2021 China Transparency Report
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The People's Liberation Army
January 5, 2021 China Primer: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Overview sovereignty) as the “operational target” of military The two-million-strong People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is preparations since 1993. China’s defense planners anticipate the military arm of the People’s Republic of China’s that a military confrontation over Taiwan could involve (PRC’s) ruling Communist Party. The Trump “powerful enemy interference,” an apparent reference to the Administration identified strategic competition with China United States. China also has sought military capabilities to and Russia as “the primary concern in U.S. national dominate its maritime periphery and to support foreign security” in 2018 and U.S. defense officials have since said policy and economic initiatives globally. that China is the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) top priority. According to a 2020 DOD report, the PLA has PLA Modernization and Key Capabilities “already achieved parity with—or even exceeded—the Since 1978, China has engaged in a sustained and broad United States” in several areas in which it has focused its effort to transform the PLA from an infantry-heavy, low- military modernization efforts and is strengthening its technology, ground forces-centric force into a leaner, more ability to “counter an intervention by an adversary in the networked, high-technology force with an emphasis on joint Indo-Pacific region and project power globally.” See also operations and power projection. In 2015 and 2016, Xi IF11712 on U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relations. publicly launched the most ambitious reform and reorganization of the PLA since the 1950s. -
Blue Dots Red Roads
JULY 2020 Blue Dots AND Red Roads Frictions and the Potential for Limited Cooperation Between Chinese and U.S. International Development Models AUTHORS Matt Geraci Asiana Cooper Mengze Li JULY 2020 Blue Dots and Red Roads Frictions and the Potential for Limited Cooperation Between Chinese and U.S. International Development Models AUTHORS Matt Geraci Asiana Cooper Mengze Li I About ICAS The Institute for China-America Studies is an independent think tank funded by the Hainan Freeport Research Foundation in China. Based in the heart of Washington D.C. ICAS is uniquely situated to facilitate the exchange of ideas and people between China and the United States. We achieve this through research and partnerships with institutions and scholars in both countries, in order to provide a window into their respective worldviews. ICAS focuses on key issue areas in the U.S.-China relationship in need of greater mutual understanding. We identify promising areas for strengthening bilateral cooperation in the spheres of maritime security, Asia-Pacific economics, trade, strategic stability, international relations as well as global governance issues, and explore avenues for improving this critical bilateral relationship. ICAS is a 501(c)3 nonprofit organization. ICAS takes no institutional positions on policy issues. The views expressed in this document are those of the author(s) alone. © 2020 by the Institute for China-America Studies. All rights reserved. Institute for China-America Studies 1919 M St. NW Suite 310 Washington, DC 20036 202 290 3087 | www.chinaus-icas.org -
2010 IEEE International Conference on Emergency Management and Management Sciences (ICEMMS 2010)
2010 IEEE International Conference on Emergency Management and Management Sciences (ICEMMS 2010) Beijing, China 8 – 10 August 2010 IEEE Catalog Number: CFP1033J-PRT ISBN: 978-1-4244-6064-9 TABLE OF CONTENTS SESSION 1 001-E002 THE STUDY ON LABOR-INTENSIVE SERVICE ENTERPRISES VIRTUAL 1 OPERATING STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL SYSTEM ESTABLISHMENT BASED ON VALUE CHAIN Kang Jian 002-E010 GREY HIERARCHY COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION OF INDUSTRIAL 5 CLUSTER’S INNOVATIVE POWER Zhao Qiang, Peng Wuliang 003-E021 COORDINATION OF PRICE DISCOUNT AND SALES PROMOTION IN A 9 TWO-LEVEL SUPPLY CHAIN SYSTEM Lu Yali, Li Zhanguo 004-E043 LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT RISK EARLY-WARNING SYSTEM AND 13 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS Kao Yanming, Ding Hongfu, Brima Turay 005-E051 THE RISK OF INDUSTRIAL CLUSTER NETWORK STRUCTURE BASED 16 ON LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS Wang Weidong 006-E052 STUDY ON MODULARIZED SYNTHETIC CULTIVATION SYSTEM OF 20 TECHNOLOGY ENTREPRENEURSHIP EDUCATION THAT CONNECTS INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL NETWORKS Xiaoqing Fan, Yu Qi, Fan Gao 007-E056 CONDITIONAL VALUE-AT-RISK IN A NEWSVENDOR MODEL WITH 25 UNDERAGE LOSS AND OVERAGE PENALTY Weimin Ma, Ningfang Dong, Yingying Wang 008-E058 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM OF 29 TROUBLESHOOTING OF COAL MINE Zhao Zuopeng, Yin Zhimin, Liu Yun, Yu Jingcun 009-E059 COMMERCIAL BANK CUSTOMER EVALUATION MODEL RESEARCH 33 BASED ON MULTI-VIEW Bing Li, Fangyu Ai, Rui Zhu, Yuwang Long 010-E060 EQUITABLE RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM WITH MULTIPLE 37 DEPOTS IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT JianmingZhu,JunHuang,DegangLiu SESSION -
Commission on the National Guard and Reserves 2521 S
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 2521 S. CLARK STREET, SUITE 650 ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202 ARNOLD L. PUNARO The Honorable Carl Levin The Honorable John McCain CHAIRMAN Chairman, Committee Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services on Armed Services WILLIAM L. BALL, III United States Senate United States Senate Washington, DC 20510 Washington, DC 20510 LES BROWNLEE RHETT B. DAwsON The Honorable Ike Skelton The Honorable Duncan Hunter Chairman, Committee Ranking Member, Committee LARRY K. ECKLES on Armed Services on Armed Services United States House of United States House of PATRICIA L. LEWIS Representatives Representatives Washington, DC 20515 Washington, DC 20515 DAN MCKINNON WADE ROWLEY January 31, 2008 JAMES E. SHERRARD III Dear Chairmen and Ranking Members: DONALD L. STOCKTON The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves is pleased to submit to E. GORDON STUMP you its final report as required by Public Law 108-375, the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (as amended by J. STANTON THOMpsON Public Law 109-163). As you know, Congress chartered this Commission to assess the reserve component of the U.S. military and to recommend changes to ensure that the National Guard and other reserve components are organized, trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to best meet the needs of U.S. national security. The Commission’s first interim report, containing initial findings and the description of a strategic plan to complete our work, was delivered on June 5, 2006. The second interim report, delivered on March 1, 2007, was required by Public Law 109-364, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, enacted on October 17, 2006. -
Minister for Education; Tourism
fiLSZ 1%1 Minister for Education; Tourism VIif/111/11`,1P1117: lIdril INIIf 1 of 44o. fif,I AP- A,Penif,ly 1 1 I 11 it 100'3 hl,,,tin In Of ho d 11 91Ucr Hon Colin Barnett MLA Premier 24th Floor, Governor Stirling Tower, 197 St Georges Terrace PERTH WA 6000 Dear Premier Please find attached my report on my travel to Hong Kong and China from 18 April to 26 April 2009. As you know, the purpose of my trip was to lead a delegation of Vice Chancellors from Perth's four public universities to promote Western Australia's higher education credentials. I believe we successfully opened doors at government level to help promote access and linkages for the State's universities, while alsostrengthening other important government relationships, particularly in our Sister State of Zhejiang. Yours sincerely Dr abeth Constable MLA Minister for Education and Tourism 1 0 JUN 2009 Level 19, Governor Stirling Tower, 197 St Georges Terrace, PerthWestern Australia 6000 Phone: +61 8 9222 9699Facsimile:+61 8 9222 9288 Email: Minister,Constable©dpc.wagov.au MINISTER CONSTABLE'S VISIT TO CHINA 18 APRIL TO 26 APRIL 2009 From April 18 to 26 April 2009, I led a delegation representing the four Western Australian public universities to Guangzhou, Shanghai, Beijing and Hangzhou and involving tourism contacts in Hong Kong and Shanghai. The main objectives of the delegation were: 1. To strengthen important government relationships, including our Sister-State relationship with Zhejiang Province, and to open doors at government level to help promote access and linkages for the State's universities. -
