2021 China Transparency Report

Edited by Walter Lohman and Justin Rhee  Report 2021 China 2021 China Edited by Walter Lohman and Justin Rhee and Justin Lohman Walter by Edited Transparency Transparency  Cover Photo: Feature China/BarcroftMedia viaGetty Images Printed intheUnitedStatesofAmerica. © 2021by TheHeritage Foundation (202) 546-4400|heritage.org 214 Massachusetts Ave., NE ISBN: 978-0-89195-304-3 Washington, DC20002 All rightsreserved.  1 v 5 ix 27 87 67 vii 51 21 75 93 59 35 43 83 101 105 121 113 119 ......

CONTENTS ...... JAMES JAY CARAFANO, PHD CARAFANO, JAY JAMES ...... BRENT D. SADLER DAVID FEITH AND LARA D. CROUCH FREDERICO BARTELSFREDERICO COLLIN KOH COLLIN CHAD WOLF and JOSHUA MESERVEY JOSHUA and Africa May Offer an EspeciallyValuable Trove Creating Some Clarity on the PLA Budget Commanding Depths: China’s Bid Dominate to the Cloud—Under the Sea China Considers Big Data a Fundamental Strategic Resource, Chinese Influence on and Exploitation of U.S. Colleges and Universities The Future of China’s Maritime Militia in the “New Situation”: A Primer The South China Sea: 21st-Century Fulda Gap for Major in War Asia Economy Politics and Law Endnotes Energy and Environment Methodology Human Rights Human Preface Military Executive Summary Executive Influence Operations Influence Introduction Contributors Outbound Investments Outbound Acknowledgements Topical Essays Technology   v Contributors The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The is Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, where he specializes in China’s military in China’s he specializes where Center, in the Asian Studies Fellow Dean Cheng is Senior Research and foreign policy. and foreign Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation. The at Policy, and Foreign Security is Director of the Asian Studies Center, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National National for Institute Cullom Davis and Shelby of the Kathryn Center, of the Asian Studies is Director Lohman Walter is Program Coordinator in the Asian Studies Center, where he manages the China Transparency Project. the China Transparency he manages where Center, in the Asian Studies Coordinator Rhee is Program Justin   vii June 2021 Walter Lohman Walter Washington, DC Washington, Senior editor William T. Poole and senior Poole Senior editor William T. Kay C. James, president of The Heritage president of The Heritage James, C. Kay We would also like to express our apprecia- would also like We for our ongoing work. China Transparency Report readers around of China Transparency ducing this product. designer Melissa Bluey designed the cover. designer Melissa employ, and manager of data graphics John and manager of data graphics John employ, created the wonderful charts and graphs cialist, and great source of encouragement in pro- a key role in keeping the production on schedule. role in keeping a key and for preparing content for the website. Senior Senior designer and web developer Jay Simon was Simon was Jay Senior designer and web developer tion to all of you who are paying close attention close attention tion to all of you who are paying to this report. The support and encouragement as a major source of inspiration the world serve that appear throughout the report. Therese that appear throughout the report. research editor Karina Rollins bear primary research editor Karina responsibility for perfecting the language we of the report, responsible for the design and layout Foundation, has been an enthusiastic supporter has been an enthusiastic Foundation, Fleming and Luke Karnick, data graphics spe- Karnick, Fleming and Luke played Editors, director of Research Pennefather, - The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The Acknowledgements of great effort by many people to make this people to make by many of great effort China Transparency Report is the product he China Transparency We would also like to express our gratitude to non- would also like We Various Heritage foreign policy Heritage experts were Various Justin Rhee, program coordinator for the Asian Rhee, program coordinator Justin for National Security and Foreign Policy, provided provided Policy, for National Security and Foreign provided important production support. provided significant research and quality control. Asian professionals to make this report a reality. Senior this report a reality. professionals to make provided the data, research, graphics, design, edit- the data, research, graphics, provided guidance and assistance throughout the process. guidance and assistance guiding production of the report. He worked with worked guiding production of the report. He our gratitude to the various individuals that have that have our gratitude to the various individuals essays, as well as recognize the invaluable contribu as well as recognize the invaluable essays, the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute Institute Cullom Davis and Shelby the Kathryn Studies Center interns Hannah So and Luke Kim Studies Center interns Hannah So and Luke Studies Center, shouldered the major task of Studies Center, the authors, editors, and graphics and production editors, the authors, type of publication possible. We wish to express type of publication possible. We the experts who responded to our survey. tions from Nicolas Loris (formerly at Heritage), Andytions from Nicolas Loris (formerly at Heritage), instrumental in authoring this report: Dean Cheng, instrumental research fellow Dean Cheng and Justin provided provided Dean Cheng and Justin research fellow ing, and quality control for this report. Helle Dale, Katie Tubb, Jeff Smith, and Olivia Jeff Tubb, Dale, Katie Helle of vice president PhD, Carafano, Jay James Enos. Heritage experts who authored the report’s topical Heritage experts who authored the report’s Keiser, Riley Walters (also formerly at Heritage), and (also formerly at Heritage), Riley Walters Keiser, T   ix - It is not the Chinese people that are at fault; It is not This inaugural release of the 2021 China As China continues its rise, the actions of of As China continues its rise, the actions between the Chinese communist government and government the Chinese communist between blames goes to the communist dictatorship that blames goes to the communist become increasingly aggressive, and in many and in many become increasingly aggressive, free world will solemnly remember the millions of ship in Beijing celebrates the party’s centenary, the centenary, ship in Beijing celebrates the party’s oppresses them and jeopardizes the well-being domestic and foreign activities of the CCP. domestic anniversary of the CCP’s founding. As the leader of the CCP’s anniversary and liberty of nations around the world. Just as the and liberty of nations around the world. Just across the globe. In the American context, U.S.