Caribbean regional plan for HF connectivity.

Good practices: The following were areas commended by the Grenada team in the Grenada workshop in April of 2005. (See also Strengths in SWOT analysis.) 1. Adequate teams deployed (problem was lack of coordination with NS) 2. Committed team who knew what they were about 3. Equipping of NS with equipment (computers, IT, emergency equipment) 4. Good working relationship (early days) to achieve key results 5. Cultural exchange (learning how other NS operate during disaster) 6. Sharing of knowledge within teams & capacity building within NS. 7. Incentive (monetary) was welcomed since most volunteers last their sources of income and had volunteered for lengthy periods free of cost.

Assessment Issues

The Federation appeal was based on preliminary figures from fact finding surveys (largely visual assessments) conducted by PADRU and RIT members. The following were issues mentioned in relation to the initial assessment: · The initial assessment process was unclear and the Plan of Action seemed to be based on tentative needs rather than a scientific assessment. Follow-on delegates were uncertain where numbers came from and how the choices were made for certain programs. · Due to the extent of the impact, there may have been assumptions that everyone was in equal need of all types of assistance. · There were obstacles to collecting assessment data including widespread debris blocking access and damaged vehicles.

The numbers set out at first also included people who would benefit from recovery activities. However, the GRCS/IFRC roofing teams went house to house starting in mid-October to ascertain people in need of assistance to repair and replace their roofs. This survey was very time consuming requiring more than a month to complete. The results of this survey are still in raw data form.

In terms of capacity development, considerable efforts were required to achieve goals for training and technical assistance. Both delegates and GRCS staff were pressured to achieve the goals.

Distribution issues for food and non-food relief items

Emergency relief distributions to the general public were undertaken by the GRCS and NERO, and by OXFAM for watsan. (The GRCS was supported by a Logistics Emergency Relief Unit from the British Red Cross.) Other organizations providing support on a much smaller scale included Samaritan’s Purse and the Seventh Day Adventist Church. Political pressures were widespread to distribute food to political constituencies but the GRCS reportedly resisted these pressures. People staying in shelters were generally well served by a number of organizations.

Many interviewees felt that the Federation distribution was a text book case of good practice and indeed there were many good practices. The RIT members performed their tasks well in accompanying distributions. RIT members felt that very good coverage was achieved and that every affected community received distributions. RIT members felt that in some cases they had exceeded targets. Students were recruited to assist in assembling food parcels.

However, in October to November, the roofing teams found that in some areas, up to 50% of people had not received immediate emergency assistance. The community interviews conducted as part of this evaluation (see summary at the end of this section) confirms that coverage was uneven in some areas. People who had gone to a shelter or a relative of course did not receive assistance from the truck distributions during that time. Nevertheless, when returning home and in subsequent distributions, some people in need were missed by the distributions.

Some issues were reported by community interviewees and volunteers. · There were no distribution lists at first to ascertain who had received assistance and who had not. After more than a week, these lists were obtained from community leaders and

used for distributions. Some district committees were not fully active to support distributions. · Centralized distributions were missed by some vulnerable people living on the periphery and off the main roads or any roads and drive through distribution did not reach everyone. The trucks stopped only for a certain period of time and if you could not reach them you missed out. · Trucks and fuel was limited for traveling around the island. · The situation was so chaotic at first, security was required on initial trucks. · People took advantage of the chaos and took more than their share; some items such as tarps were found on the open markets. · Some affected people felt that distribution was influenced by politicians seeking to serve their constituencies. · The GRCS was unaccustomed to handling food distributions and large amounts of labor were required to pack food parcels. · Weak coordination on the part of NERO led to duplication of distributions and goods distributed in some areas.

Coordination issues

The National Emergency Relief Organization (NERO) was virtually incapacitated by the hurricane. Its headquarters were destroyed and it had to move to its new office which was still under construction. A CDERA team arrived immediately after the hurricane to assist NERO to set up an EOC. Due to absence of government staff from impacts they themselves suffered, and inexperience of NERO staff in major disasters, the coordination offered by NERO was relatively weak. NERO, however, held daily meetings but they were not always productive and did not result in written reports or analyses. CDERA offered information on its website. The NS and the IFRC staff made efforts to coordinate by sending reports and lists. UNDP and OCHA were not present. The East Caribbean Donor Group was instrumental in promoting preparedness before hurricane season and just prior to the disaster which paid off. The UNDAC team arrived a week into the emergency and started regular meetings.

Coordination was severely hampered by lack of communication and lack of transportation. This led to rumor mongering around the island. The NERO EOC could only be considered a fledgling EOC after 8 days and its operation was hampered by lack of experience government personnel. All relief supplies from bi-lateral donors went through NERO and the goods immediately became politicized with politicians trying to get items for their constituencies. NERO tried to target the worst hit communities and carried out distributions with the help of the Trinidad Tobago military and a CDRU (unit of mixed military forces from the region). The Minister of Tourism (oversight of NERO) eventually called the district coordinators for a meeting. The GRCS has had a good relationship with NERO and GRCS staff supported the EOC.

Management Issues

While the GRCS had preparedness measures in place, it was not prepared for the level of destruction caused by Ivan. The Director of the GRCS asked for IFRC assistance within 24

hours and help was on its way immediately. The GRCS was generally pleased with IFRC human resource assistance, and felt that many good experiences for its staff came out of the operation.

The following issues were raised in regard to planning and communication: · There was poor communications regarding who was coming and what they were doing. The Secretariat in Geneva did not inform them regarding the position of the person who later became the Operations Manager for the Ivan appeal. She had been assigned to be relief delegate but found upon arrival that this position was already filled. · The GRCS felt left out of the lines of communication regarding planning. The appeal and the Plan of Action were both developed without consulting the national society. The government also was not consulted but read about the appeal on the internet. The Plan of Action did not cover community level preparedness as requested by the GRCS. · An architect was sent by the Sub-regional office with no TOR to advise on the design for the new NS building · A computer specialist advised in consultation with the GRCS regarding computer needs but this advice was not taken.

Other issues in resource efficiency included: · The GRCS had to beg for assistance for salaries for staff. Geneva finally agreed for the period of the appeal. Volunteers were also given monetary incentives for overtime hours. · The international delegates stayed too long (after November) when functions might have been taken over by the RITs and the GRCS · Monitoring of programs might have been done from other countries as the BRCS does now. · There are too many steps in the protocols, going through PADRU and then through Geneva and back.

Rehabilitation and Recovery Issues

The recovery efforts were too slow to materialize and might have been started much earlier. A constraint to the galvanized roofing project was the lack of available sheeting in the region. Another constraint was the poor condition of rafters and the house frames and lack of money to repair these before a roof could be sustainably placed. A further constraint was the need to have permission from landlords before major repairs could be done to houses. Since most Grenadians do not own the land under their houses, the lack of permission prevented some assistance organizations from helping with major house repairs. There seemed to be some parallel efforts: printed instructions were distributed by Grenada Partners in Reconstruction (GRCS and FRCS, USAID PADCO and ECHO) and others by UNDP regarding hurricane proofing a roof.

Small and short term livelihood projects particularly for short term crops might have been started as soon as possible after the emergency but these opportunities were missed. The psychosocial support program was highly regarded by all volunteers who received services. The planning for the services took a long time and eventually developed capacity building goals. The JRC assisted the NS with implementing psychosocial support.

Volunteer issues:

Some volunteers found themselves in key positions, such as responsible for port clearance, after the disaster and had to learn by experience. They received good support from the Logistics ERU. Volunteers expressed needs for improvement in several areas: · There was a feeling among volunteers that the Federation had come to take over. Many were not sure who “was at the top” and they had little contact with the FACT. They felt ignored and overlooked at times even though almost all work was done by volunteers. · Some rules that were enforced were insulting to long time volunteers such as preventing them from entering their work areas if they did not have the right t-shirt and threatening them with replacement by other volunteers at the peak of volunteer frenzy. · T-shirts were not provided at first so identification of volunteers was problematic · Volunteers felt they were the last to receive assistance for themselves and their families. They were asked to wait or some received and some didn’t. Some volunteers had lost their homes and were living in shelters. · Volunteers were asked to work long hours without rest or incentive. They finally received psychosocial counseling and also some remuneration. · There were many trained volunteers in the community but they were not effectively contacted by the GRCS for deployment. · Orders were being issued from several directions causing confusion. · A consultant came 5 months after the emergency to inform them about volunteer management and opened their eyes to how well things could be run, with structured manuals and policies.

RECOMMENDATIONS from Grenada Team Grenada Workshop, April 2005

Recommendations 1. National Societies should be made aware of all foreign delegated deployed to their Island/country and the purpose for which this visit is intended. 2. National Societies capacity should be analyzed before a disaster makes its impact and deploy a team to ensure on the ground coordination when the disaster strikes. 3. ERU’s should be deployed almost simultaneously for greater coordination of activities on Island. 4. Initial assessment, launch appeal and call for delegates should be done in consultation with national societies. 5. Appeal should be broken down in phase’s relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction 6. Terms of reference including length of stay should be cleared with NS, Sub regional Office and operations manager. 7. Standard Operating Procedures should be implemented and adhered to by all arms/departments within the movement. 8. A fleet of vehicles is trucks should be within the ambits of the FED to be deployed when in need. 9. NS should develop MOU’s with relevant businesses in the country so that it easy to work together after a disaster 10. Appeal budget and financial issues should be discussed before decisions are made. Provisions should be made for subsistance of the NS (staff) and financial support for implementation pre- disaster programs. 11. Provision should be made for training of local personnel in various areas relating to DT/DM 12. An OD delegate should be present on Island to assist the society in redeveloping itself/establishment of long term goals. FRC came through on this.

13. Policies should be developed to make special provision for the staff and volunteers who are affected directly and involved in the operations. 14. The Society is best placed to determine its needs and as such should be consulted before purchases are made or behalf of the Society. 15. Geneva should be aware of the capacity available within the region and use such in the region during/after disaster terms of reference should developed and shared with NS.

Other Recommendations: Grenada

Assessment, Distribution, Community Preparedness · Training is required for rapid assessment techniques in emergency conditions. · Survey results should be used properly for planning. · Community resource people who are trained and reliable must be found to identify needy families and ways of reaching them. · Train volunteers for the CDRT

FACT, RIT and NS Relationships: · Experienced delegates should be deployed who have a track record of treating people well. · The RITs should have clearly defined roles and contractual arrangements. · The FACT and ERUs should be fully briefed on the roles of the RITs and prepared to use their skills and time efficiently and effectively. · Establish better channels for communication between foreign and national teams

Volunteer Management · Implement a volunteer management system as soon as possible. · Provide assistance to volunteers and their families in a timely manner so they can carry out their duties.

Chronology of Hurricane Response Activities Grenada - Hurricane Ivan, 2004

(Sources: IFRC Information Bulletins and Evaluation Interviews)

Date Events/Issues Response/Comments Sept 6 Ivan gains strength and moves from east of Barbados GRCS checks pre-positioned relief supplies; The steadily west. National EOC is activated; Threat not taken too seriously by population Sept 7 Ivan turns into a category 3 storm and hits south of Schools close at 2:00; volunteers are assigned to Barbados and Tobago; strengthens to a category 4 and shelters, virtually all communications networks cease hits Grenada directly, rain and winds all night to work as storm passes Sept. 8 Director of the GRCS reaches St. Georges; finds office GRCS requests external assistance: A multinational destroyed, is given a small room in the EOC Caribbean Disaster Response Unit arrives Sept. 9 GRCS distributes materials in container to shelters, PADRU and SRO staff arrive in Grenada just after the many shelters destroyed or damaged storm passes, meet with GRCS president Sept Response is rapid from all places; Food from Antigua IFRC issues a preliminary appeal to be adjusted based 10 RC arrives; WASA, the water authority works to on actual needs, for 10,000 families (50,000) out of and restore service; FACT, RITs, ERU deployed 60,000 in need in Grenada; GRCS distributes small 11th food parcels in poverty stricken areas

Sept PADRU plane arrives; Telecommunication Sans Main supplies are hygiene kits (2,000), plastic sheeting 12 Frontieres provides technical assistance (2,000), jerry cans (481) Sept. Canadian RC bring watsan materials and generators; Distribution of 1st PADRU supplies begins; NERO 14 Martinique and Trinidad RCs send food; OXFAM broadcasting messages to the public; UNDAC team takes responsibility for watsan arrives with coordination role, receives Rubb hall from IFRC Sept. 2nd PADRU plane arrives; 2nd plane carries 3,500 6 teams with one RIT each distribute items; All 16 plastic sheet tarps and 2,000 food crackers; Many hygiene kits and tarps distributed in parishes of St. Caribbean RCs sending supplies George, St. John and St. David Sept GRCS, FACT and RIT determine that 5,000 people are Tracing needs being assessed but lacks system due to 17 in shelters, and 55,000 have been directly affected. communication problems; The Caribbean Broadcasting Needs of four parishes to be totally covered and Corporation expanded service to Grenada and a toll selected people from other two free number for relatives seeking family Sept. People called back to work, some volunteers lost; food GRCS said to be reaching 1,000 families per day with 20 supplies very limited; water supply is now functioning two tarps and a food package per family (food for five in most places (Fed supplied 2 10,000 litre water people for one week); GRCS sets up special provision bladders and generator), heavy rains leave those with center to distribute plastic sheets at the warehouse no roofs or patched roofs vulnerable; national radio compound; 17 delegates now present: 3 FACTS, 7 back in operation; Distributions become more orderly RITs, 3 ERU, 1 American RC ERU, 2 finance, and a with distribution lists; no electricity and shortages of psychologist; Video made on GRCS and IFRC efforts fuel persist Sept. Food continues to be a relief priority; Requests for FACT team leader replaced by deputy; Relief delegate 24 tarps very high; mobile phone coverage restored; arrives from American Red Cross for takeover from PAHO worried about mosquitoes; UNICEF repairing PADRU, Admin and finance established to be staffed schools; 40 volunteers functioning daily; IFRC Plan of by GRCS; 3 - 4 000 families have received assistance; Action is drafted and under review by the Sub-regional More tarps and other items arrive on boats and by Office and PADRU. plane Sept UNDAC holds regular meetings attended by FACT, IFRC coordinating with the French Red Cross to plan 24 cooperation with NERO formalized and a distribution bi-lateral assistance for an ECHO funded project to information system established. reconstruct 200 homes. Sept. Prisons and hospitals and remote areas lack adequate The goals of reaching 10,000 families with food and 29 food and water; The curfew was lifted but was non-food have been reached - all 6 parishes; Tracing reinstated by the Regional Security System; UN Joint still not initiated; Psychosocial activities cover Logistics Team working with CDERA volunteers; FACT leader interview appears in the national paper; some international media coverage Oct 1 UNDAC team replace by joint UNDP/UNDAC; : Final Original targets exceeded by 15% with reportedly IFRC distribution of relief items takes place ; 800 765% of the entire population receiving assistance families to be assisted with galvanized zinc roofs from the Red Cross (11,468 families) Oct. 14 Food and shelter needs continue; pledges received from The IFRC and GRCS move into a new office; GRCS the UN and US for reconstruction, PAHO responding and OFDA conduct assessments for shelter needs; Int. to outbreaks of diarrhea and rashes in 140 shelters; team includes 1 FACT, 1 logistics delegate and RITs UNICEF provides psychosocial support to 400 (?); The British Logistics ERU left last week, The Sub- children; Additional IFRC relief items are placed in Regional Office assembles support team; Swedish GRCS contingency stocks; GRCS continues delegate originally sent as relief delegate to Grenada is distribution of goods received outside the appeal – posted as Operations Manager to Trinidad; More than serving an additional 3,000 families with food and 18,000 tarps were distributed to 13,000 families; clothes; GRCS has received 100 tracing requests; UN Tracing requests addressed; St. Georges University Habitat carrying out shelter survey, also IFRC/GRCS provides counseling for 45 volunteers; Short and long and OFDA; joint strategy to be developed under the term plan for psychosocial support developed Agency for Reconstruction and Development; Nov. GRCS and IFRC focus on rehabilitation including British Red Cross explores an agricultural support 19 galvanized roofing, psychosocial support activities and program; IFRC extends warehousing support for two strengthening the NS response capacity; GRCS months; GRCS sends a message to other NS to cease warehouse capacity exceeded due to items coming in sending resource; number of tarps now stated as outside the appeal C 20,000; 1,000 now targeted for roofing assistance;

number of planned hygiene kits reduced from 10,000 to 7,000 Jan The first cruise liners return to St. Georges; GRCS starts food voucher program for the most 2005 Unemployment continues to rise; the ARD is not yet vulnerable (250); the number of tarps is now 19,800 to operational; NERO is phasing out; A new IFRC/GRCS 13,400 families; 3,523 galvanized sheets distributed; Plan of action includes reconstruction of the GRCS wat/san activities cease – buffer stock divided between headquarters and a branch in Grenville; plus provision WASA and GRCS; Advertising campaign published of IT equipment and computer and office equipment; for 2 weeks in national newspapers; local TVv Ivan appeal covered 103% coverage weekly . . Feb Ivan appeal covered 125.4%; Government GRCS continues distribution of in-kind goods; 19,000 2005 reconstruction roles evolving; FRCS will implement sheets of zinc now distributed; Roof repair slowed by bi-lateral roof repair; BRCS distributed ag inputs; rains, zinc hard to find; VCA exercise commences in Movement activities covered 2-3 times per month on with CBDP for CDRT and NIT training to follow; a national TV Regional Organizational Development (OD) Delegate with work with GRCS in the last month of the appeal March ARD is coordinating recovery efforts; VCA results will IFRC supporting GRCS psychosocial program and 4 -5 be shared with stakeholders such as UNDP; FRCS food security; Additional 4,000 sheets galvanized 2005 holds TOT for hurricane resistant roofing techniques; roofing purchased; 80% of vulnerable families in 3 will target 300 homes; IFRC assistance officially ends most affected parishes reached – all targets were met..

