Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State Author(s): Abimbola O. Adesoji Source: Africa Today, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Summer 2011), pp. 99-119 Published by: Indiana University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/africatoday.57.4.99 Accessed: 13-06-2017 13:51 UTC

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This content downloaded from 139.184.223.161 on Tue, 13 Jun 2017 13:51:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Despite the time gap between the Maitatsine riots and the Boko Haram insurrection, the socio­ economic conditions that sustained the risings in 1980 are relevant to the Boko Haram situation.

This content downloaded from 139.184.223.161 on Tue, 13 Jun 2017 13:51:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State Abimbola O. Adesoji

Nigeria has a long history of religious conflicts, some of the most virulent being those of the Maitatsine (1980s) and Boko Haram (July 2009). The latter matched the former in intensity, organization, and spread. Given the international attention to global terrorism, there is the likelihood that fundamentalist groups receive motivation, material, and ideological support or influence from a global jihadist movement. Unresolved national issues, including the weak economy, weak security and intelligence apparatuses, and the failure to define what the national culture and identity is, are critical factors. The precedent of Maitatsine and the government’s handling of it suggest that government incapacity and lack of political will have served to encourage recurrence and question the state’s capacity. This paper discusses the resurgence of violence under the guise of religious revivalism and draws parallels between the Maitatsine uprisings and the Boko Haram upris- ing. It examines the Nigerian state response to these uprisings. It concludes that unless the state addresses concretely and tackles bravely the conditions that can aid or fuel violent religious revivalism, uprisings may recur.

Introduction

Nigerians are a highly religious people, or so it seems. Religious senti­ ments and explanations, beyond being seen as the lifeblood of the people’s fundamental reality and daily experience, have been offered to justify even mundane or politically motivated situations (Enwerem 1999:123). More worrisome is the gradual but steady growth of religious fundamentalism or extremism beginning in the 1980s (Suberu 1997:477–508). Although the politicization of religion became stronger in the late 1970s, religious fears and the use of religion for propaganda have been important features of Nigeria. This was evident in the attempt at allaying the fear of “religious minorities” in the old northern and western regions by the Henry Willink

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2 ­ Beyond being similar to Beyond being similar 1 All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms could not have explicitly been given by the group to itself;Boko Haram could not have explicitly been given by The Maitatsine uprisings of 1980 to 1985 were the first major mani­ of 1980 to 1985 were the first The Maitatsine uprisings Islamic fundamentalism is mostly restricted to northern Nigeria. This content downloaded from 139.184.223.161 on Tue, 13 Jun 2017 13:51:51 UTC the Maitatsine uprisings, the Boko Haram uprising of July 2009 indicated the Boko Haram uprising of July the Maitatsine uprisings, in the face of the in Nigeria, apparently growing Islamic fundamentalism the Apparently, seeming unreadiness to tackle the menace. government’s Although this could be explained in terms and its of the dominance of Islam adherents in the region, it could imply the prevalence of factors and circum­ stances that made the region prone to extremism. Among such factors and prolifera seeming and existence the poverty illiteracy, are and circumstances recurrentand groups, Islamic radical of tion Beyond crises. religious violent related crises cannot be divorced from this seeming complacencyof religious-related crises cannot be divorced from on the part of the state. Government complacency itself could be explained and by other factors. The Kala Kato patronage of religion, by the ruling elite’s out barely five months after the uprising of December 2009, which broke resources Boko Haram incident, suggests that the deployment of the state’s to quell insurrection is far from stamping out fanaticism. name could have been deduced from its basic belief, as well as its leader’s it rather, Nigeria are such fac­ in views. Underlying the growth of fundamentalism practices, and doctrines; social tors as hardline position on religious beliefs, patronage of religion. Grow­ and economic dislocation; and the political provided ideological supporting global Islamic fundamentalism has and not provided materials and training motivation to local groups where it has the government given its approach, response to Islamic supports. Ironically, nor enduring. The prompt trial of fundamentalism seems neither adequate arrested culprits, bold and firm implementation of previous commission reports, of security reports and a more devoted handling and armed gangs, as points and hot spots, would, in addi­ well as better handling of known flash tion to serving as a deterrent, portray the government as a responsible and Apart addressing issues in abdication from the seeming a responsive body. uprisings, the more serious problems that triggered and catalyzed previous been glossed over once the uprisings raised by the uprisings have perhaps groups and the recurrencewere quelled. The proliferation of fundamentalist 1967–1970 (Laitin 1986:134). The Sharia debate in the Constituent Assemblyin the Constituent The Sharia debate (Laitin 1986:134). 1967–1970 Nigeria conflict to polarize the first major was perhaps during 1977–1978 heart lines. At the along religious struggleconflict was the of the for and Sharia Court provision for a Federal against the the proposed of Appeal in Nige­ of the secularity the for implications its because of Constitution 1979 result in the taking but then this conflict did not rian state (Laitin 1982:416), up of arms, as occurred in 1980. the on built they although Nigeria, in fundamentalism Islamic of festation 1980s, in which Shiite movement in the late 1970s and precedent set by the was a major player (Mohammed Haram leader, the Boko Mohammed Yusuf, left in their wake the legacy of recurrent they ethnoreligious 2010). Yet human and material losses. crises, with attendant Commission (Nigeria 1958:11, 26, 63), as well as in the Biafran secession of secession Biafran as in the 63), as well 26, 1958:11, (Nigeria Commission