– across the globe. In the American context, leadership in Beijing has The emboldened ago. the Soviet government and the Russian people, government the Soviet the Chinese people. the CCP have greater implications for everyone greater implications for everyone the CCP have the best available open-source information on the available the best innocent lives lost at its hands. lost innocent lives in China’s history. The year 2021 marks the 100th history. in China’s it must take great care to make the distinction the distinction great care to make take it must role in the world. most important issues for decades to come. The important issues for decades to come. The most ways, it is a threat to America, its interests, and its and its interests, it is a threat to America, its ways, China relations will continue to be one of the one of the China relations will continue to be U.S. made a distinction in the Cold War between between in the Cold War made a distinction U.S. U.S. now faces a different China from a decade China from a decade faces a different now U.S. comes at a symbolic point Report comes at a symbolic Transparency Preface The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The he COVID-19 pandemic has been one of the most of devastating global crises of our time. of devastating most But the need for transparency does not stop But the need for transparency stop does not To this end, The Heritage Foundation launched Foundation this end, The Heritage To The Chinese government, under the governance under the governance The Chinese government, for greater official transparency and to shine a data on the CCP. The project provides a window to a window The project provides data on the CCP. economics, and more. economics, greater accountability and transparency from the economic devastation, there are many questions questions there are many economic devastation, get those happens again. But we cannot edy never (CCP), neglected Party of the Chinese Communist and law, human rights, its military, foreign policy, foreign policy, its military, human rights, and law, and much-needed turning point in U.S.–China and much-needed turning point in U.S.–China answers without greater transparency from China, answers the China Transparency Project in 2020 to push those millions of lost lives, the world needs greater lives, those millions of lost - to ensure that such a trag answered be that must insight into what happened. off a chain reaction of calls for It set relations. its duty to the safety of its own people, and to the of its own its duty to the safety of be held accountable, and for the sake must light on dozens of existing private efforts to gather of existing light on dozens with COVID-19. The pandemic was a monumental The pandemic was with COVID-19. world, in its handling of the pandemic. The CCP where the virus originated. CCP, not just in public health issues, but in politics in public health issues, just not CCP, With millions of lives lost and unprecedented lost With millions of lives T  Transparency Projectintendstooffer.Transparency x with China.More andbetter dataandmoreatten- fingertips tocraftthepoliciescriticaldealing fingertips mats, andthosewhoadvisethemneeddataattheir the U.S. cancreatepoliciestokeep theCCPin tion ondatacollectioniswhatHeritage’s China America’s politicalleaders, policymakers, diplo- With greater transparency onChineseissues,With greatertransparency China Transparency Report haps even fortheChinesepeople. a better futureforAmerica,theworld,andper check, toneutralizeitsvariousthreats, andtobuild The HeritageFoundation Kay C.James,President June 2021 -  1 - This report does not limit data to quantitative limit data to quantitative This report does not The report is not a comprehensive review of a comprehensive The report is not Also, while the focus of the report is primarily Also, form of numbers. This is especially the case for cat- form of numbers. policies made today will have consequences for will have policies made today egories. Methodologies and best practices are not practices are not and best Methodologies egories. to a single category. exclusive generations come. As such, it is critical that to create sound policy. or project. The editors seek tracker available every but analysis within the policydriven community, exacerbates the lack of transparency. As continued exacerbates the lack of transparency. on private, non-governmental research, gov on private, non-governmental ernmental agencies in data are instrumental The otherwise, collection as well. Unless stated egories such as human rights, where there simply egories such as human rights, also encourage cat- cross-fertilization between and their methodologies, while pointing to where and their methodologies, Second, the U.S.–China competition and the competition Second, the U.S.–China to raise awareness about ongoingto raise awareness private efforts this report will encourage only more data- not utmost priority, the CCP benefits from repress- priority, utmost ing data that do not fall in line with its narratives. fall in line with its narratives. ing data that do not more research can be done. The editors hope that is not enough numerical data. is not figures or statistics. Data do not always come in the always Data do not statistics. figures or Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control is its Party Chinese Communist U.S. policymakers have access to accurate data to policymakers have U.S. Introduction The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The China Transparency China Transparency he Heritage Foundation’s assesses the current state of China’s of China’s Report assesses the current state Broadly speaking, transparency is important Why is transparency important? The report Why While the editors of the report acknowledge because the Chinese government has a history has a history because the Chinese government for its own purposes. As U.S. policymakers look As U.S. purposes. for its own provide accurate assessments of China’s capabili- accurate assessments of China’s provide private, global organizations and researchers to fill private, global organizations and researchers of withholding, manipulating, and falsifying data data becomes increasingly important. Data help to the Chinese government’s of transparency issues, addresses this question for each of eight categories: addresses this question to address the China challenge, access to reliable expose areas where China poses the greatest ties, and examine where interests, threat to U.S. threats are overstated. some degree have that virtually all governments transparency on eight issues. It does so by ana- does so by It transparency on eight issues. military, (6) outbound investments, (7) politics and outbound investments, (6) military, in the (very wide) gaps using open-source data. in the (very lack of transparency is alarming on two fronts. lack of transparency is alarming on two fronts. law, and (8) technology. law, lyzing the data, or lack thereof, provided by the by lyzing the data, or lack thereof, provided Chinese government, and highlights measures by by and highlights measures Chinese government, First, the nature of the Chinese communist system system the nature of the Chinese communist First, (1) the economy, (2) energy and the environment, energy and the environment, (2) (1) the economy, (5) the (4) influence operations, (3) human rights, T  Heritage Foundation does not claimownership of 2 written by Heritageanalysts andexternal authors: the dataprojectsmentionedinthisreport. egories, thisreportalsofeaturessixtopicalessays l l l