Community Interviews Analysis: Grenada

General Findings/Satisfaction with assistance: While people were grateful to receive whatever goods they got in the early stages of the emergency, most are stuck with what seems like unsolvable problems, such as how to secure livelihoods and how they will afford to fix their homes if they lack proper framing or if they are not able to get permission for major repairs or rebuilding from landowners. Government systems are very slow in responding and people were waiting for various actors to return including the RC to help them with roofing.

Recognition of the Red Cross: In general, people who received distribution did not have a clear idea of what the RC did in normal times but felt the response was efficient and effective, compared to the government which was felt to be weak. .

Knowledge of assistance options: In the course of community interviews, the team found that the government recovery money from the MLSS was not always appropriately targeted to need and missed vulnerable people who did not have the wherewithal to apply for the funding. Some of the women interviewed seemed reticent to go to the government offices to apply for assistance. Some vulnerable people who did apply did not receive any money for reasons that they did not understand.

Grenada Interview Summary - Interviews conducted from April 2nd to April 8th2005

Situation of Pre-hurricane Immediate Emergency assistance and Recovery Assistance and the Affected preparedness when received Status Person(s) Measures: Post hurricane situation Small town Stayed in house and 1. NERO came with a small bag of food They received a tarp but no dweller, were glad they did in 2 days, RC and NERO gave water mattresses, there were sheets Female HOH: since the roof blew 2. The RC came in one week with food of zinc on the ground but 1 child and off the shelter; entire for one week, tarp, very helpful house frame has been twisted five adults; roof lost on house 3. Local community did first and can’t hold a new roof; Town of assessment, then NERO the biggest issue is lack of Beaulieu, St. 4. RC measured roof ownership of the land – they Georges have lived there for 26 years parish and pay $100/month Rural female Pre-: Heeded After some weeks: unknown person came RC said would give daughter 76 yrs. radio.TV warnings. to ask community questions; roof sheets – not received to Vendolme Bought extra food, After 1 month: GRCS recorded names date. St.George’s water, lanterns, and brought bag of food; batteries. Took in old 1 month plus: other organisations lady (90 years) for brought small amounts of different protection. commodities. Red Cross largest donor. Post: House not damaged. 32 persons in house night of hurricane. 16 remained for 2 moths. Daughter’s roof destroyed – hid in cellar. Rural female Pre-: None Plastic sheeting received from unknown Asked GRCS/IFRC fpr

shopkeeper. Post: Roof & shop organisation. roofing assistance in January Widow 60 yrs. stock looted/ Said nothing else received but this is 2005. RC said they would Vendolme, destroyed. Lost unlikely since GRCS blanket distributed call when sheets came into personal belongings in this village (Vendolme). stock – nothing heard so far. (mattresses, clothes Paid man to mend roof with etc). recycled sheets – incorrectly fitted and leaking through sheet ‘valleys’ – sleeping on floor under leaking plastic sheet. Needs credit to re- open shop. Elderly rural Pre-: None Plastic sheeting received from unknown He would like to sell the site male Post: Roof/some organisation. After 1 month: GRCS and buy a small 1-room Widower 75 walls completely recorded names and brought bag of food; house. yrs.Vendolme. destroyed - house 1 month plus: other organisations Very feeble should be knocked brought commodities. and a little down. confused. Woman, in 7 Went to shelter for 1. RC in 3 – 4 days, food, clothes and The women rebuilt the house person woman one night where they water - fair distribution themselves using salvaged headed stood in water all 2. NERO came and had a politically lumber. Tarps still cover the household, night. Entire house inclined distribution, ruling party roof and leak through holes Vendolme; fell down except one supporters that have been worn. St. Georges wall. r 3. RC tarp, USAID tarp Rural female Pre: Packed up and After 2 days, men from church rebuilt Early November: GRCS (off road) 45 stayed with friends in house family had to buy nails etc.. asked questions – said would yrs. Mama bigger house. Took NERO came by, asked questions, return with roofing materials Cannes village as much food as she delivered nothing. November: GRCS did give Grenville. could carry. sheeting in village (nearer Husband Post: Very small December: GRCS gave Plastic sheeting, road) but not to them. March: (printer) 12 shack & food/ Rice, Sugar, tinned food. Everyone GRCS gave roof sheeting children, 3 belongings; house received some food once only and windows/doors but not grandchildren. completely destroyed. to them. Stayed with friends 1 month. House looks OK but not weather-proof. Old rural Pre: None December: GRCS gave Plastic sheeting, Still awaiting recovery female. 70 Post: 50% of house Rice, Sugar, tinned food. assistance. years. Mama destroyed. Sheltered Cannes village and fed at church. Husband (farmer). Young rural Pre:Grandmother – Grandmother sheltered by neighbours but Samaritan’s Purse gave ply male. 30 yrs. none went back to house next day. For 2 and roof sheets. (living in Post- Came to look weeks, no-one ensured that she received Netherlands). after grandmother insulin (until her grandson brought it Windsor (diabetic & wounded from Europe) despite the fact that her Forest, leg in hurricane). health & wounds were seriously St.David’s. Roof damaged. deteriorating. + 2 months:visit from OXFAM – nothing. December 9th: Grandson went to GRCS HQ who gave box of cleaning materials. Woman, HoH Stayed in home, home 1. Neighbors helped first; pure spring 100% agriculture area, now Mt. Granby , damaged but many water was available great loss of livelihood; RC St. Johns others had serious 2. 1 -2 weeks NeRO gave out 1 day distributed galvanized damage ration roofing

3. 3 weeks later RC gave food and hygiene kits Woman, Very poor, off road, Never saw the Red Cross or NERO for House rebuilt by 7th Day HoH, 9 house completely months afterward, distributions took place Adventists with hurricane children, destroyed; stayed in away from the house, not notified straps, very hot in the day River Road, shelter for two weeks Now on the RC voucher program, did not from zinc, Children sleep on Darbu, receive last voucher distribution bare floor, only one mattress St. Georges which is severely damaged Woman, Stayed home under 1. Catholic Church gave rice and flour Some of her children lost HoH, elderly the bed with 2. RC in one week with food and soap livelihoods, she has a meager cares for grandchildren, lost 3. NERO tarp pension from working in the grandchildren roof, has arthritis, sugar cane fields, can barely St. Paul’s can’t walk up to the manage; roof was not Spring road properly replaced, no new Garden, St zinc. Georges

Recommendations and Final Comments from Communities:

1. Someone needs to check to see who received and who did not and then conduct a selected distribution. 2. The assistance organizations need to work with government to deal with land ownership issues and house repair permissions. Too many people have no assistance because of these rules. 3. People need to quickly get to making a living, or at least trying to raise some food in their yards, because they have lost jobs in the tourist, fishing and agricultural sectors. 4. The communities need to be better prepared and shelters have to be safe.

Grenada Plan of Action (April 2005) Objective 1.: Vulnerable families (10 000) will have benefited from the provision of food and non food items to assist them in recovering from the effects of the hurricane.

Activities: - Identification and registration of beneficiaries to receive Red Cross assistance, focusing on families who sustained significant or total damage to their homes or personal belongings, female heads of households and households with children, disabled persons or senior citizens.

Direct Distribution of: - 10 000 Food parcels - 8 000 Hygiene kits

Emergency Food Kits Rice 5kg Flour 1kg Pulses 0.5kg Tinned Meat 4 tins Tinned Fish 2 tins Oil 2 litre Sugar 0.5 kg Salt 0.25kg TOTAL 12 kg Additional items based on supply

Emergency Hygiene Kits Toilet Paper 2 rolls Soap 1 bar Toothbrush 1 unit Toothpaste 1 unit Shampoo 1 unit Feminine Products 5 units Baby Kit As Needed Additional items based on supply

As bilateral and in kind contributions continue exceed distribution capacity of GRCS, IFRC will provide warehousing support for the duration of the appeal to meet continued needs in vulnerable communities. Evaluation of emergency distributions conducted with results to be included in final report.

Objective 2.: To provide most vulnerable individuals (250) with supplementary food assistance for 2 month period and stimulate economy in community based markets.

Activities:

- Cross reference with Ministry of Social Welfare to begin assessment catchments in communities worst affected by Ivan - Social Welfare Assistants conduct home based assessments, and identify beneficiaries based on income/resource vulnerability and age. - Teams will visit families monthly and provide bi.weekly vouchers to be redeemed in local markets for food basket. - Contract with local markets for provision of food baskets based on voucher system

2) SHELTER

Objective: 10,000 families in Grenada will be able to return home as a result of the provision of temporary shelter materials including tarpaulins and galvanized aluzinc roof sheeting.

Activities:

- Identification of beneficiaries to receive tarpaulins, focusing on families who sustained significant or total damage to their homes or personal belongings, female heads of households and households with children, disabled persons or senior citizens. - Direct Distribution of: - 20 000 tarpaulins for 10,000 beneficiary families, according to their needs. - Training of GRCS volunteer teams in basic housing structure assessment methods - Community based needs assessment to identify 1,000 targeted families to receive galvanized aluzinc sheeting based on vulnerability, structural damage, ability to absorb assistance, and home ownership criteria. - Sponsorship and distribution of roofing instruction flyer - Monitoring of homes and coordination with NGO community to avoid duplication of benefits. - Monitoring of roof repair within one month of distributions

Direct Distribution of: - 20 000 aluzinc roof sheets - 3 000 ridge caps - 1 000 construction tools kits Aluzinc Roof Tool Kits Nails 2 kg Hammer 1 unit Measuring Tape 1 unit Shears 1 unit Tool Box 1 unit

3) WATER & SANITATION

Objective: The water and sanitation needs for 10,000 families in Grenada, have been assessed and a plan has been developed to deliver the planned assistance in this sector.

A joint strategy between National Water and Sewage Agency (NAWASA) and IFRC will aim to cover the needs of the affected population with a line of several tanks and 2 bladders (distribution points). Targeted people estimated to be 530 families (3 200 beneficiaries)

Activities: - Two 10 000 litres bladder with tap stand kit are deployed. - Collapsible jerry cans ordered but not distributed (1, 980) will be used as part of the GRCS disaster response stock. - 30 000 Water Purification Tablets ordered but not distributed will be use as part of the GRCS disaster response stock. - Bladders, spare parts and water pump will be donated to NAWASA since GRCS has no direct mandate on water supplying issues (GRCS will retain permission to use in future disasters if necessary). - 300 000 Water Purification Sachets ordered but not distributed will be donated to NAWASA.

III) REHABILITATION PHASE

1) PSYCHO SOCIAL SUPPORT PROGRAM

Objective: 66

Community based program to provide coping strategies to and disseminate knowledge regarding stress reactions and management to affected individuals (800) to assist in recovering from the effects of the hurricane.

The objective of the PSP program is to provide support to the population of Grenada, who are all, to a lesser or greater extent, effected by the hurricane disaster. In a post-disaster community, only a smaller part will present pathological reactions such as psychiatric disorders, and it is assumed that early intervention will prevent development of many cases of severe depression and other pathology. Trained PSP workers should promote healthy ways of coping and disseminate knowledge about normal stress reactions and stress-management. It is the objective of this intervention to prevent increase in sleeping disorders, problems in concentration, social withdrawal, aggressiveness and antisocial behaviors.

Activities:

- De-briefing of GRCS volunteers - Dissemination of basic psychological first aid knowledge and skills to GRCS volunteers (Jamaican RC) - Training of GRCS volunteers and staff in community based outreach PSP strategies - Build capacity in GRCS society in PSP work - Provide basic knowledge and awareness about shock and stress reactions to the public through radio spots. (Public education and awareness, printing of banners, billboards…) - Community outreach: community support groups –elderly, shut in visits, youth- - Set-up networks between sisters societies in the region, to strengthen and consolidate PSP in Grenada. - Integrate psychosocial first aid into the GRCS disaster preparedness plan.

2) LIVELIHOOD/AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY

Objective: Phase 1: Provide agriculture inputs, including seeds, tools and fertilizer to small holding farmers (450) to reestablish household food security and contribute to local market economy.

Project to be conducted in phases; Phase 1 as in kind contribution from British Red Cross.

Activities: - Identification of 450 farmers in the three poorest parishes in Grenada based criteria including female headed households, elderly, economic vulnerability, land size, clearing, dependence on subsistence farming and access to employment opportunities.

Distribution of: - 450 x 1 each of file, cutlass, garden fork, spade, hand fork and trowel - 450 x 10 grams each of: cabbage, tomatoes, lettuce, sweet peper, cucumber, carrots, water melon and corn (recommended by MoA) - 420 bags of fertilizer

IV) GRCS CAPACITY BUILDING

The GRCS strategic planning process focuses primarily on defining or reaffirming its mission statement as well as setting the broad long-term goals and objectives for the Society as a whole, thus defining its humanitarian role in the country.

RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

2) Rebuilding of the GRCS HQ Objective:

By supporting the reconstruction of the Head Quarter of the NS, objective is to hand over a sustainable facility to be able to run properly the humanitarian programs carried out by the GRCS.

2) Development of the Grenville Branch Objective: Support the development of the Grenville (second largest city of the country) branch through the already existing network of local volunteer, GRCS will established itself in a long term strategy to strength it presence by a more wide coverage of the territory.

3) Material and in-kind resources - Vehicle ( 4 Wheel pick up) - Computer hardware equipment - Office materials and furniture

STRENGHTHEN THE GRCS IN DP CAPACITIES

Objective: The capacity of the Grenada Red Cross Society and vulnerable communities in disaster response and preparedness will have been strengthened.

Software component:

2) Logistics and warehousing

Objective: The GRCS is able to manage it own storage capacity and is familiar with basic logistic and distribution procedure.

Activity: - 4 day logistic introduction course (PADRU) for 5 GRCS staff/volunteers including procurement, stock management, movement, warehousing and port procedures

3) Disaster Preparedness

Objective: In order to better prepare vulnerable communities for disaster, community-based disaster preparedness initiatives are planned, promoting education in risk mitigation and preparedness measures. Training will take place initially at national society level and facilitators based in vulnerable communities will be identified for training and replication of knowledge.

Activities: - GRCS participation in VCA training and in country exercise - Provision of support to the Grenada Red Cross Society to review current contingency plans and the disaster relief and preparedness plan. - Holding of workshops and promotion of disaster preparedness education in vulnerable communities, focusing on risk mitigation and preparedness in Grenada. - Provision of educational tools as communitarian guide, manual for awareness, posters etc… - Organization of National Intervention Team (NIT) to boost response capacity.

Activities will be carried out by the RD / SRD or if not available by a DP delegate expatriate on the field.

Hard Ware component:

Objective: The capacity of the GRCS will increase in term of immediate response to disaster.

Material and in-kind resources - 1 prefabricated warehouse structure (Cover Hall) - Tents - 3 Generators, spares - 250 Picks (head and handle) - 30 000 Water Purification Tablets - 1980 Water Containers Collapsible - 5000 Dusk Masks - 15 Diesel Jerry Cans

4) Telecom

Activity: - Workshop on telecommunication for GRCS telecom staff - Technical follow up of the installed equipment for the Ivan ops. (PADRU).

Material and in-kind resources - VHF radio equipment - HF equipment

Haiti

Introduction

Haiti, discovered by Columbus in 1492, and (with the now Dominican Republic on the other side of the island) named Hispaniola, became the first black population to throw off the shackles of slavery after the white colonists had first taken advantage of the French Revolution to break away from France. The country declared its independence in 1804 but has since been plagued by political instability and violence for most of its remaining history. From being one of the wealthiest economies in the Caribbean, based on forestry and sugar-related industries, Haiti is now the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and a major Caribbean trans-shipment point for cocaine to the US and Europe, money-laundering and illicit financial transactions. It is marked by pervasive corruption and large numbers of Haitians, fleeing economic privation and civil unrest, present an illegal immigration problem to the US as well to its neighbors across the border in the Dominican Republic.

With a population of nearly eight million people of which some 80% live below the poverty line3, it is estimated that more than two thirds have no formal employment4 while two-thirds of all Haitians depend on small-scale subsistence farming. Estimated purchasing power parity is USD 1,600.5

Following flawed legislative elections in May 2000, international donors6 suspended almost all aid to Haiti. Widespread civil strife in early 2004 lead to the flight of President Aristide and the return of a UN stabilization force (MINUSTAH) several months later. New elections are planned for the end of 2005 but, due to Aristide’s earlier demobilization (but not disarming) of its regular

3 2003 4 2002 5 2003 6 Including the US and EU. 70

military forces, a significant armed and disaffected political faction poses a risk to their success, while an equally disaffected group of his supporters seek his return. The resumption of aid flows are expected to alleviate but not end the country’s severe economic problems.

At 20.00 hours on Wednesday 15th.September 2004, Tropical Storm Jeanne was located at 17.8 degrees North/65.8 degrees West to the South-east of Puerto Rico and was moving slowly along the Northern coast of the Dominican Republic by the morning of Friday 17th when warnings of flooding were issued for the North East, North and North West of Haiti but not for the Gonaives area.

By the morning of Saturday 18th September, and still only moving at about four knots, the storm clouds associated with Jeanne were rising above the northern land mass of Haiti and, between 12.30 and 17.30, deposited some 261 mm7 of rainfall over the water-shed to the North of Gonaives.8 This level of precipitation (nearly half the average annual9) is exceptional and caused by the facts that: § the hurricane had moved so slowly that it had gathered an inordinate amount of energy and moisture from the warm open water to the East § the resultant storm clouds passed (and almost stopped) over the warm land mass which, by virtue of its height and the effects of convection, pushed them up to an altitude at which precipitation was initiated.