africa today 57(4) 100 Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram africa today 57(4) 101 Abimbola O. Adesoji These were supposedly the students or 3 All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms This content downloaded from 139.184.223.161 on Tue, 13 Jun 2017 13:51:51 UTC There is scholarly agreement on the centrality of economic factors There is scholarly agreement on the Pertinent Haram and the Boko of the Maitatsine to the comparison he Maitatsine Uprisings: Islamic Revivalism in a Secular State Revivalism Uprisings: Islamic he Maitatsine disciples of the mallams, who teach, preach, and officiate to perpetuate the traditional northern Nigerian societal expression of Islam, characterized by the availability of koranic teachers, whose teaching and followership are tion of himself as a prophet and his abhorrence of Western technology and tion of himself as a prophet and his abhorrence of Western Isichei 1987:194–197). its products marked him out (Falola 1998:142–143; Lubeck in the outbreak of the uprisings of 1980, although emphases differ. (1985:369–390) explains the discontent in terms of economic dislocation, deprivation, and income inequalities, but with links to Islam; he sees the of Marwa,the followers Hausa traditional to the belonging as Tatsine, Yan . class known in Kano as gardawa of the Nigerian state (Falola 1998:144–145; Stock 2004:415–417). His declara­ of the Nigerian state (Falola 1998:144–145; 1989:83–90; Usman 1987:11–25). The Maitatsine movement, led by Muham­ 1989:83–90; Usman 1987:11–25). The Maitatsine madu Marwa, a long period of residence in Kano, had a Cameroonian with of Islam. Maitatsine is a Hausa as its professed objective the purification is derived from the regular cursing or word meaning ‘the one who damns’; it Marwaswearing of bitter public condemnation and alluded to his frequent, Hiskett 1987:209–223; Ibrahim 1997:509–534; Isichei 1987:194–208; KastfeltHiskett 1987:209–223; Ibrahim 1997:509–534; In 1980, the first in the chain of Maitatsine riots broke out in Kano. Others In 1980, the first in the chain of Maitatsine and 1985 in occurred Bulumkutu, 1984 in Yola, in 1982 in Kaduna and The outbreak and recur­ Bauchi (Ibrahim 1997:511; Isichei 1987:194–208). (Albertdocumented well have been the uprisings of rence 1997:285–325, 1987:93–115; Hickey 1984:251–256; 1999a:274–309, 1999b:19–36; Clarke T paper discusses the underlying factors for the outbreak and recurrence underlying factors for the outbreak and paper discusses the of the and contrasts the for the Boko Haram. It compares uprisings and accounts in the context of Haram uprisings and situates them Maitatsine and Boko they pose to the Nigerian state, Islamic fundamentalism and the challenge particularly reluctance, or inability. given its seeming abdication, tackling them. By appropriately categorizing them and examining their examining and them categorizing appropriately By them. tackling of their modus factors, a clearer understanding motivations and sustaining and supportoperandi, networks, necessitating a better base would be aided, governmentdeter future crises involving response, meant to prevent or This generally. and check Islamic fundamentalism these or similar groups Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria in the context of the Maitatsine and Boko and Maitatsine the of context the in Nigeria in fundamentalism Islamic the Nigerian state. the response of and considers Haram Uprisings of the growth of relevance for a proper understanding uprisings is their their convergence in Nigeria, the need to identify Islamic fundamentalism of government factors, and reasons for the failure and distinguishing in the ethnic backlash of recurrent backlash the ethnic in northern crises religious there Nigeria, of this and operation in the emergence ethnic consideration is no apparent Thus, using northernmovement. this paper examines Nigeria as the basis, (those who ‘eat’ or use or exploit or use or ‘eat’ who (those yan-ci-rani from the respected status of recipients of of recipients of status respected the from gardawa or gardawa according to him, were mainly seasonal migrantsseasonal mainly were him, to according gardawa, All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms yan-ci-rani, economic opportunists who seek the golden pavements Hiskett (1987:213–215) agrees with Lubeck’s economic-distress thesis, Hiskett (1987:213–215) agrees with Lubeck’s This pattern until the period of continued after political independence, This content downloaded from 139.184.223.161 on Tue, 13 Jun 2017 13:51:51 UTC of the big cities for what they can glean from them. As layabouts who have of the big cities for what they can glean from them. As layabouts who have no firm enjoyed motivation, either intellectual or religious, they have never a potentially turbulent as regarded been have always but status, respected a class of vagabonds, thieves, and roughnecks. Both Isichei (1987) and Kastfelt but was not really made up of the gardawa, Tatsine but argues that the Yan rather rather than being its genesis, could only have intensified their alienation, rather than being its genesis, could only were they whether the dry argues that the economic ills within season). Isichei (1987:201–202) in partwhich the movement flourished were the result of the profligate poli­ thus engendered, in parttics of the Second Republic and the indebtedness the in partconsequence of world recession, and the consequence of the rapac­ charges for servicingity of the lenders, manifested in high debts. Added to northernthis was the peculiar situation of the states, where the movement disasters like desertflourished, troubled, as it were, by local encroachment, While acknowledging povertydrought, and a rinderpest pandemic. as the for whom Maitatsine became a focus, driving force among many young men exclusion of the group from Nigeria Clarke (1987:93–115) argues that the enemies and saw in all as their pagans considered to eliminate prepared it people, who, an evil force to be fought. The poor who were Westernized, not benefitted from the oil boom, according to Hickey (1984:251, 253) had the rate of inflation, were victims and whose distress was increasing with state and were particularlyof the confrontation with the Nigerian attracted to Marwa, of the hypocrisy and ostentation of the with his condemnation righteous people. nouveau riche and the promise of redemption to God’s Muslim charity in recognition of their spiritual worthMuslim charity in recognition into that of vagabonds, the new industrial thieves. Thus, the oil boom and nuisances, and potential But as Hiskett (1987:212–215) Tatsine. capitalism it created bred the Yan rightly observed,central importance attaching such to the merely economic overemphasis. Economic deprivation,distress of the discontents amounts to understood the interplay of supply and demand for labor in the big cities— of supply and demand for labor understood the interplay in addition to teaching them. made use of the migrants and demand in the delicate balance of traditional supply the oil boom, when bloating consump­ and craft economy was devastated by the petty mercantile This resulted of inflation (Lubeck 1985:369–390). tion, against a background the of translation the in on society. These These society. on countrysidefrom the part where they pursued the urban centers, into -time elementary mallams, but of their chosen under the tuition koranic studies urban such traditional in labor as seasonal were available time same at the market portering,making, embroidering, as dyeing, cap occupations and the strain on repairing. While these migrations relieved mud building and who these mallams—knowledgeable middlemen, village grain supplies, expected to strengthen and promote the spread of Islam and sustain its hold its hold and sustain Islam of spread the promote and strengthen to expected

