FALSE HOPES? POLITICAL INCLUSION PROSPECTS IN ROJAVA AND IRAQI

Mustafa Gurbuz, Ph.D. Arab Center, Washington D.C.

October 2018

© 2018 by the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University

This material may be quoted or reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the author and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy.

Wherever feasible, papers are reviewed by outside experts before they are released. However, the research and views expressed in this paper are those of the individual researcher(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy.

Mustafa Gurbuz, Ph.D. “False Hopes? Political Inclusion Prospects in Rojava and ”

This report is part of a two-year research project on pluralism in the after the Arab uprisings. The project is generously supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. False Hopes? Political Inclusion Prospects in Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan

Among those deeply affected by the Arab Spring were the —the largest ethnic minority without a state in the Middle East. The Syrian civil war put the Kurds at the forefront in the war against the Islamic State (IS) and drastically changed the future prospects of Kurds in both and . This research paper examines the challenges that hinder development of a politically inclusive culture in Syrian Kurdistan—popularly known as Rojava—and Iraqi Kurdistan. Political and economic instability in both regions have shattered dreams for political diversity and prosperity since the early days of the Arab Spring.

This research also aims to provide an overview of the political inclusion prospects in the Kurdish-controlled regions in Syria and Iraq. Threats to political inclusion in Kurdish regions are multifaceted. First, ethnic tensions with Arab tribes and rapid demographic changes are entangled with the fierce competition for resources in the disputed territories of northern Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan. Second, enduring violence and deep divisions among Kurdish rival factions have presented challenges for the democratic prospects of an inclusive political culture. Finally, institutional structures are weak and fragile in Kurdish regions. In the absence of a system of checks and balances, Kurds remain vulnerable to outside influences and the regional power play in both Syria and Iraq.

The Rising Tide of Syrian Kurds

The civil war in Syria has thus far bolstered the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and its political platform, the Democratic Union Party (PYD); these groups have received both U.S. and Russian military support. In order to placate —which declared the aforementioned groups as “terrorists” due to their links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—American officials called U.S.-YPG relations “tactical,” “transactional,” and short- term; likewise, they also downplayed the PYD’s links to the PKK.1 The threat of IS has led the American media to reimagine Kurdish fighters as the United States’ “best allies” with a secular and egalitarian ideology; this view is often presented with a juxtaposition of a “malevolent IS” versus “freedom fighter women.” The Rojava project (i.e., unifying Kurdish cantons in northern Syria under a new local governing body) is depicted as a dream for egalitarianism and a liberal inclusive culture that counters patriarchal structures in the Middle East.2

U.S. policy toward the Kurds, however, has become puzzling since the 2017 defeat of IS in Syria. While the U.S.—to avoid alienating the Turks—did not object to the Turkish troops’ invasion of the Kurdish canton of Afrin, the YPG began forging closer ties to — which led to complaints from some American officials that the Kurdish group “has turned

1 Laurie Mylroie, “State Department: ‘US Made No Promises to YPG, Our Relationship is Tactical’,” Kurdistan 24, May 18, 2017, http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/a4fa408c-e24b-46f2-9bbd- 0cf4051143af. 2 See, for example, Wes Enzinna, “A Dream of Secular Utopia in ISIS’ Backyard,” The New York Times Magazine, Nov. 24, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/29/magazine/a-dream-of-utopia-in- hell.html.

3 False Hopes? Political Inclusion Prospects in Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan into an insurgent organization.”3 In fact, from the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Syrian Kurds have been most careful to not directly target the Assad regime, aside from some short-term clashes in certain places like Rojava, for two major reasons.

First, given the common enemies of the Kurds and the Assad regime, Damascus continued to pay the salaries of civil servants in PYD-controlled regions and pursued an accommodative policy.4 Rojava has been immune from the regime’s air strikes since the beginning of the Syrian civil war. In addition, Damascus enabled Rojava residents to enjoy access to central government services such as public sector salaries, schools, health care, travel on civilian airlines, and the issuance of identity cards, passports, and property records. Given the Assad regime’s resilience and high likelihood of staying in power for the foreseeable future, Syrian Kurds will keep this strategy of realpolitik. In the words of the PYD’s former co-chair Saleh Muslim, “The PYD is part of the Syrian revolution, but it is not prepared to be used as its soldiers.”5 As the economy and finances are the most important challenges, Rojava is still very much dependent on the Syrian regime, and without economic independence, an autonomous Kurdish zone is a mirage. YPG officials blame the Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish embargos for the economic deficiencies and shortages of essential goods such as medical supplies.6 Financial suffering, however, also led to local accusations of incompetence and nepotism, and the local administration still lacks control over large sectors of the economy. Despite efforts to regulate the food market by taxing goods traded within Rojava, residents still sometimes witness spikes in the prices of basic items.7