The consequent massive flow of water down onto the low lying basin of Gonaives, surrounded on three sides by the high land mass, then became a matter of time. While the flows of water were unavoidable, their destructive forces were not helped by the facts that: § the slopes of the land mass are steep, denuded of all vegetation and already subject to gulley erosion § rivers, streams, drainage ditches and canals were not maintained and already full of household and industrial debris § tides were high and coastal water levels raised by the effects of the cyclone.

Mud slides became inevitable, flood waters carried large volumes of suspended clay material, un-maintained protective river banks were breached and, with the sudden slowdown of water flows in the basin and particularly in the town, large quantities of mud were precipitated.

While the meteorological circumstances had never been experienced in living memory and were, in legal terms, likely to have been an ‘Act of God’ (ie. a statistically unlikely to happen), the level of destruction was higher than it would have been if environmental practices and human behavior had been different over the previous century. A time-line of events is presented in Chronology below.

Estimates of the total affected population range from 200,000 to 300,000 people including up to 200,000 in Gonaives Town where water sources were contaminated. Some 3,000 deaths have

7 Recorded at Ennery. 8 Georges.J.B. Inondations a Gonaives – Diagnostic et actions a court terme, Beta Ingenieurs-Conseils, Haiti, Oct.’04 9 Average annual rainfall at Gonaives is 550 mm. 71

been confirmed, livestock and an estimated 80 and 90% of crops were lost and thousands of homes were totally or partially destroyed.

The Haitian National Red Cross Society (HNRCS) founded in 1932, has 13 regional branches (including Port-au-Prince) and approximately 3,500 volunteers. As of March 2004, HNRCS, with the support of the Federation, was implementing an operation in response to social unrest in the North as well as a relief operation in response to flooding in the Central part of the country. The Netherlands Red Cross has been working with in the South East for several years to reinforce the Jacmel branch while the French Red Cross has been working with HNRCS for many years in the North.

Relevance and Appropriateness

The relevance of emergency aid tends to be proportional to its time of handover to the concerned victims. (Within very few days (2 or 3) of a disaster’s incidence, the relevance of emergency aid tends to be inversely proportional to the number of days of delivery delay from that date.) Reference to Table A will indicate that no IFRC food aid10 was distributed until 3rd.December 2004, some 77 days after incidence of the disaster on the night of Saturday 17th. September 2004. This distribution served several rural villages/towns outside Gonaives.

The most significant needs, within the first few days of the disaster, were (in order of importance): 1. Potable water 2. Food 3. Shelter, clothing and blankets 4. Fuel and means of cooking.

As such, the delivery of food to a rural area more than two months after the disaster cannot be considered as relevant particularly in light of the strong family and community support mechanisms which prevail, not only in the rural area, but also within and between the urban and rural areas.

Non-food items11 were first delivered on 7th.October, some 20 days after the disaster and to the urban area of Gonaives closely followed on 11th.October to the rural villages/towns of Ennery and Passe Reine, and later (February and March) to Anse Rouge and Port de Paix.

In light of the difficulties to enter Gonaives Town (initially due to floodwater and mud, and then due to insecurity), the delivery of NFIs to the town after 20 days has to be accepted as relevant.

A Norwegian/Canadian field hospital, delivered to Gonaives Town on 7th.October, was welcomed and was well attended by the beneficiary population particularly for maternity, small wounds and pediatric care. The issue of the hospital, which was unilaterally mobilized prior to

10 1,390 families received one food parcel per family member per month over three months. Each parcel contained a range of foodstuffs (including rice and tinned sardines) with a calorific value of 1,200 kcal. per day (or 50% of the SHERE recommended intake). 11 6,203 families had received Hygiene kits, Kitchen sets, Jerry cans, blankets as at 25th.February 2005. 72

the IFRC appeal12 and subsequently included in it as a fait accompli, is the subject of more detailed discussion in the Sustainability/Connectedness section below but, nevertheless, proved to be relevant at the time more by default than by design in that it gave Red Cross a high level of visibility, credibility and security.

Intervention by the Haitian Red Cross, albeit limited and not at all coordinated with that of the Federation13, was however relevant in that it represented a Red Cross presence in Gonaives within 48 hours with an ambulance, volunteers, certain small aid stocks and, most importantly, providing a focus for local donations of assistance.

Appropriateness is also related to timing of delivery but refers more14 to tailoring of the humanitarian activities to needs at the time of expected delivery, ownership and to cost effectiveness. From this point of view, the NFIs delivered to Gonaives Town were very appropriate and, while their delivery very much later to Anse Rouge and Passe Reine could be seen as ‘dumping’, the items were undoubtedly of value to targeted victims who had lost everything.

Effectiveness

IFRC’s mission (or, in LogFrame terms, its goal) is “to improve the lives of vulnerable people by mobilizing the power of humanity.” While it was slow to be translated into concrete aid delivery on the ground, mobilization of the Federation Secretariat in Geneva to produce its first appeal within four days on 22nd.September 2004,15 the arrival from Geneva of the IFRC Coordinator16 in Haiti on 23rd.September, the arrival in Gonaives of the FACT team from Central Haiti on 24th.September (and their helicopter assessment missions from 26th.September to 1st.October), the latter’s revised appeal on 5th.October, the Gonaives Coordinator’s Plan of Action on 10th.October, the consequent rapid dispatch of ERUs17 and the operational status of the field hospital on 14th.September (seven days after its arrival in-theatre) were indeed impressive.

It was unfortunate that, while HNRCS volunteers were employed by, or coopted as volunteers into IFRC activities, the latter was unable to effectively cooperate with HNRCS at the Gonaives level. This was due to internal HNRCS in-fighting such that no effective Red Cross institution was available at the Gonaives provincial level. This represents a denial of the Red Cross mission statement and fails to present a good ‘role model’ to the Red Cross youth who are consequently likely to be lost to the movement.

In order to consider the efficiency of the Jeanne operation, one has to revert to the earlier IFRC Social Unrest and Mapou18 floods operations and to other issues prevailing before and after that time which subsequently affected Red Cross efficiency in Gonaives post September 18th. 2004:

12 By Norwegian and Canadian Red Cross Societies. 13 But more with that of the French Red Cross with whom it was working bilaterally. 14 ALNAP Evaluating Humanitarian Action (An ALNAP Guidance Booklet), ALNAP, London, September 2003. 15 See Chronology below. 16 M.Roger Bracke 17 The Spanish and British ERUs had already arrived on 25th.September. 18 Central Haiti 73

i) A FACT team had arrived in Mapou in May 2004 and members of that group transferred to Gonaives within five days. It is admirable that they were able to mobilise for a new (and possibly more difficult) challenge after having already been involved (without a break) in the previous two Haiti operations. They did, however (and understandably), bring along some inherent problems: - these delegates were already exhausted from their work in the two previous operations; - they were not, in fact, FACT-trained; - while in Mapou, they did not report to Haiti HQ in Port au Prince but to PADRU in Panama; - the Head of Haiti IFRC Delegation19 and the Head of IFRC Regional Finance in Panama had both asked Geneva not to renew the contracts of certain delegates because of difficulties experienced with them. The Secretariat ignored this request.20 ii) There was an ECHO commitment in 2004 to fund the restoration of the countrywide Red Cross VHF radio network21 on the condition that other NGOs could use it. The Federation Field Support (IT/Telecom) Department22 advised the Americas Department that this was not only technically unwise but contrary to Red Cross rules of independence – this advice was ignored. When, in the realities of the field, other NGOs were not allowed to use the system, ECHO considered that it had been cheated. The subsequent IFRC ECHO proposal for Operation Jeanne feeding in Gonaives Town was rejected in the statement23 “ECHO is not convinced of the capacity of the HNRCS and previous experience with the Federation in Haiti had been negative.” This apparent reference to the radio problem lost the Federation a substantial source of funding and, more seriously, denied the people of Gonaives a significant humanitarian input. iii) The fact that the Haiti fund holder was unable to know the balance of funds on, at least, a monthly basis led to a substantial underspend on the budget.24 When this became known in January 2005 with only six weeks of the planned operation time remaining, the Gonaives Coordinator was asked by Geneva to extend the programme – he refused. This cannot be judged to be the most efficient application of Emergency Aid. iv) Mobilisation of the ERUs was indeed impressive and the auto-sufficiency of many of them presents a fine example of best practice.25 The Evaluation Team failed to find any Red Cross representative to agree with its suggestion that the rapid turnover26 of ERUs was inefficient particularly in the light of widespread poor IFRC handover (documentation) procedures. This is interesting but, from a cost-effectiveness and time-management perspective, the implications are undeniable. v) The lack of French speaking delegates seems to have caused far more problems than encountered in African, Asian and Eastern European countries where the lingua franca is not

19 Who had arrived in Port au Prince in June 2004. 20 Reportedly under pressure from their National Societies. 21 Including the addition of six to ten mountain-top radio repeaters. 22 Located next to the Main Secretariat Building in Geneva. 23 Personal communication by IFRC Gonaives Reporting Delegate quoting ECHO’s rejection letter. 24 71% of incomes spent up to January 2005 – source: Regional Finance Unit, Panama 25 A small number of them, however, were not auto-sufficient (as required by ERU training) and presented a substantial drain on IFRC Delegation time and resources. 26 Every two weeks in the case of the French WATSAN ERUs 74

necessarily English.27 The problem goes back to the fact that the Federation has little close contact with the National Society other than at the Port au Prince level. There are many English speakers in Haiti28 who have the capacity to translate – the problem is that they have already been taken by other international organiztions.

Sustainability/Connectedness

Due to the disfunctionality of the Gonaives level of HNRCS, it was impossible to carry out any meaningful strengthening work with the National Society at that level29 although, clearly, involvement of the Society at Headquarters level presented some further experience of disaster management.

The question of the Norwegian/Canadian field hospital intervention and subsequent rehabilitation of sections of the Providence Hospital in Gonaives, however, raises serious questions of connectedness and ultimate sustainability.

A senior NorCross representative visited Gonaives within days of the disaster – they had a previous association with the town and their recent rehabilitation work on Gonaives Providence Hospital had been destroyed in the flood. NorCross had a mobile field hospital30 ready for immediate dispatch to Haiti and, in a meeting with the Haitian Prime Minister, made a commitment to its mobilization as well as concurrent re-rehabilitation of the destroyed units. This was without reference to the Federation with whom it was said that it could be ‘normalized later’ – the intervention (in cooperation with CanCross) was subsequently included in the IFRC appeal and the latter actually paid for most of the rehabilitation work.

It would appear that no ‘exit strategy’ was considered, the rehabilitation works proved to be more costly than estimated and were significantly delayed. NorCross departed from Haiti at the end of February 2005 and the Evaluation Team observed the rehabilitated and equipped31 units to be lying empty. The mobile field hospital had, however, been a success in terms of Red Cross visibility and as a short-term palliative.

There were certain incorrect assumptions in the launching of this intervention: 1. Providence had never been a referral hospital – this was elsewhere; 2. Providence had never functioned properly, its Haitian ‘employees’ did not receive regular salaries and consequently did not attend; 3. Providence had been sustained by Cuban medical staff for some years; 4. The Haitian Ministry of Health was accordingly not (and is still not) in control of the hospital;

27 This is particularly poignant in the fact that the language of the people is Creole, an almost untranslatable language even to natural French speakers. 28 Viz. the interview in the slums of Gonaives Town (below). 29 Volunteers were trained at the Gonaives branch level but this can only be seen from a personal and not institutional perspective and, unless the infighting within the National Society can be quickly resoved, it would seem that there is little encouragement for them to remain with the movement. 30 With Rubhall tent. 31 The Rubhall tent had been repatriated and equipment moved into the rehabilitated buildings. 75

5. Nevertheless, Taiwanese Cooperation were committed to rehabilitation of the hospital and subsequently set about taking out Norcross structures (ceilings, wiring etc).

It was thus not sensible for NorCross to bring in resources for what amounted to an alternative health structure to run in parallel with that of the Haitian Ministry of Health and not to refer to its own recent past experiences. This unsustainable situation is considered to be one which is beyond the scope of Red Cross to resolve or to fund in the longer term.

Recommendations: Haiti

1. While the speed of mobilization was impressive, the issues (discussed above) which then caused implementation to grind to a halt have to be addressed.

2. Rapid staff turnover, inadequate delegate training and lack of language skills have to be addressed.

3. The lines of communication, reporting and delegation of responsibilities of IFRC sub- institutions from the Secretariat down to through the Regional to field levels needs to be corrected.32

4. The fundamental problem is that IFRC has not built the necessary links with the National Society and this in a country which suffers from chronic structural poverty33 and is in an almost perpetual state of political instability and violence. While not under-estimating the difficulties of maintaining a permanent Delegation in Haiti,34 this is what must be done.

5. The organizational development of the National Society down to branch level is of paramount importance. The short-term dropping-in of inexperienced foreign delegates who ‘take over’ with their ‘superior’ knowledge represents a set-back to the National Society not development. There are very good volunteers in HNRCS but they need better role models without which they will disappear.

32 A source of considerable confusion may be found in the document PADRU – Functions, organisation and relations (2003 version) viz: “Automatically, the Head of PADRU will subordinated to the direction of the Head of Operations, for as long as agreed for this specific operation.” 33 It is the poorest country in the western hemisphere. 34 Haiti is not politically interesting to donors and may be considered a hardship posting 76

Haiti - Community Interviews Analysis

Interviews – Locations and Descriptions of People Interviewed:

John Wilding visited Gonaives Town, outlying villages and rural areas in Greater Gonaives. He carried out interviews within the constraints of security, time and the five to six hour (each way) road journey to the area. Information was triangulated between victim respondents and with IFRC Gonaives staff, French and Dutch Red Cross delegates, HNRCS volunteers, ICRC, UNOCHA, UN police, MINUSTAH officers and other NGO staff whom he had met on his previous visit to the area three weeks previously as well as with the National President and Disasters Manager of HNRCS. It was not possible to visit disaster areas beyond the environs of Gonaives Province.

Gonaives: Gonnaives Town: Population: 200,000; Traditionally highly politicized and violent (both political and criminal). Gonaives Town is built on very low-lying land and is surrounded on three sides by deforested and consequently highly eroded mountains which form the watershed upon which Tropical Jeanne precipitated some 261 mm of rainfall35 over a five hour period.36 It is bounded to the South by the sea whose level was raised by the onshore winds of Jeanne.

Building structures are heavily damaged by three to four meter flood waters and mud flows, the deposits of which are still in the process of being cleared. While the blockage of open drains and drainage canals by household and industrial waste was not the cause of the disaster, it did not help to reduce its effects. Even though international efforts to clear such waterways is currently under implementation, the population has not changed its risky (and unhealthy) practice of rubbish disposal into them. 37

Urban Family informant: Asifa zone, Gonaives Town Man, wife and six children (8 in household). Paul is a stone mason/setting-out engineer whose leg was wounded in the disaster and unable to work since but hires out a generator for cash. The family spent all Saturday night (18th.Sept.) on the roof, could not re-enter the house at 5am. Sunday and so went to higher ground in the surrounding rural area.

The family returned later and rural relations38 brought mattresses and then food and water daily. A water bladder was installed locally by the Government on Wednesday 22nd.Sept. and was filled daily by truck. They all had difficulty to find salt since local salt fields were destroyed and the family suffered from anti-riot tear gas as late as January 2005.

The family knew about Red Cross but received nothing – their losses (clothes, mattresses, blankets etc) were lying in evidence in a dump at the side of their house. They were eventually given ration cards by CARE on 29th January2005. Paul and his wife were rather sceptical about sources of assistance and were unsure as to which agency was doing what (if anything).

35 Recorded at Ennery some 15 kilometres uphill and to the North of the town. 36Average annual rainfall at Gonaives is 550 mm. 37 There is no public rubbish removal service in the town even though rubbish dumps do exist around it.. 38 By hand and donkey from Bayontail, three hours’ walk away. 77

Male urban informant: Puilboreau zone, Bois-neuf, Gonaives Town Unmarried young man (24 years old, unemployed but speaking good English and reasonably well educated) living next door to his sister (married with 4 children – house badly damaged).

Wilner was initially aggressive and totally cynical of government and assistance agencies. He knew about Red Cross but said that they had received nothing from anyone.39 He said that he had lost all his belongings and in fact his own (very small self-built) house was almost completely empty.

Female urban informant: Rabateau zone, Gonaives Town Husband, wife and six children. Husband is a mason’s laborer earning 175 Gourdes per day (approx. US $5). Three and a half rooms of their 4-room house were destroyed. On the morning following the disaster, the family moved to the hillside but had no water or food for two days until they accessed an open well and took refuge in a church for two days. They then rented a one-room house on the hillside for two months.

They knew about Red Cross but their only assistance was received as food from CARE in January and February 2005 (4 months after the flood). Paulette shared the food (destined to last eight days) with her sister, so covering her own family’s needs for only six days. All kitchen utensils were lost along with clothes, beds, bedding etc.

The attitude of the family was not one of cynicism but of resignation to the normality of poverty and lack of attention to their needs by the authorities and assistance agencies in this overcrowded and violent slum area of the town.

Ennery commune: A small rural community of population approximately 10,000, situated uphill from and about 25 kilometres to the North of Gonaives Town. Ennery lies in a valley below the Gonaives watershed and thus in the direct line of floodwater and mud flows. There is considerable damage to property and loss of livestock and agricultural production.

Woman-headed household informant: Ennery commune, Gonaives Province. Husband left to seek work after the disaster and is unheard of since. Eleven persons in household between the ages of 6 months and 64 years, being the grandmother (with some older children) and Anne with the younger children. Anne’s house in Gonaives Town40 destroyed and now living in her mother’s house in Ennery. They seemed to be business people in Gonaives with 0.25 hectare of farmland in Ennery.