Answer: Maoism Is a Form of Communism Developed by Mao Tse Tung
Ques 1: What is Maoism? Answer: Maoism is a form of communism developed by Mao Tse Tung. It is a doctrine to capture State power through a combination of armed insurgency, mass mobilization and strategic alliances. The Maoists also use propaganda and disinformation against State institutions as other components of their insurgency doctrine. Mao called this process, the ‘Protracted Peoples War’, where the emphasis is on ‘military line’ to capture power. Ques 2: What is the central theme of Maoist ideology? Answer: The central theme of Maoist ideology is the use of violence and armed insurrection as a means to capture State power. ‘Bearing of arms is non-negotiable’ as per the Maoist insurgency doctrine. The maoist ideology glorifies violence and the ‘Peoples Liberation Guerrilla Army’ (PLGA) cadres are trained specifically in the worst forms of violence to evoke terror among the population under their domination. However, they also use the subterfuge of mobilizing people over issues of purported inadequacies of the existing system, so that they can be indoctrinated to take recourse to violence as the only means of redressal. Ques 3: Who are the Indian Maoists? Answer: The largest and the most violent Maoist formation in India is the Communist Party of India (Maoist). The CPI (Maoist) is an amalgamation of many splinter groups, which culminated in the merger of two largest Maoist groups in 2004; the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), People War and the Maoist Communist Centre of India. The CPI (Maoist) and all its front organizations formations have been included in the list of banned terrorist organizations under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. -
The Experiences of China's Agricultural Extension
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC Global Programme Food Security Stefanie Kaegi 20.05.2015 The experiences of China’s agricultural extension system in reaching a large number of farmers with rural advisory services Background paper to the SDC face-to-face workshop “Reaching the Millions!” in Hanoi, March 2015 A+FS Network www.sdc-foodsecurity.ch With family farmers towards a world without hunger Innovation in country RAS systems - China 2 ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..…………. Summary This desk study analyses the Chinese rural advisory service (RAS) system with the goal to derive learning from its successes and challenges in reaching millions of farmers in a poverty oriented, ecological, and sustainable way. The study provides a description of the public extension system, and analyses a range of private and civil society RAS providers, which are representative for ongoing RAS initiatives throughout the country. Cornerstones of the Chinese RAS system The agricultural sector - The agricultural sector contributes 10% to the national GDP - 300 million persons, respectively 20% of the Chinese population are farmers - The average farm size is 0.6 ha, most of it is private land - Since 1980, the country’s grain production increased four times and reached over 500 million t / year. - China is among the countries with the highest fertiliser use / area The worlds’ largest system public extension system - In 2006, 787,000 extension workers provided services to 637,000 villages. (one extension staff per 283 farm households) (Hu: 2012) - Public extension is offered in every county and township of the country, irrespective of how remote they are (Binswanger: 2012) - Large number of public private partnerships (PPP) at county level, mainly for the sales of inputs, The rational of PPPs is to complement public finances for RAS and to increase the outreach of private input providers. -
The China Coast Guard: Shifting from Civilian to Military Control in the Era