Second, playing the delicate balance between the Syrian regime and Western powers, the YPG has framed its mobilization as “local self-defense” that does not seek a separate nation-state. In other words, Syrian Kurds pragmatically used PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s writings as an asset to gain international recognition, blurring the line between separatism and local governance. Indeed, the particular narrative of local self-rule has deep roots in PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s prison writings. While denying their organizational links with the PKK, the YPG declared Ocalan as the group’s visionary leader. After his capture by Turkish forces in 1999, Ocalan developed a new perspective, calling it the “democratic republic” thesis in his prison writings. Ocalan’s idiosyncratic thesis rests on “,” “autonomy,” and the “dangers” of the nation-state.

For Ocalan, Kurds should not aim to establish an independent nation-state structure because the modern nation-state is intrinsically a top-down project that is based on

3 “YPG is Becoming an ‘Insurgent Group’ in Syria: U.S. Senator Rubio”, Ahval News, July 27, 2018 https://ahvalnews.com/pyd-ypg/ypg-becoming-insurgent-group-syria-us-senator-rubio. 4 Ghadi Sary, Kurdish Self-Governance in Syria: Survival and Ambition, Chatham House Research Paper, September 15, 2016, 14. 5 Cengiz Gunes and Robert Lowe, “The Impact of the Syrian War on Kurdish Politics across the Middle East,” Chatham House Research Paper, July 23, 2015, 5. 6 Sary, Kurdish Self-Governance, 14. 7 Sary, Kurdish Self-Governance, 13.

4 False Hopes? Political Inclusion Prospects in Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan homogenization and assimilation—what Kurds suffered most in recent history.8 Ocalan argues that capitalism enforces “the centralization of the state” and fascism is the “purest form” of nation-states.9 In Turkish contexts, Ocalan’s rejection of an independent Kurdish state was interpreted as a strategic reach to the Turkish civil-military bureaucracy. Ocalan’s emphasis on local structures against state centralization, however, has bolstered Kurdish civil society activism at municipal levels, which gained support from some European organizations.10 Similarly, the YPG utilized Ocalan’s thesis to support Kurdish local demands for autonomy in Syria while claiming that Kurds do not pose a real threat to the Assad regime, as they do not seek independence. Thus, Syrian Kurds have tried hard to balance ideology and political opportunity—and to present their socialist worldview with an emphasis on democratic ideals that target a Western audience for support.

Threats to Political Inclusion in Rojava

Despite the aforementioned factors in favor of what Syrian Kurds call “the Rojava project,” major challenges feed ethnic tensions between the Kurds and the Arabs and, therefore threaten stability in northern Syria.

Being heavily Kurdish, the U.S.-backed (SDF) currently have sway over 27% of Syrian territory in the north.11 In the Kurdish cantons of the eastern , Kurds constitute only a slim majority of 55% and in some places such as southern Hasaka, Kurds rule over the Arab-majority towns.12 The SDF’s ethnic composition has long been a point of discussion in Washington, D.C.; U.S. officials have provided conflicting numbers, pointing out that Arab representation has increased over time.13 At the leadership level, however, Kurds dominate the SDF ranks and pursue an agenda of indoctrination. For example, in a recent graduation ceremony of 140 Arab fighters joining the SDF following a 45-day training program, pro-PKK slogans such as “No Life without Our Leader!” were chanted as a pledge of allegiance.14

8 Abdullah Ocalan, Demokratik Uygarlık Manifestosu: Ortadoğu’da Uygarlık Krizi ve Demokratik Uygarlık Çözümü, Mezopotamya Yayınları, 2010, 195. 9 Abdullah Ocalan, Democratic Confederalism, Transmedia Publishing, 2011, 24-28. 10 Mustafa Gurbuz, Rival Kurdish Movements in Turkey: Transforming Ethnic Conflict, Amsterdam University Press, 2016, 95. To ensure European support, pro-Kurdish party politicians argue that democratic autonomy will help Turkey decentralize to be divided into 20 to 25 regions based on geography, not ethnicity. Each region has an autonomous assembly, as in Spain. “Some functions— economy, judiciary, defense—would remain at center, but the rest—like education, agriculture, tourism—are to be devolved to the autonomous regions.” See, http://new-compass.net/articles/dtks- updated-proposal-democratic-autonomy. 11 Josie Ensor, “US-Backed Syrian Kurds Meet with Regime for First Time in Hope of Protecting Territory,” The Telegraph, July 27, 2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/07/27/us-backed- syrian-kurds-meet-regime-first-time-hope-preserve/. 12 Fabrice Balanche, Secterianism in Syria’s Civil War: A Geopolitical Study, The Washington Institute, 2018, 51. 13 Daniel Wilkofsky and Khalid Fatah, “Northern Syria’s Anti-Islamic State Coalition has an Arab Problem,” War on the Rocks, Sep 18, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/northern-syrias-anti- islamic-state-coalition-has-an-arab-problem/. 14 For a video footage of the ceremony, see https://twitter.com/NSO_SY/status/975042465576210432, accessed August 27, 2018.

