Developing Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon 43

SUSTAINABLESUSTAINABLE OCTOBER 2020 INFRASTRUCTUREINFRASTRUCTURE ININ THETHE AMAZONAMAZON

ConnectingConnecting EnvironmentalEnvironmental ProtectionProtection withwith Governance,Governance, Security,Security, andand EconomicEconomic DevelopmentDevelopment

PROJECT DIRECTOR Daniel F. Runde

AUTHORS Romina Bandura Shannon McKeown

A REPORT OF THE CSIS PROJECT ON PROSPERITY AND DEVELOPMENT Bandura & McKeown 1 SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE AMAZON Connecting Environmental Protection with Governance, Security, and Economic Development

PROJECT DIRECTOR Daniel F. Runde

AUTHORS Romina Bandura Shannon McKeown

A REPORT OF THE CSIS PROJECT ON PROSPERITY AND DEVELOPMENT ABOUT CSIS

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to advancing practical ideas to address the world’s greatest challenges.

Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 2015, succeeding former U.S. senator Sam Nunn (D-GA). Founded in 1962, CSIS is led by John J. Hamre, who has served as president and chief executive officer since 2000.

CSIS’s purpose is to define the future of national security. We are guided by a distinct set of values—nonpartisanship, independent thought, innovative thinking, cross-disciplinary scholarship, integrity and professionalism, and talent development. CSIS’s values work in concert toward the goal of making real-world impact.

CSIS scholars bring their policy expertise, judgment, and robust networks to their research, analysis, and recommendations. We organize conferences, publish, lecture, and make media appear- ances that aim to increase the knowledge, awareness, and salience of policy issues with relevant stakeholders and the interested public.

CSIS has impact when our research helps to inform the decisionmaking of key policymakers and the thinking of key influencers. We work toward a vision of a safer and more prosperous world.

CSIS is ranked the number one think tank in the United States as well as the defense and national security center of excellence for 2016-2018 by the University of Pennsylvania’s “Global Go To Think Tank Index.”

CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be un- derstood to be solely those of the author(s).

Center for Strategic & International Studies 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20036 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org

Bandura & McKeown I ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to thank their CSIS colleagues Owen Murphy, Sundar Ramanu- jam, and Emily Unrue for their research, writing, and editing efforts, as well as Moises Rendon and Margarita Seminario from the CSIS Americas program for their instrumental travel assistance and expertise. Special thanks to the CSIS Dracopoulos iDeas Lab for their input on the report layout and graphics and to CSIS interns Fernanda Silveira, Mary Margaret Burniston, and Hareem F. Abdullah for their dedication to quality research support on this project.

Special thanks to Susan Mosteiro and Harry Shlaudeman for their work as consultants on this project.

During the first half of 2020, CSIS interviewed 57 stakeholders in off-the-record meet- ings in three countries (Brazil, Colombia, and Peru) from NGOs, government agencies, multilateral development banks, civil society, and philanthropic organizations. We would like to thank them for their help and support on this project. We would also like to thank the 40 experts who participated in the three roundtables held in Washington, D.C. in December 2019, February 2020, and April 2020 for sharing their views. Finally, 10 experts reviewed this report and 15 country stakeholders provided inputs to each of the country case studies. We are incredibly grateful for your constructive feedback.

This report would not have been possible without the generous support of the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, with thanks in particular to Kristina McNeff. We are grateful that you have entrusted CSIS with such a significant undertaking.

II Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon ACKNOWLEDGMENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS

About This Report 1

Executive Summary 2

Introduction 9

I. Security Challenges in the Amazon Basin 15

II. Governance Challenges in the Amazon 28

III. Infrastructure Development in the Amazon 33

IV. Conclusions: Opportunities for Developing Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon 43

About the Project Director and Authors 51

Annex I: Methodology 53

Annex II: List of Organizations 55

Annex III: Highlights of Sustainable Infrastructure Frameworks 58

Bandura & McKeown III ABOUT THIS REPORT

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has conducted a research project exploring how deforestation in the Amazon Basin is linked with weak governance, insecurity and conflict, and inadequate infrastructure planning in the region. Our findings reveal that these countries have structural challenges that enable the drivers of deforestation to thrive. As a result, deforestation in the Amazon cannot be solely circumscribed as an environmental phenomenon; it is the inevitable outcome of a confluence of security, economic, and governance issues. Introducing infrastructure development into this existing complex landscape can increase the risk to the ecosystem and the people who inhabit it. Through this project, CSIS aims to connect the non-environmental issues with the shrinking of the Amazon ecosystem and reach a wider audience by engaging actors beyond the environmental community.

The findings of this report are based on desk reviews, field interviews in three countries—Brazil, Colombia, and Peru (which comprise more than 80 percent of the Amazon Basin and are its largest economies), and Washington-based consultations. The intended audience is policymakers in the security and development community in Washington, D.C. We are targeting key decisionmakers in the next U.S. administration (either Trump or Biden), Congress, and staff in U.S. development agencies as they develop policies, programs, and funding for the region. At the same time, we are pursuing stakeholders in Brazil, Peru, and Colombia, including the media, investors, development planners, national security advisers, and regional government officials. We hope the report and accompanying country case studies generate greater interest and debate on the topic, present constructive ideas for developing the region in a more sustainable way and help change the discourse on the Amazon’s future.

Bandura & McKeown 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report analyzes how deforestation in the Amazon Ba- potential regional and global effects could be dire if action sin is linked with weak governance, insecurity and conflict, is not taken to prevent further deforestation. Given the cur- and inadequate infrastructure planning in the region. The rent situation, the Amazon is currently at a crossroads in findings of this report are based on desk reviews, field inter- responding to deforestation. views in three countries (Brazil, Colombia, and Peru, which are the largest economies and together comprise more than CURRENT CHALLENGES IN THE 80 percent of the Amazon Basin), and Washington-based AMAZON BASIN consultations. Our findings reveal that these countries have A host of environmental, economic, governance, and se- structural challenges that enable the drivers of deforesta- curity challenges are affecting the Amazon’s future, with tion to thrive. Deforestation in the Amazon cannot be solely the potential to destabilize the region. Since the 1970s, the circumscribed as an environmental phenomenon; it is the Amazon Basin has been battered by significant loss of bio- inevitable outcome of a confluence of security, economic, diversity and forest cover as well as increasing water con- and governance issues. Introducing infrastructure develop- tamination. The main activities that have contributed to ment into this existing complex landscape can increase the deforestation vary among countries and include both legal risk to the ecosystem and the people who inhabit it. economic ventures such as commercial cattle ranching, soy production, and infrastructure development and illegal ac- Beyond its rich biodiversity and natural resources, the tivities such as land grabbing, illegal gold mining, and coca Amazon is home to between 30 and 35 million inhabi- cultivation and cocaine production. tants, most of whom live in urban areas that lag behind their respective countries in socioeconomic develop- Beyond the environmental impacts, deforestation and the ment.1 This combination of environmental endowments, activities associated with it affect both the physical health natural resources, and human settlements presents chal- (e.g., fires generate pollution and mercury used in gold min- lenges and opportunities for the development of the re- ing contaminates water sources) and the economic health gion going forward. of communities, as many rely on the forest and waterways for their livelihoods. Illegal activities that contribute to de- Overall, these challenges and opportunities must be fac- forestation also affect basichuman safety and create con- tored in when designing a sustainable development strate- flicts with local and indigenous communities. gy for the basin that enables infrastructure to play a positive role in that process. Within this context, action is necessary The underlying causes of deforestation can be traced to now to ensure that the Amazon Basin is preserved and po- three main interrelated factors. First, the communities tential social conflicts and economic crises are avoided. The that live in the Amazon region are some of the poorest in

2 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon Latin America and experience a set of unique socioeconomic concerns in the Amazon. Due to the efforts of governments, problems, including a lack of meaningful economic opportu- private companies, and nonprofit organizations in recent nities, informality in the job market, disputes over resources years, more than 80 percent of the forest is still intact and (e.g., land), and insufficient basic public services (e.g., health the region has the potential to produce goods and services and education, water and sanitation, and security). Powerful more sustainably based on a “standing forest economy.”2 In groups exploit the lack of genuine economic opportunities the course of the last 20 years, some of the Amazon Ba- in parts of the Amazon region to compel people to engage in sin countries have made significant progress in instituting activities that are informal (e.g., subsistence agriculture) and a series of legal frameworks, policies, and institutions for others that are illegal in nature (e.g., logging or drug cultiva- protecting the rainforest. tion and trafficking) as a means to survive. Similarly, more robust international “quality infrastructure” Second, there is weak governance and “state presence” in (or sustainable infrastructure) frameworks and standards the region, with implications for law enforcement and re- such as those laid out by the Group of 20 (G20), the Or- source management. In many instances, the process of land ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development titling and registration at the subnational level is not well (OECD), and Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank defined, which leads to land grabs and clashes with local and International Monetary Fund) have been developed, communities and indigenous people. Inadequate gover- offering important tools to improve infrastructure planning nance creates opportunities for settlers to invade public in the Amazon Basin. These frameworks focus on gover- lands, leading to further deforestation. Regional and local nance aspects such as strengthening institutional capacity governments in the Amazon often lack the technical capac- (including planning and procurement processes) as well as ity, personnel, and budgetary resources to effectively ad- monitoring environmental and social impacts (including by dress the problems of illegal activity and provide adequate consulting with communities and promoting job creation, land governance, law enforcement, and public services. capacity building, and the transfer of expertise and know- Moreover, environmental licenses are not properly admin- how to local communities).3 istered, and areas that are delimited for indigenous ethnic At the same time, increased global attention to the Ama- groups and natural parks are not safeguarded. Bribes and zon Basin from media, donors, investors, and consumers corruption also play a role in the performance of officials. puts more pressure to shift the regional development par- Corruption across sectors and levels of government wastes adigm from one based on resource exploitation to one that valuable public resources and creates a general culture of is more sustainable in the long term. Moreover, citizens in impunity for different actors to exploit. these countries themselves are concerned about the Am- Third, poorly planned and executed infrastructure projects azon’s future and are increasingly willing to support con- can exacerbate deforestation and create more social conservation efforts. flict. Infrastructure “megaprojects”—mainly roads and hydropower—have primarily been pushed forward in the Am- INSECURITY IN THE AMAZON azon without a careful analysis of strategic prioritization, The Amazon began a process of urbanization and popula- optimal engineering designs, or viable alternatives and tion growth in the mid-1960s, led by Brazil. In Peru and have ignored the potential externalities of these endeavors Brazil, military leaders sought to secure and connect the and their harm or benefit to the full range of stakeholders. Amazon to the rest of their respective countries through large-scale infrastructure projects and encouraged the set- OPPORTUNITIES IN THE tlement of migrants in the region. The Amazon Basin was AMAZON BASIN considered a security imperative due to its sheer size and Despite these shortcomings, countries have the knowledge vast unprotected border. At the same time, the economic and tools to balance environmental, security, and economic potential of the untapped natural resources was attractive to the growing mining and agribusiness industries. To bet-

Bandura & McKeown 3 ter secure the border from “outside” international actors, both domestic and regional action, including: strength- governments promoted infrastructure, helped settle new ening institutions, governance, and oversight; fostering families, and deployed military assets to the region. alternative economic opportunities for those involved in illegal activities; and improving safety for communities Yet the security concerns of the 1960s and 1970s were and enhancing border security. Yet providing security, vastly different from the ones in the Amazon today. Rath- strengthening governance, and increasing quality of life in er than traditional security threats from foreign actors, il- this region is a significant undertaking. To understand the legal activities—mainly drug trafficking and illegal mining scale of this endeavor, one needs to envision the size of and logging—and climate change are the significant threats the Amazon Basin and its vast border. The rainforest spans currently destabilizing the Amazon region. Brazil is now about 7 million square kilometers, approximately the size the second-largest consumer of cocaine after the United of the contiguous United States. States, while the neighboring countries of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia are the main producers of cocaine, accounting To respond to these challenges, national governments have for the vast majority of the total global production. Fur- launched several initiatives. Increased monitoring of the thermore, illegal mining is one of the major causes of the Amazon—both on the ground and through satellite imag- invasion of protected areas in the Amazon. Sadly, many of ery and remote sensing—has been necessary to police ille- these activities take place under the jungle cover, creating gal activities and more accurately measure their impacts. more environmental damage to the forest, rivers, and fau- Such activities include random military and police incur- na and affecting the personal security of the communities sions as well as environmental enforcement, interception that inhabit the basin. On the ground, local governments of the communications of illegal groups, money tracking, often lack the institutional capacity and resources to con- destroying machinery, and improving local and satellite trol these illegal activities and enforce legislation, which surveillance capabilities. Moreover, at the regional level, exacerbates deforestation. Taken together, illicit activities governments of the Amazon Basin have signed coopera- not only create more deforestation, undermine the rule of tion agreements aimed at addressing deforestation, inse- law, and threaten human security, but they also prevent a curity, and economic development. The Amazon Cooper- viable long-term vision for the economic development of ation Treaty Organization (ACTO) and the Leticia Pact are the Amazon region. two of the most relevant regional initiatives in terms of deforestation and security. Insecurity in the Amazon takes three interrelated forms. The first is environmental insecurity: deforestation contrib- WEAK GOVERNANCE utes to biodiversity loss and climate change. Second, ille- Security challenges in the Amazon are magnified by a series gal economic activities in the region have fueled personal of weaknesses in governance structures and the rule of law and community insecurity, as well as recurrent instances of that enable even more deforestation in the region and allow land grabbing, colonization, and violence. In some cas- insecurity to thrive. First, land governance in the Amazon es, deforestation has displaced communities. Finally, the is weak: in general, Amazon countries have inadequate land inhabitants of the Amazon face economic and health in- registries and disorderly titling processes as well as opaque security due to a combination of factors: a lack of mean- systems for granting different types of economic conces- ingful economic opportunities, insufficient health care sions. At the same time, a large amount of land in the Am- and other public services, mercury contamination from azon remains undesignated and is insufficiently monitored. illegal gold mining, and the proliferation of vector-borne This creates opportunities for settlers to invade and expand diseases such as malaria and dengue, heightened by the their activities, leading to further deforestation and social loss of forest cover. conflict. Second, local governments often lack budgetary

Most of the illegal activity in the Amazon has transnational and human resources, technical capacity, and sometimes reach, affecting all countries in the region, which requires the political will to address competing problems. A third

4 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon governance challenge has to do with overall transparen- The challenge is that the infrastructure planning process has cy in government practices and the misuse of power and been deficient: projects have been pushed forward without public funds. Corruption across sectors and levels of gov- a careful analysis of long-term growth strategies, infra- ernment wastes valuable public resources, leaves crimes structure designs, or alternative options. Politicians have unpunished, and creates a general culture of impunity. approached the development of megaprojects as a winning Taken together, these governance challenges provide an strategy for reelection but often disregard the potential neg- avenue for environmental exploitation and allow illegal ative effects that these projects create in a complex ecosys- activities to flourish. tem such as the Amazon. Infrastructure investments have attracted more people to the region, accelerating human DEFICIENCIES IN migration and urbanization, but local governments have INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING lacked the capacity to provide public services to meet the In spite of these vulnerabilities, governments have contin- demands of larger populations. As a result, these projects ued to develop infrastructure projects in the Amazon with are often lose-lose: they do not increase economic growth the aim of providing security to the basin, increasing con- and they harm the environment and local communities. At nectivity, and fostering economic growth. Infrastructure the same time, the size, uniqueness, and complexity of large development has the potential to generate economic and public works projects increases opportunities for corrup- social gains: it can facilitate human mobility, connect prod- tion. Corruption affects the productivity and competitive- ucts to markets, generate jobs, improve communications, ness of economies, and in the case of infrastructure, it has provide inroads for security forces to disrupt criminal net- negative consequences particularly for consumers: it leads works, and increase access to medical care, potable water, to a poor selection of projects, can create cost overruns and and education services in rural areas. longer construction times, and in the end is associated with poor quality services and low economic returns. In the Amazon, there are noticeable gaps in the infrastructure for basic services such as clean water and sanitation, Within the Amazon context, infrastructure projects can- education, and health care, although there is significant not be regarded as a simple solution to security concerns heterogeneity among the different nations that comprise or an easy way to spur economic development in the the basin. Countries have developed pipelines of proposed region. In the Amazon Basin, large-scale infrastructure infrastructure projects to meet these basic needs and sup- projects can create more pressure for deforestation and port economic development, yet many of the plans are exacerbate existing security vulnerabilities if they are not “megaprojects”—large-scale projects in mining, hydropow- properly planned and managed. A more thorough dis- er, and road networks. In the case of the Amazon, these cussion of and comprehensive approach to the role that kinds of projects, specifically road and dam construction, infrastructure can play in enabling or hampering sustain- have often failed to fulfill broader promises of projected able development in the Amazon is needed. This includes benefits, particularly for nearby communities, and have better planning processes and sound infrastructure gov- contributed to environmental degradation and spurred so- ernance frameworks to ensure that selected projects will cial conflict. Although roads can spur economic develop- provide the maximum economic benefits to the region ment by facilitating the transport of goods and the mobility while minimizing environmental and social costs. of people, many of the roads constructed in the Amazon In light of these risks, the international community, show few economic benefits. Similarly, dam construction through organizations such as the OECD and the United can bring economic benefits through the production of en- Nations, multilateral development banks (MDBs) and de- ergy and the creation of hundreds of temporary jobs, but it velopment finance institutions (DFIs), and intergovern- can also lead to increased deforestation, flooding of nearby mental fora such as the G7 and G20, has been engaging areas, and damage to the local fishing industry. national governments and private actors to rethink their approach to infrastructure. Over the years, sustainable in-

Bandura & McKeown 5 frastructure development has gained importance as a con- 1. Increasing the Focus on Good Governance, Trans- cept and process. In its basic form, sustainable infrastruc- parency, and Anticorruption Efforts ture is built with greater consideration of environmental, Issues in the Amazon such as insecurity, corruption, social, and economic externalities while also promoting and weak territorial governance together with the community engagement and social benefits. The inter- insufficient institutional capacity of regional govern- national community has developed a series of principles ments must be addressed. Countries in the Ama- to guide investments in infrastructure projects. Many of zon can partner with development agencies from these principles strongly emphasize upstream planning the United States and Europe, intergovernmental and governance and enabling conditions. These same el- and multinational institutions such as the United ements should also positively impact environmental, so- Nations, the World Bank, and the Inter-American cial, and economic outcomes. Development Bank (IDB), and the private sector (particularly the technology sector) to develop programs Although this is a welcome trend, the fragmented nature of and platforms that can help overcome some of these these standards raises two issues: it remains unclear which institutional weaknesses. set of principles countries should follow and how countries can actually put them into practice. MDBs must reach con- 2. Renewing the Role of Security Forces in the Amazon sensus on a common set of indicators for sustainable in- In order to combat illegal activities and to provide ade- frastructure standards. Moreover, new players are develop- quate protection for communities, countries will need ing projects in the Amazon, which further complicates the to invest in personnel and budgets to increase securi- landscape. With these new project plans, particularly those ty presence. Local and national security forces have a originating from China, it is imperative that these new in- large role to play, given the rampant crime and illegal vestors also follow quality infrastructure standards. mafias that are operating in the Amazon with impunity. The security sector is not fully using its mandate CONCLUSION: DEVELOPING and enforcement powers to contend with activities SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE such as coca cultivation and illegal mining. Law enforcement officials often end up targeting individual IN THE AMAZON farmers or small informal miners, while more orga- Although infrastructure investments are needed to sup- nized criminal groups are left alone due to corruption port economic growth and social development in the Am- and political expediency. Increased coordination be- azon Basin, deficiencies in security and governance must tween line ministries and lower levels of government be addressed; otherwise, investments in infrastructure will have beneficial effects. Partnerships with com- would be wasted, economic growth will not be realized, munities and indigenous ethnic groups to equip them and social and environmental costs will be magnified. In- with technology, training, and new tools to report frastructure development must be better managed, from crime are also important elements of this response. planning to execution and maintenance, and the process should focus both on the quality of infrastructure services 3. Linking Security with Economic Opportunities and the potential impacts of the projects. There is no silver Security efforts also need to be linked to economic bullet: all of these elements are needed as an integrated plans. Increasing law enforcement and military units strategy and all-hands-on-deck multisector approach. is not the sole answer to combatting deforestation, violence, and crime in the region; security must be com- Within this context, international donors can partner plemented by increased state presence in other areas with countries in the region to achieve a more balanced such as creating meaningful economic opportunities approach to development in the Amazon that takes into and providing basic public services for communities. account the following principles: Otherwise, it is not a comprehensive response or a solution that is sustainable going forward. This is the

6 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon concept of “multidimensional security” that Colom- substantial gaps in basic services, including access bia is spearheading through initiatives such as its Zo- to clean water and sanitation, health care, renew- nas Futuro program. Increased security must be com- able energy, educational institutions at all levels, bined with a more integrated effort across all sectors. and communications (radio signal, internet access, and mobile coverage). Given these gaps, investments More concerted efforts are needed to involve the pri- in social infrastructure could raise the quality of vate sector to create value supply chains that can keep life for people in the region. But this does not nec- the forest alive and provide economic alternatives essarily mean that there has to be a exclusionary to people, including jobs in the bioeconomy, adding selection process between sectors in project selec- value to timber and non-timber forestry products, tion, (i.e., choosing health projects over transport and eco-tourism. Changing the economic equation projects or sanitation over energy, since these proj- from illicit production to legal activities is a huge ects can offer significant complementary effects). undertaking. As part of this, countries would benefit

from adding value to commodities such as coffee, ca- The process for selecting infrastructure projects cao, nuts, and superfruits of the forest such as açai. needs to be strengthened so that: (a) investments Internationally-funded programs that financially make economic sense and minimize environmental reward countries that reduce deforestation (known and social risks; (b) projects are evaluated as part of as reducing emissions from deforestation and deg- a broader strategic development framework in con- radation, or REDD) and carbon-offset schemes along junction with other projects put forward in the re- with investments in directed financing, easier access gion; (c) communities are brought in early on in the to credit, small business modelling and strength- discussion; and (d) different project alternatives are ening, and technology-based industries that are in- presented beforehand so that the best designs are pur- dependent of natural resources would contribute sued. Environmental and social impacts should also a more sustainable use of the forest. Investments be approached not only as risks to mitigate but as op- must ensure the conservation of protected areas portunities for new businesses and local wealth gen- and the efficient management of natural resources. eration, for example, through the issuance of green or sustainable bonds to finance projects in the Amazon. The private sector has an opportunity to play

an important role in partnership with state ac- A main challenge for countries in the Amazon as tors in creating momentum for sustainable prod- they plan future infrastructure will be to develop a ucts, while consumers can advocate for goods pipeline of quality projects and compel new inves- that do not originate from deforested lands. It tors, such as those from China, to abide by these is important for consumers to be constantly in- higher standards in terms of project planning and formed about the environmental and social con- safeguard policies. Several experts have proposed sequences of purchasing unsustainable products. developing governance standards that would apply to projects across the whole Amazon Basin to en- 4. A More Robust Planning Process Incorpo- sure the socioeconomic sustainability of the region. rating Sustainable Infrastructure Principles MDBs such as the World Bank, the Development Along with governance, economic, and security is- Bank of Latin America (CAF), or the IDB could de- sues, there is a lack of quality infrastructure in the velop and promote such regional standards. With- Amazon today. Most of the infrastructure develop- out these safeguards, there is a risk of a race to ment in the region over the past 50 years has focused the bottom leading to finance infrastructure proj- on transport and energy megaprojects that often ects with lax environmental and social standards. benefit only a few industries. eTh region remains significantly socially underdeveloped, and there are

Bandura & McKeown 7 5. Strengthening Regional Cooperation Initiatives These basin-wide standards should be embedded in existing regional cooperation initiatives to encourage their adoption. The main issue is that the three countries under consideration do not share a unified vision of the development of the basin—especially in terms of infrastructure projects. Another way to improve coordination among countries would be to appoint an Am- azon “czar”: an official who would tackle deforestation through a multidimensional and whole-of-government approach and who is well received across Leticia Pact signatories. To the extent necessary, the United States and other donor countries could facilitate the establishment of this czar by leveraging foreign assistance resources and tools. At the same time, professionalizing the enforcement agencies—under the tutelage of the czar—can minimize systemic corruption, increase the government’s ability to enforce the law over larger criminal groups, and create greater impact in addressing deforestation.

8 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon INTRODUCTION

The Amazon Basin spans eight countries (Bolivia, Brazil, AMAZONMAP 1: AMAZON BASIN SIZE BASIN RELATIVE SIZE RELATIVE TO TO THE Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and Venezu- THEUNITED UNITED STATES STATES ela) and one territory (French Guiana) and contains the largest tropical rainforest in the world, approximately the size of the contiguous United States (Map 1).4 Brazil holds 60 percent of the territory of the Amazon, while Peru and Colombia cover 13 and 10 percent, respectively. It is well documented that the Amazon Basin has the world’s greatest biodiversity, holds 20 percent of the world’s freshwater resources, and serves as the “air conditioner of the Earth,” storing carbon and regulating rainfall and climate patterns both in the region and the world.5 At the same time, the Amazon has significant economic resources: natural waterways and fisheries, rich mineral deposits (such as gold, copper, and nickel), oil and gas reserves, forestry products, and medicinal plants.

Beyond its rich biodiversity and natural resources, the Am- Amazon River Basin azon is home to between 30 and 35 million inhabitants, of Outline of USA which approximately 3 million belong to more than 350 indigenous ethnic groups.6 A lesser known fact is that the pop- South America ulation of the region is mostly urbanized (with close to 72 Source:Source: Juha Juha V. Siikamaki V. Siikamaki et al., “Internationalet al., “International Willingness Willingness to Pay for the to ProtectionPay for the of percent of the population in urban areas (primarily regional theProtection Amazon Rainforest,” of the Amazon Policy Research Rainforest,” Working Policy Paper Research 8775 (March Working 2019), Paper World Bank Group Development Economics, Development Research Group, capitals and medium-sized cities) and yet often lags behind 8775 (March 2019), World Bank Group Development Economics, Devel- http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/334711552333303292/pdf/WPS8775.pdfopment Research Group, http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/ other states in socioeconomic development.7 The confluence . en/334711552333303292/pdf/WPS8775.pdf. of environmental endowments, natural resources, and human settlements presents challenges and opportunities for basin, including deforestation, biodiversity loss, and water the development of the region going forward. pollution. Yet this ecosystem degradation is not solely an The present discussion of the Amazon’s development cen- environmental problem: it is a symptom of other vulnerabil- ters around the environmental damage occurring in the ities in the region, including high levels of poverty, human

Bandura & McKeown 9 insecurity, weak governance, and inadequate infrastruc- MAP 2: OVERVIEW OF DEFORESTATION IN THE ture planning. These problems figure less prominently in AMAZON, 2018–2019 the discourse on the Amazon. If these issues are not included in the discussion, we will literally not be seeing “the forest for the trees.”