africa today 57(4) 102 Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram africa today 57(4) 103 Abimbola O. Adesoji All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms (reformer)mujaddid Sheik of footsteps the in following This content downloaded from 139.184.223.161 on Tue, 13 Jun 2017 13:51:51 UTC Hickey (1984:252, 254) also locates the cause of the risings in the 254) also locates the cause of the risings Hickey (1984:252, this perspective (Albert 1999a:285; Federal Government of Nigeria 1981:15). categorization of the insurgents as political adven­ Related to this is Albert’s turists, who wanted political power to effect their reformationthe society. of Given the perceived level of social injustice, which should catalyze popular grievances but was generally tolerated, coupled with their abhorrence of to him and give him dominance over the Muslim realm. Maitatsine’s percep­ to him and give him dominance over the Muslim realm. Maitatsine’s a as himself of tion fromunderstood be could prophet, a as explicitly, more or, Fodio, dan Usman to in the Qur’an, from it is a popular thought that at the end of time, a man will be called the Mahdi. His ability the family of prophet will appear who will attract large followership to strengthen Islam and make justice triumph make its categorization difficult. Although Mahdism is not explicitly referredmake its categorization difficult. Although ized to the extreme. Characteristically runningized to the extreme. Characteristically through the fundamentalists’ governmentdoctrines are the declaration that the of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is a dagut or taagut (evil), unworthy the part of allegiance on of and personnel; attacks on police posts sustained good and upright Muslims; that declaration the and of schools; out to drop members of encouragement working in any form of government employment is unlawful. These doc­ But in what could not be immedi­ trines predispose the groups to violence. movement condemned the excesses ately or presently understood, the Izala (1987:202) sees the group. While Isichei the Boko Haram that characterized militant Muslim movements in Maitatsine movement as one of different northern Hickey (1984:252, 254) and Clarke (1987:96–111) see Nigeria, both Mahdi tradition, whose major centers Maitatsine as rather belonging to the in Nigeria are Kano and Borno. But the un-Islamic practices that Marwa of human organs for the manufacture was allegedly involved in, like the use of charms blood, while differentiating the movement, and drinking human constitutions had defined the secularity of the state, extremists in the Shiite the secularity of the state, extremists constitutions had defined other orga­ and the Muslim Students Society, movement, Izala movement, openly advocated rejected the constitution and nizations had consistently like the Shiite movement, an Islamic state. Implicitly, the establishment of for inspiration of source profound a and breeding ground a provided others, Boko Haram, having existed much latter groups, like the Maitatsine and the which the latter movement popular­ earlier and having held strong views, jobless, and homeless men, brought in from the countryside in from the homeless men, brought jobless, and be involved in to trade.cap knitting, and petty barbing, cobbling, of petty jobs, like all manner referringWhile collectively notes that the disinherited, he to them as the form countries, like Chad and Niger, migrants from Sahel a special category about the largely foreign position of the poor—a confirmation of Hiskett’s followers (Hiskett 1987:213–215). identity of Maitatsine fanatical groups of the Nigerian state by the rejection of the secularity Marwawithin Islam to which 1979 and subsequent belongs. Whereas the (1989:84), like Hickey, agree that the bulk of Mohammed Marwa’s foot sol­ foot Marwa’s of Mohammed the bulk agree that Hickey, like (1989:84), recruiteddiers were of northern the urban poor from nec­ Nigeria without as young, qualifies them (1987:201–202) them, but Isichei essarily labeling ­ une, New Players New une, T ld All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms A conspiracy theoryA conspiracy of the for and sustenance the motivation about to the application of strict Given their perspectives and approach This content downloaded from 139.184.223.161 on Tue, 13 Jun 2017 13:51:51 UTC he Boko Haram Rising: O Haram he Boko The Boko Haram riots lasted from 26 to 30 July 2009 and spread across The Boko Haram riots lasted from 26 to 30 July 2009 and spread across Borno,and extensive, most was it where Yobe, Kano, Bauchi, of states the perhaps because Borno the movement. The the leader of was the base of hideout at the immediate cause of the riot was the sacking of the group’s area of Bauchi on 26 July 2009 by a joint security team, Dutsen Tenshin ations. This climaxed in the Boko Haram uprising of 2009. Running through ations. This climaxed in the Boko Haram toward violence; followers saw these uprisings and riots is the disposition irrespective groups, their outside those affiliations, religious and ethnic of as enemies that must be crushed. T tatsine uprisings of the 1980s, Nigeria had experienced ferocious conflict andtatsine uprisings of the 1980s, Nigeria influenced by extraneous consider­ crises supposedly induced by religion but from a cognitive perspective, fundamentalism expresses exclusivity, particu exclusivity, expresses fundamentalism perspective, a cognitive from frame­ theological cultural a from Viewed rigor. moral and literality, larity, and cultural liberalism in defence work, it expresses opposition to religious of orthodoxy From a social movement perspective, and religious traditions. uniqueness, in regard to other it represents organizational and ideological the authority of scripture and the types of religious movements. It stresses emphasis on right doctrine and the necessity of righteous living, and places necessity of organized warfareagainst the forces of modernism (Danjibo 1993:212, 411). Thus, from the Mai­ 2009:4; Komonchak, Collins, and Lane secular authority, the Yan Tatsine, like other fundamentalist movements, movements, other fundamentalist like Tatsine, Yan the authority, secular transformation violent and radical believed in through open of the society back as crises dating as far as the hotbed of given its notoriety revolt. Kano, a natural factors, provided of other triggering with the prevalence 1953, and perhaps a startinghaven and (Albert point of the revolution 1999a:298–299). discontent is worthy in two different ways of examination. This is viewed the Machiavellian device of first, as a by Isichei: class, meant to ruling divertin various homes haunting life of facts the dismal from attention as perceived by people in government,Nigeria; second, and as a front for a by unpatriotic manipulated, directed, and financed Mafia that is operated, the country with foreign elements to destabilize Nigerians in connivance that the success of (1987:114) refers to the impact (Isichei 1987:205). Clarke The Aniagolu in Iran could have had on Maitatsine. the revolution of 1979 the investigated the Kano riot of 1980, dismissed which of Inquiry, Tribunal Mossad of Israel and Gadhafi of Libya and the involvement of Muammar the porosity of elements in the riots, but it admitted other suspected foreign which exposed the country to uncontrolled infiltration the Nigerian border, (Federal Government 1981:36). of Nigeria both the Maitatsine and the Boko Islam, though with some colorations, Viewed as fundamentalist groups. Haram movements are broadly defined

