Dictatorship Is Democracy: the Persuasive Power Of

View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE

provided by The University of Utah: J. Willard Marriott Digital Library

DICTATORSHIP IS DEMOCRACY: THE PERSUASIVE POWER OF

PERFORMANCE, REPETITION, AND SILENCE IN ARABIC

POLITICAL SPEECHMAKING IN ASSAD’S SYRIA

Kellie Stirling

A thesis submitted to the faculty of The University of Utah in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Middle East Studies: Arabic and Linguistics

College of Humanities

The University of Utah

December 2014

The University of Utah Graduate School

STATEMENT OF THESIS APPROVAL

The thesis of Kellie Stirling has been approved by the following supervisory committee members:

Thomas N. Huckin , Chair 08/22/2014 Date Approved

Asaad Al-Saleh , Member 08/22/2014 Date Approved

Peter von Sivers , Member 08/22/2014 Date Approved

and by Johanna Watzinger-Tharp , Chair of the Department of Middle East Center and by David B. Kieda, Dean of The Graduate School.

ABSTRACT

This thesis is an analysis of performance, linguistic repetition, and silence in

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s March 30, 2011 speech to the People’s Assembly given 2 weeks after riots erupted in the Syrian province of Deraa on March 15, 2011.

Various types of repetition including syntactic parallelism, word strings, lexical repetition, and phonological and morphological repetition particular to Arabic syntax and its root and pattern system of morphology are analyzed along with manipulative silence and performance aspects of the speech.

This examination reveals that these features were employed intentionally in order to support political strategies and have a certain degree of persuasive or influential power over speech receivers.

The analysis also exposes some of the possible practical and/or ideological considerations specific to the Arab or Syrian context which seem to be motivating either specific instances of repetition and/or the overarching political strategies supported by repetition structures, such as a perception of the U.S. and Israel as colonial or imperial oppressors, the increasing significance of words such as “revolution”, “people”, etc., in the Arab world, Syrian Ba’ath Party ideologies, Arab culture and the concepts of “honor” and “shame”, the preeminence of family in Arab culture, security concerns, Syria’s societal heterogeneity, tactics related to limiting communications, and Syrian national understanding of previous crises and regime critics.

The study of emotive speech such as repetition is particularly relevant in the

Syrian case where political ideology largely precludes the use of mixed Arabic and/or religious speech in political speech-making. This study facilitates further studies of repetition in speechmaking for Arab political leaders. Future studies will be enhanced if researchers are able to precisely measure reactions of speech consumers.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………...iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………………..vii

CHAPTERS

1: INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………...1

2: ARABIC POLITICAL SPEECH-MAKING…………………………………………...6

Language Variation……………………………………………………………….7 Variation and the Linguistic Market……………………………………………....9 When and When Not to Employ Colloquial Arabic in a Political Speech……………………………………………………………………12 Religion: Islam…………………………………………………………………...17 Emotive Speech………………………………………………………………….20 Repetition………………………………………………………………………...21

3: REPETITION IN ARABIC…………………………………………………………...26

Universality of Repetition………………………………………………………..27 Function of Arabic Repetition…………………………………………………...28 Crossover of Repetition………………………………………………………….30

4: POLITICAL CRISES IN SYRIA……………………………………………………..31

Arab Spring and the Syrian Uprising…………………………………………….34

5: ANALYSIS OF SPEECH PERFORMANCE………………………………………...38

The Speech……………………………………………………………………….38 Performing Democracy and Obedience………………………………………….39

6: STRUCTURES OF REPETITION……………………………………………………44

Lexical Couplets…………………………………………………………………44 Lexical Couplets and Semantic Groupings………………………………46 Lexical Couplets and Linguistic Levels………………………………….48

Phonological Level Repetition…………………………………………………...48 Morphological Level Repetition-Pattern………………………………………...55 Morphological Level Repetition-Root…………………………………………...57 Cognate Accusative……………………………………………………...60 Lexical Level Repetition…………………………………………………………63 Lexical Chains…………………………………………………………...63 Phrase and Discourse Level Repetition………………………………………….66 Parallelism………………………………………………………………..66 Paraphrase and Rhetorical Presentation………………………………….68

7: ANALYSIS OF REPETITION……………………………………………………….75

On Close Reading………………………………………………………………..75 Approach to Data Analysis………………………………………………………76 Strategy of Inspiring Fear………………………………………………………..77 Strategy of Inspiring Hope……………………………………………………….82 Strategy of Praising the People…………………………………………………..88 Strategy of Constructing Enemies that Shame and Oppress……………………..97 Strategy of Unification………………………………………………………….104 Analogy/Intertextuality…………………………………………………………111

8: ANALYSIS OF MANIPULATIVE SILENCE……………………………………...113

The Enemy……………………………………………………………………...114 Justice…………………………………………………………………………...117 Economic Policy………………………………………………………………..120 Democracy/Freedom Level……………………………………………………..121

9: CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………124

APPENDICES

A: TRANSCRIPTION SYSTEM……………………………………………………....127

B: SUPPLEMENTAL SPEECH TRANSCRIPT………………………...... 129

C: OFFICIAL SPEECH TRANSCRIPT……………………………………………….140

REFERENCES..………………………………………………………………………..154

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to all who supported me throughout the course of this project, including my knowledgeable and influential committee members,

Dr. Thomas Huckin, Dr. Assad al-Saleh, and Dr. Peter Von Sivers, who at all times extended their time, energy, and patience; Arabic, Middle Eastern, and International

Affairs professors, including but not limited to Dr. Mushira Eid, who were involved in shaping the way I think about pertinent issues; Manar al-Shataraat and Hossam Ahmed for their assistance in the transliteration and translation of Arabic texts; Middle Eastern studies colleagues for their illuminating observations and comments about language and politics in the Middle East; the staff at the Middle East Center, June Marvel, Kellie

Parker Hubbard, and Johanna Watzinger-Tharp, who helped me naviga te administrative matters; my family, especially my parents, without whose support accomplishing this would not have been possible; Can Ozcan, whose awareness, insight, and esprit de corps made the most intense writing phases seem effortless; and, for the inspiration of the Syrian people, may God watch over them as they pass through this trial.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The analysis of political speech-making has been an important feature of modern studies in the field of political communication. Such analyses have been approached from a variety of disciplines. As the interdisciplinary field of political communication develops, studies of political speech-making have extended to include the study of political speech-making for various cultures, languages, and political systems. This includes the Arab World whose geopolitical significance has risen in recent decades due to a number of factors. Despite the increasing significance of the Arab World in international affairs, the number of studies which examine political communication remains lacking, and the number of studies which focus on political speech-making in the

Arab World is even more infrequent.

Linguistic studies of Arabic political speech-making have largely been dominated by sociolinguistic studies which have examined Arabic variation and/or language use through the lens of a linguistic marketplace. Other studies have examined the use of religious language in Arabic political speech-making. In Chapter 2, I demonstrate through other cases, most notably the Syrian case, how studying other aspects of language use in Arabic political speech-making might be beneficial in understanding the relationship between language use and political power in the Arab World. Emotive

2 speech (i.e. symbolic language, figures of speech such as metaphors or euphemisms, repetition, etc.) may present a useful approach with respect to the Syrian case. Repetition in Arabic political speech-making, specifically, represents an area of study which has yet to be fully explored.

Most previous considerations of repetition in Arabic and repetition in Arabic political speech-making have been approached from a translational perspective focused on problems of translating repetition in Arabic to English where the same range of surface structures does not exist. These and other types of analyses of repetition in

Arabic are informative for translators and language analysts as they specify the ways in which repetition in Arabic differs both structurally and functionally from repetition in

English. In other words, they seek to shed light on those aspects of repetition use which may cause meaning to be “lost in translation” (or “lost in interpretation” for a language analyst). In Chapter 6, I discuss the principal features of Arabic repetition dealt with in the literature on repetition in Arabic and which were prevalent in the data for this study.

These include parallel structures, word lists and word strings, lexical repetition, paraphrase/reverse paraphrase, and the cognate accusative structure, as well as phonological and morphological repetition particular to Arabic syntax and its root and pattern system of morphology. For each feature, I discuss how rhetorical values and structures of various types of repetition, which may factor into an analysis of the rhetorical use of repetition, vary from Arabic to English supported by the literature and examples from the data.

With the exception of one previous study by Lahlali, considerations of repetition in Arabic in general and repetition in Arabic political speech-making specifically have

3 not taken the step to link rhetorically laden repetition structures with their deliberate use in support of a set of strategies which aim to have an impact on the political ideologies of its receivers. Lahlali studies a set of speeches given by Hezbollah leader, Hassan

Nasrallah, and establishes that he deliberately used repetition in his speeches to support certain political strategies.

This study builds on work done by Lahlali. However, not only does this study demonstrate a connection between repetition structures and political strategies but it expands on Lahlali’s work by considering the socio-political-historical dimension surrounding the speech. Rather than studying a set of political speeches, as is often done when analyzing the speech style of a particular leader, I execute a close reading of a speech which is significant because it was given by a state leader at a critical historical moment. The close reading of one speech, rather than a surface analysis of a group of speeches, is more conducive to an analysis which incorporates an understanding of the relationship between rhetoric and socio-political-historical contextual factors.

This study analyzes a speech given by Syrian president Bashar al-Assad which was delivered to the Syrian people’s assembly on March 30, 2011. It was the first public statement made by the Syrian president in the 2 weeks since the onset of Syria’s popular uprising which began on March 15, 2011. Because the speech was given during a time of political crisis, and because al-Assad tends to lean toward emotive speech as opposed to more logical argumentation during times of political crisis, the speech is rich with emotive expression, including repetition. Analyzing any speech given by Bashar al-Assad deepens our understanding of language use and political power with respect to

Arab leaders in general and of the Syrian regime in particular.

Contextual factors such as the history of colonialism/imperialism in the region, the history of Syria’s economic development policies, or the history of antagonism toward Israel are all associated with discourses that can be connected to political strategies that are supported by linguistic features of repetition in the text.

As far as I am aware, the rhetorical use of repetition by Bashar al-Assad has not been previously studied. Analysis of a speech by the Syrian president also allows comparisons between the use of repetition and the political strategies supported by repetition for state leaders. The most recent analyses of repetition in political speech- making have focused on speeches by leaders of nonstate entities.

However, the analysis of this particular speech at this particular time in history allows not only deeper insights into Bashar al-Assad as a state leader, the Syrian regime, and traditional discourses, but permits observations of discourses as they emerge in response to events and discourses that challenge the current regime. In the analysis of repetition (Chapter 7), I demonstrate how repetition is used to support ideologies which compete with in-progress criticism being proffered by opposing voices.

If one views repetition as a way to persuade others to one’s vision of the world by dominating a discourse domain with sheer volume and quantity of ideas extended, as if one wants to wear down an opponent with a protracted speechifying of repeated messages, then it begs the question as to which ideas are being suppressed in such a struggle. Thus, the examination of textual silence becomes a logical complement to analyses of repetition. Possible manipulative textual silences identified within the speech are examined in Chapter 8. As far as I am aware, this is the first study of Arabic political speechmaking specifically or Arabic political discourse in general in which the matter of

5 manipulative textual silence is addressed.

In addition to considering the contribution of repetition and manipulative silence in effectively persuading one’s audience, the role of performance is also measured.

CHAPTER 2

ARABIC POLITICAL SPEECH-MAKING

There has been an increasing interest among Arabic linguists and political scientists in studying the language use of Arabic-speaking politicians and leaders.

Scholars have studied various Arab leaders using a number of approaches and emphasizing differing features and aspects of the language. Keeping in mind that no clear delineation of characteristics of Arabic language use in political speeches exists, studies can be said to be more or less focused on one of three major categories: language variation, religious speech, and emotive speech. It bears repeating that these categories are not fixed, and they will crossover in a single analysis of a political leader(s) or speech(es). For example, although some studies focus on language variation, this is a feature of Arabic that seems to be of such significance that it is difficult to find a study about Arabic political speech-making that does not discuss the role of variation. Thus, studies which are not focused on the diglossic linguistic situation but rather on emotiveness or religious intertextuality will also discuss the issue. Similarly, the tendency for Arabic political discourse to develop an element of intertextuality as religious texts are introduced or mingled with political ones, a common characteristic, tends to come up recurrently in studies which have emphasized either emotiveness or

Arabic variation.

Language Variation

In 1959, Charles Ferguson defined and applied the term diglossia (coined English version) to describe the language situation in the Arab World. Since then, the issue has been one of the most dominant in the modern field of Arabic linguistics. Diglossia has been defined by Ferguson as follows:

DIGLOSSIA is a relatively stable language situation in which, in addition to the primary dialects of the language (which may include a standard or regional standards), there is a very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superposed variety, the vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature, either of an earlier period or in another speech community, which is learned largely by formal education and is used for most written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by any section of the community for ordinary conversation. (1959: 244-245)

Arabic linguists immediately began to critique the simplicity of this theory, which describes two neat varieties of Arabic which are relegated to various domains. Linguists have since created or applied competing theories in an attempt to more accurately describe a linguistic situation where one of several dialects and varying levels of a distinctive standard Arabic are spoken alongside one another. Ferguson himself later revised his own theory.

The dialects are known as ʕamiyya (Arabic: popular), Colloquial Arabic, Dialect, or Spoken Arabic (spoken) and the standard is known as fuṣḥa (Arabic root: eloquent/eloquence), Modern Standard Arabic, Literary Arabic, Classical Arabic, or

Written Arabic (written).

Some of the general characteristics of Modern Standard Arabic or MSA are as follows: MSA is a modernized version of classical Arabic which is the language of

Arabic literature and of religious texts including the Bible and the Qur’an. MSA is not spoken naturally by Arabs. Arabs speak local spoken varieties of Arabic and learn MSA

8 in school as the register of the written word. The more educated one becomes, the more he or she incorporates MSA into his or her speech. However, only students who major in

Arabic literature or journalism learn to speak “purely” MSA conversationally. Prepared texts such as speeches and news broadcasts are delivered in MSA because they are “read” as opposed to being “spoken” in a spontaneous manner. However, some Arab politicians have delivered political speeches in a mix of MSA and a local dialect.

Many analyses of Arabic political speeches have focused on these types of speeches and Arabic’s unique diglossic situation. Holes studied speeches given by

Gamal Abdel Nasser from the perspective of Halliday’s functional grammar theory for the relationship between speech variety and the goal or function of communication

(1993). He found that Nasser used MSA to “convey messages which are abstract, idealized or metaphorical” (33) (Halliday’s ideational function) and used colloquial

Arabic to “convey the concrete or the physical and is strongly associated with the personalization of issues” (33) (Halliday’s interpersonal function). Holes also related the use of variation in Nasser’s Arabic to the role the interlocutor wishes to play and the status which the interlocutor wishes to afford what is being said (37). For example,

Nasser used MSA to present his National Charter or to define socialism but used colloquial Arabic to tell humorous or sarcastic stories to make political points (status).

While presenting a text in MSA, Nasser sometimes played the role of a “mediator of scripture” reading the audience the “scripture” of his socialism (MSA) and sometimes would play the role of surrogate listener, reacting to the formal text (colloquial), i.e.

“what is meant by that?”, etc. and sometimes play the role of patient teacher, explaining or interpreting abstract ideas (colloquial).

Holes’ investigation into variation use in political speeches was followed by

Mazraani, who analyzed political speeches delivered by Gamal Abdel Nasser, Saddam

Hussein, and Muammar al-Qaddafi using a similar approach, although her linguistic analysis was more intensely focused on code-switching (1997). Because Mazraani observed data for three leaders, she was able to point out differences and similarities in variation use among them, most notably that Nasser’s variation was more dramatic or distinct than that of the other two leaders.

Variation and the Linguistic Market

Holes’ and Mazraani’s analyses shed light on the larger Arabic diglossia puzzle.

With respect to Arabic political speech-making, they demonstrate that characteristics particular to the language can be exploited or used strategically for specific goals or purposes. What was left less clear by these studies is the freedom (or lack thereof) Arab leaders have to be able to strategically use the characteristic of code-mixing or code- switching in their speech. The freedom or privilege to do so seems to vary from leader to leader.

For example, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who is widely viewed as the father of this deviation, was admired for his charisma and charm as a public speaker and his effective use of Egyptian dialect in his speeches. He was among the first (if not the first) Arab leaders to employ such a strategy, and he used it more pervasively than other prominent

Arab leaders. On the other hand, some leaders such as the former Tunisian President Ben

Ali have been hesitant to insert colloquial expressions or features in political speeches.

Ben Ali delivered his first two speeches in response to the Jasmine Revolution in MSA.

Then, in his third speech, having failed to persuade the public to come off demands for him to step down, he attempted to lessen the distance between himself and the public by addressing the audience in the Tunisian dialect (Maalej 2012).

Such a strategy may be more or less amenable to a particular country or political context as well as a political situation. For example, Haeri asserts that in the domain of political speech within the linguistic market of Egypt, Egyptian Arabic is often the dominant code, and is merely interspersed with MSA, rather than the traditional MSA being sprinkled with Egyptian colloquial Arabic (Haeri 1997: 797).

Questions about the degree to which deviations are afforded to leaders, why one leader might be constrained more or less than another, and under which circumstances deviations are deemed acceptable or unacceptable have been addressed by Arabic linguists who have analyzed issues of variation through the framework of Bordieu’s concept of the linguistic market and associated terms.

In the Tunisian context, Naima Boussofara executed two separate analyses for two Tunisian leaders through a linguistic market lens. In one study, she analyzes a set of political speeches delivered by former Tunisian President Habib Bourgiba (2011). The speeches were delivered primarily in the Tunisian dialect but were interspersed with elements of Modern Standard Arabic and French. Boussofara analyzes segments of the speech as they were delivered in such a mixture of codes, along with the performativity aspect of the delivery, i.e. showing pictures, taking on and off of spectacles, pounding a fist on the table, etc.

Another important part of Boussofara’s analysis are the published versions of this set of speeches which needed to be completely translated or “rewritten” into Modern

Standard Arabic in order to be published. She views the original performance and text along with the rewriting of the speeches through the lens of scholars of language and symbolic power stating that she draws more heavily on the words of Bourdieu and his framework, which is shaped by his concepts of “(linguistic) market, (political) field,

(linguistic) habitus, (structural) censorship, and symbolic power in institutions of power.”

Boussofara concludes that a politician who has been designated as the spokesperson for a particular set of values, beliefs, etc. may be afforded some leeway in which he/she can cross or extend linguistic boundaries but that he/she will be promptly corrected by the spokesperson’s establishment. In the case of this particular set of speeches, Bourguiba was able to speak to the people in a personal way, using unofficial language and tone, but deviations from the official ideology or political stances were minimized or eliminated through the process of translating the speeches’ texts into the written variety of Arabic.

The study is similar to Boussofara’s study on the subsequent and now former

President of Tunisia Ben Ali. Boussofara’s earlier study focuses on Bordieu’s concept of the ‘linguistic habitus’, which she seems to deem of particular importance for an unelected leader whose legitimacy is very much wrapped up in his/her ability to associate with previously established persons or ideologies of power.

Boussofara uses the concept of the linguistic market to analyze a particular speech and to discover linguistic boundaries for a new politician, unelected, with questionable political legitimacy and operating within a particular political environment (2006). The text is a political address delivered by Ben Ali of Tunisia over the radio to announce himself the successor to the previous president who was ill and aging. She has a copy of the original draft which has been edited and reworded presumably by political advisors to

Ben Ali. She also touches on sociolinguistic factors involved, i.e. whether and for whom it is possible to use MSA, French, or Tunisian Arabic as well as factors of political ideology and foregrounding. In contrast to his predecessor, Bourguiba, Ben Ali did not have the political capital to be free with his use of Arabic variation and/or French.

Boussofara’s studies contribute to an understanding of language and power in

Arabic political speech-making as well as the complex nature of Arabic diglossia. They demonstrate how linguistic practices by leaders operating within the confines of an authoritarian regime are evaluated and employed in supporting and maintaining power in nondemocratic systems. In some contexts, the type of language use studied by

Boussofara in the first study, i.e. Arabic diglossic code switching or code mixing is significant. However, a focus on this characteristic may be less relevant in other Arab political contexts where a leader is not able to pepper his speech with colloquial or foreign speech even lightly or momentarily.

When and When Not to Employ Colloquial Arabic in a Political Speech

According to Holes, delivering a political speech in a mix of MSA and a local dialect is a populist strategy that gives the appearance that the leader, who is most often elite and highly educated, is one of the people (1993). It makes it difficult for people to say that he/she is out of touch with the common man or the less advantaged majority.

Although the contrast for the Arabic situation would be more dramatic, the idea is similar to the way that Barack Obama might affect an African American cadence in some speeches to appeal to black audiences which in America have historically and traditionally been marginalized.

On the other hand, the traditional delivery of political speeches in MSA has the effect of making the speech sound more official and perhaps even more reasonable as

“written” arguments more often have the advantage of being more well-argued or well- reasoned than “spoken” ones.

The Syrian President is known for being particularly skilled in his ability to

“speak” or “deliver a speech” in MSA. The SP was western educated in London

(postgraduate), which makes his abilities more notable. This is in contrast to King

Abdullah of Jordan, for example, who is often considered as having better English than

Arabic (referring to his MSA skills—Arabs often do not refer to the regional dialects they speak natively as Arabic).

There are many possible reasons for this. One is that Syrian political ideology is based on Arab Nationalism and/or Arab unity as a way to be insulated from Western or

Israeli influence or power. For some, especially in Syria, which is identified by many in the Arab World as the last defender of Arab national identity, values, and goals, MSA is a hallmark or symbol of Arab unity. It is a language that unites Arabs because even though one might speak Moroccan Arabic and another Iraqi Arabic, which to a significant degree are not mutually intelligible, they can understand one another through the medium of standard Arabic or MSA (as long as they are educated). There are those in the Arab world who are hoping that someday all Arabs will speak natively a common language and the hope is that that language will be MSA. Some Arabs view attempts by Western linguists interested in learning or studying local dialects or Western-educated policy makers or anyone from the West or with Western ties encouraging the use of local dialects with suspicion. They suspect it as a way to divide Arabs or to break their unity

14 as part of a divide and conquer strategy/mentality.

Another reason for al-Assad’s tendency toward MSA is likely related to Syria’s political ideology. Arabic education in Syria has a strong emphasis on learning MSA. At the college level, Syria might be one of the only Arab countries where college subjects such as science, medicine, and engineering normally taught in English (in other Arab countries) because of a worldwide trend toward English as the lingua franca of the scientific world are taught in MSA. Syria’s students are better than those of many other

Arab countries in terms of their ability to speak MSA but behind in their ability to speak

English or French. This does not mean that there are not brilliant speakers of English and

French as a second language from or in Syria, Bashar al-Assad being one of them

(English). However, on the whole, the education system has encouraged MSA language speaking skills over English or French speaking skills. Of course it varies somewhat from person to person, but collectively, Syrians are much more likely than the Lebanese or the Egyptians, for example, to enjoy speaking Arabic to a speaker of Arabic as a second language. This is not only because they might be less confident in their English or French skills, but because they have a greater sense of pride in their own language and heritage.

Another possible reason for Bashar al-Assad’s developed MSA skills and use of

MSA in his speeches may also be related to Syrian national ideology. Within Syria there is language variation. There are differences in Syrian Arabic based on whether one is from the East near the Iraqi border (Deir Azor), the Mediterranean coast (Lattakia,

Tartous, etc.), the North (Aleppo), Central Syria (Homs, Hama), Damascus, etc. Of course there are also differences between those smaller populations living in villages or

15 tents (Bedouins) versus those living in cities. Some even say that Christians have minor innovations in their Syrian Arabic that distinguish them from Muslim Syrians. Bashar al-

Assad’s minority sect, the Alawites, traditionally marginalized and rejected at times by

Shiite and Sunni Muslims as heretical, have larger numbers in Syrian coastal cities such as Lattakia, Tartous, Banyas, and others. Because of his Alawite heritage, Bashar al-

Assad is said to have a Syrian coastal accent, which may even be further differentiated on the basis of the Alawite sect if there are certain words or sounds that distinguish them from other coastal Arabic speakers as there are minor words or sounds that distinguish

Aleppan Christian Syrians from other Aleppans, for example. Even prior to the exacerbation of sectarian tensions in Syria, Bashar al-Assad avoided the political costs associated with his religious sect by speaking strictly in MSA.

In addition to its role as a defender of national identity, the use of Arabic (MSA) may in some political contexts have an added layer of importance among Muslim Arabs.

Because it is considered by Muslims to be the language of God, it also carries with it an aspect of the sacred. Because of the importance the culture places on language, particularly this register which is closer to classical Arabic (the language of God and the

Qur’an), there is a tendency for some listeners to be more impressed and thus more receptive to what is being said. Thus, someone who demonstrates that they are skilled in

Arabic (MSA) may earn themselves a great deal of credibility with their audience. In the

Syrian context, this type of power behind the formal language is questionable since the regime has promoted the superiority of the Arabic (MSA) language for nationalist qualities rather than religious ones. However, the possibility that this language might accrue credibility to the Syrian president for such religious reasons among non-Syrian

16 audiences of the Arab and Islamic World may be a consideration.

Because many Arab politicians will not be willing or able to exploit the Arabic diglossic situation for political advantage, studies that focus on language and power about

Arabic diglossic code-mixing or code-switching may be less relevant to certain Arab political contexts. Thus, in cases where Arabic diglossic code-switching or code-mixing is not a factor because it is not employed, what other features of language use might also be employed for political purposes and thus more relevant to these particular situations?

Boussofara recognizes and has written on the cultural significance that is wrapped up in issues of the use of MSA in her studies on Arabic political speech-making and elsewhere. She addresses the issue in the second study mentioned above with respect to

Ben Ali who ultimately is also mostly restricted to using MSA in his speeches. In that study, she addresses how word choice is manipulated by Ben Ali (and/or his advisors) to gain legitimacy via connections (as opposed to differences) with his predecessor and his predecessor’s beliefs. However, in that study, Boussofara has special access to the speech-making process. She has the luxury of having access to a marked up copy of the speech under examination and using the crossed out phrases and notes written between lines and in the margins, she is able to demonstrate how word choice is strategically employed. If one had access to every draft of a speech along with notes and recorded conversations between speech writers and leaders surrounding the changes to be made for each iteration, our understanding of the relationship between the employment of language and power for a given leader or regime would, as would our understanding of many other things, be significantly increased. Yet, in most cases, even a small portion of this type of data is unlikely to be available.

Thus, the study of word choice in Arabic political speech, although important, has not been studied in the way that Boussofara was able to in her study of Ben Ali’s first public speech. Rather, other linguistic practices studied in Arabic political speech- making in terms of language and power have dealt with religious speech and emotive speech. Such practices are more relevant in contexts where an exploitation of Arabic diglossia by Arabic leaders does not occur. Yet religious speech and emotive speech can also be employed in combination with Arabic diglossic code-switching or code-mixing.

Religion: Islam

An important feature that seems to have arisen as a prominent one in Arabic political communication and speech-making is that of the interweaving of religion, particularly the Islamic religion into political speeches. It is important to recognize that not all members of the Arabic linguistic community are Muslim. However, because all

Arab countries have a Muslim majority, Islam is the religion of power in the Arabic speaking world. In other words, those in positions of power are generally more likely to be of the Islamic faith and laws are more likely to reflect Islamic values. This also means that Islam is the religion most likely to be exploited for political purposes.

Abdul-Latif argues that the infusing of political speech with religious speech limits responses by the citizens being addressed in these speeches (2011). This is because critiquing political agendas comes to be equated with questioning the sacred or the divine. Those who dare to question what is considered divine may be considered heretics, apostates, or unbelievers, which in some cases can be punishable crimes.

According to Abdul-Latif, this is not a new problem. He claims that Arab rulers

18 throughout history have controlled their citizens by making such accusations against those who did not agree with them.

Abdul-Latif identifies the intertextuality and interdiscursivity of language use in

Anwar Sadat’s discourse. In other words, he demonstrates how religious discourses are introduced into political discourse. Sadat utilized the conventions of Islamic sermons as well as recited Qur’anic verses in his political addresses. In order to be credible as an instructor of religious truth, Abdul-Latif describes how he cultivated the persona of a devout and enlightened follower. For example, Sadat’s prayers were broadcast on television throughout his term in office. To the extent that Sadat was successful in being able to mingle religious discourses with political discourse, the “addressees” of such discourse were not really free to respond as they might otherwise do, according to

Abdul-Latif.

Sadaat was the head of state of a powerful Arab country friendly to the United

States and Israel. Dina Matar analyzes the political speech-making, in 2006, of

Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah, a nonstate actor antagonistic to the United States and Israel (2008). Her analysis consists of two parts. First, she describes what she calls the “mediated charisma” of the leader. She refers to both Nasrallah’s and the organization’s shift in tone from that of religious to political. She explains the way that

Nasrallah’s image, which is distributed through the media outlets acquired by Hezbollah in recent years, embodies both intellectual and populist, i.e. a man of the people. Matar dedicated the second part of her analysis to Nasrallah’s 2006 speeches. She focuses on the feature of framing Nasrallah employs. One of the major frames employed by

Nasrallah is about cultivating a common identity of opposition to the U.S. and Israel.

This frame is reinforced by the use of pronouns, “antum”, i.e. second person plural and

“naḥnu”, i.e. 1st person plural. The other major frame is one of “jihad” and “resistance”.

Such a frame is described as the crossing of an Islamic frame “jihad” with a political frame “resistance” using terms that fit the discourses of their respective areas. She refers to this as ideological ambiguity and claims that by intersecting frames, along religious and political lines, Nasrallah is able to expand his appeal and the popularity of Hezbollah.

The Lebanese religious context within which Hassan Nasrallah is operating is much more complex than that of the Egyptian one within which Sadaat could be said to have operated. Statistics vary but Egypt is said in some figures to currently have a population as much as 94% Sunni Muslim (Pew, 2009). The largest religious minority in

Egypt are the Coptic Christians. There are only handfuls of Islamic sectarian minorities such as the Shias or those that follow Sufi orders (less than 1% of the population). Some statistics put Christian populations higher, i.e. 90% Sunni Muslim and 10% Christian

(CIA, 2014). However, the number of Muslim sectarian populations remains minor.

Egypt was similarly predominately Sunni Muslim in Sadaat’s time.

This is in contrast to Lebanon where Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims each make up 27% of the population (Sunni 27% and Shia 27%) and Christians make up over 40% of the population (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2010)1. Hassan

Nasrallah, and members of his organization, Hezbollah, are Shiites. Thus, the use of religious discourses is more complex than were Sadaat’s. The concept of “hybridity” has

1 A study conducted by the Lebanese Information Center estimates Muslim populations as significantly higher and Christian populations as significantly lower than a Statistics Lebanon study cited by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (The Daily Star, 2013).

20 also been employed by Badran to interpret the rhetoric of Hezbollah in the context of a religiously fragmented Lebanon (2010).

It would seem that “hybrid” forms of religious discourse would be relevant to other Arab countries which have similarly diverse populations, i.e. Syria and Iraq.