“Chinese InfluenceonandExploitationof U.S. “China ConsidersBigDataaFundamental “Creating SomeClarityonthePLABudget,” African datathatcanhelpChinarefinecriti- This essay analyzesChina’s risinginfluence In additiontoanassessmentoftheeightcat- Institute vicepresident Fellow Secretary ofHome andformerActing - People’s LiberationArmy. Beijing’s ambitiousproject.Chinesecompanies, Colleges andUniversities,”Colleges by HeritageVisiting CCP believes thattechnologicalsuperiorityis vision ofwhattheChineseallocateto valuable opportunity. land Security it isimportanttounderstand how adversaries institutions have madeupfortheinformation international order. Africaislikely akey partof institutions tothesecurityand prosperityofall implausible thatBeijingdeclinestoexploitthis mine Africandata,thisessay arguesthatitis have gainedextraordinary access tovaluable ties. Thus, itisparamounttohave aclearer ties. Given theimportanceofU.S. research Strategic Resource,andAfricaMay Offer an EspeciallyValuable Trove,” by Heritage are buildingtheirmilitariesanditscapabili- available primarydataonthePRC’s military and exploitationofU.S. anduniversi- colleges and biomedicaltechnology. Given Beijing’s and throughthemtheChinesegovernment, gap. Inascenarioofgreatpower competition, expenditures, itsgaps, andhow independent critical toachievingitsmost cherishednational government, andtheeasewithwhichitcan companies’ history ofsharingdatawiththe cal technologies such as artificial intelligence cal technologiessuchasartificialintelligence senior policy analystsenior policy priorities, includingtheupending oftheU.S.-led prioritization ofdataasastrategic asset, its by analyst Heritageseniorpolicy Bartels . Thisessay examinesthecurrent Chad F. Wolf Joshua Meservey James J. Carafano, PhD , andHeritage Davis Frederico . The China Transparency Report . l l