africa today 57(4) 104 Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram africa today 57(4) 105 Abimbola O. Adesoji With the death of the death of With 4 Although popularly Although popularly 5 All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms This content downloaded from 139.184.223.161 on Tue, 13 Jun 2017 13:51:51 UTC A different claim was that he left the Taliban because of their extremist extremist their of because Taliban the left he that was claim different A its leader and its known sponsor, Alhaji Buji Foi, and the scattering of its of its Alhaji Buji Foi, and the scattering sponsor, its leader and its known difficult get­ it is absence of any official reportmembers, and in the far, so ting precise information what is available, however, on the group. From time, as long as the group has been around for some it would appear that Such past. the in names different under operated and years, fifteen to ten and hijra, the Nigerian Taliban, names included Ahlusunna wal’ jamma 2009a:48). (Fasure 2009:2; Omipidan the Yusufiyya dan 2009a:43–44). It would appear that he prepared himself for the leadership dan 2009a:43–44). It would appear that he prepared himself for the leadership role which he played in the Boko Haram sect with his membership of other fundamentalist groups. It is not impossible that the Boko Haram sect was truethe movements, fundamentalist the of one facet just of which extent if determined.fully be to yet is Taliban, the with link his of severance The it actually happened, could have been informed ten­ not by their extremist long-termhis actualize to desire the by but dencies, reform,of dream which perhaps was being slowed down by those less passionate tendencies but with a vow that his group would not relent until an “indepen­ tendencies but with a vow that his group haram had been established” (Omipi­ dent and a just State devoid of anything in which nine of its members were arrested of its members nine in which making for and materials attacks reprisal to This led confiscated. weapons were other bombs and formations members on police later by the group two hours in Bauchi and 2009:5; and Shobiye states (Bakare, Adedeji, in the other three eventually after The riot was quelled 2009:2–3). Falola, and Shobiye Owuamanam, of its leader, custody, supposedly in police and the killing, the capture some of and a fierce battle with his followers, Yusuf, Ustaz Mohammed the was a product of a gardi, whom were arrested (Adedeji 2009). Yusuf, education he had dropped out of the Western madrasas school system; mostly of the that more than seven hundred lives, system. It is estimated stations, pris­ lost, while public buildings like police sect members, were governmentons, (Nwankwo destroyed were churches and schools, offices, 2009:67–71). and Lawal Oyegbile and Falola 2009:2; referred appear that the group has no specific to as Boko Haram, it would after its suppression in 2009, name for itself, but following its resurgence it referred of the People of Sunnah, Call, and Jihad” to itself as “The Group and claimed affinity with the North of Al-Qaeda (Agency African branch Shiites the of one be to claimed was Yusuf, Reporterleader, Its 2010). the when that and originally, Zakzaky El Ibrahim of leadership the under of Abubakar Mujahid broke away Islam (JTI) Kano-based Jama’atul Tajdidi a member of the JTI and was became from the Shiites, in the 1990s, Yusuf even the amir (leader) of the group for Borno State (Suleiman 2009:19–23). His radical transformation, born out of his long-term dream of reforming the group under his leadership could explain the radicalization of society, Abubakar Lawal, erstwhile leader, to assume a hardline position after its Saudi Arabia, for studies (Oyegbile had left for the University of Medina, did not play a prominent Abubakar Lawal and Lawal 2009:68). Obviously, perhaps following his alienation. role in the group thereafter, Ironically, Yusuf, the sect Yusuf, Ironically, 6 ­ the Tal f the group, fashioned, as it were, after o 8 All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms The north, which may be the poorest region of the country, has been The north, region of the country, which may be the poorest 7 Despite the time gap between the Maitatsine riots and the Boko HaramDespite the time gap between the Maitatsine is derived from a combination of the Hausa the Hausa of a combination from derived is Haram name Boko The ‘something forbidden, ungodly, forbidden, ungodly, haram ‘something the Arabic word boko ‘book’ and This content downloaded from 139.184.223.161 on Tue, 13 Jun 2017 13:51:51 UTC the most frequent origin of fanatical uprisings (Ibelema 2009:18; Makinde the most frequent origin of fanatical 2009:6). There is no conclusive link with jihadist movements outside Nigeria2009:6). There is no conclusive link with yet, but the modus operandi Given its large followings and iban in Afghanistan, has generated curiosity. the claim that it had sent members to Mauritania and Algeria for training, it could be that the modeling was simply to acknowledge its source of inspi­ ration. It could have been meant to attract sympathy and support from the or related groups. Also, links may actually exist but have not been Taliban conclusively proved. Speculation in the Nigerian and foreign press about the activities of such groups as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Com­ missionaries Wahhabist and Pakistan, from clerics Tablighi Algeria, in bats insurrection, conditions that sustained the risings in the socioeconomic situation. The situation had gotten 1980 are relevant to the Boko Haram of opportunities, inequality improper worse with regard to mass poverty, lack of educational opportunities,use of resources, revulsion of injustice, ignorance, corruption,unemployment (Ale 2009:8; Enwerem 1999:125; and the Usman 1987:21). These problems swelled army people, of vulnerable made them easy prey in the whose disillusionment and impoverishment saw the uprising of London The Times hands of a demagogue like Yusuf. that has made Nigeria prone to vio­ as a symptom of the social breakdown lence. of his members (Madunagu, Shobiye, and Chiedozie 2009:2). Membership in Shobiye, and Chiedozie 2009:2). of his members (Madunagu, a preponderant but the broad spectrumthe group cut across of the society, beyond former among the poorest social groups. Thus, number came from and commissioners and other officersuniversity lecturers, students, bankers, of state, membership extended to drug addicts, vagabonds, and generally binding the group membership lawless people. The common denominator together was the desire to overthrow the secular government and propagate oratory would seem to have been a contributory but Yusuf’s Islamic law, 2009a 43–44; Olu 2009:9). factor (Michael and Bwala 2009:3; Omipidan word that meaning is but its deeper sinful’, ‘book is it means Literally, sinful’. and should therefore or ungodly is sinful, sacrilegious, education Western out­ opposed to, but sect was not only the Characteristically, be forbidden. modernand culture, Western education, science. Western rejected, rightly to, Islam the propagation of, and strict adherence It embraced and advocated by everyone,or not. In line with this regardless of whether it was wanted across all the the adoption or imposition of Sharia objective, the sect sought and Adelakun 2009:40). states in Nigeria (Bumah leader, enjoyed the best of what Western technology could offer in the form technology Western enjoyed the best of what leader, the best medical latest communication equipment, and of exotic cars, the services.send­ encouraged his for his jihad prepare to his desire In addition, alienated some medical training—a development that ing people abroad for

africa today 57(4) 106 Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram africa today 57(4) 107 Abimbola O. Adesoji All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms This content downloaded from 139.184.223.161 on Tue, 13 Jun 2017 13:51:51 UTC Mohammed Yusuf stated that he was invited to Yobe State during the to Yobe stated that he was invited Mohammed Yusuf The role of partisan in the sustenance politics and political patronage There were financial supportsThere were Many from within Nigeria. for the sect his ideology (Omipidan 2009b:5–6). When it is considered that the Maitatsinehis ideology (Omipidan 2009b:5–6). When a civilian president in 1980, the link riots broke out during the tenure of be understood. The thesis to political patronage could of the rise of Yusuf leaders for supportthat politicians who patronized religious or protective charms and later discarded them or unleashed them on used them as a tool (Adam al Ilory situation 2009:23). It innocent people best describes Yusuf’s goes along with the explanation that politicians were mostly the backers of groups who needed the group members’ violent disposition the murderous to achieve their political and, by extension, economic ends (Muogbo 2009). buildup to the 2003 elections in the wake of Sharia implementation in some buildup to the 2003 elections in the wake abandoned to its fate before the state group was thought it would take, his government to leave the state. His relationship with ordered its members occasion when he was arrested,the political elite explains why on one his who obviously supportedrelease was facilitated by a politician him and/or ment could have hastened his desire to effect a change through violence. ment could have hastened his desire to northern the election did not assume the direction that his host states. When to secure political power, which would in turnto secure political power, be used to protect and advance following his abandon­ his career (Omipidan 2009b:5–6). His disappointment states fell short he had expected. He could have thought of the standard that knowledge of or their Muslims, that the officeholders were not serious education was hindering or limiting them. His fraternizationWestern with politicians possibly informed his willingness to use his group to assist them and some of the rulingas their decision aligned and/or aspiring politicians, but he was perhaps law, strict adherence to Islamic with his plan to promote was introduced across some northerndisappointed, as the type of Sharia that of the sect is obvious. It would appear that the introduction of Sharia in some It would appear that the introduction of the sect is obvious. northern some closeness between Yusuf states beginning in 1999 encouraged goodwill. The givers could be Yusuf’s disciples, admirers, partners, admirers, disciples, ­ associ or be Yusuf’s could givers The goodwill. ignorant of the importates. They could be of what the group or ramifications their supportrepresented, but with they inadvertently became part of the war against the state. conspiracy to levy Motivations for such support could include belief in the group’s cause, given supportMotivations for such the group’s could include belief in sowing for future the desire to promote religion, and the level of persuasion, of them are not yet known, but the example of Alhaji Buji Foi, a formerof Alhaji Buji Foi, but the example not yet known, of them are in BornoCommissioner Other speculated knowledge. State, is common prominent northernsponsors included leaders and businessmen. religious from Saudi Arabia in Northern Saudi Arabia from reported as the as well Nigeria, of training are proof, however in foreign countries in Al-Qaeda camps fundamentalists Soboyede 2009:14). and Lawal 2009:69; 2009:1, 8; Oyegbile tenuous (Alli wo of a Kind wo T All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms ­ West rejecting in similar were sects both objectives, and philosophy In This content downloaded from 139.184.223.161 on Tue, 13 Jun 2017 13:51:51 UTC he Maitatsine and the Boko Haram Uprisings: Uprisings: Haram Boko and the he Maitatsine Michael 2010:13). What could not really be proved conclusively now is if the Kala Kato riot was not a continuation of the Boko Haram riot, a resurgence of Marwa from Kano in the 1960s and his imprisonment in 1973 hardened him Marwahardened 1973 in imprisonment his and 1960s the in Kano from did not deter of Mohammed Yusuf the same way that the regular detention him (Albertin what is clearly hypocritical of the duo, 1999:284–286). But their doctrines: for Marwa,they were involved in practices that negated it was his involvement in charms and amulets, mostly with human parts; for which he officially abhorred technology, it was his revelry in Western Yusuf, that he too made use of charms,(Hiskett 1987:215–217). (It is possible but to light.) These groups were linked no conclusive evidence of it has come had started father the Boko Yusuf’s in a curious way: it was claimed that was banished from Gashua by Emir Haram ideology in the 1960s before he because of and Islamic education, Umar Suleiman, who had both Western Maitatsine education; at the outbreak of the his condemnation of Western riot in Kano, he reportedly with the intention of participating came in the (Omipidan 2009a:49). If this informajihad, but was caught in the crossfire ­ sect merely continued from where his Yusuf’s tion is anything to go by, efforts the stopped. Isichei (1987:194) and Hiskett (1987:220) give father’s Kala Kato, as Kalo Kato or Yan other name of the Maitatsine movement, it”’, in apparent reference to “A mere man said meaning ‘Those who say, dicta were of human, and not divine, origin. the teaching that the Prophet’s The same name described a group that started a riot in Bauchi in December Mallam Sale Badamasi. Beyond the in-fighting within 2009 under its leader, the group, which claimed links with the Maitatsine sect of the 1980s, its major grouse was the unjust killing of Boko Haram members for preaching against what they considered as a reality (Abubakar and Mohammed 2010; ern of strict Islam. Their and its products, and the enforcement civilization of the use of violence could have informedacknowledgement the stubborn­ This accounted for their brushness and general lawlessness of members. they it did not mellow them: rather, with the law at different times, yet The deportationwere emboldened to become more lawless. of Muhammadu and air force to suppress it. Obviously evidence of its elaborate planning and it. Obviously evidence of its elaborate and air force to suppress the mold of insur­ persistence and spread cast them in organizations, their five years in five states: persisted for The Maitatsine uprisings rectionists. Kano, Kaduna, Borno, the Boko Haram riots spread old Gongola, and Bauchi; and Borno of a five-day period. The number over Yobe, across Bauchi, Kano, is furtherlives lost in the uprisings intensity. evidence of their Both the Maitatsine and the Boko Haram uprisings have things in common. have things in Boko Haram uprisings and the Both the Maitatsine dif­ basic beliefs Islamic sects, whose both were fanatical Fundamentally, conservative those held by the majority fered from Nigeria. Both Muslims in which almost compromised the intensity of on the Nigerian state, levied war the aggression, despite of the persistence the instances, both In security. her the national army in quelling it, led to the deployment of police involvement T