Perhaps it is the case in Iraq. Syria does have a diverse religious make-up. Yet in Syria, the issue of religious discourse is also less relevant. In contrast to the Lebanese political context where religious identity in politics is built into the political system, Syria’s political ideology and system is secular. Although the secular nature of the Syrian regime does not reach the level of secularism of its Islamic neighbor, Turkey, where religious speech in the political sphere has been outlawed, Syrian politics are much more devoid of religious discourses than most if not all Arab countries. This does not mean that Islamic references are not made in Syrian political discourse (or the Turkish one), because they are. However, such factors might be considered less prominent than others might be in the Syrian political context.

Emotive Speech

Although register or code shifts and religious discourse are not limited to Arab political speech-making, such features might be distributed differently or more pervasively than they are in other languages. The same could be said of particular surface structures for any language. Another realm where the rhetoric of political speeches is influenced by culture is the area of emotive speech, i.e. metaphor, figures of speech, etc. Some studies of Arabic political speeches have highlighted these features as they present issues or problems of translation from Arabic to English.

al-Hamad analyzed several speeches delivered in Syria by President Bashar al-Assad following the Rafik Hariri assassination, an event which challenged and ultimately led to the end of the Syrian military occupation of Lebanon (2011). He selected examples of emotive expression, i.e. simile, metaphor, personification, and euphemism, etc. from Assad’s speeches and found that the English translations did not convey the same degrees of emotional arousal as were expressed in the original texts.

al-Harahsheh performs a similar study, which analyzes the accuracy of translations of emotive expressions through a CDA theoretical framework (2013). He indicates that cultural and ideological differences between the text producer and the translator, i.e. consumer, require examination. He analyzes political speeches given by

Hamas political leader Khalid Mashaal. According to al-Harahsheh, the aim of his analysis is “studying the critical discourse aspect of Mashaal’s political discourse as well as the translatability of emotive figures of speech (i.e. simile, metaphor, personification, dysphemism, and euphemism), and cultural expressions (i.e. religious, fatalistic, and colloquial) in Mashaal’s political speeches.”

Repetition

Despite the strong attention given to Arab politics and by extension Arab political speech-making in linguistic and discourse studies, little attention has been paid to the employment of repetition structures in political speeches.

In many studies that deal with Arabic political speeches, repetition structures have been unnoticed. In a few cases, repetition structures have been examined as ancillary to textual features that have been given more prominence. Repetition has not been

22 considered a feature that warrants treatment in and of itself or one that warrants a weightier treatment. Furthermore, there does not seem to be a strong connection between efforts to establish the nature of repetition structures, i.e. parallelism, paraphrase, lexical strings, etc. in Arabic discourse on one hand and the presence/use/employment of such structures in Arabic political speeches on the other hand.

Of the studies of Arabic political speech that have been reviewed, two have included structures of repetition as features. One of these is al-Harahsheh’s study, which will be discussed in detail below.

The second is Mazraani’s. In her work on variation in Arabic political speech- making, she addressed the genre of political speech demonstrating the genre’s universals based on previous research in the area and using examples from Arabic, English, and

French political speeches. She discusses rhetorical features in terms of tactics, which are: listing three elements, contrasting pairs, memories-images-details, references to “us”, direct and reported speech and dialogue in political discourse, the passionate plea as well as the political strategy of code-switching.

“Listing three elements” and “contrasting pairs” might fall under the category of word strings or lexical couplets by discourse linguists and have been dealt with extensively in studies about repetition in Arabic discourse. Although it is the case, as demonstrated by Mazraani, that word strings are employed for rhetorical purposes in speech-making across English, French, and Arabic texts, scholarship on repetition in

Arabic indicates that lexical couplets or word strings in Arabic might be even more significant, rhetorically, since these structures can contain repetition at phonological, morphological, and syntactic levels as well as at the semantic level.

Besides Johnstone’s seminal work on repetition in Arabic (1991), whose data set of written work also contained one political speech, four additional studies not previously reviewed have dealt to varying degrees with repetition in political speeches (Shunnaq

(1992, 1993, 2000), Lahlali (2012)). Three of these were done by Shunnaq. The first of

Shunnaq’s studies concentrated on word strings found in speeches given by Arab diplomats or political leaders mostly at the U.N. (1992). Shunnaq also studied the relationship between Arabic grammar and morphological repetition using data from the same set of speeches (1993). Shunnaq’s last study on repetition in Arabic speech- making dealt with the emotiveness of repetition in Gamel Abdel Nasser’s speeches

(2000). In that study, Shunnaq deals with repetition at all levels of grammar, including the phonological, morphological, lexical, semantic, and discourse (parallelism) levels.

Based largely on Shunnaq’s study of the translatability of emotive expressions

(2000), al-Harahsheh’s study of Khalid Mashaal’s speeches focuses on the translatability of phonological and lexical repetition in addition to figures of speech and cultural, religious, and colloquial expressions (what Shunnaq calls emotiveness at the semantic level).

In the quantitative aspect of his assessment, al-Harahsheh analyzes Mashaal’s speeches for “repetitiveness” or the “repetition of…emotive words”. Repeated lexical items are evaluated for their semantic or emotive value. About 20 words are selected for this and he includes words such as Arab, Islam, Netanyahu, children, resistance,

Palestinian, Hamas, Fatah, Jerusalem, the West Bank, etc. In his interpretation of the repetition of such words, greater frequency seems to indicate ideological dominance in some cases. In other cases, the collocation of such words with other emotive words or

24 words with negative connotation aim to justify a course or action or to indict particular persons or groups. For example, he suggests that the preponderant use of the term

Arabs/Arabic over the term Islam/Muslims indicates that Arabism is more essential than

Islamism (ideological) while American and European countries are in some cases implicitly accused of wrongdoing by associating or collocating the term

America/American with terms such as Zionism (a term which has negative connotation for a majority of Arabs).

The last study not mentioned previously in studies of emotiveness in Arabic political speech-making, is that of Lahlali. al-Harahsheh’s study of the translation of emotive expressions in Arabic political speeches was approached from a Critical

Discourse Analysis perspective. al-Harahsheh supports the integration of CDA with translation studies and adapts his model from al-Hejin’s whose is based on Fairclough’s model for applying CDA to translated texts. However, Lahlali previously applied CDA in studying political speeches (2012). Not only does Lahlali seem to be the first person to apply CDA to Arabic political speeches in general, but he also seems to have taken the lead in relating ideology with the forms of repetition present in political speeches.

Lahlali analyzes the link between repetition and ideology in speeches that were delivered by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Lahlali does refer to the intertextuality of

Nasrallah’s speeches similar to the way such aspects are focused on by Matar who also analyzes Nasrallah’s speeches and Abdul-Latif who also focuses on religious intertextual references in Sadat’s speeches. However, the principal focus of Lahlali’s analysis is the relationship between instances where words or phrases are repeated at the discourse level and how Nasrallah’s ideological or political stance is promoted by the same repetitive

25 structures. Lahlali seeks to demonstrate that repetition in Nasrallah’s speech serves to praise and give hope to the Lebanese people, condemn enemies, and to unify and rally the

Lebanese people along with elevating himself as a capable and worthy leader of the people.

Yet this study also has limitations. It demonstrates the connection between linguistic repetition and political strategy only for the Lebanese context and focuses on a nonstate actor rather than a state leader. Lahlali’s study is also restricted to the study of phrase repetition rather than being attentive to multiple types of repetition. Lahlali analyzes data from a variety of speeches delivered by Nasrallah rather than doing a close reading of a single speech. He does not consider how political strategies supported by linguistic repetition might fit into the overarching discourse at play within the context.

Such factors are important as they may render a combination of linguistic structure and political strategy more effective. A more in-depth analysis of both the political motivations and the linguistic structures is also important for reducing uncertainty and increasing awareness with respect to the possible reactions of the receivers.

CHAPTER 3

REPETITION IN ARABIC

In this section, I present an overview of the literature on repetition in Arabic. The universality of repetition, the function of repetition in Arabic, and the crossover of repetition in Arabic are also discussed.

Whereas some studies seem to have been motivated by a lack of knowledge in the area of applied linguistics (Johnstone/Koch (1982, 1983, 1991), Williams (1990), Fakhri

(2004), al-Jabouri (1984)), most of the studies on repetition in Arabic have filled a need in the area of translation studies (Abdulla (2001), Ali (2005), Jawad (2007, 2009), al-Khafaji (2006), Hannouna (2010), Shunnaq (1992, 1993, 2006), al-Qinai (2012),

Menacare (1992)). Others studies on repetition in Arabic have contributed to the field of sociolinguistics (Holes (1993, 1995)) and theories about language (al-Khafaji (2005),

Rieschild (2006), Haggar (2010))2.

Studies on repetition in Arabic have analyzed patterns of repetition in various genres and discourse fields, including literature (Abdulla (2001), Ali (2005), Jawad

(2007, 2009), al-Khafaji (2006)), political/argumentative (Shunnaq (1992 and 1993), al-Jabouri (1992), al-Khafaji (2006), Koch/Johnstone (1982, 1983, 1991)), religious (Ali

2 al-Khafaji and Rieschild question claims made about the difference between repetition in Arabic versus repetition in English. Haggar analyzes both structuring and communicative purposes of Arabic repetition.

(2005), al-Quinai (2012), Haggar (2010), Hannouna (2010)), academic (al-Jabouri

(1992), Fakhri (2004), Williams (1990)), everyday speech (Holes (1995), Rieschild

(2006)), and text types such as poems (Ali (2005)), the Quran (Ali (2005), al-Quinai

(2012), Haggar (2010), Hannouna (2010)), autobiography (Jawad (2007) and (2009)), short story (al-Khafaji (2006)), political speeches (Shunnaq (1992) and (1993),

Koch/Johnstone (1982, 1983, 1991)), newspaper columns (al-Jabouri (1984)), political articles (al-Khafaji (2005)), books on political thought (al-Khafaji (2005),

Koch/Johnstone (1982, 1983, 1991)), research articles (Fakhri (2004)), MA theses and

PhD dissertations (Williams (1990)), extemporaneous speech (Holes (1995)), ethnographic interviews (Rieschild (2006)), political essays (Koch/Johnstone (1982,

1983, 1991)), and a book of literary criticism (Koch/Johnstone (1982, 1983, 1991))3.

Universality of Repetition

There are types of repetition, which are particularly prevalent in political speeches or other public forums, which may not necessarily have characteristics unique to a particular language. For example, Mazraani demonstrates that one of the elements of the genre of political speech which occurs across Arabic, English, and French is the tendency to present lists of three or more things (1997). In the data, we will also see examples of parallelism where similar phrases are repeated but where one element of each of the phrases will be varied. Such structures, which are created by the author for each situation

3 Abdulla analyzed data from multiple types of literary texts, i.e. poetry, novel, etc. Menacare and Shunnaq (2006) analyze data from multiple dissimilar genres and text types.

28 present endless possibilities and are probably as common in one language as they are in another.

Function of Arabic Repetition

Repetition in Arabic has been presented as having a wide range of functions from persuasion, maintaining involvement, and emphasis to discourse structuring, cohesion, and grammatical functions. The literature on the functions of repetition has been reviewed by Lahlali and others.

Repetition seems to occur more frequently in Arabic than it does in English.

Repetition in Arabic occurs in a functional (grammatical) sense which differs from

English. Citing Johnstone (1991) and Hatim (1997), al-Khafaji claims that English rejects repetition unless it is used as a figure of speech (2006). This “textual-cultural discrepancy”, he states, has a “bearing on both the translation processes and their products whenever the two languages (Arabic and English) are involved” (2006: 39).

Lahlali (2012: 1) indicates that some researchers have concluded that repetition in

Arabic is generally more functional grammatically than at a rhetorical level stating that

“while English can be used to emphasize meaning (Rieschild, 2006), repetition in the

Arabic language is more often considered part of the Arabic language structure

(Johnstone, 1991)”. Lahlali (2012: 1) also indicates that Williams (1989) came to the conclusion that, “Arabic uses lexical strings as a cohesive device more than English. It is not used for ornamental purposes but considered ‘essential to the cohesion of the text’

(Williams, 1989:164).”

The exceptional grammatical function of repetition in Arabic, however, is not to

29 dismiss its rhetorical purpose. Citing Beeston (1983), Holes (1995), and al-Khafaji

(2005), Lahlali describes the situation generally as follows: “The repetition of lexical items, such as synonyms and antonyms, not only creates a cohesive link between different segments of the text, but serves as an indication of the writer’s creativity and is a feature of ‘elevated’ discourse” (2012: 1).

Lahlali (2012) also reviews the less well researched area of nongrammatical repetition in Arabic as distinct from the literature on the grammatical function of repetition (which he says has been fully researched). Citing previous research, he points out that repetition in Arabic “can have a persuasive and emotional impact on the audience

(Mazraani 1993: 265–267; Johnstone 1994: 6)” (2). He continues by stating that “(for

Tannen) repetition is ‘a fundamental, pervasive, and infinitely useful linguistic strategy’

(1989: 44)” (2). He states that “…the power of persuasion can also be displayed through the character of the speaker and the way he/she conducts himself/herself” and that,

“According to Wodak, the speaker ‘performs traits that have normative (cultural, traditional) meanings’ (2009: 8)” (2). He says, “Part of these traits is the display of belief, which can be considered as ‘a necessary ingredient for the staging of politics’

(2009: 8)” (2). Lahlali also says the following about the function of repetition in Arabic:

In the same vein, Johnstone (1991) has looked at persuasion strategies in Arabic texts and concluded that repetition plays a salient role in persuading the Arab audience of one’s argument. Their conclusion was that repetition stems from the Arab perception that the persuasion strategy rests on established truth (Suchan 2010). The power of persuasion also resides in displaying an emotional argument that can penetrate the Arab audience and influence their emotions (Mazraani 1993; Johnstone 1994). According to al-Khafaji, repetition “can have didactic, playful, emotional, artistic, ritualistic, textual and rhetorical functions” (2005:6). Similarly, Hoey argues that part of the function of repetition in language is “its informational value in providing a framework for interpreting what is changed or “new” by repeating what has already been said, in a process that he calls ‘repetition

and replacement’ (1991: 20). (Lahlali, 2012: 1)

From Lahlali’s observations it seems clear that the function of repetition in Arabic is still being worked out. Obviously, the discrepancy between the usage of repetition in

English and Arabic and its resulting challenges for translators indicates that analysts of

Arabic political discourse should also be aware of it and the potential challenges it represents to understanding the author’s intentions or goals.

It is my view that in addition to there being multiple interpretations as to the function of repetition in Arabic, a given structure may be serving multiple purposes at the same time.

This study is less concerned with nonrhetorical purposes of repetition and does not attempt to evaluate the extent to which a repetition structure is operating for which function.

Crossover of Repetition

Linguists have studied repetition in Arabic and its existence at all different levels, i.e. phonological, morphological, syntactic, lexical, semantic, discoursal, etc. These categories can overlap one another even in English. However, the root and pattern system of morphology in Arabic is one characteristic of Arabic that makes discrete categorizations according to these levels somewhat problematic. Agreement rules in

Arabic are another, and so on. Discrete categorizations can also be problematic since repetition can occur at multiple levels for the same set of data. Oftentimes, repetition at various levels is weaved together to create a kind of tapestry, web, or network of repeated features.

CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL CRISES IN SYRIA

This section outlines some principal historical/political events in Syria as they relate to the existing situation in Syria. One of the aspects of the speech in question, which was most heavily focused on by the media, is Assad’s attribution of the events in

Syria to a conspiracy which included both foreign and domestic (foreign agents) elements. Thus the term “conspiracy” is a significant one for this speech and cannot be ignored. Propagating conspiracy theories is a tool often employed by authoritarian regimes in order to delegitimize opposition to established authority. The extent to which conspiracy theories are propagated and tolerated in the Middle East has been researched considerably.

In order to more accurately assess the impact of such claims, the extent to which previous challenges have been framed as conspiracy-driven in official reactions by the

Assads is considered.

Syria was a French Protectorate during the inter-war period and gained independence in 1946. One year later the Syrian branch of the regional Ba’ath party was established. A Syrian Ba’ath movement led to the establishment of a Syrian Ba’ath party which has been the ruling party since 1966. Syria experienced a series of leadership changes from 1946 until 1970 when Hafez al-Assad gained control of the government.

Hafez ruled Syria until his death in 2000 when his son, Bashar al-Assad, became president.

Since the Assads have been in power they have passed through a series of crises and events which may have had some influence in shaping current Syrian policies, ideologies, and discourses.

The Syrian government was involved in a conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria from 1976 to 1982. In 1979, the government responded to the brotherhood’s guerrilla tactics by bombing Hama, a MB stronghold, followed by the capture and execution of suspects.

Hafez al-Assad gave a famous 3- or 4-minute speech in 1982 in which he criticized the Muslim Brotherhood for committing crimes in the name of Islam. He did not use the word “conspiracy” but he did use it in other speeches given during the time period of Syria’s conflict against the Muslim Brotherhood.

Among other crises that preceded the uprising of 2011 was the crisis felt by the

Syrian regime in 2000 when Hafez al-Assad died and was replaced by his son and current

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In the months which followed, the transition Bashar al-Assad allowed a certain degree of political openness to go along with the economic openness that he brought to the position. The period known as the Damascus Spring was characterized by political group gatherings and discussions in Damascus, along with political demands, which included the lifting of the state of emergency that had been in place since Hafez al-Assad took power in 1970 and which was not lifted until April 2011.

The period is also characterized by concessions and the releasing of prisoners followed by a repression of the movement and the imprisonment of those participating. This event

33 in Syria’s history of which even the name resembles the term for events leading up to this speech, i.e. Damascus Spring/Arab Spring, is reminiscent by way of the demands and the government’s responding with concessions and then repression.

Bashar al-Assad did not use the word “conspiracy” or “conspiracies” in a presidential address responding to the Damascus Spring because according to public

Ba’ath Party records of speeches given (Ba’ath Party, 2014), he did not give any speech in which the issue was addressed.

Another crisis for Syria came in 2005 when Lebanon’s Rafik Hariri was assassinated. The accusation that Syria was involved was followed by pressure that led to the withdrawal of Syria’s military from Lebanon.

The SP did use the term “conspiracy” several times in a speech given subsequent to Syria’s military withdrawal from Lebanon. Assad did not use the term “conspiracy” at all in the speech he gave as an immediate response to the assassination which was given in March 2005 (the assassination was in February 2005). However, in a November 2005 speech he gave at Damascus University (while the U.N. was investigating Syria for its potential involvement), he began the speech as he began the March 2011 speech to parliament with the suggestion of ongoing conspiracies against Syria:

استذكر فيها سنواتى الست التى امضيتها فى الجامعة فى ابنيتها وساحاتها ومخابرها طالبا ينهل العلم من اساتذتها

وكتبها ويعيش هموم الوطن مع طالبها فى مرحلة سياسية صعبة لم تكن تختلف بمضمونها السياسى وتحدياتها عما

هو عليه االمر اليوم من حيث خطورة الموءامرات على سورية والمنطقة ومن حيث جسامة التحديات التى نواجهها

والتى كان للهيئات الجامعية دور اساسى فى تشخيصها وكشف خلفياتها وابعادها من جهة وفى تعبئة المجتمع

لمواجهتها من جهة اخرى

“I recall the six years I spent at this university…in its buildings, courtyards, and labs as a

student drawing knowledge from its teachers, books, and sharing the concerns of the

country with its students in a difficult political stage which wasn’t much different in terms of its political implications and challenges from today’s issues with respect to the

seriousness of conspiracies against Syria and the region and with respect to the

immensity of the challenges which we face. The structures of this university played a

fundamental role in diagnosing these challenges and discovering their background and

dimensions on one hand and mobilizing society to confront them on the other hand.”

Assad went on to use the word “conspiracy” or “conspiracies” several more times in the same speech.

Despite the fact that Western audiences might find the propagation of a conspiracy theory by a state leader shocking in this instance, it has been demonstrated that there is a previously established precedent for framing challenges to authority as conspiracy-driven. It is important to realize this because it has an impact on the extent to which Syrian audiences experience shock at such assertions. Also, this section demonstrates the potential associations made by listeners, i.e. Muslim Brotherhood uprising versus Damascus Spring.

Arab Spring and Syrian Uprising

The Syrian uprising took place in the context of a wave of popular protests that affected Arab states beginning with Tunisia. Tunisian protests were sparked by the self- immolation of a street merchant who had been harassed by a security officer for not having a sales permit. Shortly after protests began in Tunisia, the Tunisian president,

Ben Ali, was deposed. Encouraged by the rapid results of popular protests in Tunisia,

35 citizens from other Arab states ruled by long-standing dictatorships began protesting for political change. Egypt’s Mubarak and Yemen’s Saleh were similarly removed from power. In Libya, the situation devolved into a conflict between rebels and government forces. The United Nations and NATO intervened in Libya with a no-fly zone which helped the rebels to gain an advantage over the Qadaafi’s forces. Qadaafi was captured, brutally killed, and dragged through the streets by militia rebels. In other Arab states such as Jordan and Bahrain, protests were quelled before becoming a serious threat to existing regimes. A few attempts to organize protests in Syria were unsuccessful until a controversy in Deraa sparked off protests that began on March 15, 2011. Protests quickly spread to the border cities of Syria while Aleppo and Damascus remained largely insulated for months into the uprising.

It is difficult to ascertain or to verify the details of the events in Deraa which sparked off the protests in Syria. A report commissioned by two French agencies, the uprising provides the following account of the events in Deraa in March 2011:

The events were triggered primarily by the children of Deraa scandal. A first demonstration took place in front of the mosque in the city centre. Children wrote tags on the walls criticizing the regime and demanding the withdrawal of the governor. They were immediately arrested and tortured (finger nails pulled out, etc.). Three of the children were killed. When their parents came to demand their release, the governor told them: «All you have to do is have more children. And if you are not capable, bring your women here and we will do it ourselves». Publicly humiliated, the parents called on tribal leaders who organized demonstrations in front of the governor’s palace. The protests quickly turned violent. The governor of Deraa was later dismissed by Bachar al--‐Assad, who met with the relatives of the victims. (Benhabyles, 2012: 13)

However, variations of this version of events circulated as rumors that reached

North to Aleppo and beyond. Another version of this narrative, printed in a cultural magazine, puts Bashar al-Assad’s cousin and security operative in the midst of the

36 conflict:

One night in mid March 2011, the Syrian authorities arrested several Deraa youth, ranging from ages 10 to 15. These youth had written written (sic) slogans on their city walls similar to those they heard and saw on satellite channels from the Tunisian and Egyptian protests: “The people want the overthrow of the regime.” The families of those arrested tried to communicate with the security and political officials to release their children. Instead of simply refusing to answer these families, the authorities escalated the situation, insulting the families and cursing their honor. When leaders of Deraa met with Atif Najib, the head of the local branch of government security and cousin to Bashar al-Assad, said to them, “Forget your children, who belong to me. Go to your wives to have other children. If you are not manly and unable to do so, then my men can take your place.” The town leaders, feeling insulted, carried out a symbolic act well known in Syrian culture: they removed their headbands from their heads and laid them on Najib’s table as a sign of their humiliation. This showed they would not forgive him unless he apologized for his insult. However, Najib refused to acknowledge or pay attention to this symbolic act. Instead, he continued to insult them by throwing the headbands gathered on his desk in the trash. As a result, the leaders left him with the determination to win back their honor. After two weeks, the children were released, only for everyone to discover that they had been exposed to terrible torture. Some had broken teeth, while others had fingernails pulled off. After hearing their stories, an uprising erupted in the city. The youth took to the streets, followed by their fathers, mothers, brothers, and sisters. (Bayrakdar, 2012)

In this version of the story, there were no children killed. Also, insults were allegedly made following the children’s release rather than in response to demands for their release. In addition, there are the additional details about the chiefs casting their headbands in front of the security principal. It is important to note that no one has been able to confirm that the alleged insults were actually made by any government official.

Other details of these accounts are similarly difficult to verify.

The speech being investigated for this study was delivered prior to calls for the

Syrian president to step down by protestors or opposition groups and prior to a major militarization of the conflict which started around three months later in June 2011.

A number of factors have been attributed to the onset and the resilience of the rebellion in Syria including economic disparity and political grievances. However, it seems that it was the events of the Arab Spring which led to the Syrian uprising. A report funded by the Harvard Negotiation Project, the Norwegien Institute of International

Affairs, and Trinity University lays out the landscape of viewpoints over issues related to the Syrian uprising collected from interviews with various stakeholders in the Syrian conflict. This report can be referenced for an overview of the perceptions of the causes of the Syrian uprising as well as other dimensions of the situation. For example, opinions of 1) governments, organizations, and prominent individuals considered to be supportive of the government, 2) internal Syrian opposition, 3) external Syrian opposition, 4)

UN/Arab League/Arab government officials/Western government officials and those who recently were government officials in Western of Arab countries were interviewed and asked about their viewpoints on a number of issues related to the causes, advancements, expectations, obstacles, concerns, directions, outcomes, etc. of the conflict.

Changes such as the government’s lifting of a ban on the use of Facebook had been implemented weeks earlier seemingly in response to the Egyptian revolution, and in the days between the onset of protests and Deraa and leading up to the speech on March

30, the government had announced other changes such as increases in salaries for government employees. Media coverage prior to the speech mostly focused on Syrian expectations that a lifting of the emergency law in place since 1963 would be announced in the speech. And, it was mentioned by many reports after the speech as an expectation that went unaddressed in the speech. Syria had been under emergency law since 1963 when its use was justified based on ongoing conflict with Israel over the Golan Heights.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS OF SPEECH PERFORMANCE

The Speech

The speech that will be analyzed in this chapter and those subsequent to it was delivered by President Assad on March 30, 2011, which was two weeks after the eruption of riots in Syria’s southern border town of Deraa that set off the subsequent uprising and armed conflict. It was addressed to the People’s Council of Syria (majlis aš-šaʕab). The

Arabic transcript of the speech was obtained from the Syrian Ba’ath Party website. The transcript of the speech referred to was published on the website with introductions (one at the beginning and one following the SP’s greeting to the council). The transcript also contains subtitles given to different sections of the speech as well as narrations such as

“and President Assad added:” It was necessary to ignore the latter innovations and the introductions from the transcript whereas the added subtitles can be useful in that they serve to separate and highlight the main arguments and points. They demonstrate an official Ba’ath Party interpretation of the arguments presented in the speech.

The published text was checked against video of the speech also available online.

One or two statements were made by the SP which did not end up in the published text of the speech. Praises and comments given by parliamentarians were also not published.

I created a separate transcript and translation for the speech that includes only those interjections and statements that were left out of the official texts (Appendix B). I did the

39 translation in consultation with Arabic native speakers.

In the following section, I discuss the events of the speech itself and how they contribute to what Wedeen calls a “strategy of domination based on compliance (rather than legitimacy)” (1999:6). However, it will also be demonstrated that the events of the speech not only illustrate that the regime was pursuing a strategy of domination but that they also followed a strategy of depicting the Syrian authoritarian political system as democratic.

Performing Democracy and Obedience

The location or venue for a political speech should be considered because such a choice can not only have implications for the use of genre but it can also support the structure of the speech similar to the way a picture can support the structure of a news article. An example of the importance of the venue in oral political communication is the conflict between CJ Craig, the fictional White House Press Secretary, and Ann Stark, the chief of staff for the congressional majority leader of the opposite party, in season 2 episode 11 of the television drama The West Wing, over the location of a press briefing following a bipartisan leadership breakfast. In this episode, politicians have all started strategizing about presidential campaigns because it is just about 2 years until the current term will end. It is important for Ann that her boss be able to brief the press following the breakfast from the Capital steps as opposed to the White House lawn because she feels that if she briefs on the White House lawn and the President’s Press Secretary briefs from the press from the White House briefing room it places her boss on a lesser footing.

The White House briefing room is prestigious and ceremonial whereas the White House

40 lawn, especially because congressmen and women are guests at the White House and do not work there, seems less official. The congressman’s chief of staff was also objecting to the fact that the President’s staff had the privilege of being the last to brief the press about the results of the bipartisan breakfast. In the same episode, there was also a conflict between CJ Craig and Sam Seaborne because he wanted to permanently move the White House press briefing room and with it the press corps across the street from the

White House. CJ argued that the press would not want to have such distance from the

White House and that the American people would view it as the White House refusing to be transparent and being secretive.

Thus it is important to ask questions about what or whose purposes are being served by the choice of venue and related decisions by political figures. The speech given on March 30, 2011 was significant because it was the first speech given by the SP since uprisings began in the middle of March 2011. The presidential speech was given to members of the Syrian parliament. Videos and media reports of the speech show the SP entering the Syrian parliament building to deliver this speech amid crowds of cheering supporters (C-SPAN, 2011). The SP is shown walking from the building’s entrance area to the council’s chamber alongside the then current president of the People’s Council,

Mahmoud al-Abrash. Then footage cuts to the SP in front of the podium in a room filled with “elected representatives” in the Syrian People’s Council. Members of the council are standing and cheering one of the two primary slogans heard throughout the country by the SP’s supporters, “God, Syria, Bashar, that’s all”4. The SP smiles and waves to the

4 These slogans are adaptable and have been used to support other leaders in Syrian and Lebanese history at the least.

41 members of the parliamentary council who stand as they chant the slogan and clap. The

SP joins in the clapping extending his hands to show that he is clapping for them just before the crowd is hushed for the speech to begin. The SP begins with a remark that is one of about two or three remarks that were either spontaneously spoken or were overlooked by record keepers as they were not included in the Ba’ath Party’s transcript of the speech. He says, “the most difficult…the most difficult is to respond to this situation.” The idiomatic meaning is, “It is difficult for me to respond to such a welcome.” This is followed by the listeners chanting the other primary slogan heard throughout the country which is, “With spirit, with blood, we sacrifice for you, O

Bashar.” Before Assad begins to speak, a member of the audience is heard speaking from the back of the hall. The speaker is heard saying the following:

نورت المجلس يا ابن األسد نورت سورية يا درع سورية واألمة العربية

“you have spread light on the council, oh son of Assad

you have spread light on Syria, oh armor of Syria and of the Arab nation”

The speech is interrupted several times not only by applause and parliamentarians’ chanting slogans of support but also by some of these members rising to their feet to similarly announce greetings, praise, poetry, declarations of support, etc.

It is important to point out a few things about the spectacle of parliamentarians interrupting the speech to recite poetry in praise of the SP. First, the elaborate nature of the comments and the fact that so many were prepared with comments indicates that it was coordinated beforehand. At what level it was coordinated cannot be known.

Second, the statements indicate that not only is there a rhetorical role for repetition in political discourse but that in this speech, there is an attempt to push the boundaries of the

42 genre of political discourse in the form of a political speech to include poetic phrases.

Third, regardless of whether one believes these outbursts were spontaneous or prepared, such a display from beginning to end has the effect of promising those watching that the president has a great deal of support both within the government and among the public at large. Although Bashar al-Assad publicly eschews the spectacles and symbolic worship that were a normal part of his father’s rule, this seems to be an example of that kind of scene and culture described by Wedeen, where people are seen acting while no one believes the sincerity of it. However, the fact that they are doing it demonstrates loyalty through obedience and disciplined behavior. Through an examination of the regime symbols, i.e. photos of the president and practices, i.e. parades and other demonstrations of loyalty, Wedeen’s important work on Syrian political discourse established that there is a complex relationship between the leadership and the governed which essentially results in citizens who do not believe in the government rhetoric but who profess or demonstrate loyalty.

Finally, this type of spectacle was not done in any of the subsequent speeches of the 8 or 9 that have been given since. And, when I asked Syrians about it, I was told that such spectacles had not been seen in public speeches given by the president prior to this.

