The Use of Voluntary Safety Reporting Programs by the Federal Aviation Administration

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The Use of Voluntary Safety Reporting Programs by the Federal Aviation Administration COLLABORATING WITH INDUSTRY TO ENSURE REGULATORY OVERSIGHT: THE USE OF VOLUNTARY SAFETY REPORTING PROGRAMS BY THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION A dissertation submitted to Kent State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Russell W. Mills May 2011 Dissertation written by Russell W. Mills B.A., Westminster College, 2005 M.P.A, University of Vermont, 2007 Ph.D, Kent State University, 2011 Approved by _____________________ , Mark K. Cassell, Co-Chair, Doctoral Dissertation Committee _____________________, Renée J. Johnson, Co-Chair, Doctoral Dissertation Committee _____________________, Daniel Hawes, Committee Member _____________________, Issac Richmond Nettey, Outside Reader _____________________, Paul Farrell, Graduate Faculty Member Accepted by _____________________, Steven Hook, Chair, Department of Political Science _____________________, Timothy Moerland, Dean, College of Arts and Sciences ii TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... X LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ XI ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................. XII CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW .................................... 1 1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 1.1.1 “Voluntary Regulation Does Not Work” ........................................................ 1 1.1.2 The Regulation Dilemma and Voluntary Regulatory Partnership Programs .. 3 1.1.3 The Federal Aviation Administration’s Voluntary Safety Reporting Programs ......................................................................................................................... 8 1.1.4 Research Questions ....................................................................................... 11 1.2 Literature Review .................................................................................................... 13 1.2.1 Regulation in the United States: An Overview ............................................ 13 1.2.1.1 Economic Regulation: The Market and Associational Regimes ........ 13 1.2.1.2 The Societal Regulatory Regime ......................................................... 15 1.2.1.3 The Efficiency Regime: Regulatory Reform and Deregulation ......... 17 1.2.1.4 The Reinventing Government and Voluntary Partnership Era: The Clinton and Bush II Years .................................................................................. 19 1.2.2 Perspectives on Regulatory Change .............................................................. 20 1.2.2.1 The Public Choice Perspective ............................................................ 20 1.2.2.2 The Structural Politics Perspective ...................................................... 21 1.2.2.3 The Behavioral/Punctuated Equilibrium Approach ............................ 22 iii 1.2.2.4 Wilson’s Perspective: Mission, Tasks, and Culture ........................... 23 1.2.2.5 The Historical Development of Reputation and Autonomy Perspective ............................................................................................................. 25 1.2.3 Types and Use of Regulatory Instruments .................................................... 26 1.2.3.1 Command and Control Regulation ..................................................... 27 1.2.3.2 Industry Self-Regulation ..................................................................... 29 1.2.3.3 Voluntary Programs ............................................................................ 30 1.3 Research Design ...................................................................................................... 33 1.3.1 Epistemological Foundations ........................................................................ 33 1.3.2 Summary of Research Design/Case Selection and Presentation ................... 34 1.4 Outline of Dissertation Chapters and Brief Description ......................................... 35 1.4.1 Chapter 2: The Use of Voluntary Regulatory Partnerships in the United States-The Case of the FAA’s Voluntary Safety Reporting Programs ...................... 35 1.4.2 Chapter 3: The Historical Development of the Federal Aviation Administration’s Voluntary Safety Reporting Programs .......................................... 36 1.4.3 Chapter 4: Fostering Bureaucratic Policy Learning through Voluntary Safety Reporting Programs: The Case of the Federal Aviation Administration ................. 37 1.4.4 Chapter 5: The Future of Voluntary Programs: Policy Implications, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations ................................................................................ 38 CHAPTER 2 THE USE OF VOLUNTARY REGULATORY PARTNERSHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE FAA’S VOLUNTARY SAFETY REPORTING PROGRAMS......................................................................................................... 39 iv 2.1 The Federal Aviation Administration ..................................................................... 39 2.1.1 The FAA’s Traditional Approach to Safety Oversight ................................. 39 2.1.2 An Overview of the FAA’s Voluntary Safety Reporting Programs ............. 42 2.2 Methodology and Research Questions .................................................................... 43 2.3 The Aviation Safety Reporting Program (ASRS) ................................................... 45 2.3.1 Overview ....................................................................................................... 45 2.3.2 Confidentiality and Reporting Incentive ....................................................... 46 2.3.3 Reporting and Data Analysis Process ........................................................... 47 2.3.4 ASRS Outputs Produced ............................................................................... 50 2.3.5 Challenges Facing ASRS .............................................................................. 52 2.4 Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program ............................................................... 53 2.4.1 Overview ....................................................................................................... 53 2.4.2 Confidentiality and Regulatory Incentive ..................................................... 53 2.4.3 The Six Stages of the VDRP Process ............................................................ 54 2.4.4 Analysis and Outputs of VDRP Data ............................................................ 56 2.4.5 The Southwest/American Airlines Incident .................................................. 57 2.4.6 Challenges Facing VDRP ............................................................................. 60 2.5 The Aviation Safety Action Program ...................................................................... 61 2.5.1 Overview ....................................................................................................... 61 2.5.2 Confidentiality and Regulatory Incentive ..................................................... 62 2.5.3 The Memorandum of Understanding and the Event Review Committee ..... 63 2.5.4 Analysis of ASAP Data ................................................................................. 67 v 2.5.5 Outputs of ASAP Data .................................................................................. 71 2.5.6 Challenges Facing ASAP .............................................................................. 72 2.6 Structural Differences Between ASRS, ASAP, and VDRP .................................... 74 2.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 79 CHAPTER 3 THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION’S VOLUNTARY SAFETY REPORTING PROGRAMS 81 3.1 Introduction and Research Questions ...................................................................... 81 3.2 Theoretical Frameworks for Explaining the Development of Voluntary Regulatory Programs ........................................................................................................................... 82 3.2.1 Public Choice Agency Capture Theory ......................................................... 82 3.2.2 Structural Politics Theory.............................................................................. 84 3.2.3 Organization Reputation Theory ................................................................... 85 3.2.4 The Behavioral/Punctuated Equilibrium Theory .......................................... 87 3.3 Methodology ........................................................................................................... 88 3.4 The Historical Development of Aviation Regulation in the United States ............. 90 3.4.1 The Early Years: World War I and NACA .................................................. 90 3.4.2 Through Rain and Snow: The Air Mail Acts ............................................... 91 3.4.3 The Beginning of Modern Aviation Regulation: The Air Commerce Act of 1926 and the Aeronautics Branch .............................................................................. 92 3.4.4 The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 ............................................................... 96 3.4.5 The Federal Aviation Act of 1958
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