“The Future ofChina’s MaritimeMilitiain “Commanding Depths: China’s BidtoDominate Americans, itiscrucialtohaveon transparency This essay advocates sharpeningU.S. at policy Reef incidentwiththePhilippinespresentsa East AsianandPacific Affairsandiscurrently Networks andother Beijing-backed firms, University inSingapore.Thisessay argues U.S. DeputyAssistant Secretary ofStatefor Chinese maritimemilitia.TherecentWhitsun China cansteal information,divert ormanipu- Chinese government andgovernment-directed wild-catch fisheryandmaricultureactivi- views expressedinthisessayviews areherown and firms, improving coordination acrossthe U.S. late data,cutoffcommunicationsinacrisis, national StudiesatNanyang Technological requires understanding whobuildsandfinances home, keeping U.S. technologyfromChinese unit oftheS. RajaratnamSchoolofInter undersea cables, whichcarrymorethan95 the ‘NewSituation’:APrimer,” by the Cloud—Under theSea,”the Cloud—Under by that, notwithstanding China’s expansioninto ties amplifiesthecontinuedrelevanceof that protecting economicandnationalsecurity States government. Feith andCrouchhighlight and rightsinthearea.Thecombinationof an adjunctfellow attheCenterforNewAmeri- and install subseasurveillance equipment. assess theeffectiveness ofmitigationmeasures. activities inordertobest evaluatetherisksand good caseinpoint. good government andwiththeprivatesector, and of DefenceandStrategicStudies, aconstituent cially intheSouthChinaSearemainsimportant distant-waters fishing,near-seas fishingespe- do not necessarily reflectthose oftheUnited can Security. LaraD. Crouchisacongressional of Beijing’sambitions. ThroughHuawei Marine staffer whofocusesonIndo–Pacific issues. The partners, andother important players. withNATOprioritizing diplomacy allies, Quad percent ofglobaldataflows andareaclearfocus for Beijingtoassertitsmaritimesovereignty Lara D. Crouch PhD . Koh isaresearchfellow attheInstitute . David Feith formerlyserved as David Feith Collin Koh, - and  3 come of any armed conflict with China. armed come of any during the Cold War, this essay argues that the argues essay this Cold War, during the the South China Sea will determine the out- the will determine the South China Sea most notably over Taiwan and in the South and in Taiwan over notably most forces operating and engagednaval in in combat was the case for the Fulda Gap in Germany Germany Gap in Fulda the case for the was China Sea, the Navy has its new Fulda Gap. As Gap. has its new Fulda the Navy China Sea, The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The . Since the end of the Cold . Since the Brent D. Sadler D. Brent fellow fellow - challengecompelling naval to inform invest tensions rise with tragic consequences in Asia, tensions rise with ments in building its future fleet. Today, as Today, its future fleet. ments in building Gap for Major War in Asia,” by Heritage senior Heritage senior by Asia,” in War Gap for Major War, the U.S. Navy has struggled to identify a to identify has struggled Navy the U.S. War, “The South China Sea is the 21st Century Fulda Fulda Century 21st China Sea is the “The South

l   5 - To study the economy of 1.4 billion individuals billion individuals of 1.4 the economy study To There are two problems with measuring China’s There are two problems with measuring China’s Also, while the focus of the report is primarily while the focus of the report Also, broad, macro-level data and trends. One common data and trends. broad, macro-level better assessment of the welfare of China’s econ- assessment of the welfare of China’s better between categories. Methodologies and best prac- and best Methodologies categories. between per capita (or GDP per person) is one-fifth the size spending, and net exports within China. spending, and net gross domestic product (GDP). This includes the gross domestic country has: GDP is an imperfect model that fails A advanced economies. most of those in the world’s GDP per Even requires more inputs than GDP. omy capita is an insufficient measure of the wealth of on private, nongovernmental research, gov on private, nongovernmental in data ernmental agencies are instrumental The otherwise, collection as well. Unless stated total of consumption, investment, government government investment, of consumption, total to fully reflect the welfare of a country. China may China may to fully reflect the welfare of a country. the Chinese people. the projects mentioned in this report. tices are not exclusive to a single issue category. to a single exclusive tices are not have one of the world’s largest GDPs, but its GDP largest GDPs, one of the world’s have in China is a colossal task. It requires default to in China is a colossal is to look at the components of China’s method Economy GDP, however. The first problem is one that every problem is one that every The first however. GDP, Heritage Foundation does not claim ownership of claim ownership does not Foundation Heritage - - The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The Executive Summary Executive he Chinese government has a history of with- has a history he Chinese government data for holding, manipulating, and falsifying The report is not a comprehensive review of a comprehensive The report is not As U.S. policymakers look to address the China As U.S. by private global organizations and researchers by by analyzing the data, or lack thereof, provided by by analyzing the data, or lack thereof, provided by pointing to where it appears more research can be stated. This report addresses this issue for each of stated. every available tracker or project. It is a survey. or project. It is a survey. tracker available every eight categories: (1) the economy, (2) energy and eight categories: (1) the economy, - outbound invest (6) (5) the military, operations, challenge, to reliable data becomes increas- access done. The editors hope that this report will encour assessments of China’s capabilities, expose areas capabilities, assessments of China’s age not only more data-driven analysis within age only more data-driven not the environment, (3) human rights, (4) influence (3) human rights, the environment, to fill in the gaps. the Chinese government and highlights measures and highlights measures the Chinese government the policy community but also cross-fertilization ment, (7) politics and law, and (8) technology. ment, (7) politics and law, ingly important. Data help to provide accurate ingly important. Data help to provide be over and examine where threats may interests, its own purposes. The Heritage Foundation’s China The Heritage Foundation’s purposes. its own while ing private efforts and their methodologies where China poses the greatest threat to U.S. threat to U.S. where China poses the greatest China’s transparency in eight issue areas. It does so transparency in eight issue areas. China’s The editors seek to raise awareness about ongoThe editors seek to raise awareness - assesses the current state of Report assesses the current state Transparency T  But becauseofChina’s lackoftransparency—and 6 Government actionssuchasincreasinginvest- China’s GDP, andincome populationsize,andwage reflect apoorereconomy). TheCCPisknown to release—there hasbeenfartoomuchfocusonits oftheofficialdataitdoes its carefulmanagement in China’s economy willgive analysts abetter information thatisascomprehensive andavail - invest inChina—butthereisfarlessopen-source individuals thatareinvested inorplanningto resources thatareoftenusedby companiesand reliable—trade statistics, forexample,becausethey ment andgovernment spendingcanmake itseem rates; itstravel, retail, andeducation industries; have officiallyundercountedgrowth aswell. trends. Thisignoresmany oftheproblemsChina that onecanusetoanalyzeChina’s economy— the informationcollectedby theNBS. Government the NationalBureauofStatistics: information on tal economy, butmuchofthattoplineinformation analysts arenot economists. Many simplyreflect able. Thefollowing areafewexamplesof the as thoughGDPisincreasingwhencomponents at theprovincial level andatthenationallevel, agencies alsopublishmorein-depthagencies information and more.Provincial government datafeedsinto on thesizeofChineseeconomy andrelated economy isimportantbecausemost publicpolicy open-source resources. others aremore questionable. can becomparedtoother countries’statistics— economic growth isstable, ifnot increasing. can falsifynumberstomake itseemasifChina’s corruptible. Chinesegovernment officials, both ends upbeingpublishedby theNBS, too. While on industries theycover, suchastradeorthedigi- such asconsumption aredecreasing(whichmight strengths andfartoolittle onitsweaknesses. picture oftheworld’s second-largesteconomy. some ofthedatathatNBSpublishesmay bemore faces asanincreasinglyassertive socialist economy. l