As previously mentioned, within the genre of presidential speech-making, a president’s choice of speech venue can serve his/her interests. For this speech, the choice was made to make the speech before parliament in order to highlight the democratic aspects of the Syrian government as well as a focus on the reform-centeredness of the president. The last time the president addressed the People’s Council public was in 2007 which was a follow up to his reelection and delivering an inauguration speech. Prior to

43 that, he addressed the council publicly in response to the crisis Syria faced when Rafik

Hariri was assassinated and Syria was forced to withdraw its occupation forces from

Lebanon.

In analyzing the enduring nature of authoritarian governments in the Middle East, international relations experts have written about the phenomenon of such governments being able to maintain power by displaying a veneer of democracy. For example, the

Syrian Parliament or People’s Council does not have the same level of power as the U.S.

Congress, i.e. it does not have the power to check the president or to control legislation and funding. However, the existence of the People’s Council may appeal to citizens with regard to the issue of being a democratically developed nation.

The Arab Spring brought demands for democracy in Tunisia and Egypt and demands for combinations of reform and democracy in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan, and Syria at least. Speeches in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Jordan responding to domestic uprisings were not given to a congress or parliament. With the exception of

Qadaafi’s speeches which were given from his bombed out compound (1986-U.S. retaliation against Libya for a European terrorist attack), speeches given by Ben Ali,

Mubarak, Saleh, and Abdullah were prerecorded statements given from presidential offices or rooms and broadcast. The demands in Syria at the time of the speech were only for reform and demonstrators had not yet begun to call for the stepping down of the president. However, calls for democracy were part of the uprisings taking place across the Arab world. The SP, with this choice of venue, was able to reinforce in the minds of viewers that Syria has democratic-like institutions in place and that reform can take place within such institutions.

CHAPTER 6

STRUCTURES OF ARABIC REPETITION

This section represents a discussion of Arabic repetition types and structures from the literature on repetition in Arabic to be addressed in the data. Though the list is comprehensive, it is not exhaustive as there are structures and types of repetition at all grammatical levels, not all of which will be dealt with in this study. However, the most prominent types and structures contained within the literature and the data are represented.

Repetition structures in Arabic are compared to their English counterparts or lack thereof in terms of their structure and their rhetorical value. Excerpts from the data will be discussed in relation to the scholarship’s definitions of each feature.

Lexical Couplets

Lexical couplets represent a large portion of the repetition identified within the data for this study. Lexical couplets are defined by Johnstone as “sets of two roughly synonymous words connected with wa ‘and’” (1982, 1991). This pattern has been referred to by subsequent scholars as a lexical couplet (Rieschild 2006) as well as other labels including the lexical doublet (Jawad 2009) or the semantic doublet (Shunnaq

2000). al-Jabouri prefers the term word strings stating “ (Johnstone’s) word strings are

45 termed ‘couplets’, i.e. composed of two constituents, thus ignoring strings that have more than two constituents” (1984:104). He also indicates that the term “synonym couplet”, which was previously (1981) employed by Johnstone as well, is limiting since couplets can consist of antonyms. Others have also preferred to call them “word strings”

(Shunnaq 1992). Mazraani (1997) deals with specific types of lexical couplets or word strings which she labels “listing of three elements” (which are word strings consisting of three constituents) or “contrastive pairs” (which are antonymous lexical couplets). In some cases, the phenomenon is not labeled. For example, Menacare (1992), who concentrates on repetition and translation of the Arabic particle wa, simply describes examples of lexical couplets in his data by stating “wa may also be used to join synonymous words…” Similarly, Fakhri (2004: 1133) referred to lexical couplets in this impressive example of repetition patterning as simply “seven noun phrases in a row conjoined by wa “and””:

…lan natawaqqafa…’illaa ’amaama ’abrazi ma‘aalimi al’istraatijiyyati nash’atan wa

ta‘riifan, wa taariixan wa ’anwaa‘an, wa mabaadi’a wa ‘awaamila wa mafaahiima.

(…We will focus only on the main features of [the notion] of strategy in terms of its

development and definition, and history and types, and principles and factors and

constructs.) (1133)

Johnstone expands upon her definition of the lexical couplet:

A lexical couplet is a structure of the form AxB which meets the following three criteria:

1) x is a coordinating conjunction, usually additive (and; Arabic wa) but

occasionally disjunctive (or; ’aw)

2) A and B are synonyms, if they are single words, paraphrases if they are

phrases…5

3) The structure AxB has a single referent; it is used to refer to a single object, action

or state, rather than two temporally or logically discrete objects, actions or states.

(1991:37)

Shunnaq, who refers to lexical couplets as word-strings, defines them as follows:

Two or more lexical items strung together to constitute one group, roughly showing the same meaning. The lexical items are of the same syntactic category. The use of word strings may create semantic elaboration through the use of:

1) Nouns, as in Huru:b wa-munaza:ca:t (wars and conflicts);

2) Verbs, as in na:qasha wa-baHatha ([he]debated and discussed);

3) Adjectives, as in Wa:diH wa-qa:Tic wa-Sari:H (clear and decisive and

straightforward); or even

4) Adverbs, as in sa:khiTan wa-Ha:qidan (grudgingly and maliciously) (1992:6)

Lexical Couplets and Semantic Groupings

Consider the following example from the March 30 speech:

الشعب السوري شعب مسالم وودود

aš-šaʕb as-suūrī šaʕb musālim wa wadūd

“the Syrian people are peaceful and loving”

In this couplet, the words are correlated in meaning only. The items in the couplet have completely different patterns and roots. Thus, the repetition in this couplet

5 Johnstone discusses issues with recognizing semantic relationship and synonymy later in the chapter.

47 is limited to the semantic level.

Scholars of Arabic repetition have demonstrated that lexical couplets can be divided into groups based on semantic relationships between the two terms in the pair.

For example, Shunnaq subdivides word strings into the following categories: mentioning a specific item after a general one (or vice versa), totality designated into component parts, exact specification, intersecting category, culturally associated freezes or near freezes, synonymity, and contrasts (1992).

al-Jabouri identifies 8 groups: synonymous, near-synonymous, implication, particular to general, one modifies the other, gradation of meaning, antonyms or near antonyms, freezes or near freezes (1984).

Johnstone’s semantic categorization includes the following types: “modified- modifier (…the second term modifies the first term, usually by restricting its meaning or making it more concrete), implicational couplets (…there is a relationship of implication between the first term and the second), heniadic (…the two terms share some meaning element…which is the referent of the couplet), metaphorical expansion (…the second term can be a metaphorical version of the first), synonym groups (…seem to be really synonymous), near freezes (…have a strong tendency to be used together, but they do not immediately call one another to mind), and freezes (…consists of Arabic couplets like beck and call…many of these have religious background or ritual origins just as many

English couplet freezes are legalistic) (1991).

Johnstone suggests, however, that such categories are problematic since (1) it is difficult to determine whether or not two words are synonyms and (2) many couplets may fit into several semantic classes. Johnstone uses this problem to explain her labeling and

48 defining lexical couplets as consisting of synonyms. That is that diachronically, the more an expression is used, the more common it becomes, the more the two terms come to share the same meaning (1991:49). She also indicates that the semantic categorization fails to explain how lexical couplets are operating linguistically and rhetorically

(1991:48). For this reason, Johnstone urges us to consider the morphological identicalness of Arabic lexical couplets which is, as she indicates, made possible because of Arabic’s productive morphological system of Arabic (1991:53).

Lexical Couplets and Linguistic Levels

In the sections that follow, repetition at various levels, including the phonological, morphological, lexical, and phrase level will be discussed. Examples of these repetition types from the data for this study will be considered. In many cases, these repetition types will be operating within the structure of the lexical couplet. However, there will also be many instances where they will be contained within other structures.

Phonological Level Repetition

Shunnaq, who deals with the emotiveness of repetition in Arabic political speech- making, describes phonological repetition as follows: “At this level we deal with sound symbolism, rhythm, and other prosodic features. Phonological features play a significant role in both spoken Arabic and English. Rhythm, for instance, is favored in spoken political discourse” (2000: 219). al-Harasheh, whose work is based largely on

Shunnaq’s, demonstrates the differences between emotiveness in Arabic and English at the phonological level of repetition with an excerpt from a speech by Hamas leader

Khalid Mashaal (2013):

أبعث من الرسائل ما يلزم لكل من يعنيه أو تعنيه هذه الرسائل في لحظة صعبة لكنها عظيمة ومجيدة من تاريخ قضيتنا

وشعبنا ومسيرة نضالنا ومقامتنا الباسلة الشجاعة األصيلة

abaʕθu min ar-rasāʔil mā yalzam li-kul-li man yaʕnīhi aw taʕnīhi hāihi ar-rasāʔil fi:

laḥa ṣaʕba lakin-nahā ʕaīma wa majīda min tārīx qaḍiyyatinā wa šaʕbinā wa masīrat

niḍālinā wa muqāwamatinā al-bāsila aš-šujāʕa al-aṣīla

I send what is required of messages to whom they may concern in this hard, but great and

glorifying moment in the history of our question, our people, our struggling march,

our courageous and genuine resistance. (106)

In this instance, which includes a translation provided by al-Harahsheh as part of the example, there are two sets of repetition. First, there is the set of nouns which are not necessarily synonyms but are referenced as closely related types of histories. Each noun ends with a possessive pronoun suffix meaning “we”, not all of which appear in the translation. The second set of repetition is also not evident in the translation but refers to the three adjectives being used to describe the last or all of the nouns in the phrase. The meanings of these adjectives are “dauntless, courageous, and genuine”. al-Harahsheh describes the translation problems presented by these forms in the following statement:

قضيتنا وشعبنا In the Arabic version, the use of sound of the morphemes (rhythm) "nā" in“

does not appear in English. Therefore, English translation )…) is less ونضالنا ومقاومتنا emotive than the Arabic version. The use of such rhythm is functional and expressive, as the speaker tries to get the listeners involved in his or her speech. Again, the rhythm "a"

sic]. The two] الشجاعة الباسلة االصيلة which is the last morpheme in the following words

have the same meaning (i.e., repetition of synonyms that end الباسلة [and] الشجاعة words

50 with the same rhythm)” (2013: 106-107). The repetition of the particle “wa” meaning

“and”, is not translated, nor discussed by al-Harahsheh, but also represents a kind of phonological repetition that contributes to the rhythm of the passage. Thus, al-Harahsheh indicates here that the repetition of elements containing grammatical information is combined with semantically loaded items and contributes to the emotiveness of redundant phrases in a way that cannot adequately be conveyed in English. The closest practice that this can be compared to in English would be alliteration, although it still does not adequately represent the types of phonological repetition possible in Arabic.

In the following example from Assad’s March 30 speech, the phonological repetition of grammatically loaded morpheme suffixes combine with a lexical couplet to intensify the effect of the message:

وقاتلنا بشدة ضد هذا المشروع في القمة العربية في تونس وأفشلناه ورفضناه

wa qātalna bišidda ḍiḍḍa haā al-mašrūʕ fī el-qimma al-ʕarabiyya fī tūnis wa afšalnāhu

wa rafaḍnāhu

“and we fought with intensity against this plan in the Arab summit in Tunisia and we

caused it to fail and we refused it”

or ‘afšal’ literally means أفشل .In this statement, the verbs have similar meaning

رفض .”to cause to fail” which also carries connotations of “derail” “thwart” or “oppose“ or ‘rafaḍ’ means “to refuse”. The statement is in reference to plans proposed in an Arab summit. Both verbs are in the past tense and conjugated for “we” which accounts for the first suffix attachment to the verb “nā”. Then there is an object pronoun suffix attachment “hu” which means “he or it” referring to the plan. In this case the phonological repetition adds intensity to the semantic and syntactic parallelism.

In other cases the meanings between items displaying phonological repetition may be more loosely affiliated. Consider the following example from the March 30 speech:

وهذا ما حقق المعالجة السليمة والسالمة واألمينة والوطنية وأعاد الوحدة الوطنية بشكل سريع إلى سورية

wa hāā ma ḥaqqaq al-muʕālaja as-salīma wa as-sālima wa al-ʔamīna wa

al-waṭaniy-ya wa ʔaʕāda al- wiḥda al-waṭaniy-ya bišakl sarīʕ ilā suriy-ya

“and this is what led to the achievement of safe, sound, peaceful, and patriotic

treatment (of the situation) and the restoration of national unity, in a quick fashion, to

Syria”

Here the adjectives “safe”, “sound”, and “peaceful” are related in meaning. The word that means “patriotic” does not seem to be related in meaning. Yet, it is placed within a group of adjectives that mean “safe”, “sound”, and “peaceful”. The first two adjectives meaning “safe” and “sound” both begin with the consonant sound “s” as they do in English. All four of the adjectives describe a feminine noun that means

“treatment”. Thus, the adjectives all match the noun in gender and definiteness which leads to an instance of phonological repetition as well. In addition to adding intensity or emotiveness, the phonological repetition may serve to reinforce a relationship between the words in the word string.

The following examples from the data demonstrate phonological repetition caused by the addition of various types of morpheme prefixes and suffixes:

ننجح في مواجهته في كل مرة نجاحاً باهراً يزيدنا قوة ومنعة

nanjaḥ fī muwājahatihi fī kul-li marra najāḥan bāhiran yazīduna quw-watan wa

minʕatan

“we succeed in facing it each time a shining success which increases our strength and

force”

بعد االستقالل ما أعطاها المزيد من المناعة والقوة..

baʕda al-istiqlāl ma aʕtāhā al-mazīda min al-manāʕa wa al-quw-wa

“after independence, it provided an increase in force and strength”

In these examples, it is the Arabic feminine ending for nouns “a” that is repeated in addition to the definite article prefix in the second example. In the following example, it is also a feminine ending for nouns that is repeated. In this case, it is the plural noun ending. The plural feminine noun ending can be used for feminine nouns. In some cases, the feminine plural ending can be used to pluralize a nonhuman masculine noun.

وبغض النظر عما إذا كان هناك من سلبيات وإجابيات

wa biɤaḍ-ḍi an-naδar ʕamā iā kāna hunāk min as-salbiy-yāt wa ʔijābiy-yāt

“irrespective of whether there are positive aspects or negative aspects”

The items in this example are acting as nouns but are of a form most often used as a specific type of adjective in Arabic (the nisba). This type of adjective has a distinctive and specific ending “iyy/a” (masculine/feminine) which is also a repeated sound in this example.

Because repetitions such as these involve morphemes carrying grammatical information, there may be a tendency to regard such as mere grammatical requirements and devoid of any persuasive purpose. In other words, to a native English speaker, for example, they seem to be almost poetic until one appreciates that production might be restricted by grammar. Yet the repetition of grammatically loaded morphemes in an

Arabic discourse is often the result of choice. This is according to Shunnaq who deals with the tension between grammatical requirement and rhetorical function. From his

53 examples of the repetition of adjectives (also of nisba adjectives and nominal correspondents) in political discourse and argumentative discourse, he indicates that adjectives of the same form could be replaced by a synonym (1993). However, he indicates that in cases where this is not done, it could be a compromise or a transition between repetition that is requirement and repetition that is rhetorical or persuasive or

“from forced repetition to functional repetition”. In the following example, the definite article “the” is repeated in addition to the feminine nominal ending.

وهم أهل النخوة والشهامة والكرامة

wa hum ahal un-naxwa wa aš-šahāma wa al-karāma

“they are people of chivalry, gallantry, and honor”

The definite article is pronounced as “al” in cases where it is followed by a consonant whose place of articulation is further back in the mouth. Whereas, for letters that are produced more dentally, the “l” sound is not produced. Instead, the consonant following the definite article is doubled. Thus, for the letter that sounds like “n”, you would hear an-nahār as opposed to al-nahār. But, the “a” sound would be pronounced each time the definite article is present (unless preceded by a word ending in a short vowel ‘u’ or ‘i’). Because this lexical couplet has more than two items, it is worth mentioning that the cohesive marker “wa”, which translates as “and”, is also repeated between each element. The literal translation would be “They are people of chivalry and gallantry and honor”. In English, the connective article “and” would commonly not be repeated between each element and would only be expressed prior to the last element.

Yet there are cases in English where “and” might be repeated between elements. In

English, this could occur in a political speech and repetition of “and” could be used for

54 rhetorical purposes. In Arabic, it is more complicated since the repetition of “and” is not only used rhetorically but is used more frequently in Arabic. The various reasons for the repetition of the cohesive marker “wa” and their translation in English has been addressed by Menacare (1992). Among its uses are “it can imply coordination, it can relate two sequences for emphasis, it can express continuation, cause, simultaneity, etc.”

(Menacare 1992: 32). Menacare argues that it is important for the translator to understand the function of this connector in Arabic in order to make appropriate decisions about how to translate it. Menacare implies that a translator must be aware of the rhetorical purposes, among others, for such types of repetition in his conclusion saying, “the meaning of an utterance is not a single issue but a synthesis of various elements, the relative importance of which varies from one situation and language user to another; for one the purpose may be to emphasize rhetoric and repetitious patterns, while for another these factors may be irrelevant” (1992: 36).

This section has dealt with phonological repetition resulting from the accumulation of morpheme prefixes and suffixes. Phonological repetition has also been applied to examples where there is repetition of the root or pattern which occurs as the result of the Arabic system of morphology which will be discussed in the following sections. Although repetition of roots and patterns results in rhyme and the repetition of sounds, and the affixing of morphemes is a morphological level process, I am nevertheless obligated to attempt to delineate the various types of repetition in one way or another. One way that this crossover has been described for such cases is: “This type of repetition (morphological) initiates a phonological pattern producing an emotive aura.”

(Shunnaq 2000).

Morphological Level Repetition-Pattern

The root and pattern system in Arabic creates the conditions for a distinctive type of alliteration or rhyme where not only endings but entire word patterns as well as morphological roots can be repeated. Ali, who views repetition in Arabic from a historical perspective with an eye to the translation of repetition between Arabic and

English, categorizes repetition into two types: one that is more technical and used for aesthetic purposes and another which is thematic in nature (2005). In the following statement, Ali describes the two types of repetition with respect to both English and

Arabic literature. He also explains the linguistic reasons for the liberality of what he calls cognitive repetition (technical, stylistic, aesthetic, incantory, emotive, etc.) found in the

Arabic language:

It follows, that whereas cultural factors are the main motivation for repetition in English, and particularly in poetic English, mostly technical and aesthetic factors account for repetitions occurring in Arabic texts for, besides it paradigmatic elasticity, Arabic harbors morphological peculiarities which, in addition to their grammatical and semantic significance, give birth to morphological repetitions where numerous similar forms stem out of the same root. Moreover, Arabic encompasses countless synonyms which themselves give rise to cognitive repetition. Conversely, English morphology only gives very few similar derived forms and it, therefore, does not harbor morphological repetition. (350)

Thus, in addition to the circumstance of Arabic as a language rich in synonyms, repetition in Arabic is amplified because of the root and pattern system of morphology.

The examples that follow demonstrate some instances of the repetition of morphological patterns locate in the data. Consider the following example:

وكانوا يطرحون علينا طروحات م عا ِكسة و م ناقِضة لمصالحنا

wa kānū: yaṭraḥūna ʕalayna ṭurūḥāt muʕākisa wa munāqiḍa li-maṣāliḥnā

“they were suggesting proposals for us that were contrary and opposed to our interests”

(short vowels part of the pattern cannot be highlighted)

This is an example of a lexical couplet where the two items are similar in meaning, i.e. contrary and opposed. However, the focus here should be on the repetition of the pattern which is of the type muCāCiCa (where C represents the consonant of the

or ʕ-k-s and n-q-ḍ are ن-ق-ض and ع-ك-س trilateral root). When the root consonants removed, the pattern the synonyms share is evident. In the following example, the patterns are not exactly the same but very similar:

نريد أن نكون واقِعيين ووا ِضحين

nurīd an nakūn wāqiʕiy-yīn wa wāḍiḥīn

“we want to be realistic and clear”

(short vowels part of the pattern cannot be highlighted)

The adjectives in this couplet are not obvious synonyms. However, the meanings of each of the adjectives could potentially be connected. In terms of the pattern, both adjectives contain a long vowel “alif” (‘ā’) following the first root letter “w” and each adjective has a “kasra” )short vowel ‘i’) in the pattern following the second root letter.

This pattern is a common one for adjectives. However, the adjective that means realistic has a nisba adjective suffix in addition to the common adjective pattern. This is probably

is an adjective with a different meaning. With the human plural واقِع because the adjective suffix at the end of each adjective, which could be functioning nominally here, the difference is less noticeable. Thus, the patterns are very similar. The couplet also

or w-q-ʕ و-ض-ح and و-ق-ع .employs adjectives that begin with the same root letter, i.e and w-ḍ-ḥ. The following examples will not only demonstrate the repetition of the entire root of items in lexical couplets or synonym groups but also a distinct type of root

57 repetition common in Arabic.

Morphological Level Repetition-Root

Johnstone (1991) makes the following statement about repetition and Arabic’s morphological system, “There are two ways in which this morphological system can be exploited to create repetition in discourse: a pattern can be repeated, or a root can be repeated. Both sorts of repetition occur frequently” (55). In the following examples, it is not the pattern, but the root, that is repeated. In the initial examples the root is repeated in a lexical couplet. The items in each lexical couplet are not synonyms but have related meanings since they share a root that carries semantic information:

ونحن بلد جزء من هذه المنطقة نتفاعل نؤثر ونتأثر

wa naḥnu balad juzʔ min hāihi al-minṭaqa natafāʕal nuʔaθ-θir wa nutaʔaθ-θar

“and we are a country which is part of this area….we interact, we affect and we are

affected”

ʔ-t-r) is repeated. The first verb form carries an) ء-ث-ر In this example, the root active meaning and the second form conveys a passive meaning. In the following

s-b-b) is repeated and the meanings of each word in the pair) س-ب-ب example, the root are related to the meaning “to cause”:

ومن الضروري أن نبحث عن األسباب والمسببين

wa min aḍ-ḍarūri an nabḥaθ ʕan al-asbāb wa al-musab-bibīn

“and it is necessary to search for the causes and the causers”

:s-l-m) is repeated within the pair) س-ل-م In the following example, the root

أتت حادثة 11 أيلول حادثة في نيو يورك واتهام المسلمين واإلسالم

ʔatat ḥādiθat 11 aylūl fī nyū yurk wa it-tihām al-muslimīn wa l-islām

“then came the event of September 11, the New York event, and the accusing of

Muslims and Islam”

Up until this point, all of the examples provided from the March 30 speech to demonstrate phonological or morphological repetition have been of lexical couplets or word strings. The repetition of roots is also found in other types of phrases, however. In the following example, two words with the same root but different patterns are placed in close proximity to one another:

ونحن فاعلون ولسنا منفعلين

wa naḥnu fāʕilūn wa lasna munfaʕalīn

“and we are the enforcers and we are not the enforced”

The translation as it is in many examples previous and subsequent is more literal and less natural to English than it could be. This is done in order to demonstrate repetition expressed in the original Arabic text. The way that the phrases are structured here is also a form of repetition which will be discussed more at length later under the section about paraphrasing. At this time, it will only be said that in the first phrase, an idea “we are the enforcers” can be said to be following by a phrase in the negative that conveys the same meaning. “We are the enforcers” is followed by the phrase “We are not the enforced”. As long as the supposition that someone must be either “an enforcer” or “an enforced” is accepted, the second statement serves to reiterate the first statement.

In the next example, the root is repeated in both the noun and the adjective in a noun adjective phrase:

وهم من سيقومون بتطبيق القل ة القليلة التي أرادت إثارة الفوضى وتخريب اللحمة الوطنية

wa hum man sayaqūmūn bitaṭbīq al-qilla al-qalīla al-latī ʔarādat ʔiθārat al-fawḍā wa

taxrīb al-luḥma al-waṭaniy-ya

“and they are among those who will apprehend the minor minority (scarce few) who

wanted to stir up chaos and sedition of the national fabric”

or q-l-l. The following is also an example of repetition ق-ل-ل The repeated root is in a noun adjective phrase. It presents a case similar to those mentioned previously where there was a repetition of patterns that were similar but not exact. In the following case, the roots are not repeated but the combination of the root and pattern of the first word makes is similar in sound to the combination of root and pattern in the second item:

نستطيع أن نؤجل أحيانا معاناة معينة

nastaṭīʕ an nuʔaj-jil aḥyānan muʕāna muʕay-yana

“we can defer sometimes a certain (kind of) suffering”

or ʕ-n-y. The basic meaning is related to ع-ن-ي The root of the first word is

or ʕ-y-n. It carries a connotation of ع-ي-ن suffering”. The root of the second item is“

“specificity”. Essentially, the second and third consonants of each root are reversed.

Also, the patterns are similar. The pattern for the first item is the gerund form for the third verb form (among the 10 common patterns for Arabic verbs) and begins with a letter that sounds like the letter “m” in English. The adjective “specific” or “certain” has a pattern that begins with the same consonant. And, the adjective must match the noun in gender so both words in the noun-adjective phrase end in “a”.

Cognate Accusative

Another structure which is prevalent in the data is what has been called the

“cognate accusative” by Johnstone (1982, 1991). Johnstone explains the structure as follows:

The counterpart of morphological parallelism, or the repetition of patterns, is the repetition of lexical roots. This occurs in several different kinds of structures. One of these structure types, the cognate accusative, is common enough and serves a clear enough syntactic function that is has been labeled as given place in both traditional and modern grammars of Arabic, while other structure types are the sorts of things that are referred to as stylistic tendencies. All, however, are reflexes of the same linguistic pressure to make multiple use of the same root, pressure which exists to a far greater degree in Arabic than it does in English.

Since the complex verbal morphology of Arabic makes it possible to express shades of verbal meaning through morphological variation, there are very few adverbs in Arabic. When root-meaning modification cannot be accomplished morphologically, various other structures are called into service, and their adverbial function is signaled with the accusative case. The cognate accusative is one such structure. In a cognate accusative, a verbal form (verb, participle, or verbal noun) is accompanied in a phrase by a verbal noun of the same root. The verbal noun is usually, and preferably, of the same verb form class as the verbal element, thus creating a two- faceted repetition (repetition of the root and repetition of the verb class). The verbal noun is usually modified, either by an adjective (in which case both verbal noun and adjective are in the accusative case), or by being made the second term of an iḍāfa (genitive construct) construction, or in one of a number of other ways. (In some cases, the “cognate” and the “accusative” of the cognate accusative do not coincide.) The function of the cognate verbal noun together with its modifier is to provide adverbial modification for the main verbal element. (1991:62)

or mafʕu:l muṭlaq in Arabic مفعول مطلق The cognate accusative, which is termed grammar, is a structure which can be noticed in lines of song in The Fiddler on the Roof’s song Matchmaker:

matchmaker, matchmaker make me a match, find me a find, catch me a catch

Yet in English discourse, it is generally discouraged and it would seem a bit sugary to the

English native speaker to hear a phrase such as “It breathed new breath into the project” preferring instead something like “It breathed new life into the project”. Likewise, it would be unusual to hear “Scarlett drank a sweet drink on the deck” rather than “Scarlett had a sweet drink on the deck”. In other words, in English, this type of repetition sounds somewhat “sing-songy”. More jarring to the English ear are cases where in Arabic a noun and verb have the same root where in English the noun and a verb with shared meaning have different roots, i.e. “Ariel wrote a long writing (letter) to his future self”.

The structure is found in Qur’anic prose. The following example is taken from al-Qinai who uses it to discuss polysemy with respect to the word maṭar (rain):

وأمطرنا عليهم مطرا فساء مطر المنذرين

wa-amtarna ‘alayhim mataran fasaa’a mataru l-munthareen (transliteration al-Qinai’s)

“And we rained on them a rain, and evil was the rain of those who had been warned.”

(Shakir’s translation cited by al-Qinai) (36)

The final instance of the word “rain” in this example along with the verb “rained” is a type of cognate accusative structure which has also been found in pre-Islamic poetry as demonstrated by Ali (2005:340-341).

The cognate accusative is also found in spoken Arabic. Holes, who refers to the structure as “lexical echo”, documented its use among illiterate populations of native

Arabic speakers living in rural villages (1995). Holes also indicates that the structure has the effect of emphasizing the action. In the following examples, there are two English translations of the phrases identified. For each case, the first translation is more literal and the second demonstrates the more natural-sounding idiomatic version:

وكانوا يطرحون علينا طروحات معاكسة ومناقضة لمصالحنا

wa kānū yaṭraḥūn ʕalayna ṭuruḥāt muʕākisa wa munāqiḍa li maṣāliḥinā

“and they were proposing upon us proposals contrary to and against our interests”

“they were making proposals contrary to and against our interests”

فكانوا يبتسمون ابتسامات والكالم غير مصدق

fa kānū yabtasimūn ibtisāmāt wa l-kalām ɤayr muṣad-daq

“and they were smiling smiles and the speech was not believed”

“and they were smiling (skeptically) and the speech was not believed”

نعتقد ونتمنى أن يكون اعتقادنا صحيحا ً

naʕtaqid wa nataman-nā an yakūn iʕtiqāduna ṣaḥīḥan

“we think and we hope that our thinking is correct”

“we think and we hope that we are correct/that our logic is sound/that our assumptions

are correct”

اعتمد على التحريض وعلى رسائل ترسل بالهواتف المحمولة رسائل قصيرة

ʔiʕtamada ʕalā at-taḥrīḍ wa ʕalā rasāʔil tursal bil-hawatif al-mamḥmūla rasāʔil qaṣīra

“it is based on incitement and on messages messaged by mobile phone…short

messages”

“it is based on incitement and on messages sent by mobile phone…short messages”

In the last example, the noun of the cognate accusative structure is repeated an additional time to describe the type of messages that were sent. This seems very similar to the structure of the Qur’anic example cited previously in this section, i.e. (we) rained

(on them) rain……rain that is evil. The only difference is that in the Qur’anic prose, the second use of the noun is in a nominal sentence whereas in the March 30, speech it is in a noun-adjective phrase. In both cases, however, the second noun is used to explicate or to

63 explain what type of “rain” or what type of “messages”.

Lexical Level Repetition

Lexical Chains

Lexical repetition or lexical chains have been studied by Halliday and Hassan

(1976, 2014) as well as Hoey (1991) in general and by Abdulla (2001), Jawad (2009),

Fakhri (2004), Shunnaq (2000), Williams (1990), al-Quinai (2012), al-Khafaji (2005,

2006), Harahsheh (2013), and Lahlali (2012) for Arabic specifically.

According to Hoey (1991:6), lexical cohesion was dealt with previous to his own analysis by Halliday and Hassan in a superficial way. Hoey argues that text at the discourse level is connected through lexical repetition expanding on previous research which focused less on lexical cohesion and more on connection through conjunction, reference, substitution, and ellipses.

al-Quinai examines English translations of instances of polysemy and lexical recurrence in the Quran (2012). Because translating a holy text is sensitive, he finds generally that translators of the Qur’an are more likely to “maintain the rhetorical strategies and mystical effects of the Holy Scripture” via “formal overloading, archaism, and over adherence to SL (source language) peculiarities such as repetition and synonymy,” while a minority produced “communicative translations using contemporary

‘simple’ English” with the intention of “making the translations intelligible to the masses and the young generation” (27). After an analysis of the source text’s language and accompanying translations for several instances of polysemy and recurrence in the

Qur’an, al-Quinai finds that there is a danger for recurrence to be repeated in a formal

64 way or treated as semantic redundancy in the TT (target text) and suggests that in order to preserve the informative and aesthetic functions of recurring words and phrases, translators should “reproduce them in approximate functional equivalents or compensate their deletion with lexical insertions, annotations, or ideational equivalents.”

al-Khafaji compares the frequency and type of lexical chains between an English text and an Arabic text (2005). He describes the texts as parallel and argumentative.