THE BAD NEWS ABOUT THE AMAZON: CURRENT CHALLENGES A host of environmental, economic, governance, and security challenges are affecting the Amazon’s future, with the potential to destabilize the region. Since the 1970s, the Amazon Basin has been battered by significant loss of biodiversity and forest cover as well as increasing water contamination. The main activities that have contributed to deforestation vary among countries and include both legal economic ventures such as commercial cattle ranch- Source: “MAAP Synthesis: 2019 Amazon Deforestation Trends and Hotspots,” Monitoring of the Andean Amazon Project, February 7, 2020, ing, soy production, and infrastructure development and https://maaproject.org/2020/synthesis-2019/. illegal activities such as land grabbing, illegal gold mining, and coca cultivation and cocaine production (Map The underlying causes of deforestation can be traced to 2).8 From 1970 to 2018, about 20 percent of the Brazilian three main interrelated factors. First, the communities Amazon was destroyed, and deforestation rates have since that live in the Amazon region are some of the poorest in remained high in Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia.9 Latin America and experience a set of unique socioeco- Deforestation rates have recently started rising again in nomic problems, including a lack of meaningful econom- Brazil after a period of decline between 2004 and 2012. ic opportunities, informality in the job market, disputes Recently, unprecedented levels of deforestation have pro- over resources such as land, and insufficient basic public pelled the Amazon Basin dangerously close to what some services such as health and education, water and sani- scientists describe as its “tipping point”—the level of de- tation, and security (Table 1). Today, despite significant forestation after which the rainforest will be incapable of economic progress since the 1970s, communities in the producing enough rain to sustain itself, resulting in its Amazon remain behind their national peers in term of degradation into a savannah.10 A drier Amazon would re- human development. Powerful groups exploit the lack of lease billions of tons of carbon into the atmosphere, ex- genuine economic opportunities in parts of the Amazon acerbate global warming, and disrupt weather patterns in region to compel people to engage in informal activities South America and abroad. (e.g., subsistence agriculture) while others are illegal in Beyond the environmental impact, deforestation also has nature (e.g., logging or, in the extreme, producing illegal significant social repercussions. Every year, hundreds of drugs such as cocaine) as a means to survive. When un- early deaths occur in the Amazon from the pollution gen- checked, these activities lead to the uncontrolled slash- erated by fires, mercury contamination in water stemming ing and burning of the Amazon forest. from gold mining, and other causes.11 Moreover, deforestation undermines the livelihoods of communities, as many rely on the forest and waterways for their revenue. Illegal activities that contribute to deforestation also affect basic human security and create conflicts with local and indigenous communities.12

10 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon TABLE 1: SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS IN PERU, COLOMBIA, AND BRAZIL PERU NATIONAL AVERAGE PERUVIAN AMAZON AVERAGE Informal Employment (%) (2018) 73.013 84.514 Poverty (%) (2017) 20.515 42.116 Literacy Rate (%)* (2018) 94.417 93.818 Infant Mortality** (2018) 20.9819 22.7620 GDP per Capita (USD) (2017) 6,73021 5,34022 Access to Water Infrastructure (%) (2017) 67.423 43.624 Access to Sanitation (%) (2017) 72.825 46.626

* People ages 15 and above ** Infant deaths per thousand live births

COLOMBIA NATIONAL AVERAGE COLOMBIA AMAZON AVERAGE

Informal Employment (%) (2018)27 72.3 87.5 not calculated for departments in the Poverty (%) (2018)28 27.0 Colombian Amazon Literacy Rate (%)* (2018)29 95 93.5 Middle School Coverage (%) (2019)30 72.1 55.2 Infant Mortality** (2016) 13.3631 35.3332 GDP per Capita (USD) (2018)33 5,096 3,016 Access to Water Infrastructure (%) (2018)34 86.4 47.6 Access to Sanitation System (%) (2018)35 92.4 44.1

* People ages 15 and above ** Infant deaths per thousand live births

BRAZIL NATIONAL AVERAGE BRAZIL AMAZON AVERAGE

Informal Employment (%) (2019) 41.136 52.337 Poverty (%) (less than $5.5 per day) (2012) 25.3 38 3739 Literacy Rate (%)* (2017/2018) 93.240 91.341 Infant Mortality (2018) 14.042 17.743 (1 year old and below) ** GDP per Capita (USD) (2017) 9,87644 6,85545 Access to Water Infrastructure (%) (2018) 83.546 6047 Access to Sanitation System (%) (2018) 52.448 16.649

* People ages 15 and above ** Infant deaths per thousand live births

Bandura & McKeown 11 Second, weak governance and “state presence” have an im- have proposed initiatives to create a new economic vision pact on deforestation. In many instances, the process of for the Brazilian Amazon based on the bioeconomy. It is land titling and registration at the subnational level is not estimated that by the second half of 2020, three commu- well defined, which leads to land grabs and clashes with lo- nities in the state of Pará will receive the first of Nobre’s cal communities and indigenous people. Inadequate land proposed creative labs.52 Additionally, since 2000, Natura, governance creates opportunities for settlers to invade the largest Brazilian cosmetics company, has been operat- public lands, leading to further deforestation. Regional and ing in the Pan-Amazon with the mission to contribute to local governments in the Amazon often lack the technical the economic, social, and environmental development of capacity, personnel, and budgetary resources to effective- the region.53 So far, Natura’s program, Amazônia Viva, has ly address the problems of illegal activity and provide ad- benefited 4,636 Pan-Amazonian families and generated equate land governance, law enforcement, and public ser- more than $260 million (R$1.5 billion) in economic activ- vices. Moreover, environmental licenses are not properly ity. The Amazon region is very heterogeneous, home to 10 administered, and areas that are delimited for indigenous percent of all the world’s species, at least 80,000 species of ethnic groups and natural parks are not safeguarded. Bribes plants, and 350 indigenous groups that possess an incred- and corruption also play a role in the performance of offi- ible knowledge of the use of the forest’s natural resourc- cials. Corruption across sectors and levels of government es.54 If this heterogeneity is explored in a sustainable way, wastes valuable public resources and creates a general cul- it could bring significant benefits to the population and im- ture of impunity for different actors to exploit. prove the region’s socioeconomic status.55

Third, poorly planned and executed infrastructure proj- In the course of the last 20 years, some of the Amazon Ba- ects can exacerbate deforestation and create more social sin countries have made significant progress in institut- conflict. Infrastructure megaprojects—mainly roads and ing a series of legal frameworks, policies, and institutions hydropower—have primarily been pushed forward in the for protecting the rainforest. For example, a wide range of Amazon without a careful analysis of strategic prioritiza- laws, policies, and development plans give stature to the tion, the best engineering designs, or viable alternatives Amazon as a vital asset for Colombia. The Brazilian Amazon and have ignored the potential externalities of these Council was recently recreated and will be responsible for endeavors and their harm or benefit to the full range of coordinating “diverse actions within each ministry focused stakeholders. Migration toward and the urbanization of on the protection, defense, and sustainable development of the Amazon region has accelerated as a result of infra- the Amazon.”56 Additionally, each country has carried out structure projects, but local governments have been un- significant efforts to control deforestation in the Amazon at able to provide adequate public services to meet the de- the federal level using its armed forces, including Operation mands of these increased populations. Green Brazil, Operation Mercury in Peru,57 and Operation Artemisa in Colombia.58 In its first year, Operation Artemisa THE GOOD NEWS ABOUT THE successfully preserved 136,000 hectares of tropical forest in AMAZON: FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES Chribiquete Park, arrested and charged more than 120 peo- Despite these shortcomings, the encouraging news is that ple, and decommissioned armed vehicles and machinery 59 countries have the knowledge and tools to balance environ- in the Colombian Amazon. In addition to domestic initia- mental, security, and economic concerns in the Amazon.50 tives, regional cooperation in the Amazon includes conven- 60 Due to the effortsof governments, private companies, ing platforms such as ACTO and the Leticia Pact. and nonprofit organizations in recent years, more than 80 In parallel, more robust international quality infrastruc- percent of the forest is still intact and the region has the ture (or sustainable infrastructure) frameworks and stan- potential to produce goods and services more sustainably dards such as those laid out by the G20, OECD, and Bretton based on a “standing forest economy.”51 In Brazil, the In- Woods institutions have been developed, offering import- stituto Escolhas and the renowned scientist Carlos Nobre ant tools to improve infrastructure planning in the Amazon

12 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon Basin.61 These frameworks focus on governance aspects such Likewise, big investors and consumers are pressuring hun- as strengthening institutional sustainability (including the dreds of companies that source commodities from the Am- planning and procurement processes) as well as assessing azon Basin to meet their deforestation commitments and environmental and social impacts (such as consulting with to display environmental responsiveness.66 International communities and promoting job creation, capacity building, pressure from outside governments and civil society, cer- and the transfer of expertise and know-how to local commu- tification of deforestation-free production from compa- nities). The guidelines these organizations have established nies, action from commodity buyers, public opinion from can become even more effective if they are reproduced in do- citizens in these countries, and infrastructure provider and mestic legal frameworks. financier practices are some of the forces pushing governments to change course. Recently, a Bolsonaro-proposed Finally, increasing global attention to the Amazon Basin bill was stymied after a group of 40 companies, mostly Eu- from media, donors, investors, and consumers puts more ropean, signed a letter threatening to boycott Brazilian ex- pressure to shift the development paradigm of the region ports if the bill went through. Going even further, a group from one based on resource exploitation to one that is more of seven large European asset managers, holding more than sustainable in the long term. For example, Germany and $5 billion in investments tied to Brazil, said they will divest Norway announced that they would suspend planned pay- from Brazil unless they see improvement in the governments totaling more than $60 million to the Amazon Fund ment’s approach to surging deforestation.67 Furthermore, after President Bolsonaro closed the fund’s steering com- as of July 8, 2020, the Brazilian Environment Ministry was mittee.62 The former Norwegian minister of the environ- drafting a decree banning Amazon fires for four months at ment remarked “[w]hat Brazil has shown is that it no longer the direction of President Bolsonaro. In early July, a group wants to stop deforestation.”63 Moreover, the EU-Mercosur of companies including Suzano SA, Mafrig Global Foods SA, trade deal remains under threat due to perceived inade- and U.S. food giant Cargill Inc. sent a letter to Brazilian au- quacies in Brazilian efforts against deforestation.64 The U.S. thorities warning of the negative reputational and business House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Richard E. effects of the surging deforestation in the Amazon Basin.68 Neal (D-MA) and committee Democrats recently expressed their strong opposition to the Trump administration’s plan At the same time, the citizens in these countries themselves to strengthen economic ties with Brazil and President Bol- are concerned about the Amazon’s future. According to a re- sonaro.65 The lawmakers cited the Bolsonaro government’s cent Gallup poll, most people surveyed in Brazil, Venezuela, disregard for human rights, workers’ rights, and the health Colombia, and Peru express dissatisfaction with the actions of the Amazon Basin as well as its promotion of anticom- their governments have taken to preserve the environment petitive practices as evidence that Brazil is an unfit partner (Table 2).69 In Brazil, the dissatisfaction has deepened since for upholding the labor and environmental standards and 2013, when deforestation rates started to pick up again, and protections laid out in the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement. currently dissatisfaction is at a new high (Figure 2).

TABLE 2: SATISFACTION WITH EFFORTS TO PRESERVE THE ENVIRONMENT ACROSS AMAZON COUNTRIES

SATISFIED DISSATISFIED

% % Ecuador 58 38 Bolivia 53 43 Peru 45 50 Colombia 41 55 Venezuela 34 64 Brazil 30 66 Source: Archer and Ray, “Brazilians Least Satisfied in Amazon with Environment.”

Bandura & McKeown 13 SATISFACTION WITH EFFORTS TO PRESERVE THE ENVIRONMENT FIGUREIN BRAZIL, 1: SATISFACTION 2007–2018 WITH EFFORTS TO PRESERVE THE ENVIRONMENT IN BRAZIL, 2007–2018 Brazilians’ Statisfaction on Evironment Drops to New Low In this country, are you satisfied or dissatified with the e orts to preserve the environment? 70 64 66 63 61 60 55 54 55 51 51 51 50 48 50 48 47 47 44 46 46 40 42 41 38 34 33 30 30 20

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Gallup World Poll % Satisfied % Dissatisfied

Source: Archer and Ray, “Brazilians Least Satisfied in Amazon with Environment.” Source: Archer and Ray, “Brazilians Least Satisfied in Amazon with Environment.”

Overall, these challenges and opportunities must be fac- tored in when designing a sustainable development strategy for the basin. Going forward, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru have a significant opportunity to develop the region in a more sustainable way and enable infrastructure to play a positive role in that process. Within this context, action is necessary now to ensure that the Amazon Basin is preserved and potential social conflicts and economic crises are avoided. The potential regional and global effects could be dire if action is not taken to prevent further deforestation. Given the current situation, the world faces a crossroads in responding to deforestation in the Amazon.

14 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon Photo by: CRIS BOURONCLE/POOL/AFP via Getty Images

Peruvian Army soldiers take part in an operation to blow up a makeshift landing strip used by drug smugglers, in the northeastern Amazon jungle.

SECURITY CHALLENGES IN 01 THE AMAZON BASIN SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE AMAZON BASIN

Te Amazon region is currently experiencing a wave of ille- length of the borders the contiguous United States shares gal activities, including cocaine production and trafficking with Canada and Mexico (Box 1).76 and illegal gold mining and logging, among others. Taken together, illegal activities not only create more deforesta- BOX 1: BRAZIL’S EFFORT TO CONTROL tion, undermine the rule of law, and threaten human secu- ITS BORDER rity, but they also prevent a viable long-term vision for the Brazil’s 10,000-mile border encompasses 10 different economic development of the Amazon region. At the same countries and has proven difficult to control and moni- time, local governments often lack the institutional capaci- tor. However, in the past three decades, Brazil has man- ty and resources to control illegal activities that exacerbate aged to reestablish the confidence of civilian leaders deforestation or to enforce legislation. through a variety of techniques such as repositioning its forces, practicing better military-police cooperation, Most of the illegal activity in the Amazon has transnational investing in technologies to give itself an advantage in reach, affecting all countries in the region, which requires the future, and publishing strategic documents with both domestic and regional action: strengthening insti- support from both civilian and military authorities.75 tutions, governance, and oversight; fostering alternative economic opportunities for those involved in illegal activities; and improving safety for communities and enhanc- The Amazon Basin, led by Brazil, began a process of urban- ing border security.77 Yet providing security, strengthening ization and population growth in the mid-1960s.70 The mili- governance, and increasing quality of life in this region is tary leaders who governed Brazil devised a policy to connect a significant undertaking. To understand the scale of this the Amazon to the rest of the country through large-scale endeavor, one needs to envision the size of the Amazon Bi- infrastructure projects and encouraged the settlement of ome and its vast border. The rainforest spans about 2.124 migrants in the region. The Brazilian military considered the million square miles, approximately the size of the contig- Amazon Biome a security imperative because of its sheer uous United States. Brazil alone, the country that hosts the size and vast unprotected border (Box 2). At the same time, majority of the rainforest, has a land border that is twice the the economic potential of the untapped natural resourc-

16 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon es was attractive to the growing mining and agribusiness States.78 Neighboring countries such as Colombia, Peru, and industries. To better secure the border from “outside” in- Bolivia are the main producers of cocaine, accounting for ternational actors, the Brazilian military government pro- the vast majority of the total global production.79 Further- moted infrastructure, helped settle new families, and de- more, illegal mining is a major cause of the invasion of ployed military assets to the region. Large-scale projects, protected areas in the Amazon.80 Sadly, many of these including transportation infrastructure (mostly roads such activities take place under the Amazon jungle cover, cre- as the 1972 Trans-Amazonia and the 1974 Belém-Brasília ating more environmental damage to the forest, rivers, highways) aimed to increase regional connectivity, human and fauna and affecting the personal security of the com- settlements, and economic development.71 This agenda munities that inhabit the basin. was dubbed as a nation-building strategy designed to “in- tegrar para não entregar,” meaning to integrate (or connect) the Amazon with the rest of the country to protect its natural resource wealth from international actors (literally, “integrate to prevent surrender”). The settlement of families in the Amazon also aimed to provide solutions to pressing social problems emerging elsewhere in Brazil. An unequal distribution of land among farmers and droughts in northeast Brazil prompted the military government to settle “landless men” to “the land without men,” that is, the Amazon Basin (“terra sem homens para homens sem terra!”).72 Energy production was also a key focus and was seen as a way to elevate Brazil as a global power. Given the basin’s rich endowment of water resources, the national government began developing hydropower at a massive scale in the period between 1960 and 1980. As a result, by 2003, a total of 139 medium and large hydroelectric power plants were operating in Brazil, with 12.7 percent of installed capacity in the Amazon.73

Similar to Brazil, in the case of the Peruvian Amazon, infrastructure projects (mainly road construction) were developed during the 1960s and 1970s to expand the presence of the state in this remote region. Successive governments sought to colonize and integrate the region and its indigenous ethnic groups with the rest of the country (Box 3).74 In the case of the Colombian Amazon, the territory largely lacked state presence, creating a vacuum that insurgent groups such as the FARC filled, often constructing illegal roads in the region.

Te security concerns of the 1960 and 1970s were vastly different from the ones in the Amazon today. Illegal activities—mainly drug trafficking and illegal mining and logging—and climate change are the significant threats currently destabilizing the Amazon region. Brazil is now the second-leading consumer of cocaine after the United

Bandura & McKeown 17 BOX 2: DEFINING SECURITY referents. The basics of human security are guaran- When analyzing security-related issues in the Am- teed by meeting the needs that people value most, azon, different terms are discussed. Security can be which include food, shelter, good health, education, defined more traditionally as national security, that protection from violence, and freedom from fear. In is, “the ability of a state to cater for the protection this situation, the state-society relationship is sepa- and defense of its citizenry.”82 This view of security rated from international relations, and the domestic is focused on the external threats to the state, such setting becomes more important and exclusive to as extremism, terrorism, war and conflicts, drug human security. Proponents of the human security trafficking, and cybersecurity. They are threats to a view argue that these nontraditional elements of se- nation’s sovereignty and to its borders based on the curity are the ones that determine a country’s state integrity of its geographical whole.83 This definition of security, followed by national security. also includes the protection of the geopolitical and In practice, there is a fine line between both notions economic interests of the state. of security. In today’s complex world, these two sepa- Another concept of security that is linked to na- rate conceptions of security are interlinked. Localized tional security is that of “human security,” which problems can threaten to destabilize regions and the refers to protecting “the vital core of all human lives overall national security of a country. Similarly, (non- in ways that enhance human freedoms and human conventional) external threats can impact individual 84 fulfillment.” A UN General Assembly Resolution and community security. The questions policymakers defines human security as “an approach to assist need to ask are: whose security are the national bor- member states in identifying and addressing wide- ders protecting and where do individual (and commu- spread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, nity) insecurity and national insecurity intersect?81 livelihood, and dignity of their people.”85 The idea is built on four principles: it is people-centered, comprehensive, context-specific, and prevention-ori- ented. The United Nations lists seven types of security challenges: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security.86 Promoting human security requires collaboration among states, international organizations, and civil society but does not include the use of force.

What is the relationship between these two ap- proaches: are they separate issues or are they interlinked? What is the order of priority, that is, which comes first: national security or human security? According to Lama (2018), in the national security view, the state is at center stage and national security precedes all other critical human-centric needs including food, the environment, and energy.87 On the other hand, advocates of human security contend that the state does not function outside people, and thus human beings should be the primary

18 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon BOX 3: INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN in the cities of Iquitos and Pucallpa, and the regions PERU AND COLOMBIA of Ucayali and Loreto received investments for the Infrastructure development in the Peruvian construction of their first hydropower plants in Amazon saw massive investments in the region’s 2001 and 2005, respectively. transportation system in waves.94 In the first period it is estimated that the Amazon Te Colombian Amazon was overlooked for many ,(1965–1955) transportation network expanded by more than 440 years.88 Due to its low population density, there percent, growing constantly until the first years of was a lack of political interest in investing in the Peru’s military government in 1968. Nationwide development of the region. In 1959, a law estab- investments in transportation stagnated after 1975 lished that some Amazon territories were “Forest due to an economic and social crisis. During the Reserves” (i.e., protected areas), though there was 1980s, the Peruvian government was combatting little state presence in the region.89 By the begin- a brutal terrorist movement waged by the Sendero ning of the 1990s, the FARC had expanded its ac- Luminoso (“Shining Path”), a communist group that tivities across the Colombian Amazon, occupying aimed to overthrow the state, and a rival movement, the departments of Caquetá, Putumayo, Amazonas, Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA). Guainía, and Vaupés. The group gained direct influ- Despite short periods of infrastructure development ence over these areas, and it became difficult for in the 1980s (e.g., expansion of the Marginal the state to access the region and implement infra- Highway), the sector only started to attract massive structure development projects. During this period, investments again by the end of the 1990s and several illegal roads were paved in the Amazon. It the beginning of the twenty-first century. The is estimated that the FARC alone built more than government of Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000) led 3,000 km of roads, at least 490 km of which were this process by implementing several infrastructure inside protected areas.90 By the end of the twenti- development programs financed by the World Bank. eth century, Colombia had built a road network that Furthermore, in 2005, the Ministry of Transportation covered most of the western part of the country, and Communication included the concept of connecting Colombia’s main cities to international “intermodal transportation” in the country’s borders and Pacific and Caribbean ports, but leaving Intermodal Transportation Plan (2004–2023), the Amazon border untouched.91 Today, however, emphasizing the need to invest in infrastructure the context is quite different from 30 years ago. The projects that can be connected to existent networks. recent peace agreement between Colombia and the Throughout this period, investments were mainly FARC has encouraged governmental bodies to work focused on the construction of highways rather toward the development of isolated areas in the re- than waterways or dams. The hallmark projects gion.92 Infrastructure development projects will fo- included IIRSA Norte (Paita Yurimaguas), IIRSA cus on an intermodal approach that takes into con- Sur (also known as the Interoceanic Highway), and sideration the biogeographic characteristics of the IIRSA Centro (Lima-Tingo Maria-Pucallpa). As the Amazon. Plans to build the first hydroelectric power Peruvian government started to implement these plants (HPPs) in the Colombian Amazon have also projects, total public expenditures in infrastructure been announced in recent years93; however, as of quickly reached remarkable levels. By 2011, the yet, Colombia stands out as the only Amazon coun- Peruvian Amazon had 12,000 km of road, twice try that has not built HPPs in its rainforest territory. as much as in 1998. Moreover, during this period, construction rehabilitation projects were carried out in the main airports of the Amazon, including

Bandura & McKeown 19 CURRENT SECURITY CHALLENGES IN ral resources and species in the Amazon. Agribusiness in THE AMAZON BASIN the Amazon could also suffer from these ecological shifts, Insecurity in the Amazon has three interrelated forms. causing unforeseen economic effects. Undoubtedly the The first is environmental insecurity: deforestation con- worst effects of climate change are the ones that will af- tributes to biodiversity loss and climate change. Second, fect the entire world. A drier Amazon would reduce its im- illegal economic activities in the region have fueled per- portant role as a carbon sink, releasing large amounts of sonal and community insecurity, as well as recurrent in- greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. stances of land grabbing, colonization, and violence. In Personal and Community Insecurity some cases, deforestation has displaced communities. Related to environmental insecurity, illegal economic ac- Finally, the inhabitants of the Amazon face economic tivities are spurring deforestation and threatening the safe- and health insecurity due to a combination of factors: a ty and security of communities in the basin. Among these lack of meaningful economic opportunities, insufficient activities are cocaine production, illegal timber extraction, health care and other public services, mercury contam- illicit gold mining, land grabbing for speculation, wildlife ination from illegal gold mining, and the proliferation and human trafficking, forced labor, and sexual exploita- of vector-borne diseases such as malaria and dengue, tion, which have the potential to further destabilize the heightened by the loss of forest cover.99 region and incite more violence against indigenous ethnic Environmental Insecurity groups and local communities. Criminal networks operate Since the 1970s, the rainforest has been battered by sig- in the basin and have the logistical capacity to coordinate nificant loss of biodiversity and forest cover as well as in- the large-scale extraction, processing, and sale of products creasing water contamination. Researchers have found that while deploying armed men to protect their interests.95 deforestation has contributed to a loss of species in the These criminal groups generate conflicts with existing Amazon and declining biodiversity.100 Since the beginning communities over the use of land and resources. Often, of 2019, at least 80,000 fires have been reported in the Am- members of indigenous communities, environmental en- azon, per Brazilian government data—a spike of nearly 30 forcement agents, and forest residents who denounce ille- percent since 2018.101 The increase in atmospheric carbon, gal activities or attempt to enforce environmental laws are including from the loss of rainforest cover, has contribut- killed. Sadly, their murderers are rarely brought to justice, ed to a short and warm “rainy winter season.”102 Estimates and police tend to not properly investigate the crimes.96 claim that temperatures in the Amazon could increase by Illegal Logging: Illegal logging and wood extraction with- two to three degrees Celsius by the year 2050.103 While the out proper management drives forest degradation and Amazon produces approximately half of its own rainfall, deforestation. In the Amazon, logging activity is generally climate change could significantly reduce this amount. A concentrated along highways and major river courses.97 In drier Amazon increases the likelihood of more and more Peru, it happens near the river port of Pucallpa (Ucaya- frequent fires, which would release billions of tons of car- li) and along the Interoceanic Highway in Madre de Dios. bon into the atmosphere, exacerbate global warming, and In Brazil, the areas most affected by logging are located disrupt weather patterns in South America and abroad. close to the river port of Santarém (Pará) and along the Warming temperatures would further contribute to the Trans-Amazon Highway in the north and the BR-163 high- decrease in rainfall levels and increase the potential for way. Also, outsiders frequently conduct illegal logging ac- droughts. The Amazon already experienced three droughts tivities inside indigenous territories. In Colombia, illegal in 2005, 2010, and 2015. Deforestation and the effects of logging accounts for 10 percent of the deforestation in climate change could also dramatically alter the Amazoni- the country. The departments of Caquetá, Putumayo, and an ecosystem by drying out the forest into a savannah.104 Amazonas reported the extraction of 359,223m3 of timber These changes have the potential to devastate the natu during 2012 and 2017.98

20 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon Illegal Mining: Due to a decrease in the profitability of the northern city of Caballococha has become a regional cocaine production, the criminal groups that controlled hub for drug trafficking. On the Brazilian side, the cities the drug trade have moved into gold mining. The surge of Tabatinga and Benjamin Constant are also part of the in the price of gold since 2018 and the fragmented nature drug trafficking route. From there, drugs generally go to of artisanal gold mining has facilitated the entry of orga- Manaus, the key transit point of the region, and are deliv- nized crime into this activity.116 According to a 2016 report ered to international and national markets.105 On the Co- from the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized lombian side of the border, drugs are normally transported Crime, illegal gold mining represents about 28 percent of to the city of Leticia.106 gold mined in Peru, 30 percent of gold mined in Bolivia, Wildlife Trafficking: The biodiversity of the Amazon and 77 percent of gold mined in Ecuador, 80 percent of gold its remote borders attract a significant number of wildlife mined in Colombia, and 80 to 90 percent of gold mined in traffickers to the region.107 Between 1992 and 2000, 31 Venezuela. The value of gold exports in Peru and Colombia percent (81,901) of all the animals seized in Brazil were surpasses cocaine.117 Some of the gold is produced by ar- from the north region, which includes seven of the nine tisanal gold miners as a means to survive, the majority of states of the Brazilian Amazon.108 The city of Belém, in the whom are in the informal economy. In the region of Madre state of Pará, is one of the hubs of the wildlife trade.109 de Dios (Peru) in the southeastern Amazon, an estimated Wildlife trafficking is also prevalent in Peru: according to 90 percent of gold production is done either illegally or the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), 383 species have through informal channels and 90 percent of the popula- been trafficked in Peru in the last 10 years.110 They are gen- tion depends directly or indirectly on the mining sector.118 erally sold as pets or used in shamanic rituals. In Colom- Illegal mining is one of the major causes of the invasion bia, more than 34,600 animals were seized in 2018.111 The of protected areas and the displacement of indigenous figure represents a 44 percent increase over 2017, mostly groups in the Amazon. Out of the 453 illegal mines iden- due to the more aggressive role that Colombian authori- tified in the Brazilian Amazon, at least 18 are inside indig- ties have played in controlling wildlife trafficking.112 enous territories and conservation units.119 The Madre de Wildlife trafficking, in addition to moving live animals, Dios region in Peru is the most impacted by gold mining also includes killing animals to use their parts in ho- activities.120 In Colombia, illegal gold mining occurs in the meopathic medicines and other goods. Reports in 2015 basin of Amazon rivers.121 In many parts of the Amazon, by Defenders of Wildlife indicate that between 2004 and including Peru and Brazil, local governments are not well 2013, more than 7,000 animals and nearly 50,000 prod- equipped to combat illegal gold mining. Indigenous peo- ucts from Latin America were seized at U.S. borders.113 The ple have resorted to defending themselves and patrolling Humane Society International notes that it is difficult to the territories for intruders, leading to clashes. Gold min- precisely determine the amount of illicit animals and an- ing has produced severe environment and social effects imal-sourced products that move within and out of Latin including mercury poisoning (in water and air), deforesta- America each year, but the organization estimates that the tion, sex trafficking, child slavery, child trafficking, and numbers are in the millions, which is in line with a 2014 forced labor. The U.S. State Department’sTrafficking in Per- UN Environment Programme report that estimated the sons Report has widely documented this trend.122 value of such trade globally at between $50 to $150 billion Drug Production and Trafficking: At the same time, co- each year.114 caine production and trafficking is associated with -in Human Trafficking: Men, women, and children are re- creasing violence in the region, with criminal factions cruited for sexual exploitation, sale of organs, slavery, and fighting over drug trafficking routes.123 The three main forced participation in drug trafficking.115 In Brazil, 31.5 global producers of cocaine (Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia) percent of all the international and national human traf- all share borders with Brazil, where drugs are sent to cities ficking routes are concentrated in the northern region; 43 close to each side of the border.124 In Peru, for instance,