FEATURE The China Coast Guard Shifting from Civilian to Military Control in the Era of Regional Uncertainty ULISES GRANADOS Abstract As part of the restructuring of state organizations announced in March 2018, it is known that the China Coast Guard (CCG), previously controlled by the State Oceanic Administration, is coming under the administration of the People’s Armed Police (PAP) from the Central Military Commission (CMC). As a para- digmatic shift from a joint civilian–military control (State Council–CMC) to a purely military one, the reorganization of the CCG, only five years from the latest reshuffling, seems to reveal an the party’s increasing control over the military as outlined in the September 2017 CCP Central Committee and also the intention by the Chinese central government to provide the CCG with more flexibility and authority to act decisively in disputed waters in the East and South China Seas if needed. This article inquiries into the causes, logic, and likely regional conse- quences of such a decision. Amid the upgrading of insular features in the Spratlys, the deployment of bombers in the Paracels, and overall modernization of China’s naval capabilities, the article also explores plausible developments in which the PAP- led CCG, irregular maritime militias, and People’s Liberation Army Navy forces might coordinate more effectively efforts to safeguard self-proclaimed rights in littoral and blue- water areas in dispute. Introduction During the last eight years, East China Sea (ECS) and South China Sea (SCS) waters have been the setting of increased Chinese civil and naval activity that have altered the balance of power among Northeast Asian and Southeast Asian states, trying to cope with a more robust projection of Chinese maritime power. -
Reach, Implications, Consequences
MAPPING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE REACH, IMPLICATIONS, CONSEQUENCES EDITORS Harsh V Pant and Premesha Saha Introduction © 2021 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from ORF. Attribution: Harsh V Pant and Premesha Saha (Editors), Mapping the Belt and Road Initiative: Reach, Implications, Consequences, February 2021, Observer Research Foundation. Observer Research Foundation 20 Rouse Avenue, Institutional Area New Delhi 110002 India [email protected] www.orfonline.org ORF provides non-partisan, independent analyses and inputs on matters of security, strategy, economy, 2 development, energy and global governance to diverse decision makers (governments, business communities, academia and civil society). ORF’s mandate is to conduct in-depth research, provide inclusive platforms, and invest in tomorrow’s thought leaders today. Editing and Production: Vinia Datinguinoo Mukherjee Design and layout: Rahil Miya Shaikh ISBN: 978-93-90494-37-8 Contents Introduction INTRODUCTION 5 Harsh V Pant and Premesha Saha SECTION 1 PIVOTAL GEOGRAPHIES: PROJECTS, PROGRESS, AND THE CHALLENGES SOUTH ASIA CPEC: Building a Path For 9 Pakistan’s Financial Ruin Kriti M Shah BRI & Afghanistan: Systemic Challenges Impede 13 Integration Shubhangi Pandey Bangladesh: Riding the BRI Tide 20 Joyeeta Bhattacharjee The BRI Quandary in Nepal and Sri Lanka 24 Sohini Nayak SOUTHEAST ASIA AND OCEANIA 3 Myanmar and Thailand: A Cautious Approach -
Foresight Hindsight
Hindsight, Foresight ThinkingI Aboutnsight, Security in the Indo-Pacific EDITED BY ALEXANDER L. VUVING DANIEL K. INOUYE ASIA-PACIFIC CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES HINDSIGHT, INSIGHT, FORESIGHT HINDSIGHT, INSIGHT, FORESIGHT Thinking About Security in the Indo-Pacific Edited by Alexander L. Vuving Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking About Security in the Indo-Pacific Published in September 2020 by the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2058 Maluhia Rd, Honolulu, HI 96815 (www.apcss.org) For reprint permissions, contact the editors via [email protected] Printed in the United States of America Cover Design by Nelson Gaspar and Debra Castro Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Name: Alexander L. Vuving, editor Title: Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking About Security in the Indo-Pacific / Vuving, Alexander L., editor Subjects: International Relations; Security, International---Indo-Pacific Region; Geopolitics---Indo-Pacific Region; Indo-Pacific Region JZ1242 .H563 2020 ISBN: 978-0-9773246-6-8 The Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies is a U.S. Depart- ment of Defense executive education institution that addresses regional and global security issues, inviting military and civilian representatives of the United States and Indo-Pacific nations to its comprehensive program of resident courses and workshops, both in Hawaii and throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Through these events the Center provides a focal point where military, policy-makers, and civil society can gather to educate each other on regional issues, connect with a network of committed individuals, and empower themselves to enact cooperative solutions to the region’s security challenges. -
LE 19Ème CONGRÈS DU PARTI COMMUNISTE CHINOIS
PROGRAMME ASIE LE 19ème CONGRÈS DU PARTI COMMUNISTE CHINOIS : CLÔTURE SUR L’ANCIEN RÉGIME ET OUVERTURE DE LA CHINE DE XI JINPING Par Alex PAYETTE STAGIAIRE POSTDOCTORAL POUR LE CONSEIL CANADIEN DE RECHERCHES EN SCIENCES HUMAINES CHERCHEUR À L’IRIS JUIN 2017 ASIA FOCUS #46 l’IRIS ASIA FOCUS #46 - PROGRAMME ASIE / Octobre 2017 e 19e Congrès qui s’ouvrira en octobre prochain, soit quelques semaines avant la visite de Donald Trump en Chine, promet de consolider la position de Xi Jinping dans l’arène politique. Travaillant d’arrache-pied depuis 2013 à se débarrasser L principalement des alliés de Jiang Zemin, l’alliance Xi-Wang a enfin réussi à purger le Parti-État afin de positionner ses alliés. Ce faisant, la transition qui aura vraiment lieu cet automne n’est pas la transition Hu Jintao- Xi Jinping, celle-ci date déjà de 2012. La transition de 2017 est celle de la Chine des années 1990 à la Chine des années 2010, soitde la Chine de Jiang Zemin à celle de Xi Jinping. Ce sera également le début de l’ère des enfants de la révolution culturelle, des « zhiqing » [知青] (jeunesses envoyées en campagne), qui formeront une majorité au sein du Politburo et qui remanieront la Chine à leur manière. Avec les départs annoncés, Xi pourra enfin former son « bandi » [班底] – garde rapprochée – au sein du Politburo et effectivement mettre en place un agenda de politiques et non pas simplement des mesures visant à faire le ménage au cœur du Parti-État. Des 24 individus restants, entre 12 et 16 devront partir; 121 sièges (si l’on compte le siège rendu vacant de Sun Zhengcai) et 16 si Xi Jinping décide d’appliquer plus « sévèrement » la limite d’âge maintenant à 68 ans. -
Navigating Great Power Competition in Southeast Asia JONATHAN STROMSETH
THE NEW GEOPOLITICS APRIL 2020 ASIA BEYOND BINARY CHOICES? Navigating great power competition in Southeast Asia JONATHAN STROMSETH TRILATERAL DIALOGUE ON SOUTHEAST ASIA: ASEAN, AUSTRALIA, AND THE UNITED STATES BEYOND BINARY CHOICES? Navigating great power competition in Southeast Asia JONATHAN STROMSETH EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Brookings Institution has launched a new trilateral initiative with experts from Southeast Asia, Australia, and the United States to examine regional trends in Southeast Asia in the context of escalating U.S.-China rivalry and China’s dramatic rise. The initiative not only focuses on security trends in the region, but covers economic and governance developments as well. This report summarizes the main findings and policy recommendations discussed at an inaugural trilateral dialogue, convened in Singapore in late 2019 in partnership with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and the Lowy Institute. A key theme running throughout the dialogue was how the region can move beyond a binary choice between the United States and China. In this connection, Southeast Asian countries could work with middle powers like Australia and Japan (admittedly a major power in economic terms) to expand middle-power agency and reduce the need for an all-or-nothing choice. Yet, there was little agreement on the feasibility of such collective action as well as doubts about whether the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has the capacity to create independent strategic space as U.S.- China competition continues to grow. Southeast Asian participants noted that Beijing has successfully leveraged its signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to expand its soft-power in the region, to the detriment of U.S.