They made no preparations for the oncoming Hurricane and considered the flood waters to be ‘fun’ until 5 pm. when they rose rapidly and alarmingly. They sheltered in a local school in Gonaives Town for one week before moving up to Ennery. First assistance (25 kg. of rice) was offered by WFP on Thursday 23rd.Sept. (five days after the flood) and water was provided in sachets the next day (possibly by HNRCS). At the same time, La Comite du Quartier Formel

39 This is a difficulty in Haiti as respondents fear neighbours or even family knowing that they have received assistance as they might be forced to share it. 40 Where she was living with her family at the time of the disaster. 78

gave a cooking kit and soap, tooth-paste/tooth-brush although it is unclear whether the latter were from WFP.

HNRCS brought very significant assistance on 27th.Sept. in two packages (one for the Grandmother family and one for Anne’s family) each of 25kg rice; 1 bucket; 1 cooking stove. Shortly afterwards, the household was given 3 blankets; clothes; bedsheets; cleaning kit.

27 food parcels were delivered to the household over three (monthly) IFRC distributions starting on 3rd.December 2004. Each package included 10 lb.Rice; 2 lb.Beans; 2 lb.Sardines; 1 lb.Iodized Salt; 4 lb.Sugar; 2 lite Cooking oil. Nobody, at any time, asked what they needed.

The family expressed pleasure at their gifts, said that all items were useful, that distributions were well organized and fair but did add that they did not always reach the most vulnerable. Criteria for targeting included: i) without shelter; ii) without husband; iii) woman-headed household; iv) young children; v) including old persons.

This household is next door to the school which had been the IFRC distribution point for Ennery and the interview was organized by some HNRCS/IFRC volunteers – its ‘textbook’ nature raises some doubts as to whether it was a ‘set-up’ or as to the influence of the family. If true, it does represent very good practice to which Red Cross should aspire. An indicator of local appreciation of Red Cross was noted in children’s spontaneous shouting “Croix Rouge” as the interview car traveled through the countryside.

The family house in Gonaives Town remains unrepaired with little signs of forthcoming assistance

Aufilier district, Gonaives province: located on fertile flat land some 10 kilometres to the North of Gonaives Town and close to the main river which normally flows past Gonaives Town but whose banks burst on the day of the disaster.

Male rural focus group: Farmers with tenure between 0.5 and 5 hectares of very fertile land which is good for cotton but not sugar cultivation and generally growing: Banana, Plantain, Maize, Sorghum; Aubergine; Shallot; Peppers; Cassava. All crops of the second planting season (Augus to December) were lost along with their plant nursery structures. Average livestock holding was: Cattle: 2 to 3; Pigs: 0 to 3; Goats: 2 to 5; Poultry: 1 to 10 but all livestock was lost. In addition to gulley and sheet erosion, up to 1 metre of sediment41 now covers their land.

Most houses were partially destroyed killing 12 persons and wounding many others. Contaminated wells have caused water-bornes illnesses until now. They know Red Cross but only received food from CARE by ‘informally’ joining blanket distributions in the town 42. About 100 men received FFW and Bean seeds from OXFAM for canal cleaning. There is a general cynicism about Government and assistance agencies.

41 This is very fertile but difficult to dig with hand tools. 42 100 of 800 households eventually received CARE ration cards in November 2004. 79

Dolent district, Gonaives province: located on the outskirts of Gonaives Town amongst fertile flat fields. The Catholic convent/hospice here lies directly in the path of the major flood/mud flows which devastated Gonaives Town.

Key informant: Mother Superior, Order of Mother Teresa, Dolent District, Gonaives.

In an informal, unstructured interview without notes, this informant gave a detailed background to the disaster and its social consequences which form the understandings basis of this report. Sister Abha described the night of Saturday 18th.Sept. spent standing in water on the altar, the terror of mud passage through the church and destruction of convent buildings and structures, the drowning of their priest next door who could not escape from his house because of his mud blocked door, the 90 human bodies and countless dead livestock in the field next morning, their pitiful efforts to address overwhelming needs and the informal social support mechanisms within families, between families and between the rural and urban areas.

General Findings: Apart from the ‘textbook’ case in Ennery, respondents communicated little satisfaction with the assistance they had received, if any at all. There was a general acceptance that family and community support mechanisms were the main source of survival but that, finally, the immediate family had to find its own means of survival. This was perceived as more difficult but little different from the ‘situation normal’ which characterizes their miserable existence which they consider is of little interest to the authorities and to which assistance agencies, while appreciating their sentiments, have little capacity to address.

Recognition of the Red Cross: The Red Cross is well known in Haiti for its tracing work, impartial humanitarian efforts and First Aid activities. Everyone seems to know where the offices of HNRCS may be found in Gonaives and there appears to be great appreciation of their good sentiments and the fact that they were at least seen on Day 1 of the disaster. As far as a provider of assistance is concerned, however, the Red Cross would seem to be considered as just another aid agency with little capacity to respond fully to the population’s needs whether these be in the face of disaster or in the people’s everyday struggle for survival.

The establishment of the temporary field hospital in the town has certainly increased Red Cross visibility and the population’s appreciation of it but the fact that handover of the permanent Red Cross rehabilitated wards43 to the Haitian authorities has failed and they now lie empty is going to do little to sustain any acclaim gained during the post-flood period.

Knowledge of assistance options: The case of the Mayoress of Ennery’s visit to IFRC office to inform them of urgent needs in her constituency and IFRC’s immediate assessment of the area the following day does highlight what, at least, community leaders know and hope from the Red Cross. The people are long experienced in being disappointed by all institutions and the fact that assistance arrived very much later would not seem to have changed their perception of the Red Cross.

43 into which the temporary hospital equipment was moved 80

Haiti Interview Summary - Interviews conducted from March 30th to March 31st

Situation of Pre-hurricane Immediate Emergency assistance and Recovery Assistance and the Affected preparedness when received Status Person(s) Measures: Post hurricane situation Urban Family Pre- : None Day 1 - food, water, bedding - Relations None husband, wife Post- : all bedding, Day 4 - water bladder – Government Bread-winner wounded in & six children, clothes etc. destroyed. D 103 - 3 x monthly food - CARE flood and unable to work; centre of Gonaives Town Urban male Pre- : None Nothing None (single) Post- : Lost all Unemployed centre of property, house badly Gonaives damaged, 2 rooms Town still habitable. Urban female Pre- : None Day 120 - 2 x monthly food - CARE None husband & 6 Post- : 3.5 rooms of Husband working children 4-room house destroyed. All clothes, bedding destroyed Woman - Pre- : None Day 5 - 25 kg. of rice – WFP None headed h/h Post- : House Day 6 - water sachets, cooking kit –HRC Husband gone to seek work 9 children. destroyed. Now - soap, tooth-paste/brush – local after flood but now Family from staying with community support group disappeared Gonaives grandmother in Day 9 - 50 kg rice; 2 buckets; 2 cooking Town Ennery. stoves. Day 12 - 3 blankets; clothes; bedsheets; cleaning kit – HNRCS Day 77 - over 3 months: 27 food parcels each containing: 10 lb.Rice; 2 lb.Beans; 2 lb.Sardines; 1 lb.Iodized Salt; 4 lb.Sugar; 2 lite Cooking oil - IFRC Male rural Pre- : None Day 7 - joined general food distributions FFW and Bean seeds – group Post- : All livestock in Gonaives Town - CARE OXFAM Aufilier & crops lost. Houses Day 60 - One hundred H/h monthly food 2nd season crops now district outside damaged. Farmland rations until April ’05 - CARE planted. Gonaives badly damaged. 12 Town persons killed, many wounded. Water- borne diseases persist. Convent & Pre- : None Catholic church Catholic church hospice Post- : Some Dolent district structures destroyed, Gonaives 1 priest killed

Recommendations and Final Comments from Communities: 1. The fundamental problem of Haiti is Structural Poverty and the incidence of the Jeanne floods is just another, albeit devastating, setback in people’s daily struggle for survival44. The response of Red Cross, while appreciated, is perceived as symbolic, short-term and not durable.

44 Verbal communication of respondent in the Puiloreau slums of Gonaives Town. 81

2. The Haitian Red Cross is appreciated for its sentiments and presence but not for its capacity to respond to any meaningful extent. IFRC is appreciated in the same vein but, being international, is little understood and perhaps presumed to have ‘got it right’ in other theatres of humanitarian need.

3. For the time being, the machinations within the Haitian Red Cross appear to be little known to the population at large but there is a certain feeling that it has potential for greater things and, in this, a need is express for support from the international community.

Haiti Appeal 22/04 Objectives and activities planned

Non-food Items Objective 1: 50,000 beneficiaries (10,000 families) will have benefited from the provision of non-food items delivered through secure distribution centres. 15,000 vulnerable people (3,000 families) will benefit from the distribution of non-food items in the communes of Gros Morne, Pilate, Ennery, Portde-Paix, Chansolme, Bassin Bleu and Anse Rouge. In the area outside Gonaïves, the beneficiary selection criteria target all those whose homes were damaged or destroyed by the floods. In addition, a total of 35,000 vulnerable people (7,000 families) in Gonaïves will receive the same assistance.

Activities planned to reach this objective: Several distributions per commune to every family: · 3 hygiene kits. · 1 clean up kit. · 1 kitchen set. · 3 blankets. · 3 mattresses. · 1 cooking stove. · 1 container of kerosene. · 2 collapsible jerry cans (10 litre capacity) and 1 plastic bucket with lid (20 litre capacity). · 3 impregnated mosquito nets.

Food Objective 2: 1,400 families (7,000 people) will have benefited from the provision of food items delivered through secure distribution centres. WFP is mandated to provide sufficient food to the affected population in Gonaïves. Federation assessment results outside Gonaïves confirmed that most of the 15,000 people identified as being ‘affected by the floods’ were not in immediate need of food assistance, with the exception of the communes of Chansolme and Ennery. In these two communes a total of 1,400 families (7,000 people) required food assistance as a result of massive damage to agricultural land. In both communes those affected are dependent on subsistence agriculture and have lost most or all of their crops. Additional damage to cash crops will limit the capacity of the community to compensate for the losses through purchase.

Activities planned to reach this objective: Distribution of food parcels to the most vulnerable flood-affected families. Food parcels for a three month period will consist of the following items per person: · Rice (25 lbs). · Cooking oil (1 gallon). · Red beans (2 lbs). · Sardines (15 ounces). · Spaghetti (400 grams). · Salt (2 lbs). · Sugar (5 lbs). · Matches (10 boxes).

Shelter Objective: 15,000 beneficiaries (3,000 families) will have benefited from the provision of shelter materials delivered through secure distribution centres. The aforementioned 7 communes outside Gonaïves whose homes were totally collapsed (18 per cent of the total) or suffered severe damage (82 per cent of the total) will receive plastic sheeting, saws and nails for the temporary reconstruction of their homes or for the construction of temporary shelters. Severely damaged homes are considered

to be those under the risk of total collapse in the event of future rain. In Gonaïves, shelter materials are being provided to residents by other humanitarian actors.

Activities planned to reach this objective: The following items will be distributed: · Plastic sheeting (4x6 meters) – 2 sheets per severely damaged home or 4 per totally collapsed homes. · Saw – 1 per 10 households. · Nails – ½ kilogram per damaged home and 1 kg per totally collapsed home. · 1 hammer per 10 households.

Health Objective 1: To rehabilitate Gonaïves’ only referral hospital (La Providence) serving the primary and secondary health care needs of the population. La Providence Hospital, the region’s main referral hospital, was refurbished by the ICRC with the support of the Norwegian Red Cross in February 2004. Recent floods have severely damaged the hospital, rendering it unusable. The Canadian and Norwegian Red Cross will rehabilitate the hospital. In the meantime, a fully equipped 100 bed field hospital will be set up and run by existing local staff supported by 17 expatriate staff from Canada and Norway. This hospital will have the following services typical of a referral hospital: operating theatre, radiology, obstetrics, internal medicine, gynaecology, paediatrics, laboratory, outpatient department, kitchen and laundry. The costs of the activities planned to reach this objective represent a significant portion of this Emergency Appeal budget given the high costs of the rehabilitation work.

Activities planned to reach this objective: · Deployment of a joint Canadian and Norwegian Red Cross hospital ERU in Gonaïves. · Using a mobile water treatment plant, the Spanish Red Cross water and sanitation ERU will provide clean water to serve the needs of the field hospital and living compound. · The population of Gonaïves and surrounding areas will receive primary and secondary health care services through the field hospital. · Concomitantly, the existing hospital will be refurbished and all equipment from and activities of the field hospital will be transferred to the existing hospital within a period of six months.

Objective 2: To reduce the impact of water/vector borne diseases (typhoid, malaria and diarrhoeal diseases) in the affected areas. Given the extensive flooding in the town of Gonaïves and the other aforementioned seven affected communes, the risk of outbreaks of waterborne diseases is high, particularly since many latrines and city sewer systems overflowed. Furthermore, existing pools of water serve as breeding grounds for the Anopheles mosquito that can transmit falciparum and vivax malaria, and the Aedes Aegypti that can transmit dengue fever. The Federation will provide mosquito nets, water purification tablets, and water makers.

Activities planned to reach this objective: · All 38 dispensaries in all 8 affected communes will each be provided with 100 packets of oral rehydration salts. Each packet makes 1 litre of oral rehydration fluid. · A New Emergency Health Kit will be supplied to the hospital in Pilate. · Impregnated mosquito nets will be distributed to 15,000 people (3,000 families) in the 7 affected communes outside Gonaïves. Each family will receive a total of 3 nets. · A total of 15,000 people (3,000 families) in the communes outside Gonaïves will be provided with water purification tablets (two boxes of 50 tablets per family) or in the case of Gros Morne (885 families), where the water is turbid, sachets of water purification solution. These quantities are sufficient to last two weeks when contamination levels are at their peak. · During distributions HNRCS, volunteers will provide rapid training to beneficiaries on how to use these items.

Water and Sanitation

Objective 1: To provide 450,000 litres in accordance with WHO water quality standards, affording 30,000 people (6,000 families) in Gonaïves with 15 litres per person per day. The FACT team assessment identified that there were major problems in some areas with regard to the availability of safe drinking water. These problems were not caused by recent floods but were pre-existing. It concluded that an emergency solution would not resolve these issues and that intervention from the Haitian authorities to repair structural problems with existing water systems is essential. In Gonaïves the situation is the opposite with city water still unavailable directly as a result of flooding. The focus of activities will be on the production, storage and distribution of water at a minimum of WHO quality standards. The Haitian Red Cross National Society will be responsible for distributing the water to beneficiaries.

Activities planned to reach this objective: · Deployment of a French Red Cross mass water and sanitation ERU that will install and maintain a water treatment plant that can produce 450 m3 of water per day; · Installation of sufficient storage facilities; · Installation of sufficient and secure distribution sites to serve 30,000 people with 15 litres per person per day; · Training of appropriate Haitian National Red Cross Society staff and/or water engineers during a handover after one month.

Objective 2: To improve the transport and storage capacity at household level of clean water for 50,000 people (10,000 families). Water containers will be given to the affected population in all 8 communes including the town of Gonaïves, to be distributed by the Haitian National Red Cross Society.

Activities planned to reach this objective: distribute 2 collapsible jerry cans (10-litre capacity) and 1 plastic bucket with lid (20 litre capacity) per family.

Objective 3: To supply the Gonaïves field hospital and living compound with sufficient water in accordance with the WHO standards for quality water. The Spanish Red Cross has brought into the country a total of five mobile water purification plants. One of these will be used to provide the ERU field hospital and living compound with adequate quality water.

Activities planned to reach this objective: · Deployment of a Spanish Red Cross specialized water and sanitation ERU. · Installation and maintenance of a mobile water treatment plant. · Installation of sufficient storage facilities. · Production of specialized water to service the needs of the field hospital and living compound.

Objective 4: To provide materials and technical assistance in latrine reconstruction for 1,000 families living in areas where the risk of uncontrolled disease is high. Both Federation assessment teams deployed covering the North and North-Western regions of Haiti identified the need to reconstruct pit latrines as a priority, particularly in Ennery, Chansolme and Paulin, one of the villages of Port de Paix. However, the assessment teams acknowledge that families may not be able to concentrate the required attention and efforts on the reconstruction of latrines at this time as their priorities are on the repair of homes and of agricultural assets, perceived as more vital by the affected population. Therefore, the Federation will implement a four month programme, focusing on the construction of 1,000 latrines combined with a sustained effort to promote their use. Although still under the framework of this Emergency Appeal, this programme will only be started six weeks after the launch of this revised appeal, once more urgent needs have been adequately addressed.

Activities planned to reach this objective: · carry out a zone by zone evaluation of the sanitary situation. · Training of a team of Red Cross volunteers and/or members of the community in the construction of the latrines and their use and maintenance. · Distribution of materials to the construction teams zone by zone who distribute them to the beneficiaries. · Provision of assistance to families with the construction of latrines.

· Teaching families on the use and maintenance of latrines by the construction teams. Construction materials distributed to each family would be: 50 kg bag of cement, 10 mm bar of iron, 8 mm bar of iron, 0.5 kg of wire, 4 zinc sheets, hammer, 2” PVC piping 3 meters long, ½ kg nails. Every 10 families would receive: 1 roll of mosquito netting, wheelbarrow, level, and shovel.

Support to the National Society Objective 1: To reinforce the HNRCS with its mandate to respond to catastrophes within a country with a fragile political context and during the hurricane season. Since the beginning of the year Haiti has suffered three disasters: social unrest, May floods and most recently floods as a result of Tropical Storm Jeanne. This has served to deplete the material resources of the Haitian National Red Cross Society that must continue to operate within a fragile political context during a hurricane season that is not yet over. To ensure the HNRCS’ ability to respond to potential future disasters, its relief stocks need to be replenished and its disaster response capacity needs to be strengthened.