5 False Hopes? Political Inclusion Prospects in Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan

Ethnic tensions mattered less when there was a strong coalition between the Kurds and the Arabs against IS; some Arab tribes sought revenge against IS, while others have long been allied with the Assad regime. The post-IS era, however, has unleashed ethnic competition over limited local resources.

One factor that drives tensions is the oil fields. Kurdish cantons include key oil fields in southern Hasaka. The al-Shaddadi oil fields, for example, are located in predominantly Arab lands and are deemed especially valuable for Rojava’s economic future. Before the Syrian civil war, Hasaka and Raqqa provided almost two-thirds of Syria’s total oil extraction—251,000 out of 387,000 barrels per day.15

Oil revenue is already significant for Rojava’s economy and will be a major source of revenue if Kurds can initiate transactions with Damascus via the original pipeline. Negotiations with the regime, however, may not ease Kurdish-Arab tensions as some of the local Arab tribes have long supported Damascus. In fact, during the 2004 Kurdish uprising in , the Assad regime offered armed support to Arab tribes in Jazira—namely Adwan, Jabbour, Ougaidat, and Tay—to quell the riots.16 Despite the somewhat cordial relations between Damascus and the Kurds during the civil war, the Assad regime aimed to continue close relations with these Arab tribes. When Kurds began offering higher salaries to Arab locals after the SDF captured lucrative oil fields, the regime did not hesitate to conduct air bombings of Hasaka in August 2016 to defend its public image as the arbiter of Kurds and Arabs.17

In addition to oil, fertile agricultural land in the Jazira and Hasaka region may cause mayhem if Kurdish authorities choose to redistribute land to attract thousands of landless peasants. Before the civil war, the region produced 43% of Syria’s grains and 80% of its cotton.18 Although the region is considered Syria’s food basket, the Assad regime did not invest in it when farmers faced severe water shortages in the past two decades. Years of drought and increasing consumption of water on the Turkish side pressured the farmers whose traditional agricultural practices such as gravity feed systems demand extremely high water usage. The regime promised to develop modernized irrigation techniques following the 2004 Kurdish revolt, but this was never implemented. According to Fabrice Balanche’s research based on French Ministry of Agriculture statistics, the Hasaka province witnessed a 25% decrease in cultivated areas between 1995 and 2008, causing a steady outflow of the region’s population into urban centers such as Aleppo and Damascus.19 The regime’s food and fuel policies—extracting maximum resources while deliberately not establishing industries—were consistent over the years, making the region subservient to

15 David Butter, Syria’s Economy: Picking up the Pieces, Chatham House Research Paper, June 23, 2015, 15-16. 16 Balanche, Secterianism in Syria’s Civil War, 89. 17 Aron Lund, “Bombers over Hasakah: Assad Clashes with The Kurds,” Diwan, Carnegie Middle East Center, Aug. 22, 2016, http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/64375. 18 “Syria: Crop Progress Report,” U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Office of Global Analysis, Jan. 24, 2009. https://ipad.fas.usda.gov/pdfs/Syria/Syria_January2009_Monthly_Report.pdf. 19 Balanche, Secterianism in Syria’s Civil War, 126.

6 False Hopes? Political Inclusion Prospects in Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan the state. Thus, access to water and resources will remain as the key flashpoint in the Kurds’ relations with the central government.

It is unclear how the local population will perceive the redistribution of land under the YPG. The YPG believes in a communal system of government that provides food and fuel security and education through local councils. The communes take care of most functions of a modern state; in many ways, local autonomy in Rojava appears to constitute a type of socialist revolution. Some local residents, however, have begun to raise concerns, complaining about the decision-making authority and unaccountability of YPG leaders.20 There is also criticism of the YPG’s strict budgetary control over the communes and its practice of channeling funds and humanitarian aid in exchange for the recipients’ loyalty to its authority.