An accurateassessmentofthehealthChina’s All sortsofeconomicdatacanbefoundthrough There aresomeprominentfor-pay resources The secondproblemisthatGDPaccounting MacroPolo: “China’s Debt Hangover” Understanding thestrengths and weaknesses 1 China Transparency Report Transparency from theChineseGovernment: 4outof10 Overall Transparency: 5outof10 l l l

“Trade andInvestment” “Best-Performing CitiesChina” There isalsoasevere lackof reliable data from The data provided by theChinesegovernment One research area that could have themost Official data on SOEslacks basicfirm-level sta- Chinese government isfairly transparent with Mercator Institute forChinaStudies: Milken Institute: China Power Project Center forStrategicandInternationalStudies: government’s subsidiesandChina’s GDP. With government control over ChineseSOEs and gaps indata, especiallyonthenature ofthe efficiency ofan economy isbasedonwhat is economy actually is.Generally speaking,the owned enterprises (SOEs) andbusinesses. on itseconomy hassignificant gaps. While the significant impact ishow efficient China’s spending anddebt,asthisarea oftransparency spending, thecentral government seemsmore and technology. Measuringwhat isactually aggregate GDPfigures. that said,theseefforts have notbeenable to the Chinesegovernment onsubsidiesand transparent thanlocalgovernments. Local debt tistics. When itcomes to debtandgovernment the government control over Chinesestate- there isalackofinformation onthenature of data onconsumption, wages, andemployment, Private efforts have helpedfilledsomeofthe is more complicated, andmuchisoffbudget. being usedefficiently isquestionable, especially many other economies, butwhether they are has plentiful laborandcapitalcompared to referred to astotal factor productivity. China produced basedonthese inputsissometimes being produced given acountry’s labor, capital, must beprovided by theChinesegovernment. provide sufficient data onChinese government nificantly improved transparency onChinese businesses. Private efforts have alsosig- 3 4 2  7 - The 12 nongov 8 13 and U.S. government government and U.S. 9 This is important because 11 In recent years, however, outside however, In recent years, 10 Given the lack of scope and resources, it is the lack of scope and resources, Given Independent data from external sources has Independent data from external In the past, the Chinese government has the Chinese government In the past, been complicated by the difficulty of “collecting, been complicated by - has helped to create account countries, from other pollution in urban areas simply pushed industrial industrial pollution in urban areas simply pushed provinces. For example, a joint project between a joint project between example, For provinces. pressure, whether from the Chinese people or from the Chinese people pressure, whether state secrets, but in other cases, the absence of cases, but in other secrets, state ernmental organizations, outcomes in others. For instance, efforts to reduce efforts instance, For outcomes in others. environmental policies in one city or province policies in one city or province environmental of China’s provinces but “concluded that data provinces of China’s extremely difficult for independent data to capture difficult for independent data to capture extremely caught withholding or misrepresenting data on data or misrepresenting caught withholding database of spending on Belt and Road Initiative database of spending on Belt and Road Initiative consistent data is due to the sheer complexity and consistent example, with respect to monitoring and publish- example, with respect activity outside the city to more rural areas. activity outside the city to more rural affect economic decisions and environmental affect economic decisions and environmental a full picture of energy and environment realities a full picture of energy and environment attempted Kong of Hong and the City University - energy and environ for reporting a reputation ability to aggregate all these data is essential if one ability to aggregate all these data is and patterns also shed light on Chinese investment ability and drive change by the government—for government—for change the ability and drive by the Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning, the Chinese Academy for Environmental assessment of each an environmental to develop tor Institute for China Studies, which maintains a which maintains for China Studies, tor Institute treated some energy and environmental data as and environmental treated some energy ties and villages.” resources. in China. For example, Yale, Columbia University, Columbia University, example, Yale, in China. For mental data consistently or accurately. It has been It has or accurately. consistently mental data citizens, its own occasions by multiple into the energy sector, and already amounts to into the energy sector, more than 50 billion USD.” - envi the magnitude of China’s is to understand ronmental problems. - example, the Merca For in global energy markets. magnitude of data collection across all of China’s all of China’s magnitude of data collection across ing data on air quality. - environ integrating, analyzing, and interpreting mental and health data at various administrative levels ranging from provinces and cities to coun- ranging from provinces levels Chinese spending on completed BRI projects went Chinese spending on completed China and the United States to build a Chinese China and the United States to build Environmental Public Health Tracking system has Tracking system Public Health Environmental (BRI) projects, estimates that “about two-thirds of estimates (BRI) projects, -