Activities planned to reach this objective: · Equipping and training volunteers in assessment methodologies and in disaster response; · Improving the lines of communication between the HNRCS branches and the National Red Cross Office, with the Department for Civil Protection, other government structures, NGOs and UN agencies to ensure coordinated mechanisms to alert populations at risk and if necessary facilitate their evacuation. · Replenish the stock of relief material stored in Port au Prince to be able to respond to the needs of 2,000 families. Pre-positioned relief items will include hygiene kits, kitchen sets, blankets, mattresses, plastic sheeting and water sachets.

Table A.Haiti Floods: Distribution of IFRC emergency aid

Distribution of Food Aid: Area: Ennery and Passe Reine (rural) Dates: December 2004 3,5,21,23 January 2005 4,8,11,15,18,22,25,29

Distribution of Non-Food Aid: Area: Ennery and Passe Reine (rural) Dates: October 2004 11 December 2004 3,5,9,11 Area: Greater Gonaives (urban) October 2004 7 November 2004 5,8,22,30 December 2004 10,13,15,16,17,20,22 January 2005 4,7,8,12,14,15,21,24,26,27,28 February 2005 17,18,21,22,23,25,26,28 March 2005 1,2,3,6,7,8,9,14,15,16 Area: Anse Rouge (rural) February 2005 23 March 2005 10 Area: Port-de-Paix (urban) March 11-13

Chronology of Response Activities

Date Event Response Wed. 1. The National Weather Center in Miami reports that at 15th.Sept 15.00 GMT, the center of tropical storm Jeanne was located near latitude 17.8 North, longitude 65.8 West or about 45 miles (75 km).south-southeast of San Juan , Puerto Rico. This is also about 65 miles (105 km) west of St. Croix. 2. A Hurricane Warning is in effect for the eastern coast of the Dominican Republic from Cabrera southward to Isla Saona. A Hurricane Warning is also in effect for Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 3. A Hurricane Watch and a Tropical Storm Warning are extended westward along the northern coast of the Dominican Republic west of Cabrera to Puerto Plata. A Hurricane Watch and Tropical Storm Warning are also in effect for the southern coast of the Dominican Republic from Isla Saona westward to Santo Domingo. Fri. Hurricane Warnings / Rain AM 17th Sept Meteorological Service announces Jeanne is over DR, asking people living in Haiti’s NE, N and NW to be prepared. National Meteorological Center (CNM) warns about flooding for specific rivers, ANY in the Gonaives area Hurricane warnings pointing out massive flooding NOT

for Gonaïves area. Sat. Rains continue during the morning. Flooding of some 18th.Sept streets during long rains being observed. NOT a threat for the population.; In the evening, people worried when rains accelerated and water levels increase; Heavy rains continue pouring over Gonaïves and surrounding areas; 5 pm, massive flooding; Night, 2-3 meters water + landslides in Gonaïves, Port- de-Paix, Bassin-Bleu, Chansolme Sun. 19th.Sept Coordination Committee created in NW, Gonaïves ICRC (1 WATHAB & 1 Doctor) takes Many deaths in Gonaïves – many missing body bags & preservatives by car to Gros-Morne Gonaïves road covered by debris; gullies St.Marc, then inshore boat to Gonaives – observed in several sections. 2 MINUSTAH helicopters they spend 1 week in body collection fly to Gonaives. before being repatriated. IFRC WATSAN takes water purification tablets to Gonaives Mon. UNOCHA & GOH coordination; 20th.Sept Lafond isolated; Port-de-Paix - Bassin-Bleu road cut near Chansolme. Wed. MINUSTAH troops secure CARE warehouse First IFRC Appeal. NRCS delegate 22nd.Sept loaned to IFRC from Mapou – he goes to survey in Gonaives. 23rd.Sept IFRC Coordinator arrives in Haiti from Geneva Fri. FACT team arrives in Gonaives from 24th.Sept Mapou (Central Haiti) 25th.Sept Spanish & British ERUs arrive in Gonaives Sun. FACT helicopter assessment mission. 26th.Sept IFRC (Logistics) delegate arrives in Gonaives. NorCross & CanCross hospital teams arrive in Gonaives 27th.Sept FACT helicopter assessment mission 28th.Sept FACT helicopter assessment mission 29th.Sept FACT helicopter assessment mission Thur. GOH warehouse looted (next to CARE ware house) FACT helicopter assessment mission 30th.Sept Fri. FACT helicopter assessment mission 1st.Oct IFRC Gonaives Team Leader (Brigitte Gaillis) arrives Haiti. NRCS delegate takes stock inventory in Gonaives 4th.Oct IFRC trucks attacked leaving CARE warehouse – 1 truck Food parcels ordered from PADRU stolen (Panama)

Tues. IFRC Revised Appeal 5th.Oct NRCS delegate makes census in Kasolet district of Gonaives. 6th.Oct UNDAC mandate ENDS. Thur. NorCross/CanCross field hospital arrives 7th.Oct/ Haiti and moved to Gonaives by boat. NFIs delivered in Gonaives Town ECHO proposal sent to Regional Delegation Reporting and Finance Units (Panama).

9th.Oct Visit of GOH President + PM Road communication (PAP Gonaives) unusable for 1 week 3 persons killed. 20 houses burnt in Gonaïves 10th.Oct IFRC Plan of Action NRCS delegate makes census in Rabataut district of Gonaives. Training of HNRCS staff. 11th.Oct NFIs delivered to Ennery and Passe Reine 12th.Oct Red Cross + CARE vehicles attacked 14th.Sept NorCross/CanCross field hospital operational 22nd.Oct Census taken in districts of Gonaives Town 24th.Oct Red Cross (and other NGOs) asked to vacate CARE ware house 30th.Oct NRCS delegate leaves Gonaives 1st.Nov Armed attack on Canadian Trucks – 2 persons killed Tues. 1 MSF staff attacked outside Gonaïves during NFI 2nd.Nov distribution 3rd.Nov 21 WFP trucks attacked near CARE Office Mayoress of Ennery asks IFRC to address pockets of IFRC survey made in Ennery need in Ennery 5TH.Nov NFIs delivered Gonaives 8th.Nov NFIs delivered Gonaives 16th.Nov ECHO proposal sent by IFRC Regional Office (Panama) to Brussels 22nd.Nov NFIs delivered Gonaives 23rd.Nov Care truck attacked 25 cartons biscuits stolen 24th.Nov CDC Medical supplies trucks attacked medicines stolen 25th.Nov Water sachet truck attacked sachets stolen. ACF trucks (Food / NFI) attacked, part of cargo stolen 27th.Nov 3 Care trucks attacked 10 km North of Gonaives - no thefts 30th.Nov NFIs delivered Gonaives 1st.Dec Strike at PaP port 3rd.Dec Food & NFIs delivered Ennery & Passe Reine 5th.Dec. Food & NFIs delivered Ennery & Passe Reine 6th.Dec PaP port strike ends 1 ship of food turned away, will return Jan’ 05 3rd.Dec Disturbances in PaP, some deaths 8th.Dec Some seeds already planted wilting due to low rainfall 9th.Dec NFIs delivered Ennery & Passe Reine Fri. NFIs delivered Gonaives 10th.Dec 11th.Dec NFIs delivered Ennery & Passe Reine 13th.Dec to Mon NFIs delivered Gonaives 20th 21st.Dec Food delivered Ennery & Passe Reine Wed. NFIs delivered Gonaives 22nd.Dec 23rd.Dec Food delivered Ennery & Passe Reine

4th.Jan 2005 Food & NFIs distributed Gonaives, Ennery & Passe Reine 7th.Jan NFIs delivered Gonaives 8th.Jan Food & NFIs distributed Gonaives, Ennery & Passe Reine 11th.Jan Food delivered Ennery & Passe Reine 12th.Jan NFIs delivered Gonaives 15th.Jan Food & NFIs delivered Gonaives 18th.Jan Food delivered Ennery & Passe Reine 21st.Jan NFIs delivered Gonaives 22nd.Jan Food delivered Ennery & Passe Reine 24th.Jan NFIs delivered Gonaives 25th.Jan Food delivered Ennery & Passe Reine 26th.Jan to 21st NFIs delivered Gonaives Feb 22nd.Feb NFIs delivered Gonaives 23rd.Feb NFIs delivered Gonaives & Anse Rouge 25th.Feb NFIs delivered Gonaives 26th.Feb to Wed NFIs delivered Gonaives 9th Mar 10th.Mar NFIs delivered Anse Rouge 11th.Mar to Mar NFIs delivered Port de Paix 13th 14th.Mar - 16th NFIs delivered Gonaives

Jamaica

Introduction:

Jamaica, home to 2.7 million, was affected by two hurricanes in 2004, Hurricane Charley in August and Hurricane Ivan in September. Currently Jamaica is experiencing a drought which is having a serious impact on agriculture. The Jamaican economy is heavily dependent on services, which now account for 70% of GDP. The country continues to derive most of its foreign exchange from tourism, remittances, and bauxite/alumina.

The response to Hurricane Charley was managed effectively by the Jamaican Red Cross Society in coordination with the government and the Federation did not launch an appeal. In anticipation of the hurricane, the Jamaican Red Cross opened the Emergency Operation Centre and put Red Cross branches on alert. After the storm had passed, the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (ODPEM) held a preliminary debriefing meeting with national agencies, including Utilities and Works Agencies, Telecommunications companies, the Army, Law Enforcement, the Fire Department and the Meteorological Office. Parish Disaster Committees and personnel of the local JRC branch reported that St. Elizabeth parish was particularly badly affected and that 30 families had been stranded in the community of Big Woods. Six shelters were opened in St. Elizabeth, housing about 100 people and were managed by the JRC. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MLSS) provided food supplies to the shelters, and the St. Elizabeth branch of the JRC prepared meals and distributed hygiene kits.

Hurricane Ivan caused significant structural and economic damage to Jamaica. Official figures suggest that 15 persons were killed with another 100,000 directly affected. More than 34,000 houses were damaged and 5,000 completely destroyed. Bearing the brunt were communities scattered across the south and west of the island, including families dependent on farming and fishing who lost livelihoods. Ivan’s direct damage and indirect losses amounted to 8% of the GDP in 2003, or US $580 million. According to an analysis conducted by UNDP/Jamaica in March 2005, the disasters (including Hurricane Charley) will reverse the economic recovery trend the country had been experiencing since 2002 reducing growth from an expected 2.6% to only 1.9%.

On Thursday the 9th of September winds of nearly 250 km per hour accompanied by heavy rains and tidal surges pounded Jamaica loosening topsoil and precipitating landslides. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, main arterial routes remained blocked thus slowing the relief and recovery effort. Utility services, particularly electricity and water services were shut off contributing to fears of an outbreak of disease. Portland Cottage and Rocky Point in the parish of Clarendon sustained extensive damage and lost safe water supplies. UNDAC reported that 177 communities were affected and 40-50 landslides occurred cutting off 30- 50,000 people from food and services for several weeks.

However, six weeks after the emergency the island had visibly recovered. Utilities were restored, schools reopened and significant amounts of humanitarian assistance was delivered. However, 17 shelters remained open offering accommodation to those whose homes were destroyed. Through the MLSS, a special office, the Office of National Reconstruction (ONR), was created to disburse funds and loans to those whose livelihoods have been interrupted. Each parish has a disaster committee.

With a presence in 13 or 14 parishes, the JRC, in partnership with the Jamaican authorities and the IFRC, responded quickly to Hurricane Ivan. JRC has trained 9 Community Disaster Response Teams (CDRT) through a DIPECHO-funded project and response in areas where CDRTs existed was more efficient than others. The JRC managed 100 of the 278 shelters which were used by over 11,000 people. Assessments were undertaken and relief items procured and distributed to those in need. By early November, 70% of food and non food items originally forecast in the Ivan Jamaica Appeal had been distributed. The remaining relief items were distributed in the next few months.

According to OCHA’s financial tracking system, over $4.3 million was pledged from donors, plus many millions in in-kind donations, to the emergency operations in Jamaica. (See timeline at the end of this section for Federation Responses.)

The Final Plan of Action (November 2004) set out the following objectives (See ex-post logframe at the end of this section for details on activities.)

General objective: Support the JRC in their activities to address the immediate needs of the people affected by Hurricane Ivan and to support the NS in identifying medium to long term needs. IFRC support will also strive to strengthen the capacity of the JRC Objective 1: 7,500 families in Jamaica will have benefited from the provision of food and non-food items to assist them in recovering from the effects of the hurricane. Objective 2: Around 3,000 families in Jamaica have been able to return home as a result of the provision of temporary shelter materials and roof repairs. Objective 3: The water and sanitation needs for 3,000 vulnerable families in Jamaica have been assessed, and a plan has been developed to deliver the planned assistance in this sector Objective 4: Children whose families lost their livelihoods as a result of hurricane Ivan will be provided with supplementary food assistance. Objective 5: Vulnerable families will have benefited from psychosocial support to assist them in recovering from the effects of the hurricane.

Objective 6: The capacity of the Jamaica Red Cross and vulnerable communities in disaster response and preparedness will have been strengthened

Good practices: The following were areas commended by the Jamaica team in the Grenada workshop in April of 2005. (See also Strengths in SWOT analysis.) 1. Existence of community disaster response teams (CDRTs) 2. Excellent support from and for other NGOs and ODPEM, the national emergency office. 3. Pre-positioning of supplies among branches 4. Excellent pre-disaster relationships based on MOUs with local suppliers for equipment, hardware, and food and beverage distributors. 5. Excellent pre-disaster relationship with service clubs (Kiwanis, etc.). 6. Good media relations 7. FACT team pre-deployment 8. Existence + deployment of disaster mental health unit. 9. Weekly coordination meetings with UNDAC and other players.

Assessment Issues

The Federation appeal was based on preliminary figures from the assessment, however, the collection and analysis of data proved to be problematic for the following reasons: · Assessments were carried out by technical or relief sectors that were not coordinated among actors from other organizations · Assessment data was not stored in a central location but was located in various laptops and in files · The assessment analysis was not incorporated into the plan of action so that the relationship between data and requested assistance was clear. · The assessment methodology confused hurricane related damage and hurricane related needs · The assessment relied heavily on visual inspection rather than a carefully developed set of questions · People inflated their losses in order to receive assistance. · Lack of access to the communities cut off by landslides and debris meant reliance on local volunteers and other (possibly untrained) community members to collect assessment data · The JRC volunteers and staff were not fully capacitated to conduct a more scientific assessment and experienced many difficulties in judgment and the FACT did not compensate for these weaknesses.

Since Federation response is rooted in the generation of accurate data in the assessment phase, the response must be seen to be compromised by the poor quality of this data. The weakness in the assessment created the following problems: · The rationale for some of the programming was not well understood at later stages in the operation, after the first FACT team had left. · Not all households that had lost roofs required the full range of relief assistance but often they received everything on offer. · The confusion between damage and need made it more difficult to identify the most vulnerable (such as those who had lost livelihoods but not roofs) · The appeal was based on data that was somewhat in question. 93

Distribution and program resource issues

The JRC is seen by a large number of citizens as the organization responsible for assisting them, or the “Provider of Necessities”. Although there are criteria for selection of beneficiaries, distributions in the initial stages are often “blanket”, or untargeted by necessity to act quickly and due to the immediate post-disaster chaos. Unanticipated issues came up in distributions. . Some of the issues were:: · Lack of ability to target resulted in a “stampede” for assistance at first. Security personnel were needed to ensure peaceful distributions at least once in Portland Cottage. · Centralized distributions were missed by some vulnerable people living on the periphery and drive through distribution did not reach everyone · Supplies ran out before all people in-need received them · The beneficiaries for the ongoing program for the homeless and destitute had to be assisted but many were lost among the others clamoring for help · The warehouses and distribution places were surrounded by people seeking assistance. · Local suppliers were not able to deliver all materials in time as per the pre-disaster arrangements. · Distribution lists grew and prices in the local markets became very high due to demand, delaying distributions. · Politicians exerted political pressures to distribute goods in their jurisdictions. s · Food distributions continued after four months using JRC funds · Some of the hygiene kits and kitchen sets were retained for JRC stocks rather than distribute the entire amount specified in the appeals. This was done with the full knowledge of IFRC and donors and documented as replacing stock for the remainder of the hurricane season. · The response operation struggled to achieve some of its objectives on time. For example, the few available volunteers managed to package the food parcels but they were not always delivered to beneficiaries on time.

Other resource issues included: · Sending leased vehicles (2) by the Sub-regional office at great cost and time for customs clearance when purchase of a vehicle might have been more cost effective and sustainable · In-kind donations of bed sheets which were too small for the beds Jamaican people normally use. (Currently, these sheets are still being distributed to institutions and centres serving vulnerable social groups).

The psychosocial support program was highly regarded by all who received services, including volunteers and communities. The JRC also assisted other NS with implementing psychosocial support. However, the service did not receive all of the support it needed and coverage was not adequate.

Coordination issues

The JRC enjoys a good relationship with the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (ODPEM). Through its strong network, the JRC was able to facilitate the coordination by the FACT team with actors in the government and other organizations.

ODPEM offered praise for the collaborative efforts on the part of JRC staff and volunteers but said that the JRC representatives should be present constantly in the EOC during the warning phase of the emergency (48 hours before to after the onset), since it is somewhat predictable that communications will be disrupted. Their absence (less than full presence) during this time resulted in gaps in response and made it less coherent. There are relatively few JRC staff and volunteers who command authority and some have stronger management skills, thus, communications tend to be with these individuals. Communication based on personalities is not effective in the long term and organizations outside the JRC should be able to depend on the entire management staff to respond to them effectively and share information.

In partnership with ODPEM, UNDP was responsible for the coordination of the international relief effort but it was spread too thin as staff were called away to other islands affected by Ivan. Due to poor coordination and information sharing, agencies targeted similar groups of beneficiaries and provided some with similar types of assistance. The lesson of need for coordination is a hard learned one in many emergencies but the lead organization must ultimately assign organizations to work in areas where they are strong dividing up the affected areas so that coverage is achieve, duplication is avoided and anarchy does not reign. The FACT team may have been instrumental in the initial weeks in helping ODPEM and UNDP.