Bandura & McKeown 21 percent of them are international routes related to sexual Mercury contamination is also common in areas where hy- exploitation of teenagers and indigenous girls.132 The main dropower plants are built. In flooded areas, anaerobic bac- final destinations of the victims are European countries. teria consume inoffensive inorganic mercury compounds and transform them into toxic methylmercury.125 Brazilian One of the Amazon’s main routes for human trafficking is researchers analyzed hair strands of 37 ribeirinhos who live located in Peru.133 The route starts in the northern city of close to the Tucuruí dam and found that the rate of mer- Caballococha; from there, the victims are transported to cury in their hair was seven times greater than what the Iquitos, the main city of the Peruvian Amazon. In Iquitos, World Health Organization deems acceptable.126 This level they have access to international airline routes and are of exposure to mercury can cause a series of health-related sent to their final destinations. problems, harming the brain, heart, kidneys, and lungs. In

Sexual Exploitation: Sexual exploitation of women is a some cases, it can even cause death and fetal deformation. common problem in all the states of the Brazilian Ama- Widespread deforestation also creates the perfect envi- zon and particularly in Maranhão, Pará, and Amazonas.134 ronment for the spread of mosquito-borne diseases such According to the Brazilian National Department of Federal as malaria and dengue. The positive relationship between Highway Police, Pará is one of the states with the greatest forest loss and the proliferation of diseases is exemplified number of child prostitution spots along highways such in a study in Brazil where scientists found that clearing 4 as the BR-230 (Transamazônica).135 Moreover, prostitution percent of the forest “resulted in a nearly 50 percent in- is prevalent in areas where hydropower plants are under crease in human malaria cases.”127 This is because the el- construction. The region of Madre de Dios is the main evated water temperature of cleared areas and the short prostitution hub in Peru.136 There are hundreds of pros- vegetation of agricultural lands provide the ideal breeding titution spots along the Interoceanic Highway that links ground for different species of mosquitoes. In addition, Brazil to Peru, crossing the region of Madre de Dios. Sex- climate change can cause early hatch of mosquito eggs ual exploitation of boys, girls, teenagers, and indigenous and larger summer populations.128 women is also common on the Colombian side of the border, mainly in the state of Amazonas.137 Added to these conditions, basic services (such as clinics, potable water, and electricity) are often unavailable or pre- Health Insecurity carious, not only in rural areas of the Amazon but also in Beyond contributing to environmental degradation and urban centers. This acts as a significant barrier to treating personal insecurity, some of the economic activities tak- common hazards such as snake bites, diarrhea, acute respi- ing place in the Amazon Basin also impact the health and ratory infections, tuberculosis, and malaria, especially in wellbeing of communities. The informal and illegal gold children. The highest levels of infant mortality (out of Peru, mining that takes place in large swaths of the Amazon Colombia, and Brazil) are reported in the Colombian Ama- countries not only leads to deforestation and degrades zon.129 In 2016, the departments of Amazonas and Vaupes soil and rivers but also affects the health of communi- registered rates greater than 45 deaths per 1,000 live births. ties living near the mines. Mercury contamination in the This is an issue that is even more pronounced in indigenous Amazon is mostly associated with informal and illegal communities. According to UNICEF, the infant mortality gold mining, unregulated activities that make heavy use rate in the Brazilian Amazon among indigenous children is 138 of the liquid metal. The mercury is used in the gold much higher than that of non-indigenous children.130 purification process and then released into the water and air, contaminating plants and animals that locals The region is badly underserved by medical institutionsand consume, mainly affecting ribeirinhos (i.e., people who has an extreme lack of health care infrastructure. Only 15.6 live near the rivers and rely on fishing and small-scale percent of Brazilian hospitals are located in the Amazon,131 139 agriculture) and indigenous groups. and while Brazil has an average of 470.5 inhabitants per doctor, the average is 953.3 inhabitants per doctor in its

22 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon northern region.142 In Peru, the scenario looks even more cal, and dental treatment, along with monetary assistance, precarious because there are only 45 hospitals (7.6 percent financial planning, education, nutrition, and identification of the national total) in the Peruvian Amazon.143 The same registration programs. The navy currently has 5 ships for trend applies in the Colombian Amazon, and according to this purpose and plans to expand to 12. the Colombian Ministry of Health, the Amazon depart- The current Covid-19 pandemic underscores the basin’s ments are the least prepared for the Covid-19 pandem- inadequate health care. Due to close living quarters, cul- ic, and none of the hospitals in the region have an in- tural barriers to social distancing, and a lack of access to tensive care unit (ICU).144 clean water and health care facilities, indigenous com- In the Brazilian Amazon, the Special Secretariat for Indig- munities face disproportionately high risks during pan- enous Health (SESAI) manages indigenous populations’ demics.140 Primary risks include difficulty in transmitting access to the Brazilian universal public health system—the Covid-19 public health information to isolated villages Sistema Unico de Saúde (SUS). Military forces are frequent- and peoples and the lower immunity to this type of dis- ly deployed to support the provision of health assistance ease in such populations. These communities also lack in isolated areas of the Amazon. In these operations, the infrastructure connecting them to health care facilities, Defense Ministry works in partnership with SESAI and oth- a key barrier to receiving care.141 er groups such as the Health Expeditionaries’ Association (EDS).145 For more than 20 years, the Brazilian navy has also DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL assisted the Amazon’s riverine communities with its Hos- SECURITY INITIATIVES pital Assistance Ships (NAsH), known as “Ships of Hope.” Domestic Initiatives However, many remote indigenous health centers lack pro- To respond to these challenges, countries have undertaken fessionals and materials needed to treat common health initiatives to improve security and combat illegal activity in 146 hazards. For example, SESAI’s health workers recently re- the Amazon. Increased monitoring of the Amazon—both on ported a lack of protective equipment and hand sanitizer to the ground and through satellite imagery and remote sens- 147 deal with the Covid-19 crisis. ing—has been necessary to police illegal activities and more accurately measure their impacts. Such actions include ran- The Peruvian navy’s Traveling Social Action Platforms (PIAS) dom military and police incursions as well as environmen- have provided medical assistance to more than 130,900 tal enforcement, interceptions of communications of illegal residents in the Amazon Basin since 2013 as part of Peru’s groups, money tracking, destroying machinery, and im- Enduring Social Action Plan.148 Peru’s Enduring Social Ac- provements to local and satellite surveillance capabilities. tion Plan aims to improve the quality of life for those living in the country’s most remote areas, and the PIAS brings government services in a modular form to the areas of the Amazon where they are most needed. Not only are these areas geographically remote, but they also deal with social conflicts, extreme poverty, drug trafficking, illegal mining and logging, human trafficking, and a multitude of diseases.

Many residents in rural areas would not have access to medical and dental care and social support services if it were not for the navy, which has been bringing government services to these populations through floating hospitals for more than 50 years.149 The PIAS project has built upon this past engagement and builds ships (along with using boats seized from drug traffickers) to provide general health care, medi

Bandura & McKeown 23 BOX 4: BRAZIL’S SECURITY INITIATIVES IN plement the work performed by the INPE—rather than THE AMAZON optical satellites, the program installed space-based From 2009 to 2019, Brazil’s defense expenditures have radar that can monitor deforestation during rainy followed the country’s economic growth and increased seasons.157 The second program, Connected Amazon, 159 by more than 100 percent. In 2017, total state public is currently being implemented with the objective to security expenditures in the Brazilian Amazon totaled provide isolated communities with access to high- $2 billion (R$10.2 billion), amounting to 14.6 percent speed internet that could support projects on telemed- of the country’s total public security expenditures for icine and e-learning.158 Finally, the Instruction Center 160 the year. In the Brazilian Amazon, military forces are provides training on how to conduct military opera- deployed in several large- and small-scale operations tions in the jungle. to prevent and combat environmental crimes.

With regard to innovative security technologies, today, Among other recent Brazilian initiatives (Box 4), President Brazil has one of the world’s largest land monitoring Jair Bolsonaro recreated the Amazon Council, which will be projects.161 This includes five major Amazon programs responsible for coordinating “diverse actions within each carried out by the National Institute of Spatial Research ministry focused on the protection, defense, and sustain- (INPE). One of the programs is the PRODES-Amazon, able development of the Amazon.”150 The council, which which uses satellite images to monitor the deforesta- since 1995 had been attached to the Ministry of Environ- tion of the Brazilian Amazon.162 It is supported by a ment, will now be led by Brazil’s vice president, General second initiative, TerraClass, which is responsible for Hamilton Mourão, as well as 14 heads of ministries.151 It investigating the causes of deforestation (e.g., annual will not include representation for any minority group, nor crops, urbanization, and mining activities).163 Besides even the participation of state governors or environmental PRODES and TerraClass, INPE has developed DETER, a and governmental protection agencies such as the Brazilian satellite-based system that provides near-real-time im- Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources agery of deforestation “hot spots” in the Brazilian Ama- (IBAMA) and the National Institute for Indigenous Affairs zon.164 The imagery is subsequently sent to local police (FUNAI).152 According to General Mourão, the council will, and law enforcement agencies. A platform called Ter- however, continue to consult state governors.153 raBrasilis allows the public to interact with the spatial In response to a surge in deforestation ahead of the 2020 data generated by DETER and PRODES.165 Lastly, by the forest fire season, on May 7, President Bolsonaro issued a end of this year, the institution is projected to launch Law and Order Guarantee (Garantia da Lei e da Ordem, or the first “Earth Observation satellite completely de- GLO) decree that declared the country’s armed forces would signed, integrated, tested and operated by Brazil.”166 In take charge of monitoring and containing deforestation December 2019, the China-Brazil Earth Resources Sat- and fires in the Amazon, overseeing and coordinating the ellite (CBERS) bilateral cooperation program launched nation’s environmental agencies.154 The decree, which fol- its sixth satellite, which, according to Chinese author- lowed a similar decree issued in 2019 in response to inter- ities, will be used to support Brazil’s work monitoring national outcry over dramatically increased deforestation the Amazon Basin.167 rates, gave the minister of defense control of the operation Other initiatives concerning the use of innovative se- and was declared valid inside and outside of conservation curity technologies include the following programs units, indigenous lands, and other federal areas in the Am- carried out by the Ministry of Defense: Amazônia SAR, azon for a period of one month155; it was later extended for Connected Amazon, and the Jungle War Instruction a second month.156 The decree followed a string of changes Center. 168 The Amazônia SAR was developed to com to leadership, procedures, and budgets for IBAMA. These changes come at a time when the Bolsonaro government is

24 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon suspending fines for land-grabbing violations and granting temisa successfully recovered 136,000 hectares of tropical amnesty to settlers. forest, arrested and charged more than 120 people, and decommissioned armed vehicles and machinery. Moreover, Operation Green Brazil was initiated in 2019 to combat fires and environmental crimes in the Amazon.190 Similarly, the government of Peru has responded to these In one month, Brazilian authorities seized 28 vehicles, de- issues through numerous military and police crackdowns. tained 63 people, and applied a total of 112 criminal charges Recently, in 2019, the Peruvian government launched Op- associated with illegal mining, deforestation, and seizure of eration Mercury, a major crackdown on illegal gold mining timber cut. The government authorized a punctual action in Puerto Maldonado and other neighboring towns, which against loggers in the state of Rondônia (Operação Inimigos also rescued dozens of women and girls who were victims da Tora)191 and the deployment of 3,800 military personnel of the sex industry.169 The initiative involved a declaration for the second phase of Operation Green Brazil.192 of a state of emergency that lasted two months, the establishment of seven fixed military bases, the deployment Recent reports have emerged that fires in the Brazilian Am- of 1,800 police and military officers, and the embedding azon continue despite the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic of 80 national prosecutors in the operation.170 The state 193 in the first half of 2020. Brazil has the second-highest of emergency declaration allowed legal prosecutions for number of Covid-19 cases in the world, while Peru and illegal mining to be expedited, with trials occurring as 194 Colombia rank sixth and eighth, respectively. Fearing a quickly as within 48 hours, and convictions returned as rebuke from the international community, President Bol- soon as eight days later.171 The program resulted in a 92 sonaro deployed military assets in May 2020 to prevent percent reduction in La Pampa’s deforestation rate from environmental crimes from occurring in the Amazon, 2018 to 2019 and rescued dozens of trafficked women with a timeframe of 30 days. Brazil’s INPE recorded 6,803 and girls in the process, many of whom were underage fires in the Amazon in July 2020 and estimated nearly 464 and as young as 11 years old.172 square miles of Amazon tree cover was deforested from January to April of this year. Another security strategy involves citizen participation, such as the self-defense committees (comités de autode- In its most recent National Development Plan, the Colombi- fensa, or CADs) in Peru. Peru’s Ministry of Defense defines an government emphasizes the need for a multidimension- CADs as “organizations arising spontaneously and freely, to al conception of national security that transcends military develop self-defense activities against crime,” such as illicit and political divides to integrate institutions to guarantee drug trafficking.173 Peru has a long history with CADs, dat- rights both “civil, economic, social, cultural, and environ- ing most notably back to those that emerged in the 1980s to 195 mental.” Under this multidimensional strategy, Colombia counter the Sendero Luminoso movement.174 In the mod- has launched a variety of national programs that combine ern day, views of the effectiveness of CADs in countering military and social dimensions. The Zonas Futuro program drug trafficking remain mixed. Some point to CADs in the focuses on territories most affected by violence, criminal Ayacucho region of Peru as examples of self-defense com- activity, and poverty. Launched in 2019, the program aims munities working to share resources, train, and organize in to “achieve institutional control, guarantee citizens’ rights, order to effectively fill gaps left by the lack of police pres- disrupt illicit economies, and preserve and defend the en- ence. However, others levy criticisms that CADs in the Am- 196 vironment.” Zonas Futuro includes seven areas of focus, azon region have turned a blind eye to drug trafficking.175 the largest dedicated specifically to the Chiribiquete Zone, In 2003, Peru passed a legal framework outlining the rights Colombia’s largest national park, located in the heart of the of CADs, and as recently as 2013, the Ministry of Defense Amazon, and a UNESCO World Heritage Site. President Iván named CADs as playing a supportive role to the Peruvian Duque launched another initiative, Operation Artemisa, Armed Forces and National Police.176 Yet in practice, coop- with the objective to combat deforestation, illegal mining, eration between CADs and the Peruvian government has 197 and narcotics trafficking. In its first year, Operation Ar not always been consistent. For example, in May 2015, the

Bandura & McKeown 25 Ministry of Defense called for the deactivation of CADs.177 park rangers (or guardaparques) and with the Peruvian Additionally, many Peruvian politicians oppose CADs over Environmental Assessment and Oversight Body (OEFA) in worries about human rights abuses or fears that CADs investigative processes. themselves will become involved with drug trafficking.178 International Cooperation In the state of Maranhão in Brazil, the Forest Guardians At the regional level, cooperation initiatives have aimed are composed of 17 indigenous groups that work with to address deforestation, insecurity, and economic devel- IBAMA agents, the federal police, and the military po- opment. The Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization lice to identify areas of criminal activity, including ille- (ACTO) and the Leticia Pact are two of the most relevant re- gal logging, wildlife trafficking, and drug trafficking.179 gional initiatives in terms of deforestation and security. The Equipped with drones, GPS devices, trucks, shotguns, agreement that created the ACTO in 1998 was signed by the and bows and arrows, the Forest Guardians started to eight countries sharing the Amazon Basin: Brazil, Bolivia, monitor illegal activities back in 2010 as a response to Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and Venezu- the lack of public initiatives to combat crime and pro- ela.182 In January 2020, ACTO signed a cooperation agree- tect indigenous territories. In 2014, the Dutch NGO For- ment with the United Nations Environment Programme for est Forces carried out a similar initiative in the Brazilian a Global Environment Facility-funded initiative.183 The proj- Amazon, a pilot project to implement community-based ect’s objectives are to “ensure integrated and sustainable forest crime prevention.180 Several Amazonian commu- management” of the water resources in the Amazon basin nities were equipped with waterproof GPS cameras to given the effects of climate change. Previously, in 2011, identify and report criminal activities to environmental ACTO established the Forest Cover Monitoring Project in agencies and the police. The NGO also provided power partnership with the Brazilian National Institute of Space banks and portable solar charges to communities that Research (INPE) to improve regional capacity to monitor did not have access to electricity and mobile phone net- the deforestation of the Amazon. Additionally, ACTO is also works. The objective of the project was to test whether implementing a number of projects on indigenous issues, the evidence that communities collected would reach water resources, science and technology, health, tourism, the Brazilian forest law enforcement system. According and social inclusion. However, conflicts between ACTO to Tim Boekhout Van Solinge, the researcher behind the members, mainly pitting Bolivia and Venezuela against the project, the work performed by GPS-equipped commu- other member countries, are weakening the organization. nities complements the use of satellites because it can identify small-scale deforestation and is not affected by More recently, the Leticia Pact was signed in September rainy seasons. In three years, the project showed some 2019 by seven countries: Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecua- 184 positive outcomes; however, they were limited to com- dor, Guyana, Peru, and Suriname. More a declaration of munities that maintained a strong level of organization intentions than a cooperation agreement, the pact aims to and leadership. protect the Amazon Basin and guarantee the sustainable development of the region.185 It utilizes disaster response Similarly, for more than 10 years, indigenous communi- coordination and satellite monitoring to protect the forest. ties from the Colombian and Peruvian Amazon have been Signatories also agree to share information regarding illegal using technological devices to monitor and report envi- activities in the Amazon. ronmental crimes.181 In Peru, Loreto has even established a hub, the Centro de Información y Planificación Territo- Countries in the region have also worked with interna- rial (CIPTO), where local professionals and engineers can tional partners to bolster their capacities in the Amazon. analyze the data that indigenous groups collect. Addition- In November 2017, the United States provided security ally, Peruvian indigenous populations have been working training to Brazil, Colombia, and Peru. The focus of the closely with the National Service of Protected Natural Operation AmazonLog17 was to prepare domestic armed Areas (SERNANP) to complement the work performed by forces to conduct humanitarian assistance operations in

26 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon the Pan-Amazon.186 The activities were based in the city of Tabatinga (Brazil, in the border region between Peru, Colombia, and Brazil).

In 2019, world leaders at the G7 summit voiced their support for Brazil’s efforts to combat deforestation and forest fires in the Amazon Basin and also offered their financial and technical services.187 President Trump said, “if the Unit- ed States can help with the Amazon Rainforest fires, we stand ready to assist.” Since then, the U.S. military has been supporting the Amazon Basin through joint military exercises and equipment provision as a sign of closer U.S.-Brazil defense ties.188 U.S. troops have joined ranks with troops from Brazil, Colombia, and Peru, who have set up temporary military bases in the area surrounding the three borders. The United States also provides a number of aircraft to Brazil, including several Hercules C-130 military planes that help put out massive forest fires and transport military personnel and equipment.189

Bandura & McKeown 27 Photo by: TARSO SARRAF/AFP via Getty Images

Government health workers arrive to visit riverside communities of the municipality of Melgaco to test them for COVID-19 coronavirus infections in the Marajoara region.

GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES IN 02 THE AMAZON GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES IN THE AMAZON

The security challenges discussed in the preceding section actors can operate in the region. These frameworks include are magnified by a series of weaknesses in governance struc- national constitutions, international agreements, laws and tures and the rule of law that enable deforestation in the regulations, and environmental and economic strategies region and allow insecurity to thrive. First, land governance that span agriculture, energy and mining, infrastructure, in the Amazon is weak: in general, Amazon countries lack forestry, environment, indigenous population and territo- adequate land registries and have disorderly titling processes ries, and protected areas. However, land governance and and opaque systems for granting different types of economic compliance with the laws in the region remains weak: this concessions. At the same time, a large amount of land in the creates an opportunity for different actors to invade lands Amazon remains undesignated and is insufficiently mon- and expand their economic activities, furthering environ- itored. This creates opportunities for settlers to invade and mental degradation and social conflict. expand their activities, leading to further deforestation and In Brazil, successive governments passed laws to protect social conflict.198 Second, local governments often lack bud- the Amazon between the late 1980s and the early 2000s. getary and human resources, technical capacity, and some- As a result of this legal framework, half of the land in the times the political will to address competing problems. A Brazilian Amazon is now protected, either as indigenous third governance challenge is the lack of overall transparency territories or conservation. The remaining half of the in government practices and the misuse of power and public land is privately owned or is undesignated public land. funds. Corruption across sectors and levels of government However, a lack of enforcement of regulations, loopholes wastes valuable public resources, leaves crimes unpunished, in the existing land titling framework, and weak institu- and creates a culture of impunity. Taken together, these gov- tional capacity in the Brazilian Amazon creates an envi- ernance challenges provide an avenue for environmental ex- ronment in which deforestation can flourish, which has ploitation and for illegal activities to flourish. intensified security challenges. Land Governance Each country with territory in the Amazon Basin has differ- Land titling in the Brazilian Amazon is complicated due to ent laws and regulations that provide the legal framework many claims to the land and “squatter’s rights.” To stream- for how the government, communities, NGOs, and other line the land title process, the Terra Legal System was cre-

Bandura & McKeown 29 ated in 2009 to provide titles to small landowners in oc- tion, Tinigua National Natural Park, lost nearly 13,890 hect- cupied forest territory. These titles are contingent upon ares of protected land in the first third of 2018 alone. While landowners’ compliance with the 2012 Forest Code, which addressing the problem of land grabbing was included in stipulates that residents must maintain 80 percent rainfor- the peace deal with the FARC, the section lacked a detailed est cover. The new code is the latest update to the original strategy for addressing the problem.204 1965 Forest Code, which outlines rules for private property In June 2018, Colombia defined the country’s agricultural holdings in the Amazon.199 The new update decreases the border into law, which includes 40,075,960 hectares (or 35 total protected area required on each private property. Ad- ditionally, the update outlines new rules for the national percent of the continental territory) that are demarcated Rural Environmental Registry system (Cadastro Ambiental for agricultural, livestock, forestry, and aquaculture and Rural) that requires landowners to register their properties fishing activities. The remaining 65 percent of the Colombi- with high-resolution satellite images and reserve a certain an territory is dedicated to natural forests (42 percent) and percentage of their property to “Legal Reserves” or set- conservation areas (23 percent) such as national parks and 205 asides and preserve permanent protected areas such as ri- flora and fauna sanctuaries. Despite this ruling, enforce- parian vegetation. Failure to comply with this standard can ment remains weak because the agencies responsible for lead to a loss of agricultural credits and product embargoes. controlling and monitoring the issue (the local environ- However, the Rural Environmental Registry can be used as mental authorities and the National Natural Park System) a vehicle for corruption and land grabbing, especially of un- have insufficient personnel and inadequate budget and designated public lands. technical capacity to confront lawbreakers. Meanwhile, the agency principally responsible for administering land Despite the legal protections for the Brazilian Amazon, acquisition and preventing illegal seizures (Agencia Na- the Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) has found that most cional de Tierras) faces intense commercial pressures to deforestation occurs on public lands, both in undesig- relax the protective regulations on land administration in nated areas (25 percent) and agrarian settlements (30 favor of greater production.206 Added to these difficulties, 200 percent). An estimated 54.6 million hectares of public the different levels of government lack a multisectoral ap- land is undesignated in Brazil, a large part of which is proach and remain uncoordinated.207 in the Amazon.201 These areas lack management plans or management councils to monitor their activities. There Similarly, the Peruvian Amazon also has a disorderly land is also weak law enforcement and few resources and per- titling framework and an opaque system for granting dif- sonnel to protect the land. A recent survey of Brazilian ferent types of economic concessions. Land cadastres at the land tenure found that there is “a substantial overlap regional level suffer from inconsistencies, and the Peru- between these undesignated lands and lands registered vian government is uneven in its issuance and enforce- under public and private tenure.”202 ment of land titles, which leads to overlapping rights and land grabbing, creating disputes between indigenous Colombia also has an inadequate land titling system and groups, mining companies, and settlers.208 According to weak territorial governance. Despite a 2018 ruling by the the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 90 percent Colombian supreme court asserting the rights of the Am- of land owned by landowners in the Peruvian Amazon azon rainforest to be protected, conserved, maintained, lacks a formal land title.209 Farmers in the region do not and restored by the Colombian government, inadequate feel incentivized to invest in their lands because there land titling in Colombia continues to enable deforesta- is a risk they will not reap the fruits of their labor if the tion through illegal land grabbing and speculation.203 Land land becomes titled to someone else. hoarding occurs when an armed group systematically seizes control of a protected or forested area. Such is reportedly The Consejo Interregional Amazónico, a special commission the case with remaining members of the FARC who intend established by regional governments in Peru to develop a to distribute national parkland. One of the parks in ques- sustainable action plan for the Amazon region (for 2019

30 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon to 2021), has identified several challenges in this area.210 tions of trust.”213 This concept is known as the “revolving One key problem is the lack of official information on -in door” phenomenon, which is when individuals go from digenous communities and their land titling. Obtaining the serving in the private sector as consultants, lobbyists, and geographic scope of land titles and verifying such informa- strategists, to serving in the public sector as federal em- tion is also difficult. The laws and regulations are complex ployees, and then back to serving in the private sector.214 and lead to overlapping claims among indigenous commu- This presents several problems for the national govern- nities and mining and oil concessions that come up against ment that often go unrecognized and unaccounted for, the demarcations of public lands and protected areas. For such as possible conflicts of interest and lobbyists with example, a comprehensive study conducted in the Madre unprecedented access to decisionmakers.215 In Peru, this de Dios region found more than 600 overlapping rights, has led to a shortage of properly trained, specialized per- leading to constant land conflicts.211 There is also a lack of sonnel tasked with granting contracts, licenses, and per- transparency in the process of granting mining concessions mits related to mining.216 Because of this, there is a lack of in the Peruvian Amazon. compliance with existing laws, and the process of obtaining legal permission for mining exploration and exploita- In addition to the land tenure weaknesses, the process of tion is often bypassed completely.217 “territorial planning” in Peru was intended to streamline and integrate the planning process, though after almost 20 In Brazil, deforestation levels have steadily increased since years, the territorial planning of the country has not been 2012. Many environmentalists blame the weakening of fully realized. Where plans exist, they are not integrated or the 2012 Forest Code (with the updated 2016 provisions), aligned at the local, provincial, and regional levels.212 which decreased the forest cover requirements for farmers and timber companies.218 It also gave amnesty to those who Institutional Capacity cut down the rainforest illegally before 2008, which further In addition to the land governance difficulties, there is emboldened loggers. These conditions combined with the also a lack of compliance with the laws and regulations economic and political crises in Brazil in 2017 have led to governing the Amazon, mainly due the limited budget fewer resources to monitor and punish illegal deforestation allocated to enforcement agencies, deficient presence of activities. Since 2018, fines for deforestation have decreased environmental agencies, and a lack of incentives for com- nearly 38 percent, to the lowest levels in two decades.219 Il- plying with these regulations. This is more evident at the legal logging activities have increased as many loggers are subnational level, where fundamental institutional capac- increasingly confident that they will not face fines or sanc- ity issues become apparent. tion due to the loosening of environmental regulations. In

Despite the autonomy subnational governments enjoy addition, decreases in the number of personnel and inspec- to administer their resources, some of the municipalities tors at agencies such as IBAMA and FUNAI have made en- 220 in Brazil, Colombia, and Peru lack adequate budgets and forcement efforts increasingly limited. skilled human resources, which leads to weak planning Although Colombia is one of the more affluent countries and execution. This can incentivize communities to favor in Latin America, the Colombian state has significant insti- patronage and clientelism in order to manage expectations. tutional capacity bottlenecks and enforcement challenges Most of the Amazonian departments struggle with these is- that weaken the rule of law in the country.221 Per the 2019 sues to a varying degree, with a high risk of corruption on Rule of Law Index, Colombia is one of the few upper-mid- the one hand and low state capacity on the other. Moreover, dle-income countries that lacks a strong commitment to regional governments often have inadequate fiscal space to the rule of law. It ranks 27th out of the 38 upper-middle-in- perform their duties. In other words, spending responsibil- come countries, doing just better than China and Russia.222 ities are not matched with corresponding income sources. International and bilateral donors observe that one of the In the case of Peru, local governments experience vacancies biggest challenges of enforcing the laws on the books is and a high turnover of personnel, especially in “high posi- that the state is often unable to control certain parts of the

Bandura & McKeown 31 country and, beyond this, is unable to provide an alterna- of Justice and Public Security, General Comptroller’s Office, tive to those engaged in illegal economic activities. General Attorney’s Office, and the federal police. It includes information sharing among ministries, the establishment Corruption of compliance rules to be followed by the Ministry of Infra- A third governance challenge relates to corruption, which structure, and the definition of technical criteria to nomi- affects all levels of government. Scholars have argued that nate individuals to new functions. Moreover, it has created rampant corruption in Brazil, Colombia, and Peru is respon- a guide of ethical conduct and a transparency portal that sible for the various environmental crimes that are com- receives complaints against corruption. mitted in the Amazon Basin.223 According to the Corrup- tion Perception Index, Brazil, Peru, and Colombia have the fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-highest rates of corruption in the Latin American region, respectively.224

As mentioned, all three of these countries have laws in place to protect the rainforest and its natural resources from overexploitation. However, these countries seldom take into account the possibility of government corruption in their policies, and there has been increased collusion between private companies and public servants to evade these rules.225 Additionally, despite these laws, environmental crimes in the Amazon often go unpunished.