5 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The put those tools and accountabil- 7 not only because these societies pos- only because these societies not 6 have a tendency to be overproduced in China. be overproduced to a tendency have in view of the fact that manufactured goods manufactured that of the fact in view China’s commitment to transparent and reli- China’s Categories energy produc- of energy data include Free economies are generally cleaner Free While energy and environmental issues are environmental While energy and After decades of fraudulent, inconsistent, After decades of fraudulent, inconsistent, because they are the core building blocks of well- because they are the core building blocks Affordable, reliable energy being and livelihoods. but also because the tools of stewardship— problems, declines in worker productivity, migra- productivity, declines in worker problems, people, who must live with the consequences of with live people, who must directly pollution is China’s sound environment. property rights, rule of law, transparency and rule of law, property rights, such as China’s, sess greater wealth to improve their environments their environments sess greater wealth to improve energy infrastructure investment, energy poverty, energy poverty, investment, energy infrastructure use Energy policy. energy and environmental exist and incentivize data-driven solutions. and incentivize data-driven exist economies, and imports and exports. They also encompass and imports and exports. - Reli per dollar of GDP. and energy consumption evaluate how able trend data in these areas can help Chinese able data is important chiefly for the close to home strike environment and a healthy and negative impacts on environmental quality, quality, impacts on environmental and negative policy impacts access to energy and environmental and party authorities—where conflicts of interest conflicts of interest and party authorities—where stew evidence of poor environmental anecdotal ardship, the Chinese government does not have have does not the Chinese government ardship, accountability, incentive to innovate and become to innovate incentive accountability, tion patterns, and harm to people’s well-being. and harm to people’s tion patterns, tion and use by source of energy, end use by sector, sector, end use by source of energy, tion and use by they provide an important benchmark for evaluat- an important benchmark for they provide tainable economic outcomes. Unfree economies, Unfree economies, tainable economic outcomes. responsible for a number of serious public health responsible for a number of serious is a necessity for families, but so too is a clean, is a necessity for families, ing human well-being. resources, and therefore, development. Together, Together, and therefore, development. resources, ity for them largely in the hands of government negate its effectiveness. or undisclosed national data and nonexistent, more efficient—contribute to environmentally sus- more efficient—contribute to independent, there is interplay between them. between is interplay independent, there Energy and Environment Energy China’s energy mix is changing or not changing. energy mix is changing or not China’s Clear, objective data can identify where problems objective Clear, Energy production and use can have both positive positive both and use can have Energy production  Transparency from theChineseGovernment: 4outof10 Performance Index.” 8 Overall Transparency: 6outof10 China. Thefollowing areafewexamplesofthese lent toallow fortheconstruction ofaconsistent in China’s baselineofficialdataweretoopreva- rate andtransparentaccesstoinformationin and comparableprovincial ChinaEnvironmental ate andorganizedatahave proved tobeandwill gaps, alackoftransparency, andinconsistencies continue tobecriticalachievingmoreaccu- open-source resources. l l l l l l l

The Chinesegovernment’s transparency on Yale CenterforEnvironmental Law andPolicy: Our World inData zero transparency on water andlandmanage- China hasgreatly improved itsdisclosure of SOEs that are listed andfloated onlocalChi- Mekong DamMonitor Henry L.StimsonCenter: Energy FinanceDatabase Boston University, GlobalDevelop- Nevertheless,gener independenteffortsto Environmental Performance Index” Climate Action Tracker Climate Action Climate Watch Global EnergyMonitor when itcomes to airquality data, there isnearly environmental data over thepast decadeboth external efforts. Energy production data tends on thetype ofdata. Whereas itistransparent energy andenvironment varies depending as well asthird-party reporting have increased ment Policy Center:China’s Global to bemore available, becauseitisproduced by in terms of data published. Outsidepressure in terms of environmental issues covered and nese, andsometimes global,stock exchanges. provided isoften notverifiable orisdisputed by ment andChina’s climate data. What little is 19 14 18 21 17 20 16 15 China Transparency Report - At best, theU.S. government’s decisiontosideline Human Rights tral both tothe country’s survival andtoitsown. a consistent record offailingtoprotect and cies inU.S. atworst, policy; ithashamstrung U.S. or deprioritizehumanrights concernsinbroader often viewedissuesofhumanrightsinChinaas of Chinesecitizens. strategy toward China. strategies toward Chinahasledtoinconsisten- peripheral, theCCPseestheirsuppressionascen- preserve theinternationallyrecognizedrights The first isincreased third-party participation. Another potential avenue for research would A 2020 articleintheJournalof Environmental While successive U.S. have Administrations The ChineseCommunist Party (CCP)has China. Management found that increased third-party extend to theotherenvironmental indicators environmental governance from amono-centric environmental policy. Consequently, research clear understanding ofhow Chinaformulates environmental data reporting andenviron ers should investigate how environmental shed light ontheprogress orlackthereof in and soiltoxicity. and non-participatory policy process to one and to pursue furtherresearch. are plenty ofopportunities to fillgapsindata true where thequality ofdata ispoor, suchas that integrates bothauthoritariancontrol and dence “supports China’s efforts to advance its data reporting andavailability. However, there data undertheguiseof“state secrets.” Like indoor airquality, drinkingwater, surface water, mentioned inthischapter. This is particularly possible, more third-party monitoring should market-based mechanisms.” monitoring improved thedata onairquality in mental progress. many otherpublicpolicy issues, there isno hidden industrial projects andenvironmental be more investigative innature. Chinahas lated. Abetter understanding of thiswould laws, regulations, andstrategies are formu 22 The editors concluded that theevi- 24 23 To theextent - - -  9 31 29 - 33 26 27 30 28 32 have been widely criticized as inaccurate and inaccurate as been widely criticized have plete lack of transparency from the Chinese from lack of transparency plete the Chinese government’s in uncovering mental improving transparency on rule of law, freedom freedom on rule of law, transparency improving lend that and reports information identifying but and actions intentions the CCP’s into insight research. in the gaps in current Private efforts have significantly improved improved significantly have efforts Private in also been instrumental have efforts Private System of Militarized Vocational Train- of Militarized Vocational System the World: China” the World: there are data reported by the Chinese gov by reported data are there - the com given on human rights transparency from the Chinese government’s narrative are are narrative the Chinese government’s from ing Comes to Tibet” rithms of Repression” rithms of Database Prisoner racy: Political Tibetan actions in Xinjiang. Transparency on Tibet has on Tibet Transparency in Xinjiang. actions should be done. more although also improved, also to inspire future research projects that fill that projects research future inspire also to Open Doors USA: World Watch List: China List: Watch Open Doors USA: World ernment. The issue is that the data provided provided the data is that issue The ernment. deviates that Data as propaganda. categorized available. or not readily either quickly removed of speech, and religious freedom. of speech, and religious - been instru have efforts Private government. when it comes to human rights. To be clear, be clear, To human rights. to when it comes ChinaFile: State of Surveillance - “Algo Watch: Human Rights Protest Watch: Kong Hong Prosecution Database in “Freedom House: Freedom - Centre for Human Rights and Democ Tibetan Xinjiang Victims Database Xinjiang Jamestown Foundation: “Xinjiang’s Foundation: Jamestown The Chinese government is not transparent is not transparent Chinese government The This report can serve not only as a resource for for not only as a resource can serve report This