The YPG’s ideology may on occasion appeal to anti-establishment Arab youths who are alienated from their tribes; however, the ideology is particularly attractive to Kurdish youths due to its Kurdish nationalist flavor, which does not resonate with Arabs.21 Moreover, the Arab tribes’ fear of Kurdish will be reinforced as long as the SDF structure facilitates indoctrination of PKK ideology. The Syrian regime’s “” policies since the 1970s have changed the demographics of the region; therefore, the Arab tribes’ anxiety regarding the “re-Kurdification” of Rojava under YPG rule is not baseless. The YPG’s earlier practice of forced conscription of Arab boys and girls (under the age of 18) is still fresh in the memories of local Arabs.22 In fact, Amnesty International accused the YPG forces of committing “war crimes” to change region’s demographics.23

Escalation of Intra-Kurdish Tensions

The threats to democratic prospects of an inclusive political culture cannot simply be reduced to ethnic competition between Kurds and Arabs. Enduring violence and deep divisions among Kurdish rival groups are among the significant factors that trouble both Syrian and Iraqi Kurdistan.

For example, the YPG’s repressive measures were not only targeted at Arabs but also Syrian Kurds who were critical of YPG rule. About 300,000 who currently reside in Iraqi Kurdistan were forced to leave their hometowns in part due to their support for Barzani’s

20 Dan Wilkofsky, “The Commune System: A Look at Local PYD Governance in Northeastern Syria,” SyriaSource, Atlantic Council, March 12, 2018, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/the- commune-system-a-look-at-local-pyd-governance-in-northeastern-syria. 21 Rod Nordland, “Syrian Kurds: U.S. Allies, but Followers of Leader Jailed as Terrorist,” The New York Times, March 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/world/middleeast/syria-kurds-turkey- rojava-abdullah- ocalan.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fmiddleeast&action=click&contentCollection=mid dleeast®ion=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPl. 22 Abdullah Al-Jabassini, “Civil Resistance to Military Conscription in Kurdish Areas of Northern Syria: The Untold Story,” Journal of Peacebuilding and Development 12, no.3: 104-110. 23 “Syria: US Ally’s Razing of Villages Amounts to War Crimes,” Amnesty International, Oct. 13, 2015, https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2015/10/syria-us-allys-razing-of-villages-amounts-to- war-crimes/.

7 False Hopes? Political Inclusion Prospects in Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan

Kurdistan Democratic Party.24 No less than 200,000 other Kurds have fled to Turkey, allegedly escaping the YPG’s forced conscription and authoritarian regime.25 The YPG is also accused of assassinating Syrian Kurdish leaders such as Mish’al Tammu, Mahmud Wali, and Ahmad Bunjak.

With the intensification of intra-Kurdish tensions, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria—an affiliate of Barzani’s KDP—declared its intention to re-deploy its 14,000 forces to the Kurdish enclave in Syria.26 In return, the YPG leadership warned that such a move would cause a “civil war.” Iraqi Kurdistan’s Sinjar region has become a flash point in the deterioration of KDP-YPG relations. After helping save from the Islamic State, YPG/PKK forces have established a stronghold in the Sinjar Mountains.

Iraqi Kurdish authorities threatened to use force if the PKK would not leave Sinjar and shut down the office of the allegedly PKK-linked Yazda—an international NGO to help Yazidis—which was reopened later.27 The PKK withdrew from Sinjar with the hope that its allies in the Yazidi community combined with the formation of local militias would enable the PKK’s penetration into the region and possible return in the future.

The Rise and Fall of Iraqi Kurdistan

The Arab Spring and ensuing meltdown of the Iraqi security architecture have led to dramatic changes in the fortunes of Iraqi Kurdistan, which is the most thriving region of the post-Saddam era. Kurdistan was often praised as a virtual island of stability—a reference to its secular character and immunity to Shia-Sunni sectarian tensions.28 The 2011 Sulaymaniyah protests inspired by the Arab uprisings, however, revealed institutional fragility. To quell the protests, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) approved a parliamentary bill that consisted of 17 points of agreement between the government and the opposition, including a promise for structural economic reforms and to fight against cronyism and corruption.29

24 Roy Gutman, “Have the Syrian Kurds Committed War Crimes?” The Nation, Feb. 7, 2017, https://www.thenation.com/article/have-the-syrian-kurds-committed-war-crimes/. 25 The numbers are contested, and the causes of Kurdish migration are controversial and multifaceted. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, 300,000 Syrian Kurds fled to Turkey. See, “Turkey Open to Kurds Participating Syria Negotiations,” Rudaw, Dec. 13, 2017, http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/13122017. 26 “Syrian Kurdish Faction Likely to Dispatch KRG-Trained Peshmerga to Rojava,” Rudaw, Jan. 22, 2017, http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/22012017. 27 “KRG Closes Offices of Yezidi Rights Organization Yazda,” Rudaw, Jan. 2, 2017, http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/020120175. 28 See, for example, Thomas L. Friedman’s columns on Iraqi politics, including “The Kurdish Secret,” The New York Times, Sept. 2, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/02/opinion/02friedmancolumn.html. 29 “Iraq’s Kurdistan Parliament Introduces Changes,” E-Kurd, Feb. 25, 2011, https://ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2011/2/state4721.htm.