This is part of a familiar pattern of corruption in infrastructure projects in the Amazon. Studies show that corruption was common within the innumerable infrastructure projects that military governments implemented in the 1970s.226 In general, large infrastructure projects are complex undertakings, and often corruption during the project preparation stage continues and trickles down to the implementation stage.227 In 2017, an investigation carried out by Folha de São Paulo disclosed that at least 15 infrastructure projects in Brazil had evidence of overbilling.228 Irregulari- ties in these projects cost the public coffers at least $3 billion. More recently, due to local population pressure and the Operation Car Wash scandal, which implicated the leaders of Peru and Brazil and major infrastructure firm Odebrecht in a kickback scheme surrounding dam construction, nearly 22 proposed dams along the Marañón River in the Brazil- ian and Peruvian Amazon were halted.229

Operation Car Wash spurred a number of new anti-corruption measures. In the first half of 2019, the Brazilian Min- istry of Infrastructure launched an Anticorruption Radar Program to “fight the embezzlement of federal funds.”230 The initiative was developed in cooperation with the Ministry

32 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon Photo by: ELSON ALMEIDA/AFP via Getty Images

Aerial view of trucks queue- ing along the BR163 highway, in Moraes Almeida district, Itaituba, Para state, Brazil, in the Amazon rainforest.

INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN 03 THE AMAZON INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN THE AMAZON

Given the Region’s vulnerabilities infrastructure projects infrastructure construction projects such as hydroelectric have continued to be championed in the Amazon to pro- dams and roads—as a “winning strategy” for reelection but vide security to the basin, increase connectivity, and foster often disregard the potential negative effects that these economic growth on both a national and a regional basis. projects create in a complex ecosystem such as the Amazon. During the early-2000s, the Initiative for Integration of Re- Infrastructure investments have also attracted more people gional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA) was founded to the region, accelerating human migration and urban- to better integrate highway networks, riverways, and hy- ization, but local governments have lacked the capacity to droelectric dams throughout South America and promote provide public services to meet the demands of larger pop- regional integration.231 ulations.235 As a result, these projects are often lose-lose: they do not increase economic growth and they harm the Infrastructure development has the potential to gener- environment and local communities. ate economic and social gains: it can facilitate human mobility, connect products to markets, generate jobs, Within the Amazon context, infrastructure projects cannot improve communications, provide inroads for security be regarded as a simple solution to security concerns or an forces to disrupt criminal networks, and increase access easy way to spur economic development in the region. to medical, potable water, and education services in rural In the Amazon Basin, large-scale infrastructure projects areas.232 Despite these potential benefits, however, some can create more pressure for deforestation and exacerbate of the infrastructure projects developed in the Amazon existing security vulnerabilities if they are not properly have contributed to environmental degradation and planned and managed.236 A more thorough discussion of spurred social conflict (Box 5).233 and comprehensive approach to the role that infrastructure can play in enabling or hampering sustainable de- Part of the problem is that the infrastructure planning pro- velopment in the Amazon is needed. This includes better cess has been deficient: projects have been pushed forward planning processes and sound infrastructure governance without a careful analysis of long-term growth strategies, frameworks to ensure that selected projects will provide infrastructure designs, or alternative options.234 Politicians the maximum economic benefits to the region while min- have approached the development of megaprojects—large imizing environmental and social costs.237

34 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon BOX 5: EXAMPLES OF LARGE INFRASTRUCTURE Hydropower plants (HPPs): Similar to the impacts PROJECTS LEADING TO SECURITY CHALLENGES articulated above for roads, HPPs create social effects Roads: The construction of a main road may improve including a sudden influx of workers without proper trade logistics and enable greater transportation ac- planning, leading to the displacement of communities. cess to remote regions, but the decision to construct In the case of Belo Monte dam, the arrival of thou- these roads is often driven by political motives and sands of workers completely changed the dynamics of does not follow economic principles. Moreover, the city of Altamira in the state of Pará, Brazil. The city environmental and social externalities are often lacked the infrastructure and financial capacity to re- ignored. Many of these roads in the Amazon have ceive a large number of migrants. The price of products, brought in settlers, local smallholder farmers, and houses, and services escalated, and the city reported forest-dwelling communities, which led to countless high levels of violence and prostitution.240 The popula- unplanned deforestation efforts. Without proper tion of Altamira doubled during the construction of the planning and governance structures, the construction hydroelectric dam, and by 2017, it was one of the most of a main road in the Amazon creates a “fishbone” violent cities in Brazil.241 Moreover, the construction of pattern, wherein secondary (illegal) adjacent roads the Belo Monte HPP resulted in constant conflicts with are built around them, creating more deforestation. the riverine communities and the rights of indigenous Estimates point out that approximately 95 percent groups living in the area.242 of all deforestation occurs within 50 km of highways or roads in the Brazilian Amazon. In Peru, 75 percent of the deforestation occurs on plots of land CURRENT PIPELINE OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS that are less than half a hectare in size (less than IN THE AMAZON BASIN 1.25 acres), and 95 percent of deforestation takes Across Latin America, the provision of infrastructure re- place less than 6 km from a road.238 When roads mains deficient, with significant gaps infrastructure in- are constructed in vulnerable areas without prop- vestment and the access to and quality of these services.243 er planning and with weak governance, they can Issues such as transport delays, slow internet speeds, and bring added security challenges such as opening up electricity disruptions relate to the quality of services. In isolated areas to new illegal activities and creating particular, citizens express discontent with the provision of conflicts with adjacent communities. infrastructure and consider it vital for their country’s future These impacts are seen in the small towns (pueblos) economic growth. The 2019 Global Infrastructure Index and cities located along the Interoceanic Highway (GII) from the Global Infrastructure Investor Association that crosses the region of Madre de Dios in Peru.239 (GIIA) and Ipsos Mori indicates that only 31 percent of the The population of the city of Puerto Maldonado (the population in Latin America is satisfied with infrastructure capital of the region) doubled after the construction of in their country.244 This survey measured citizens’ percep- the highway. With no infrastructure to support a large tions of infrastructure such as airports, roads, rail, housing, number of migrants, nearly half the residents of the water and sanitation, and wind and solar, among others. region do not have access to the water supply net- For Brazil, the survey showed that only 22 percent of the work. According to the regional president of Madre population reported satisfaction with infrastructure, while de Dios, plans to develop the region were never tak- 52 percent were dissatisfied. Brazil’s dissatisfaction ranking en into consideration during the implementation of was the highest out of the 28 countries surveyed. Peru and the project. The level of violence has escalated in the Colombia’s satisfaction ratings were slightly higher, at 30 region, and the highway became a route of human percent and 29 percent, respectively.245 and drug trafficking.

Bandura & McKeown 35 In the Amazon, there are noticeable gaps in the infra- countries at large, though to differing extents. One of structure for basic services such as clean water and san- the largest gaps in social infrastructure between the itation, education, and health care, although there is Colombian Amazon and the rest of the country relates significant heterogeneity among the different nations to water and sanitation infrastructure. The rate of ac- that comprise the basin. Data from the Brazilian Am- cess to sanitation in the Colombian Amazon is less than azon paints a sobering picture: less than 10 percent of half of the national average, as is the rate of access to people have access to sanitation (sewage collection) water infrastructure.253 In terms of health, infant mor- in the states of Amapá, Amazonas, Pará, and Rondônia tality is roughly double the national rate.254 However, it with the worst states being Rondônia (4.5 percent) and is important to note that the departments that make Pará (6.3 percent).246 In the case of water, 60 percent of up the Colombian Amazon are highly varied: Meta, for residents have access to water on average, with Amapá instance, has the fourth-highest regional GDP of the na- and Pará being the worst states at 37.1 percent and 45.7 tion, while Vaupes has the lowest.255 percent, respectively. More than 90 percent of cities in Likewise, access to sanitation in the Peruvian Amazon Amapá are plagued by epidemic and endemic diseas- is nearly 30 percent lower than the national average, es.247 Moreover, 19 percent of people living in indige- and access to water is more than 20 percent lower.256 As nous territories in the Amazon and 22 percent of people in Colombia, the departments that make up the Peruvi- living in conservation areas lack access to electricity.248 an Amazon are highly varied. Madre de Dios, which has The Brazilian government has instituted a successful a large mineral extractive industry, has the fifth-high- program called Luz para Todos, created in 2003 with the est GDP per capita of the nation. In contrast, economies objective of promoting access to electricity for families that rely mainly on agriculture, such as San Martin and living in rural areas, through renewable sources, with Amazonas, have the fourth- and fifth-lowest GDP per nearly 80 percent of the costs subsidized by the fed- capita of the nation. eral, state, and local governments.249 Because the first phase of the program (2003–2011) did not meet the ini- Countries in Latin America have developed pipelines of tial goal of providing electricity to 2 million families, it proposed infrastructure projects to meet the needs of was extended through 2018. The priority of the second their populations and support economic development. phase was to reach quilombolas and indigenous commu- Yet many of the infrastructure plans in these countries, nities, riverside dwellers, small farmers, families living including in the Amazon region, are heavily focused on in extractive reserves, and areas with community wells large-scale projects in mining, hydropower, and road (shared water wells).250 According to a 2013 survey, 97.2 networks (Box 6). percent of the beneficiaries said that they were satisfied with the initiative.251 More than 40 percent of the Large-scale infrastructure plans aim to integrate markets, population surveyed thought that the program was also create jobs, and ultimately stimulate economic growth.257 responsible for the creation of more job opportunities Many of these projects are undertaken with the premise and an increase in family incomes. Between the years that they will generate economic growth and automatic of 2000 and 2011, the number of households with elec- benefits for all citizens.258 However, often these benefits tricity access grew in the state of Pará (19.8 percent), in do not materialize, especially for the communities sur- Maranhão (22.2 percent), and Amazonas (12.2 percent). rounding these projects, leaving them to bear the brunt The per capita income rate during this period also in- of the social and environmental costs. Infrastructure can creased in those states: Maranhão (65.1 percent), Pará generate economic growth and contribute to people’s (33.1 percent), and Amazonas (53.5 percent).252 well-being, but the focus should be on the quality of infra- Similarly, the Amazon regions in Colombia and Peru structure services and impact and not solely on the quan- 259 tend to lag behind the development of the rest of their tity and volume of investments.

36 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon BOX 6: OVERVIEW OF PLANNED INFRASTRUC- access in Alto Amazonas, Loreto, Maynas, and Putu- TURE PROJECTS IN SELECT COUNTRIES OF THE mayo through installing 1,255 km of fiber-optic cable, AMAZON BASIN which will benefit 268 locations in the Amazon.263 Ad- Brazil: The current government has a pipeline of 69 in- ditionally, the National Infrastructure Plan for Com- frastructure projects including concessions, public-pri- petitiveness outlines the priority of improving and vate partnerships (PPP), and privatization initiatives maintaining navigability conditions in the Hidrovía among airports, railways, ports, roads, defense, power Amazónica (Amazon waterway), for a total investment generation and transmission, and oil-and-gas business- of $100.6 million.264 es. The government is pushing ahead with a big new railway, the Ferrogrão (Grainrail). The Ferrogrão railway SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL is in two Amazonian states, Mato Grosso and Pará.260 IMPACT OF LARGE The railway would radically increase Brazil’s capacity to INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS export grains and minerals in the north of the country, In the case of the Amazon, large-scale infrastructure proj- increasing pressure substantially on the Amazon and ects have often failed to fulfill broader promises of projected Cerrado biomes. Additionally, the Brazilian govern- benefits, particularly for nearby communities. More specifi- ment has signaled its intention to sign contracts with cally, road and dam projects have been associated with fur- 265 the private sector for $27 billion in road construction thering environmental degradation and social conflicts. projects over the next four years. Some of the fund- Road expansion in the Amazon has been problematic ing will most likely go to paving the BR-319 highway due to the associated negative environmental external- through the Madeira Basin rainforest or for the exten- ities.266 When roads are constructed in vulnerable areas sion of the BR-163 highway across the Amazon River to such as a rainforest without proper planning and with the Suriname border, which could open that region to weak governance, they can result in added challenges. agribusiness and mining. Roads can open up isolated areas to new actors and ac- Colombia: The Colombian government is considering tivities, creating more deforestation and conflicts with new projects and investments in the Amazon region, adjacent communities. In the Amazon, weak infrastruc- with a critical focus on preserving the rainforests, cre- ture planning and the absence of state authority in some ating sustainable agricultural practices, and providing parts of the region have given way to a network of infor- 267 access to mainstream economic and public services to mal (and illegal) roads. Usually, when one main road is the local communities.261The government is also look- constructed, secondary adjacent roads are built around ing to ensure that key Sustainable Development Goals it, exacerbating deforestation and creating a “fishbone” (SDGs) such as clean and affordable energy (#7), de- pattern (Map 3). Estimates point out that approximate- cent work and economic growth (#8), and inequality ly 95 percent of all deforestation occurs within 50 km 268 reduction (#10) are all achieved along with biodiver- of highways or main roads in the Brazilian Amazon. sity preservation. Roads improve access to forests and facilitate activities such as logging. Major roads increase deforestation by Peru: As Peru consistently ranks in the bottom three improving the profitability of cattle herding, and agricul- of South American nations in telecommunications ser- ture production then incentivizes further clearing. Roads vices, the country has placed a particular emphasis on also stimulate deforestation through induced effects by expanding telecommunications infrastructure, espe- facilitating the construction of smaller side roads and cially in rural areas.262 Among the plans are telecommu- human settlements in remote areas. Moreover, criminal nications and waterway projects in the Amazon. One groups have taken advantage of the current road network telecommunications project aims to increase internet to expand their activities, which in hand generates further environmental degradation.

Bandura & McKeown 37 MAP 3: “FISHBONE PATTERN” IN RONDÔNIA STATE, BRAZIL “FISHBONE PATTERN” IN RONDÔNIA STATE, BRAZIL 2000 2008 2012 [this is a placeholder per Shannon’s comments on using NASA images]

Source: “World of Change: Amazon Deforestation,” NASA Earth Observatory, 2000-2018, https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/world-of-change/Deforestation/show-all. Source: “World of Change: Amazon Deforestation,” NASA Earth Observatory, 2000-2018, https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/world-of-change/Defor- estation/show-all.

Although roads can spur economic development by facil- Similarly, dam construction can bring economic benefits itating the transport of goods, mobility of people, and the such as the production of energy and the creation of hun- creation of jobs, many of the roads constructed in the Am- dreds of temporary jobs, but it can also lead to increased azon show few economic benefits. A recent study evaluated deforestation, flooding of nearby areas, and damage to the 75 planned road projects spanning 12,000 km in five Am- local fishing industry.270 Dam development has generated azon countries and concluded that 45 percent of the roads significant environmental degradation and social tensions were not economically viable—even without accounting for for neighboring communities.271 While dams are not sig- the environmental and social costs.269 The same study found nificant carbon emitters, they produce large amounts of that all roads would have negative environmental conse- methane, which is more detrimental to the environment quences and that avoiding the riskiest roads would prevent than carbon. Moreover, hydroelectric dam projects in the losses of more than $7.6 billion and more than a million Amazon have been responsible for flooding significant hectares of deforestation. Only a small subset of carefully areas of the forest and displacing many riverine commu- selected road projects would bring economic benefits while nities. Construction of these dams has spawned a web of minimizing environmental and social costs. secondary roads, drawing in more people and activity and, in turn, increasing deforestation. In particular, the Balbina dam in Brazil (state of Amazonas) flooded approx- The decision to build a major road in imately 2,400km2 of rainforest on completion.272 In its first three years Brazil is determined by the government, of operation, the reservoir emitted whereas much of what occurs after 23,750,000 tons of carbon dioxide and 140,000 tons of methane. In the case the road is built escapes government of the Belo Monte dam in Brazil (state control as squatters and others move of Pará), between 20,000 and 50,000 people were displaced and the city into the newly accessible areas. of Altamira underwent a migration -Handbook of Road Ecology boom. When construction was com- “ pleted, jobs vanished, violence broke

38 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon out, and a health crisis erupted, caused by sewage backing of the major shortcomings that have now become very ev- up behind the dam.273 ident are the dam’s weak design and its dubious economic analysis, not to mention allegations of a graft scheme to Although the future of large dam projects is still uncertain, funnel money from the companies behind the dam’s con- China is now the “world’s leading financier and builder of struction to political figures.282 In Peru, government author- international dams.”274 The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative ities have instantly approved environmental impact studies (BRI) in particular is fueling large infrastructure projects that lack social and environmental details for construction around the world.275 The good news is that overall global in- companies. In 2015, Odebrecht, the Brazilian construction vestment in renewable energy has outpaced investment in company involved in Operation Car Wash, obtained the hydropower. According to a UN Environment Programme Peruvian Ministry of Energy and Mines’ approval for a report, over a period of nine years (2010–2019), invest- dam study that did not provide any detail on the resettlements in renewable energy reached an estimated $2.6 ment of the population or evidence of environmental im- trillion, with China standing out as the biggest investor, pacts.283 Similarly, in Colombia, the tourist esplanade of followed by Europe and the United States.276 The solar and the Leticia Port (Malecón Turístico del Puerto de Leticia), wind power sectors account for more than 90 percent of to- also known as the “Esplanade of Corruption” (Malecón tal investment. Some innovative initiatives concerning the de la Corrupción), was built without any feasibility study hydropower sector today include the construction of “smart to address technical, financial, or environmental aspects. dams” that have solar panels floating on their reservoirs as Moreover, a report from the comptroller general of Co- a way to address seasonal variations.277 lombia on irregularities such as the diversion of pub- At the same time, features such as the size, uniqueness, lic funds and alleged embezzlement in Amazonas also and complexity of public works projects increase oppor- indicated that, for this project, a sense of urgency was tunities for corruption.278 Corruption affects the produc- claimed to speed ministry approval before the feasibili- tivity and competitiveness of economies and, in the case ty studies were conducted, construction materials were of infrastructure, has negative consequences particularly purchased at inflated prices, and the entire contracting for consumers: it leads to a poor selection of projects, process violated the country’s Procurement Law.284 can create cost overruns and longer construction times, The problems that arise in large infrastructure projects and in the end is associated with poor-quality services typically materialize through the interaction of a series and low economic returns. Estimates for Latin America of drivers over a long period of time: poor planning and show that corruption has huge economic costs, between governance, limited access to resources, an overall lack 5 and 10 percent of GDP.279 of community benefits, and weak communication and Corruption and mismanagement can occur during all transparency. According to a 2017 IDB study on conflicts phases of a project. However, studies have found that cor- in infrastructure projects in Latin America, the main gov- ruption during the early stages of the investment cycle—at ernance drivers of conflicts in such projects include defi- the project preparation stage, when projects are appraised, cient planning (present in 86 percent of cases) and a lack designed, and budgeted—can lead to bad outcomes at the of adequate consultation with communities (74 percent implementation stage.280 For example, in the Tapajós river of cases), while a lack of transparency and corruption con- basin in Brazil, a set of hydropower projects that are un- tributed to conflicts in 68 percent and 34 percent of cases, derway have had questionable economic projections and respectively.285 Conflicts can arise at any point during a have disregarded the demands of communities and indig- project’s life cycle, but the earliest phases are most likely enous people in the area, creating socio-environmental to experience conflict and cause the project to be post- conflicts.281 In the nearby Xingu river basin, the Belo Monte poned or canceled. These issues can be addressed by creat- dam caused significant changes to the economy, natural re- ing well-planned and sustainable projects, but many firms sources, and social structures of the surrounding area. Some tend to be unresponsive to conflicts or do not respond well

Bandura & McKeown 39 or in time. The analysis also found that conflicts within -ur families because Eletronorte resettlement estimates did ban environments are much more likely to have a cascading not take into consideration two factors: the population effect. In the case of the Amazon, with the region rapidly that lived close to the flooded area and depended on the urbanizing (more than 70 percent of the population of the river for their subsistence and the population growth be- Brazilian Amazon lives in cities), these impacts can be an- tween the period of the studies and the actual flooding of ticipated and managed.286 the area. Thousands of families also received compensatory payments, but for many, the amount received did not fully Similarly, according to a study by Brazilian think tank compensate for their losses.291 Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) and the International Fi- nance Corporation (IFC), large-scale projects are planned The number of people impacted by another project, the according to national macroeconomic goals with little to no Belo Monte dam, was also underestimated, and the project connection to actual demands from the local and region- failed to plan well for those it did consider.292 Thousands of al levels, and there is no widespread information or guide people were relocated to precarious resettlements with few that would help new investors or developers learn from the resources and far from the river. The part of the river where mistakes of the past.287 Many of the problems that projects fishermen were allowed to fish was significantly reduced, encounter have been repeated over the years, including the and conflicts became common over a spot within the de- misuse of money, not setting or understanding the local marcated area. Moreover, the water quality was negatively agenda, a lack of territorial planning, and issues regarding affected, and the number of fish significantly declined. communication and decisionmaking. A significant problem is insufficient participation by those groups that are direct- INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES TO ly affected by and most vulnerable to the negative conse- GUIDE INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING quences of these large-scale projects. AND EXECUTION In light of these risks, the international community, through Other studies have also found that weak stakeholder en- organizations such as the OECD and the United Nations, gagement and community participation in infrastructure multilateral development banks (MDBs) and development decisionmaking is a key factor that triggers environmental finance institutions (DFIs), and intergovernmental fora degradation and social conflicts in Amazon Basin countries. such as the G7 and G20, has been engaging national gov- The planning process should be designed to incorporate ernments and private actors to rethink their approach to community consultations early in the development of the infrastructure. Over the years, sustainable infrastructure project. This should include sharing project information but development has gained importance as a concept and pro- also giving stakeholders the opportunity to impact project cess. In its basic form, infrastructure that is sustainable is design and implementation. Therefore, tools that encour- built with greater consideration of environmental, social, age transparency and accountability such as increasing ac- and economic externalities while also promoting com- cess to environmental reports and allowing stakeholders to munity engagement and social benefits. The international fully participate in community consultations are important community has developed a series of principles to guide in- 288 ways to mitigate conflicts. vestments in infrastructure projects (see Annex III). Many

At the same time, communities have not been adequately of these principles strongly emphasize upstream planning compensated for the impacts of the projects or do not ful- and governance and enabling conditions. These same ele- ly understand compensation mechanisms. For example, it ments should also positively impact environmental, social, is estimated that the construction of the Tucuruí dam in and economic outcomes. 289 the Brazilian Amazon displaced more than 23,000 people. According to Aizawa (2019), there are about 30 different ini- By February 1988, nearly 4,000 families had been resettled tiatives that are designed to increase sustainable infrastruc- 290 by Eletronorte, the company responsible for the project. ture investment.293 Although this is a welcome trend, the However, this figure does not include all of the affected fragmented nature of these standards raises two questions:

40 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon it remains unclear which set of principles countries should na (CHEXIM)—have become a large source of development follow and how countries can actually put them in practice. finance in Latin America, especially in dam construction.298 MDBs must reach consensus on a common set of standards With these new project plans, particularly those originating and related indicators for sustainable infrastructure. from China, it is imperative that these new investors also follow quality infrastructure standards. The private sector plays a role in sustainable development In Peru, for example, China has replaced the United States in the Amazon, both actively and passively. There is an in- as Peru’s top trading partner and in 2019 joined the Belt creasing emphasis on sustainability in corporate culture, and Road Initiative (BRI).299 With more than 170 Chinese and this serves as a tailwind for sustainability-minded de- companies operating in Peru, investments have focused velopment projects and pressures governments to curb and particularly on mining.300 In the Amazon, of the seven proj- prevent unsustainable licit and illicit businesses, as illus- ects financed or slated to be financed since 2015, three rely trated in the case of Brazil. Recently, seven major European on financing from China.301 Recent mining investments un- investment firms announced that they will divest from beef derscore the challenge of implementing strong social and producers, grain traders, and government bonds in Brazil if environmental standards. progress is not made in curbing the deforestation and de- 294 struction of the Amazon Basin. The collective of inves- Similarly, China has also become the top trading partner tors, who in total control more than $2 trillion in assets and and infrastructure investor for Brazil.302 China’s interests more than $5 billion in investments linked to Brazil, are in Brazil center on food security and natural resources. taking a new approach. This comes after 230 institutional In 2018, Brazil sold China 70 percent of its soy exports, investors signed a letter calling for action to combat raging valued at $27 billion.303 China is also the largest buyer fires in the Amazon. As sustainability risks negatively im- of beef in Brazil, contributing to steady growth in the pact some Brazilian companies’ investment analyst ratings, world’s most profitable beef industry. The Chinese gov- some investment funds and institutions prioritizing envi- ernment is playing an active role in Brazil by supporting ronmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) have Brazilian industries, facilitating infrastructure projects, been rewarding and supporting Brazilian companies with and investing in key sectors such as agriculture, logistics, sustainable and environmentally-friendly business models, and energy. China has focused on coastal areas, includ- such as the &Green Fund, which provided Grupo Roncador ing offshore oil fields (Santos Basin), hydropower energy 295 with $10 million in funding. for Brazil’s coastal metropolises (São Simão plant), and transportation infrastructure projects. Financial institutions are required to analyze social, environmental, and governance impacts, though they often fail to do China’s recent interest in financing infrastructure projects so accurately.296 Ray et al. point out three areas in which inin the Brazilian Amazon is mostly driven by a national strat- ternational DFIs and national governments show weakness- egy to supply the country’s increasing demand for soy and es in implementing their stated standards: in stakeholder beef.304 As a consequence of the ongoing trade war with the engagement processes, when conducting environmental im- United States, China has become more dependent on Bra- pact assessments, and in project transparency and oversight. zil’s soy production and sees this scenario as an opportunity 297 Projects that neglected communities’ needs had greater to expand the BRI. It aims to create a network of railways, environmental impacts, instigated serious social conflict, roads, and ports that will reduce transport costs and make and generated reputational damage for DFIs. Brazil more competitive against other global soy producers. Currently, Brazil has two BRI-designated deals, both in the Moreover, new players are developing projects in the Ama- Amazon, and a third deal could be the controversial con- zon, which further complicates the landscape. The most sig- struction of the Ferrogrão railway, which will open up a nificant of these is China: China’s policy banks—the China new route to transport the soy produced in Mato Grosso to Development Bank (CDB) and Export-Import Bank of Chi- the northern ports of the Amazon. During a meeting of the

Bandura & McKeown 41 BRICS group, China pledged $100 billion “to Brazilian infrastructure and agribusiness projects,” and Chinese state- owned companies have already indicated their interest in bidding for railway construction contracts.