FACT Management and Capacity Development Issues

In advance of the hurricane, the Federation deployed its Geneva-based FACT officer (and a PADRU Information Officer), who initiated discussions with the JRC Director of Emergency Services and the Disaster Management Coordinator regarding the potential appeal. A second FACT team leader arrived a week later and did not have formal FACT training.

Differing memories and opinions exist regarding the deployment and operations of the FACT which reflect the distancing of the NS and the FACT. Some staff reported that there was a considerable delay in formulating TORs for the team but a FACT TOR was sent in advance of the first team. Further, many interviewees felt that there was not a clear delineation of responsibilities while a plan of action was agreed upon on September 14 with an organigram, developed as a result of negotiation with JRC,

For its part, the JRC had mixed feeling regarding the FACT deployment and presence. The differences in management styles between the JRC and the FACT members raises the need for improved managerial understandings. The FACT members need to be aware of capacity and have the skills to negotiate contentious issues. The FACT operates in a supporting role to the JRC but numerous comments indicated that the FACT at times was not respectful of NS capacity and the NS was not consulted on all decisions. (See results of the Lessons Learned workshop below.). Positive elements included: · Preparedness deployment of two team members and pre-planning for the appeal

· The self-sufficiency of FACT (mixed blessing, see below) allowing NS staff to carry on their duties · The location of the FACT near the NS so that they are familiar with each other

The JRC understood that that the FACT mandate was to consolidate one operation, however, it became apparent to both insiders and outsiders that there were in fact two separate operations. This perception was expressed by several interviewees despite the fact that FACT had a NS focal point who worked with the logistics delegate and there was a Team Leader counterpart as well. The coordination of the external aid was made by the IFRC and the JRC was not always aware of where funds came from. At the urging of the IFRC, JRC persuaded cooperating NS to channel funds through the IFRC. The warehouses in customs, as well as donations and supplies of the JRC could not be mixed, according to delegates, with those of the IFRC where certain donors were concerned, however, the goods were mixed in distributions.

Water and sanitation are not a normal service of the JRC and it had not distributed watsan inputs before aside from bottled water. A watsan program was initiated as an important first step in watsan capacitation for JRC. The FACT member correctly attempted to coordinate with the national program for water and sanitation and vector control, however, the details of this coordination were not provided to the JRC. Ongoing assessment revealed that the water authority could restore the water services. The JRC provided affected numbers of families and this information was used to plan the purchase of a large quantity of chlorine, most of which was unused and will now be available to longer term services such as health services. Ultimately, the FACT watsan member along with volunteers provided some training.

Volunteer issues:

The JRC does not have enough volunteers to meet the assessment and distribution needs resulting from the widespread impact of a hurricane like Ivan. FACT team members said that the volunteer capacity was overestimated by the JRC which ultimately led to a weak assessment and distribution problems.

Volunteers who had been trained in CDRT (shelter management, first aid, search and rescue, logistics, etc.), in charge of assessment and distribution said that although they were “well trained” they lacked key components to making their roles effective. These issues had provoked exceptional frustration to the point of causing bickering and animosity among the entire local network. These included: · Not enough anticipation of problems with shelters: some shelters lacked supplies at first when people had nothing; some shelters were damaged, the roofs blew off · There was very little time to do the assessments and not enough volunteers, some had to walk many miles in the mountains and cover several small communities (25 – 29) ; despite joining with MLSS, there were not enough people to cover all communities · There was no container pre-positioned in this remote area (Cedar Valley); food was procured by pre-arrangement from the local stores · Thousands of people came to the central courtyard seeking help; assistance had to be negotiated, hygiene packs divided, etc. so the most needy received something

· There were not enough vehicles so the one large truck had to fill up in Kingston (2 – 3 hours away) and return; they were always short of food · The amount “sent” from Kingston came nowhere near meeting needs in terms of zinc and mattresses (assessment indicated 4,000 sheets of zinc were needed, but only 500 were received; 1,000 needed mattresses but only 500 received) · The volunteers did not understand what the constraints were on resources and could not explain it to the communities; they could not see how results of assessments were analyzed and were part of the distribution plan. Due to lack of information, they said that their area was simply not favored to receive what it needed. · They experienced a sense of powerlessness to achieve goals in assisting the community. · They themselves needed assistance but were asked to wait for help. · They desperately need a volunteer support system and want to work with other volunteers from other areas.

Financial management issues

The delay in producing budgetary information on a timely basis hampered the ability of FACT team leaders to make decisions regarding expenditures and caused lengthy delays in the purchase of much needed items, such as mattresses. Replies from PADRU or the Sub-regional Operations Manager took usually one month. Some of reasons for the delays are: · Four countries were served by the Ivan appeal · Procurement largely took place outside the country · Lack of efficient tools for budget holders to manage accounts · Possible lack of a larger strategy for spending the Ivan account · Weakness in lines of management and ability to share relevant information.

Lessons Learned From Jamaica Team in Grenada Workshop, April 2005 Lesson Recommendation 1. Recognizing the value of having CDRTs. 2. Promote the development of CDRTs 2. Recognition of the importance of the role of 3. Continue pre-deployment of FACT teams the pre-deployment in being able to FACT 4. Ensure that plans at all levels are continually team, properly assess the NS capacity. tested and updated 3. The importance of disaster response planning 5. Access various information databases, to 4. The importance of communication and access continually be abreast of things that are to various means of communication. happening 5. The importance of the FACT team 6. Establish MOUs with potential donors for developing cultural sensitizing and assistance. familiarization with the host nation. 7. Should emergencies arise establish ongoing 6. The importance of the role of disaster mental education programmes to maintain visibility health in the process of disaster management. 8. FACT team should be oriented to the host 7. The necessity of capacity building country. Members should spend time en the 8. Importance of knowledge of the principles in community as part of orientation process the work in the community 9. Psychological support programmes should be 9. Importance of the maintenance of budget developed persons trained, and administration allocation for additional staff strengthened. 10. Importance of collaboration among all 10. Increase the focus on proper capacity building by: stakeholders. a) ensuring that programme is in place to develop, recruit and management volunteers. B) ensuring that the stress management is incorporated in

disaster management training. C) Physical infrastructures should be able to deal with the demands that will be placed on the NS during times of disaster. 11. Ensure that field reps a NS are aware of the policies and principles of the IFRC before deployment. 12. Continue to include allocation of monies towards hiring additional staff during times of disasters. 13. Any operation that involves international input all stakeholders must be consulted on the plans of the operation before decisions are made and action taken.

Other Recommendations: Jamaica

Assessment, Distribution · Amplify and accelerate training for branch staff and volunteers for rapid assessment · Increase number of volunteers who are trained in CRDT · Hire full time staff in the branches to implement preparedness measures and pre-planning for distribution

FACT and NS Relationships: · Encourage interaction with means of consultations among the different actors within the Federation (FACT – PADRU – Regional Delegations - NS) for taking decisions. · Make clear agreements of cooperation and facilitate more willingness for bilateral cooperation with other cooperating NS · Unify the operation between the FACT and the NS, including the NS in all areas for decision making. · The FACT should show respect to cultural norms of the region · Establish better channels for communication between foreign and national teams · Establish procurement norms ahead of emergencies.

Coordination: · Develop communication and information management skills of JRC management so that all managers can be called upon to share information · Develop field operations skills, planning skills – response to different scenarios · Ensure JRC presence in national EOC to streamline coordination. · Coordinate ahead of time where all organizations will work · Create working groups to tackle sectoral problems ahead of the disasters

Community Interviews Analysis: JAMAICA

Interviews – Locations and Descriptions of People Interviewed:

The team (Gamarra and Reed) conducted interviews in five parishes which were among the 7 suffering the greatest impact: Clarendon, St. Catherine, Manchester, St. Elizabeth and St. Thomas. These perspectives were triangulated with the information provided by the Branch offices and the volunteers.

Clarendon: Portland Cottage: Population: 13,000; Received the highest winds, one hour drive south-west of Kingston, Red Cross volunteer Pastor from nearby town serves the area; People living near the ocean are due to be relocated by the government, thus people have minimally repaired their original houses, but the new houses have not been started yet. There is one public shelter which sheltered 500 people during the storm and was extremely crowded. Many did not go to the shelter due to fear of loss of personal items in their houses. There were problems with JRC distribution, threats and anger, and security guards accompanied the earlier distribution.

Woman Informant: three children (5 in house), male partner employed, location of house - about a mile from the center of town, lost roof and possessions inundated

Male Focus Group: Fisherman, 9 men, ages 25 – 50, lost nets, protected most boats during the storm, inlet for parking boats near the mangroves was inundated with silt and had not been dredged by the government yet; angry, indignant about inequities in distribution.

Rocky Point: Population: 23,000; Received the highest winds, about 1½ hour from Kingston. Two women, who had been trained as Red Cross volunteers but were not acting in the capacity of volunteers, organized the community and shared resources, including food, water and medicines. The water was seriously polluted and some people became ill, they bleached the water supply.

Women’s Focus Group: Approximately 9 young and middle aged, 2 elderly, raise small stock and kitchen gardens; angry and indignant about inadequacy of emergency and recovery assistance

St. Thomas: West Albion area: Population around 300, impoverished area.

Woman Informant: 4 children and 2 adults living in house, entire roof lost and windows. Roof patched with assorted zinc and partially tarped. Stayed in shelter for 2 weeks, very crowded. She cannot afford to send her daughter to high school, does not have money to buy the zinc and did not receive government assistance although she applied for it.

Manchester: Bryan’s Land: Population approximately 2,000

Woman Informant: Single HoH, 5 children; lost roof, sought shelter for a week, people on the main road had received assistance but the houses on hilly side roads were missed; less than 5 km from the RC Branch office

St Elizabeth: Fagan Town, population, approximately 1000 people Woman informants: Two HoH; one in household of 5, one with 7; “poorer” woman lost chickens and her house; she repaired it herself, the roof leaks, “richer” woman received government money when her house indicates relative wealth; the first woman did not know how to apply for assistance.

General Findings/Satisfaction with assistance: While people were grateful to receive whatever goods they got in the early stages of the emergency, most cannot afford to buy the larger items, such as mattresses and zinc for the roof, new fishing nets and small stock. Therefore, at this stage they feel that they have not received enough to help them recover. The JRC is helping with roofs but it was unclear whether the available zinc would meet the needs and unclear how people were selected for help. There were many people who had patched their roofs with faulty zinc and on appearance would seem that they did not need new roofs. The use and education regarding hurricane straps was unclear.

Recognition of the Red Cross: The Red Cross is thrown together in people’s minds with other responders, possibly due to the chaos in the early weeks. Thus the entire system is judged and brought down by the weakest member, which is often the government relief organizations. Very few exemplified the Red Cross over others. Some responders were exemplified over the JRC, such as the private donors and citizens and private sector contributors.

Jamaica Community Interview Summary - Interviews conducted from March 25-31

Situation of Pre-hurricane Immediate Emergency assistance Recovery Assistance and Status the Affected preparedness and when received Person(s) Measures: Post hurricane situation Woman: three Roped roof, but it 1. Food for the Poor – 3 days, food None, did not request MLSS, roof children, one blew off bought extra 2. Maxi and Super Plus (Maypen partially tarped; cannot afford to mile from the food; not familiar stores) 1 week, clothes and shoes, replace frig, uses ice chest, bought central Port-. with shelter food, cooked food only one small mattress, others land Cottage 3. Red Cross – 1 week, food, tarp ruined: awaiting relocation Fishermen Secured fishing boats, 1. Private sector people: water and Princess Anne visited and sent focus group; sent elderly to a safe food, 48 hours community money; Oxfam, Food one half mile place; Catholic 2. Red Cross – 3 days, food, water for the Poor, Disaster Committee, from center of Church offered trained medical people, health Red Cross follow-up: zinc, Portland shelter advice, assessment, central furniture clothes, mattresses, Cottage distribution and drive through but Pending house relocation and silt

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ran out of goods removal; need nets; small stock 3. Food for the Poor - tarps

Women’s Some citizens left the 1. Private citizen – came with Parish Disaster Committee; the focus group: area: The water was water truck, 3 weeks Office of Reconstruction did Rocky Point; polluted, many got 2. British Council - MD assessment; out of 23,000, 10,000 sick; people have to 3. ADRA – one month, medical are yet to receive any assistance; buy food, candles at 4. Red Cross and Kiwanis – After Some houses scheduled for inflated prices one month, drive through relief relocation truck Woman None, stayed under 1. Mother in law Still no mattresses, drought is informant, floor boards after roof 2. Shelter for one week killing food crops; had to pay Single HoH- 5 blew off; once back 3. Red Cross – 3 weeks – pound of someone to put back the roof; no children; home after shelter had flour, tarp, 1 blanket, one towel money left Bryan’s Land to buy water Woman Saw warnings on TV 1. Shelter – very crowded – 2 No prospect to buy zinc; tarp informant: 4 - Went to shelter with weeks blows continuously in the wind children; West children 2. 4-H mattress making a loud noise Albion 3. 3 weeks –hygiene kit – not really needed but appreciated, RC volunteer recognized but not organization – other distributions took place a mile away

2 Women Stayed in houses 1. Red Cross – One week, survey, One woman, the wealthier, informants: food package received government assistance; Fagan Town, 5 2. Ryder company – food package the other had not received any and 7 family long term recovery assistance - members roof leaking

Recommendations and Final Comments from Communities:

1. Many of the distributions occurred in the town center. People on the outskirts were not notified or were not present to receive goods. If there were drive-throughs, the trucks often ran out of goods before getting to the more remote parts of the towns. If you were not home at the time, you were out of luck. Someone needs to check to see who received and who did not and then conduct a selected distribution. 2. There was too much food and too many clothes distributed when there were other immediate needs such as clean water and tarps and mattresses and restoration of livelihoods such as fishing nets and small stock. A good assessment needs to be done and distributions based on needs. People need to patch up their houses and then to quickly get to making a living, or at least trying to raise some food in their yards. 3. People need to come in and train communities completely in disaster preparedness and first aid. 4. Water tanks are needed to back up the drinking water needs for the entire population near the ocean as the ground water level is very high so ground water quickly gets polluted. 5. Woman and sometimes men get resigned to waiting for something to come or else accepting their fate. They may tend to use whatever resources they have to buy a television. They need advice as to what assistance is available and how to apply for it and then to follow up to receive it.

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Good Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop: Hurricane Ivan

April 4, 2005, Grenada

Workshop Agenda As Implemented

SESSION TIME TOPIC KEY POINTS Introduction 8:30 – 9:15 Welcome, · Welcome by IFRC and Introductions, Grenada Red Cross Expectations, · Introduction of Facilitators and Workshop Participants with their objectives and expectations from the overview of the workshop day’s activities · Brief overview and rationale Session 1 9:15 – 10:30 Problem Analysis · Problems encountered in the response · Problems and weaknesses in the system · Categorization and prioritization of the problems BREAK 10:30 – 10:50 Session 2 10:50 – 12:00 Resume problem · Complete problem analysis analysis; · Develop solutions and fill gaps Initiate Solution · Analyze strengths, Analysis weaknesses, opportunities and threats · Compile good practices SWOT analysis LUNCH 12:00 – 1:00 Session 3 1:00 – 4:30 Country and Group · Presentation of Good Presentations Practices, Lessons Learned and Recommendations BREAK 4:30 – 4:50 Session 4 4:50 – 5:30 Progress in · Group ranking of status in meeting standards meeting standards Summary 5:30 – 6:00 Workshop · Summary of results and summary and participant evaluations, closing evaluation, closing

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Grenada Workshop Participants

Name Institution Position Telephone 1. Scott Musniks Trinidad & Tobago Red Disaster Director 678-3919 Cross 2. Cathy Wells Bahamas Red Cross Centre Chairman 242 – 3527163 3. Hemant Balgobin B.V.I. Red Cross RITS –Disaster 473-4037916 Coordination – Grenada 4. Karine Amurath IFRC – Sub regional Office in Finance Admin Officer 868-6272665 Trinidad & Tobago 5. Hezela Caballero IFRC – Regional Officer – RFU Assistant 507-3171300 Panama 6. Yvonne Clark Jamaica Red Cross Director General 876-984- 78603 7. Erroll Alliman Jamaica Red Cross ESSC – Chairman 876-9449469 8. Ruth Crishlom Jamaica Red Cross Director Emergency & Communication 9. Samora Bain Jamaica Red Cross Coordinator Mental Health Unit 10. Tracy Reines IFRC – Grenada Team leader 404-3918 11. Grete Stormoen IFRC – Sub regional Office in Ops. Manager Trinidad & Tobago 12. Sheena Vacciana Jamaica Red Cross Chairman Clarendon 13. Ngozi Decoteau Grenada Red Cross 14. Terry Charles Grenada Red Cross Director General 15. Gyvon George Grenada Red Cross DP member 440- 1483/4494866 16. Roslyn Joseph Grenada Red Cross Youth Officer

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GRENADA WORKSHOP SWOT ANALYSIS

STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES · Respect by government – Beneficiaries respect Red · Over compensating HEADS and underpaying – actual Cross “laborers” those who get the work done · Federation ability to launch appeal – Raise funds – · Targeting + beneficiaries – NS support during Respect of donors. operation · Great support through bi-lateral agreements · Unwillingness to support NS operation and staff · Improved RC image in many communities during rehabilitation phase. · A very clear outline of roles and responsibility · Caribbean National Societies are not as wealthy and mainly use volunteers for works. demands are great Mobilize volunteers – delegate – response units – · on volunteers but compensations are not available for existing structure PADRU – Regional officer, NS. work done. · Logistical in disaster, pre-positioning for every · Lack of funding for sustained capacity building response. · Awareness of available resources (logistic, human, Disaster mental health unit exists · RITs.) – Team leaders should first acknowledge what · A wonderful core of volunteers to carry out is there available. operation · Personnel from within region area hardly used or · Quick response by movement when used not used to the fullest capabilities. · NS (regional) response and support · Shear size increases risk of losing the common/local · Involvement of non RC members in distribution touch and serving their communities · Not enough respect shown for the views and ideas of · Personnel are available within region to be used and subordinates can respond quickly · Bulk of appeal funds spent on personnel instead of · Common goal – humanitarian aid actual goods for relief. · National society has an excellent track record in · Missus of volunteers during relief operations, disaster management sometimes back of training. · Sister societies and IFRC, have finances that could · Bad communication between PADRU/SRD/team be provided to assist smaller societies in capacity leader and response team. building bonds would be greater and more unity for · IFRC – Dissimilation of information. When NS’s ask, future events and development they can get, IFRC needs to be more pro-agive and · Visibility in disaster preparedness able to anticipate through on going contact and · Red Cross good image dialogue. · NS unite per common cause · Lack transport for god delivery – connecting wrong perception in public eyes that RC has all answers for International support for relief efforts from IFRC – · finances. Tried and test programmers and guidelines · Many NS feel outside of IFRC system management · A very strong support system is in place quick response to Grenada · Not enough local NS accountability to bens / donors – implementation/evaluation funds · Local partners area available to assist when the need arises. · Transfer of information between societies, branches, IFRC, donors, NGO’s and agencies. · Good training opportunity made available · Ability to change at times in NS structures and needs. · Net-working with other agencies. · Inter Island NS relationship/communication · To many volunteers not enough paid staff · Not clear enough responsibility lists for personnel · Expectation between volunteers and paid staff · Coordination of response unit · Information sharing · Management of teams · The tendency to over extend ourselves · Financial support to NS · Respect of decisions, suggestion from de NS · Who is in charge? – NS? – IFRC? – Panama? Too

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much confusion. · Communication issues · Working relationship with sub regional officer and DP personnel in Regional Officer. · Lack of TOR and defined structure.. OPPORTUNITIES THREATS · Upgrading of all systems · Most government expect the RC to do all the work · To expand disaster mental health awareness within · Societies can become self sufficient and take away the region some of their funding (IFRC) · Past response of the financial team in this operation · Fund miss appropriate for manage the funds · The stigma of mental health being for those who are · Easily marketable recognized image “mad” will continue to prevail. · In disaster to have memberships + volunteer · Lack of accountability at every level increased · Differences between differences (NS, NGO, etc.) · Opportunity present for capacity building within the causing mistrust this will hamper future relief efforts. NS · Emergency – recovery and recovery and rehabilitation · Experience gained in different cultures. This should phasing out be nurtured developed by RD, secretariat, SRO, etc. · Government and NGO fears – Public affectation – · Learning from other Caribbean Societies, we are Donation of insolated going/service not doing it enough · NS’s being left out of loop due to political agendas – · Betterment of community and societies through NS’s as scope goats – NS’s relying to much on training and interfacing. outside sources for assistance. · Bringing funding opportunities to Island and pounding more visibility. · NS can pitch services (DP) to government for funding and local $ recognition. · Donor support – Beneficiary ready to be served – NGO respect – International agencies to make with.

Results of Group Discussions (See Grenada and Jamaica reports for country results)

IFRC – Group (Panama Regional Office, Sub Regional Office, Bahamas Red Cross, and RIT member) Recommendation Best practice 1. Maintain DREF in Caribbean 1. Involved of units ERU, PADRU, (disposable funding for the FACT, NS. emergencies) 2. Integration between 2. Have a logistic person with the Government and NS Caribbean 3. Quicker response 3. DM in Caribbean 4. Set plans aloud be present every NS (Emergency Plans) 5. Different nationalities (for Caribbean) employed in the SRO 6. Instead of delegates (Int’l) regional delegates are be utilized 7. Training session 8. Emergency equipment for the RITs 9. OSB, FEDNET

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International Group: Delegates Grenada and Sub-Regional Office; Trinidad and Tobago Red Cross Fact team - 1st team deployed Expectation: Opportunity to prepare – NS of what coming. Consultation. Procedures. Capacities; FED. Come in before to - Ensure all phase for strikes and needed for give donations. Getting familiar 1. Society is in charge – Expectation what happens/roles & responsibilities; which informs and Plan of Action. Clear terms of reference for 1st 3 months. Within week FACT on ground (NS/IFRC) (NS & Government as well). good communication. Previous accounts supply, new guests. 2. Be aware of importance of information sharing needs & preparedness. Sharing & processing checklist. Mutual responsibilities. VISAS. Is Society able 1st to confirm who to report to. What are people prepared with. 3. FACT team – tool box – check list – function security – info to inform & put in MOU – clear expectation – Not subjective ® Account/responsible, needs ® Appeal must to be when correct 1st time. appeal on reality ® Appeal based needs based on assessment and fact ® Reassess with NS – Should be on going process 4. Clear TOR & PADRU role, needed from PADRU 5. Flexible of roles 6. RITS – TORs (Here to implement relief) 7. Team leader & starkness: FACT team to in form & identify local channels (how to access). team leader (qualification). ® ECHO money FED relieve must be involved ® More regionally involvement, better. Need to reassess abilities

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Annex 1: Terms of Reference

FINAL EVALUATION OF THE HURRICANES OPERATION

Background

Hurricane Charley On 13th August 2004, Cuba was severely impacted by hurricane Charley, a category 3 storm, which hit the provinces of Ciudad de la Habana and La Habana. In anticipation of the storm, the Civil Defence evacuated 215,532 individuals from high-risk areas. Of those evacuated 35,794 took refuge in temporary shelter whilst the rest stayed with family and friends. Over 70,000 homes were damaged and thousands of hectares of crops were spoiled. Electricity, water and telephone networks were severely affected and 798 schools and 312 health centres were damages.

The International Federation requested assistance seeking CHF 2,419,000 to assist 25,000 beneficiaries for 6 months.

Haiti Floods The floods in Haiti were a result of tropical storm Jeanne which hit the island between 17th and 19th September 2004. Floodwaters were over 2 metres in depths. The most affected departments include l’Artibonite, Plateau Central, Sud and Nord-Ouest. The town of Gonaives in l’Arbonite, with a population of approximately 200,000, and its surrounding areas was the hardest hit. Over half of Gonaives populations was left without food, water and shelter. According to the Civil Protection Directorate approximately 300,000 people have been affected; 1,514 dead; 2,600 injured; and approximately 1,000 missing.

In response to tropical storm Jeanne the International Federation launched a preliminary appeal on 22 nd September and later a revised appeal on 5th October as a result of the finding of the joint Haiti RC and IFRC needs assessment mission. CHF 150,000 was disbursed from the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF).

The preliminary appeal: sought CHF 4,246,000 to assist 40,000 beneficiaries for a period of six months.

The revised appeal: sought CHF 11,673,000 to assist 50,000 beneficiaries for the same period of time. Appeal coverage: 83.5%

The main objective of the appeal is “providing and ensuring balanced and equitable assistance to the most vulnerable in both Gonaives and the outlying areas”

Hurricane Ivan Hurricane Ivan, the most powerful hurricane to hit the Caribbean, in the last fifty years, lasted from 7th – 13th September 2004. It started off as a category 3 hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson scale when it passed by Barbados, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago. It strengthened into a category 4 hurricane when it hit Grenada where approximately 60,000 people were in need of assistance. In Haiti 830 people were evacuated as a result of the flooding and shelters were set up for 1600 persons in five communes. Although Ivan did not directly hit Jamaica, where approximately 500,000 people were urged to evacuate high risk areas, much destruction was caused to the infrastructure. Hurricane Ivan passed Cuba and Mexico causing relatively minor damage and the moved on to the United States where it caused at least 20 deaths – the worst damage was seen in Florida.

The International Federation launched a preliminary appeal on 10 th September 2004 and later a revised preliminary appeal on 15th September 2004. CHF 300,000 was disbursed from DREF.

The preliminary appeal: sought CHF 1,389,560 to assist 10,000 beneficiaries for a period of 6 months. 107

The revised preliminary appeal: sought CHF 6,033,000 to assist 85,000 beneficiaries for the same period of time. Appeal coverage: 94.3%

In the above operations the following international and regional teams were deployed:

§ Field Assessment and Coordination Teams (FACT) § Emergency Response Units (ERU) § Regional Intervention Teams (RIT)

Additional information on the above appeals can be found on:

§ http://www.ifrc.org/where/reg_spcrep.asp?iYear=0&xFlag=2&txtRegion=4&view=1 § http://www.ifrc.org/where/reg_spcrep.asp?iYear=1&xFlag=2&txtRegion=4&view=1

Aim of the Evaluation:

This evaluation aims to provide Secretariat management and the respective National Societies with lessons learnt and recommendations on systemic and generic issues pertaining to disaster operations. It will strive to improve disaster response and disaster management mechanisms.

The main objectives of are: § To assess the relevance of the programme design in relation to the needs of the beneficiaries; § To review the effectiveness of the disaster response tools and systems; § Assess the coordination mechanisms with the various components of the Federation and external stakeholders

Scope: This evaluation will specifically address the following issues:

§ Assess the adequacy of the appeal objectives in relation to the needs of the affected population; § Evaluate whether the activities carried out were appropriate in achieving the objectives § Assess whether the programme design met the needs of the beneficiaries; § Assess beneficiary satisfaction of the Federation response in terms of delivery, adequacy and appropriateness of the relief supplies; § Assess and comment on the participation of the beneficiaries and volunteers in the implementation of the programme at local level; § Assess the quality and efficiency of information management especially the Federations Disaster Management Information Systems, information bulletins appeals and reports and their impact on the operation. § Assess the speed of the response by documenting the evolution of the operation response and commenting on the decision making process; § Assess how the International Federations Secretariat internal management systems interacted to include PADRU, reporting lines and who was responsible for what § Review the process of management of funds at all stages of the operation; § Measure the degree of compliance to internationally recognised standards and Federation policy in the implementation of the operation in the areas of Sphere Standards, Federations standard operating procedures for disaster response and Code of Conduct for Disaster Relief § Assess of the effectiveness of o the Regional Intervention Teams (RITs), Field Assessment and Coordination Teams (FACT) and Emergency Response Units (ERU) deployed; o timeliness, use and adequacy of the funds disbursed from the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF); § Evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the outputs § Assess the communication mechanisms in the areas of: o visibility,

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o pre-hurricane communication materials, o cooperation and coordination with the national and international media § Assess whether the emergency phase of the operation proactively addressed strengthening of the local disaster preparedness and disaster response capacities.

Performance measurement and comment should be provided against the following:

Performance Indicator Where we stand 1. Fundamental principles and humanitarian values/advocacy · RC/RC distinguished from other organizations by its values and principles · known to stand on the side of vulnerable people

2. Disaster preparedness · did we have trained local volunteers and community based preparedness mechanism in place 3. Disaster response did the response results in: · meeting basic needs of affected people (food/water/shelter) · beneficiaries satisfied with service received · no food riots or long lines for relief material in any of the affected areas. 4. Health · no disease outbreak · other organisations know with clarity: what we do, and how we operate in an emergency situation · known for substantial work in health and care 5. National Society · meets performance indicators in the areas listed above. · is know as credible and effective · partner of choice of governments/international organizations/civil society/private sector 6. Working together effectively · acting as one organization determined to maximize the full potential of our global reach and resources in order to achieve greatest impact for our beneficiaries and greatest influence on other actors · all participating and host NSs feel equally valued and respected contributors · Red Cross Red Crescent seen as the 'Heart Beat of Humanity' and is a welcoming space for all people who wants to help or be helped, regardless of nationality, race, religion, political affiliation or any such consideration.

Methodology:

§ Desk review of key documents: appeal, operations update and field reports § Interview with key stake holders to include secretariat staff, delegation staff, donors etc § Field visits to all countries covered by the appeal § Extensive phone interviews will be carries out § Facilitate a one day “lessons learnt” session in Grenada (details will be given at a later date § Operations to be evaluated are in the following countries: Haiti, Jamaica, Grenada, Cayman Islands and Cuba i.e. all countries included in appeals # 21/04 and 22/04

Expected output

§ Inception report (max 5 pgs) to be submitted within 3 days from the commencement of the mission (i.e. by 2rd March) § Draft report (max. 25 pgs) to be submitted within 10 days after the end of the field visits § Final report to be submitted 1 week after receipt of comments (on the draft) from the secretariat 109

§ Final report should include: a) 2 page executive summary b) substantiated findings c) recommendations with proposed actions d) list of people interviewed e) list of documents consulted § Presentation of finding and recommendation within 10 days of submission of final reports

Team Composition:

The team will be comprised of 3 members each of whom has expertise is one of the following areas: § Emergency relief § Financial management § Disaster management

The team leader will be an external and independent consultant and is responsible for the writing up of the final report. One member will be a NS peer reviewer None of the team members would have been involved in the operation All team members will have a working knowledge of French/Spanish

Team members will be selected on the basis of: § Knowledge of the Red Cross Red Crescent Federation § Experience in evaluation and preparing analytical reports

Evaluation Audience: Operating National Societies, Participating National Societies, Federation Secretariat, Federation and external partners.

Timeline:

February 29th – identification of all team members March 7th – meeting of team in GVA for briefing on mission After-which field visits will commence.

4 days for each of the countries involved in the evaluation (details of which will be finalised during the GVA visit)

Draft report to be submitted by 28th March Feedback on draft by 28th March Final report to be submitted by 15th April

Presentation of findings and recommendations to be carried out by 11th April.

Deadline for submitting application: 28th February 2005 Applications should be made to: [email protected]

Only short-listed applicants will be contacted.

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Annex 2: Inception Report

Introduction

This inception report sets out an evaluation strategy which was developed following interviews in Geneva by Sheila Reed and John Wilding and before their arrival in Panama on 20 March. It is considered a starting point and will evolve as Ms. Gamarra, the third team member joins the team in Panama and as key issues arise.

The goal of the evaluation is to provide the Secretariat management and the respective National Societies with lessons learnt and recommendations from preparedness, response, and recovery operations related to Hurricanes Charley (13 August 2004) and Ivan (7 – 13 September 2004) and Hurricane Jeanne (17 – 19 September, 2004). Operations to be evaluated are in all countries included in Appeals # 21/04 and #22/04: Haiti, Jamaica, Grenada, Cayman Islands, Trinidad and Tobago and Cuba. It will study systemic and generic issues pertaining to disaster operations. It will strive to improve disaster response and disaster management mechanisms.

The main objectives of the evaluation are: § To assess the relevance of the programme design in relation to the needs of the beneficiaries; § To review the effectiveness of the disaster response tools and systems; § Assess the coordination mechanisms with the various components of the Federation and external stakeholders

Scope of the evaluation and the ToR: The scope of the evaluation is very broad. A period of 22 days has been allowed for data collection including travel to Geneva and the five countries included in appeals #21/04 and 22/04. Team members will split up to visit Haiti and Jamaica. The time allowed is relatively short and it will be difficult to collect sufficient data, particularly in Haiti, and Jamaica.

The main issues that have thus far been identified are: 1. Communication and coordination: among Federation staff and Federation staff and European societies with national societies, among others 2. Structural issues – roles, responsibilities and relationships 3. Assessment of needs and distribution of timely and appropriate inputs (satisfaction of affected people) 4. Effectiveness of the reporting system: timeliness, reporting requirements, constraints to information collection 5. Human resources management: appropriate skills and training, deployments 6. Stock performance monitoring

The questions in the ToR will be grouped under the OECD/DAC criteria Relevance/Appropriateness, Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Sustainability as shown in the attachment to this inception report. This will allow the readers to relate the questions to overarching concepts in humanitarian assistance and will make the report easier to read.

Data Collection: Constraints, Advantages and Methods

Methods for data collection include document reviews, focus and key informant interviews, and telephone interviews based on a standard interview guide which can be e-mailed ahead of the interview. Special emphasis will be placed on interviewing the people who benefited from assistance and other affected people. Interviewees will include:

· Key actors in the national Red Cross societies that provided Emergency Response Units and other resources, such as the Canadian, Norwegian and British Red Cross Societies. · Donors providing human and material resources, such as ECHO, UNDP, UNICEF, etc. · Government disaster management office staff such as the ODPEM in Jamaica. · Members of the FACT teams, RITs and ERUs

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· Members of communities receiving preparedness, response and recovery assistance as well as other affected people · Staff of regional and national IFRC and Red Cross societies

IFRC intended to conduct this evaluation several weeks earlier which would have been optimum for data collection from the participating delegates and staff. Since then, several of the delegates and regional staff have departed from the region. Some members of the FACT teams and national societies have been interviewed in Geneva and others not present in the countries visited will be interviewed by telephone.

The Easter holiday, which is a major event in the region, takes place during the team’s visit to the region. It will be difficult to conduct interviews in the countries during the four day celebration. At that time, the team members will be in Haiti and Jamaica and can use the time for data analysis of the preceding interviews and documents collected as well as phone interviews to other countries. However, the operations in Haiti and Jamaica will form major parts of the evaluation, and extensive analysis should be carried out in these countries to collect lessons learned and best practices. The time assigned to these countries is clearly insufficient.

Therefore, due to the limited time for data collection in Haiti and Jamaica as per the current schedule, it is recommended that two additional days are added to the schedule in those countries (extended to April 1). It is also recommended that one extra day be added to the time for data collection in Grenada. Thus, departure from Grenada would be moved back three days (from April 6 to April 9). (See rationale below under “Regional Visits”.)