Citing Johnstone (1994:6) he states that “such texts are known to encourage the use of repetition, since repetition is a universal ‘persuasive device’ in argument. He is able to determine that the frequency of simple lexical chains in Arabic is about twice that of complex lexical chains which are differentiated from simple lexical chains in that the lexical item exhibits variation in word class, i.e. important and importance, whereas simple lexical chains are composed of items which vary only in number, definiteness, past/present, etc. English exhibits only slightly less use of simple lexical chains. He finds that the actual difference in lexical chains in Arabic and English is the length, where the Arabic text had lexical chains that were longer. Furthermore, when he compared the longest lexical chains in Arabic to the longest lexical chains in English he found that the difference between the use of simple lexical chains and complex lexical chains became considerably more marked. The longer the lexical chain in English, the more likely it was to be complex and vice versa in Arabic. al-Khafaji determines that this is the reason for the impression that Arabic uses more simple lexical repetition than English.

The following examples do not demonstrate the full length and/or complexity of lexical chains in Arabic but demonstrate the differences between simple and complex lexical chains:

فهو ضغط الثقة التي وضعها الناس فيه وضغط المسؤولية التي يحملها والضغط األكبر اآلن هو ضغط الوعي الوطني

الشعبي

fa huwa ḍaɤṭ aθ-θiqa al-latī waḍaʕahā an-nās fīhi wa ḍaɤṭ al-masʔūliy-ya al-latī

yaḥmiluhā wa aḍ-ḍaɤṭ al-ʔakbar al-ʔān huwa ḍaɤṭ al-waʕī al-waṭanī aš-šaʕbī

“thus, it is the pressure of trust that the people put in him and the pressure of

responsibility which he carries and the biggest pressure now is the pressure of the

national public awareness”

وبما أن البعض ذاكرته قصيرة على الفضائيات فأنا أعود وأذكر أنه ليس كل ما يحصل هو مؤامرة لكي يتذكروا

wa bimā ʔan-na al-baʕḍ ākiratuhū qaṣīra ʕalā al-faḍāʔiy-yāt fa ʔanā ʔaʕūd wa

ʔuak-kir an-nahū laysa kul ma yaḥṣul huwa muʔāmara li kay-y yataak-karū

“and because some of the satellites have a short recollection, I will go back and remind

that everything that happened is not a conspiracy, so that they recollect/remember”

In the first example, the repeated word “pressure” is only varied in that it contains, in one case, the definite article, whereas the second set of lexical repetition has a change in word class from the noun “recollection” to different forms of the verb which carry variations in meaning and which are conjugated here for different subjects, i.e. “I” and “they”.

Scholars such as al-Harasheh and Shunnaq study the relationship between the number of times a lexical item is repeated and its emotive value.

Phrase and Discourse Level Repetition

Parallelism

Phrase repetition in Arabic is dealt with to varying degrees by Abdulla (2001),

Jawad (2007, 2009), al-Quinai (2012), Haggar (symmetry) (2010), Fakhri (2004),

Williams (repetition of clause structure) (1990), Holes (1995), Rieschild (2006), Shunnaq

(2000), and Johnstone (1982, 1983, 1991).

Phrase repetition goes by various definitions and labels. Williams deals with the

“repetition of clause structure” and defines it as a “category (that) includes cases where lexical items forming more than one element of clause structure are repeated” (1990:110, examples page 162).

Some scholars refer to examples of phrase repetition as syntactic parallelism

(Fakhri (2004), Holes (1995), Johnstone (1991)) or simply parallelism (al-Quinai,

Hannouna, Jawad (2007), Johnstone (1990), Shunnaq (2000)). Jawad calls parallelism the “repetition of structure” and citing De Beaugrande and Dressler indicates more specifically that the term connotes “repeating a structure but filling it with new elements

(2007)”.

Elsewhere Jawad uses the term “phrase repetition” and describes it as an extension of lexical cohesion which “…takes the form of explicit recurrence of a phrase, or even a clause, that has the function of connecting a number of sentences” (2009)

(example page 762).

Among the labels Johnstone applies to phrase repetition is “repetition of syntactic form” which she and others have indicated is the converse of paraphrase which is the

“repetition of meaning” (1990:97).

Some analyses of phrase repetition can be more complicated: 67

Haggar analyzes repetition as “symmetry” which she says can be achieved at all levels

(including the phrase level) (2010). Her definitions of forward symmetry, asymmetry, and even partial symmetry could all be potentially applied to various cases of phrase repetition.

Rieschild talks about “syntactic frame repetition” which she subdivides into two different types: emphatic contrastive syntactic frame repetition and emphatic coordination syntactic frame repetition (2006). Rieschild also uses the term multiple parallelism where there is emphatic syntactic frame repetition within another case of emphatic syntactic frame repetition.

Abdulla simply deals with the repetition of phrases his data, without labeling it:

بيروت ينتظرني, بكل بريقها, بكل امكانات الحرية فيها, بكل امكانات الحب فيها, بكل امكانات الشهرة فيها, بكل

امكانات نشر قصائدي في صحفها, وقلبي طائر جائع للتحليق.

(Saman 75:9)

Beirut is waiting for me with all her glamour. With all the possibilities of freedom, with all the possibilities of love, with all the possibilities of fame, with all the possibilities of

publishing my poems in her newspapers. (Abdulla suggested translation—2001: 297)

The following statements from the data contain an example of a lexical couplet as well as an example of syntactic parallelism:

تبدو األحداث والتطورات فيها كامتحان لوحدتنا ولغيريتنا..

tabdū al-ʔaḥdāθ wa at-taṭaw-wurāt fīhā ka-ʔimtiḥān liā-wiḥdatin wa li-ɤayratinā

“it seems that the events and the developments in it (this moment) are like a test for

our unity and for our selflessness ”

In the lexical couplet, the items “events” and “developments” are related in meaning but besides the fact that both are marked for definiteness with the definite article

“al”, there is no repetition of root, pattern, or additional morphemes. The second phrase which means “for our unity and for our selflessness” contains repetition of the attached particle “li” which means “for” as well phonological repetition resulting from the possessive pronoun suffixes “nā” meaning “our”. Both nouns end with the feminine ending which changes in sound from “a” to “t” when possessive pronoun suffixes are added.

Paraphrase and Rhetorical Presentation

An important type of repetition is paraphrasing. Paraphrase has been defined by

Johnstone and others as the repetition of content as opposed to the repetition of structure, which signifies parallelism (1982, 1991).

Many examples of this type of repetition are found throughout Assad’s speech.

Consider the following examples where ideas are reiterated by restating the claim using an inverse idea:

وتعتمد هذه المؤامرة في توقيتها ال في شكلها على ما يحصل في الدول العربية

“this conspiracy is based in its timing, not in its form on what is happening in Arabic

countries”

Johnstone refers to this as reverse paraphrase (1991:80). Johnstone demonstrates hu ‘aaraa’u ‘anTuun sacaada wa- this phenomenon with an excerpt from a short text by al-Husari titled “Hawla Hududi suuriyaa.” Who is summarizing a claim made by Antuun Saʕaada (1991:81): -‘ummati al- ‘inna al-miHwara al-’asaasiyya allaδii taduuru Hawla-

tacaaliimu-hu, tartakizu calaa al-zacmi al-taalii: “al-suuriyyunna ‘ummatun taammatun,

qaa’imatun bi-nafsi-haa.” “wa-al-‘ummatu al-suuriyyatu laysat juz’an min al

carabiyyati.” 69

Indeed the basic axis around which revolve the opinions of Antuun Sacaada and his

teachings rests on the following claim:

“The Syrians are a complete nation, standing by itself.” “And the Syrian nation is not part

of the Arab nation.”

A similar effect is achieved by introducing the idea first in the negative and then refuting the opposite:

ال أقول مختلفتين بل شقيقتين ليقولوا لألولى الطائفة الثانية أصبحت بالشارع انتبهوا انزلوا إلى الشارع

lā -ʔaqūl muxtalifatayn bal šaqīqatayn li-yaqūlū lil-ʔūlā aṭ-ṭāʔifa aθ-θaniya ʔṣbaḥat

biš-šāriʕ ʔintabihū ʔinzilū ʔilā ʔaš-šāriʕ

“I am not talking about different ones but rather blood brother ones in order to say

to one sect that the second sect was in the street and be warned about going out into the

street”

From the March 30 speech, it seems that the particle ‘bal’ which means ‘rather’ can signal this type of paraphrasing:

lā -ʔaqūl muxtalifatayn bal šaqīqatayn

“I’m not talking about different ones but rather blood brother ones”

There are at least two instances of paraphrasing in the following statement:

ال يمكن لشخص أن يكون من موقعه يدافع عن الوطن وبنفس الوقت يتآمر على الوطن أو يضر به فهذا الكالم

مستحيل وغير مقبول وبالتالي أهل درعا ال يحملون أي مسؤولية فيما حصل..

“it is not possible for a person to have a stance of defending the nation and at the same

time conspire against the nation or to harm it. This talk is impossible and not logical.

Furthermore, the people of Deraa do not carry any of the responsibility for what

happened”

Johnstone (1991—original 1981) discusses how paraphrasing works in Arabic discourse and highlights a pervasive pattern in Arabic rhetoric wherein arguments are made by stating a claim or thesis, paraphrasing it, and then making a more specific statement. This is what she refers to as “rhetorical presentation”. The structure is described as tripartite and global-specific. Johnstone discusses a structure where a global statement is made first, a more specific statement of the thesis is made second, and a third statement is “closely related to the second, and in fact a continuation of it” (84). She demonstrates with the following example: min al-macluumi ‘anna Huruuba naabuliyuun wa-futuHaata-hu, fii ‘awaa’ili al-qarni al-

taasica cashara, qad rayyarat kaθiiran min macaalimi xaariTati ‘urubbaa al-siyaasiyyati.

‘inna-haa qaDat calaa ciddati duwalin qadiimatin, wa-‘ansha’at ciddata duwalin jadiidatin.

wa-laakinna-haa fii kulli δaalika ‘ayDan lam taltafit ‘ilaa Tabiicati sukkani al-bilaadi

allatii tu’allifu haaδihi al-sawlati ‘aw tilka.

It is known that the wars of Napoleon and his conquests in the beginning of the

nineteenth century had changed many of the characteristics of the political map of

Europe. They did away with a number of old states and created a number of new states.

But in all this as well they did not take into account the nature of the inhabitants of the

lands which form this state or that.

The following statement from Assad’s speech is another example of this:

وهذا ما قلته في حديثي مع جريدة /وول سترييت جورنال/ منذ شهرين عندما بدأت األمور في مصر تتدهور وسألوني

عن اإلصالح وماذا عن سورية..وسألني هل تريدون أن تقوموا باإلصالح..قلت له..إن لم تكن قد بدأت باألساس ولم

يكن لديك النية والخطة فاآلن تأخرت وإذا لم يكن لدينا هذه النية والرؤية انتهى وعالموض وال داعي ألن نضيع

وقتنا. ال..لدينا وكل الشعب لديه والدولة.

“and this is what I said in my interview with the Wall Street Journal two months ago

when the issues in Egypt started to deteriorate. They asked me about reform and what

about Syria. And they asked me, “Do you want to implement reforms?” I said to them

that if it hadn’t begun with the foundation and you hadn’t had the intention and

made the steps then you’re too late and if we didn’t have the intention and the

vision, the issue is finished and there is no reason now to waste our time. No. We

have it and all of the people have it and the country.”

Here Assad refers to responses he made to foreign media regarding reform in the wake of Arab Spring uprisings in which he makes a statement and then paraphrases.

When he talks to the media, his statements are hypothetical. Then he makes his argument that the government and the people do have the intention to reform the system.

A moment later, Assad addresses the familiar assessment by analysts and reporters that he is a reformer who is constrained by “those around him”. These are who are usually referred to by the media as members of the old guard and are understood to be those regime members whose ties are to Assad’s father Hafez and to whom Assad must remain loyal to a certain extent, thereby preventing the more complete and aggressive reform that Bashar wants. He refutes the assessment using the same structure of stating, restating, and making a specific point:

وقلت له بالعكس هم يدفعونني بشكل كبير..النقطة التي أريد أن اصل إليها ال يوجد عقبات يوجد تأخير وال يجد أحد

يعارض ومن يعارض فهم أصحاب المصالح والفساد وأنتم تعرفونهم...قلة كانت موجودة ولم تعد موجودة اآلن..قلة

محدودة جدا ًتعرفونها باالسم ولكن اآلن ال يوجد عقبات حقيقية وأعتقد أن التحدي اآلن ما هو نوع األصالح الذي نريد

أن نصل إله

“I say to them, on the contrary…they are pushing me in a big way. The point that I want

to emphasize is that there are no obstacles. There is delay. There is no one who is

opposing. Whoever opposes are friends of self-interest and corruption and you know

them. A few were in existence but they are no longer in existence now…a very limited

few who you know by name. But now there are no real obstacles and I think the

challenge now is the type of reform we want to achieve.”

Here Assad has made several statements and restatements which refute the idea that an old guard who prevents or opposes reform exists. Then he makes an argument that it is not a matter of whether or not to reform but rather how or what kind of reform is needed.

In the following example, the same structure is used but the argument made in the third part of the tripartite is followed by an empirical proof, albeit personal/anecdotal:

فتغيرت األوليات أصبحت األولوية األهم هي أستقرار سورية ونحن نعيش في حالة تؤكد هذا الشيئ..الوضع

واألولوية التي نوازيها باألهمية هي الحالة المعيشية..ألتقى أناساً كثيرين أكثر من 99 بالمئة من الحديث هو حول

الموضوع المعيشي..هناك مظالم أخرى وأشياء أخرى..وظيفة وإلى آخره.

“so priorities changed. The most important priority became the stability of Syria and the

state in which we are living confirms that. The situation and the priority which we

deemed to be the most important were the living conditions. I meet many people and more than 99% of what they talk about revolves around the situation of living. There are

other grievances and other things…work, etc.”

This stands out because such types of proofs are less characteristic of Arabic rhetoric (Johnstone, 1983). Here it is possible to notice the structure being used to persuade the listeners to the regime’s point of view that economic reform should be prioritized over political reform.

The following example is interesting because it contains sets of paraphrasing within the overall tripartite structure:

إن سورية ليست بلدا ًمنعزالً عما يحصل في العالم العربي ونحن بلد جزء من هذه المنطقة نتفاعل نؤثر ونتأثر ولكن

بنفس الوقت نحت لسنا نسخة عن الدول األخرى والتوجد دولة تشبه األخرى لكن نحن في سورية لدينا خصائص

ربما تكون مختلفة أكثر في الوضع الداخلي وفي الوضع الخارجي.

“Syria is not a country that is isolated from what is happening in the Arab world. We are a country that is part of this region, we interact, we impact and are impacted. But, at the

same time, we are not a copy of other countries. There is no existence of a country that

resembles another.”

Assad goes on after this statement to discuss Syria’s uniqueness on both internal and external levels. He discusses Syria’s policies of development, opening up, and open communication between the president and the people. Externally, he discusses the policies of adhering to Arab national rights, independence, and resisting occupation as in the case of Palestine.

The following represents another example:

ال نستطيع أن نقول..كل من خرج متآمر..هذا الكالم غير صحيح..نريد أن نكون واقعيين وواضحيين

“we don’t want to say that all who went out (to protest in the streets) are conspirators.

This talk isn’t true. We want to be realistic and clear.”

This is a statement, restatement, and a final point which is that the government realizes that there are legitimate grievances for which protesting could be the result. The phrase “realistic and clear” is a lexical couplet in which both words are of the same pattern on whose roots both begin with the same letter:

واقعين وواضحين

wāqiʕiy-yīn wa wāḍiḥīn

“realistic and clear”

The following is another example of the same pattern where there is a statement and its restatement a second statement and its restatement and the final point. It also notably includes two examples of lexical repetition:

هناك معظم الشعب السوري يدعو إلى اإلصالح وكلكم إصالحين..معظم الشعب السوري لديه حاجات لم َّتلب وكنا

نختلف ونتناقش وننتقد ألننا لم ِنلب حاجات الكثير من المواطنين ولكن الفتنة دخلت على الموضوع.

“most of the Syrian people are calling for reform and you are all reformers…most of the

Syrian people have unmet needs and we disagreed and we debated and we criticized because we hadn’t met a lot of the people’s needs. But, riots/chaos entered the situation.”

Note also the repetition of the topic “needs unmet” where it is initially expressed with a passive verb and a prepositional phrase to demonstrate possession while the second time is expressed with “we” as the subject of the verb with a noun phrase to demonstrate possession:

)لديه( حاجات لم َّتلب

(ladayhi) ḥājāt lam tulab-bi

“they have needs which were not met”

لم ِنلب حاجات )الكثير من المواطنين(

lam nulab-bi ḥājāt (al-kaθīr min al-muwāṭinīn)

“we have not met many of the needs of the citizens”

CHAPTER 7

ANALYSIS OF REPETITION

On Close Reading

Those who followed the English news outlets’ reaction to Bashar al-Assad’s first speech in response to large-scale protests in Syria’s smaller cities would come away with the impression that Assad had blamed the protests on foreign conspiracies. Some news agencies, attempting to be more precise, reported that Assad indicated that those protestors who were not a part of the conspiracy had been duped into thinking that they were a part of something other than a foreign conspiracy. It would be difficult for someone who had this information about the speech to understand how it would be possible for anyone to believe or continue support a President who would make such blatantly offensive claims. However, such media interpretations were quite unbalanced and probably contributed to the misunderstanding of the Syrian situation where the

Syrian President’s public support, though considerably decreased, continued to be above what Western onlookers expected. From the beginning, there were those who favored

Assad for security reasons over indistinct demands for change. Within the first 2-3 months of the uprising, there were those among the educated in Syria who expressed fears of sectarian conflict and blamed media outlets and foreign interests for Syria’s uprising. In Assad’s March 30 speech, he did point to a role for conspiracy in the events

76 leading up to his speech. In fact, he put the type of people that will act opportunistically in such situations in a prominent position in the speech. However, he not only indicated that those opportunists were from countries near Syria as well as far from Syria, but he acknowledged that some elements of the so called conspiracy were inside Syria.

Additionally, he recognized that there were protestors who were understandably calling for reform. With this more precise reading of the speech, the public support Assad enjoyed, not only out of fear but out of proclivity, relative to leaders such as Ben Ali and

Mubarak begins to become more comprehensible. This is not to say that Assad did not pursue a strategy of encouraging fear among the Syrian population in an effort to regain control. Indeed, messages with a seeming intent to inspire fear in the listener are found in great abundance as has been demonstrated. However, it helps to analyze a whole speech rather than simply the aspects that make the best headlines. Hopefully, a close reading of the speech will present a more balanced view of what might have been internalized by the

Syrian audience.

Approach to Data Analysis

In the sections that follow, I present examples of repetition used in Assad’s March

30 speech. I demonstrate how instances of various types of repetition used by Assad support or reinforce political strategies. Individual cases and types of repetition are compared with those used by Nasrallah and Khalid Mashaal whose repetition in political speeches has been analyzed by Lahlali (2012) and al-Harahsheh (2013), respectively.

The political strategies supported by Assad’s use of repetition are also compared with those used by Nasrallah per Lahlali’s analysis of his speeches. For each political strategy

77 seemingly supported by Assad’s use of repetition, possible historical, social, or political causes specific to the Syrian context are explored.

Strategy of Inspiring Fear

Before discussing repetition structures, we should first consider the following statement made by Assad in his speech:

ال يخفي أن سورية اليوم تتعرض لمؤامرة كبيرة خيوطها تمتد من دول بعيدة ودول قريبة ولها بعض الخيوط داخل

الوطن وتعتمد هذه المؤامرة في توقيتها ال في شكلها على ما يحصل في الدول العربية

“it is not hidden from you that Syria today is encountering a huge conspiracy whose tentacles stretch from countries far away and countries close by and which has tentacles

inside the nation. This conspiracy relies in its timing and not in its form on what is

happening in Arab countries.”

From this statement it seems clear that Assad intends to make the audience feel fearful about what is happening in Syria. In the analysis that follows, other excerpts from the speech demonstrate how the linguistic device of repetition might be intensifying emotional responses or feelings of fear in listeners.

In the following example, Assad is discussing why it took him over two weeks to speak publicly about the unprecedented events taking place in Syria. Just before this statement, he indicated that the reason was that he wanted to have more information about what was behind the events in order to provide the public with a clearer picture of the situation as opposed to soothing the nation with rhetoric in order to appease public uncertainty:

ولكن ال يبدل وال يؤثر في الوقت الذي بعمل فيه أعداؤنا كل يوم بشكل منظم وعلمي من أجل ضرب استقرار سورية

“but, which (the soothing rhetoric) does not change or have any affect in a time where

our enemies are acting every day in a systematic and scientific way in order to strike

Syria’s stability”

The lexical couplet used here, “systematic and scientific” emphasizes an unfeeling image of the enemy. In the following example, it is the goals of Syria’s enemies which are described using the repetition of synonyms in a repeated phrase:

لكن نحن يهمنا شيء وحيد المرحلة االخيرة هي أن تضعف سورية وتتفتت...هي أن تسقط وتزال آخر عقبة من وجه

المخطط اإلسرائيلي

“but, the one thing that concerns us is the last stage which weakens Syria and crumbles

(Syria) and that which brings down and eliminates the last obstacle from the face of the

Israeli plan”

weakens Syria and crumbles it) could be phrased as) تضعف سورية وتتفتت The term

weakens and crumbles Syria). Though the synonyms are broken up) .تضعف وتتفتت سورية by the term Syria which is placed between rather than at the end of the verbs, it follows the pattern of a lexical couplet. This is followed by another lexical couplet which invokes similar meanings having to do with Syria’s destruction and fall. Each set of lexical couplets is also part of a larger phrase which is repeated two times. The repetition

which by itself is closer in meaning to “it is to…” is not easily conveyed in هي أن of

English translation above because of the overall structure. The literal translation of the phrases in isolation would be:

“it is to weaken Syria and to crumble it”

“it is to bring down and eliminate…”.

Assad devotes a segment of his speech to talking about “sectarian incitement” or

in Arabic. In this part of the speech, he discusses the escalation of tactics التحريض الطائفي used by the “conspirators”:

بدؤوا أوالً بـ ضالتحري .. بدأ التحريض قبل أسابيع طويلة من االضطرابات في سورية.. بدؤوا التحريض بالفضائيات

وباالنترنت ولم يحققوا شيئا ًوانتقلوا بعدها خالل الفتنة إلى موضوع التزوير.. زوروا المعلومات زوروا الصوت

والصورة زوروا كل شيء.. أخذوا المحور اآلخر وهو المحور الطائفي.. اعتمد على التحريض وعلى رسائل ترسل

بالهواتف المحمولة رسائل قصيرة تقول لـطائفة انتبهوا الطائفة األخرى ستهجم ويقولون لـلطائفة الثانية إن الطائفة

األولى ستهجم ولكي يعززوا مصداقية هذا الشيء أرسلوا أشخاصاًملثمين يدقون األبواب على حارتين متجاورتين من

طائفتين ال أقول مختلفتين بل شقيقتين ليقولوا لألولى الطائفة الثانية أصبحت بالشارع انتبهوا انزلوا إلى الشارع..

وتمكنوا من إنزال الناس إلى الشارع وقاموا بهذا العمل ولكن تمكنا من خالل لقاء الفعاليات من درء الفتنة.. فتدخلوا

بالسالح وبدؤوا بقتل األشخاص عشوائياً لكي يكون هناك دم وتصعب المعادلة هذه الوسائل.

“they began first with incitement…they began the incitement many weeks before the disturbance in Syria…they began the incitement with satellite television and the internet and didn’t achieve anything. They moved after that during the turbulence to the issue of forging/faking…they faked information, they faked sound and images, they faked everything…they took another element and it is the sectarian element…it depended on incitement and on messages sent by mobile phone, short messages saying to one sect to watch out for another sect who will attack and they said to the second sect that the first sect will attack. In order to strengthen the credibility of this thing they send masked people to knock on the doors of two neighboring areas of two sects. I’m not saying two different ones but blood sisters in order to say to one sect that the second sect will be in the street and to watch out about going out into the street. And, they managed to get people to go out into the streets and carry out these acts, but we were able through meetings with community leaders to diffuse the chaos…and then weapons entered and

80 they began killing people randomly, because when there is blood, solving the problem becomes more difficult.”

This narrative is itself frightening. The entire segment is tied together by repetition of the phrase, “they started/began” which is repeated three times at the beginning and appears once very close to the end of the segment. The possible effect of the repetition of this phrase is that the actions of the “conspirators” come to be seen as persistent and/or tireless in their efforts.

The words “incitement”, “faked/forged”, and “sect/sectarian” are also repeated as the phrase, “going out into the street” which may be intended as a reference or euphemism for street fighting. These words and phrases are loaded with emotion that could be meant to inspire fear in listeners. The passage also contains words that mean

“sedition” which are repeated numerous times elsewhere in the speech as well as the word that means “randomly” which is not repeated. However, the idea of “randomness” is one that is particularly fear-inducing and is placed at the end of the passage following the emotive description of the escalation of violence.

The passage also contains an instance of emphasis on the actions of the

“conspirators” through repetition. In particular, the emphasis is placed on their “sending of messages” to members of one sect claiming to be members of another sect and instigating sectarian conflict through such messages. This phrase from such a narrative contains an example of the cognate accusative type of repetition in Arabic:

اعتمد على التحريض وعلى رسائل ترسل بالهواتف المحمولة رسائل قصيرة تقول لـطائفة انتبهوا الطائفة األخرى

ستهجم ويقولون لـلطائفة الثانية إن الطائفة األولى ستهجم

“…it (the sectarian tactic) depended on incitement and on messages sent (messaged) by

mobile phone, short messages saying to one sect to watch out for another sect who will

attack and they said to the second sect that the first one will attack.”

The English translation would not be natural if the root of the word “messages” were repeated in the passive verb as it is in Arabic. During the early weeks and months of the uprising until the current time, there are times when cell phone or internet services are disrupted. Assad’s description of the use of the internet and cell phone services (for sectarian incitement), which he expands upon later in the speech, may have been a calculated strategy to provide the government with a continual justification for disrupting services.

The passage also contains the tripartite structure explained by Johnstone referred to above. This is a structure of argument particular to Semitic cultures where the organization of an argument does not follow a syllogistic pattern familiar to Westerners.

Rather, a claim is made and then restated, oftentimes in the negative (or vice versa in this case), followed by a final point. In this passage, the tripartite structure may not be complete, but you have the statement and restatement of the idea referred to above as paraphrasing:

أرسلوا أشخاصا ًملثمين يدقون األبواب على حارتين متجاورتين من طائفتين ال أقول مختلفتين بل شقيقتين ليقولوا

لألولى الطائفة الثانية أصبحت بالشارع انتبهوا انزلوا إلى الشارع

“they sent masked people to knock on the doors of two neighboring areas of two sects.

I’m not saying two different ones but blood sisters in order to say to one sect that the

second sect will be in the street and to watch out about going out into the street”

Here Assad seems to be instilling fear into listeners about the potential destructive nature of sectarianism. The reference to blood sisters/full sisters/kindred is possibly an

82 indication that the sectarianism is between two Muslim sects or two Christian sects as opposed to sectarianism between Abrahamic faiths, i.e. Christian/Judaic/Islamic, which might be considered “sisters” but not “blood or full sisters”. By not only indicating, but emphasizing through repetition, that violence is not Christian on Muslim or Muslim on

Christian but rather Christian on Christian or Muslim on Muslim, Assad’s comments effectively heighten fears. An allegation that people are not safe from their own brother or sister designates a state of deep depravity. The metaphor may take on greater emotive tones in the Arab context where the culture elevates the importance of family in the life of an individual relative to Western culture.

Strategy of Inspiring Hope

Although it did not seem to get as much if any media attention as Assad’s strategy of fear, Assad’s speech could also be said to have followed a strategy of encouraging hope. In Lahlali’s analysis of Nasrallah’s speeches, Nasrallah used repetition to support his own political strategies which included encouraging hope. Lahlali says that Nasrallah reinforced a strategy of encouraging hope in his speeches through “the persuasive act of repeating positive phrases and semantic pairs, which created a sense of hope, patriotism and harmony among the audience” (2012: 10). The examples used by Lahlali are mostly related to Hezbollah’s battlefield disadvantages on paper, but he gives people hope via messages of god being on their side because of their faith and of claims that the people are entitled or have a right to victory, reinforced by repetition. Citing Charteris-Black,

Lahlali indicates that Churchill was an avid employer of a strategy of hope in his speeches which he reinforced using metaphors in order to raise morale among the

83 population (2012). Encouraging hope was a policy strategy for the Obama presidential campaign in 2008 which was made infamous by Shepard Fairey’s artistic interpretation of Obama in the Barack Obama “Hope” Poster. The strategy is in contrast to the strategy of fear espoused by the Bush administration, especially post-9/11 and leading up to the

2004 presidential campaign when he was running for reelection. The hope strategy also stands in opposition to a strategy of fear employed by Arab leaders previously collapsed by way of the Arab Spring. Mubarak especially warned of the chaos that would ensue were he to be removed. In addition to Assad’s own strategy of fear, he also encourages the recipients of his speech to be hopeful for the future using repetition devices:

...ننجح في مواجهته في كل مرة نجاحاً باهراً يزيدنا قوة ومنعة

nanjaḥ fī muwājahatihi fī kul-li marra najāḥan bāhiran yazīduna quw-wa wa

minʕa

“we succeed in facing it (a test of unity and selflessness) each time a brilliant success

which increases our strength and force”

Assad does not necessarily follow an open strategy of recruitment, inspiring people to sacrifice their sons or themselves take up arms for the struggle (against those who are opposing them). Also, the Syrian regime, which is represented by Assad, does not have the battlefield disadvantage as a nonstate actor such as Hezbollah would. The message of this statement is that Syria will not only emerge from the current events victorious as they have in the past but will come out of them with increased “strength and power (or force)”. There are three types of repetition identified in this message. First

which translates roughly to “we ننجح نجاحا ً there is use of the cognate accusative as in succeed a success”. A previous discussion of the cognate accusative implicates the

84 structure as having an emphatic function so that the idea of succeeding is packed more

can be said to be نجاحاً باهرا ً heavily by way of this type of repetition. The phrase phonologically repetitive in that both the noun and the adjective contain a long vowel sound “ā” in the middle of each word. Also, the structure dictates that both the noun and the adjective end in the same accusative ending for the indefinite “an” resulting in phonological as well as morphological pattern repetition. Finally, the lexical couplet, that means strength and force, and the repetition contained within it, represents a third type of repetition. This statement was used by Assad in the opening of Assad’s speech.

Several lines later, Assad uses the word that means “success” again to inspire hope in listeners:

ال ينجح هذا نوع من المؤامرات ونقول لهم: ال يوجد خيار أمامكم إال أن تستمروا في التعلم من فشلكم أما الشعب

السوري فال خيار أمامه إال أن يستمر بالتعلم من نحاحاته.