Chinese partners are encountering several issues, including their choice of socially and environmentally risky projects and lack of due diligence. For infrastructure, Chinese policy banks have ESG strategies that largely defer to those of the host country, which can falter when host countries do not enforce regulations.305 The standards used by borrowing countries are inferior to those developed by the IFC, World Bank, or IDB.306 Moreover, these new institutions do not require competitive bidding for contractors, nor do they condition loans on the borrowing country’s ability to meet these standards.

42 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon Photo by: CARL DE SOUZA/AFP via Getty Images

Solar panels donated by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Brazilian government are carried from a boat to the village of Volta do Bucho in the Western Amazon region.

CONCLUSIONS: OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE AMAZON 0443 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE AMAZON

Inadequate security, poor governance, and enforcement development needs to be better managed, from planning of laws, gaps in basic services, and a lack of economic op- to execution and maintenance, and the process should fo- portunities are the determining factors allowing deforesta- cus both on the quality of infrastructure services and their tion and illegal activities in the Amazon to thrive. In other potential impacts. In sum, there is no silver bullet: all of words, weak state presence in the region leaves a vacuum these elements are needed as an integrated strategy and for a set of other actors to fill. This combination of condi- all-hands-on-deck multisector approach. A framework tions makes it easier for criminal cartels to operate and for for sustainable infrastructure in the Amazon is needed to land to be seized, which further degrades the environment ensure that economic, environmental, and social benefits and can generate more conflict with the indigenous groups are achieved. Within this context, international donors and communities that inhabit the Amazon Basin. In addi- can partner with countries to achieve a more balanced ap- tion, infrastructure development can aggravate the existing proach to the development of the region. difficulties in the Amazon region if not properly planned and executed. The default infrastructure investments tend INCREASING THE FOCUS ON GOOD to be in megaprojects but often come with little under- GOVERNANCE, TRANSPARENCY, AND standing of how these projects will meet development ob- ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS jectives within the Amazonian context. Issues in the baseline conditions in the Amazon such as insecurity, corruption, and weak territorial governance, together Although infrastructure investments are needed to support with the insufficient institutional capacity of regional gov- economic growth and social development in the basin, is- ernments, must be addressed. Countries in the Amazon can sues in the baseline conditions of the Amazon such as in- partner with development agencies from the United States security, weak territorial governance, and the insufficient and European nations; intergovernmental and multination- institutional capacity of regional governments must be al institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, addressed; otherwise, investments in infrastructure would and the IDB; and the private sector (particularly the technol- be wasted, economic growth will not be realized, and social ogy sector) to develop programs and platforms that can help and environmental risks will be magnified. Infrastructure overcome some of these institutional weaknesses.

44 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon Moreover, strengthening these governance aspects could cations of public lands and protected areas. Changes are be part of the “asks” that the OECD requests of Brazil and needed in the legal framework for land, such as establishing Peru if they embark upon the accession process.307 Con- one main national cadastre to resolve existing zoning prob- vergence and enforcement of OECD governance standards lems and prevent future ones. At the same time, land titling will provide long-run economic benefits to these coun- for indigenous communities will need resolution, and eco- tries overall, signaling to the international community— nomic activities such as mining and agriculture will need to and especially foreign investors—that they are ready to ap- undergo a more serious formalization process. ply the best standards possible.308 Colombia, for example, To expand and grow their economies, Amazon countries was invited to join the OECD in May 2018 after passing will also need to tackle corruption within their own institu- through a five-year accession process that resulted in ma- tions. In April 2020, CSIS published a report, Fighting Cor- jor legal and regulatory reforms aligned to the standards ruption for U.S. Economic and National Security Interests, established by the OECD.309 providing recommendations on how the United States can Nowhere are governance challenges more evident than support developing countries in fighting corruption. First, it within governments at the subnational level. Local gov- mentions the necessity to strengthen public procurement ernments need more administrative capacity (in human processes and implement budget transparency laws. Pro- resources, salaries, and technical training) and budgetary curement systems should be more public, follow interna- and financial tools to carry out their activities, especially tional standards, and be based on a life-cycle cost approach in areas such as land titling, management of concessions, rather than awarding contracts to the lowest bidder. Bud- fiscal management, and security and public services pro- get transparency laws, if implemented, could work as vision. This will require reallocating fiscal resources from an instrument to strengthen government accountabili- the central government (in the case of Peru and Colombia), ty. Second, the report suggests that using technology to changes to tax policy and payment arrangements for envi- move government processes online would eliminate per- ronmental services, and local government capacity build- son-to-person contact and reduce opportunities for bribes ing. Efforts to strengthen capacity and empower local au- and favors. Lastly, efforts to eliminate corruption should thorities would have positive effects. be incorporated across U.S.-funded development programs, and corruption programs should be linked to U.S. At the same time, strengthened land governance needs national security discussions. to be integrated in economic development plans to avoid an increase in deforestation and the conflicts that are as- The OECD Anti-Bribery and Corruption Convention rec- sociated with competing economic demands for land. This ommends that member countries take effective actions to includes improving existing land survey data, clearly delin- combat foreign bribery.311 This includes raising public and eating environmental areas, and limiting agricultural ex- private sector awareness of corruption issues and ensuring pansion.310 Critically needed improvements include better that national laws, regulations, provisions, and international demarcation of land for economic use, better land titling, cooperation agreements comply with the OECD guidelines. and improved patrolling and monitoring of land grabbing According to these guidelines, countries should ensure that and enforcement of laws and regulations. Colombia is the accessible channels and appropriate measures are in place to only country that has delimited a frontier where agricultur- facilitate the reporting of corrupt practices and to protect in- al economic activities can take place, though it is not fully dividuals who report suspected acts of bribery. In addition, enforced. Adopting a frontier should be a requirement for countries should take into consideration the specific circum- sectoral and regional development plans going forward. In stances of a company (e.g., size, type, and industrial sector) Peru, the laws and regulations governing land titling and in order to apply adequate laws and regulations concerning the system of economic concessions are complex and lead accounting requirements, external audits, internal controls, to overlapping claims among indigenous communities and and ethics and compliance programs. With regard to public mining and oil concessions that conflict with the demar- procurement, development assistance agencies and enter-

Bandura & McKeown 45 prises that have engaged in corruption should be appropri- Guardians program that equip communities with technol- ately suspended from competing for public contracts. Also, ogy, training, and new tools to report crime are important contracts funded through bilateral aid should be required to elements of this response.315 Similarly, for more than 10 have anti-corruption provisions. In order to combat bribery years, indigenous communities from the Colombian and in international business transactions, competent author- Peruvian Amazon have been using technological devices to ities and law enforcement networks of both member and monitor and report environmental crimes.316 In Peru, Lo- non-member countries should cooperate in investigative reto is the most advanced Amazon region in this aspect: it and other legal procedures. Lastly, compliance with the has even established a hub where local professionals and OECD guidelines also suggests the criminalization of brib- engineers can analyze the data that indigenous groups col- ery and a prohibition on counting bribes to foreign public lect. Additionally, Peruvian indigenous people have been officials as tax-deductible. working closely with the National Service of Protected Nat- ural Areas (SERNANP) to complement the work performed RENEWING THE ROLE OF SECURITY by park rangers (or guardaparques) and with the Peruvian FORCES IN THE AMAZON Environmental Assessment and Oversight Body (OEFA) in In order to combat illegal activities and to provide adequate investigative processes.317 In Colombia, indigenous groups’ protection for communities, countries will need to invest use of technology is still new, and they have not yet estab- in personnel and budgets to increase security presence. lished a clear collaboration with governmental bodies. Local and national security forces have a large role to play, given the rampant crime and illegal mafias that are oper- LINKING SECURITY WITH ECONOMIC ating in the Amazon with impunity. The security sector is OPPORTUNITIES not fully using its mandate and enforcement powers vis-à- Yet security efforts also need to be linked to econom- vis activities such as coca cultivation and illicit mining. To ic plans. Increasing the presence of law enforcement and their credit, law enforcement officials do make headlines military units is not the sole answer to the challenges of (and keep the public pressure at bay), but they often end up deforestation, violence, and crime in the region: security targeting individual farmers or small informal miners while must be complemented by increased state presence in oth- more organized criminal groups are left alone due to cor- er areas such as creating meaningful economic opportuni- ruption and political expediency.312 ties and providing basic public services for communities. Otherwise, it is not a comprehensive response or a solution Increased coordination between ministries and levels of that can sustain itself going forward. This is the concept of government can produce beneficial economic and social “multidimensional security” that Colombia is spearheading effects for communities affected by illicit activities and -de through initiatives such as its Zonas Futuro program. In- forestation. As Operation Mercury in Peru shows, this pro- creased security must be combined with a more integrated cess required heavy coordination and increased resources: a effort across all sectors. declaration of a state of emergency that lasted two months, the establishment of seven military bases, and the deploy- While often the first (and the most influential) player in ment of 1,800 police and military officers and 80 national ecological preservation, the public sector is not the sole prosecutors. The state of emergency declaration allowed stakeholder of the rainforest. More concerted efforts are prosecutions for illegal mining to be expedited, with trials needed to bring in the private sector in order to create occurring as quickly as within 48 hours and convictions re- value supply chains that can keep the forest alive and pro- turned as soon as eight days later.313 The program resulted vide economic alternatives to people, including jobs in the in a 92 percent reduction in La Pampa’s deforestation rate bioeconomy, adding value to timber and non-timber for- from 2018 to 2019 and rescued dozens of trafficked women estry products, and ecotourism. Changing the economic and girls in the process.314 equation from illicit production to legal activities is a huge At the same time, partnerships such as Brazil’s Forest undertaking. As part of this, countries would benefit from

46 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon producing value-added products from commodities such tributes more than $1 billion per year to the Amazon econ- as coffee, cacao, nuts, and superfruits of the forest such omy while supporting the preservation of the environment as açai. To ensure more sustainable usage of the Amazon and generating socioeconomic benefits for local communi- Basin, the following measures could be implemented: in- ties.321 According to climate scientist Carlos Nobre, açaí’s ternationally-funded programs that financially reward contribution to local economies could be even higher if countries that reduce deforestation (known as reducing modern technology was incorporated into the value chain. emissions from deforestation and degradation, or REDD); The implementation ofAgroforestry Systems (SAF), for ex- carbon-offset schemes along with investments in direct fi- ample, could make the production of açaí 10 times more nancing; easier access to credit, small business modelling profitable than beef production and significantly reduce and strengthening; and technology-based industries that greenhouse gas emissions.322 do not depend on natural resources. Investments must Another example of companies working with local commu- ensure the conservation of protected areas and the effi- nities in the Amazon Basin is AJE, a producer of sustainable cient management of natural resources.318 beverages which makes its products using superfruits from Economic incentives can serve to leverage the Amazon’s re- the Pacaya Samiria Natural Reserve, Peru’s second-largest sources as a “standing forest economy” so that value of the protected nature area. The ingredients are collected sus- living forest surpasses the benefit of deforestation.319 This tainably, and the proceeds help support local Amazonian can be achieved by harnessing the power of the bioecon- communities. The company, in a statement, notes that even omy and environmental services (i.e., using science and though they operate in a market economy, it falls to them to technology to harness the resources of the forest in a sus- create initiatives to support the Earth and environment.323 tainable manner) to benefit local communities and ensure Brazil also has several examples of companies working to environmental sustainability through pharmaceuticals, implement more sustainable practices aligned well with food production, and other areas.320 local communities. Since 2000, Natura, the largest Brazil- The private sector has an opportunity to play an important ian cosmetics company, has been operating in the Amazon role in partnership with state actors in creating momentum with the mission to contribute to the economic, social, and for sustainable products, while consumers can advocate for environmental development of the region. An objective of goods that do not originate from deforested lands. It is im- Natura’s program, Amazônia Viva, is to source 30 percent of portant for consumers to be constantly informed about the the company’s inputs from the Pan-Amazon by the end of environmental and social consequences of purchasing un- 2020.324 So far, the program has benefited 4,636 Pan-Ama- sustainable products. Just as companies need to be moni- zonian families and generated $260 million (R$1.5 billion) toring their supply chains for abuses in labor practices, they in economic activity. In food and beverages, Coca-Cola’s can make their supply chains more sustainable, with fair factory, located in Manaus, sources half of its guaraná berry trade and green labels that provide traceability, add value inputs from family farms in 12 Amazonian municipalities. to the products, and more fairly distribute wealth among all The company also invests in initiatives to provide potable actors in the product life cycle. water to the population (Water + Access Program) and technical support to implement agroforestry systems in family Several companies already work in partnership with local farms (Programa Olhos na Floresta). In the state of Pará, the inhabitants in the Amazon and provide essential jobs har- company Alcoa has invested more than $1.6 million (R$9.5 vesting the land in a non-exploitative way. Therefore, mov- million) in public health infrastructure, sanitation, educa- ing to a more sustainable, bioeconomy-focused economic tion, social assistance, and security. By 2017, the company model will ultimately preserve the vitality of the rainforest had generated more than $26.5 million (R$152 million) while also benefiting local communities. in economic activity just in the region of Juruti, in western Pará. Organizations such as the Amazon Environmen- For example, the production of the açai berry already con- tal Research Institute (IPAM) and the Sustainable Amazon

Bandura & McKeown 47 Foundation (FAS) work with communities on sustainable time to develop to achieve the necessary scale and will re- models of production, strengthening value chains such as quire increased investments in quality infrastructure, sci- fish and forest products and cutting intermediary costs. ence, and technology. At the same time, these efforts must be complemented by continued interventions to improve The Amazon will need to shift its production systems so productivity in traditional food sectors such as cattle graz- that they are not as dependent on the fluctuations of in- ing and soy without furthering deforestation and a massive ternational commodity prices. Suggestions include the education campaign to educate global corporations and transformation of commodities into manufactured goods consumers about responsible and sustainable consump- to increase their value added as well as new services and tion. Infrastructure that supports this more sustainable investments in technology-based industries that are not vision of the Amazon will include a mix of new technolo- reliant on natural resources. Products such as rubber, nuts, gies, transportation modalities, and renewable energy pro- and rare fruits such as camu camu, açaí, and aguaje could duction. There are significant opportunities to develop the all make up a larger portion of the Amazon’s exports if in- region in a more sustainable way and enable infrastructure frastructure project planning processes improve and the to play a positive role in that process. correct incentives are established.

In terms of infrastructure to support a more sustainable A MORE ROBUST PLANNING PROCESS economy, the region lacks basic infrastructure: water and INCORPORATING SUSTAINABLE sewage, schools, hospitals, health centers, law enforcement, INFRASTRUCTURE PRINCIPLES and digital infrastructure. New technologies and alternative Along with governance, economic, and security issues, transportation and energy sources (such as solar power) of- there is a lack of “quality infrastructure” in the Amazon fer some possible solutions to help fill these gaps. In logis- today. As discussed earlier, most of the infrastructure con- tics, this includes the use of drones to transport products structed in the region over the past 50 years has focused within the Amazon jungle—unmanned aerial vehicles could on transport and energy megaprojects that have often just facilitate the transportation of processed products to ports benefitted a few industries. There has been little evaluation and airports and from there to international markets. In the of alternative types of infrastructure that could meet the case of primary commodities, shifts in transport modalities same needs (e.g., improving the waterway system instead should be considered, including railways and waterways. of constructing new roads), new engineering designs (e.g., With reference to product perishability, lyophilization tech- using roads that circumvent protected areas rather than niques have been proposed; examples include freeze-dried linear roads that cut through them), alternative locations fruit powder that still retains significant nutritional value. for large infrastructure projects, or who really benefits from Carlos Nobre emphasizes the importance of keeping people projects in practice. connected and recognizes some advancements in this area, The region remains significantly socially underdeveloped including the existence of the Brazilian geostationary tele- and there are substantial gaps in basic services, including communications satellite and government plans to install access to clean water and sanitation, health care, renewable fiber-optic cables along Amazon rivers. These initiatives energy, educational institutions at all levels, and commu- would provide isolated communities with high-speed in- nications equipment and access (internet connectivity and ternet connections and support the implementation of dis- mobile coverage). Given these gaps, investments in social tance learning programs as well as the use of virtual reality infrastructure could raise the quality of life for people in the 325 training techniques. In the United States, for example, region. But this does not necessarily mean that there has remote communities are serviced by medical professionals to be a direct trade-off between sectors in project selection through federally-funded telemedicine, which has proven (i.e., choosing health projects at the expense of transport effective during the Covid-19 pandemic. projects or sanitation over energy), since these projects can offer significant complementary effects. The process for se- The shift in the economic paradigm of the basin will take

48 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon lecting infrastructure projects needs to be strengthened so There is also a fragmentation of project pipelines across dif- that: (a) investments make economic sense and minimize ferent line ministries that compromises a comprehensive environmental and social risks; (b) projects are evaluated and cumulative understanding of their impacts. as part of a broader strategic development framework in Furthermore, environmental and social risks are regarded conjunction with other projects put forward in the region; as just a formality or a checklist item, so these risks are not (c) communities are brought in early on in the discussion; fully incorporated. To better inform decisions, social and and (d) different project alternatives are presented before- environmental aspects need to be included early on in the hand so that the best designs are pursued. Environmental project cycle, preferably in the design phase of the project, and social impacts should also be approached not only as and not after the project has been approved. Real commu- risks to mitigate but as opportunities for new businesses nity participation accompanied by an informed discussion and local wealth generation, for example, through the is- on the development gaps and priorities of the region must suance of green or sustainable bonds to finance projects be a common practice going forward. Environmental and in the Amazon.326 social considerations must be incorporated throughout the In this regard, the role of civil society and external donors life cycle of the project, starting from the early stages of is paramount. These institutions can help governments de- feasibility studies to execution and evaluation. Project velop sound project pipelines and present different designs evaluations also need to take into account the second- for projects that are more sustainable. International quali- ary impacts of projects as well as the cumulative impacts ty infrastructure frameworks and standards such as those of multiple projects in the region. Overall, more targeted laid out by the G20, OECD, and Bretton Woods institutions community participation in the planning process would can be important tools to improve infrastructure planning help address potential sources of conflict or community in the Amazon Basin. These frameworks focus on gover- unrest before it occurs. Projects likely would take more nance aspects such as strengthening institutional capaci- time to complete because of the added measures, but this ty (including the planning and procurement processes) as process will guarantee quality (over quantity), with more well as including environmental and social impacts (such sustainable outcomes. as consulting with communities and promoting job cre- A main challenge for countries in the Amazon as they plan ation, capacity building, and the transfer of expertise and future infrastructure will be to develop a pipeline of qual- know-how to local communities). Institutions such as the ity projects and compel new investors, such as those from IDB, World Bank, and IFC can become key allies of govern- China, to abide by these higher standards in terms of proj- ments and assist, in particular with subnational level gov- ect planning and safeguard policies. Chinese development ernments, in improving technical capacity to plan, procure, institutions typically operate on the standards used by their execute, and evaluate infrastructure projects and to better borrowing countries, which are inferior to those developed coordinate plans at the different levels of government (na- by the IFC, World Bank, or IDB. Moreover, these new insti- tional, state, and municipal) and across the different sectors tutions do not require competitive bidding for contractors, (water, transport, agriculture, energy, and education). Such nor do they condition loans on borrowing countries’ ability requirements could be conditioned in trade and investment to meet these standards. agreements and in foreign aid disbursements.

The decisionmaking process for selecting infrastructure Several experts have proposed developing governance stan- projects also requires upstream improvements. Many of the dards that would apply to projects across the whole Ama- infrastructure ventures pursued are susceptible to political zon Basin to ensure the socioeconomic sustainability of the or external influences whereby the main project beneficia- region. Without such safeguards, there is a risk of a race to ries are the ones sponsoring the investments. Often, the the bottom to finance infrastructure projects with lax en- economic analysis of projects indicates that they are not vironmental and social standards. MDBs such as the World viable—that is, the economic costs outweigh the benefits. Bank, CAF, or IDB could develop and promote these region-

Bandura & McKeown 49 al standards. For example, Gerlak et al. (2018) suggests de- ics but also the Maduro government’s unwillingness to offer veloping regionally shared standards for environmental im- or support any real solutions to these problems. pact assessment (EIA) processes and regional mechanisms Yet Peru and Colombia are beginning to shift their ap- to mitigate the conflicts that can emerge in projects.327 Ray proach to the region: there is significant political will at et al. (2018) recommend pursuing more comprehensive the national level to pursue a more sustainable develop- EIAs, taking into account indirect effects (i.e., displacement path, as exemplified by key policies and strategies ment of communities, new settlers, and illegal activities) (e.g., the Colombia Defense Strategy, Colombia’s National and evaluating all segments of the project.328 This can alert Development Plan, Peru’s Strategic Vison 2050, and Peru’s governments and international DFIs to all of the risks that Infrastructure Development Plan). These countries could the project will face and should be built in in the upstream take the lead in strengthening regional cooperation mech- part of the planning process. Gallice et al. (2018) propose a anisms by factoring in environmental, economic, gover- series of polices to mitigate the negative impacts of certain nance, and security considerations. transport infrastructure (such as road expansion) on the 329 environment and communities. This includes strength- One way to improve the coordination among countries ening the technical assistance provided to farmers so that would be to appoint an “Amazon czar”—an official who they can increase their productivity without deforestation, would tackle deforestation through a multidimensional, providing advice for better land-use planning, strengthen- whole-of-government approach and who is well received ing economic and environmental zoning, and proposing across Leticia Pact signatories. To the extent necessary, the alternative transport methods specific to the community’s United States and other donor countries could facilitate the needs. Better standards, technical assistance, and EIAs will establishment of this czar by leveraging foreign assistance mitigate and prevent negative externalities in infrastruc- resources and tools. At the same time, professionalizing the ture project construction and promote a more sustainable enforcement agencies—under the tutelage of the czar—can approach to planning and execution going forward. minimize systemic corruption, increase the government’s ability to enforce the law over larger mafias, and create STRENGTHENING REGIONAL greater impact in addressing deforestation. COOPERATION INITIATIVES In addition, these basin-wide standards should be embed- With the cooperation of Brazil, Colombia, and Peru, a po- ded in existing regional cooperation initiatives to encour- tential deforestation czar could be tasked to monitor defor- age their adoption. The ACTO and Leticia Pact are some of estation trends across the Amazon Basin. The czar would the most important regional initiatives in the Amazon in be equipped with a regional security force (working with terms of deforestation and security. The main issue is that national security forces) to investigate illegal activity and the three countries under consideration do not share a uni- enforce laws. Their work would seek to uphold better secu- fied vision of the development of the basin—especially in rity conditions in the basin, but this would have to go hand terms of infrastructure projects. in hand with crafting a sustainable development vision for the basin based on strategic pillars (bioeconomy, tourism, External political factors also pose roadblocks to a more infrastructure, and workforce development). With the help sustainable vision of the basin. Recent political develop- of the MDBs, the czar could also operationalize regional ments in Bolivia and the dire economic, social, and political standards on quality infrastructure. situation in Venezuela have had negative consequences for Brazil, Colombia, and Peru in terms of deforestation, illegal gold mining, human trafficking, and cocaine trading.330 Although not the main actor in the Amazon, Venezuela’s situation continues to be a destabilizing force not only in terms of the negative repercussions of its domestic dynam-

50 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon ABOUT THE PROJECT DIRECTOR AND AUTHORS

Daniel F. Runde is senior vice president, director of the Dan- serves on the board of the International Foundation for iel F. Runde is senior vice president, director of the Project Electoral Systems (IFES), the Millennium Challenge Corpo- on Prosperity and Development, and holds the William A. ration (MCC) Advisory Council, the Western NIS Enterprise Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at CSIS. A global thought Fund (WNISEF), and the Ashesi University Foundation (a leader and change agent, his work centers on leveraging private university located in Accra, Ghana). Mr. Runde is U.S. soft power and the central roles of the private sector also a lifetime member of the Council on Foreign Relations and good governance in creating a more free and prosper- (CFR) as well as a member of Bretton Woods. Mr. Runde is ous world. Mr. Runde has been recognized for influencing a regular contributor to The Hill and hosts a podcast series, the debate on USAID-State Department relations, as an ar- Building the Future with Dan Runde: Freedom, Prosperity, chitect of the BUILD Act, and led the debate surrounding & Foreign Policy. the role and future of the World Bank Group. Mr. Runde Romina Bandura is a senior fellow with the Project on Pros- has also influenced thinking about U.S. economic engage- perity and Development and the Project on U.S. Leadership ment with Africa (of which he is in favor of much more) in Development at CSIS. Her current research focuses on and domestic resource mobilization. Mr. Runde holds the the future of work in developing countries and the Unit- Officer’s Cross in the Order of Isabel la Católica, a Spanish ed States’ economic engagement in the developing world. Civil Order. She has also conducted extensive research on enhancing

Previously, Mr. Runde held senior leadership roles at the In- the reach and impact of the Multilateral Development Bank ternational Finance Corporation (IFC). From 2005 to 2007, system. Before joining CSIS in September 2017, she was a he was director of the Office of Global Development Allianc- senior consultant at the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). es (GDA) at the U.S. Agency for International Development She worked closely with clients to design research and (USAID), and he led the GDA partnership initiative by pro- manage projects that included index building, quantifying viding training, networks, staff, funds, and advice to estab- qualitative variables, policy analysis, and strategies for in- lish and strengthen public-private partnerships. His efforts vestment and growth. EIU flagship projects include bench- at USAID leveraged $4.8 billion through 100 direct alliances marking indices like the Global Microscope on Financial and 300 others through training and technical assistance. Inclusion and the Latin America and Caribbean Infrascope project. Ms. Bandura is an economist with 18 years of expe- Mr. Runde is the chairman of the Advisory Committee on rience in international development research, policy anal- Voluntary Foreign Aid (ACVFA), and he also serves as the ysis, and project management. Before joining EIU, she was chair of the Sub-Saharan Africa Advisory Committee for the an economist at the International Labour Organization’s Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM). He also

Bandura & McKeown 51 Washington office. In her previous capacity as a business manager at DAI’s Economic Growth Sector, she managed a $90 million private-sector development portfolio of projects in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe. She has also served as a policy analyst for the UN Development Programme. Earlier in her career, she worked in the banking sector in Argentina. Ms. Bandura holds an MPA in international development from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government and a BA in economics from the Universidad Católica Argentina, Buenos Aires.

Shannon McKeown is a program coordinator for the Proj- ect on Prosperity and Development (PPD) and Project on U.S. Leadership in Development (USLD) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where she coor- dinates events and supports the projects’ research agenda. Prior to becoming a program coordinator in June 2019, she was an intern at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Center for American Progress. Her research interests include human rights, gender equality, security policy, and education in lower-to-middle income countries. She holds a bachelor’s degree in international affairs from the George Washington University.

52 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon ANNEX I: METHODOLOGY

Ise-Shima Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastruc- CSIS incorporated desk reviews, field interviews in three ture Investment and other initiatives guide coun- countries (Brazil, Colombia, and Peru), and Washington, tries as they develop infrastructure in the Amazon? D.C.-based consultations (through a series of three private and off-the-record roundtables) as basis of our findings • What can the role of the private sector be in these for this report. Overall, CSIS has engaged almost 100 local discussions? and regional organizations and government agencies from • New investors and commodity buyers are driving in- the development, environment, security, and infrastruc- frastructure development in the Amazon. How do we ture communities. The project targeted transport networks engage governments and other stakeholders in light (roads, waterways, and railways) and hydroelectric genera- of this changing landscape? tion and transmission as types of infrastructure. • What are the main levers or pressure points for gov- The project posed two main questions: ernments, infrastructure developers, and financiers,

• Is it reasonable to tie deforestation risks resulting internal and external? from poorly planned infrastructure with security and • What should be the role of military and security other risks? forces going forward?