Current Schedule Recommended Schedule Haiti visit: March 25 to March 30 (Easter holiday, Haiti visit: March 25 to April 1 March 25 to March 28): Jamaica visit: March 25 to March 30 Jamaica visit: March 25 to April 1 Grenada visit: March 30 to April 6 Grenada visit: April 1 to April 9

Regional Visits

The initial visits to IFRC headquarters in Geneva and the IFRC Regional office and PADRU in Panama and the Sub-Regional Office in Trinidad and Tobago will provide an overview of the operations. Following are comments on the data collection process from each of the countries targeted for the evaluation, which are included in the two main appeals.

Cayman Islands: The Caymans are not scheduled to be visited. The Islands sustained damages from Hurricane Ivan. The Cayman Islands Red Cross Society was able to learn lessons from this experience when preparing for a possible larger impact. Telephone interviews will be conducted with key informants.

Cuba: A visit by the evaluation team is not possible to Cuba, due to the time needed for and difficulties in getting necessary permissions. Teresa Gamarra, the Spanish speaking member of the team will conduct telephone interviews with key informants. Other contacts will be sought through email.

Grenada: Grenada sustained major damage from Hurricane Ivan. The visit to Grenada is scheduled for March 31 to April 6. During this time, a lessons learned workshop is planned, which is scheduled for April 3rd or 4th. Planning and participating in the workshop will take several days, thus data collection through focus group and key informant interviews in Grenada will be limited. The time in Grenada should be extended by one day in order to visit the affected areas and meet with people who received assistance.

Haiti: Among the countries to be included in the data collection process, Haiti is clearly unique due to extreme poverty, the post-crisis transitional issues including sporadic violence, and a continuing emergency in some areas of the country. The context in Haiti with regard to the hurricane and flood response was extremely complex and numerous assistance actors were involved. Fortunately, the team member who will be visiting Haiti, John Wilding, returned from conducting an evaluation in the country two weeks earlier. Due to the short time available for data collection and the interfacing Easter holiday, the in-depth understanding of the context will be extremely valuable. However, since data collection in Haiti will be extremely limited with the current schedule, it is recommended that the visit be extended by two days.

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Jamaica: The visit to Jamaica interfaces with the Easter holiday. As the schedule stands now, there are only two days available for interviews in Kingston and visits to affected areas. They will have to take place on Thursday before Good Friday, by Teresa Gamarra who will precede Sheila Reed who arrives on Good Friday, and on the Tuesday following Easter Monday by Reed and Gamarra. The staff of Jamaica Red Cross (JRC) have tentatively agreed to be available for discussions on Easter Monday. It may be possible to have a short lessons learned, good practices session on that day.

Since data collection in Jamaica will be extremely limited with the current schedule, it is recommended that the stay be extended for two days. Outside of JRC, key actors who should be interviewed in Jamaica include: citizens of seven parishes receiving relief distributions, the Office of National Reconstruction (ONR), Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (ODPEM), Disaster Mental Health Unit (DMHU), as well as representatives of UNDP, UNDAC, ADRA and The Salvation Army.

Analysis and Reporting

Due to the unique situations in each of the countries, a separate analysis will be provided for each with an overview of the overlapping issues and those emanating from regional or secretariat offices. All findings will be triangulated. Several analytical tools will be employed to consolidate data analysis. These include:

· An Ex-post Logical Framework (for Haiti and Jamaica) · A Chronology of Events During Preparedness, Response and Recovery · Participatory SWOT Analysis · An outcome ranking of progress in meeting Sphere standards · An outcome ranking of progress in meeting the Federation’s standard operating procedures · An outcome ranking of progress in meeting the Code of Conduct for Disaster Relief

Final Evaluation of the Hurricanes Operation

Revised Ordering of TOR Questions

Relevance/Appropriateness: This criterion is concerned with assessing whether the operations met needs and respected priorities of the citizens and were appropriate in the context of the disaster.

· Were the appeal objectives adequate in relation to the needs of the affected population? · Were the activities carried out appropriate in achieving the objectives? · Did the programme design meet the needs of the beneficiaries? · To what degree were beneficiaries satisfied with the Federation response in terms of delivery, adequacy and appropriateness of the relief supplies? · To what degree did beneficiaries and volunteers participate in the implementation of the programme?

Effectiveness: This criterion measures the extent to which an activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs. Implicit within the criteria of effectiveness is timeliness. Issues of resourcing and preparedness should also be addressed under effectiveness.

· How effective were the decision making processes as the operations evolved? Was the response timely? · How effectively did the International Federations Secretariat internal management systems interact? · How effectively were funds managed at all stages of the operation? · How effective and efficient were the information management systems, particularly the Federations Disaster Management Information Systems, information bulletins appeals, and reports? What was their impact on the operations? · How effectively did the International Federations Secretariat internal management systems interact to include PADRU? Did the Secretariat have effective reporting lines? Were roles and responsibilities clear?

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· To what degree did the operations comply with internationally recognised standards and Federation policy in the implementation of the operation in the areas of Sphere Standards, Federations standard operating procedures for disaster response and Code of Conduct for Disaster Relief? · How effective were the following teams: the Regional Intervention Teams (RITs), Field Assessment and Coordination Teams (FACT) and Emergency Response Units (ERU)? · How effective was the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) in terms of timeliness and efficient use of use of funds? · How effective were the communication mechanisms in the areas of: o visibility, o pre-hurricane communication materials, o cooperation and coordination with the national and international media?

Efficiency: This criterion measures the outputs, qualitative and quantitative, in relation to the inputs. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving the same outputs, to see whether the most efficient process has been used.

· How cost-effective were the outputs?

Sustainability/Connectedness: This criterion refers to the need to assure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account. The implementation strategy should be coherent (root causes to immediate needs) and coordinated within the Federation and National Societies and with the activities of other actors.

· Did the emergency phase of the operation proactively addressed strengthening of the local disaster preparedness and disaster response capacities?

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Annex 3: Community Survey Instrument

B.1. Community Questionnaire

Introduction: We are visiting from other countries and on behalf of the International Federation of the Red Cross. (Some of us may be from the National Red Cross.) We are interested in your experience during the hurricanes last year and want to know whether you received the help you needed on time and in the way that you needed it. Your comments are very important to help the Red Cross, national and international, to improve ways to help people in disasters. 1. Please describe your situation. What is the name of your community? What is the population? If key informant interview, how many people are in your family (genders, ages)? How many people live in your house? (Include description of the area where the interview is taking place, such as a city center, a remote village and the distance from the nearest Red Cross office.) What do you do for a living? 2. Please describe what happened to you when the hurricane (name the hurricane, Ivan, Charley or Jeanne and date that it hit) struck, including 3. Measures you took to prepare yourself and your family and your house before the hurricane. Did you receive any training or mitigation inputs from anyone? 4. Where you were when the hurricane struck? (at home, at a shelter, at a relatives, etc.) 5. How did you protect yourself and your family from harm during the hurricane? (If people went to a shelter, how many people were in the shelter and how large was the shelter relative to the population, how accessible was it?) 6. When the hurricane left, who was the first person or organization that made contact with you? What was the purpose of the contact? Did you receive something? If so, what? Were you asked questions? If so, what questions? (Get exact times, e.g. 24 hours afterwards, 48 hours afterwards, etc.): Who was the second person?; Who was the third person? 7. Did anyone ask you what you needed? Who was the first, second, third, etc. to ask you about needs and opinions when you arrived? How many hours or days after the hurricane? 8. What were your most important needs? Were you able to meet some of your own needs? 9. How did you receive needed items, through large distributions, brought to your house, brought by a relative, etc.? 10. Was the help that you received useful? Did it help to meet your most important needs? What did you find the most helpful? The least helpful? 11. Did women, children, elderly, ill, and other groups in your community receive the assistance they needed? 12. What is your opinion of the distributions that took place (by organization)? Were they fair? Were they organized? Did they reach everyone in need? 13. Did the Red Cross come to help you? If so, when? Are you familiar with the Red Cross? Do you know where the closest office is? Are there volunteers in your community? How do you know who they are? How long after the hurricane did you see Red Cross staff or volunteers? 14. It is now 6 months after the hurricane. What problems do you have that are related to what you suffered during the hurricane? 15. What help do you think you will receive for recovery? From whom? Is there a problem with receiving this help? 16. What recommendations do you have for the international and national Red Crosses to help you if there is another hurricane here? Any other comments or questions?

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Annex 4: Persons Consulted

Geneva, IFRC

Ibrahim Osman, Director, Policy and Relations Division Ken Philips, Head, Organisational Development Department Santiago Gil, Head of Americas Department Luis Luna, Officer for Central America, Mexico & the Caribbean, Americas Department Inigo Barrena, Senior Officer, Disaster Preparedness and Response Department Peter Rees-Gildea, Head of Operations Support Department, Geneva Stephen McAndrew, Senior Officer, Field Assessment and Coordination Team (FACT) Tor Planting, Head of Security and Field HR Pieter de Rijke , Emergency Response Unit Senior Officer, Operations Support department, Matthew Varghese, Head of Evaluation Amna AlAhmar, Evaluation Officer Sara Canna, Human Resources Isabelle Sechaud, Logisitics Officer Pierre Haessin, Manager, Field Support (Information Systems Department) Jan Gelfand, Acting Regional Officer, Americas Department Eva Calvo, Officer, Media and Public Relations Unit Lars Tangen, Officer, Security Unit Karla Morizzo, Assistant, Americas Department Mikhail Chitashvili, Officer, Resource Mobilization Unit

Panama:

PADRU: Daniel Bolanos Gonzalez, IT/Telecom Delegate, PADRU, Panama Carl-David Fraser, Regional Logistics Cordinator, PADRU, Panama Manuel Rodriguez, Information Officer, PADRU, Panama Inigo Vila, Disaster Management Delegate, PADRU, Panama Alex Claudon de Vernisy , Disaster Management Delegate Guillermo Garcia, Water and Sanitation Delegate

Regional Delegation

Fabricio Lopez, Sacconi, Regional Head of Delegation Anna Dobai, Regional Programme Coordinator Ole Petersen, Head of Regional Finance Unit, The Americas John Fleming, Regional Health Delegate, Mexico/Central America/Caribbean Marcos Diaz, Regional WATSAN Delegate, Latin America & the Caribbean Xavier Castellano, DPP Delegate John Fleming, Health Delegate Jane Grimshaw, Head of Regional Reporting Delegate

OCHA

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Marie-Louise Belenguer, Acting Head

Trinidad and Tobago

Trinidad and Tobago Red Cross: Lisa Lalsingh, Director General, Port of Spain Scott Muzniks, Director of DPP, Port of Spain

IFRC Sub-Regional Office Julia Brothwell, Coordinator, Port of Spain Grete Stormoen, Operations Manager, Port of Spain Jill Marie St.John, Branch & Disaster Preparedness Officer, Port of Spain

Jamaica

JRC Yvonne Clark, Director General Lois Hue, Deputy Director General Dorothy Francis, Volunteer, Disaster Management Pauline Lawrence, Kingston and St. Andrew Branch Representative Errol Alliman, Chairman of Emergency Services Sheena Vasciannie, Branch Chair, Clarendon Ruth Chisholm, Disaster Management Coordinator Olive Donaldson, Volunteer, Director, Manchester Branch Valenton Wint, Vice President Joshua Davis, St. Thomas Branch Emergency Chair Cedar Valley Community Response Team Sheila Doctor, Emergency Section Chair, St. Elizabeth Lawrence Doctor, Volunteer, St. Elizabeth

Others: David Smith, Programme Officer, UNDP Ron Jackson, Office of Disaster Preparedness and Management (ODPEM)

Haiti

Haitian Red Cross, Croix Rouge Haitienne President, Haitian Red Cross Society, Port au Prince, Haiti Marc Regis, Responsible Gestion des Desastres, , Port au Prince, Horeb Morinvi, Volunteer, Gonaives Saget Kesner, Volunteer, Gonaives - Pierre-Jacques Dorgil, Volunteer, Gonaives

IFRC, Haiti - Hans Havik, Head of IFRC Delegation, Port au Prince, Haiti Pierre Kana, Administrator, IFRC, Gonaives, Haiti

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Serge Estil, IFRC employee & Volunteer, Haitian Red Cross Society, Gonaives, Haiti Brigitte Gaillis, Administrator, IFRC, Gonaives, Haiti Annette Bokkenheuser, Reporting Delegate, IFRC, Gonaives, Haiti Benjamin Wahren, Assistant Head of Delegation (Security), ICRC, Port au Prince, Haiti Roger Bracke, IFRC Coordinator, Gonaives, Haiti

Other Organizations Jens Kristensen, Head of Humanitarian & Development Coordination Unit, UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, Port au Prince, Haiti Marie-Helene Meaux, Chef de Mission, French Red Cross, Port au Prince, Haiti Elene Verluyten, Netherlands Red Cross Society, Port au Prince, Haiti Alfredo Vargas, Netherlands Red Cross Society, Port au Prince, Haiti

Grenada

Grenada Red Cross Terry Charles, Secretary general, Grenada Red Cross Society, St.George’s Gillian Charles, GRCS Warehouse Manager, St.George’s Roslyn Joseph, GRCS Youth volunteer & IFRC Relief Officer, St.George’s Daniel Williams, GRCS Warehouse volunteer & IFRC Field Officer, St.George’s Natasha Monroe, GRCS Emergency Relief and Volunteers’ Manager, St.George’s Tracy Reines, IFRC Representative, IFRC, St.George’s Cindy Lewis, IFRC Finance & Administration Manager, St.George’s Rhonda Joseph, Gavanized Roofing Team Gyvonne Toussaint, Galvanized Roofing Team Yvonne Collins, Emergency Relief, Bi-lateral Roofing Team Hubert Pierre, RIT (St. Lucia Red Cross) Hemant Balgobin, RIT (British Virgin Islands Red Cross)

Other Hon. Brenda Hood, Minister for Tourism, Aviation & the Performing Arts, Government of Grenada, St.George’s Ignacio Cristobal Alcarraz, Independent Humanitarian Consultant, Managua, Nicaragua Michelle Gyles McDonnough, UNDP Country Coordinator, St.George’s Craig Keller, USAID PADCO Housing Program Audrey Creighton, CDERA (formerly)

Cuba

Maria Louisa Arroyo, RIT member Cristina Estrada, Information Delegate

Cayman Islands

Jondo Malafa-Obi, Director, Cayman Islands Red Cross

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Annex 5: Documents Consulted IFRC Antigua and Barbuda, Build it Strong – Hurricane Resistant Wood Frame Housing Project Antigua & Barbuda, West Indies, June 1999 Connecting the Points – A Logistics Strategy for the Americas IFRC Regional Logistics Unt in the Americas, Panama, 2004 Cruz Roja Cubana Plan de Accion – Hurrican Ivan CRC, Havana, Augusto 2004 Fraser,C-D Mission Report – PHT506 – Hurricane Jeanne – Haiti, IFRC, Gonaives Field Office, Haiti, 6th.December 2004 Functions, organisations and relations – PADRU IFRC, Panama, 2003 HNRCS Plan of Action (2005-2008) and Movement cooperation support Disaster Mnagement Programme, HNRCS, Port au Prince, 20th.January 2005 Little, Simon. Jamaica Ivan Operation – Lessons Learnt IFRC, Geneva, 2005 Lockwood,H and Gelford.Jan Evaluation of the Pan-American Disaster Response Unit - Final Report, IFRC, Geneva, July 2004 PADRU – Regional Logisitics Unit – Health in Emergencies Workshop IFRC, Panama, 19th.March 2005 Plan of Action 2003-2007 of the XVIIth Inter-American Conference, IFRC, Santiago de Chile, April 2003 The Red Cross Society of Trinidad and Tobago 2004-2007 Disaster Preparedness Plan RCSTT, Port of Spain, 2004 The Red Cross Society of Trinidad and Tobago Disaster Preparedness Report RCSTT, Port of Spain, 2004 Review of Major Operations in the Americas: Hurricane Georges, Hurricane Mitch and Venezuela Floods, IFRC, Geneva, January 2001 Response Systems in the Americas - PADRU IFRC, Panama 2005 Strengthening National Societies and delivering a more effective service – A change Strategy for the Secretariat IFRC, Geneva, March 2003 Torbjornsen,A., Reimer,D., Puyo-Tschanz,P. In Search of a movement approach in Haiti – An evaluation of the Haitian Red Cross capacity for and Respond to human and natural disasters, HNRCS, Port au Prince, Haiti, 20th.September 2004 Walker, Peter. Armed escorts IFRC, Geneva, 9th.June 1995 Information Bulletins and Appeals Information bulletin – Jamaica, Cuba, Cayman Islands: Hurricane IFRC, Geneva, 13th.August 2004 Information bulletin - Caribbean: Hurricane Frances IFRC, Geneva 31st.August 2004

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Request for Assistance – Cuba: Hurricane Charley (Appeal no.20/2004) IFRC, Geneva, 8th.September 2004, Emergency Appeal – Caribbean: Hurricane Ivan (Preliminary Appeal no.21/04 IFRC, Geneva, 10th.September 2004 Information bulletin- Caribbean: Hurricane Jeanne IFRC, Geneva, 16th.September 2004 Haiti – Appeal no.05AA042 IFRC, Port au Prince, 2005 Emergency Appeal - Haiti: Floods(No. 22/2004) IFRC, Port au Prince, 5 October 2004 Operations Update - Cuba: Huricane Charley IFRC, Geneva, 24th.January 2005 Operations Update – Caribbean: Hurricane Ivan IFRC, Geneva, 4th.March 2005 ICRC Respect et protection du personnel d’organisations humanitaires, ICRC Geneva, 1998 Directives et Regles de Securite ICRC, Port au Prince, Haiti December 2004 UNDP Cayman Islands, Assessment of Hurricane Ivan, ECLAC, 2005 Jamaica, Assessment of Hurricane Ivan, ECLAC Report, 2005.

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