“this type of conspiracy will not succeed and we say to them: There is no choice in front of you except to continue to learn from your failures, whereas for the Syrian people, there

is no choice in front of them except to learn from their successes.”

The lexical repetition of the words meaning “success”, “successful”, “succeed”, etc. is interesting in Arabic because, as has previously been mentioned, items in this type of repetition can occur with greater distance between items than is usual in English. This is a case where the repetition of words having to do with “success” have a further range than they might in English. Assad also extends the metaphor of the “test” here which he mentioned in the opening remarks of the speech. Those opening remarks contained lexical repetition of the word “test”:

أتحدث أليكم في لحظة استثنائية تبدو األحدث والتطورات فيها كـامتحان لوحجتنا ولغيريتنا..وهو امتحان تشاء

الظروف أن يتكرر كل حين بفعل المؤامرات المتصلة على هذا الوطن...وبشاء إرادتنا وتكاتفنا وأرادة هللا أن ننجح في

مواجهته في كل مرة نجاحاً باهراَ يزيدنا قوة ومنعة.

“I am speaking to you at an exceptional moment where the events and developments in it are like a test of our unity and selflessness…and it is a test whose circumstances want to

repeat themselves every so often in the action of an ongoing conspiracy against the

nation, and which want (and owe debt to) our will and solidarity and the will of God to

succeed in facing them each time with a brilliant success which increases our strength

and power.”

When Assad discusses success later as he expands upon the idea of the ongoing conspiracy, he introduces and repeats the word “to learn” which fits with the metaphor of

“the test” which Syria is currently facing. In addition to the lexical repetition of words related to “success”, Assad creates an elaborate paradigm where repetition is used to contrast the unnamed conspirators who want to harm Syria with the Syrian people:

ال يوجد خيار أمامكم إال أن تستمروا في التعلم من فشلكم أما الشعب السوري فال خيار أمامه إال أن يستمر بالتعلم من

نحاحاته

“…there is no choice in front of (you) except to continue learn from (your

failures)….there is no choice in front of (them) except to continue to learn from (their

successes)…”

Assad’s messages of hope are mostly confined to the beginning and closing of his speech. The previously mentioned examples are from the opening of the speech. In the closing statements of Assad’s speech, he reiterates the message that the events will be overcome by Syria and that they will only serve to make Syria stronger. He uses a similar lexical couplet to the one he used at the beginning of the speech:

...ولكن األزمات هي حالة إيجابية إن استطعنا أن نسيطر عليها وأن نخرج منها رابحين..وسر قوة سورية هو األزمات

الكثيرة التي واجهتها عبر تاريخها وحاصة بعد االستقالل ما أعطاها المزيد من المناعة والقوة..فإذاً علينا مواجهة

األزمات بثقة كبيرة وبتصميم على االنتصار

“but, crises are a positive condition if we are able to control them and to emerge from

them winners...the secret of Syria’s strength is its many crises which it has faced throughout history, particularly after independence which gave it an increase in strength

and power. Thus, it is upon us to face crises with a great confidence and with

determination to be victorious.”

The repetition at the end of a speech of a lexical couplet uttered at the beginning of a speech is significant. However, the most interesting repetition found in this statement is not the lexical couplet and its being a repetition from the beginning of the speech, but the lexical repetition of the word “crises”. Previously, Assad made an argument that the events of the Arab Spring meant that many people were making references to “revolutions”. He stated that the position of the government is that what was happening in Syria was not a revolution but an attempt to weaken or destroy Syria under the cover of a revolution. Here, as Assad presents a message of hope, i.e. we should emerge from these events victorious and in a stronger position than we were previously, he uses little repetition to reinforce this message of hope. Rather, it would seem that Assad takes the opportunity here to use repetition in order to reinforce the strategy of fear discussed previously.

At the same time, the regime was and still is in a contest with the people over the word(s) that should be used to describe events taking place in Syria. In this, Assad’s first speech to the public following the uprising, he used some of his time to enter this debate

87 with explicit statements:

اليوم هناك صرعة جديدة هي ثورات بالنسبة لهم ونحن ال نسميها كذلك فهي ليست كذلك هي حالة شعبية بمعظمها..

ولكن بالنسبة لهم إذا كان هناك شيء يحصل فيكون الغطاء موجودا ًفي سورية.. ثورة هناك وثورة هنا.. إصالح هناك

وإصالح هنا.. الحرية.. الشعارات.. الوسائل كلها نفسها وبالتالي إذا كان هناك فعال ًدعاة لإلصالح وكلنا أعتقد دعاة

لإلصالح فسنسير معهم من دون أن نعرف ما الذي يجري حقيقة لذلك قاموا بالخلط بشكل ذكي جدا ًبين ثالثة

عناصر..

“today there is a new craze which, according to them, is of revolutions. But, we

don’t call them that because they are not as such, but rather a popular state in a general

sense…But according to them if something happens then it becomes a cover inside

Syria…a revolution here, a revolution there…reform here, reform there…freedom…slogans…messages…all of it is the same. Furthermore, if there was an actual call for reform (and I think all of us are calling for reform), then we would march with them without knowing what was really happening. So, they were able to mix things

up in a very clever way between three elements…”

This unequivocal statement of the regime’s disagreement with the events in Syria being categorized as a revolution is supported throughout the speech with the repetition words such as “crises”, “events”, “developments”, etc. as opposed to the word

“revolution” which is only used in the above instance and once more to refer to the events that took place in Tunisia.

At the beginning and at the end of Assad’s speech, Assad indicates, in tandem with his message of hope, criticism of Syria’s enemies. Elsewhere, they were depicted as

“systematic and scientific” as a part of Assad’s fear strategy or as despotic as a part of a strategy of depicting the enemy as oppressive which will be discussed later. Here though,

88 he seems to indicate that Syria’s enemies will be unable, due to their ignorance and underestimation of the superior will and strength of the Syrian people, to defeat Syria.

نحن نقر لهم بذكائهم في االختيار األساليب المتطورة جداً فيما فعلوه ولكننا نقر لهم بغبائهم في االختيار الخاطئ

للوطن والشعب حيث ال ينجح هذا نوع من المؤامرات

“we acknowledge their cleverness in choosing very developed methods in what they

did but we acknowledge their stupidity in choosing mistakenly the nation and the

people where this type of conspiracy will not succeed.”

Within the syntactic parallelism in this case, the words meaning “cleverness” and

“stupidity” share the same pattern which intensifies the rhetorical effect of the statement.

Unlike Nasrallah who indirectly implicates his enemies in being indifferent to the suffering of his constituency or lacking the will to fight, Assad’s criticism of his enemies is not about their will to fight (against Syria rather than on its behalf in this case), but about their being too unknowledgeable or unskilled to defeat Syria, thus encouraging hope as opposed to fear.

Strategy of Praising the People

Assad’s messages of hope were mainly restricted to the opening and closing of his speech, whereas at least two sections of the main body of the speech were devoted to developing the conspiracy theory and inspiring fear. Despite the fact that Assad’s strategy of fear may have been more prevalent than his strategy of hope and that the messages of Assad’s fear strategy were the primary focus of the media analysis of the speech, there were emotively positive strategies, in addition to encouraging hope, that were ubiquitous in Assad’s speech. One of the most striking strategies employed by

Assad is that of praising “the people”.

Lahlali demonstrates Nasrallah’s use of repetition to support a strategy of praising the people. Nasrallah created his own frame of repetition (parallelism) which he used to praise the Lebanese people and Hezbollah fighters. The frame he created was, “you are a

…. people” where different positive attributes were filled in for each instance of the phrase. He also repeated the superlative form of each attribute to describe the Lebanese people while addressing them.

The political strategy of praising the people is a universal one. However, it is particularly important that Assad praise “the people” and attempt to reshape or reconstruct the image of “the people” because the concept of “the people” had been in the process of being redefined by the people themselves across the Arab World and in Syria.

The way “the people” were being constructed, mostly as having power to change their leaders, was particularly disquieting for the Syrian regime, as it would be for any authoritarian government.

Essentially, the term meaning people or “aš-šaʕab” in Arabic came to occupy front and center position in Arabic discourse because of its use in uprisings and revolutions in the region. It was this term that was involved in the cause of the Syrian uprising, as the phrase “aš-šaʕab as-sūri yurīd nisqāṭ an-nizām”, which translates to “the

Syrian people want the fall of the regime”, was said to have sparked off conflict in Deraa where the phrase was painted on a city wall. Similar phrases were chanted in Arab countries with their own country names inserted or without specifying which “šaʕab”.

This idea of the people being able to shape their government through revolt became distressing to the Syrian regime to the extent that a slogan to the effect just

90 mentioned which was graffitied on a wall in Deraa is alleged to have led to the torture of a group of children thought to be the perpetrators or have information about the perpetrators of the act. The consequences for writing the slogan “the people want the fall of the regime” affected the Syrian people deeply. And, Syrians everywhere began to repeat the phrase, “the people” or “the Syrian people” in their slogans and their protest songs. Assad repeats the term “the people” copiously in his March 30 speech. It could be said that Assad was trying to wrest control of the concept of “the people” which was being contested by the people themselves.

The idea of fighting over concepts which are politically charged is expressed by

Ziter (2013) who compares web activists’ images and representations of martyrs, victims of regime brutality, with the construction of martyrs and martyrdom in official Syrian state ceremonies and media coverage of such ceremonies post the onset of the uprising in

March 2011. He depicts a contest between the state and opposition activists over the concept of martyrdom, over which Ziter claimed the regime had been losing ownership.

At the time of the March 30 speech, there had not yet been any state ceremonies commemorating events and their associated martyrs. Nor had oppositional web activism reached its epitome. However, contests over concepts are ongoing and it seems that

Assad’s speech was crafted in a way that indicates that the regime was fighting to wrest control of some concepts, other than martyrdom, on which it had been losing territory.

Assad uses repetition to reinforce the strategy of praising the people. In addition to creating his own structures of phrase repetition as Nasrallah did, Assad also employs traditional structures of repetition. For example, he makes heavy use of lexical couplets in his speech. Here he uses a lexical couplet to praise and define the Syrian people:

الشعب السوري شعب مسالم وودود

aš-šaʕb as-sūrī šaʕb musālim wa wadūd

“the Syrian people are a peaceful and loving people”

The words peaceful and loving can be said to be synonyms or are words that are semantically related. Besides the repetition in the lexical couplet, the word for “people” is repeated. Rather than saying, “The Syrian people are peaceful and loving”, the statement is phrased in a way that bears the repetition of the word meaning “people”.

The significance of the repetition of this lexical item will be elaborated on subsequently.

The specific praise of the Syrian people as peaceful and loving is of particular significance in Syria, which may also have roots in Syrian Ba’athist discourse. Whatever the origin, the sentiment and variations of it were alive and well in the months previous to the Arab Spring and uprising in Syria. The sentiment was often expressed by persons with whom the researcher had casual encounters, i.e. merchants, taxi drivers, etc.

Sometimes it seemed as though the frame had to do with the international isolation of

Syria or it was in the context of Syria’s being labeled as an “axis of evil” state by the

United States under the Bush Administration on the heels of the 9/11 tragedy. Syrians would say something to the effect of, “look how peaceful we are here” and “do you see that we don’t have crime or terrorism here” and “there is security and peace here” or

“everything here is quiet and secure”. Such discourse seems to place the values of peace, security, safety in a superior position to values such as spirit, determination, justice, and personal freedom. The values of peace, safety, and security were promoted to me as a foreign student over and over again in initial encounters with Syrians wanting to communicate with me.

In the following example, Assad uses a synonym group or a word string to praise the people of Deraa. Deraa is the city where the conflict between the government and the people began. The events and protests of Deraa were the spark for the Syrian uprising and resulted in protests in many cities throughout Syria. A common narrative of the events in Deraa was one where the government acted cruelly toward a group of children and their families. The protestors of Deraa were seen as rebelling against the government in the city of Deraa. Assad challenges such narratives generally in his speech by claiming that there was foreign involvement along with opportunistic elements. It seems that Assad also wants to reconstruct the people of Deraa in the following phrase:

وهم أهل النخوة والشهامة والكرامة

wa hum ahal un-naxwa wa aš-šahāma wa al-karāma

“they are people of chivalry, gallantry, and honor”

The phrase is similar to the one Nasrallah uses to describe and address the

Lebanese people, i.e. “You are a great people and you are a proud people and you are a loyal people and you are a courageous people” and “oh, the most honorable people and the most generous people and the most righteous people.” Here Assad’s repetition is more subtle than Nasrallah’s. He does not repeat the phrase, “they are a ….. people” each time6. He is only repeating synonyms used to describe the people of Deraa in the form of a synonym group. Assad seems to want to redefine the people of Deraa who, from images and stories, may have seemed more like a people who were bold, daring,

6 The word for people used in these statements is not the one that denotes people in the political sense but rather people can mean family/relatives or in this case has a sense of residents/citizens/inhabitants.

93 defiant, and rebellious. Such characteristics could be seen as positive in some cases, but would not be likely to inspire confidence in the regime when such traits are aimed in their direction. The nouns used in the word string are all feminine and because of Arabic grammar rules, all are carrying the definite article “al”. As such, the phrase is characteristic of phonological repetition which, according to al-Harahsheh, amplifies or intensifies the semantic repetition and adds to the emotional appeal (2013).

At the end of the March 30 speech, Assad makes a statement contributing to this strategy and which contains simple lexical repetition of the word “people”:

وإن كنتم قد هتفتم بالروح بالدم نفديك يا بشار فالسليم هو أن الرئيس بشار هو الذي يفتدي وطنه وشعبـه..وأنا أرد

عليكم بأن أقول هللا, سورية, شعبـي وبس, وهو الذي أي أنا سيبقى االبن البار بـشعبـه واألخ والرفيق الوفي ألبنائه

يسير معهم وفي مقدمتهم لبناء سورية التي نحبها ونفخر بها..سورية العصية على أعدائها المقاومة والمقاومة

“if you have been cheering, ‘With soul, with blood, we sacrifice for you oh Bashar’, it’s

more right that the President, Bashar, is the one who sacrifices for his country and his

people…and I will respond to you (the slogan, ‘God, Syria, Bashar and that’s it’) by saying, ‘God, Syria, my people and that’s it’. And it is he, yes me, who will remain the loyal son to his people and the brother and the faithful friend to their sons, who marches with them in their introduction to building the Syria which we love and of which we are

proud…Syria the stick upon its enemies, resisting and resisting.”

The SP mentions aš-šaʕab and/or aš-šaʕab as-sūrī several times in the entire speech. The term means “people” in the political sense. Other words that mean “people” or “citizens” were also mentioned repeatedly throughout the speech although with significantly less frequency, i.e. “ʔahal”, “muwāṭinīn”, “an-nās”, and “ašxās”. There are other examples of the repeated use of lexical items with high emotional value being used

94 throughout the speech. However, this item stands out because of the overwhelming number of times it was used and because of the developing significance of this word in

Arabic discourse. Throughout the speech, the term aš-šaʕab was repeated no less than 36 times throughout the speech. The only words that were repeated at a higher rate in

Mashaal Khalid’s speeches (where lexical frequency has been documented) were

Palestine, Israel, and Arab/Arabic. Assad, who is normally very driven by Ba’athist ideology which includes to a great extent the idea of Pan-Arabism, only used the words

Arab/Arabic/Pan-Arabism 19 times in this speech almost ½ as many times as the occurrence of words for the political term for people alone, i.e. people/peoples/popular.

This does not include instances of words that mean people in less of a political sense of the word which have been previously mentioned, i.e. ʔahal, muwāṭinīn, an-nās, ašxās, etc.

Furthermore, as has been demonstrated with previous examples, not only is the word itself repeated but the use of the word is adapted in ways which extol the people’s virtues and characteristics.

The strategy of praising the people seems to go hand in hand with a strategy to depict Syria as being democratic in the sense that the people are the true rulers of Syria.

The following example demonstrates this:

وفيها تآمر على المقاومة وعلى غيرنا من العرب وعندما كان يشتهد الضغط كنت اقول لهم...حتى لو قبلت بهذا

الطرح فالشعب لن يقبل به وإذا لم يقبل به الشعب لـسوف ينبذني وإذا نبذني فهذا يعني انتحاراً سياسياً

“which contained collusion against the resistance and against others of us who are Arab

and when they used to intensify the pressure, I used to say to them…even if I accepted

this proposal, the people would not accept it and if the people don’t accept it then

they will reject me and if they rejected me this would mean political suicide.”

This excerpt contains a sort of parallelism where two sets of verbs are repeated in coordination with conditional statements. The subject is “the people” who Assad claims would not have accepted proposals made by foreign leaders and would reject Assad for proposing them. These statements would seem to support a strategy of appealing to the democratic ideal/principle of government “by the people and for the people”.

It has been demonstrated that on the occasion of March 30, 2011, Bashar al-Assad communicated a strategy not only of praising the people using repetition devices but also attempting to redefine them or construct them in a way that is more suitable for the

Syrian regime by praising them. Assad makes use of lexical couplets and/or word strings as well as lexical repetition to support his strategy.

It seems as though Assad’s praising the people had a lot to do with recent events in Syria and it probably did. However, there seems to be a longer view of the Syrian context where there is a documented history of the role the strategy of praising the people in Ba’athist Syria. According to Sottimano (2009), the strategy of praising the people demonstrated by Lahlali (2013) has been part and parcel of Syrian Ba’athist discourse for decades. It predates the Assad regime in Syria and began with the Ba’athist movement in

Syria between 1963 and 1970. In Sottimano’s analysis of Syrian ideology and discourse in modern Syria, she describes a discursive strategy where the Syrian economy is constructed in a way that limits identities for citizens:

The economy was discursively constructed as a terrain of struggle between subjects who possess rights and principles and reactionary forces which are responsible for ‘the inherited backwardness of the country’.

In such a narrative of the Syrian economy, Sottimano describes how leadership began to discursively construct the citizen within such a frame:

The discursive construction of the underdeveloped masses lacking as yet sufficient consciousness provided the rationale for a disciplinarisation of society deemed necessary to transform these masses into a proud people (‘worth of a nation’). The discursive construction of the economy as a terrain of struggle against enemies within and without set up a powerful frontier between the friend and the enemy; the desirable and the unthinkable; correct attitudes and immoral behavior. Opposite camps holding mutually excluding identities with fixed or pre-given choices and interests, associated with ‘correct’ behavior, became characteristic of the discursive terrain on which identities were grounded and the Ba’thist project of social engineering was based. Grasping this discursive construction as operative and enabling is crucial to understanding the way in which Syrian economic discourse operated as a discourse of power. This division mapped the terrain of possible – that is meaningful, legitimate or obligatory – political action in many ways. Crucially, the purported qualities attributed to the ‘good citizen’ became part of the ‘correct’ behavior. This helped to shape the identity of the Syrian citizen, including his expectations and demands, and the kind of sociability in which s/he was asked to identify. (11-12)

Sottimano seems to be saying that the citizen was defined narrowly and was limited to either being “good” and compliant with the government’s program or being morally inferior and opposed to government policies. The implication is that, in the

Syrian context, praise would likely have been used to construct a citizen that would adhere to the government program and policies. Through discourse the citizen would have needed to be conferred with positive and morally superior qualities. A highly critical interpretation might indict such praise as being manipulative because consumers of this discourse have the potential to be flattered into strict compliance with the policy positions posited in the same time frame.

Sottimano discusses other ways in which the Syrian regime used discourse to shape the Syrian citizen in a way that was amenable to its economic policies. In general,

Syrian regime discourse constructs a citizen that has elevated qualities, i.e. loyal, hardworking, and is thus prepared to endure hardship and make sacrifices for the country.

In the March 30 speech, where Assad was faced with a defiant citizenry, it seems as though Assad may be attempting to redefine the Syrian citizenry using the same strategy as had been used historically in Syria to promote its economic policies.

Strategy of Constructing Enemies that Shame and Oppress

Another concept which Assad seems to want to spend time contesting is that of dignity and its negative inverse, humiliation. In contrast to Lahlali’s description of

Nasrallah’s strategy toward his enemies which is to name and to “shame” them, Assad depicts his enemies as attempting to “shame” the Syrian people. Time and time again

Assad seems to depict his enemies as attempting to oppress him and/or the Syrian people.

In many of the cases described by Assad, this occurs in public forums, which makes an action that is oppressive, humiliating. Assad reinforces these images of the enemy using repetition.

The immediate contextual relevance of such a strategy is related to the protest movement in Syria. At the time of the March 30 speech, oppositional elements in Syria had begun to shape the image of their uprising as a revolution of dignity and not a revolution of “bread”. This is despite the fact that scholarly analyses seem to indicate that economic factors determined the level and location of early participation in protests in Syria. The first major incident in the Syrian uprising was the protest movement in

Deraa which was a response to events that occurred between local government officials and the parents of children who were victimized by those officials. Yet a previous smaller incident had an impact on the discourse surrounding the uprising. The incident took place in a souk area of Damascus and involved a dispute between merchants of the

98 souk and police forces. The incident was reminiscent of that between Tunisia’s Bouazizi and Tunisian authorities since it occurred in the street in a crowded commercial area. It was clearer in Bouazizi’s case, however, that economic despair, in addition to the humiliation he suffered at the hands of police in the street, was more of a feature than it was in the Damascus souk incident. It is probably from this incident that the Syrian uprising began to fashion itself as an uprising or revolution of dignity.

In the following statement, Assad had been talking about “the Arab condition” which Assad indicated had been in need of change from the perspective of the Syrians prior to the events happening within the region and that the “changes and events” happening within the region vindicated the Syrian point of view:

حاولوا تدجينـها ولكنها لم تدجن وسيكون لهذا الموضوع عدة تأثيرات

ḥāwalū tadjīnahā wa lākin-nahā lam tudaj-jan wa sayakūn lihāδā al-mawḍūʕ ʕid-dat

taʔθīrāt

“they tried to domesticate it but it has not been domesticated and there will be several

effects related to this issue”

The word meaning either “to tame”, “to domesticate”, or to “train” is repeated in this statement in different forms, i.e. infinitive and passive form of the verb. The provided English translation gives a sense of what the Arabic sounds like where the root of the word is used and reused. A more natural English translation likely would tend toward variation. For example, “they tried to domesticate it but it was not tamed…” In the following statement, Assad continues his imagery of oppressive enemies and resistant

Arab peoples:

الشعوب العربية لم تدجن ولم تتبدل في مضمونها

وكان في الصحافة أحياناً يسخرون...السياسيون األجانب...يبتسمون وخاصة في اللقاءات وعندما اشتدت الضغوط

على سورية

“the Arab peoples did not domesticate and did not change from the inside. But, in the

press sometimes used to mock, the foreign politicians used to smile, especially in

meetings when pressure was intensified upon Syria”

In this excerpt, Assad gives two things that the Arab people did not do, i.e. they did not domesticate and they did not change (their core) and then gives two things that the enemies did, i.e. they mocked (the foreign politicians)….they smiled. Thus, there is a repetition of two for each group of people, i.e. the Arab people and the foreign politicians and there is a repetition in that Assad talks about the actions of one group of people and then talks about the actions of a second group of people. The concept is continued in the following statement:

وكانوا يطرحون علينا طروحات م عا ِكسة و مناقِضة لمصالحنا

wa kānū yaṭraḥūn ʕalayna ṭuruḥāt muʕākisa wa munāqiḍa li maṣāliḥinā

“they were proposing to us proposals that were contrary and opposed to our interests”

(short vowels part of the pattern cannot be highlighted)

The statement contains two examples of repetition. The first is the cognate accusative which has been discussed previously as in “they were proposing proposals”.

The second is the lexical couplet where there is repetition not only semantically in that both words are synonyms but that the synonyms share the same pattern. Both types of repetition have the impact of emphasizing the oppressive and forceful actions of the constructed enemy.

Here Assad begins to make and equation between external pressure and internal

100 pressure:

أما إذا قلنا إنها حصلت تحت ضغوط حالة معينة أو ضغوط شعبية فهذا ضعف وأنا أعتقد أن الناس الذين يعودون

دولتهم على أن تكون خاصعة للضغوط في الداخل فيعني أنها ستخضع للضغوط في الخارج

“as for what we said about whether a condition is arrived at under certain pressures or popular pressures, well that’s a weakness. I think that the people who rear their country

into submitting to the internal pressures, then it means that they will submit to

external pressures.”

The word “pressures” is repeated in this section of text. The last two instances are part of entire phrases which are parallels of one another where constructions that mean “it will submit” though phrased slightly differently are repeated and there is redundancy in the use of prepositions and the forms of the antonyms which both follow the same pattern. After this statement, Assad goes on to say that the relationship between the government and the people is not one of popular pressure but one of societal needs which the government must provide and the people have the right to receive. He continues to use the word “pressure” many times. He then makes the following final statement, which fits into his strategy of praising the people discussed previously:

فأنا أردت أن أصحح المبادئ أما الضغط الوحيد الذي يمكن أن يتعرض له المسؤول وهذا يجب أن يشعر به من تلقاء

ذاته فهو ضغط الثقة التي وضعها الناس فيه وضغط المسؤولية التي يحملها والضغط األكبر اآلن هو ضغط الوعي

الوطني الشعبي الذي رأيناه..وهو وعي غير مسبوق أذهلنا كما أذهلنا سابقاً في كل مرة..هذا كلها ضغوط تجعلنا نفكر

كيف نرد الجميل لهذا الشعب..بوضع أفضل وبتطوير وازدهار وإصالح بكل هذه األمور

I wanted to emend the principle as to the only pressure which a government official can

face and should feel in facing himself is the pressure of confidence which the people

place in him and the pressure of the responsibility which he carries and the biggest

101

pressure now is the pressure of national and popular awareness which we have seen.

Such awareness is unprecedented and has amazed us as it has amazed us previously each

time. All of this pressure made us think about how to give a graceful response to this people by putting in place the best in development and prosperity and reform in each of

these issues.

The statement also contains numerous repetitions of the word

“pressure/pressures”. Having already discussed pressures in the context of foreign attempts to be oppressive toward Syria, and having begun to compare it with internal pressure, Assad seems to be interested here in reshaping the meaning of the word

“pressure”. Assad and the regime had implemented some minor reforms within the government such as increasing government salaries and intended to implement more changes such as the lifting of the emergency law which had been in place since the

Ba’ath takeover in 1963, extending more rights to Kurds living in Syria, etc. Such reforms were implemented in the months following the speech. However, they were announced days before the speech and the perception was that such reforms were the direct result of events taking place in Syria would be dangerous for the regime as it would be an indication that the current methods of protesting the government had been effective and would thus continue to result in gains in the form of concessions and an overall weakening of the regime’s power. Elsewhere in the speech, Assad indicates that any action being done on the part of the Syrian government in response to current protests had been in process prior to Arab uprisings. Here he seems to want to take the idea of

“pressure” a step further to include support of the government. The new type of pressure discussed here by Assad actually feeds into the previously discussed strategy of praising

102 the people.

Below is another example of how the word “pressure” is used with the traditional meaning where enemies are applying it to Syria in an attempt to humiliate or oppress:

بدأت االنتفاضة بعد شهرين من ذلك الخطاب بدأ التآمر على المقومة بدأت الضغوطات 11..أتت حادثة أيلول حادثة 11..أتت حادثة

في نيو يورك واتهام المسلمين واإلسالم والعرب معهم طبعا..إحتالل افغانستان والعراق..التآمر على سورية..

“the Intifada started two months after that speech, the conspiracy against the resistance started, pressures started. The event of September 11 came, an event in New York and

the accusing of Muslims and Islam and Arabs with them of course…the occupation of

Afghanistan and Iraq…the conspiracy against Syria.”

This statement describes events taking place in the region which Assad indicates impacted Syria’s ability to progress more quickly and contains two sets of lists of three.

First, Assad lists three things which came after one of his speeches beginning each event with “it started” and following it by the event or phenomenon, i.e. Intifada, Conspiracy,

Pressures. Then, Assad lists three things which came after September 11. The second list is characterized by each of the three things beginning with the gerund form of the verb as well as all being emotively charged and contributing to the idea that Syria is being oppressed. The pattern is “(then came 9/11 and) the accusation of…..the occupation of….the conspiracy against……” Within this list, Assad creates the lexical couplet “Muslims and Islam” following a phrase that means “then came the accusing of…..(after September 11)”. Another lexical couplet Afghanistan and Iraq is inserted following the word meaning “occupation”. This also contributes to the strategy of depicting enemies as oppressive. The words meaning “pressure” and

“collusion/conspiracy” which are repeated throughout the speech are repeated here and

103 within this excerpt as well.

The concept of humiliation closely related to shame seems to be a prevalent one in Arabic political discourse. Honor and shame are dominant concepts in Arab culture and society and are probably the reason for the concept of humiliation being so important in political discourse. For example, if one wants to make a political statement, one can send a strong message by saying that a particular political leader was humiliated by another one. Adversely, if one wants to indict ones enemies, he can accuse an enemy of attempting to humiliate the other. The Syrian people were indicting the regime for attempting to humiliate them. You can see the evidence of this discourse in the line of a famous protest song whose author was said by some to have been found with his throat cut out for his writing and performing of the song. The line is: “the Syrian people will not be humiliated” (Ibrahim Qashoush: yallah ʔirḥal ya bashar).

Similar to the way that there seems to be both a motivation for certain strategies because of recent context as well as a historical precedent in reference to the contest over the concept of the “people” in Syria, there also seems to be a long view of the motivation behind constructing the enemy as attempting to humiliate which reduces positive inverses such as honor, pride, and dignity. That is such constructions of the enemy as

“humiliator” feed into larger discourse on “humiliation” and “oppression” associated with

“imperialism” and “colonialism”. Just as the regime and the opposition struggle over who gets to name someone a martyr, a privilege which prior to the uprising was mainly afforded to the state, the regime and the opposition are in contest over who decides who is doing the oppressing. Ziter describes ceremonies which take place every year in Syria in memory of martyrs who died opposing Ottoman of French occupation rulers (2013).

104

This is evidence that the history of French Occupation and Ottoman Rule is not long in the memories of Syrians and the regime is in a position to link the oppression associated with these periods with actions of Western or Israeli actors.

Strategy of Unification

The Assad’s have been analyzed as being both unifiers as well as following divide and conquer strategies in confronting challenges of ruling a comparatively heterogeneous population within the region. In a previous section, it was demonstrated that Assad raised the specter of sectarian conflict. Yet Syrian expert Joshua Landis’ first reaction when asked about the speech by media was that it was a “unifying” speech meant to rally the troops and get everyone behind his message. Similar to other discrepancies between the content of the speech and how it was interpreted by major media outlets or analysts, this represents a much different view of the speech than what was reported by activists and many media outlets. In this section, Assad’s use of repetition to reinforce a strategy of unification will be analyzed.