• Is the narrative tying environmental and security risks • How can international cooperation efforts be more ef- compelling to infrastructure decisionmakers? fective in addressing security and risks related to de-

Supporting questions included the following: forestation and ensuring the sustainable development of the Amazon? • What are some examples of successful infrastructure projects in the Amazon that involved good planning, community engagement, and sustainable ACTIVITIES Between November 2019 and May 2020, CSIS conduct- outcomes? What are some of the lessons learned? ed a thorough literature review, undertook three coun- • What are some effective ways to strengthen infra- try case studies, and conducted three roundtables in structure planning, procurement processes, economic Washington, D.C. analyses, and environmental, social, and governance • Literature Review: One of the first activities that CSIS standards in infrastructure projects? How can the G7 embarked upon was to conduct a thorough literature

Bandura & McKeown 53 review on key themes such as the drivers of deforesta- cymakers and stakeholders. These were smaller, more tion, the economic development of the Amazon, qual- intimate, private events to discuss critical issues in an ity infrastructure standards, infrastructure planning, off-the-record setting allowing for more candid dis- project impacts, and the main governance and securi- cussion for 60 to 90 minutes. ty challenges in the region. The main sources consult- The first roundtable took place at CSIS on December 4, ed include books, journal articles, and press articles in 2019. The purpose of the roundtable was to conduct a English, Spanish, and Portuguese published in the last “scoping session” to introduce the topics, relevant project 20 years. The purpose of the literature review was to: stakeholders, and outline the objectives and research ques- (1) establish links among deforestation, infrastructure tions. Participants discussed the non-environmental risks planning, governance, and security; (2) inform on the associated with deforestation, the relationship between key themes and stakeholders in the space; (3) help poorly-planned infrastructure and security and other risks, refine the questions for the private roundtables and and how relevant stakeholders can ensure sustainable de- in-country visits; and (4) inform the main messages velopment in the Amazon. Through this roundtable, CSIS and recommendations laid out in this final report. refined its key questions, taking into consideration different country and stakeholder perspectives. • The literature review helped inform the project’s focus areas and identified key stakeholders in this field. The second roundtable was held at CSIS on February 10, CSIS together with the Moore Foundation drew up 2020. The roundtable discussed the infrastructure needs a network of organizations to engage in this in the Amazon and the connection between infrastructure research project. development, governance, and deforestation. During the meeting, the concept of “sustainable infrastructure” was • Country Case Studies: To understand the issues debated. The discussion also focused on ways to strength- from the ground up, CSIS conducted three coun- en infrastructure planning to mitigate risks and distribute try case studies for Brazil, Colombia, and Peru. Al- benefits more equitably and operationalize the G7, G20, though the Amazon Basin comprises eight coun- and other infrastructure principles as countries develop in- tries, these three countries were chosen since they frastructure in the Amazon. represent more than 80 percent of the Amazon and are the largest economies in the basin. The country The third and final roundtable took place on April 21, case studies are a deep dive into the specific devel- 2020 in a virtual setting. The roundtable examined how opment issues facing each country combining sig- deforestation and infrastructure development are con- nificant desk research and in-country interviews nected to security challenges in the Amazon as well as with relevant stakeholders. The country case studies how infrastructure can enable security (or insecurity) helped inform the main messages of this final report. in the Amazon. CSIS also explored the future role of the military, police, and local communities in providing se- • In 2020, CSIS traveled to two countries and con- curity to the Amazon and how insecurity in the Amazon ducted a total of 57 interviews with local stake- affects indigenous communities. holders from NGOs, indigenous communities, think tanks, governments, and the agriculture, forestry, security, and infrastructure sectors working on Amazon challenges (see Annex II for a list of organizations interviewed). The findings of the case studies are incorporated into this final report.

• Roundtables: CSIS conducted three facilitated roundtable discussions in Washington, D.C. with key poli-

54 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon ANNEX II: LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS CONSULTED

WASHINGTON, D.C. 18. DT Global

1. U.S. International Development Finance 19. Amazon Watch Corporation (DFC) 20. George Mason University 2. V5Initiative 21. Global Development Policy Center 3. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 22. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 4. Harvard Kennedy School of Government 23. InSight Crime 5. The Nature Conservancy 24. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 6. World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 25. World Bank 7. U.S. Treasury Department 26. Embassy of Brazil in Washington, D.C. 8. U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) 27. Embassy of Colombia in Washington, D.C. 9. Boston University 28. Embassy of Peru in Washington, D.C. 10. World Resources Institute (WRI)

11. University of Maryland BRAZIL Manaus: 12. Global Environment Facility (GEF) 1. State Environmental Secretariat (SEMA) 13. U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) 2. Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF)

14. United States Agency for International Development 3. Secretariat of Development, Science, Technology, and (USAID) Innovation (SEDECTI)

15. U.S. State Department 4. Brazilian Federal Police Department (PF)

16. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 5. National Institute for Amazonian Research (INPA)

17. Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four (G-24)

Bandura & McKeown 55 1. Operational and Management Center of the Amazon 23. Brazilian Institute of Mining (IBRAM) Protection System (CENSIPAM) 24. Brazilian National Confederation of Industry (CNI) 2. Amazonas State Public Prosecutor’s Office (PGE) 25. Brazil Ministry of Environment (MMA) 3. Sustainable Amazon Foundation (FAS) 26. Brazil Ministry of Foreign Affairs 4. Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) COLOMBIA 5. Federal University of Amazonas – UFAM Bogotá 6. World Wildlife Federation (WWF) 1. National Association of Industries

2. National Environmental Licensing Authority Rio de Janeiro: 7. Brazilian National Economic and Social Development 3. Ministry of Defense of Colombia Bank (BNDES) 4. Amazon Vision (Ministry of the Environment) 8. Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) 5. National Planning Directorate 9. Brazilian Economist 6. Mongabay Latam

Brasília: 7. World Bank 10. Brazil Ministry of Infrastructure 8. National Development Finance (FDN) 11. USAID 9. USAID 12. Amazon Environmental Research Institute (IPAM) 10. Transparency for Colombia 13. Brazil Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) 11. Natural Heritage, Fund for Biodiversity and 14. Brazilian National Confederation of Agriculture (CNA) Protected Areas

15. Brazilian Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) 12. Ministry of the Interior - Directorate of Indigenous, Roma and Minority Affairs 16. Journalist from Valor Econômico 13. Foundation for Conservation and Sustainable 17. National Institute for Indigenous Affairs (FUNAI) Development (FCDS)

18. Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Renewable 14. Green Global Growth Institute (GGGI) Natural Resources (IBAMA) 15. Corporación Andina de Fomento - Development Bank 19. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) for Latin America (CAF)

20. World Bank 16. Luis Carlos Sarmiento Angulo Organization

21. Brazilian National Department of Transportation 17. World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) Infrastructure (DNIT)

22. Socio-Environmental Institute (ISA)

56 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon PERÚ Lima 1. Videnza Consultores

2. World Wildlife Fund (WWF)

3. Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (PUCP)

4. The Nature Conservancy

5. Proética

6. Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental (SPDA)

7. Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS)

8. Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental (Sede Madre de Dios)

9. USAID

10. Derecho Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (DAR)

Puerto Maldonado 1. Centro de Innovación Científica Amazónica (CINCIA)

2. Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental (SPDA)

3. Conservación Amazónica (ACCA)

Bandura & McKeown 57 ANNEX III: HIGHLIGHTS OF SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE FRAMEWORKS

OECD FRAMEWORK FOR THE 8. Generate, analyze, and disclose useful data;

GOVERNANCE OF INFRASTRUCTURE 9. Make sure the asset performs throughout its life; and In September 2015, the Organization for Economic Coop- eration and Development (OECD) released a framework 10. Make infrastructure resilient.334 on the governance of infrastructure.331 Governance of infrastructure is defined as “the processes, tools, and norms GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE FACILITY: of interaction, decisionmaking and monitoring used by CORE PRINCIPLES governmental organizations and their counterparts with The World Bank in 2015 established the Global Infrastruc- respect to making infrastructure services available to the ture Facility as a global and open platform that sought to fa- public and the public sector.”332 The OECD framework offers cilitate the preparation and implementation of infrastruc- a set of guidelines to help countries assess and balance their ture projects.335 According to the facility, its activities are specific state, project, and sectoral priorities to choose the governed by the following core principles:336 best infrastructure delivery systems.333 The framework recognizes that good governance is crucial for good infrastruc- • Providing Public Goods ture delivery and encompasses 10 key recommendations: • Mobilizing the Private Sector

1. Develop a strategic vision for infrastructure; • Achieving Value for Money 2. Manage the integrity and corruption threats through- • Promoting Sustainability and Inclusiveness out the project; • Collaborating for Best Results 3. Choose how to deliver the infrastructure; • Augmenting Partners’ Capacity 4. Ensure good regulatory design;

5. Integrate a consultation process; ISE-SHIMA PRINCIPLES FOR QUALITY INFRASTRUCTURE 6. Coordinate infrastructure policy across levels of Since 2015, Japan has made global commitment to government; high-quality infrastructure development one of its top dip- 7. Guard affordability and value for money; lomatic and strategic priorities. Under the recently end- ed premiership of Shinzo Abe, not only has the country

58 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon launched several multibillion-dollar bilateral initiatives, it Under the aegis of the United Nations, representatives from has also used multilateral platforms to develop comprehen- the global investment community launched a set of volun- sive standards. In 2016, Japan used its presidency of the G7 tary principles in 2006 that recognized the need for sustain- to adopt the following principles at the Ise-Shima Summit: ability in development and sought to give effect to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations when • Ensuring effective governance, reliable operation, undertaking any investment into development projects. Sig- and economic efficiency in view of life-cycle cost as natories of these principles agreed to commit themselves to: well as safety and resilience against natural disaster, terrorism, and cyberattack risks; • Incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decisionmaking processes; • Ensuring job creation, capacity building, and transfer of expertise and know-how for local communities; • Be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into the signatories’ ownership policies and practices; • Addressing social and environmental impacts; • Seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the • Ensuring alignment with economic and development entities in which the signatories invest; strategies, including aspects of climate change and environment at the national and regional levels; and • Promote acceptance and implementation of the principles within the investment industry; • Enhancing effective resource mobilization including 337 through public-private partnerships. • Work together to enhance the signatories’ effectiveness in implementing the principles; and OSAKA PRINCIPLES FOR QUALITY INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT338 • Report on the signatories’ activities and progress Building on the progress it had made in leading the inter- towards implementing the principles. national community to commit to quality infrastructure, Ja- pan used its G20 presidency in 2019 to adopt principles for IDB PRINCIPLES OF SUSTAINABLE 340 financing quality infrastructure and operationalize the Ise INFRASTRUCTURE Shima principles adopted by the G7 in 2016. The principles In 2018, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) con- of financing are as follows: sidered the above global principles on sustainable infrastructure and several other private sector- and civil society-led • Maximizing the positive impact of infrastructure to international principles to present its conceptualization of achieve sustainable growth and development; sustainable infrastructure. According to the IDB, “sustainable infrastructure” refers to “infrastructure projects that are • Raising economic efficiency in view of life-cycle cost; planned, designed, constructed, operated, and decommis- • Integrating environmental considerations in infra- sioned in a manner to ensure economic and financial, social, structure investments; environmental (including climate resilience), and institu- • Building resilience against natural disasters and tional sustainability over the entire life cycle of the project.” other risks; The IDB’s principles of sustainable infrastructure have four • Integrating social considerations in infrastructure dimensions: investment; and • Economic and Fiscal Sustainability; • Strengthening infrastructure governance. • Social Sustainability;

UN PRINCIPLES FOR • Environmental Sustainability; and 339 RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT • Institutional Sustainability.

Bandura & McKeown 59 FIGURE 1: THE FOUR DIMENSIONS OF INFRASTRUCTURE SUSTAINABILITY

Source: “What Is Sustainable Infrastructure?,” Inter-American Development Bank, March 2018, https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/ What_is_Sustainable_Infrastructure__A_Framework_to_Guide_Sustainability_Across_the_Project_Cycle.pdf.

IDB’s Sustainable Infrastructure framework encompasses • Conducting territorial development and land-use the following five Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): planning through integrated and cross-sectoral consultation; • SDG 6: ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all; • Creating instruments and processes that enable the mobilization of finances at critical stages in the • SDG 7: ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustain- development and operation of projects; able, and modern energy for all; • Strengthening institutions and capacity to im- • SDG 9: build resilient infrastructure, promote prove governance and enable inter-agency and inclusive and sustainable industrialization, and inter-stakeholder coordination; foster innovation; • Factoring in the implications of development • SDG 11: make cities and human settlements inclu- projects for indigenous peoples, quilombolas, and sive, safe, resilient, and sustainable); and traditional communities; • SDG 13: take urgent action to combat climate change • Factoring in the implications of development proj- and its impacts. ect for children, adolescents, and women; and

FGV AND IFC: GUIDELINES FOR • Making institutional arrangements to rationalize LARGE-SCALE PROJECTS and utilize legally suppressed vegetation that is IN THE AMAZON341 necessary to facilitate the development of infra- The Brazilian think tank Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) structure and mining projects. together with the International Finance Corporation (IFC) undertook a field-based case study of the Amazon and de- BLUE DOT NETWORK In November 2019 at the close of the ASEAN summit in veloped a total of 25 guidelines that aim to maximize the Thailand, the United States, Japan, and Australia launched opportunities and minimize the risks of developing the the Blue Dot Network. Public statements described the net- Amazonian region by focusing on the following six areas: work as a “multi-stakeholder initiative” aiming to “bring together governments, the private sector, and civil society to promote high-quality, trusted standards for global in-

60 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon frastructure development in an open and inclusive framework.”342 Implicit in its launch is the idea that the network should serve to counter and contrast China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through providing “transparency and market-driven solutions.”343 Led by the United States De- velopment Finance Corporation (DFC), the network hing- es on the idea that global trust standards, such as those established in the G20’s Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment, are crucial to increasing private investment in infrastructure.

While most public statements remain vague, the most recent press release for the network describes its process as follows:

• Projects seek certification from the Blue Dot Network by completing an online application.

• Once approved, the project will create confidence about the high standards and sustainability of the infrastructure.

• Adherence to commonly accepted principles and standards will promote market-driven, transparent, and financially sustainable infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific Region.344

Bandura & McKeown 61 ENDNOTES

1. Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin zon,” Mongabay Environmental News, January 4, 2020, https://rain- (COICA), “COVID-19: Inaction and Lack of Funds Threatens Over forests.mongabay.com/amazon/deforestation_calculations.html. Three Million Indigenous People and Over 400 Ethnic Groups in the 10. Matt Sandy, “‘The Amazon Is Completely Lawless’: The Rain- Amazon,” Amazon Watch, May 6, 2020, https://amazonwatch.org/ forest After Bolsonaro’s First Year,”New York Times, December 5, news/2020/0506-covid-19-inaction-and-lack-of-funds-threatens- 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/05/world/americas/ over-3-million-indigenous-people-in-the-amazon. amazon-fires-bolsonaro-photos.html; and Dom Phillips, “Amazon 2. “Deforestation and Forest Degradation,” World Wildlife Fund. Ac- Rainforest ‘Close to Irreversible Tipping Point’,” Guardian, October cessed September 9, 2020, https://www.worldwildlife.org/threats/ 23, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/oct/23/ deforestation-and-forest-degradation; “Overview,” n.d., WWF, Ac- amazon-rainforest-close-to-irreversible-tipping-point. cessed August 24, 2020, https://www.worldwildlife.org/threats/de- 11. IPAM, IMAZON, and Greenpeace, A Pathway to Zero Deforestation forestation-and-forest-degradation. in the Brazilian Amazon (Belém, Brazil: October 7, 2017), https:// 3. “The Launch of Multi-Stakeholder Blue Dot Network,” U.S. In- ipam.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/A-Pathway-to-Zero-De- ternational Development Finance Corporation (DFC), November forestation-in-the-Brazilian-Amazon-full-report.pdf. 4, 2019, https://www.dfc.gov/media/opic-press-releases/launch- 12. “What is Human Security?” United Nations Trust Fund for Hu- multi-stakeholder-blue-dot-network; Hector Gomez Ang and Ma- man Security, https://www.un.org/humansecurity/what-is-hu- rio Monzoni, Large-Scale Projects in the Amazon: Lessons Learned man-security/. and Guidelines: Executive Summary (São Paulo: FGV/IFC, April 13. ILO News, “Lima’s Gamarra Market: The Benefits of Moving to 2017), http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/handle/10438/18321; the Formal Economy,” International Labour Organization, October “What Is Sustainable Infrastructure?,” Inter-American Development 9, 2019, https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/ Bank, March 2018, https://publications.iadb.org/publications/en- WCMS_723278/lang--en/index.htm. glish/document/What_is_Sustainable_Infrastructure__A_Frame- 14. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica e Informatica, Producción y work_to_Guide_Sustainability_Across_the_Project_Cycle.pdf; “G7 Empleo Informal en el Perú, Cuenta Satélite de la Economía Informal Ise-Shima Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure,” Minister 2007–2017 (Lima: Government of Peru, November 2018), 37, https:// of Foreign Affairs Japan, Accessed August 25, 2020, https://www. www.inei.gob.pe/media/MenuRecursivo/publicaciones_digitales/ mofa.go.jp/files/000196472.pdf.; “G-20 Principles for Quality Infra- Est/Lib1589/libro.pdf. structure Investment,” Minister of Finance Japan, https://www.mof. 15. Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática - Encuesta Na- go.jp/english/international_policy/convention/g20/annex6_1.pdf. cional de Hogares, “Población En Situación De Pobreza Monetaria, “What Are the Principles for Responsible Investment?,” UN Prin- Según Ámbito Geográfico, 2009–2018” [spreadsheet], Government ciples for Responsible Investment, https://www.unpri.org/pri/ of Peru, https://www.inei.gob.pe/media/MenuRecursivo/indices_ what-are-the-principles-for-responsible-investment. tematicos/cd1_5.xlsx. 4. Matt Piotrowski, Nearing the Tipping Point: Drivers of Deforestation 16. Ibid. in the Amazon Region (Washington, DC: The Dialogue, May 2019), 17. Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática - Encuesta Nacio- https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Near- nal de Hogares, “Tasa de Analfabetismo de la Población de 15 y Más ing-the-Tipping-Point-for-website.pdf. Años de Edad, Según Ámbito Geográfico, 2007–2018” [spreadsheet], 5. El Ghali Fikri, Henry Koster, and Wijnand de Wit, Healthy Rivers, Government of Peru, https://www.inei.gob.pe/media/MenuRecur- Healthy People: Addressing the Mercury Crisis in the Amazon, prepared sivo/indices_tematicos/5.21.xlsx. by Dahlberg Advisors (Gland, Switzerland: WWF, 2018), https://www. 18. Ibid. wwf.org.uk/sites/default/files/2018-11/WWF%20-%20Healthy%20 19. Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática - Encuesta Na- Rivers%20Healthy%20People.pdf. cional de Hogares, “Tasa de Mortalidad Infantil y en la Niñez, Según 6. Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin Área de Residencia, 2007–2008-2017–2018” [spreadsheet], Govern- (COICA), “COVID-19: Inaction and Lack of Funds Threatens Over ment of Peru, https://www.inei.gob.pe/media/MenuRecursivo/in- Three Million Indigenous People and Over 400 Ethnic Groups in the dices_tematicos/22-tasa-de-mortalidad-infantil_area-resid_3.xlsx. Amazon.” 20. Ibid. 7. UNICEF Brasil, Agenda pela infância e adolescência na Amazônia 21. “GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) – Peru,” World Bank, https:// (Brasília: UNICEF, September 2018), https://www.unicef.org/brazil/ data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD?end=2018&loca- media/1131/file/Agenda_pela_infancia_e_adolescencia_na_Ama- tions=PE&start=1961&type=shaded&view=chart. zonia.pdf. 22. Ibid. 8. Piotrowski, Nearing the Tipping Point. 23. El Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática, Perú: Formas 9. Rhett A. Butler, “Calculating Deforestation Figures for the Ama- de Acceso al Agua y Saneamiento Básico (Lima: Government of Peru,

62 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon March 2018), 7, https://www.inei.gob.pe/media/MenuRecursivo/bo- hia (SEI), “Tabelas e Gráficos - PIB Nacional,” Government of letines/boletin_agua_y_saneamiento.pdf. Brazil, https://www.sei.ba.gov.br/index.php?option=com_con- 24. Ibid., 62. tent&view=article&id=137&Itemid=337. 25. Ibid., 48. 45. Ibid. 26. Ibid., 59. 46. Guilherme Queiroz, “Infográfico: A realidade do saneamen- 27. Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), to básico no Brasil,” Agência CNI de Notícias, November 7, 2018, Pobreza multidimensional región Orinoquía – Amazonía. Departa- https://noticias.portaldaindustria.com.br/especiais/infografi- mento de énfasis: Arauca (Bogotá: Government of Colombia, July 12, co-a-realidade-do-saneamento-basico-no-brasil/. 2019), https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/condiciones_ 47. Ibid. vida/pobreza/2018/Region_bt_pobreza_multidimensional_18_am- 48. Ibid. azonia-orinoquia.pdf. 49. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 50. Juliano Assunção and Clarissa Gandour, Brazil Knows What to Do 29. María Paula Torres, “En Colombia el 5% de sus habitantes aún es to Fight Deforestation in the Amazon [policy brief] (Rio de Janeiro: analfabeta,” RCN Radio, January 2, 2019, Climate Policy Initiative, November 2019), https://www.climatepol- https://www.rcnradio.com/recomendado-del-editor/en-colombia- icyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/PB-Brazil-Knows- el-5-de-sus-habitantes-aun-es-analfabeta. What-To-Do-To-Fight-Deforestation.pdf. 30. Ministerio de Educación Nacional, “Estadisticas en Educacion 51. “Overview.” n.d. WWF. Basica por Departamento,” Government of Colombia, June 9, 2020, 52. Sibélia Zanon, “Indústria 4.0 chega à Amazônia: projeto quer sal- https://www.datos.gov.co/Educaci-n/ESTADISTICAS-EN-EDUCA- var a floresta levando tecnologia de ponta,” Mongabay Environmen- CION-BASICA-POR-DEPARTAMENTO/ji8i-4anb. tal News, February 13, 2020, https://brasil.mongabay.com/2020/02/ 31. “Colombia Infant Mortality Rate 1950–2020,” Macrotrends, industria-4-0-chega-a-amazonia-projeto-quer-salvar-a-floresta-le- https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/COL/colombia/in- vando-tecnologia-de-ponta/. fant-mortality-rate. 53. Kempson Cabral, “Empresas e o desenvolvimento sustentável na 32. Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), Amazônia,” Conselho Empresarial Brasileiro para o Desenvolvimen- “Estadísticas vitales nacimientos y defunciones,” Government of Co- to Sustentável, August 29, 2019, https://cebds.org/empresas-desen- lombia, https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/ volvimento-sustentavel-amazonia/#.Xrg7hi-z1N0. demografia-y-poblacion/nacimientos-y-defunciones#certificados. 54. Mind the Graph, “The Biodiversity of the Amazon Rainforest in 33. Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), Images,” Age of Awareness, August 30, 2019, https://medium.com/ Cuentas departamentales Producto Interno Bruto por departamento age-of-awareness/the-biodiversity-of-the-amazon-rainforest-in-im- 2018 preliminar (Bogotá: Government of Colombia, June 25, 2019), ages-8922e55b1e32. https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/pib/departamental- 55. On May 20, 2015, President Dilma Rousseff signed Brazil’s New es/B_2015/Bol_dptal_2018preliminar.pdf. Biodiversity Law No. 13, 123/15, or the “Brazilian ABS Law,” into 34. Gualteros Velasquez Diego Gerardo, “Cobertura saneamiento law. The main purpose of the law is to regulate scientific research básico en municipios de Colombia,” ArcGIS StoryMaps, October 15, and the economic use of Brazilian genetic heritage. Included in 2019, https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/22886ec822944d24a- the law are: a requirement that companies pay 0.1 percent to 1.0 61065fae61ed4f4. percent of the net revenue obtained from products created from 35. Ibid. matter obtained from Brazilian biodiversity to the National Benefit 36. Marília Loschi, “Desemprego cai em 16 estados em 2019, mas 20 Sharing Fund, new rules for access to Brazilian genetic heritage by têm informalidade recorde,” Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Esta- companies headquartered outside of Brazil, and a “benefit shar- tistica, Government of Brazil, February 14, 2020, https://agenciad- ing program” that supports communities in exchange for sharing enoticias.ibge.gov.br/agencia-noticias/2012-agencia-de-noticias/ traditional knowledge, among other requirements and rules. Bra- noticias/26913-desemprego-cai-em-16-estados-em-2019-mas-20- zil has signed but not yet ratified the Nagoya Protocol on Access to tem-informalidade-recorde. Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 37. Ibid. Arising from their Utilization (ABS) to the Convention on Biological 38. Carmen Nery, “Extrema pobreza atinge 13,5 milhões de pessoas Diversity. The Nagoya Protocol provides a legal framework for the e chega ao maior nível em 7 anos,” Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of e Estatistica, Government of Brazil, November 7, 2019, https://agen- genetic resources. Although a signatory, Brazil does not participate ciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/agencia-noticias/2012-agencia-de-noti- effectively in the treaty, which has garnered criticism. The Nagoya cias/noticias/25882-extrema-pobreza-atinge-13-5-milhoes-de-pes- Protocol and Brazil’s law employ a variety of terms differently, in- soas-e-chega-ao-maior-nivel-em-7-anos. cluding some crucial to the purposes of the texts including “access,” 39. Ibid. “genetic resources,” and “benefit-sharing agreement.” 40. “Taxa de analfabetismo no Brasil por estados,” Gazeta do Povo, 56. Eduardo Simoes, “Brazil to Create ‘Amazon Council’ to Protect July 16, 2019, https://infograficos.gazetadopovo.com.br/educacao/ and Develop the Rainforest,” Reuters, January 21, 2020, https://www. taxa-de-analfabetismo-no-brasil-por-estados/. reuters.com/article/us-brazil-environment/brazil-to-create-am- 41. Ibid. azon-council-to-protect-and-develop-the-rainforest-idUSKB- 42. UNICEF Brasil, Agenda pela infância e adolescência na Amazônia, 8. N1ZK237; and BRIDJE, “Conselho da Amazônia e Força Nacional 43. Ibid., 9. Ambiental: o que são?,” Politize, April 3, 2020, https://www.politize. 44. Superintendência de Estudos Sociais e Econômicos da Ba- com.br/conselho-da-amazonia-e-forca-nacional-ambiental/.