8 False Hopes? Political Inclusion Prospects in Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan

The institutional problems, however, have remained a major problem.30 Although the KRG has introduced some measures for accountability in the oil sector, the opposition has claimed such steps are too little too late. Iraqi Kurdistan faced a major danger when IS directly threatened to invade . The war against IS caused not only a shrinking economy but also a domestic refugee flow: internally displaced people now represent one- third of Kurdistan’s population of 5.2 million.31 Mass outrage about the economic downturn grew as the KRG failed to properly pay public employees and unconstitutionally postponed presidential elections several times.32

In Iraqi Kurdistan, political and economic power is concentrated in the hands of two main political parties: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by former President Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by , the former president of Iraq, and his family. The overall economic system is based on oil revenues and construction projects, and it favors the rentier state model, strengthening the major party patronage networks. The two parties also divide the security sector and intelligence services, forming their own separate networks. Although the KRG has an independent Ministry of Peshmerga, the strong influence of the two main political parties (KDP and PUK) over their own military units is undeniable. In the early years of Iraqi Kurdistan during the 1990s, the KDP and PUK engaged in a bloody war. This legacy still generates distrust between the parties. The bitter reality is that there is not a single authoritative Kurdish military institution that represents the overall Kurdish quasi-state and its population.33 PUK officials often complain that the weapons provided by the United States and Western countries mainly help the KDP but do not benefit the broader population of Kurdistan. On the other hand, the KDP blames some PUK leaders for seeking an alliance with the PKK and Iran, leading to Iran’s increased influence over the region.

The KDP’s power-sharing agreements and coalition government with the PUK have enabled the establishment of a status quo in the past few years. The current financial crisis, however, emboldened the disenchanted Kurdish opposition, which has long complained about mass corruption and nepotism. The Movement of Change (Gorran) Party— established by Nawshirwan Mustafa, a former deputy secretary of the PUK, in 2009—has attracted significant support from the Kurdish youth in the Sulaymaniyah region, the traditional stronghold of the PUK. Mass protests and public strikes have convinced the PUK leadership to address grievances in Sulaymaniyah, and thus, they signed an agreement with Gorran in May 2016 to unite in the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament to pursue a common policy

30 For a detailed account of institutional problems, see Kawa Hassan, “Kurdistan’s Politicized Society Confronts A Sultanistic System,” Carnegie Middle East Center paper, Aug. 2015. 31 “Official: IDPs Make Up 35 percent of Kurdistan Region Population,” Rudaw, Oct. 20, 2015, http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/201020153. 32 Kamal Chomani, “To Prevent Violence, Kurdish Government Must Address Demands of Protesters,” The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, Jan. 5, 2018, https://timep.org/commentary/analysis/to-prevent-violence-kurdish-government-must-address- demands-of-protesters/. 33 Mario Fumerton and Wladimir Van Wilgenburg, “Kurdistan’s Political Armies: The Challenge of Unifying the Peshmerga Forces,” Carnegie Middle East Center Regional Insight paper, Dec. 2015.

9 False Hopes? Political Inclusion Prospects in Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan agenda.34 Soon after, however, a public prosecutor filed a complaint against Gorran leader Nawshirwan Mustafa, accusing him of asking “his followers to launch attacks on the headquarters of consulates of foreign countries and oil companies in the Kurdistan Region.”35 In June 2016, the Erbil Court issued an arrest warrant for Mustafa, who then left the country and passed away in London. The PUK leadership later retreated from the bilateral treaty with Gorran due to internal disputes.

As the IS threat vanished, the KRG’s push for an independence referendum in September 2017 was a major gamble. On one hand, it could boost the ruling elite’s legitimacy and authority— and indeed, the referendum galvanized the national sentiment among and beyond. On the other hand, failure could seriously undermine the KRG’s legitimacy. High emotions turned into major frustrations when the Iraqi military undertook operations in the territories around , areas of dispute between the KRG and the central government in Baghdad in the immediate aftermath of the referendum. The Kurdistan region not only lost massive oil revenues but also faced an economic embargo, including the blockade of international flights that was imposed by the central government.36

Specifically, after the loss of Kirkuk to Baghdad, the KRG’s oil production fell from 550,000 to 250,000 barrels per day.37 The dire outcomes have led the ruling parties to accuse each other of treason, while opposition parties forcefully demanded the resignation of the government. In a historic decision and with deep embarrassment, left the presidential office in November 2017.