africa today 57(4) 108 Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram africa today 57(4) 109 Abimbola O. Adesoji All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms This content downloaded from 139.184.223.161 on Tue, 13 Jun 2017 13:51:51 UTC Marwa’s declaration of himself as a prophet distinguished him from Marwa’s ­ relatively large follow elements among of foreign The preponderance In their bid to actualize their objectives through violence, almost everyalmost violence, through objectives their actualize to bid their In Marwa was identified by a vast majority of the northern the of majority vast a by Marwa identified population, was Nigerian including Islamic scholars, as clearly heterodox and fringe, given the loose attachment of his group to mainstream Islam and his rebellious and non­ conformist of disposition. His use of Islam as a vehicle for the propagation other person and group outside the groups fit into the mode of an enemy. fit into the mode of an enemy. other person and group outside the groups orientation, which Nigeria’s a manifestation of their fanatical Apparently, among Muslims have compounded, it secularity and the growing suspicion only is a loud warning to put more appropriately, the fanatics—or, that only reminder of what should have been the group members—are safe. It is a seeming condonation, vacilla­ The done, but was neglected or wished away. or apathy on the part of the governmenttion, fear, apparently strengthened prompt, carefully considered the hand of the fanatical sects. Contrastingly, action and response on the partof government in the form of firm but fair handling of potentially explosive situations, and devoid of the usual fire- brigade approach, would have made a difference. whose claim was the strict application and enforcement of Islam. Yusuf, do members, like Buji Foi, the sale of their propertieswell-to-do members, like Buji for the acquisi­ tion of arms the group was the height of or the donation of the proceeds to training by Boko and Lawal 2009:71). The emphasis on fatalism (Oyegbile what obtained with Maitatsine, as Haram, obviously an improvement on is an additional factor in the groups’ well as the assemblage of explosives, Chie­ and Shobiye, (Madunagu, agencies security the with confrontation dozie 2009:2). They had their headquarters in Kano and Borno respectively, two important tradition in Northern centers of Mahdist Nigeria. Of all the in the commencement or other places, these centers featured prominently of Bauchi, the third prominent spread of the riots. The growing notoriety strategic its with do to have could activities, groups’ both by affected place the two centers and a consequence of placement in the interaction between the effort original networks. The Kala Kato riot of to integrate it into the December 2009 in Bauchi supports this claim. ings characterized the groups. These foreign elements, mostly from Chad mostly from These foreign elements, the groups. ings characterized had their interest could have with other members, together and Niger, righteous cause, belief in a to the groups’ by their commitment sustained and, in the case of their zeal, as well in the leadership, heavenly reward for inability to While pointing to the of Yusuf. Boko Haram, the demagoguery, in the north,properly define identity of foreign elements the involvement to which militants could go to recruitindicates the extent followers. Char­ and deter­ The willingness was their gallantry. acteristic of the followings convergence of members explains the to destroy or be destroyed mination major centers, once a jihad was to be on their with their families sometimes boasted of few which perhaps Haram in particular, launched. For the Boko - of the hydra face another or perhaps of the 1980s, movement the Maitatsine Nigeria. assuming in extremism is gradually that Islamic headed monster One of 9 10 All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Viewed from a broader perspective, the adoption of Sharia appeared Sharia of adoption the perspective, broader a from Viewed This content downloaded from 139.184.223.161 on Tue, 13 Jun 2017 13:51:51 UTC measure appeared not strong enough to appease these elements which, when not would they would not embark on insurrection like Marwa and Yusuf, check it before it degenerated, or feebly condemn it. The potency of Islam in trial for corrupt in office—a vindication of sorts practices while of the critics of Sharia adoption. (Nmehielle 2004:730–759; Ostien 2007:171–120. Going by constitutional (Nmehielle 2004:730–759; Ostien 2007:171–120. meant the existence of dual legal sys­ provision, the adoption of Sharia law of state religion, contrarytems in those states, as well as the adoption to the which states expressly that provision of section 10 of the 1999 Constitution, “the Government or of a State shall not adopt any religion of the Federation as State Religion” (Federal Military Government 1999). But even at that, the Boko Haram in particular the limited application of Sharia criticized state governors,and condemned the insincerity of the whom it accused of only of Sharia not implementation the full why explains This it. politicizing was the advertised cause of the in the north, country, but the whole of the reasons, the federal governmentjihad. Like Boko Haram, but for different the adoption, which it saw as uncon­ under Olusegun Obasanjo condemned would soon “fizzle out.” stitutional, a political phenomenon that Islamic Fundamentalism and the Nigerian and State Fundamentalism Islamic faced by the central governmentA major challenge in Nigeria since the return of civil rule1999 was the introduction of Sharia law in some states in in northern Zamfara blazing the trail. The law now operates Nigeria, with northernnineteen the of twelve in varyingwith states, manifestations cal, the theory that rain comes from water, and other scientifically proven and other scientifically cal, the theory that rain comes from water, the involvement intellectual base of the movements, facts, point at the poor (British movement notwithstanding teachers in Yusuf’s of some university Broadcasting Service 2009). betrayed him. This contrasted with Yusuf, whose desire for change informed for desire whose with Yusuf, This contrasted betrayed him. was Whereas Marwahis disposition. Yusuf of a political pawn, was more serving Beyond on the Borno player. more of a Board, he was a State Shari’a had any Neither movement movements. several other Islamic member of of intel­ or alienation of noninvolvement base—a product deep intellectual Muhammad ascription of the status of Prophet Marwa’s lectuals from them. world is spheri­ rejection of the concept that the Yusuf’s to himself, as well as Islamic practices that he was involved in involved was he that practices Islamic un- the notwithstanding, cause his the governors who introduced Sharia became the country’s president and the governors Sharia became the country’s who introduced ruled died; some of them are currently until 5 May 2010, when he facing like an effort to pacify a section of Muslims who had consistently agitated and perhaps were seen as a threat to against the secularity of the country, political officeholders or a supportthe tenure of the base that could not be neglected on the basis of political calculation. The undue emphasis on reli­ gion as a basis for differentiation and mobilization accounts for this, but the