Assad opens his speech with concepts of unity. The following statement is one of the first statements made by Assad in the speech:

سورية التي تنبض في قلب كل واحد فينا حباً وكرامة..سورية القلعة الحصينة بتالحمها..العظيمة بأمجاها..الشامخة

بشعبها في كل محافظة ومدينة وبلدة وقرية

“Syria which beats in the heart of every one of us love and honor…Syria the castle

impenetrable with its cementation…great with its glories…tall with its people in

every province and city and town and village”

As has been eluded to and demonstrated previously, it is often the case that there

105 will be repetitive structures positioned within larger repetitive structures…as if these structures were a set of Russian dolls. Here Assad is almost using a list within a list to describe some of Syria’s characteristics. He begins with “Syria…..” and follows with a metaphor of “Syria as blood”. Not only is Syria described as the blood that beats in the heart but it beats in the heart of “every one of us”. Assad begins a new phrase also with

“Syria…..” and follows with the metaphor of “Syria as a castle/fortress/citadel”. Then he follows the second metaphor with a list of three highly ornamental or decorative extensions to the metaphor of “Syria as a castle/fortress/citadel”. Each one begins with an adjective that modifies the noun castle/fortress/citadel and is followed by the preposition meaning “with” in this case and a noun which modifies the adjective and has a possessive pronoun attachment which refers back to “Syria”. Within two of the metaphor extensions are references to unity. The first one, “Syria is impenetrable with its cementation”, clearly connotes unity and the protection such unity (cementation) affords.

In the last metaphor extension, there is yet another list which could also be described as a word string. “Syria is tall with its people in every province and city and town and village” reinforces the idea that Syria is one nation and everyone is a part of it whether they live in a city, town, or village and whether they live in this province or that province or this city or that city.

The following is an example of Assad putting forth a statement which indicates the strategy of unification but does not actually contain an example of repetition:

وإن تالحمـكم في مواجهة الفتنة يشعرني بمزيد من اإليمان بالمستقبل..

“your cementation in facing this chaos gives me an increase of belief in the future”

Although there are no examples of repetition within this statement, the word

106 meaning “cementation” which was used at the beginning of the speech is now reiterated in the closing statement of the speech perhaps to tie it to the metaphor and repetition set used at the beginning of the speech. The word meaning “cementation” is not the most common way to refer to unity which hints that the lexical repetition or the second instance of the word from the beginning of the speech to the end was most probably deliberate. Another example of this type repetition where a word or phrase is repeated to tie a concept put forth at the beginning of the speech was discussed in reference to the lexical couplet “strength and power” or “strength and force” which was only slightly varied and fed into Assad’s strategy of hope discussed above. The following statement contains the common word designating unity or “oneness”:

كونت حالة من الوحدة الوطنية في سورية غير مسبوقة وهذه الحالة الوطنية التي تكونت كانت السبب أو الطاقة أو

الحامي الحقيقي لسورية في المراحل الماضية

“it created a condition of national unity in Syria which is unprecedented and this

national condition which was created was the reason and the energy and the true

protection for Syria in past stages.”

This statement contains root repetition of verbs of different forms both having a sense of “to create” or “to form” and the noun meaning “condition”. The noun

“condition” is also described first as a condition of national unity and second as a national condition. This excerpt also contains a list or word string which was used to describe what this “national condition” was for Syria. It was the “reason or the energy or the (true) protection (for Syria)”. Each of the items in the list is related by virtue of its existence for or on behalf of Syria and Syria’s well-being. Following this statement,

Assad goes on in the speech to discuss the importance of this unity saying, “Especially in

107 the last few years when the pressure on Syria began. We managed, thanks to it (unity or condition) to carry out the dismantling of huge mine fields which were confronting

Syrian politics and we preserved Syria’s central position…but this didn’t discourage enemies.” A pronoun “she” or “it” is used to refer back to either the “unity” or the

“condition (of unity)”, which are both feminine nouns.

In the examples that follow, Assad is addressing the subject of the city of Deraa which is where conflict and significant protests first took place in Syria:

ابتدؤوا بـمحافظة درعا...البعض يقول إن درعا هي محافظة حدودية وأنا أقول لهم إذا كانت درعا هي محافظة

حدودية فهي في قلب كل سوري أما إذا لم تكن محافظة درعا في وسط سورية فهي في قلب الوفاء لسورية ولكل

السوريين وهذا هو تعريفها وهذا هو حاضرها..فـدرعا محافظة نسق أول مع العدو اإلسرائيلي..والنسق األول يدافع

عن األنساق الخلفية..النسق األول مع محافظة القنيطرة وجزء من ريف دمشق هم يدافعون عن األنساق األخرى في

الخلف..وال يمكن لشخص أن يكون من موقعه يدافع عن الوطن وبنفس الوقت يتآمر على الوطن أو يضر به فـهذا

الكالم مستحيل وغير مقبول وبالتالي أهل درعا ال يحملون اي مسؤولية فيـما حصل..ولكنهم يحملون معنا

المسؤولية في وأد الفتنة..ونحن مع درعا وكل المواطنين السوريين معـها.

“they started in the province of Deraa…some are saying Deraa is a border province. I say to them if Deraa is a border province then it is in the heart of every Syrian. And, if the province of Deraa is not in the center of Syria, it is in the faithful heart of Syria and

all Syrians. This is its definition and this is its present….because Deraa is a province which is on the front line with the Israeli enemy and the front line which defends the land behind…the front line with the province of Quinetra and part of rural Damascus which

defends other lines in the back…and it is not possible for a person from a position of defending the nation at the same time to conspire against the nation and damage it. This

talk is impossible and not accepted. Additionally, the people of Deraa do not carry

108 any responsibility for what happened…but they carry with them the responsibility to

repair the tumult…and we are with Deraa and every Syrian citizen is with them.”

Here it seems that Assad is describing Deraa as a city that is the opposite of what it had become in the media up until that point, which was a symbol of defiance and bravery in standing up to the regime. Assad again tells a different story about Deraa.

Part of Assad’s story is the supposition that many Syrians deemed what was happening in

Deraa as being unimportant to Syria’s future because of its distance from major city centers and its proximity to Syria’s border with Jordan and all that that entails, i.e. social ties to tribe and other Arab countries, lack of sense of nationalism, etc. There were whisperings between the first and second months of the uprising that people were beginning to divide themselves, in the way they spoke, across such lines, i.e. Deraa is not my city and the people there are not my people so I don’t care what happens there, etc.

However, the extent to which such talk existed in the first two weeks of the uprising and leading up to Assad’s first speech is unknown to me. In any case, Assad’s intention in these statements seems to be to instill a sense of unity by indicating that Deraa is as much a part of Syria as Damascus is. One type of repetition used here is the lexical repetition of the city name “Deraa” which occurs 7 times within this set of text. The word meaning

“province” is also repeated as is the word that means “line/s” as in “lines of defense

(against outside enemies)”. Another interesting form of repetition here is the type where there is statement (in the positive) and then restatement (in the negative) to reinforce the previous point. The statement and restatement in this example is followed up by a similar set of phrases where the first phrase is a statement of what “is not” the case and the second statement is a statement of what “is” the case. The phrase “carrying responsibility

109 for” is repeated in this case. The statement ends with “we are with Deraa and every

Syrian citizen is with her (Deraa)” where the word “with” is repeated referring to Deraa in both cases. Assad continues to discuss Deraa:

إن أهل درعا هم أهل الوطنية الصادقة والعروبة اإلصلية..وهم أهل النخوة والشهامة والكرامة وهم من سيقومون

بتطويق القلة القليلة التي أرادت إثارة الفوضى وتخريب اللحمة الوطنية.

“the people of Deraa (they) are people of genuine patriotism and authentic pan-

Arabism and they are people of chivalry and gallantry and honor and they are who

will undertake the containment of the small few who wanted to stir up chaos and to

destroy the national fabric”

The word string which praises the people of Deraa is preceded by two highly positive descriptions of the people of Deraa and followed by root repetition in the noun meaning “a few” and the adjective describing it which means “small”. Each set of phrases begins with “they”. The noun and the adjective share the same root which does not seem to be possible in modern English to convey the same meaning. This is followed by a type of parallelism where two noun phrases are followed by the verb “they wanted” referring to “the small few”. The gerund is used in both cases and each is followed by one noun. The second noun is followed by an adjective. In the following example,

Assad is still discussing Deraa and what happened there:

إن الدماء التي نزفت هي دماء سورية وكلنا معنيون بها ألنـها دماؤنا...فـالضحايا هم أخوتنا وأهلهم هم أهلنا..

“the blood which was spilt (it) is the blood of Syria and all of us are suffering with it

because it is our blood…and the victims (they) are our brothers and their family

(they) are our family”

Assad seems to essentially be making a set of three metaphors in this statement.

110

Each of them is set off with a pronoun which matches the metaphor in gender and number. For each case there is a noun that “is” something else. In the first case, Assad states the same thing in two different ways, i.e. the blood…is Syrian blood…is our blood”. The pronouns used in this case (similar to the example above) have the meaning of “to be” and in most cases are not necessary since the verb “to be” is implied in Syrian syntax rather than expressed explicitly. However in some cases, such as to clarify a statement that resulted in ambiguity pronouns acting to mean “to be” are necessary. In other cases, it can signal emphasis. In this case, it is necessary because both the subject and the predicate are definite. Each of the metaphors also ends in the pronoun meaning

“our”, i.e. “our blood”, “our brothers”, “our family”. Assad continues to discuss the losses as a result of what happened in Deraa:

إذا كان الجرح قد نزف فليكن ذلك من أجل وحدة أبناء الوطن وليس من أجل تفريقهم..ومن أجل قوة الوطن وليس من

أجل ضعفه..ومن أجل ضرب الفتنة وليس من أجل تأجيجها..ولنعمل بأقصى سرعة على رأب الجرح لنعيد الوئام

لعائلتنا الكبيرة ولنبقى المحبة رابطاً قوياً يجمع بين أبنائها

“if the wound is bleeding then let this be for the sake of the unity of the sons of the nation and not for the sake of dispersing them…and for the sake of the strength of the nation and not for the sake of weakening it…and for the sake of striking down sedition and not for the sake of igniting it. Let us act as quickly as possible to heal our wounds and let us return harmony to our large family and let us keep love as a strong connection

which unites its sons”

Assad begins and ends this set of statements with messages of unity. He begins with a conditional statement “if…then…” and has created a paradigm that he repeats three times, which follows the pattern “for the sake of x and not for the sake of x”.

111

Lahlali demonstrates how Nasrallah had a similar paradigm which he used to “name and shame” his enemies. In both cases, leader’s repeated the phrase “for the sake of”.

However, Assad’s paradigm is different in form from Nasrallah’s in that Assad’s statements contain both an affirmative and a negative side. Lahlali discusses three examples of repetition Nasrallah used to shame enemies as well as to support or refute negative accusations against allies or friends of Hezbollah. In each case, there was a repetition of negative particles, i.e. “not” or “nor” as in the following example:

لن تقاتلوا ال من أجل لبنان وال من أجل غزة وال من أجل الضفة الغربية والحتى من أجل القدس

“you will not fight, not for the sake of Lebanon, not for the sake of Gaza, not for the

sake of the West Bank, not even for the sake of Jerusalem”

Analogy/Intertextuality

Lahlali indicates that Nasrallah has a tendency to use Qur’anic sentences structures and phrases. Lahlali acknowledges that this type of register can be expected from Nasrallah because he is also a religious leader. Conversely, Assad and the Syrian regime are secularists. Thus, these types of religious speech are not expected. Indeed, this is mostly the case for Assad’s March 30 speech. However, Assad made two token

Qur’anic references in the closing statements of the speech:

أيها األخوة واألخوات وعسى أن تكرهوا شيئاً وهو خير لكم صدق هللا العظيم..

“dear brothers and sisters…maybe you will hate something and it is good for

you…said God who is great”

والفتنة أشد من القتل كما جاء في القرآن الكريم

“sedition is worse than killing…said in the Holy Quran”

112

With the exception of these statements and references to God (Allah), Muslims and Islam, Islamic religious intertextuality seems to be absent from the speech. Obama’s speech to the Muslim world in Cairo, Egypt in 2008 made more Islamic intertextual references than Assad did in this speech.

The reasons for this have been alluded to previously. Not only is the Assad regime secular in nature but the society itself is quite diverse. Assad’s own sect along with other Shia sects such as the Druze are known for being followers of Muhammad the

Prophet but in some cases (the cases are mixed) do not adhere to the Quran and other texts sacred for mainstream Muslims. Although Kurds are Sunni Muslims, there is a tendency also for the Kurdish to have varying perspectives on religion and politics. All of this is in addition to the fact that Syria has a large Christian population on whom

Damascus relies for support as an ally in a political counterbalance to the Sunni Muslim majority.

CHAPTER 8

ANALYSIS OF MANIPULATIVE SILENCE

Many Syrians who heard the speech commented that what they heard was essentially nothing that had not been heard before. It seems that they were expecting to hear something new. In other words, they did not hear what they had wanted or expected to hear. As has been mentioned previously, media coverage focused on the expectation that Assad would announce the lifting of the emergency law which he did not do on the speech but which took place subsequently. While the paraphrasing of statements in the speech along with other forms of repetition seems to foreground some topics, their prominence stands in contrast to other topics which might be minimized, backgrounded, or omitted.

Huckin characterizes manipulative silences as being especially prevalent in public discourse and being the most ideologically powerful of all types of textual silence (2002).

I follow Huckin’s methodology for evaluating the extent to which textual silences are manipulative. This involves determining whether a silence adheres to three main criteria, which are (1) deceptive (2) intentional and (3) advantageous. Determining whether something is deceptive or not requires consideration of the genre and the speaker’s knowledge of the information being excluded. Defining intentionality is more involved but essentially requires determining the extent to which the speaker is constrained by

114 ideological factors or is subjected to sociopolitical pressures. Finally, questions about what a speaker might stand to gain from a textual silence need to be asked in order to determine whether or not the silence would be advantageous.

The Enemy

On March 30, Assad was careful not to blatantly name the Gulf countries or any

Western country by name as part of his charging Syria’s enemies for the situation in

Syria. He was later more prone to do this as Western powers and Gulf countries made clear their stance toward Syria. But, at the beginning, it was not clear and Assad was careful not to make unnecessary provocations. What Assad does over and over again in his speech is to construct his mostly unnamed enemies as oppressors. There are at least two advantages to not naming enemies. By not defining an enemy, the state gives itself more justification for punishing domestic challenges to legitimacy under the banner of

“state enemy”. Second, by not naming enemies, the state can prevent unnecessary attention from powerful states being accused of having enemy status. Third, the regime can imply the involvement of a wide variety of enemies from expats who left the country for political reasons or states such as Qatar, Turkey, or other regional actors as well as

Western countries, i.e. France, the United States, etc.

A head of state has access to state intelligence resources and thus is aware of its true military foes. Genre conventions of political speech-making do not restrict the naming of enemies. For example, George W. Bush named specific countries as U.S. enemies following 9/11. Arab leaders in general and Syria in particular do not refrain from naming Israel as a state enemy.

115

Assad’s silence with regard to this is different from the way Nasrallah tended follow a strategy of naming and shaming his enemies. Examples of Nasrallah using repetition to support his strategy demonstrate that Nasrallah criticizes his enemies for being indifferent to the suffering of his constituency or lacking the will to fight (on their behalf).

Alternatively, Assad does not seem to use a strategy of naming and shaming when describing his enemies. First, with the exception of Israel, Assad does not name Syria’s enemies. He makes general references to them. He alludes to people conspiring against the country who are without and within Syria. The listener is left to imagine and fill in the blanks using what they know about the actions of regional actors, Western actors, or internal or exiled opposition.

In the following excerpt, Assad is reacting to a common criticism of the Syrian government which is that elements in the regime were in a perpetual state of blocking

Assad from making the reforms that he wants. Assad develops an argument that everyone in the government wants reform and that any delays in reform are strictly due to practical issues of implementation. Here Assad makes reference to elements of the government who opposed reform without naming names:

وأنتم تعرفونهم..قلة كانت موجودة ولم تعد موجودة اآلن..قلة محدودة جداً تعرفونهم باالسم ولكن اآلن ال يوجد عقبات

حقيقية وأعتقد أن التحدي اآلن ما نوع من اإلصالح الذي نريد أن نصل إليه

“and you all know them…a few were in existence and they are no longer in existence now…a very limited few…you all know them by name. But, now there is no existence of true obstructions and I think that the challenge now is what type of reform we want.”

Assad probably wants listeners to be reminded of government officials who were

116 expelled from the government and possibly the country, i.e. those regime officials who were carried over from Hafez’s administration. Assad seems to want to imply that those from the old guard who were expelled from Syria during Bashar’s period as president were expelled because they did not want the reform that Bashar wanted. There is lexical repetition of the words meaning “a few”, “in existence”, along with repetition of the phrase, “you all know them”. The entire argument which was discussed in a previous section seems to follow Johnstone’s tripartite pattern of statement, paraphrase, or restatement and then a final point which is made more effective having been preceded by such an introduction. In fact, in this example, the pattern itself seems to be repeated. In the first case, the original statement, “a few were in existence” is rephrased as “they are no longer in existence”. Both phrases essentially mean the same thing which is that the existence of a particular few is in the past. Then the point is made that the few was not significant to the extent that they can be named, i.e. “a very limited few…you know them by name”. Then there is an additional paraphrasing of the idea that the limited few that existed is in the past, i.e. “But, now there is no existence of true obstructions” and the final point is made which is that the matter is one of determining the type of reform wanted rather than whether or not reform is a good idea.

Assad emphasizes elsewhere in the speech, the idea that “opposition” are “few in numbers”:

دائماً المتآمرون هم قلة

“always, the conspirators are few”

By emphasizing this idea through repetition, Assad is able to uphold the strategy of praising the people while leveling accusations against certain ones. In the following

117 statement, Assad indicates that numbers of those involved in trying to weaken the government were also “few”:

وهم من سيقومون بتطبيق القلة القليلة التي أرادت إثارة الفوضى وتخريب اللحمة الوطنية

“and they (the people of Deraa) will apprehend the small few who wanted to stir up chaos

and to destroy the national fabric”

Here the word for “few” is emphasized as the root is repeated in the adjective used to modify the noun meaning “few”. This does not come through in the translation.

The use of the word meaning “few” is not used in any other context in Assad’s speech except when referring to enemies of the government or enemies of Syria.

Justice

The SP discussed many things in the speech related to the current events. He talked about the Arab Spring (though not by name), Arab aspirations, the deaths that had taken place in Syria, deaths of innocent people in Syria because of mistakes made, the city where the uprising began (Deraa), the changes he was planning to do before the Arab

Spring and in the future, the drought that had afflicted Syria in recent years and its impact on living conditions in Syria, protestors, the criminal/conspiratorial activity that is mixed in with the protests, fabricated media information, sectarian conflict, Palestinian rights, the West’s or George W. Bush’s Iraq War, Syria’s crisis of 2005, etc.

Some of the topics were foregrounded more than others through repetition. At the same time, there were many issues that were not discussed in the speech. For example, the SP said that in Deraa people were killed because, though there were clear instructions not to harm any Syrian citizens, things became chaotic and mistakes were made.

118

However, there are many details about this situation that were not provided. For example, who gave the instructions not to harm Syrian citizens and where along the chain of command did that get confused? Was it somewhere at the top, in the middle, or at the very bottom so that only individual foot soldiers were to blame? Regarding who was responsible, whether it was at the foot soldier level or higher up the chain of command, how were they being corrected or how were they to be punished for these mistakes?

Knowing the answers to all of these questions is the responsibility of the state. War or police action can be an area where right and wrong becomes blurry, but when the public finds out about something wrong that happened in the war context, it is often accompanied by calls for justice. For example, when the story and pictures of Abu

Ghraib prison abuse by American soldiers in Iraq, the public outcry demanded trials and punishment of the lower level soldiers who were involved. The Abu Ghraib abuses led to the death of one prisoner whose medical condition combined with the abuse resulted in death. Many soldiers stood trial and many of them were punished with jail sentences.

Yet, in the Syrian case, the SP did not discuss how those involved were to be punished for mistakes that killed tens of Syrians. With respect to the same issue, the SP did not discuss how the government planned to act to prevent such mistakes from occurring in the future. Yet, in a case that involves errors in military or law enforcement rules of engagement, it might have been important for the public to know how the government planned to separate criminals/conspirators from civilian protestors in the future. This could involve what the government is doing to stop the criminals/conspirators. When something occurs that is significant on a national level, it would not be inappropriate for the head of state to comment on such details rather than leaving them to his spokespeople

119 or journalists. For example, after the Boston bombings, Barack Obama made statements about what the government was doing and the government’s commitment to catch the perpetrators of the crime. In addition to capturing and punishing armed elements found among protesters, Assad could have made statements about acting to prevent the kinds of mistakes that resulted in the deaths of tens of Syrians vis-a-vis how the government plans to control protests in the future, i.e. by legalizing protests, by designating certain areas for legal protest, by using tear gas to disperse illegal protests, by using rubber bullets to disperse illegal protests, etc.

Finally, since it was the first time since the president had spoken since the beginning of the uprising and rumors as to what happened in Deraa were in circulation, it might have been important for the people to know more about the situation in Deraa that led to the protests there.

The governor who presided over the Deraa incident was removed from his post, but the public was never made aware of whether or not he stood trial or was punished for what happened.

A possible reason for the silence is that fact that the regime structure is based on a system of group alliances which could be threatened by punishing its members. Not being able to punish civilian or military leaders or personal is a political constraint which has the advantage of preserving the system in current form. Another reason is that discussing matters openly might have limited the regime’s ability to use force using similar premises in the future.

120

Economic Policy

Another example of issues that were not addressed in the speech is related to the

SP’s discussion about living conditions in Syria. Assad remarked about the drought and how this (along with security threats from the U.S. invasion of Iraq (2003) and the assassination of Rafik Hariri in Lebanon (2005)) contributed to delays in political reform as priorities had to be shifted to deal with the larger issues of economy and security. He mentioned that, at that time, living conditions were the issues of greatest concern to

Syrians (as opposed to political reform). And, he acknowledged that problems related to living conditions were connected to why people had been protesting. He also mentioned a plan to raise salaries for government employees. He said that this decision was the only decision made out of a meeting he headed to discuss a package of economic decisions.

While discussing the effect of the drought on Syria’s economy, the issue of Syria’s overarching economic policies and the impact of those policies on the society and on the economy was avoided. Other topics that were avoided were the aspects of the problems with living conditions, i.e. the difference between life for people living in the cities and those who are living outside the cities or the effects of liberalization and corruption on manufacturing. Although Assad acknowledged the importance of making sure that children are not hungry in Syria, he did not acknowledge the people’s discontent with the difficulty associated with starting a business that might benefit from liberalization policies while members of the SP’s family and his friends had become billionaires in recent years7.

7 Assad’s liberalization of the Syrian economy in certain industries and areas such as telecommunication, finance, retail, etc. disproportionately advantaged urban middle classes. Also, major industries are dominated by businessmen who are friends or related

121

Neither the causes nor the potential solutions to such a disparity were addressed in the speech either. For example, Barack Obama frequently discusses economic inequality and solutions for reducing the inequality, i.e. increase in taxes for the wealthiest, incentives for manufacturing or new technologies, etc.

Such problems cannot be unknown to the president or the regime. It is more likely that Assad is constrained by the system which provides economic benefits to those who serve his interests in the government.

Democracy/Freedom Level

A final example of issues that were elided relates to the Syrian parliament and political reform. The SP commented on the Syrian government’s previous initiation of political reform. He also remarked on having drafted a party law that had yet to be discussed. He said there were other draft laws to be discussed by relevant institutions.

He also mentioned other measures would be announced, after they were studied, in the areas of strengthening national unity, fighting corruption, the media, and creating jobs.

The SP talked about having a new people’s assembly (parliament), a new local administration (governors-14 governates appointed by Ministry of the Interior), a new

to the SP and his regime. The best example of this is Rami Makhlouf, the SP’s maternal cousin. He is the primary owner of the telecommunications company Syriatel which is one of only two telecommunications companies operating in Syria. He is also involved in real estate, banking, and other capital investment areas. He controls as much as 60% of the Syrian economy (Peel, 2011). In 2011, Rami Makhlouf’s name was on tongues of many average Syrians. Some Syrian’s spoke about him and his role in Syrian business with contempt. At the same time, manufacturing had been suffering because of the import of foreign products. The economic liberalization of the Syrian economy leading up to the current conflict in Syria sharply widened the gap between rich and poor and led to the problems in living conditions for many sectors of the Syrian population.

122 government (cabinet), and a regional conference (Ba’ath Party congress). And, he discussed that they would be involved in process of enacting new measures and laws.

However, the SP did not address the more fundamental problems of the political system such as the need to repair major flaws of the political system and its institutions.

For example, a data-driven perspective of democracy in Syria paints a bleaker picture of view of the extent to which Syria is “democratic”.

The Economist Intelligent Unit publishes and annual report called the Democracy

Index. It is self-described as follows:

The index provides a snapshot of the state of democracy worldwide for 165 independent states and two territories—this covers almost the entire population of the world and the vast majority of the world’s states (micro states are excluded). The Democracy index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Countries are placed within one of four types of regimes: full democracies; flawed democracies; hybrid regimes; and authoritarian regimes. (2012: 1)

For the EIU’s 2012 Democracy Index report, Syria ranked 164 out of 167. Only

Chad, Guinnea-Bissau, and North Korea ranked lower than Syria. This places Syria in the least democratic category of “authoritarian regime”. Syria’s actual score for 2012 was 1.63 (out of 10). The score combines marks in the following areas: Electoral Process and Pluralism, Functioning of Government, Political Participation, Political Culture, and

Civil Liberties. The crisis in Syria has resulted in lower scores for Syria in each category and overall.

In the months leading up to the uprising in 2011, Syria’s ranking was slightly higher. In 2011 and 2010, Syria’s scored slightly higher in the democratic index with overall scores of 2.31 in 2010 and 1.99 in 2011 (on a 10 point scale). However, they were still ranked among the least democratic countries and fell into the category of

123

“authoritarian regime”. Similar studies result in similar conclusions with respect to Syria.

Freedom House’s study is called Freedom in the World. Freedom House results are based on similar factors of political rights, i.e. electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government and civil liberties, i.e. freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, personal autonomy, and individual rights. Based on results in these areas, countries are placed in one of three categories, i.e. Free, Partly Free, and Not Free. The 2013 report (based year

2012) examined 195 countries or polities. Syria was not only in the Not Free category but was in a category called The Worst of the Worst for countries which earned the lowest score of 7 in both of the major categories of Political Rights and Civil Liberties.

Syria was in this category along with North Korea, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Sudan,

Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, and Somalia. Syria was also labeled as going in a downward trend or becoming less free. In Freedom House’s 2012 report (based on

2011), Syria’s overall score for civil liberties decreased from 6 to 7 (7 is the worst score).

So, in 2010, Syria’s scores were slightly higher but still fell well below the requirements for being considered Partly Free.

Assad wants to separate the political issues in Syria from the economic ones.

However, the two issues are closely related. Political reform could lead to a loss of control of state wealth and resources by those currently in power. Preventing this is both the advantage and the political constraint.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

Analysis of the data reveals that repetition is a much more salient factor in terms of its ability to provide insight into political ideologies and persuasion than factors of language variation or religious language. This confirms expectations that there is less of a role for these types of language practices in a Syrian context where the overall political climate is dominated by an ideology of secular nationalism.

Analysis of the data also reveals that there are a wide range of repetition structures in Arabic that can be made use of in order to stir emotion and gain support for political strategies. Repetition that may seem redundant or superfluous in English may in fact be effective in persuading one’s audience in Arabic. The deliberate use of various types of repetition accumulates in Assad’s speeches to the point where particular ideologies seem to be emphasized and it becomes evident that repetition is being used in order to support particular political strategies.

Examination of Assad’s repetition in this speech reveals political strategies which are positive as well as negative and provide us with greater insights as to how a listener might be persuaded to continue to support or to refrain from actively opposing the regime.

A comparison between Nasrallah and Assad further demonstrates the way that

125 political strategies supported by repetition shift according to the social/historical/political context in which the speaker is operating. For example, in the Syrian context at this particular moment in history, it seems that strategies such as inspiring fear and constructing enemies as oppressors as well as the preponderant importance of a strategy of praising the people were deemed to be more useful by the Syrian regime at this particular time than they might have been for Nasrallah over the course of several speech- giving events.

The repetition Assad uses and the political strategies which are supported by it also seem to be used to wrest control of certain concepts from critics and/or to redefine concepts in ways that benefit the regime. Assad may also be using repetition to capitalize on previously established discourses which may leave the listener to make associations that have been calculated by the regime.

The data indicate that repetition is used to minimize or background actors or events which carried to its furthest extent involves the omission of subjects which might otherwise be included in an address to the nation. Manipulative silences are also employed in order to reinforce existing power structures and resist change. In addition to repetition, the performance and ceremony of the speech support political strategies.

Repetition, along with performance and silence, all contribute to shaping the public’s ideas about a particular concept. Through these practices the regime is able to effectively persuade the public with respect to a concept such as democracy. The results are cases where ideas about what it means to live in a country with a democratic system of government is very different from prevailing ideas in other parts of the world.

In this analysis, comparisons were made to Mashaal and Nasrallah’s speeches to

126

Assad’s. These comparisons are not ideal because of differences in studies’ focal points.

Both al-Harahsheh and Lahlali analyze groups of speeches given by the same leader rather than looking at one speech on a deeper level. al-Harahsheh’s focus on Khalid

Mashaal’s speeches was on the difficulties associated with translating Arabic repetition into English and he dealt only with instances of phonological and lexical repetition.

Lahlali’s analysis of Nasrallah’s speeches did deal with the relationship between repetition and ideology. Lahlali indicates that he is focused on lexical repetition, though his examples indicate the repetition of more complex parallels.

Conversely, an attempt has been made in this study to analyze more than one or two types of repetition. As such, it might be possible that it could serve as a baseline for comparative studies on repetition and the speech styles of particular leaders in the Arab

World. State leaders as well as nonstate actors should continue to be analyzed on a deeper level in various contexts.

Although the speech analyzed seems to have reinforced the support of those who back Assad, there is an acknowledgement that elements of this speech may have been off-putting even to those who supported Assad and/or continue to support him. A limitation of this study is that receivers of the speech were not interviewed about their reactions to the speech. This makes is difficult to make a more precise statement as to the extent of the speech’s effectiveness. Obtaining this type of data can be problematic in the

Syrian case for a variety of reasons including the safety of the participants. Future studies similar in nature might consider how the challenges to obtaining such data might be overcome.