In December 2017, protests, thousands strong, once again rocked Sulaymaniyah and Halabja. In clashes with security forces, five protesters lost their lives and a hundred were wounded. Given that protesters set fire to the offices of the ruling parties, namely Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the late Iraqi President Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Kurdish authorities justified their harsh measures on security grounds. The crackdown on the opposition media was particularly violent, with hundreds arrested.38

The Sulaymaniyah protests revealed a deep split in Iraqi Kurdistan following the independence referendum. The Kurdish opposition parties, specifically the Gorran Movement and the Kurdistan Islamic Group (Komal), have withdrawn their ministers from the government. The opposition accused the KDP and PUK of failing the nation before and

34 Mahmud Yasin Kurdi, “One Year On, PUK-Gorran Alliance at a Crossroads Amid Blame Game,” Rudaw, May 17, 2017, http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/170520171. 35 Sangar Ali, “Erbil Court Issues Arrest Warrant for Gorran Leader,” Kurdistan 24, June 16, 2016, http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/8f1033ed-4662-4d12-9e87-73114ceaeae7/Erbil-court-issues- arrest-warrant-for-Gorran-leader. 36 Joost Hiltermann and Maria Fantappie, “Twilight of The Kurds,” The Foreign Policy, Jan. 16, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/16/twilight-of-the-kurds-iraq-syria-kurdistan/. 37 “KRG to Make More Salary Cuts in 2018 after Losing Kirkuk Oil,” Rudaw, Dec. 12, 2017, http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/121220176. 38 “Journalists Arrested to Prevent Coverage of Iraqi Kurdistan Protests,” Reporters without Borders, Dec. 28, 2017, https://rsf.org/en/news/journalists-arrested-prevent-coverage-iraqi-kurdistan-protests.

10 False Hopes? Political Inclusion Prospects in Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan after the independence referendum, demanding of the current cabinet and formation of a national representative committee to pursue negotiations with Baghdad.

Kurdistan’s most recent elections in September 2018, however, did not bring hope to the opposition parties. Despite the opposition’s claims of election fraud, the ruling elite was quite successful in consolidating power and securing even more parliamentary seats.39 The low voter turnout signaled increasing disenchantment among the Kurdish electorate. It is clear that the lack of an organized opposition as a viable alternative fuels the status quo.

Divisions within the KDP elite after Barzani’s resignation are also important. Competition between Masrour Barzani and Nechirvan Barzani has intensified,40 as has the traditional rivalry between the KDP and PUK—especially with the election of Bahram Salih, a former PUK leader, as the new president of Iraq.41 By pitting the opposition stronghold of Sulaymaniyah against Erbil—the seat of government and home to Barzani—Baghdad will continue to benefit from the intra-Kurdish divide. Kurdistan’s multifaceted and structural problems signal major future challenges and the vulnerability of the region to outside interferences.

Political Inclusion in Iraqi Kurdistan: What Does the Future Hold?

The disputed territories between Baghdad and Erbil have become flash points in defining the future of Kurdistan’s policies toward minorities. The KRG insists on the implementation of Article 140 in the 2005 Iraqi constitution, which envisioned finalizing the settlement of the disputed territories in three steps: 1) a normalization process in which there is a resettlement of the people displaced during the Arabization campaign under Saddam Hussein; 2) the collection of official census data; and 3) a popular referendum to determine whether the territories will join the autonomous Kurdish region or the central authority. Since then, however, the KRG has launched a systematic campaign for Kurdish resettlement in Kirkuk and Nineveh, changing the demographics considerably. Human rights organizations have accused the KRG of “Kurdification” of the disputed territories by expelling Assyrian and Yezidi communities and employing “heavy handed tactics, including arbitrary arrests and detentions, and intimidation, directed at anyone resistant to Kurdish expansionist plans.”42 A report by Human Rights Watch detailed the rampant

39 “KIU Rejects Preliminary KRG Election Results Citing Fraud, Violations,” Rudaw, Oct. 6, 2018, http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/061020181. 40 Honar H. Rasheed, “Not-Kissing Cousins: Is the Rivalry at the Top of Iraqi Kurdistan’s Most Powerful Party Heating Up?” Niqash, March 1, 2018, http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/politics/5848/. 41 “Barham Salih Abandon CDJ, Returns to PUK to Run for Iraq Presidency,” BasNews, Sept. 19, 2018, http://www.basnews.com/index.php/en/news/kurdistan/467128. 42 “On Vulnerable Ground: Violence against Minority Communities in Nineveh Province’s Disputed Territories,” Human Rights Watch, Nov. 10, 2009, https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/11/10/vulnerable- ground/violence-against-minority-communities-nineveh-provinces-disputed.