africa today 57(4) 110 Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram africa today 57(4) 111 Abimbola O. Adesoji All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms This content downloaded from 139.184.223.161 on Tue, 13 Jun 2017 13:51:51 UTC Even before the Boko Haram and Maitatsine riots, fundamentalist Even before the Boko Haram and Maitatsine 2009:11). Implicitly, it would appear that once a fundamentalist escapes 2009:11). Implicitly, being killed during the suppression of his insurrection, he can as well be sure take parthe will that equal. This non­ being other things next one, in the deterrence has arguably encouraged a culture of impunity and promoted a circle of violence; hence the recurrence of religious-related crises in Nigeria. on 1 October 1982, in what was later blamed as misguided clemency (Isichei on 1 October 1982, in what was later blamed as misguided clemency (Isichei inci­ Haram Boko the following prisons the of swelling the With 1987:197). dent, the usual complaints of how to handle them have begun again (Adedeji appropriate charge to level against them. The last batch of 923 was pardoned appropriate charge to level against them. level of advocacy, its impact on violent fundamentalist groups could not be groups could not fundamentalist on violent impact its of advocacy, level yet the approach of the same government whose legitimacy is wished away, fundamentalism could at best be being questioned to the problem of Islamic usual approach of brutallydescribed as lackadaisical. Beyond the suppress­ govern­ or commission of enquiry, ing insurgence and constituting tribunal Before the problem. toward addressing not taken concrete steps ment has the Maitatsine risings, Marwa a law unto himself. This attitude earned was him deportation yet he still led one of the bloodiest riots and imprisonment, was not markedly differ­ in the history of Yusuf of Nigeria. The experience the seemingly uncoordinated trial ent. After the Maitatsine riot of 1980 and his arrestedof of what basis the released on were them many of followers, and the uncertaintyIsichei identified as their sheer numbers about the most man 2009:19–23). Although Shiite fundamentalism was initially at the was initially at the man 2009:19–23). Although Shiite fundamentalism Muslim affirmation Sharia, the imposition of religious principles, especially on a significant to them amounts to a cultural affront of secularity according portion status of second-class population and reduces them to the of the injunction, it does this view is claimed to be a Quranic citizens. Although maintain that acceptance among liberal Muslims, who not enjoy popular Nigeria, nor does imply the need for Islamization of such a view does not of the secularity of the constitutional provision it endorse nonacceptance Imo 1995:58–59). 1998:39–66; Ilesanmi 2001:529–554; of the state (Ibrahim Pertinentgovernanceof failure the is also that tyranny a as labeling its and and members of the move­ must be discarded, prompting the leadership consider the path to Islamic justice ments to risk death to pursue what they (Danjibo 2009:4). a fanatical position that, in a wider groups like the Shiite had advocated the secular authority ab initio (Sulei­ political sense, meant the rejection of legitimizing power by northernby power legitimizing Islamic rulersto door traditional open an was start.from the fundamentalism is concerned,Hickey (1984:254) as As far the lack was not dictated by of these elements or ambivalence this position rather is over method, position: the difference the extremists’ of belief in unitary insist on a aims. The extremists than ultimate of the society, view advocate religion, and they the state and no difference between which sees to the principles Islamic state, administered according making Nigeria an the all Muslims belong to the umma (community), and of Sharia. For them, is atheistic or syncretistic. Apartidea of a secular state from challenging the and the attendant breach of public peace showed and the attendant breach of public peace All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms The Shiites, also known as the Islamic Society of Nigeria, emerged The lack of political will to tackle religious fundamentalist has had will to tackle religious The lack of political This content downloaded from 139.184.223.161 on Tue, 13 Jun 2017 13:51:51 UTC its capability for violence. The Jama’t Izalat al Bid’ah Wa Iqamat as Sunnah as Iqamat Wa Bid’ah al Izalat Jama’t The violence. for capability its Reestablishment and Islam in Innovations of Eradication the for (Society of the Sunnah, in which sunnah is the ‘practice of the Prophet’), formedin Idris bin Zakariyyah, sees every1978 under the leadership of Sheikh Ismaila un-Islamic, seeks to eradicate all forms (Brotherhood) as kind of Tarigahs of innovation, and advocates firm establishment of the Sunnah. So it seeks cannot lead of the Tarigahs to purify Islam. Its contention that members eruptedprayers inspired most of the violence that in many mosques in most of the major cities of the norththrough the 1970s and early 1980s (Amara Ibrahim 1997:513, 518–520). n.d.; Falola 1998:242–244; Hickey 1984:252; ArmyIdris (1936–2000), an imam in the Nigerian from Bauchi State, spent on the basis of the Qur’anseveral years inviting people to Islam and the Sunnah and against all forms of innovation, such as the celebrating Mawlid birthday), and visiting the tombs of the naming ceremonies, (the Prophet’s saints. He established the headquarters of his society in Jos, Plateau State. a in Nigeria in the late 1970s under the leadership of Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, 1979 first-class graduate in economics at the Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria. His reputation for radical Islam dates back to his undergraduate days during at university in the 1970s, when he led the Muslim Students Society, which period he sponsored some demonstrations. But the group leadership’s earlier links with university students provided it with a intellectual and revolutionary foundation (Albert is the 1999b:81–87; Best n.d). Its objective efficient intelligence services,efficient intelligence response to the inadequate and uncoordinated available reports, and hotspots, and derelict handling of known flashpoints sponsors and backers of extrem­ the reluctance to unmask the influential Nigerian state notwithstanding, sects ists. Their different perception by the extremists groups. Whereas the Izala like the Izala and the Shiite qualify as is not overtlypersuasive approach to Islamic evangeliza­ violent, given its the state in any conflict, its violent tion, and even when it has not engaged clashes with the Tarigahs incapable of handling crises and protecting its citizens (Kastfelt 1989:85–88). crises and protecting its citizens (Kastfelt incapable of handling This culture of impunity pervades impunity of culture This governance The nonrelease Nigeria. in reports,of commission or judicial, investigative, whether administrative, of dis­ people deep feelings It has created in the situation. has compounded trust for governments On 9 their perpetrators. of crises and in the handling in which Fatima there was a rumoredJune 1985, attack in Yola, Maitatsine suspected to murdered by a man girl, was -old -and-a-half-year Garba, a three close to the base of the Maitatsine murder, The be a Maitatsine follower. local governments’ 1984 uprising, and the state and followers during their out of fear or negligence, portrayedpoor handling of it, government as being other results. These include the reluctance to check the growing armies include the reluctance to check the other results. These country dangerous sects still operating in the of well-known but equally and armedpool of recruits gangs that could provide a ready for potential organization of is also the problem of poor funding and extremists. There

