Independent Task Force Report No. 79 Report Force Task Independent China’s Belt and Road China’s Belt Independent Task Force Report No. 79 China’s Belt and Road March 2021 March Implications for the United States Jacob J. Lew and Gary Roughead, Chairs Jennifer Hillman and David Sacks, Project Directors Independent Task Force Report No. 79 China’s Belt and Road Implications for the United States Jacob J. Lew and Gary Roughead, Chairs Jennifer Hillman and David Sacks, Project Directors The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. 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TASK FORCE MEMBERS Task Force members are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse “the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation.” They par- ticipate in the Task Force in their individual, not institutional, capacities. B. Marc Allen Oriana Skylar Mastro Freeman Spogli Institute for Charlene Barshefsky International Studies, Stanford WilmerHale University Brendan P. Bechtel Daniel H. Rosen Bechtel Group, Inc. Rhodium Group Charles Boustany Jr. Gary Roughead Capitol Counsel, LLC Hoover Institution, Stanford University L. Reginald Brothers Jr. NuWave Solutions David Sacks Council on Foreign Relations Joyce Chang JPMorgan Chase & Co. Nadia Schadlow Hudson Institute Evan A. Feigenbaum Carnegie Endowment for Rajiv J. Shah International Peace Rockefeller Foundation Jennifer Hillman Kristen Silverberg Council on Foreign Relations Business Roundtable Christopher M. Kirchhoff Taiya M. Smith Schmidt Futures Climate Leadership Council Jacob J. Lew Susan A. Thornton Columbia University’s School of Yale Law School International and Public Affairs Ramin Toloui Natalie Lichtenstein Stanford University Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies Macani Toungara Gary Locke Frederick H. Tsai Bellevue College Liferay iii CONTENTS vi Foreword x Acknowledgments 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8 INTRODUCTION 12 Background 17 Implications for the United States 20 FINDINGS 21 Economics 40 Politics 56 Climate Change and Environmental Degradation 62 Security 75 Global Health 82 The U.S. Response to BRI 88 RECOMMENDATIONS 89 Mitigate Economic Risks of BRI 95 Improve U.S. Competitiveness 104 Develop Partnerships and Strengthen Multilateral Organizations to Meet Developing Country Needs 110 Protect U.S. Security Interests in BRI Countries 114 CONCLUSION 116 Endnotes 154 Acronyms 158 Task Force Members 170 Task Force Observers 175 Contributing CFR Staff v FOREWORD Faced with a China that is more repressive at home and more assertive abroad, there is bipartisan support in the United States for a tougher approach to China. This is likely to endure for the foreseeable future. There are, however, competing views regarding China’s ultimate goals and intentions. To some, China is a revisionist power seeking to displace the United States and build a Sinocentric world order and therefore should be countered at every step. Others assess China’s goal as establishing its primacy throughout the Asia-Pacific, while to some China has more limited objectives, largely confined to extending the government’s writ to all territory (including Taiwan) it sees as Chinese. Studying China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is critical to understanding Beijing’s intentions and capabilities. BRI is Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy endeavor and the largest ever global infrastructure undertaking, far surpassing the Marshall Plan. Under the auspices of BRI, Chinese banks and companies have devoted billions of dollars to funding and building roads, power plants, railways, ports, and telecommunications infrastructure in dozens of countries. To some analysts, BRI is China’s primary conduit for pursuing global domination. This Task Force, however, argues that China pursued BRI primarily to address a number of domestic issues, such as closing the gap between the country’s affluent coastal cities and its impoverished interior, absorbing excess manufacturing capacity, putting its accumulated savings to use, and securing inputs for its manufacturing sector. Much of Chinese foreign policy is animated by a drive to bolster domestic political stability, which in turn relies on steady economic growth, and BRI is no exception. vi Foreword Although BRI constitutes a prominent element of Chinese foreign policy, the initiative remains remarkably opaque. BRI has no central governing institution. China has not published a master list of BRI projects, the terms of which are often negotiated behind closed doors and kept secret. When projects run into trouble, Beijing often pressures countries to keep all renegotiations private. This Task Force has done much to peel back the curtain, analyzing what is known about BRI and piecing together a comprehensive view of the initiative. The Task Force finds that BRI worryingly adds to countries’ debt burdens, locks countries into carbon-intensive futures, tilts the playing field in major markets toward Chinese companies, and draws countries into tighter economic and political relationships with Beijing. It concludes that “the risks for both the United States and recipient countries raised by BRI’s implementation considerably outweigh its benefits.” The Task Force assesses that BRI poses a significant challenge to U.S. interests, as it has the potential to displace American companies from BRI countries, set technical standards that are incompatible with U.S. products, push countries to politically align with China, and pressure countries to withhold access to U.S. forces during a potential crisis. The Task Force also looks at how the COVID-19 pandemic is reshaping BRI, providing one of the first comprehensive analyses of BRI in a COVID and post-COVID world. The Task Force argues that the pandemic “has revealed the flaws of China’s BRI model, forcing a reckoning with concerns that many BRI projects are not economically viable and elevating questions of debt sustainability.” BRI is likely to emerge from the pandemic as a more slimmed-down, cost-effective, and technology-focused undertaking, but it is not going away. Foreword vii The pandemic has made