11 False Hopes? Political Inclusion Prospects in Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan demolition of Arab homes and buildings—and at times entire villages—in the Kirkuk and Nineveh governorates by the KRG’s forces between September 2014 and May 2016.43

Such tense relations created discord and mistrust among the various communities and therefore obstructed the normalization process and the implementation of the nonpartisan census proposed in Article 140 of the 2005 Iraqi constitution. On one hand, what Kurds see as normalizing the demographics is perceived as Kurdification by Arabs, Turkmens, and Christian minorities. On the other hand, after the recent takeover by Iraqi forces, Kurds now claim that Shia militias are undertaking sectarian demographic engineering.44 The Turkish government called on Baghdad to reverse the demographic changes in the KRG- controlled areas, reminding the country of the dramatic decline in the Turkmen population in Kirkuk.45

Turkey has long perceived Kirkuk as a Turkmen city, and it therefore sought to empower the Turkmen population by calling for Turkmens to have a greater share in Kirkuk’s oil revenues and local governance structures. In 2017, the Turkmen Front in the Iraqi parliament, backed by Ankara, proposed a formula to divide local governance on an equal basis—32% equal share for Turkmens, Kurds, and Arabs, with the remaining 4% for Chaldeans and Assyrians.46 In fact, the 32% formula was first introduced by the late former Iraqi President Jalal Talabani; however, the Kurdish Peshmerga’s seizure of Kirkuk during the war against the Islamic State in 2014 has changed Kurdish calculations. KRG leaders repeatedly declared Kirkuk to be part of Kurdistan’s territory and that the Iraqi army would never return to the city.47 The Turkmen proposal, therefore, appears unacceptable to many Kurdish lawmakers despite the fact that the Iraqi army took full control of the city in 2017.

There is no doubt that massive numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kirkuk will complicate efforts to conduct an impartial census and referendum on the final status of the area. According to the Displacement Tracking Matrix by the International Organization for Migration—which compiled a large dataset on 3 million IDPs in Iraq—more than 500,000 Iraqis fled to the Kirkuk governorate at the height of the IS crisis.48 The current number of IDPs in the governorate is over 380,000, which constitutes more than half of

43 “Marked with an ‘X’: Iraqi Kurdish Forces’ Destruction of Villages, Homes in Conflict with ISIS,” Human Rights Watch, Nov. 13, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/11/13/marked-x/iraqi-kurdish- forces-destruction-villages-homes-conflict-isis. 44 Nadia Riva, “Kirkuk Undergoing Sectarian Campaign of Forced Demographic Change under Shia Militias: Talabani,” Kurdistan 24, Nov. 5, 2017, http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/eb92a78b-307a- 4ccf-9e60-00fa13ba75ef. 45 “Turkey Urges Iraqi Government over Kirkuk’s Demographic Status,” Hurriyet Daily News, Oct. 17, 2017, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-urges-iraqi-govt-over-kirkuks-demographic-status- 120981. 46 “Kurdish Officials Reject Turkmen Proposal to Turn Kirkuk into Region,” Rudaw, Nov. 11, 2017, http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/111120171. 47 “Baghdad Must Accept Kirkuk is now Part of Kurdistan—KRG Official,” Asharq Al-Awsat, June 30, 2014, https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/theaawsat/news-middle-east/baghdad-must-accept-kirkuk-is- now-part-of-kurdistan-krg-official. 48 Displacement Tracking Matrix Iraq, Round 70, April 2017, http://www.globaldtm.info/?s=IRAQ&submit=Search.

12 False Hopes? Political Inclusion Prospects in Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan total IDPs (672,000) within the disputed territories. Since 2014, more than 97,000 IDPs throughout Iraq have come from the Kirkuk governorate, and only a few thousand have returned, marking the lowest figure among all Iraqi regions. In the disputed territories, the Kirkuk governorate hosts the largest number of IDPs residing in private settings (including rentals), instead of camps or critical shelters—a pattern that raises concerns about long- term demographic shifts.