africa today 57(4) 112 Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram africa today 57(4) 113 Abimbola O. Adesoji All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms This content downloaded from 139.184.223.161 on Tue, 13 Jun 2017 13:51:51 UTC The inability or reluctance to tackle Sharia operators and checkmate Sharia operators to tackle The inability or reluctance The existence of “street boys” (unemployed youths) and armedThe existence of “street boys” (unemployed gangs the fanatical sects and armed and sects fanatical the ­ patron political of evidence could be gangs combination of both. The patronage age, political laxity and rivalries, or a explain the situation where the elite of religion by the political elite could in governmentmaking decisions or are indecisive on issues that vacillate in just as evident in the case of Yusuf, require prompt action. This perhaps was failure groups. In contrast, the state’s it is with other potentially dangerous and arrest movement Marwa owed to politi­ to check the growth of Marwa’s and security agents. Rivalrycal laxity and power rivalries among politicians Redemption Party (PRP), between Kano State, controlled by the People’s and the federal government, led by the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and for which Marwato the dimensions and became a useful pawn, contributed outcome of the Maitatsine crisis in Kano (Falola1998:139–140). The desire unorthodoxattempt to led it Kano over take NPN to by portrayto means the PRP government credibility as incompetent and weak, as well as create problems for it. Marwa fit into this plan and enjoyed heavy patronage from the NPN. Beyond the initial reluctance of the federal police force to check Dawha 1996:4–14; Ya’u 2000:161–178). Their existence aids fundamentalism 2000:161–178). Dawha 1996:4–14; Ya’u considerably. Tauri, which has a longer history and is described as economic opportunists, Tauri, and professional mercenary who are prepared to offer their services soldiers, a handy instrument,to whoever hires them, together constitute which could be used by anybody to start a civil disturbance (Albert 1997:285–325; Zakzakky, these sects have these sects have detention without trial of El-Zakzakky, tions and the long continued to exist. Dauka Amarya Banga, and Yan Daba, Yan Yan Tauri, like the Almajirai, Yan Northernin made some partshas Nigeria north,the of Kano, hot spots. like of a desire to resortThese gangs are mostly the product to violence as a the structuralcoping mechanism, characteristic of adjustment years. Yan Abuah 2009:1–2; Albertoccasional confronta­ these 1999a:286–288). Beyond employed, and appear less dangerous, their goals are revolutionaryare goals their dangerous, less appear and employed, reformor ­ to armsist, and their recourse particularly is not impossible, in the case of to violence, even present strategies. Their predisposition the failure of their groups, Islamic other with clashes their in seen as professed, not is it when is pertinent. with the Tarigahs, While the Izala had been at loggerheads and other Tauri, their breakaway group, the Yan the Shiites had engaged in 1996, 1997, and liberal in violent confrontation Muslims they considered their proces­ the Shiites clashes with the police during other times. Besides, and what they are capable of (Akhaine protests indicate sions and anti-West establishment of an Islamic state governed state of an Islamic establishment preaching through by Sharia and Palestine, of state the for sympathy has It influence. social subtle and not hide The Shiites did States of America. and the United abhors Israel consider all of which they and the judiciary, for the state police their disdain instrumentsAlthough these (Olugboji 1995:6). as Satan of evil, personified gainfully are educated and of their members elitist, in that many sects are ­ All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms The police and other security agencies are often blamed for not nip­ not for blamed often are agencies security other and police The The porosity of the Nigerian borders has made it possible for foreignersThe porosity of the Nigerian borders has This content downloaded from 139.184.223.161 on Tue, 13 Jun 2017 13:51:51 UTC and control of movement into the country. Although the 2004 experiment and control of movement into the country. failed (because of a combination of corruption it was and poor political will), worthwhile. Even when some foreigners would still have registered under the scheme, their monitoring would have been better enhanced. The poor definition of national identity and culture, even among Nigerians, given the prevalence of divisive tendencies, has not provided a base upon which to and strongheads. Similarly, comprehensive national civic registration as was comprehensive national and strongheads. Similarly, started features and a strict enforcement of in 2004 with detailed security compulsory birth Com­ and death registration by the National Population mission would have generated basic citizenship data for effective monitoring and illegally settled in Katsina State is considered a better indigene than an and illegally settled in Katsina State is Igbo man born, and paying tax in the same state. Obviously, bred, working, breed the unity on the one hand andethnic, linguistic, and religious affinities The usual response of the Nigerian state explain the difference on the other. has been to deport foreigners, who easily find their way back. the identified as usual. A more comprehen­ For those not identified, business continues a better better policing of the border, sive response should have included a to check corruptionmotivation of the immigration officers and aiding of armingbetter a and crossing border illegal deviant the engage to officials of tional connections of the various fanatical groups operating in the country. groups operating in the country. of the various fanatical tional connections comprehensively, adequately, the ability of the state to respond Implicitly, and promptly to future risings is not strengthened. with Nigerians to slip into the coun­ who share ethnic and religious affinities As posited by Kazah-Toure try and enlist or otherwise the fanatics’ army. join Republic carrying(2004:41–61), a Hausa man from Niger a Nigerian passport security forces, which are under the control of the federal government. federal the of the In control the under are which forces, security age of global terrorism,international national and given the outrage against been a better time for the countryreligious extremism, there could not have on the Boko Haram riot, to tremen­ to translate the sympathy and effusion interna speculated the and spread national the probe to capital security dous placed people. This is in addition to the problem of nepotism in the structurethe in nepotism of problem the to in addition is This people. placed to fund intel­ political officeholders organizations, failure of of the security coordination administration, and absence of proper ligence gathering and and processing of organizations in the exchange among different security informationintelligence of inability the is Related 2008:28–31). (Soyinka state governorsof their states to control the as the chief security officers into the Maitatsine crisis in Kano by both the federal and state governments both the federal by in Kano crisis Maitatsine into the marred its credibility. for their being responsible in the bud, or for activities ping fundamentalist failure to arm them state’s often stressed is the but what is not escalations, them for better performance.adequately and motivate The intelligence as normal constituted has been described organization as presently security personal protection of governmentintelligence used for officials and highly the menace that Marwa’s group represented, politics played with the inquiry the played with politics group represented, Marwa’s that the menace