APPENDIX A

TRANSCRIPTION SYSTEM

Consonants

ḍ ض ʔ ء

ṭ ط b ب

ẓ ظ t ت

ʕ ع θ ث

ɤ غ j ج

f ف ḥ ح

q ق x خ

k ك d د

l ل ð ذ

m م r ر

n ن z ز

h ه s س

w و š ش

ي ṣ ص

128

Long Vowels

ā ا

ū و

ī ي

Short Vowels a u i

APPENDIX B

SUPPLEMENTAL SPEECH TRANSCRIPT

(Based on: RTArabic/Youtube video(

:10 – Assad responds to applause from the audience:

يعني اصعب اصعب من انه يجيب على هذا الموقف

well, the most difficult, the most difficult is to respond to this situation

:20 – The audience chants:

بالروح بالدم نفيكك يا بشار )repeat)

with soul, with blood, we sacrifice for you

:40 – Audience member addresses the SP:

نورت المجلس يا ابن األسد نورت سورية يا درع سورية واألمة العربية

130

you have spread light on the council, oh son of Assad

you have spread light on Syria, oh armor of Syria and of the Arab nation

:50 – Audience member addresses the SP:

قول لهم قول لكل المجرمين يدمروا فليقتلوا فليسلبوا فليقهروا،

هيهات تفنى أمة قواتها باسم العروبة

كل ذئب )تردع(

tell them; say to all of the criminals who destroy

let them kill, let them pillage and let them subjugate

demise is impossible for a nation’s forces which in the name of the Arab nation

deter every predator

1:10 – The SP addresses the audience:

السيد رئيس مجلس الشعب، السيدات و السادة أعضاء هذا المجلس الكريم

Mr. President of the people’s council, ladies and gentlemen,

members of this benevolent council

2:25 – Audience member addresses the SP by reciting poetry in his praise:

131

يا َعالي الجبين يا صامدا في كل حين

يا كريما للمحسنين والمخطئين

ارفع الرأس عاليا بقوة ولين

فاألحرار سمعتهم معك في كل حين

صخرة حبك ال تلين

الشعب معك وهللا هو المعين

oh high of forehead, oh steadfast at all times

oh benevolent to the right-doers and the wrong-doers

raise your head high with strength and leniency

the free who you have heard are with you always

the rock of your love never softens

the people are with you, God is the appointer

4:53 – Audience member addresses the SP:

لبيك لبيك

يا سيادة الرئيس بشار األسد

here we are, we are at your service

oh your lordship president Bashar al-Assad

132

17:10 – The audience chants:

بالروح بالدم نفيكك يا بشار )repeat)

with soul, with blood, we sacrifice for you

18:15 – Audience member addresses the SP:

درعا معك الى األبد، سر ونحن من ورائك

Der‘aa is with you to the end

march and we are behind you

18:30 – Audience member addresses the SP:

درعا يا سيد الوطن،

بدماء شهدائها ودموع امهاتها وأهلها

جميعا أطفاال ونساء وشيوخا،

بترابها وبسنابلها الذهبية يا سيد الوطن

وبزيتونها نقول لك

نحن معك نحن معك )تصفيق حاد( الى األمام أيها البشار

--- الرحمن في األرض يابن األسد

133

Der‘aa, oh master of the nation

with the blood of its martyrs and the tears of their mothers and their families

all of them children and women and elders

with their earth and their wheat spikes, oh master of the nation

and their olive trees, they say to you

we are with you; we are with you to the end, oh Bashar

who is merciful upon the earth, oh son of Assad

24:00 – Audience member addresses the SP by reciting poetry in his praise:

األيام تبتسم

والبشر يبدو وال الحصن ينهزم

والنفس مألى سرورا إن بزغت لها

شمس الزمان تخطت دونها ُالظ َلم

ترجو العروبة فيك اليوم بادرة

وفخرنا فيك بشر الخير ياعلم

باسم مدينة حمام محافظة وريد نحن معك حتى تصل بنا الى المريد

the days smile

and joy is appearing, and the fort is not beaten

and the soul is so full of happiness that it overflows

the sun of the ages goes beyond without darkness

the Arab nation implores you today to initiate

134

and our pride is with you good tidings oh your eminence

in the name of the city of Hamaam and the district of Wariid

we are with you until you deliver us to where you desire

26:00 – Audience member addresses the SP:

سيادة الرئيس الوقت هذا

الالذقية ودماء جراحها تقول نعم نحن معك الشعب

إلى األبد يا قائد هذه الثورة وشكرا

your lordship the president, at this time,

Latakia and the blood of its wounded say yes we are with you, the people

to the end oh leader of this revolution, thank you

38:05 – Audience member addresses the SP by reciting poetry in his praise:

وكر التآمر انهزم

والحب عم بالدنا

بشار عالدنيا حمل

تاريخنا و أمجادنا

بشار بصموده رفع بنيانا وأعالمنا

من الشام لشط العرب

من مصر ال تطوانا

135

حمى حماتك علم بارواحنا وبدمانا

the den of the tiger is defeated

and love has prevailed over our country

Bashar delivered to the world

our history and our glory

Bashar with his endurance raised our buildings and our flags

from Damascus to the Arab shore

from Egypt to Tetouan

protection by your protectors has been a mark on our souls and our blood

40:15 – Audience member addresses the SP:

باسم جماهير شعبنا، يوم خرجت يوم األمس،

بجميع...بشبابها و شيبها وبشرائح المجتمع كاملة

لتعبر لكم يا سيد ى الرئيس عن مسيرة

الوفاء والوالء لقيادتك الحكيمة،

وشعبك معك وهللا معك ونحن معك،

بالروح بالدم بايعناك ونبايعك الى األبد

بإذن هللا.

in the name of the crowds of people who went out yesterday

in their entirety, with their young and their old and all sectors of society

136

in order to express to you oh mister president, by way of demonstrating,

loyalty and faithfulness to your wise leadership

and your people are with you and God is with you and we are with you

with soul and with blood and with homage we nominate you to the end

with God’s permission

40:55 – Demonstrators outside the building are shown and heard chanting supportive slogans slogans

41:15 – Audience member addresses the SP:

فعند حبك كل الشعر يصمت

when it comes to your love all poetry is hushed

41:25 – The SP responds to the last comment made by an audience member:

انت تعطينى هذه المحبة عندما تعملي من اجل كل مواطن سوري،

you give me this love when you work on behalf of all Syrian citizens

41:36 – The audience chants:

137

بالروح بالدم نفيكك يا بشار )repeat)

with soul, with blood, we sacrifice for you

41:55 – Audience member addresses the SP:

قلت أنك الوطن العربي قليل عليك، الوطن العربي قليل عليك،

وأنت الزم تقود العالم يا سيادة الرئيس

I said to you the Arab nation is small for you, the Arab nation is small for you

you should lead the world oh your excellence the president

42:10 – Audience member addresses the SP but comments become unintelligible:

الزم يفيك الشعب )unintelligible(

it is necessary, it benefits the people

44:35 – Audience member addresses the SP:

ال هزم شعب تقوده يا سيادة الرئيس،

هللا معك و الشعب معك، فسر بنا من نصر الى نصر،

ونحن من ورائك نقول نحن معك

138

نحارب حتى لو قدتنا الى االنتحار.

no people that you have led have ever been defeated oh your lordship the president

God is with you and the people are with you, explain to us from victory to victory

and we are behind you; we say that we are with you

we would battle even if you led us to commit suicide

45:30 – The SP adds to one of his statements:

(فنعود ونذكر أن ليس كل ما يحصل هو مؤامرة لكى يتذكروا(

النهم األن مستعدين باالستوديوهات للتعليق على الكلمة

)let’s go back and recall that not everything that is happening is a conspiracy

so that they remember)

because now they are ready in the studios to comment on the speech

46:20 – The audience chants:

هللا, سورية, بشار وبس )repeat)

God, Syria, Bashar and that’s all/it

47:20 – The audience chants:

139

بالروح بالدم نفيكك يا بشار )repeat)

with soul, with blood, we sacrifice for you

APPENDIX C

OFFICIAL SPEECH TRANSCRIPT

)Ba’ath Arab Socialist Party)

الرئيس األسد ألقى كلمة أمام مجلس الشعب تحدث فيها عن القضايا الداخلية والظروف المحيطة بالمنطقة:

المؤامرة كبيرة خيوطها تمتد من دول بعيدة وقريبة.. وإذا فرضت علينا المعركة فأهال ً ًوسهال

ألقى السيد الرئيس بشار األسد كلمة أمام مجلس الشعب تحدث فيها عن القضايا الداخلية والظروف التي تمر بها

المنطقة وسورية. وقال الرئيس األسد في مستهل كلمته: يسعدني أن ألتقي بكم مرة أخرى تحت قبة مجلسكم وأن

أتحدث إليكم اليوم وأن أخاطب عبركم أبناء سورية األعزاء.. سورية التي تنبض في قلب كل واحد فينا حباً وكرامة..

سورية القلعة الحصينة بتالحمها.. العظيمة بأمجادها.. الشامخة بشعبها في كل محافظة ومدينة وبلدة وقرية.

ألقى السيد الرئيس بشار األسد كلمة أمام مجلس الشعب تحدث فيها عن القضايا الداخلية والظروف التي تمر بها

المنطقة وسورية. وقال الرئيس األسد في مستهل كلمته: يسعدني أن ألتقي بكم مرة أخرى تحت قبة مجلسكم وأن

أتحدث إليكم اليوم وأن أخاطب عبركم أبناء سورية األعزاء.. سورية التي تنبض في قلب كل واحد فينا حباً وكرامة..

سورية القلعة الحصينة بتالحمها.. العظيمة بأمجادها.. الشامخة بشعبها في كل محافظة ومدينة وبلدة وقرية.

امتحان لوحدتنا وغيريتنا

وأضاف الرئيس األسد: أتحدث إليكم في لحظة استثنائية تبدو األحداث والتطورات فيها كامتحان لوحدتنا ولغيريتنا..

141

وهو امتحان تشاء الظروف أن يتكرر كل حين بفعل المؤامرات المتصلة على هذا الوطن.. وتشاء إرادتنا وتكاتفنا

وإرادة هللا أن ننجح في مواجهته في كل مرة نجاحاً باهراً يزيدنا قوة ومنعة.

وقال الرئيس األسد: من ينتمي للشعب السوري دائما ًرأسه مرفوع إن شاء هللا.. أتحدث إليكم بحديث من القلب تختلط

فيه مشاعر الفخر باالنتماء إلى هذا الشعب.. بمشاعر العرفان والتقدير لما أحاطني به من حب وتكريم.. بمشاعر

الحزن واألسف على األحداث التي مرت وضحاياها من أخوتنا وأبنائنا.. وتبقى مسؤوليتي عن السهر على أمن هذا

الوطن وضمان استقراره الشعور الملح الحاضر في نفسي في هذه اللحظة.

وأضاف الرئيس األسد: أنا أعرف أن هذه الكلمة ينتظرها الشعب السوري منذ األسبوع الماضي.. وأنا تأخرت بإلقائها

بشكل مقصود ريثما تكتمل الصورة في ذهني أو على األقل بعض العناوين األساسية والرئيسية من هذه الصورة ولكي

يكون هذا الحديث اليوم بعيدا عنً اإلنشاء العاطفي الذي يريح الناس ولكنه ال يبدل وال يؤثر في الوقت الذي يعمل فيه

أعداؤنا كل يوم بشكل منظم وعلمي من أجل ضرب استقرار سورية.

وتابع الرئيس األسد: نحن نقر لهم بذكائهم في اختيار األساليب المتطورة جداً فيما فعلوه ولكننا نقر لهم بغبائهم في

االختيار الخاطئ للوطن والشعب حيث ال ينجح هذا النوع من المؤامرات ونقول لهم: ال يوجد خيار أمامكم إال أن

تستمروا في التعلم من فشلكم أما الشعب السوري فال خيار أمامه إال أن يستمر بالتعلم من نجاحاته.

وأضاف الرئيس األسد: ال يخفى عليكم أيها األخوة التحوالت الكبرى التي تحصل في منطقتنا منذ أشهر وهي تحوالت

كبرى وهامة وستترك تداعياتها على كل المنطقة من دون استثناء ربما الدول العربية وربما أبعد من ذلك وهذا الشيء

يعني سورية من ضمن هذه الدول.

وقال الرئيس األسد: إذا أردنا أن ننظر إلى ما يعنينا نحن كسورية في ما حصل حتى اآلن في هذه الساحة العربية

الكبيرة نقول: إن ما حصل يعزز وجهة النظر السورية من زاوية هامة جداً ويعبر عن إجماع شعبي وعندما يكون

هناك إجماع شعبي يجب أن نكون مرتاحين سواء كنا نوافق أو ال نوافق على كثير من النقاط..ويعني هذا الكالم أن

الحالة الشعبية العربية التي كانت مهمشة لعقود على األقل ثالثة أو أربعة وربما أكثر بقليل عادت اآلن إلى قلب

األحداث في منطقتنا وهذه الحالة العربية لم تتبدل حاولوا تدجينها ولكنها لم تدجن وسيكون لهذا الموضوع عدة

تأثيرات.

وأضاف الرئيس األسد: أوالً بالنسبة لنا تذكرون في كثير من خطاباتي وكلماتي السابقة.. كنت دائماً أتحدث عن

142

الشارع العربي وعن بوصلة الشارع وعن رأي المواطن وكان الكثيرون في الصحافة أحياناً يسخرون.. السياسيون

األجانب يرفضون.. يبتسمون وخاصة في اللقاءات وعندما اشتدت الضغوط على سورية وكانوا يطرحون علينا

طروحات معاكسة ومناقضة لمصالحنا وفيها تآمر على المقاومة وعلى غيرنا من العرب وعندما كان يشتد الضغط

كنت أقول لهم.. حتى ولو قبلت بهذا الطرح فالشعب لن يقبل به وإذا لم يقبل به الشعب فسوف ينبذني وإذا نبذني فهذا

يعني انتحاراً سياسيا ًفكانوا يبتسمون ابتسامات وكالم غير مصدق.. واليوم وبعد هذه التحركات حصلت عدة لقاءات

وكررت نفس الكالم فكانوا يوافقونني على ذلك.

الشعوب العربية لم تدجن

وتابع الرئيس األسد: هذا جانب مهم جدا ًحتى اآلن والجانب اآلخر بما أن الشعوب العربية لم تدجن ولم تتبدل في

مضمونها فاألعمال لرأب الصدع العربي تصبح أكبر بالنسبة لنا في التحوالت الجديدة إن استمرت هذه التحوالت

بالخط الذي رسم على المستوى الشعبي كي تحقق أهدافاً معينة فيه.

وقال الرئيس األسد: الجانب اآلخر هو توجهات الشعوب العربية أيضاً تجاه القضايا المركزية وفي مقدمتها القضية

الفلسطينية.. ونعتقد ونتمنى أن يكون اعتقادنا صحيحا ًبأن هذه التحوالت ستؤدي إلى تغيير مسار القضية الفلسطينية

الذي سارت عليه خالل أكثر من ثالثة عقود تقريبا ًمن مسار التنازالت إلى مسار التمسك بالحقوق وبكل االتجاهات

نعتقد أن ما يحصل إيجابي في مقدماته.

وأضاف الرئيس األسد: إن سورية ليست بلدا ًمنعزالً عما يحصل في العالم العربي ونحن بلد جزء من هذه المنطقة

نتفاعل نؤثر ونتأثر ولكن بنفس الوقت نحن لسنا نسخة عن الدول األخرى وال توجد دولة تشبه األخرى لكن نحن في

سورية لدينا خصائص ربما تكون مختلفة أكثر في الوضع الداخلي وفي الوضع الخارجي.

وقال الرئيس األسد: في الوضع الداخلي بنيت سياستنا على التطوير وعلى االنفتاح على التواصل المباشر بيني وبين

الشعب والمواطني النظر عما إذا كان هناك من سلبيات وإيجابيات أنا أتحدث عن المبادئ العامة.. وبغض النظر عما

تم إنجازه وعما لم ينجز لكن كمبادئ عامة هذه مبادئ السياسة الداخلية.

وأضاف الرئيس األسد: إن السياسة الخارجية بنيت على أساس التمسك بالحقوق الوطنية والتمسك بالحقوق القومية

143

االستقاللية ودعم المقاومات العربية عندما يكون هناك احتالل.. والرابط بين السياستين الداخلية والخارجية كان دائماً

نفس الكلمة التي بدأت بها بأن البوصلة بالنسبة لنا في أي شيء نقوم به هو المواطن وبالتالي عندما نبتعد عن البوصلة

فهذا هو انحراف بشكل طبيعي وهذا هو دور المؤسسات أن تعدل هذا االنحراف.

وحدة وطنية غير مسبوقة

وتابع الرئيس األسد: هاتان السياستان أو محصلتهما كونت حالة من الوحدة الوطنية في سورية غير مسبوقة وهذه

الحالة الوطنية التي تكونت كانت السبب أو الطاقة أو الحامي الحقيقي لسورية في المراحل الماضية وخاصة في

السنوات القليلة الماضية عندما بدأت الضغوط على سورية وتمكنا من خاللها من القيام بتفكيك ألغام كبيرة جداً كانت

موضوعة في وجه السياسة السورية وأن نحافظ على موقع سورية المحوري.. وهذا لم يدفع األعداء لالطمئنان.

وقال الرئيس األسد: أبدأ اآلن بالمؤامرة وعندها ننتقل إلى وضعنا الداخلي لكي ال يقولون في الفضائيات إن الرئيس

السوري اعتبر كل ما يحصل هو مؤامرة من الخارج لكن نحن علينا أن نبدأ بالمحاور واحدا ًبعد اآلخر ثم نقوم بعملية

ربط.

وأضاف الرئيس األسد: تزايد هذا الدور أو الحفاظ على هذا الدور بمبادئه المرفوضة لآلخرين سيدفع األعداء

للتحضير من أجل إضعافه بطريقة أخرى.. وكنت دائما ًأحذر من النجاحات ألن النجاحات تدفع لالطمئنان والشعور

باألمان وفي المعركة تعرف عدوك تعرف الخطة لكن بعد المعركة ال تعرف ماذا يحضر لك.. فإذاً دائماً بعد كل نجاح

علينا أن نعمل أكثر لكي نحافظ على النجاح ونحمي أنفسنا من أي مؤامرة قد تأتي من الخارج وال يخفى أن سورية

اليوم تتعرض لمؤامرة كبيرة خيوطها تمتد من دول بعيدة ودول قريبة ولها بعض الخيوط داخل الوطن وتعتمد هذه

المؤامرة في توقيتها ال في شكلها على ما يحصل في الدول العربية.

كلنا دعاة لإلصالح

وقال الرئيس األسد: اليوم هناك صرعة جديدة هي ثورات بالنسبة لهم ونحن ال نسميها كذلك فهي ليست كذلك هي

144

حالة شعبية بمعظمها.. ولكن بالنسبة لهم إذا كان هناك شيء يحصل فيكون الغطاء موجوداً في سورية.. ثورة هناك

وثورة هنا.. إصالح هناك وإصالح هنا.. الحرية.. الشعارات.. الوسائل كلها نفسها وبالتالي إذا كان هناك فعالً دعاة

لإلصالح وكلنا أعتقد دعاة لإلصالح فسنسير معهم من دون أن نعرف ما الذي يجري حقيقة لذلك قاموا بالخلط بشكل

ذكي جدا ًبين ثالثة عناصر.. وأنا أعرف أن معظم الشعب الذي يسمعنا بشكل مباشر اآلن وأنتم تمثلونه يعرف كثيراً

من هذه التفاصيل.. ولكن أريد أن أدخل بها مرة أخرى لكي نوحد المفاهيم بالمعلومات الموجودة حتى اآلن.. ربما

هناك أشياء قد تظهر الحقا.. ًفقاموا بالخلط بين ثالثة عناصر.. الفتنة واإلصالح والحاجات اليومية.. هناك معظم

الشعب السوري يدعو إلى اإلصالح وكلكم إصالحيون.. معظم الشعب السوري لديه حاجات لم َّتلب وكنا نختلف

ونتناقش وننتقد ألننا لم ِنلب حاجات الكثير من المواطنين ولكن الفتنة دخلت على الموضوع وبدأت تقود العاملين

اآلخرين وتتغطى بهما ولذلك كان من السهل التغرير بالكثير من األشخاص الذين خرجوا في البداية عن حسن نية.. ال

نستطيع أن نقول.. كل من خرج متآمر.. هذا الكالم غير صحيح.. نريد أن نكون واقعيين وواضحين.

وقال الرئيس األسد: دائماً المتآمرون هم قلة.. وهذا شيء بديهي وحتى نحن في الدولة لم نكن نعرف الحقيقة مثل كل

الناس.. لم نفهم ما الذي حصل.. حتى بدأت عمليات التخريب بالمنشآت ظهرت األمور.. ما العالقة بين اإلصالح

والتخريب.. ما العالقة بين اإلصالح والقتل حتى لدرجة أن بعض الفضائيات يقولون دائماًيفكرون بالمؤامرة.. ال

يوجد نظرية مؤامرة.. يوجد مؤامرة في العالم.. والمؤامرة جزء من الطبيعة اإلنسانية.. في بعض الفضائيات أعلنوا

عن تخريب أماكن محددة عامة قبل تخريبها بساعة كاملة.. كيف عرفوا.. هل هي قراءة للمستقبل وحصلت أكثر من

مرة.. فعندها بدأت األمور تظهر.. كان من الصعب علينا في البداية مكافحة هذا الموضوع ألن الناس ستخلط بين

مكافحتنا للفتنة ومكافحتنا لإلصالح نحن مع اإلصالح ونحن مع الحاجات هذا واجب الدولة ولكن نحن ال يمكن أن

نكون مع الفتنة وعندما كشف الشعب السوري بوعيه الشعبي ووعيه الوطني ما الذي يحصل أصبحت األمور سهلة

وكان الرد الحقاً.. أتى من قبل المواطنين أكثر منه ما أتى من قبل الدولة.. وكما الحظتم الدولة انكفأت وتركت الجواب

للمواطنين وهذا ما حقق المعالجة السليمة والسالمة واألمينة والوطنية وأعاد الوحدة الوطنية بشكل سريع إلى سورية.

وقال الرئيس األسد: إن ما نراه اآلن هو مرحلة من مراحل ال نعرفها هل هي مرحلة أولى.. هل هي مراحل متقدمة..

ولكن نحن يهمنا شيء وحيد المرحلة األخيرة هي أن تضعف سورية وتتفتت.. هي أن تسقط وتزال آخر عقبة من وجه

المخطط اإلسرائيلي.. هذا ما يهمنا كيف تسير المخططات ال يهمنا ونحن نتحدث بهذه التفاصيل ألنهم سيتابعون

145

وسيعيدون الكرة بشكل آخر وكل تجربة تبنى على ما سبقها.. وإذا فشلوا فسوف يطورون من هذه التجربة وإذا نجحنا

فعلينا أن ننطلق من هذه التجربة.. فإذا ًالحديث بالتفاصيل بالرغم من أنني نصحت من أكثر من شخص أال أتحدث

بالتفاصيل وأن يكون كالماً عاماً بل يجب أن أدخل بالتفاصيل كما هي العادة لنكون نتحدث بشفافية.

التحريض الطائفي

وأضاف الرئيس األسد: بدؤوا أوال ًبالتحريض .. بدأ التحريض قبل أسابيع طويلة من االضطرابات في سورية.. بدؤوا

التحريض بالفضائيات وباالنترنت ولم يحققوا شيئا ًوانتقلوا بعدها خالل الفتنة إلى موضوع التزوير.. زوروا

المعلومات زوروا الصوت والصورة زوروا كل شيء.. أخذوا المحور اآلخر وهو المحور الطائفي.. اعتمد على

التحريض وعلى رسائل ترسل بالهواتف المحمولة رسائل قصيرة تقول لطائفة انتبهوا الطائفة األخرى ستهجم

ويقولون للطائفة الثانية إن الطائفة األولى ستهجم ولكي يعززوا مصداقية هذا الشيء أرسلوا أشخاصاً ملثمين يدقون

األبواب على حارتين متجاورتين من طائفتين ال أقول مختلفتين بل شقيقتين

ليقولوا لألولى الطائفة الثانية أصبحت بالشارع انتبهوا انزلوا إلى الشارع.. وتمكنوا من إنزال الناس إلى الشارع

وقاموا بهذا العمل ولكن تمكنا من خالل لقاء الفعاليات من درء الفتنة.. فتدخلوا بالسالح وبدؤوا بقتل األشخاص

عشوائياً لكي يكون هناك دم وتصعب المعادلة هذه الوسائل.

وقال الرئيس األسد: البنية لم نكتشفها كلها.. ظهر جزء من البنية ولكنها بنية منظمة.. هناك مجموعات دعم لها

أشخاص في أكثر من محافظة وفي الخارج.. وهناك مجموعات إعالم.. ومجموعات تزوير.. ومجموعات شهود

العيان.. وهي مجموعات منظمة مسبقاً وأنا أعطي العناوين فقط وما يهمنا هو إذا امتلكوا هيكلية.

وتابع الرئيس األسد: ابتدؤوا بمحافظة درعا.. البعض يقول إن درعا هي محافظة حدودية وأنا أقول لهم إذا كانت درعا

هي محافظة حدودية فهي في قلب كل سوري أما إذا لم تكن محافظة درعا في وسط سورية فهي في قلب الوفاء

لسورية ولكل السوريين وهذا هو تعريفها وهذا هو حاضرها.. فدرعا محافظة نسق أول مع العدو اإلسرائيلي.. والنسق

األول يدافع عن األنساق الخلفية.. النسق األول مع محافظة القنيطرة وجزء من ريف دمشق هم يدافعون عن األنساق

146

األخرى في الخلف.. وال يمكن لشخص أن يكون من موقعه يدافع عن الوطن وبنفس الوقت يتآمر على الوطن أو يضر

به فهذا الكالم مستحيل وغير مقبول وبالتالي أهل درعا ال يحملون أي مسؤولية فيما حصل.. ولكنهم يحملون معنا

المسؤولية في وأد الفتنة.. ونحن مع درعا وكل المواطنين السوريين معها.

وأضاف الرئيس األسد: إن أهل درعا هم أهل الوطنية الصادقة والعروبة األصيلة.. وهم أهل النخوة والشهامة

والكرامة وهم من سيقومون بتطويق القلة القليلة التي أرادت إثارة الفوضى وتخريب اللحمة الوطنية.

وقال الرئيس األسد: قاموا بنقل المخطط إلى مدن أخرى وكما تعرفون انتقلوا إلى مدينة الالذقية ومدن أخرى وبنفس

اآلليات.. قتل وتخويف وتحريض إلى آخره.. وكانت هناك تعليمات واضحة لمنع جرح أي مواطن سوري.. مع كل

أسف عندما تنزل األمور إلى الشارع ويصبح الحوار في الشارع خارج المؤسسات تصبح األمور بشكل طبيعي

فوضى ويصبح رد الفعل هو السائد وما نسميها أخطاء اللحظة تصبح هي السائدة وتسيل الدماء وهذا ما حصل وكلكم

تعرفون هذا الشيء.. سقطت ضحايا.

وأضاف الرئيس األسد: إن الدماء التي نزفت هي دماء سورية وكلنا معنيون بها ألنها دماؤنا.. فالضحايا هم أخوتنا

وأهلهم هم أهلنا.. ومن الضروري أن نبحث عن األسباب والمسببين ونحقق ونحاسب وإذا كان الجرح قد نزف فليكن

ذلك من أجل وحدة أبناء الوطن وليس من أجل تفريقهم.. ومن أجل قوة الوطن وليس من أجل ضعفه.. ومن أجل

ضرب الفتنة وليس من أجل تأجيجها.. ولنعمل بأقصى سرعة على رأب الجرح لنعيد الوئام لعائلتنا الكبيرة ولنبقي

المحبة رابطاً قوياً يجمع بين أبنائها.

الحرب االفتراضية

وتابع الرئيس األسد: إن جانباً مما يحصل اليوم متشابه مع ما حصل في 5002 هي الحرب االفتراضية وأنا قلت في

ذلك الوقت بأنهم يريدون منا أن نقدم صك االستسالم مجانا ًعبر حرب افتراضية باإلعالم واالنترنت.. ولو أن انتشار

االنترنت كان أقل في ذلك الوقت.. ونشعر بأن األمور انتهت وال مجال أمامنا سوى االستسالم وبالتالي نقدم لهم صك

االستسالم مجاناً من دون معركة واليوم نفس المبدأ هي هزيمة افتراضية مخططة لسورية ولكن بشيء مختلف.. هناك

فوضى في البلد ألسباب مختلفة بشكل أساسي تحت عنوان اإلصالح.. هذه الفوضى وعناوين اإلصالح ستؤدي إلى

147

طوائف.. طوائف قلقة.. طوائف تختلف مع بعضها تتصادم وتتحقق الهزيمة االفتراضية لسورية بشكل آخر.. نحن

أفشلنا هذه الهزيمة االفتراضية المخططة في عام 5002 بالوعي الشعبي.. واليوم طبعا ًالوضع أصعب ألن انتشار

االنترنت أكثر وألن وسائلهم أحدث ولكن بنفس الوقت الوعي الشعبي الذي رأيناه في هذه المرحلة كان كافياً للرد

السريع وأنا مع ذلك أقول دائماً لن نطمئن لما لدينا.. علينا أن نعزز أكثر هذا الوعي الشعبي الوطني ألنه هو الرصيد

الذي يحمي سورية في كل مفاصلها.

ينقصنا دائماً التواصل

وأضاف الرئيس األسد: يبقى هناك سؤال أساسي.. نحن نتحدث عن التحوالت التي حصلت في المنطقة على أساس

أنها موجة.. كلما سألنا شخصاً يقول هناك موجة يجب أن تنحني.. وبغض النظر عما حللناه بأن هذه الموجة فيها أشياء

إيجابية هل تقودنا الموجة أم نقودها.. عندما تدخل هذه الموجة إلى سورية أصبح الموضوع يعني السوريين وعلينا

نحن أن نحدد هذه الموجة.. إذا أتت فهي طاقة لكن هذه الطاقة يجب أن توجه بحسب مصالحنا.. ونحن فاعلون ولسنا

منفعلين.. من هذا السؤال أنا أنتقل لما أعلناه يوم الخميس بعد اجتماع القيادة القطرية عندما أعلنا زيادة رواتب

والحديث عن موضوع األحزاب والطوارئ وهذه النقاط أيضاًأحاول أن أفسر كيف نفكر.. أنا ال أضيف أشياء جديدة

ولكن عندما تفهمون كيف نفكر يكون هناك تناغم بيننا.. عندما يحصل أي شيء.. نصدر أي قرار تفهمون كيف تفكر

الدولة وينقصنا دائماً التواصل.. لدينا دائما ًمشكلة في التواصل كثير من األشياء ال نعرف تسويقها ونرى بأنها أشياء

أحياناً جيدة تفهم بشكل خاطئ أو تفهم بشكل صحيح لكن في مكان آخر.. فهل قمنا بهذه اإلصالحات ألن هناك مشكلة

أو فتنة أم ال ولو لم يكن هناك فتنة لما كنا قمنا بهذه اإلصالحات إذا كان الجواب نعم فهذا يعني أن هذه الدولة هي دولة

انتهازية تنتهز الفرص وهذا شيء سيئ.

وقال الرئيس األسد: أما إذا قلنا إنها حصلت تحت ضغوط حالة معينة أو ضغوط شعبية فهذا ضعف وأنا أعتقد أن

الناس الذين يعودون دولتهم على أن تكون خاضعة للضغوط في الداخل فيعني أنها ستخضع للضغوط في الخارج..

فالمبدأ خطأ ألن العالقة بين الدولة والشعب ليست عالقة ضغوط.. وال تبنى على الضغوط.. بل تبنى على حاجات

المجتمع التي هي حق للمجتمع.. ومن واجب الدولة أن تستمع لهذه الحاجات وتعمل على تلبيتها.. وهذه الحاجات ال

148

تسمى ضغوطاً فهي حقوق للمواطنين.. وعندما يطالب المواطن بحقوق فمن الطبيعي ومن البديهي أن تستجيب الدولة

لهذه الحقوق وهي سعيدة.. وحتى لو لم تتمكن أن تقول ذلك وهذا يعتمد على نوع الحوار.. فأنا أردت أن أصحح

المبادئ أما الضغط الوحيد الذي يمكن أن يتعرض له المسؤول وهذا يجب أن يشعر به من تلقاء ذاته فهو ضغط الثقة

التي وضعها الناس فيه وضغط المسؤولية التي يحملها والضغط األكبر اآلن هو ضغط الوعي الوطني الشعبي الذي

رأيناه.. وهو وعي غير مسبوق أذهلنا كما أذهلنا سابقاً في كل مرة.. هذه كلها ضغوط تجعلنا نفكر كيف نرد الجميل

لهذا الشعب.. بوضع أفضل وبتطوير وازدهار وإصالح بكل هذه األمور.