l l l l l l l l Overall Transparency: 5 out of 10 Transparency: Overall Transparency from the Chinese Government: 1 out of 10 1 out the Chinese Government: from Transparency - -

- 25 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The The following is a representative sample of the sample is a representative The following There is much independent critical, data-driven There is much independent critical, data-driven The CCP is often very open about new laws or open about very The CCP is often There is, therefore, an abiding need to promote need to promote an abiding therefore, There is, The government of China publishes other of China publishes other The government bigger picture with respect to the CCP’s viola bigger picture with respect to the CCP’s but much work has yet to be done. However, while to be done. However, yet but much work has policies and rights abuses. Thus, while the CCP while the CCP Thus, policies and rights abuses. of the subjects to get a clearer understanding provide insight into the CCP’s policies and often insight into the CCP’s provide significant attention to pulling back the veil on the to pulling back the significant attention sought to pull back the veil on the CCP’s efforts to on the CCP’s the veil sought to pull back on Chinese government data, ingeniouslyon Chinese government reverse- engineered technology used in the violation of cutting-edge, data-driven projects that are contrib- cutting-edge, data-driven ostensibly unrelated data that, for example, unrelated data that, for example, ostensibly in postings outline security expenditures or job ences about broader trends in the government’s government’s ences about broader trends in the of religious freedom. Regulations such as these of religious freedom. Regulations such a person’s ability to practice his or her faith, the a person’s aid organizations, academics, and others—have and others—have academics, aid organizations, the security sector that speak to an increased increased the security sector that speak to an tions of human rights. transparency with respect to the CCP’s efforts efforts transparency to the CCP’s with respect Civil society—including human rights. to curtail uting to these efforts. undermine freedom and human rights in China, undermine freedom hard to track down, many researchers have found have researchers many hard to track down, rights, and collected firsthand testimony; their testimony; and collected firsthand rights, ity of the situation. inadvertently reveal information about human reveal inadvertently rights conditions inside China. regulations do violate international standards standards regulations do violate international may not be especially transparent about the data be especially transparent about the data not may creative it releases or the trends that it observes, on other researchers can use threads of data research and reports on violations of human rights has devoted civil society in China. In recent years, regulations that it puts into place. In 2018, the CCP puts into place. In 2018, regulations that it new regulations on religious affairs. instituted nonprofits, nongovernmental organizations, legal legal organizations, nongovernmental nonprofits, level of securitization in the Xinjiang region. of securitization in the Xinjiang region. level work has shed a much-needed light on the sever ways to shed light the trends. ways CCP’s human rights abuses. Reports have drawn drawn Reports have human rights abuses. CCP’s Chinese government data on these issues are often data on Chinese government Researchers use this information to draw infer to draw Researchers use this information Although it does not acknowledge that they restrict acknowledge that they restrict Although it does not  10 Influence Operations modern states forcenturies insomeformandare is hiddenordisguised). ian exchange andculturalprogramstomilitary used ininfluenceoperations, frombenigncivil- closed) to “black propaganda”(theoriginofwhich closed) to“black on thegovernment inquestion,from“white range content ofinfluenceoperationscan,depending global influence. A range ofsoftpowerglobal influence.Arange toolsare operations aimedatchangingforeignpopular propaganda” (theoriginof whichistruthfullydis- psychological operations(psy ops).Likewise, the perceptions in order toenhanceacountry’s Influence operationshave beenused by Influence operations are governmentInfluence operationsare Some ofthismay have to dowiththefact violations ofhumanrights. Amore thorough of theseregions, more information ontheCCP’s other places (such asTibet), itmay bemore ency Project, researcher Adrian Zenz suggested appeared to besignificantly fewer data-driven and advancing U.S. interests. are new andemerging (asinHongKong). In In conducting research for thisreport, there In anepisodeofChinaUncovered, aHeritage a better understanding oftheforms offorced focused onsafeguarding U.S. national security there may beaneedfor more research inboth the policy context, particularly for policymakers does willdeepentheapplication ofresearch in ther investigation. these subjects. Nevertheless, they meritfur difficult to access information, orthere may that someoftheevents andrights abuses that additionaldeepresearch isneededto gain Future research shoulddoabetter jobof Kong, especiallyascompared to Xinjiang. Foundation podcast withintheChinaTranspar understanding ofwhy theCCP doeswhat it unpacking someofthemotivations for China’s methods isalsoneeded. historical useofreeducation-through-labor has focused onXinjiang andTibet, andwhile resources onthesituation inTibet andHong be less politicalwillto conduct research on labor carriedoutby theCCP. 34 Hisown work China Transparency Report - - Formal processesareusedtoeffectively mobilize Front Work Department.TheCCPandChinese Hong Kong democracy, persecutionofUyghurs well-funded propagandaefforts. AsLowy Institute andmilitary widespread toolsofforeignpolicy influence operations. made iteasiertospot andanalyzethedata. The formajoroperations,its agencies - necessarily gen have helpedunveil theseoperationsby exploiting in Xinjiang,andTaiwan’s defactoindependence; its regionalreach;dominatethenarrative vis-à-vis influence operationscanalsobeseenasamore utilizing technologicaltools. Translationapplica- keep apurposelylow publicprofile.” tions andsocialmediaanalytic platformshave tions, includingthoseregistered undertheUnited State Council’s Ministry ofCivilAffairsmaintains the UnitedStates. globally;extend itsimage to controlandmanage and incomplete pictureofthescopeandscale a databaseofofficiallyregistered socialorganiza- accessible data,oftenavailable onlyinChinese, and theCCPthatcontributetoCCP’s massive are thereforenot easilyquantifiedthroughoffi- and ultimatelycompete forgloballeadershipwith approach focusedonspecifictargets. However, efforts helpingtofillout the pictureofChinese of Chineseinfluenceoperations, privateefforts erating informationontheirefforts. government system isnot devoid ofbureaucracy. government andpartyagencies. For example,the departments controllingpersonnelandthemedia observes inhisbookTheParty, “thebigparty cies andofficeswithintheChinese government complicated by thesprawling structure- ofagen cial Chinesedata.Evaluation ismadeeven more erally enhanceacountry’s globalstanding. strategy- general todealwithfuturecrisesandgen ence operationsrepresentanall-of-government some ofthevariousdatasourceslisted above and such asregistrations oforganizationswithin senior fellow andjournalist Richard McGregor strategy. Intheirbroadest application,influ- secretive abouttheirinfluenceoperations, which following isasample—list ofcutting-edgeprivate While officialdataprovides a verylimited The Chinesegovernment andCCParehighly Influence operationsare key toChina’s efforts However, therearesomerelevantpublicly 35  11 - - - These biannual white 42 41 more can be done. more become a target of influence; it is another thing it influence; of a target become is doing and the CCP on what has focused identifying the targets of those operations, as of those operations, targets the identifying the alarm on has raised should. This it rightfully More broadly speaking, there needs to be more be more needs to speaking, there broadly More to become influenced. Much of the discourse Much of the discourse influenced. become to be paid can closer attention so now the issue, effectiveness. the actual to organizations and technology transfer to China, China, to transfer technology and organizations evaluation of the actual effectiveness of the of the effectiveness of the actual evaluation China publishes a wide variety of information, China publishes a wide variety But these same white papers provide little little white papers provide But these same CCP’s influence operations. It is one thing to It is one thing operations. influence CCP’s The realm of national security—including The realm of national security—including Transparency about China’s military is military Transparency about China’s fashion, omitting key details and figures. Thus, the Thus, and figures. details key fashion, omitting papers have been the most authoritative sources of authoritative been the most papers have much might be spent on to indicate how provided discussed such issues as the PLA’s individual ser discussed such issues as the PLA’s opaque, even in open democratic societies. In an in open democratic societies. opaque, even each service. It has never been clear exactly what each service. It has never defense budget figure ($178 billion in 2019) ever ever defense budget figure ($178 billion in 2019) authoritarian system like that of the PRC, access to that of the PRC, like authoritarian system activities—for example, military research and the world’s largest military, including such essen- largest military, the world’s no time At tials as the Chinese military budget. military affairs, intelligence activities, and inter intelligence activities, military affairs, nal security operations—is typically the most the most nal security operations—is typically more restricted. information is bound to be even researchers important because it provides ongoing of and trends in the Chinese rent state the Chinese military Understanding military. its tangible and its requires consideration of both intangible aspects. and secu- including information about its military but it does so in an often incomplete rity forces, information on PLA doctrine and China’s evolving evolving information on PLA doctrine and China’s military thinking. of the more basic aspects of insight into many Military vices, “military strategic guidelines” of the “Active guidelines” of the “Active “military strategic vices, white papers for over two decades that have two decades that have white papers for over with a baseline of data for assessing the cur with a baseline of data for assessing was a breakdown of the single aggregate Chinese a breakdown was People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has published Liberation Army People’s and mobilization. Defense,” - - 38 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The While there there While 40 37 36 39 , Technology Foreign for Quest book China’s by the Chinese government with regard to to with regard the Chinese government by public, media, and national governments. How governments. public, media, and national - and eco on health transparency more provided With work. front and united nomic diplomacy - or spread manipulation information involve ing disinformation. influence operation mechanisms to support its mechanisms operation influence influence operations. On one hand, there is is On one hand, there operations. influence is some publicly available literature on this role on this role literature is some publicly available influence operations, particularly on digital particularly operations, influence united front system’s role in technology transfer transfer in technology role system’s front united Private efforts have greatly improved overall overall improved greatly have efforts Private technology objectives. As pointed out in the As pointed objectives. technology of the understanding insufficient is still there thanks to organizations such as Georgetown’s such as Georgetown’s organizations to thanks tremendous attention recently from the general the general from recently attention tremendous that said, there still needs to be more overall overall be more to needs still said, there that work. front on united transparency transparency on the Chinese government’s on the Chinese government’s transparency front work (within Chinese language sources). Chinese language sources). (within work front ilton 2.0 Dashboard ilton 2.0 and talent recruitment programs. recruitment and talent and cyber operations. These efforts have also have efforts These operations. and cyber some transparency provided by official data data official by provided some transparency ency on digital and cyber operations that that operations on digital and cyber ency ever, the available open-source research has research open-source the available ever, the surface. only scratched on health and economic diplomacy and united and united diplomacy on health and economic which have conducted analysis on professional on professional analysis conducted which have MapInfluenCE One specific opportunity is in Beijing’s use of is in Beijing’s One specific opportunity On the other hand, there is no transpar On the other hand, there Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Technology, and Emerging Security for Center Interference Tracker AidData: China’s Public Diplomacy AidData: China’s Alliance for Securing Democracy:Alliance Ham- for Securing Democracy:Alliance Authoritarian There are severe gaps in the data provided provided gaps in the data severe are There The CCP’s influence operations have received received have operations influence CCP’s The