africa today 57(4) 114 Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram africa today 57(4) 115 Abimbola O. Adesoji ­ ani from 1980 to 2004 that took place in place took 2004 that 1980 to ani from n fact, most of the purely communal clashes n fact, communal most of the purely All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms igeria, 104 were related to religion. I religion. to related igeria, 104 were This content downloaded from 139.184.223.161 on Tue, 13 Jun 2017 13:51:51 UTC Northern N Out of 178 cases of clashes recorded by Shehu S by Out of 178 cases of clashes recorded 1. tes No with an ethnic bent, is a timely warning. Already, the recurrence interethnic religious crises, mostly of intraethnic and Already, its policy of patronage of religion, with a view to leaving it in the private its policy of patronage of religion, with makes religion a potent or politicizing religious militancy realm. Trivializing The employment or applica­ threat to national security and development. usual fire-brigade approach mostly tion of these measures, rather than the employed to quell insurrections and other religious crises, would address and contribute to prevent­ more concretely the problem of fundamentalism the problem away or pretending it is not there, or ing a recurrence. Wishing not as serious as the government approach seems, is to sit on a time bomb. tors capable of igniting and fueling militancy, the government should review tors capable of igniting and fueling militancy, ing the challenge of Islamic fundamentalism is required on the part Islamic fundamentalism is required ing the challenge of of the government. appropriately categorizing This would involve identifying and a view to determining,Islamic groups with groups with a much earlier, notwithstand­ The privacy and influence of religion propensity for violence. ing, governmentit such that its practice does involvement in regulating a danger to the well-being of the state not breach public peace or constitute deserves in this regard is the enlistment of main­ encouragement. Relevant traditional rulers,stream Islamic leaders and mostly Muslim mainly from the north, categorization, and monitoring, in the process of identification, teaching from spreading. It to prevent jaundiced and politically motivated as it is, without seeking to make would involve seeing fundamentalism of failure of problem the address to seeking while it of out gains political governancea basis for an excuse for militancy in different that provides forms.Pertinent fac­ triggering and predisposing the of consideration the is security, and groups, religious Islamic of nature and types the in located tors economic, and societal structures. Beyond addressing all the triggering fac­ across the world, a more focused, pragmatic, and dynamic approach to resolv to approach dynamic and pragmatic, focused, a more world, the across rooted than the approaches appears more deep-rooted than the approaches Islamic fundamentalism adopted by the government to address it. Hurried, superficial,­ and uncoordi government the by symptoms, the on even attacks, nated an indication are to poses it danger the Given negligence. deliberate or understanding poor of countrythe from nations serious response more and the security global and Conclusion build a virile national citizenship with national outlook and pride as a basis as a and pride outlook with national citizenship a virile national build destructivefor opposing -induced cross-border affinities. religious and ethnic ee S aduna, ncident ncident I heir status heir status (retaliation (retaliation T ani Yerima of Yerima ani qisas tate, S tate, atest Bauchi Latest badan), 2 August 2009. badan), 2 August rial-Mustapha. Punch The t was used by Muhammed Muhammed by used was t T agos), 31 August, p. 23. p. (Lagos), 31 August, Tell okoto S okoto mehielle 2004:754. hiites Protest in K Protest as Shiites njured he adoption of the name by Mallam of the name by he adoption T the beginner in elementaryin beginner almajiri, the ato Crisis: How Crisis:How ato ith the exception of three amputations amputations of three ith the exception K ith the exception of Alhaji Umaru Musa of Alhaji ith the exception W W ala ead, 60 I ead, K (adultery) and severe forms of forms (adultery)severe and (I Sunday Tribune euters) eared D eared zina estern ideology and culture in a strict contest, usually in a strict ideology and culture estern contest, ect’s Activities are Political. Political. Activitiesare ect’s W (Lagos), 23 October. Punch The lood Borno. S hree F hree T eptember, pp. 1–2. pp. eptember, Islamic hose who say, “A mere man said it”’ in apparent reference to the to reference in apparent man said it”’ mere “A hose who say, T tate’s proclamation in 1999; see N proclamation tate’s aduna), 1 January. igawa, respectively. respectively. uraki of Jigawa, T ather, the persons on whom such sentences were imposed were quietly dealt imposed were were the persons on whom such sentences ather, Shayk.2009. All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms aminu mallams disciples of town-dwelling or grown-up adult students ano usage are hat is Boko Haram” (Culled from R from (Culled is Bokohat Haram” W ato is interpreted as ‘ as is interpreted ato haria courts, like stoning to death for for death Shariato courts, stoning like ho or axone, and Adamu Abuah. 2009. Abuah. and Adamu axone, ani 2007: 61–185). (Lagos), 19 S Guardian The ano. ala K ee also National Life 2009. ee also Anonymous 2009a. ee also Anonymous ale Badamasi could mean the continued existence of the Maitatsine group, despite its brutal its brutal despite of the Maitatsine group, existence mean the continued could ale Badamasi he attention the Boko Haram crisis attracted around the world points to its importance to points the world and crisis the Boko around attracted Haram he attention hey are Alhajis Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, Attahiru Bafarawa of S Bafarawa Attahiru Yar’Adua, Umaru Musa Alhajis hey are his statement was credited to President Olusegun Obasanjo during his visit to Harvard Olusegun Obasanjo during his visit to President to credited was his statement gives an insight into the nature of the group, its ideology, its modus its ideology, of the group, the nature into an insight gives Taliban he name Nigerian eporter. 2010. Boko Haram Posters F Posters 2010. Boko Haram eporter. lory, Habibulah lory, W t involves imposing on people and enforcing strict ways of life based on the group perception perception based on the group of life strict ways imposing on people and enforcing t involves T 2009b). (Anonymous it raised that the concern S T Zamfara, and S Zamfara, K (Lagos), 14 October. for theft, carriedfor out in the very the political ambition and of Sharia implementation, early days decisions of some of the hard implementing them from hindered of the governors calculation the . R or retribution) 2007:203). (Ostien with in other ways Yar’Adua, they are currently facing anti-graft charges. facing anti-graft charges. currently they are Yar’Adua, “ I of Islam, engaging and interpretation on deaths in massive resulting and being fatalistic, and armed insurgents, violence involving the part and their targets. of the groups T after S University Zamfara S it (Hiskett Isichei 1987:194). 1987:220; revive to or an attempt in the 1980s, suppression in K Gardawa migrants. no longer seasonal are been Almajirai, have once they may though who, of that between one intermediate as an of thought is T from. derives support,likely its sympathy its inspiration, of where and source its operandi, teaching that the Prophet’s dicta were of human, not divine, origin. I origin. divine, not human, of dicta were Prophet’s the that teaching Marwa of himself as a prophet. the declaration justify to took place in the Middle Belt, where the number of Muslims was lower than in the far north than in the the Middle in lower of Muslims the number was place Belt,took where (S K fully fledged mallam (HiskettQur’an of and that 1987:213). studies, S (K Trust Weekly Erupted. 7. 8. 6. 9. 3. 5. 2. 4. This content downloaded from 139.184.223.161 on Tue, 13 Jun 2017 13:51:51 UTC 10. es Cited References Adedeji, Ademola. 2009. 1000 Boko Haram Members in Prison, Awaiting Awaiting Members 2009. 1000 Boko Haram in Prison, Ademola. Adedeji, Abubakar, Mohammed, and Ahmed A. Mohammed. 2010. Mohammed. A. Ahmed and Mohammed, Abubakar, al-I Adam Agency R Akhaine, S

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