وأضاف الرئيس األسد: ما طرح يوم الخميس هو ليس قرارات.. فالقرار ال يصدر مرتين.. القرار يصدر مرة واحدة

وهذه هي قرارات المؤتمر القطري في عام 5002 لماذا أعدنا طرحها يوم الخميس.. لسببين.. األول له عالقة

باألزمة.. والثاني ليس له عالقة باألزمة.. السبب األول هو المضمون ليس له عالقة باألزمة بل لحاجتنا لإلصالح..

عندما طرحنا هذه النقاط نفسها في عام 5002 لم يكن هناك ضغوط على سورية.. قبلها في عام 5002 وفي قمة تونس

وكانت أول قمة عربية بعد غزو العراق وكانت هناك حالة انهيار وخضوع لألمريكي وكان األمريكي يريد أن يفرض

علينا في القمة مشروع إصالح وديمقراطية.. على الدول العربية وقاتلنا بشدة ضد هذا المشروع في القمة العربية في

تونس وأفشلناه ورفضناه.

وتابع الرئيس األسد: نحن طرحنا في عام 5002 نفس المواضيع ولكن لبلدنا ومن منطلقات ذاتية ولم تكن الضغوط

على سورية مرتبطة بذلك الموضوع كانت ضغوطا ًلها عالقة بالمقاومة وبالعراق وقضايا خارجية.. وكانت سبباً في

تأخرنا.. الجانب اآلخر عندما تحدثت عن العناصر /الفتنة واإلصالح والحاجات/ أردنا من طرحها في ذلك التوقيت أن

نقوم بعملية فرز.. أنتم تريدون إصالحا ًنحن فعال ًتأخرنا هذا هو اإلصالح أو هذه بدايات إصالح أو هذا مؤشر بأننا

فعال ًنريد اإلصالح اآلن نريد أن نقوم بعملية فرز من يريد إصالحاً.. ها قد سرنا أما اآلخرون فأنتم ستصبحون

معذورين يعني كان عامالً مساعداً حتى لو لم نقم به وأنا أؤكد أن الوعي الشعبي كان كافياً.. ولكن لماذا قمنا به كدولة..

لكي نساعد في عملية الفرز.. أعود وأقول إن هذه اإلصالحات ال تؤثر بالفتنة بشكل مباشر.. ألن الفتنة بحاجة فقط

للوعي الشعبي وإذا كان هناك إصالح فاإلصالحات تأتي تأثيراتها الحقاً وقد يكون فيها جوانب تعزز الوعي الشعبي

ولكن أيضا ًهو عملية تراكمية ال تظهر مباشرة ولكن النقطة األساسية التي تطرح دائماً بأن الدولة طرحت وعوداً

باإلصالح ولم تنفذها ولكي نفهم هذه النقطة أعرض بشكل سريع مسار عملية اإلصالح منذ العام 5000.

149

األولوية األهم استقرار سورية والحالة المعيشية

وقال الرئيس األسد: أتيت إلى هذا المجلس في عام 5000 في خطاب القسم وتحدثت عن إصالح.. لم يكن هذا الطرح

موجوداً.. وعندما طرحته كنت أعتبر أني أعبر عن صدى لما يجول في عقل السوريين وهذا صحيح.. طرحنا

الموضوع في ذلك الوقت لكنه كان بالعناوين لم يكن هناك صورة واضحة لما هو شكل اإلصالح ظهر في عام

5002.. بدأت االنتفاضة بعد شهرين من ذلك الخطاب بدأ التآمر على المقاومة بدأت الضغوطات.. أتت حادثة 11

أيلول حادثة في نيويورك واتهام المسلمين واإلسالم والعرب معهم طبعاً.. احتالل أفغانستان والعراق.. التآمر على

سورية.. أصبح المطلوب من سورية أن تدفع ثمن موقفها ضد الغزو.. تعرفون ما حصل في لبنان عام 5002 والحقاً

حرب عام 5002 وتداعياتها.. حرب غزة في آخر 5002.. يعني كانت مرحلة من الضغوط أضيف إليها أربع سنوات

من الجفاف أضرت كثيراً بالبرنامج االقتصادي.. الذي حصل فعليا ًفي تلك المرحلة هو تغير األولويات وهذه نقطة

مهمة يجب أن نعرفها.. تحدثت بها في أكثر من مقابلة صحفية لكن أعتقد كانت مع صحف أجنبية كنت أقول إن

األحداث التي مررنا بها خالل عملية اإلصالح دفعتنا إلى تغيير األولويات وهذا ليس مبرراً.. أنا ال أبرر لكن عندما

أشرح هذه األمور هي وقائع نقوم من خاللها بالفرز بين ما هو موضوعي وما هو غير موضوعي.. عندما أقول هناك

جفاف فهذا خارج عن إرادتي ولكن ال يعني بأنه ال يوجد إجراءات أخرى نستطيع أن نقوم بها لكي أحسن اقتصادي

لكي نعرف ونتذكر مع بعض.. من كان عمره عشر سنوات عام 5000 اليوم عمره عشرون عاماً.. هناك أجيال يجب

أن تعرف هذا الوضع.. فتغيرت األولويات أصبحت األولوية األهم هي استقرار سورية ونحن اآلن نعيش في حالة

تؤكد هذا الشيء.. الوضع واألولوية التي توازيها باألهمية هي الحالة المعيشية.. ألتقي أناساً كثيرين أكثر من 99

بالمئة من الحديث هو حول الموضوع المعيشي.. هناك مظالم أخرى وأشياء أخرى.. وظيفة وإلى آخره.

وأضاف الرئيس األسد: بما أنه ال يبرر التأخير في المحاور األخرى لكن لم يكن هناك تركيز على الجانب السياسي

كقانون الطوارئ واألحزاب وغيرها من القوانين السبب ربما يكون أحياناً إنسانياً.. نستطيع أن نؤجل بياناً يصدره

حزب.. نؤجله أشهرا ًأو سنوات ولكن ال نستطيع أن نؤجل طعاماً يريد أن يأكله طفل في الصباح.. نستطيع أن نؤجل

أحياناًمعاناة معينة قد يسببها قانون الطوارئ أو غيرها من القوانين أو اإلجراءات اإلدارية التي يعاني منها المواطن

150

ولكن ال نستطيع أن نؤجل معاناة طفل ال يستطيع والده أن يعالجه ألنه ال يمتلك األموال، الدولة ال يوجد لديها هذا

الدواء أو هذا العالج.. وهذا شيء نتعرض له بشكل مستمر.. فكانت القضية قضية أولويات ولكن هذا ال يمنع أننا على

األقل في عام 5009 و5010 كانت األمور أفضل فكان يمكن أن نقوم بهذا اإلصالح.. أيضاً القيادة القطرية قامت بهذا

الشيء.. قانون األحزاب موجود لديهم كمسودة وقانون الطوارئ موجود لديهم كمسودة.. ولكننا لم نناقشه.. فال نستطيع

أن نقول إنهم لم يقوموا.. قاموا بالعمل.. األمور لدينا تسير ببطء.. تأخرنا أم لم نتأخر هذا الشيء نتركه لتقييم

المواطنين ولكن بالمبادئ العامة لو لم نكن نريد هذه اإلصالحات باألساس لما قمنا بها عام 5002 بل لقمنا بها اليوم

تحت هذه الضغوط إذاً هي معلنة.. القضية قضية روتين وإهمال وقضية تأخر وبطء.. هناك عوامل مختلفة نحن بشر

كلنا أبناء البلد ونعرف طباعنا بشكل أساسي لكن أشرح هذا الوضع كي نفهم تماماً أين نحن.. إذا ًهذا اإلصالح الشك

إيجابي لكن المهم أن نعرف ما هو مضمون هذا اإلصالح ماذا كنا نخطط بدقة واآلن هناك مجلس شعب جديد قريباً

بعد االنتخابات وإدارة محلية جديدة.

وقال الرئيس األسد: هناك حكومة كان مخططاً أن تستقيل في هذه المرحلة وهناك مؤتمر قطري فكنا نفكر أنه في العام

5011 كل شيء هو سيكون عبارة عن دماء جديدة وعلى هذه الدماء الجديدة نحن ننتقل إلى مرحلة أخرى.. وأجلنا

المؤتمر القطري ألننا كنا سنحاسب أيضاً أمام المؤتمر القطري كيف أخذت القرارات في مؤتمر عاشر وأتيتم إلى

المؤتمر الذي يليه ولم تقوموا بهذه األشياء.. قلنا لننجز هذه األشياء ونقدمها للمؤتمر فكنا نفكر بدم جديد في كل

المجاالت.

وتابع الرئيس األسد: ما أريد الوصول إليه من كل هذا الكالم شيء وحيد، كيف نتعامل مع الموضوع ما أريد أن

أقوله.. إن اإلصالح هو ليس صرعة موسم فعندما يكون مجرد انعكاس لموجة تعيشها المنطقة فهو مدمر بغض النظر

عن مضمونه وهذا ما قلته في حديثي مع جريدة /وول ستريت جورنال/ منذ شهرين عندما بدأت األمور في مصر

تتدهور وسألوني عن اإلصالح وماذا عن سورية.. وسألني هل تريدون أن تقوموا باإلصالح.. قلت له.. إن لم تكن قد

بدأت باألساس ولم يكن لديك النية والخطة فاآلن تأخرت وإذا لم يكن لدينا هذه النية والرؤية انتهى الموضوع وال

داعي ألن نضيع وقتنا.

وتابع الرئيس األسد: ال.. لدينا وكل الشعب لديه والدولة وأؤكد نقطة أيضاً كما هي عادتي صريح معكم كان يسألني

هذا السؤال أكثر من مسؤول مروا بسورية مؤخراًمن األجانب.. يريد أن يطمئن بأن الرئيس إصالحي ولكن من حوله

151

يمنعونه وقلت له بالعكس هم يدفعونني بشكل كبير.. النقطة التي أريد أن أصل إليها ال يوجد عقبات يوجد تأخير وال

يوجد أحد يعارض ومن يعارض فهم أصحاب المصالح والفساد وأنتم تعرفونهم.. قلة كانت موجودة ولم تعد موجودة

اآلن.. قلة محدودة جداًتعرفونها باالسم ولكن اآلن ال يوجد عقبات حقيقية وأعتقد أن التحدي اآلن ما هو نوع اإلصالح

الذي نريد أن نصل إليه وبالتالي علينا أن نتجنب إخضاع عملية اإلصالح للظروف اآلنية التي قد تكون عابرة لكي ال

نحصد النتائج العكسية.

وقال الرئيس األسد: خالل عشر سنوات تحدثنا في اإلصالح وإصالحنا اليوم يجب أن يعكس عشر سنوات للخلف

وعشر سنوات لألمام.. لن يعكس هذه المرحلة وال الموجة في الخارج وال الموجة في الداخل هذه هي طريقة التفكير

التي نفكر بها والحالة اآلنية التي تأتي يمكن أن تؤخر الموضوع ويمكن أن تسرع الموضوع يمكن أن تعدل االتجاه

نستفيد من التجارب.. تجربة تونس كانت مفيدة لنا كثيرا ًأكثر من تجربة مصر ألنه كان لدينا رؤية نموذجية للتطوير

في تونس وكنا نحاول أن نرسل خبراء كي نستفيد من التجربة وعندما اندلعت الثورة رأينا بأن األسباب هي أسباب لها

عالقة بتوزيع الثروة والتوزيع ليس توزيع الثروة بمعنى الفساد فقط وإنما التوزيع بين الداخل والوسط وهذه النقطة

نحن في سورية تالفيناها واآلن نؤكد عليها أكثر بالقول هو التوزيع العادل للتنمية في سورية.

وأضاف الرئيس األسد: في المبدأ لو أردنا أن نقول إننا ال نريد اإلصالح نقول بكل بساطة ال نستطيع أن نبقى دون

إصالح.. بشكل طبيعي البقاء دون إصالح هو مدمر للبلد والتحدي األساسي هو أي إصالح نريد.. هنا البراعة التي

سنثبتها كسوريين عندما نبدأ النقاش في القوانين المطروحة قريبا ..ً وفي هذا اإلطار فإن حزمة اإلجراءات التي أعلن

عنها يوم الخميس لم تبدأ من الصفر ألنني كما قلت القيادة القطرية كانت قد أعدت مسودات قوانين سواء فيما يتعلق

بقانوني األحزاب أو الطوارئ منذ أكثر من عام.

باإلضافة إلى قوانين أخرى غيرها سيتم عرضها على النقاش العام ومن ثم على المؤسسات المعنية ريثما تصدر.

وتابع الرئيس األسد: هناك إجراءات أخرى لم تعلن يوم الخميس البعض منها متعلق بتعزيز الوحدة الوطنية والبعض

اآلخر متعلق بمكافحة الفساد وباإلعالم وزيادة فرص العمل يتم العمل عليها وستعلن عند انتهاء دراستها وبدأت بها

الحكومة السابقة وستكون من أولويات الحكومة الجديدة.. على سبيل المثال ما وضعناه في الحزمة من موضوع

الرواتب زيادة الرواتب األخيرة كنا نناقشه في اجتماع مع الفريق االقتصادي.. أنا ترأست ذلك االجتماع.. ناقشنا

حزمة قرارات اقتصادية صدر منها فقط موضوع الرواتب وهناك تتمة.

152

وقال الرئيس األسد: بهذه المناسبة وخارج موضوع الحديث كله والخطاب بالنسبة لما حصل في موضوع زيادة

الرواتب والـ/1200/ ليرة التي دمجت قامت الحكومة في اجتماعها األخير أمس بتالفي هذه المالحظة بمبادرة منها..

وصلتها الشكاوى وأرسل لي منذ ساعة تقريباً التعديل لكي تحل هذه المشكلة.. الحقيقة هم من قاموا بهذا العمل بمبادرة

وليس بتوجيه فأردت أن أعلن هذا الشيء للمواطنين.

وتابع الرئيس األسد: أردت أن أعلن هذا الشيء للمواطنين.. وسأطلب من الجهات المعنية حول هذه النقاط عندما نعلن

ما هي اإلجراءات التي لم تعلن ونتمنى خالل شهر أن نحدد ما هي هذه اإلجراءات ولكن أنا أفضل أن نعلن االسم

بالتفصيل بعد أن ننهيه.. لكي ال يبقى فقط في إطار العنوان سنطلب إطاراً زمنياً لكل واحد منها.. وطبعاً أنتم كمجلس

شعب والمجلس القادم سيحدد وهذه نقطة هامة أن يكون هناك دائما ًجداول زمنية ألي موضوع ألنها هي تنظم العمل..

البعض طلب مني أن أعلن اآلن جدوالً زمنياًفي مجلس الشعب لكن إعالن جدول زمني ألي موضوع هو موضوع

تقني.. ربما أعلن جدوالً زمنياً يكون أقل بكثير مما هو ضروري لهذه الحالة فيكون الضغط على حساب النوعية..

وأعتقد أنه من واجبنا أن نقدم للشعب السوري األفضل وليس األسرع.. نحن نريد أن نسرع ال أن نتسرع.

وقال الرئيس األسد: هناك من سيقول بالفضائيات اليوم ال يكفي.. نقول لهم ال يكفي ال يوجد لدينا ما يكفي لكي ندمر

وطننا.. وبهذه المناسبة ال تغضبوا مما قامت به بعض الفضائيات ألنهم يقعون دائماً بنفس الفخ هم يحاولون التشويش

علينا وعلى الشعب السوري.. فالحقيقة أنهم يعتمدون مبدأ اكذب اكذب حتى تصدق فيصدقون الكذبة ويقعون في الفخ.

نسير لألمام بثقة وتوازن

وأضاف الرئيس األسد: أيها األخوة واألخوات /وعسى أن تكرهوا شيئا ًوهو خير لكم/ صدق هللا العظيم.. ولكن نحن

بشر وال يمكن أن نحب ما حصل.. أو نحب الفتنة.. أو أن نحب الدماء.. وال يمكن أن نحب التوتر.. ولكن األزمات هي

حالة إيجابية إن استطعنا أن نسيطر عليها وأن نخرج منها رابحين.. وسر قوة سورية هو األزمات الكثيرة التي

واجهتها عبر تاريخها وخاصة بعد االستقالل ما أعطاها المزيد من المناعة والقوة.. فإذاًعلينا مواجهة األزمات بثقة

كبيرة وبتصميم على االنتصار أما القلق فيجب أن يكون حالة إيجابية ال سلبية تدفعنا للسير إلى األمام وليس للهروب

إلى األمام.. عندما نسير إلى األمام نسير بثقة وتوازن.. وعندما نهرب لألمام فنحن نسير بتخبط والنهاية تكون السقوط

153

والكثير من الناس في األزمات يبحثون عن أي حل بأي طريقة.. واألفضل أن تبقى من دون حلول إن لم تكن تعرف

تماما ًأنك ستجد حالً للمشكلة وهذا أيضا ًمن الدروس التي نتعلمها في مثل هذه األزمات.

وأضاف الرئيس األسد: وأد الفتنة واجب وطني وأخالقي وشرعي وكل من يستطيع أن يسهم في وأدها وال يفعل فهو

جزء منها.. والفتنة أشد من القتل كما جاء في القرآن الكريم فكل من يتورط فيها عن قصد أو من غير قصد فهو يعمل

على قتل وطنه وبالتالي ال مكان لمن يقف في الوسط.. فالقضية ليست الدولة بل الوطن.. المؤامرة كبيرة ونحن ال

نسعى لمعارك.. والشعب السوري شعب مسالم وودود ولكننا لم نتردد يوماً في الدفاع عن قضايانا ومصالحنا

ومبادئنا.. وإذا فرضت علينا المعركة اليوم فأهال ًوسهالً بها.

وقال الرئيس األسد: سأذكركم بمصطلح الدومينو الذي وجد بعد غزو العراق عندما افترضت الواليات المتحدة في

ذلك الوقت.. اإلدارة السابقة.. بأن الدول العربية هي أحجار دومينو وستأتي المشاريع لتضرب األحجار أو تضرب

حجراً ويسقط الباقي.. ما حصل هو العكس تحولت المشاريع إلى أحجار دومينو وضربناها وسقطت واحدا ًتلو اآلخر

وهذا المشروع سوف يسقط.

وأضاف الرئيس األسد: وبما أن البعض ذاكرته قصيرة على الفضائيات فأنا أعود وأذكر أنه ليس كل ما يحصل هو

مؤامرة لكي يتذكروا.

وختم الرئيس األسد كلمته بالقول: أما أنتم يا بنات وأبناء هذا الشعب العظيم فإن غيرتكم على وطنكم التي تعبرون عنها

كل يوم وبشكل أكثر وضوحا ًفي أوقات الشدة وعبرتم عنها باألمس من خالل التظاهرات الحاشدة غير المسبوقة في

أنحاء القطر تشعرني بمزيد من الثقة وتمدني بالعزيمة.. وإن تالحمكم في مواجهة الفتنة يشعرني بمزيد من اإليمان

بالمستقبل.. وإن كنتم قد هتفتم بالروح بالدم نفديك يا بشار فالسليم هو أن الرئيس بشار هو الذي يفتدي وطنه وشعبه..

وأنا أرد عليكم بأن أقول /هللا سورية شعبي وبس/ وهو الذي /أي أنا/ سيبقى االبن البار بشعبه واألخ والرفيق الوفي

ألبنائه يسير معهم وفي مقدمتهم لبناء سورية التي نحبها ونفخر بها.. سورية العصية على أعدائها.. المقاومة

والمقاومة.

والسالم عليكم ورحمة هللا وبركاته.

REFERENCES

Abdul-Latif, Emad. "Interdiscursivity between Political and Religious Discourses in a Speech by Sadat: Combining Cda and Addressee Rhetoric." Journal of Language & Politics 10.1 (2011): 50-67. Print.

Abdulla, Adnan K. "Rhetorical Repetition in Literary Translation." Babel 47.4 (2001): 289-303. Print.

Abo-Haggar, Dalia. "Repetition: A Key to Qur’anic Style, Structure and Meaning." Ph. D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2010. Print. al-Assad, Bashar. "President Bashar al-Assad's a Speech at the People's Assembly March 30, 2011." 2011. Print.

األسد: مؤامرة كبيرة تستهدف سوريا.--- (Assad: Syria Being Targeted by a Big Conspiracy) RTarabic, Youtube, 2011.

الرئيس األسد ألقى كلمة أمام مجلس الشعب تحدث فيه عن القضايا الداخلية والظروف المحيطة بالمنطقة: " .--- President)المؤامرة كبيرة خيوطها تمتد من دول بعيدة وقريبة..وإذا فرضت علينا معاركة فأهال ً ًوسهال Assad Delivers a Speech in Front of the Parliament Speaking About Internal Issues and Regional Circumstances: The Conspiracy Is Big and It Extends to حزب البعث :" (Countries near and Far...If We Are Forced into Battle, So Be It العربي اإلشتراكي: القيادة القومية: األمانة العامة Ba’ath Arab Socialist Party: National Leadership: General Secretariat 2011. Print.

a Comprehensive Political Speech at the) كلمة سياسية شاملة على مدرج جامعة دمشق" .--- حزب البعث العربي اإلشتراكي: القيادة القومية: ".(University of Damascus Amphitheater األمانة العامة Ba’ath Arab Socialist Party: National Leadership: General Secretariat 2005. Web. al-Hamad, Mohammad Qasem, and Mohammad Awad al-Shunnag. "Emotive Expressions in President Bashar al-Assad's Political Speeches with an Eye to Translation." Onomázein 23.1 (2011): 149-70. Print. al-Harahsheh, Ahmad Mohammad. "The Translatability of Figures of Speech in Khalid Mashaal's Political Speeches: A Critical Discourse Analysis." International Journal of English Linguistics 3.3 (2013): 100-14. Print. al-Jabouri, AJR. "The Role of Arabic Repetition in Argumentative Discourse." English

155

for Scientific Purposes in the Arab World, Language Studies Unit, Bermingham, University of Aston (1984): 99-117. Print. al-Khafaji, Rasoul. "In Search of Translational Norms: The Case of Shifts in Lexical Repetition in Arabic?" Babel 52.1 (2006): 39-65. Print.

---. "Variation and Recurrence in the Lexical Chains of Arabic and English Texts." Poznań Studies in Contemporary Linguistics 40 (2005): 5-25. Print. al-Qinai, Jamal. "Convergence and Divergence in the Interpretation of Qur’anic Polysemy and Lexical Recurrence." Acta Orientalia 65.1 (2012): 71-92. Print.

Ali, Salah Salim. "Pertinence and Redundancy in Poetic Repetition: A Translatological Perspective." Babel 51.4 (2005): 337-56. Print.

Web. October 27, 2014 .كلمات السيد الرئيس." Ba’ath Party. "5012

Badran, Dany. "Hybrid Genres and the Cognitive Positioning of Audiences in the Political Discourse of Hizbollah." Critical Discourse Studies 7.3 (2010): 191-201. Print.

Bayrakdar, Farag. "The Children's Revolution: Youth and the Syrian Rebellion." al-Jadid: A Review and Record of Arab Culture and Arts 2012. Print.

Beeston, A. F. L., and Clive Holes. The Arabic Language Today. Georgetown Classics in Arabic Language and Linguistics (Georgetown Classics in Arabic Language and Linguistics). Washington, DC: Georgetown UP, 2006. Print.

Benhabyles, Saida, et al. The Lebanonization of Syria: Report on the Actors of the Syria Crisis. Paris: Centre Internaionale de Recherches et d'Etudes sur le Terrorisme & l'Aide aux Victimes du Terrorisme Centre Francais de Recherche sur le Renseignement 2012. Print.

Boussofara, Naima. "Bleaching a Dialectal Voice in Political Discourse: Sociolinguistic Choices in Re-Writing Political Speeches." John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2011. 204-26. Vol. 10. Print.

Boussofara-Omar, Naima. "Learning the ‘Linguistic Habitus’ of a Politician: A Presidential Authoritative Voice in the Making." Journal of Language & Politics 5.3 (2006): 325-58. Print.

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. "Lebanon." International Relgious Freedom Report 2010 (2010). Web.

C-SPAN. Syria President Bashar al-Assad Speech to Parliament March 30, 2011. C- SPAN Video Library, 2011.

156

Charteris-Black, Jonathan. Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor. Palgrave-MacMillan, 2005. Print.

Cotter, William. "A Brief Examination of the Speech of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah." Print.

CIA World Factbook. "Egypt: People and Society." 2014. Web.

Fakhri, Ahmed. "Rhetorical Properties of Arabic Research Article Introductions." Journal of Pragmatics 36.6 (2004): 1119-38. Print.

Ferguson, Charles Albert. "Diglossia." WORD-JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL LINGUISTIC ASSOCIATION 15.2 (1959): 325-40. Print.

Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2013. 2013. Print.

Haeri, Niloofar. "The Reproduction of Symbolic Capital: Language, State, and Class in Egypt 1." Current anthropology 38.5 (1997): 795-816. Print.

Haggar, Dalia Abo. "Repetition: A Key to Qur'ānic Style, Structure and Meaning." U of Pennsylvania, 2011. 1661-62. Vol. 72. Print.

Halliday, Michael Alexander Kirkwood, and Ruqaiya Hasan. Cohesion in English. Routledge, 2014. Print.

Hannouna, Yasmin H. "Assessment of Translating Recurrence in Selected Texts from the Qur’an." Journal of Translation and Technical Communication Research Trans- kom 3.1 (2010): 85-113. Print.

Hatim, Basil, and Ian Mason. The Translator as Communicator. Routledge, 1996. Print.

Hoey, Michael. "Patterns of Lexis in Text." (1991). Print.

Holes, Clive. "The Structure and Function of Parallelism and Repetition in Spoken Arabic: A Sociolinguistic Study." Journal of semitic studies 40.1 (1995): 57-81. Print.

---. "The Uses of Variation: A Study of the Political Speeches of Gamal Abd al- Nasir." Perspectives on Arabic Linguistics, V. Eds. Eid, Mushira and Clive Holes. Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science Iv: Current Issues in Linguistic Theory (Cilt): 101. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1993. 13-45. Print.

Huckin, Thomas. "Textual Silence and the Discourse of Homelessness." Discourse & Society 13.3 (2002): 347-72. Print.

Jawad, Hisham A. "Paraphrase, Parallelism and Chiasmus in Literary Arabic: Norms and

157

Translation Strategies." Babel 53.3 (2007): 196-215. Print.

---. "Repetition in Literary Arabic: Foregrounding, Backgrounding, and Translation Strategies." Meta: Journal des traducteursMeta:/Translators' Journal 54.4 (2009): 753-69. Print.

Johnstone, Barbara. "Presentation as Proof: The Language of Arabic Rhetoric." Anthropological Linguistics 25 (1983): 47-60. Print.

---. Repetition in Arabic Discourse: Paradigms, Syntagms, and the Ecology of Language. Pragmatics & Beyond: New Series (P&B): 18. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1991. Print.

Johnstone, Barbara (Koch). "Repetition in Discourse: Cohesion and Persuasion in Arabic Argumentative Prose." 1982. 3983A-83A. Vol. 42. Print.

Lahlali, El Mustapha. "Repetition and Ideology in Nasrallah's Political Speeches." Arab Media & SocietyThe American University of Cairo: Kemal Adham Center for Television and Digital Journalism, 2012. Print.

Lesch, David W., Frida Nome, George Saghir, William Ury and Matthew Waldman. Obstacles to the Resolution of the Syrian Conflict. Oslo, Norway: Harvard Negotiation Project (Harvard University, NUPI: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Trinity University), 2013. Print.

Maalej, Zouheir A. "The ‘Jasmine Revolt’ Has Made the ‘Arab Spring’: A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Last Three Political Speeches of the Ousted President of Tunisia." Discourse & Society 23.6 (2012): 679-700. Print.

Matar, Dina. "The Power of Conviction: Nassrallah's Rhetoric and Mediated Charisma in the Context of the 2006 July War." Middle East Journal of Culture & Communication 1.2 (2008): 122-37. Print.

Matar, Dinah. "Performance, Language and Power: Nasrallah’s Rhetoric and Mediated Charisma in the Context of the 2006 July War." Arabic and the media: linguistic analyses and applications (2010): 141-58. Print.

Mazraani, Nathalie. Aspects of Language Variation in Arabic Political Speech-Making. Routledge, 1997. Print.

Menacere, Mohamed. "Arabic Discourse: Overcoming Stylistic Difficulties in Translation." Babel 38.1 (1992): 28-37. Print.

Syria's President Offers Future Reforms, Blames Conspiracy for the Protests. 2011.

Peel, Michael. "Assad's Family Picked up by the West's Radar." Financial Times 2011.

158

Print.

Pew Research Religion and Public Life Project. Mapping the Global Muslim Population 2009. Print.

Qashoush, Ibrahim. "Syrian Revolutionary Dabke." Publisher, 2011. Web.

Rieschild, Verna Robertson. "Emphatic Repetition in Spoken Arabic." (2006). Print.

Salim Ali, Salah. "Pertinence and Redundancy in Poetic Repetition: A Translatological Perspective." Babel 51.4 (2005): 337-56. Print.

Shunnaq, Abdullah Talal. "Arabic-English Translation of Political Speeches." Perspectives: Studies in Translatology 8.3 (2000): 207-28. Print.

---. "Functional Repetition in Arabic Realized through the Use of Word-Strings with Reference to Arabic-English Translation of Political Discourse." Translation Nouvelles de la FIT, XI (1992): 1-2. Print.

---. "Patterns of Repetition in Arabic Forced by Morphology with Reference to Arabic- English Translation." Papers and Studies in Contrastive Linguistics 28 (1993): 89-98. Print.

Semantic Redundance and Translation from Arabic into English. CIUTI-Forum. 2006. Print.

Sottimano, Aurora, and Kjetil Selvik. Changing Regime Discourse and Reform in Syria. University of St. Andrews Centre for Syrian Studies, 2009. Print.

The Daily Star. "Study Shows Stable Christian Population in Lebanon." The Daily Star 2013. Print.

Tannen, Deborah. Talking Voices: Repetition, Dialogue, and Imagery in Conversational Discourse. Vol. 6: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Print.

Economist Intelligence Unit. Democracy Index 2012: Democracy at a Standstill. Print.

Wedeen, Lisa. Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria. University of Chicago Press, 1999. Print.

Williams, Malcolm Paston. "A Comparison of the Textual Structures of Arabic and English Written Texts: A Study in the Comparative Orality of Arabic (Volumes I and Ii)." 1990. 3218A-18A. Vol. 50. Print.

The Leadership Breakfast. 2001. Sorkin, Aaron, January 10, 2001.

159

Wodak, Ruth. The Discourse of Politics in Action: Politics as Usual. Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke, 2011. Print.

Ziter, Edward. "The Image of the Martyr in Syrian Performance and Web Activism." TDR/The Drama Review 57.1 (2013): 116-36. Print.