Bandura & McKeown 63 57. Anastasia Moloney, “Sex Trade Flourishes in Peru’s Amazon gallup.com/poll/266183/brazilians-least-satisfied-amazon-environ- Despite Crackdown on Illegal Mining,” Reuters, January 16, 2020, ment.aspx. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-peru-trafficking-mining/ 70. In 1967, the Brazilian government created the Manaus Free Trade sex-trade-flourishes-in-perus-amazon-despite-crackdown-on-ille- Zone (“Zona Franca de Manaus”) with tax benefits to attract foreign gal-mining-idUSKBN1ZF0KE. direct investment in the Amazon. Since then, 600 companies have 58. Mariana Tokarnia, “Operação Verde Brasil: multas na Amazônia been operating in the free trade zone, which is set to expire in 2023. somam R$ 36 milhões,” Repórter da Agência Brasil, September 23, See: Patrick Bruha, “Tax Exemption in Manaus Free Trade Zone,” The 2019, https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/politica/noticia/2019-09/ Brazil Business, August 20, 2014, https://thebrazilbusiness.com/arti- operacao-verde-brasil-multas-aplicadas-na-amazonia-so- cle/tax-exemption-in-manaus-free-trade-zone. mam-r36-milhoes; and Anastasia Moloney, “Sex Trade Flourishes 71. Ibid. in Peru’s Amazon Despite Crackdown on Illegal Mining,” Reuters, 72. Kei Otsuki, Sustainable Development in Amazonia: Paradise in the January 16, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-peru-traffick- Making (New York: Routledge, 2013); Emilio Moran, “Roads and Dams: ing-mining/sex-trade-flourishes-in-perus-amazon-despite-crack- Infrastructure Driven Transformation in the Brazilian Amazon,” Ambi- down-on-illegal-mining-idUSKBN1ZF0KE. ente & Sociedade 19, no. 2 (April/June 2016), https://www.scielo.br/ 59. Richard Emblin, “Colombia’s Eco-warrior ‘Artemisa’ Combats De- scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1414-753X2016000200207; and forestation in Nation’s Parks,” The City Paper Bogotá, September 11, Fabrícia Peixoto, “Linha do Tempo: Entenda como ocorreu a ocu- 2019, https://thecitypaperbogota.com/news/colombias-eco-war- pação da Amazônia,” BBC Brasil, July 23, 2009, https://www.bbc.com/ rior-artemisa-to-combats-deforestation/22721. portuguese/noticias/2009/07/090722_amazonia_timeline_fbdt. 60. Luis Jaime Acosta, “Amazon Countries Sign Forest Pact, Prom- 73. Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica, “Energia Hidráulica,” Gov- ising to Coordinate Disaster Response,” Reuters, September 6, ernment of Brazil, http://www2.aneel.gov.br/aplicacoes/atlas/ener- 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-environment-am- gia_hidraulica/4_5.htm; and Juliano Assunção, Francisco Costa, and azon-summit/amazon-countries-sign-forest-pact-promising-to-co- Dimitri Szerman, Local Economic Impacts of Brazilian Hydroelectric ordinate-disaster-response-idUSKCN1VR2B1. Power Plants (working paper, February 18, 2019), https://ucd041ae- 61. Motoko Aizawa, “Sustainable Development through Quality Infra- 0ba6adb6249e11c96614.dl.dropboxusercontent.com/cd/0/inline2/ structure: Emerging Focus on Quality over Quantity,” Journal of Mega A6vSGHtrgZu0DYpx31uujJHfAQP1OK6DxS7vEY374hcOWNtLcMRmU- Infrastructure and Sustainable Development, January 17, 2020, https:// Mow9Bv6tlw04KcnTwpCscSDUw94N9HVOQt-ywU0UzNJAIUE3c7t- www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/24724718.2019.1706922?- fAtgKrElYWnODAPWwow-Kz_NajldgH8RJ-Mp4cxKKxupCmKnb5B5C- journalCode=rjmi20. MYQow0NHr7omJ9u4K7b8SZMKXhlSUJpbh-zMCSHmm9Zsvnu7qT- 62. Daniel Boffey, “Norway Halts Amazon Fund Donation in Dispute mdscUWk84iHH0IbkyMoI-hJnaBtPRiPl_hHMJc0wMesyfzlTY3Bh- with Brazil,” The Guardian, August 16, 2019, https://www.theguard- vQuPKYPQSy2VOeOJobZLcNP3ex8cKzTWyqb4-v1p3GYQ78bqTQN- ian.com/world/2019/aug/16/norway-halts-amazon-fund-dona- qHUlecS7WaE_h-fiI_I_OImCe1qskC9Lfx/file#. tion-dispute-brazil-deforestation-jair-bolsonaro. 74. Roxana Barrantes and Manuel Glave, “Amazonía Peruana y De- 63. Ibid. sarrollo Económico,” GRADE, 2014, https://www.grade.org.pe/en/ 64. “Amazon Deforestation Threatens EU-Mercosur Trade Deal,” Val- publicaciones/12567-amazonia-peruana-y-desarrollo-economico/. or Econômico S. A, March 4, 2020, https://www.valor.com.br/inter- 75. Ibid. national/brief/6439373/amazon-deforestation-threatens-eu-mer- 76. John A. Cope and Andrew Parks, “Frontier Security: The Case of cosur-trade-deal. Brazil,” INSS, INSS Strategic Perspectives 20, August 2016, https:// 65. “Members of the Ways and Means Committee to the Honorable inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strate- Robert Lighthizer,” Letter, U.S. House of Representatives, June 3, gicPerspectives-20.pdf?ver=2016-08-17-103324-443. 2020, https://waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysand- 77. For example, among illegal crops, the major producers of co- means.house.gov/files/documents/20200603_WM%20Dem%20 caine are Colombia and Peru, while the United States and Brazil are Ltr%20to%20Amb%20Lighthizer%20re%20Brazil.pdf. the top two consumers (UNODC). Among legal crops, 80 percent of 66. Sue Branford, “Prompted by Amazon Fires, 230 Investors Warn Brazilian soybeans are exported to China. Firms Linked to Deforestation,” Mongabay Environmental News, 78. Theresa Bradley and Ritchie King, “Brazil Now Consumes 18% September 23, 2019, https://news.mongabay.com/2019/09/ of the World’s Cocaine,” Quartz, September 23, 2012, https:// prompted-by-amazon-fires-230-investors-warn-firms-linked-to- qz.com/5058/brazil-now-consumes-18-of-worlds-cocaine/. deforestation/; and Jake Spring, “Exclusive, European Investors 79. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,World Drug Report 2019 Threaten Brazil Divestment over Deforestation,” Reuters, June 19, – Booklet 4: Stimulants (Vienna: UN, June 2019), https://wdr.unodc. 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-environment-di- org/wdr2019/prelaunch/WDR19_Booklet_4_STIMULANTS.pdf. vestment-exclusi/exclusive-european-investors-threaten-brazil-di- 80. Fernando Tadeu Moraes, “Amazônia brasileira abriga 453 garim- vestment-over-deforestation-idUSKBN23Q1MU. pos ilegais, mostra estudo,” Amazonia Socioambiental, December 67. Ibid. 10, 2018, https://www.amazoniasocioambiental.org/en/radar/ama- 68. Simone Iglesias and Fabiana Batista, “Bolsonaro Plans to Ap- zonia-brasileira-abriga-453-garimpos-ilegais-mostra-estudo/. pease Investors with Ban on Amazon Fires,” Bloomberg, July 8, 2020, 81. Ibid. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-08/bolsonaro- 82. Segun Osisanya, “National Security versus Global Security,” UN plans-to-appease-investors-with-ban-on-amazon-fires. Chronicle, https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/national-secu- 69. Kristjan Archer and Julie Ray, “Brazilians Least Satisfied in Am- rity-versus-global-security. azon with Environment,” Gallup, August 30, 2019, https://news. 83. Mahendra P. Lama, “Human vs. National Security,” Global-E 11,

64 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon no. 22, April 17, 2018, https://www.21global.ucsb.edu/global-e/ com/releases/2015/08/150824064927.htm. april-2018/human-vs-national-security. 101. Matt Sandy, “‘The Amazon Is Completely Lawless.’” 84. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Af- 102. Alexander Zaitchik, “Rainforest on Fire,” The Intercept, July 6, fairs (UNOCHA), Human Security in Theory and Practice: Application 2019, https://theintercept.com/2019/07/06/brazil-amazon-rainfor- of the Human Security Concept and the United Nations Trust Fund for est-indigenous-conservation-agribusiness-ranching/. Human Security (New York: UNOCHA, 2009), https://www.unocha. 103. “Climate Change in the Amazon,” WWF, https://wwf.panda.org/ org/sites/dms/HSU/Publications%20and%20Products/Human%20 knowledge_hub/where_we_work/amazon/amazon_threats/cli- Security%20Tools/Human%20Security%20in%20Theory%20 mate_change_amazon/. and%20Practice%20English.pdf. 104. Fred Pearce, “Amazon Watch: What Happens When the Forest 85. “What is Human Security,” United Nations Trust Fund for Hu- Disappears?,” Yale Environment 360, October 17, 2019, https://e360. man Security. yale.edu/features/amazon-watch-what-happens-when-the-forest- 86. UNOCHA, Human Security in Theory and Practice. disappears. 87. Lama, “Human vs. National Security.” 105. Charles Parkinson, “The Flow of Drugs and Blood in the Am- 88. Hernán Felipe Trujillo Quintero, “Realidades de la Amazonía Co- azon Tri-border Region,” Insight Crime, April 4, 2014, https://www. lombiana: Territorio, Conflicto Armado y Riesgo Socioecológico,” insightcrime.org/news/analysis/the-flow-of-drugs-and-blood-in- ABRA, June 30, 2014, https://www.revistas.una.ac.cr/index.php/ the-amazon-tri-border-region/. abra/article/view/6041/6010. 106. Drug trafficking through the Brazilian Amazon is thriving, driven 89. “Zona de Reserva Forestal de la Amazonia Colombiana Ley 2da by increases in Brazilian consumption and exports to Europe. Brazil de 1959,” SIAT-AC, http://siatac.co/web/guest/productos/orde- borders the world’s top cocaine suppliers, with Colombia producing namiento-territorial/zrf. 70 percent of the world’s supply, Peru 20 percent, and Bolivia 10 per- 90. “Vías terciarias: otra forma de penetrar el corazón de la selva co- cent. Production in the region is growing steadily even as U.S. con- lombiana,” Semana Sostenible, June 5, 2019, https://sostenibilidad. sumers decline, and the criminal enterprises involved are becoming semana.com/medio-ambiente/articulo/vias-terciarias-otra-for- increasingly sophisticated. Once primarily a consumer country, Bra- ma-de-penetrar-el-corazon-de-la-selva-colombiana/44468. zil has become one of the top cocaine suppliers for Europe, a launch- 91. Germán Mejía Pavony and Michael J. LaRosa, Historia Conci- ing pad for cocaine from other South American nations to make its sa de Colombia (1810-2013): Una guía para lectores desprevenidos way across the Atlantic. Brazilian gangs and syndicates have infil- (Bogotá: Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, December 5, trated Brazilian ports and are sending record amounts of cocaine, 2013), https://books.google.com/books?id=LJ0xDwAAQBAJ&dq=- making the country the top point of origin for several European na- construcci%C3%B3n+carreteras+colombia+despues+de+1970&- tions. Most of this cocaine flows into Brazil via the Amazon River and source=gbs_navlinks_s; and Instituto Nacional de Vías, “Carreteras,” eventually makes its way to northeastern seaports. Drug traffickers Government of Colombia, https://hermes.invias.gov.co/carreteras/. are increasingly using the remote and isolated locales of the Ama- 92. Mauricio Cote, “Los Retos De Los Planes En Infraestructura En La zon as refuge. Within the Amazon, traffickers can easily launder their Amazonia Colombiana,” PID Amazonia, September 3, 2017, https:// money through illicit cattle ranching and gold mining. Gold is partic- pidamazonia.com/content/los-retos-de-los-planes-en-infraestruc- ularly useful to organized crime groups, as it is easily laundered and tura-en-la-amazonia-colombiana. has as of late been a rewarding investment for drug proceeds. Like 93. La Liga Contra el Silencio, “Planes de hidroeléctricas en Caquetá, most other industries, Covid-19 has affected drug trafficking as sup- la amenaza silenciosa a la Amazonía colombiana,” 070, September 18, ply chains and travel have been disrupted. The United Nations has 2019, https://cerosetenta.uniandes.edu.co/planes-de-hidroelectri- warned that traffickers could resort to alternative transportation cas-en-caqueta-la-amenaza-silenciosa-a-la-amazonia-colombiana/. methods, such as drones and unmanned vehicles. 94. Ibid. 107. Gustavo Carrasquel, “Tráfico de especies en la Selva Amazóni- 95. César Muñoz Acebes et al., Rainforest Mafias: How Violence and ca, historia sin fin,” ECOticias.com, June 11, 2012, https://www. Impunity Fuel Deforestation in Brazil’s Amazon (New York: Human ecoticias.com/eco-america/66773/Trafico-especies-Selva-Amazoni- Rights Watch, September 17, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/sites/de- ca-historia-fin. fault/files/report_pdf/brazil0919_web.pdf. 108. Katia Silva, “Amazonia.com – Tráfico de animais silvestres da 96. Cope and Parks, “Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil.” Amazônia será tema de seminário,” Amazonia, August 9, http:// 97. Global Forest Atlas, “Amazon Logging: Practice and Policy,” Yale www.renctas.org.br/en/amazonia-com-trafico-de-animais-silves- School of the Environment, https://globalforestatlas.yale.edu/ama- tres-da-amazonia-sera-tema-de-seminario/. zon/forests-and-logging/amazon-logging-practice-and-policy. 109. Anthony Faiola, “Smuggling’s Wild Side in Brazil,” Washington 98. Antonio Jose Paz Cardona, “Según estudio, casi el 50% de la Post, December 9, 2001, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/ madera comercializada en Colombia sería illegal,” Mongabay Envi- politics/2001/12/09/smugglings-wild-side-in-brazil/bb4caee4- ronmental News, July 10, 2019, https://es.mongabay.com/2019/07/ cd08-41fb-b042-12dd88492137/. madera-ilegal-tala-amazonia-colombia/. 110. Dan Collyns, “Wildlife for Sale: An Illegal Activity out of Con- 99. Jim Robbins, “How Forest Loss Is Leading to a Rise in Human trol in Peru?,” Mongabay Environmental News, December 14, 2016, Disease,” Yale Environment 360, February 23, 2016, https://e360. https://news.mongabay.com/2016/12/wildlife-for-sale-an-illegal- yale.edu/features/how_forest_loss_is_leading_to_a_rise_in_hu- activity-out-of-control-in-peru/. man_disease_malaria_zika_climate_change. 111. Joshua Goodman, “Songbirds Silenced as Colombia Fights 100. “Evidence of Species Loss in Amazon Caused by Deforestation,” Wildlife Trafficking,” ABC News, August 14, 2019, https://abc- Lancaster University, August 24, 2015, https://www.sciencedaily. news.go.com/Technology/wireStory/songbirds-silenced-colom-

Bandura & McKeown 65 bia-fights-wildlife-trafficking-64960485. es-extincao-de-especies-e-contaminacao-por-mercurio/. 112. Ibid. 126. Sucena Shkrada Resk, “O mercúrio nas veias da Amazônia,” 113. Alejandra Goyenechea and Rosa A. Indenbaum, Combating Amazonia, August 17, 2018, http://amazonia.org.br/2018/08/o-mer- Wildlife Trafficking from Latin America to the United States (Wash- curio-nas-veias-da-amazonia/. ington, DC: Defenders of Wildlife, 2015), http://www.defenders. 127. Jim Robbins, “How Forest Loss Is Leading to a Rise in Human org/sites/default/files/publications/combating-wildlife-trafficking- Disease.” from-latin-america-to-the-united-states-and-what-we-can-do-to- 128. Sadie J. Ryan, Colin J. Carlson, Erin A. Mordecai, and Leah R. address-it.pdf. Johnson, “Global Expansion and Redistribution of Aedes-borne 114. Johnna Flahive, “Plundering Eden: Wildlife Trafficking in Latin Virus Transmission Risk with Climate Change,” PLOS Neglected America,” Advocacy for Animals, November 2, 2015, http://advoca- Tropical Diseases 13, no. 3 (March 2019), https://journals.plos.org/ cy.britannica.com/blog/advocacy/2015/11/plundering-eden-wild- plosntds/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0007213&type=print- life-trafficking-in-latin-america/; and United Nations Environment able. Programme Division of Early Warning and Assessment, UNEP Year 129. DANE, “Estadísticas vitales nacimientos y defunciones.” Book 2014: Emerging Issues in our Global Environment (Nairobi, 130. UNICEF Brasil, Agenda pela infância e adolescência na Amazônia. Kenya: UNEP, 2014), https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/han- 131. Conselho Nacional de Secretários de Saúde (Conass), dle/20.500.11822/9240/-UNEP%20Year%20Book%202014%3a%20 “Número de Hospitais Brasil – SUS,” Consensus 11 (April/ emerging%20issues%20in%20our%20global%20environment%20 May/June 2014), http://www.conass.org.br/consensus/nume- UNEP_YearBook_2014.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y. ro-de-hospitais-brasil-sus/. 115. Henderson Martins, “Regiões Norte e Nordeste têm altas tax- 132. Maria Lúcia Leal and Maria de Fátima Leal, Pesquisa Sobre Tráf- as de tráfico sexual de crianças, diz a PF,” Amazonas Atual, March ico De Mulheres, Crianças E Adolescentes Para Fins De Exploração 26, 2018, https://amazonasatual.com.br/regioes-norte-e-nordeste- Sexual Comercial No Brasil (Brasília, DF: CECRIA, December 2002), tem-altas-taxas-de-trafico-sexual-de-criancas-diz-a-pf/. http://www.crianca.mppr.mp.br/arquivos/File/publi/cecria/rel_na- 116. “20 Year Gold Price History in US Dollars per Ounce,” Goldprice. cional_pestraf_2002.pdf. org, https://goldprice.org/gold-price-charts/20-year-gold-price-his- 133. Em Tabatinga and Benjamin Constant, “Região amazôni- tory-in-us-dollars-per-ounce. ca tem rotas de tráfico humano sem fiscalização,” UOL Noticias, 117. Livia Wagner, Organized Crime and Illegally Mined Gold in March 15, 2016, https://noticias.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ultimas-no- Latin America (Geneva: Global Initiative against Transnation- ticias/2016/03/15/regiao-amazonica-tem-rotas-de-trafico-huma- al Organized Crime, April 2016), https://arcominero.infoam- no-sem-fiscalizacao.htm. azonia.org/GIATOC-OC_Illegally-Mined-Gold-in-Latin-Ameri- 134. Fabíola Munhoz, “Rotas da exploração sexual: Por que muitas ca-3c3f978eef80083bdd8780d7c5a21f1e.pdf. mulheres da Amazônia seguem esse caminho?,” Repórter Brasil, 118. Ibid. August 6, 2009, https://reporterbrasil.org.br/2009/08/rotas-da-ex- 119. Tadeu Moraes, “Amazônia brasileira abriga 453 garimpos ploracao-sexual-por-que-muitas-mulheres-da-amazonia-seg- ilegais, mostra estudo.” uem-esse-caminho/. 120. Yvette Sierra Praeli, “Minería ilegal: la peor devastación en la 135. Augusto César Pinto Figueiredo and Luís Junior Costa Saraiva, historia de la Amazonía,” Mongabay Environmental News, January “A Prostituição Em Grandes Projetos Na Amazônia: O Impacto Do 17, 2019, https://es.mongabay.com/2019/01/mapa-mineria-ile- Grande Capital Nos Fluxos De Mão De Obra Na Uhe Belo Monte,” gal-amazonia/. Nova Revista Amazônica 6, December 2018, https://periodicos.ufpa. 121. Ibid. br/index.php/nra/article/view/6467/5196. 122. Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons,2019 136. Diego Garcia-Sayan, “Ley de la selva y trata de personas,” Trafficking in Persons Report, U.S. Department of State, June 2019, El Pais, https://elpais.com/internacional/2016/06/30/ameri- https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2019-Traffick- ca/1467320665_926076.html. ing-in-Persons-Report.pdf. 137. “Firman pacto en Amazonas para luchar contra la explotación 123. Fabiano Masionnave, “Rota da cocaína peruana atrai facções à sexual,” El Tiempo, December 14, 2018, https://www.eltiempo.com/ Amazônia e gera um lucro bilionário,” Amazonia, January 13, 2017, podcast/no-es-hora-de-callar/firman-pacto-en-frontera-amazoni- https://amazonia.org.br/2017/01/rota-da-cocaina-peruana-at- ca-para-luchar-contra-explotacion-sexual-304900. rai-faccoes-a-amazonia-e-gera-um-lucro-bilionario/; and Daniel 138. Fikri, Koster, and de Wit, Healthy Rivers, Healthy People. Cerqueira et al., Atlas da Violência: Retratos dos Municípios Brasile- 139. Ibid. iros (Brasília: Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, July 2019), 140. Mitch Anderson, “‘Go Make Camps Deeper in the Forest.’ How https://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/relatorio_in- the Amazon’s Indigenous People are Handling the Threat of the stitucional/190802_atlas_da_violencia_2019_municipios.pdf. Coronavirus,” Time, April 24, 2020, https://time.com/5826188/ama- 124. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World zons-indigenous-people-coronavirus/. Drug Report 2019: Executive Summary – Conclusions and Policy Im- 141. Ibid. plications (Vienna: UNODC, June 2019), 17, https://wdr.unodc.org/ 142. Ana Carolina Moreno, “Nº de habitantes por médico no Norte wdr2019/prelaunch/WDR19_Booklet_1_EXECUTIVE_SUMMARY.pdf. é quase 3 vezes o do Sudeste; veja o raio-x da carreira,” G1, July 20, 125. Tatiana Farah, “Usinas do Tapajós podem causar morte de 2017, https://g1.globo.com/educacao/guia-de-carreiras/noticia/n- peixes, extinção de espécies e contaminação por mercúrio,” Monga- de-habitantes-por-medico-no-norte-e-quase-3-vezes-o-do-sud- bay Environmental News, December 23, 2016, https://brasil.monga- este-veja-o-raio-x-da-carreira.ghtml. bay.com/2016/12/usinas-do-tapajos-podem-causar-morte-de-peix- 143. Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (INEI), “Esta-

66 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon blecimientos del Sector Salud,” Government of Peru, http://m. madas-utilizam-tecnologia-a-servico-da-seguranca--na-Amazonia/. inei.gob.pe/estadisticas/indice-tematico/health-sector-establish- 159.“Quanto o Brasil gasta com defesa?,” FORTE, https://www.forte. ments/. jor.br/2015/01/22/quanto-o-brasil-gasta-com-defesa/; and “Defesa 144. Helena Calle, “La capacidad para enfrentar el coronavirus en registra maior reforço de caixa da Esplanada, com R$ 6,3 bi a mais la Amazonia colombiana es minima,” Infoamazonía, April 1, 2020, gastos em 2019,” Defesanet, http://www.defesanet.com.br/front/ https://www.elespectador.com/coronavirus/la-capacidad-para-en- noticia/35932/Bolsonaro-privilegia-gastos-com-militares-no-pri- frentar-el-coronavirus-en-la-amazonia-colombiana-es-minima-ar- meiro-ano-de-governo/. ticulo-912447/. 160. Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, Anuário Brasileiro 145. “Ministério da Defesa,” Government of Brazil, https://www.gov. de Segurança Pública: 2014-2017 (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança br/defesa/pt-br. Pública, 2018), http://www.forumseguranca.org.br/wp-content/up- 146. Thais Borges and Sue Branford, “Amazon Indigenous Groups loads/2018/09/FBSP_ABSP_edicao_especial_estados_faccoes_2018. Feel Deserted by Brazil’s Public Health Service,” Mongabay pdf. “Brasil vigila la deforestacíon de la Amazonía com satélites,” Andi- Environmental News, August 5, 2019, https://news.mongabay. na, December 2018, https://andina.pe/agencia/noticia-brasil-vigila-de- com/2019/08/amazon-indigenous-groups-feel-deserted-by-bra- forestacion-de-amazonia-satelites-735951.aspx.161. “Brasil vigila la zils-public-health-service/. deforestación de la Amazonía con satélites,” AFP/MAE, December 147. Richard Pearshouse and Jurema Werneck, “Land Seizures 13, 2018, https://andina.pe/agencia/noticia-brasil-vigila-deforesta- and COVID-19: The Twin Threats to Brazil’s Indigenous Peoples,” cion-de-amazonia-satelites-735951.aspx. Amnesty International, April 6, 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/ 162. “PRODES – Amazônia: Monitoramento do Desmatamento da latest/news/2020/04/land-seizures-and-covid-19-the-twin-threats- Floresta Amazônica Brasileira por Satélite,” Instituto Nacional de to-brazils-indigenous-peoples/. Pesquisas Espaciais (INPE), http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/ 148. “Peruvian Navy Brings Healthcare, Social Services to Amazon programas/amazonia/prodes. Region,” Dialogo, December 14, 2015, https://dialogo-americas. 163. “Projetos e Pesquisas: TerraClass,” Instituto Nacional de com/articles/peruvian-navy-brings-healthcare-social-ser- Pesquisas Espaciais (INPE), May 8, 2019, http://www.inpe.br/cra/ vices-to-amazon-region/. projetos_pesquisas/dados_terraclass.php. 149. Ibid. 164. “Deter,” Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (INPE), 150. Eduardo Simoes, “Brazil to Create ‘Amazon Council’ to http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/deter/ Protect and Develop the Rainforest,” Reuters, January 21, 2020, deter. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-environment/bra- 165. “TerraBrasilis,” Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais zil-to-create-amazon-council-to-protect-and-develop-the-rainfor- (INPE), http://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/en/home-page/. est-idUSKBN1ZK237; and BRIDJE, “Conselho da Amazônia e Força 166. “Amazonia – 1”, NEOIAS, July 11, 2020, https://neoiascap. Nacional Ambiental.” com/2020/07/11/11-july-2020/daily/#:~:text=ISRO%20to%20 151. Rubens Valente, “Mourão forma Conselho da Amazônia com launch%20Amazonia%2D1,Brazil%20onboard%20PSLV%20 19 militares e sem Ibama e Funai,” UOL Noticias, April 18, 2020, next%20month.&text=Amazonia%20%2D1%3A,tested%20and%20 https://noticias.uol.com.br/colunas/rubens-valente/2020/04/18/ operated%20by%20Brazil. conselho-amazonia-mourao.htm. 167. Ryan Woo, “China-Brazil Satellite Launched into Space to 152. Ibid. Monitor Amazon Rainforest,” Reuters, December 20, 2019, https:// 153. BRIDJE, “Conselho da Amazônia e Força Nacional Ambiental.” www.reuters.com/article/us-china-space-satellite/china-brazil-sat- 154. “Brazil: Amazon Penalties Suspended Since October,” Human ellite-launched-into-space-to-monitor-amazon-rainforest-idUSKB- Rights Watch, May 20, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/20/ N1YO0JO. brazil-amazon-penalties-suspended-october. 168. Projecto Amazonia Conectada, “Home,” Ministério da Defesa, 155. Daniele Bragança, “Ações do Ibama e ICMBio na Amazônia serão http://www.amazoniaconectada.eb.mil.br/pt/index.php. subordinadas aos militares, decreta Bolsonaro,” ((o))eco, May 7, 2020, 169. Moloney, “Sex Trade Flourishes in Peru’s Amazon Despite https://www.oeco.org.br/noticias/acoes-do-ibama-e-icmbio-na-am- Crackdown on Illegal Mining.” azonia-serao-subordinadas-aos-militares-decreta-bolsonaro/. 170. Reuters, “Peru Cracks Down on Illegal Gold Mining to Save De- 156. Anthony Boadle, “Bolsonaro Extends Deployment of Troops forested Amazon Area,” NBC News, February 20, 2019, https://www. to Curb Amazon Deforestation,” Reuters, June 11, 2020, https:// nbcnews.com/news/latino/peru-cracks-down-illegal-gold-min- www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-environment/bolsona- ing-save-deforested-amazon-area-n973551; and Leo Schwarz, ro-extends-deployment-of-troops-to-curb-amazon-deforesta- “Gold Mining Leaves Heart of Peruvian Amazon a Wasteland,” PBS, tion-idUSKBN23I25C. September 21, 2019, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/gold- 157. Péricles Cardim, “Projeto Amazônia SAR: desenvolvimento op- mining-leaves-heart-of-peruvian-amazon-a-wasteland. eracional e primeiros resultados na identificação do desmatamen- 171. Schwarz, “Gold Mining Leaves Heart of Peruvian Amazon a to com imagens de Radar Orbital,” Centro Gestor e Operacional do Wasteland.” Sistema de Proteção da Amazônia Censipam, Ministério da Defesa, 172. Lucio Villa and Matt Finder, “MAAP #104: Major Reduction in Government of Brazil, http://www.sipam.gov.br/projeto-amazo- Illegal Gold Mining from Peru’s Operation Mercury,” Monitoring of nia-sar. the Andean Amazon Project, August 4, 2019, https://maaproject. 158. Ariquemes Online, “TOA - Forças armadas utilizam tecnologia org/2019/lapampa_opermercury/; and Moloney, “Sex Trade Flour- a serviço da segurança, na Amazônia,” Defesa Net, August 28, 2015, ishes in Peru’s Amazon Despite Crackdown on Illegal Mining.” https://www.defesanet.com.br/toa/noticia/20177/TOA---Forcas-ar- 173. Ministry of Defense, “Comités de autodefensa del VRAEM cele-