The fluctuating demographic patterns in the disputed territories demonstrate how Kurdistan’s political inclusion and minority demographics are deeply tied to regional politics. For example, one of the primary motives behind Turkey’s harsh reprimand of the KRG for holding the 2017 independence referendum was the Kirkuk issue. Turkey’s recent rapprochement with Iran has also transformed the strategic calculus of Kurdish leaders in Erbil. The Turkish government did not object to the operations of Shia militias in disputed territories, insisting that the KRG annul the referendum. Although Ankara and Erbil have developed remarkable economic ties in the past decade, the shifting security perceptions of Turkey have rapidly pushed the Turkish government toward closer relations with the central government in Baghdad. Ankara has further invested in creating influence in the Nineveh region through local Sunni Arab leaders who viewed the KRG’s 2017 referendum in disputed territories as threatening and illegitimate.

Policy Implications for Washington

In the post-Arab Spring era, Kurds have become critical players for U.S. policy toward Syria and Iraq. In Syria, a key question for Washington is how to maintain political inclusion under the SDF structure. In Iraq, the United States should also focus on political inclusion and therefore help Kurds to achieve structural reforms in political accountability, economic resilience, and transparency in the oil sector. With the rise of Shia militias in Iraqi politics and the heightened tensions over the disputed territories between Baghdad and Erbil, the United States should prioritize long-term institutional gains over short-term calculations.

Ensuring political inclusion will be a daunting task for the U.S. officials in Rojava, especially due to Turkey’s open war against the Syrian Kurds. Washington took a positive step in supporting Arab local representation by helping to establish a new political party, the Future Syria Party, to shape Raqqa’s future with its inclusive motto, “Democratic, Pluralistic, Decentralized Syria.”49 Turkish officials, however, were quick to express their cynicism—they perceived it as yet another PKK-led organization with a new brand name.50 Once the Islamic State’s capital, Raqqa is now under SDF rule, but how Kurdish leaders will guarantee political inclusion where Arabs constitute majority is a mystery. The assassination of Omar Alloush, a key figure for reconciliation between Kurds and Arab

49 “The Future Syria Party: A New Signal for the US’ Syria Strategy?” TRT World, March 30, 2018, https://www.trtworld.com/mea/future-syria-party-a-new-signal-for-the-us-syria-strategy--16350. 50 Dorian Jones, “Turkey Criticizes US Support of New ‘Syria’s Future’ Political Party,” Voice of America, March 29, 2018, https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-us-tensions-over-ypg-syria-future- party/4322673.html.

13 False Hopes? Political Inclusion Prospects in Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan tribes who served as a member of the Raqqa Civilian Council, is a recent example of targeted killings that seek to exploit ethnic tensions.51

Moreover, it behooves the Trump administration to pursue long-term policy goals in Iraqi Kurdistan with an understanding that current instability in Iraqi Kurdistan is deeply related to the institutional problems of political inclusion. After the referendum fallout, Kurdish prospects for democracy have become even more fragile due to Baghdad’s “divide-and- rule” strategy toward the Kurds. Ad hoc deals by different Shia militia leaders reaching out to various Kurdish actors with different Peshmerga forces invite further instability. Washington can helpfully remind the Iraqi central government that settlement on the disputed territories and other key issues with Kurds cannot be peacefully resolved without ensuring stability in Kurdistan.

The present crisis between Erbil and Baghdad shows that ignoring the root cause of the problem—i.e., disputed territories—will only introduce further complications that might undermine political inclusion in post-IS Iraq. Internal divisions within the KRG as well as within Iraqi politics now pose a challenge for Washington in de-escalating further conflict in the disputed territories.

Washington also needs to ensure that the outcome of KRG’s recent parliamentary elections—held on September 30, 2018—will facilitate a broader consensus on new constitutional amendments for checks and balances. Despite stepping down as president, Masoud Barzani still remains the head of the High Political Council, a parallel governmental structure with no accountability to parliament, and whose function is “to protect the stability of Kurdistan from any type of threat.”52 The new parliament will decide on the critical roles of the prime minister and the president, as well as the system of checks and balances. Thus, Washington’s support of the KRG’s stability should focus on long-term institutional reforms, including the separation of powers, political accountability, economic resilience, and transparency in the oil sector.

51 Wladimir Van Wilgenburg, “Omar Alloush—Murdered for Building a Shared Future for Syria’s Arabs and Kurds?” The Defense Post, March 17, 2018, https://thedefensepost.com/2018/03/17/omar- alloush-murder-turkey-syria-arabs-kurds/. 52 Megan Connelly, “Is Barzani Stepping Down or Stepping Up?” Sada, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nov. 9, 2017.

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