Bandura & McKeown 67 bran XXI aniversario de lucha contra el terrorismo,” Government of dinate-disaster-response-idUSKCN1VR2B1. Peru, May 22, 2013, http://www.pcm.gob.pe/2013/05/vraem-comi- 186. Felipe Betim, “EUA participam de exercício militar na tes-de-autodefensa-celebran-aniversario-de-lucha-antiterrorista/. Amazônia a convite do Brasil,” El Pais, November 10, 2017, https:// 174. Steven T. Zech, “Drug Trafficking, Terrorism, and Civilian brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2017/11/09/politica/1510250965_868739. Self-Defense in Peru,” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 4 (April 2014), https:// html. ctc.usma.edu/drug-trafficking-terrorism-and-civilian-self-de- 187. Neuman, Scott, and Merrit Kennedy, “G-7 Leaders Pledge fense-in-peru/. Money To Help Fight Amazon Rainforest Blazes, Macron Says,” NPR, 175. Ibid. August 26, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/08/26/754255863/g-7- 176. “La Defensa De La Persona Humana Y El Respeto De Su Digni- leaders-near-deal-to-help-amazon-nations-fight-rainforest-blazes- dad Son El Fin Supremo De La Sociedad Y Del Estado,” Congress macron-says. of Peru, 2003, http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/tradocestproc/ 188. Pablo Garcia, “U.S. Military Joins Brazil Army Exercises in clproley2001.nsf/pley/FCCA421ADAF7D44C05256D25005CAF- Amazon,” Reuters, November 8, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/ D3?opendocument; and “VRAEM Self-Defense Committees Cele- article/us-brazil-usa-military/u-s-military-joins-brazil-army-exercis- brate XXI Anniversary of the Fight against Terrorism,” Presidency es-in-amazon-idUSKBN1D8347. of the Council of Ministers, May 22, 2013, http://www.pcm.gob. 189. “Brazilian C-130 Hercules Planes To Douse Amazon Fire,” pe/2013/05/vraem-comites-de-autodefensa-celebran-aniversa- Defense World, August 26, 2019, https://www.defenseworld.net/ rio-de-lucha-antiterrorista/. news/25352/Brazilian_C_130_Hercules_Planes_To_Douse_Ama- 177. Steven T. Zech, “Autonomous Security Provision in Peru,” zon_Fire#.Xr9dTS-ZPfY. Denver Dialogues, June 23, 2015, http://politicalviolenceataglance. 190. Mariana Tokarnia, “Operação Verde Brasil: multas na Amazônia org/2015/06/23/autonomous-security-provision-in-peru/. somam R$ 36 milhões.” 178. Steven T. Zech, “Drug Trafficking, Terrorism, and Civilian 191. “PF deflagra operação ‘Inimigos da Tora’ para combater ex- Self-Defense in Peru.” tração de madeira em terras da União,” G1, May 11, 2020, https:// 179. In Brazil, IBAMA agents are in charge of civil enforcement of g1.globo.com/ro/rondonia/noticia/2020/05/11/pf-deflagra-op- federal environmental law: they can fine those who violate the eracao-inimigos-da-tora-e-tenta-combater-extracao-de-madei- law and are legally authorized to detain someone in the act of ra-em-terra-da-uniao.ghtml. committing an environmental crime and hand them over to police. 192. “PF deflagra operação ‘Inimigos da Tora’ para combater ex- The federal police are in charge of investigating crimes against the tração de madeira em terras da União,” G1, May 11, 2020, https:// nation (an equivalent to the FBI in the United States), while the g1.globo.com/ro/rondonia/noticia/2020/05/11/pf-deflagra-op- state military police is a state law enforcement agency tasked with eracao-inimigos-da-tora-e-tenta-combater-extracao-de-madei- maintaining public order, patrolling communities, and imprisoning ra-em-terra-da-uniao.ghtml; and “Brasil deflagra Operação Verde those who commit environmental crimes. See: Acebes et al., Rain- Brasil,” Defesa Net, May 11, 2020, https://www.defesanet.com.br/ forest Mafias. Ciro Barros, “No Maranhão, cada guardião da floresta vb/noticia/36734/Brasil-deflagra-Operacao-Verde-Brasil-2/. é um Paulino Guajajara,” Agência Pública, November 12, 2019, 193. Ernesto Londoño, Manuela Andreoni, and Letícia Casado, “Am- https://apublica.org/2019/11/no-maranhao-cada-guardiao-da-flor- azon Deforestation Soars as Pandemic Hobbles Enforcement,” New esta-e-um-paulino-guajajara/; and Acebes et al., Rainforest Mafias. York Times, June 6, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/06/ 180. Tim Boekhout Van Solinge, “GPS-Supported, Community-Based world/americas/amazon-deforestation-brazil.html. Forest Crime Prevention in the Brazilian Amazon,” Oxford Martine 194. Ensheng Dong, Hongru Du, and Lauren Gardner, “An interactive Programme on the Illegal Wildlife Trade, November 22, 2018, https:// web-based dashboard to track COVID-19 in real time,” Lancet Infec- www.illegalwildlifetrade.net/2018/11/22/gps-supported-communi- tious Diseases 20, no. 5 (February 2020):533-534, doi:10.1016/S1473- ty-based-forest-crime-prevention-in-the-brazilian-amazon/. 3099(20)30120-1. 181. Vanessa Romo, “Tecnología para cazar delitos: monitores 195. Department of National Planning, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo indígenas combaten la ilegalidad,” Mongabay Environmental News, 2018-2022 (Bogotá: Government of Colombia, 2018), https://colab- November 4, 2019, https://es.mongabay.com/2019/11/tecnolo- oracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Prensa/Resumen-PND2018-2022-final.pdf. gia-para-cazar-delitos-monitores-indigenas-combaten-ilegalidad/. 196. “En Tumaco, el Presidente Duque lanzó Zonas Futuro, estrate- 182. Ministry of Foreign Relations, “Amazon Cooperation Treaty gia integral para impulsar el desarrollo en los territorios más afect- Organization (ACTO),” Government of Brazil, http://www.itamaraty. ados por la violencia y la pobreza,” Presidencia de la República de gov.br/pt-BR/politica-externa/integracao-regional/691-organi- Colombia, August 8, 2019, https://id.presidencia.gov.co/Paginas/ zacao-do-tratado-de-cooperacao-amazonica-otca. prensa/2019/190808-Tumaco-Presidente-Duque-lanzo-Zonas-Fu- 183. “ACTO and UN Environment Sign Cooperation Agreement for turo-estrategia-integral-impulsar-desarrollo-territorios-afecta- the Amazon Basin,” Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization, Jan- dos-violencia.aspx. uary 28, 2020, http://www.otca-oficial.info/news/details/664. 197. Emblin, “Colombia’s Eco-warrior ‘Artemisa.’” 184. ”Brasil e mais seis países assinam o Pacto pela Amazônia,” 198. Gerd Sparovek et al., “Who Owns Brazilian Lands?,” Land Use Veja, September 6, 2019, https://veja.abril.com.br/mundo/bra- Policy 87 (September 2019), https://www.sciencedirect.com/sci- sil-e-mais-seis-paises-assinam-o-pacto-pela-amazonia/. ence/article/abs/pii/S0264837719304077. 185. Luis Jaime Acosta, “Amazon Countries Sign Forest Pact, 199. Frederico Machado and Kate Anderson, Brazil’s New Forest Promising to Coordinate Disaster Response,” Reuters, September 6, Code: A Guide for Decision-makers in Supply Chains and Govern- 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-environment-ama- ments (Brasília, DF: WWF, 2016), http://assets.wwf.org.uk/down- zon-summit/amazon-countries-sign-forest-pact-promising-to-coor- loads/wwf_brazils_new_forest_code_guide_1.pdf.

68 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon 200. Julian Assunçao and Clarissa Gandour, “Combatting Illegal where-we-work/latin-america/stories-in-latin-america/an-assess- Deforestation - Strengthening Command and Control is Fundamen- ment-of-territorial-planning/. tal,” CPI, April 2019, https://climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/ 213. Madrid M. Rosana and Avila H. Magaly, Corruption Risks in the uploads/2019/04/white-paper-Combating-Illegal-Deforesta- Mining Sector: Peru Report (Lima: PROETICA National Council for tion-Strengthening-Command-and-Control-Is-Fundamental.pdf; Public Ethics, 2017), https://www.proetica.org.pe/wp-content/up- and Juliano Assunção and Romero Rocha, Rural Settlements and loads/2019/02/estudio-mineria-ingles-proetica.pdf. Small-Scale Deforestation (Rio de Janeiro: CPI, 2016), https://cli- 214. “Revolving Door,” OpenSecrets.org, https://www.opensecrets. matepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Rural_Set- org/revolving/. tlements_and_Small_Scale_Deforestation_Brief_EN_FINAL.pdf. 215. “The Revolving Door: Why Politicians Become Lobbyists, and 201. Sparovek et al., “Who Owns Brazilian Lands?” Lobbyists Become Politicians,” The Conversation, September 21, 202. Ibid. 2016, https://theconversation.com/the-revolving-door-why-politi- 203. Germán Gómez Rojas, “Corte Suprema ordena protección cians-become-lobbyists-and-lobbyists-become-politicians-64237. inmediata de la Amazonía Colombiana,” Corte Suprema de Justicia 216. Rosana and Magaly, Corruption Risks in the Mining Sector: Peru de Colombia, April 5, 2018, http://www.cortesuprema.gov.co/corte/ Report. index.php/2018/04/05/corte-suprema-ordena-proteccion-inmedia- 217. Peru has recently (2016) created regional and municipal alli- ta-de-la-amazonia-colombiana/; and Rodrigo Botero, “La espec- ances (mancomunidades) to coordinate public services that have ulación es la nueva economía de la deforestación,” La Silla Vacía, the capacity to act as single units. See: “Mancomunidades Regio- July 1, 2019, https://lasillavacia.com/silla-llena/red-social/la-espe- nales y Municipales,” Government of Peru, January 5, 2018, http:// culacion-la-nueva-economia-de-la-deforestacion-71181. www.descentralizacion.gob.pe/index.php/2018/01/05/mancomu- 204. Natalie Arenas, “Land Hoarding: What Colombia’s New nidades-regionales-y-municipales/. Administration Has Inherited,” Mongabay Environmental News, 218. Claire Asher, “Brazil’s New Forest Code Puts Vast Areas of Pro- September 10, 2018, https://news.mongabay.com/2018/09/ tected Amazon Forest at Risk,” Mongabay Environmental News, land-hoarding-what-colombias-new-administration-has-inherited/; March 4, 2019, https://news.mongabay.com/2019/03/brazils-new- and Rodrigo Botero, “Parques sin guardianes, un análisis de fondo,” forest-code-puts-vast-areas-of-protected-amazon-forest-at-risk/. Semana Sostenible, April 13, 2020, https://sostenibilidad.semana. 219. Acebes et al., Rainforest Mafias. com/opinion/articulo/parques-sin-guardianes-un-analisis-de-fon- 220. Asher, “Brazil’s New Forest Code”; and Acebes et al., Rainforest do/49906. Mafias. 205. Ministerio de Agricultura, “Frontera agrícola nacional: la 221. “GDP Per Capita (Current US$) – Colombia,” World Bank, https:// cancha del sector agropecuario para el desarrollo rural sostenible,” data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=CO; and Government of Colombia, June 21, 2018, https://www.minagri- Marcela Restrepo Hung et al., Informe sobre Los Avances en Lucha cultura.gov.co/noticias/Paginas/-Frontera-agr%C3%ADcola-na- contra La Corrupcion, la Transparencia en Colombia: Corporación cional-la-cancha-del-sector-agropecuario-para-el-desarrollo-ru- Transparencia por Colombia (Berlin: AgciChile, CSIS, and AUCI), ral-sostenible-.aspx; and Tatiana Pardo Ibarra, “La pata floja de la https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/Colombia_Trans- frontera agrícola en Colombia,” El Tiempo, August 3, 2018, https:// parency_Assessment_Report.pdf. www.eltiempo.com/vida/medio-ambiente/las-dudas-con-la-fron- 222. William H. Neukom, Rule of Law Index 2019 (Washington, DC: tera-agricola-en-colombia-251118. World Justice Project, 2019), https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/ 206. Rodrigo Botero, “Más allá del sector ambiental, ¿qué pasa default/files/documents/ROLI-2019-Reduced.pdf. y a quién le importa la deforestación en la Amazonia?,” Semara 223. Rodrigo Telles de Souza, “Amazonia Is Burning. Corruption is Sostenible, July 15, 2019, https://sostenibilidad.semana.com/opin- One of the Reasons,” The Global Anticorruption Blog, November 1, ion/articulo/mas-alla-del-sector-ambiental-que-pasa-y-a-quien-le- 2019, https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2019/11/01/amazonia- importa-la-deforestacion-en-la-amazonia/44871. is-burning-corruption-is-one-of-the-reasons/. 207. Arenas, “Land Hoarding.” 224. “Corruption Perceptions Index,” Transparency International, 208. “Peru,” Timber Trade Portal, http://www.timbertradeportal. https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi. com/countries/peru/. 225. Cassandro Maria da Veiga Mendes, “How Does Corruption Drive 209. “Peru to Improve Rural Land Registration and Titling with an Illegal Deforestation in Amazon Forest?,” R. Bras. Eco. de Emp. 9 (2): IDB Loan,” IDB, December 4, 2014, https://www.iadb.org/en/news/ 55-65, https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/rbee/article/view- peru-improve-rural-land-registration-and-titling-idb-loan. File/4212/2547. 210. “Comisión Multisectorial para el Establecimiento de Acciones 226. Luis Barrucho, “50 anos do AI-5: Os números por trás do ‘mi- para la Promoción de la Amazonía: informe final, 2019-2021,” lagre econômico’ da ditadura no Brasil,” BBC Brasil, December 13, Secretary of Decentralization, August 2019, 27-30; 47. http://www. 2018, https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/amp/brasil-45960213. descentralizacion.gob.pe/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/GIZ-PCM- 227. Jill Wells, “Corruption in the Construction of Public Infrastruc- PRODUCTO-FINAL-ok.pdf. ture: Critical Issues in Project Preparation,” Chr. Michelsen Insti- tute, U4 Issue March 2015 no. 8, https://www.u4.no/publications/ 211. Enrique Basurto Carvo, Estudio de Línea de Base de Conflictos So- corruption-in-the-construction-of-public-infrastructure-critical-is- cio-ambientales en Paisajes Específicos de la Amazonía Peruana, Madre sues-in-project-preparation-1.pdf. De Dios (Lima, Peru: Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental, 2012). 228. Maira Martini, “The Real Cost of Corruption in Brazil,” Transpar- 212. “An Assessment of Territorial Planning,” The Nature Conser- ency International, December 22, 2017, https://voices.transparency. vancy, October 2018, https://www.nature.org/en-us/about-us/ org/the-real-cost-of-corruption-in-brazil-f3def6d17c94.

Bandura & McKeown 69 229. Saul Elbein, “Of Concrete and Corruption: Resistance Kills An- ribeirinhos-atingidos-por-belo-monte-exigem-retomar-seu-territo- des Amazon Dams,” Mongabay Environmental News, January 24, rio; and “Court Rules Against Indigenous Rights in Belo Monte Hear- 2019, https://news.mongabay.com/2019/01/of-concrete-corrup- ing,” International Rivers and Amazon Watch, November 9, 2011, tion-peoples-resistance-kills-andes-amazon-dams/. https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/court-rules-against- 230. Ministry of Infrastructure, “Radar Anticorrupção encaminha 23 indigenous-rights-in-belo-monte-hearing-3698. denúncias no primeiro mês do programa,” Government of Brazil, 243. See for example, Global Infrastructure Hub for estimates on in- June 16, 2019, https://www.gov.br/infraestrutura/pt-br/assuntos/ vestment gaps and WEF for measures on quality infrastructure. noticias/ultimas-noticias/radar-anticorrupcao-encaminha-23-de- 244. “Global Infrastructure Index 2019: Public Satisfaction and nuncias-no-primeiro-mes-do-programa. Priorities,” Global Infrastructure Investor Association, slide pre- 231. Karen Honório, ”IIRSA – Iniciativa para a Integração da In- sentation, November 28, 2019, http://giia.net/wp-content/up- fraestrutura Regional Sulamericana,” Observatório de Regionalismo, loads/2019/11/261119-Global-and-G8-results.pdf. April 10, 2017, http://observatorio.repri.org/glossary/iniciativa-pa- 245. Ibid. ra-a-integracao-da-infraestrutura-regional-sulamericana-iirsa/; and 246. Guilherme Queiroz, “Infográfico: A realidadedo saneamen- Global Forest Atlas, “Roads in the Amazon Basin,” Yale School of the to básico no Brasil,” Agência CNI de Notícias, November 7, 2018, Environment, https://globalforestatlas.yale.edu/amazon/land-use/ https://noticias.portaldaindustria.com.br/especiais/infografi- roads-amazon-basin. co-a-realidade-do-saneamento-basico-no-brasil/. 232. See for example, César Calderón and Luis Servén, “The Effects 247. Ibid. of Infrastructure Development on Growth and Income Distribu- 248. “Um milhão estão sem energia elétrica na Amazônia, mostra tion,” Policy Research Working Paper No. 3400, World Bank, https:// IEMA,” Instituto de Energia e Meio Ambiente, November 25, 2019, openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/14136/ http://energiaeambiente.org.br/um-milhao-estao-sem-ener- WPS3400.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. gia-eletrica-na-amazonia-20191125. 233. Clément Doleac, “Deforestation in Peru: Building a Dramat- 249. Carla Mereles, “Luz Para Todos: Você Conhece Esse Programa ic Future in the Amazon and the Andean Region,” Council on Social?,” Politize, July 12, 2017, https://www.politize.com.br/luz-pa- Hemispheric Affairs, September 28, 2015, https://www.coha.org/ ra-todos-programa-social/; and André Luís Alves de Melo, “Programa Luz para deforestation-in-peru-building-a-dramatic-future-in-the-ama- Todos? A face oculta de uma Justiça desviada e os sítios recreio,” zon-and-the-andean-region/. Associação Nacional dos Membros do Ministério Público (CONAMP), 234. Martin Raiser et al., Back to Planning: How to Close Brazil’s In- November 25, 2014, https://www.conamp.org.br/pt/biblioteca/arti- frastructure Gap in Times of Austerity (Washington, DC: World Bank gos/item/419-programa-luz-para-todos-a-face-oculta-de-uma-jus- Group, July 12, 2017), Report no 117392-BR, http://documents1. tica-desviada-e-os-sitios-recreio.html. worldbank.org/curated/en/386151499876913758/pdf/117392-RE- 250. The term quilombolas refers to Afro-Brazilians who descend VISED-PUBLIC-Back-to-Planning-How-to-Close-Brazil-s-Infrastruc- from Afro-Brazilian slaves. Their ancestors established quilombos, or ture-Gap-in-Times-of-Austerity-with-cover-page.pdf. rural settlements that were built by escaped slaves. The quilombo- 235. Marc Dourojeanni, Alberto Barandiarán, and Diego Dou- las population today in Brazil is estimated to be 2,962. See more at: rojeanni, Amazonía Peruana en 2021 (Lima: ProNaturaleza, Sue Branford and Maurício Torres, “Brazilian Supreme Court Ruling 2009), https://www.academia.edu/33362223/Amazonia-Perua- Protects Quilombola Land Rights for Now,” Mongabay Environmen- na-en-2021-Marc-Dourojeanni.pdf. tal News, February 13, 2018, https://news.mongabay.com/2018/02/ 236. 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Kowler, “REDD+ Aline Ribas et al., “The Power of Light: Socio-Economic and Envi- in Peru: The National Context,” CIFOR, https://www.cifor.org/redd- ronmental Implications of a Rural Electrification Program in Brazil,” case-book/case-reports/peru/; and Dan Collyns, “Peru Passes Law Environmental Research Letters 12, no. 9 (August 2017), https://iop- Allowing Roads through Pristine Amazon Rainforest,” The Guard- science.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa7bdd/pdf. ian, January 22, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/ 253. Gualteros Velasquez Diego Gerardo, “Cobertura saneamiento jan/22/peru-passes-law-allowing-roads-through-pristine-ama- básico en municipios de Colombia,” ArcGIS StoryMaps, October 15, zon-rainforest. 2019, https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/22886ec822944d24a- 239. “Buena vía, mala vida,” Connectas, https://www.connectas. 61065fae61ed4f4. org/especiales/amazonas/es/vias3.html. 254. DANE, “Estadísticas vitales nacimientos y defunciones.” 240. 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Programa de Parcerias de Investimentos, “Ferrovia EF-170 – road%20is%20built%20escapes%20government%20control%20 MT/PA – Ferrogrão,” Government of Brazil, https://www.ppi.gov.br/ as%20squatters%20and%20others%20move%20into%20the%20 ef-170-mt-pa-ferrograo. newly%20accessible%20areas&pg=PA420#v=onepage&q=The%20 261. Departamento Nacional de Planeación, “Pacto Región Ama- decision%20to%20build%20a%20major%20road%20in%20Bra- zonía: Desarrollo Sostenible Por Una Amazonía Viva,” Government zil%20is%20determined%20by%20the%20government,%20 of Colombia, https://www.dnp.gov.co/DNPN/Plan-Nacional-de-De- whereas%20much%20of%20what%20occurs%20after%20the%20 sarrollo/Paginas/Pactos-Regionales/Regi%C3%B3n-Amazonia/De- road%20is%20built%20escapes%20government%20control%20 sarrollo-sostenible-por-una-Amazonia-viva.aspx. as%20squatters%20and%20others%20move%20into%20the%20 262. 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Minister Close to Dam Project,” Reuters, March 9, 2018, https://www. 298. Margaret Myers et al., China and the Amazon: Toward a reuters.com/article/us-brazil-corruption/brazil-corruption-probe-tar- Framework for Maximizing Benefits and Mitigating Risks of Infra- gets-firms-former-minister-close-to-dam-project-idUSKCN1GL1CE; structure Development (Washington, DC: The Dialogue, May 2019), Tiffany Higgins, “Belo Monte Boondoggle: Brazil’s Biggest, Costliest https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Chi- Dam May Be Unviable,” Mongabay Environmental News, January 17, na-and-the-Amazon.pdf. 2020, https://news.mongabay.com/2020/01/belo-monte-boondog- 299. Jimena Galindo, “Peru to Join China’s Belt and Road Initia- gle-brazils-biggest-costliest-dam-may-be-unviable/. tive,” Global Americans, May 1, 2019, https://theglobalamericans. 283. 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Simon Romero, “Swallowing Rain Forest, Cities Surge in Am- com/2019/10/18/opinion/china-brazil-amazon.html. azon,” New York Times, November 24, 2012, https://www.nytimes. 304. Melissa Chan and Heriberto Araújo, “China Wants Food. Brazil

72 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon Pays the Price,” The Atlantic, February 15, 2020, https://www.theat- in Colombia.” lantic.com/international/archive/2020/02/china-brazil-amazon-en- 319. Ismael Nobre and Carlos A. Nobre, “The Amazonia Third Way vironment-pork/606601/. Initiative: The Role of Technology to Unveil the Potential of a Novel 305. Myers et al., China and the Amazon. Tropical Biodiversity-Based Economy,” IntechOpen, November 5, 306. Ibid. 2018, https://www.intechopen.com/books/land-use-assessing-the- 307.The OECD and Brazil: A Mutually Beneficial Relationship,” past-envisioning-the-future/the-amazonia-third-way-initiative-the- OECD, https://www.oecd.org/latin-america/countries/brazil/; role-of-technology-to-unveil-the-potential-of-a-novel-tropical. and “Peru FA Min meets with OECD representative,” Peru News 320. Frank Rijsberman, “This is What You Need to Know about the Agency, September 10, 2019, https://andina.pe/ingles/noticia-pe- Bioeconomy,” World Economic Forum, April 26, 2018, https://www. ru-fa-min-meets-with-oecd-representative-766092.aspx. weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/can-a-nature-based-economy-help- 308. Gabriela Lecaro Calle, “The Question of Latin America and us-drive-green-growth. OECD Membership,” Global Risk Insights, August 6, 2016, https:// 321. “Carlos Nobre Talking about the Amazonia Third Way,” YouTube globalriskinsights.com/2016/08/oecd-membership-question-not/; video, posted by Stockholm Resilience Centre TV, February 16, 2019, “Do Latin American Members Benefit from the OECD?” The Dialogue, 32:30, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WwgtRdTjJE0. April 5, 2019, https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/do-latin-ameri- 322. Ismael Nobre and Carlos A. Nobre, “The Amazonia Third Way can-members-benefit-from-the-oecd/; and Angel Gurría, “Launch Initiative: The Role of Technology to Unveil the Potential of a Novel of Colombia’s Accession Process to the OECD,” OECD, October 25, Tropical Biodiversity-Based Economy”; Eliane Fonseca, “Carlos No- 2013, http://www.oecd.org/colombia/launch-of-colombia-acces- bre apresenta o conceito da Terceira Via/Amazônia 4.0 em palestra sion-process-to-oecd.htm. na Unicamp,” Unicamp, September 27, 2019, https://www.unicamp. 309. “The OECD and Colombia: A Mutually Beneficial Relationship,” br/unicamp/noticias/2019/09/27/carlos-nobre-apresenta-o-con- OECD, https://www.oecd.org/latin-america/countries/colombia/. ceito-da-terceira-viaamazonia-40-em-palestra-na. 310. Lorenzo Morales, “Peace and Environmental Protection in Co- 323. “AJE is Named ‘Conservation Ally’ for its Line of Natural lombia,” The Dialogue, January 2017, https://www.thedialogue.org/ Drinks,” Peru Retail, October 15, 2019, https://www.peru-retail.com/ analysis/peace-and-environmental-protection-in-colombia-pro- aje-nombrado-aliado-conservacion-linea-bebidas/. posals-for-sustainable-rural-development/. 324. Kempson Cabral, “Empresas e desenvolvimento sustentável na 311. OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Offi- Amazônia.” cials in International Business Transactions (Paris: OECD, 1997), http:// 325. Ismael Nobre and Carlos Nobre, “‘Amazon 4.0’ Project: Defining www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf. a Third Way for the Amazon,” Medium – Fundação FHC, September 312. Maria Fenanda Lizcano, “Criminal Mafias Take over Colombian 25, 2019, https://medium.com/fundação-fhc/amazon-4-0-project- Forests,” Mongabay Environmental News, September 7, 2018, https:// defining-a-third-path-for-the-amazon-f0412305f066. news.mongabay.com/2018/09/criminal-mafias-take-over-colombi- 326. Mack Bhatia, “Green, Social and Sustainability Bonds Ex- an-forests/. plained,” Sustainalytics, https://www.sustainalytics.com/sustain- 313. Schwarz, “Gold Mining Leaves Heart of Peruvian Amazon a able-finance/2019/03/19/green-social-and-sustainability-bonds/; Wasteland.” and Joe Rowley, “EXCLUSIVE: Brazil Looks to Green Bonds to 314. Villa and Finder, “MAAP #104: Major Reduction in Illegal Gold Reduce Amazon Deforestation,” Latin Finance, June 22, 2020, Mining from Peru’s Operation Mercury.” https://www.latinfinance.com/web-articles/2020/6/exclusive-bra- 315. Barros, “No Maranhão, cada guardião da floresta é um Paulino zil-looks-to-green-bonds-to-reduce-amazon-deforestation. Guajajara.” 327. Gerlak et al., “Dams, Chinese Investments, and EIAs.” 316. Romo, “Tecnología para cazar delitos: monitores indígenas 328. Ray, Gallagher, and Sanborn, Standardizing Sustainable combaten la ilegalidad.” Development? 317. Moreover, in Peru, OSINFOR (Organismo de Supervisión de 329. Gallice, Larrea-Gallegos, and Vázquez-Rowe, “The Threat of los Recursos Forestales y de Fauna Silvestre) is the agency that has Road Expansion in the Peruvian Amazon.” been combatting illegal timber practices. See: Laura Furones, “Pe- 330. Moises Rendon, “Illegal Mining in Venezuela: Death and Dev- ru’s Forest Inspection Agency OSINFOR Regains Its Independence. astation in the Amazonas and Orinoco Regions,” CSIS, CSIS Briefs, But What Next?,” Global Witness (blog), May 8, 2019, https://www. 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74 Sustainable Infrastructure in the Amazon COVER PHOTOS CRIS BOURONCLE/POOL/AFP via Getty Images, TARSO SARRAF/AFP via Getty Images, ELSON ALMEIDA/AFP via Getty Images, CARL DE SOUZA/AFP via Getty Images

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