l l l l Overall Transparency: 5 out of 10 Transparency: Overall Transparency from the Chinese Government: 3 out of 10 3 out of Chinese Government: the from Transparency  They have provided hints, forexample,astothe Five-Year 2021–2025) noted that Plan(governing Research Institute publishesanannualyearbook 12 China’s militarywas acceleratingitseffortsto which provides basicdata(numbersoftroops, major additionstothePLA’s orderofbattle. including assessmentsofoverall Chinesestrategy, national strategy, the evolution ofmilitarydoc- thewho,intelligence”: what,where,when,andhow munity isoftenmuchmorefocusedon“current com- is especiallytruebecausetheintelligence important, whatactivitiesarenot. research—are includedinthisfigureand,equally understanding oftheChinesenationalsecurity those termsmightmeanandwhatmetrics were tanks, planes, warships, nuclearweapons, etc.) for questions.trine, andother “why” therefore likely Chinesenationalpriorities. This tion withtheNationalPeople’s Congress(NPC) the world.ItincludesassessmentsofChineseand that covers majormilitary developments around Similarly, theStockholmInternationalPeace and informationizedthePLAisnow. are afewexamplesofthese open-sourceresources: and CCPCongressesprovide importantdataand agreements, andarmstransfers. changes inforcestructurechanges andorganization, of thepast year’s nationalsecuritydevelopments, decade, theChinasectionhasincludedanoverview every nation,includingthePRC. For more thana of dailydevelopments. Thereismuchlesstime establishment, Chinesestrategic thinking,and gic StudiesproducestheannualMilitaryBalance, only sporadically. Theannouncementofthe14th extent ofChineseinternalsecurityspending—but development, spaceinfrastructure, orbiological other military expenditures, recentarmscontrol signposts onmajorChinesesecurityinitiatives. for morein-depth examinationsofissuessuchas being employed, muchlessonhow mechanized but nodetails wereforthcomingonexactlywhat become “fullymechanizedandinformationized,” l

As noted, theInternationalInstitute forStrate- The Australian StrategicPolicy Institute: China Defence Universities Tracker Open-source informationisvitaltoany in Similarly, theworkreportsissuedinconjunc- 45 46 Thefollowing China Transparency Report 44 43

Transparency from theChineseGovernment: 5outof10 Overall Transparency: 7outof10 l l

Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative Asia MaritimeTransparency zones/theaters, andthecreation ofseveral new Given China’s translucent ifnotopaquenature, Chinese government andtracking PLA activities Chinese government butisstill incomplete and While theChinesegovernment scores low on National BureauofAsianResearchand Center forStrategicandInternationalStudies: without muchdetail. Details onmilitaryarma- could benefitfrom sustained open-source services—each area includes awealth oftopics. score isnotablyhigherthansomeofthescores also become more transparent becauseof and movement. Otherareas—such asdoc activities andarmssalesby theChinesegovern- the Central MilitaryCommission, thetransfor there isanenormousrange ofareas that these efforts. trine, private reform efforts, andpolicies—have tary size isslightly better documented by the transparency withregards to itsmilitary, the Sasakawa USA:MaritimeAwareness Project For example: Private efforts have beenmost impactful in in 2015—which saw acomplete overhaul of info islackingasitoften notreported. in othercategories withinthisreport. Mili- mation ofseven militaryregions into five war research. With themassive reform ofthePLA providing transparency onarmssalesby the ment. PLA activity canbeseen,buttheofficial public. There isalackoftransparency onPLA ments outsideofimagesare limited from the l

What are thefunctions ofeachthe13 offices, commissions, anddepartments that these staffed? For example, are they predomi- terms ofseniority andstaffing? How are eachof branch), orare they deliberately madejoint? nantly from theground forces (now aseparate mission? How dotheserelate to eachother in now comprise thenew Central MilitaryCom- 47 - - 48  13 Finally, different definitions may include or different definitions Finally, However, in more than a few cases, Chinese in more than a few cases, However, In several developing economies, Chinese economies, developing In several Horizontal FDI generally refers to funds Horizontal branch in the United States or purchasing a com- branch in the United performance, infrastructure, and productivity, and productivity, performance, infrastructure, subsidiaries, acquiring voting stocks, mergers and stocks, acquiring voting subsidiaries, Vertical in the United States. store clothing peting that purchasing the garment manufacturer store that it sells. supplies the clothing and traditional Western more risky by physically structure investments, and in some cases, Chinese some cases, and in investments, structure for financ- been their only options sources have sword, providing economic benefits that are either providing sword, Chinese economic costs. outweighed by selves—or existing businesses, providing loans to overseas loans to overseas providing businesses, existing different classes of FDI. Some defini- exclude and propelling eco- enhancing living standards have Chinese lenders and investors economies, distinguishing FDI from short-term portfolio distinguishing elite, leadership networks, or Chinese firms them- elite, leadership networks, criticized for failing to meet international financial criticized for failing to meet acquisitions, and joint ventures. acquisitions, a retail clothing store in China opening a new in China opening a store clothing a retail in infra- a compelling need for trillions of dollars and technical standards, for lacking transparency, for lacking transparency, and technical standards, prac- and for contributing to irresponsible debt international standards met have and would not the supply chain: for example, a retail clothing clothing for example, a retail the supply chain: that limit FDI to investments for example, tions, tices. The BRI is littered with examples of projects The BRI is littered tices. autocratic elites by been hand-picked that have ture projects, have frequently and credibly been have ture projects, - an entity construct including forms, multiple expanding plants, or power ing new factories In a number of high-risk developing nomic growth. net at least 10 percent of voting power in a firm, power 10 percent of voting at least net in stocks. investment and con- energy, in infrastructure, investments economic improved nectivity projects have invested abroad in the same industry: for example, for example, industry: in the same abroad invested world has The developing international lenders. ing and construction. investments, particularly large-scale- infrastruc investments, limited—in some cases to small groups of business financed projects deemed too economically or financed projects deemed too economically widely adopted by more traditional lenders. While more traditional lenders. by widely adopted FDI flows have proven a double-edged economic proven have FDI flows generally refers to investments up and down down up and FDI generally refers to investments The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The Broadly defined, FDI can assume 49 modate all of the new technologies? How How technologies? all of the new modate (the backbone of officers noncommissioned For example, how does the western war zone, zone, war does the western how example, For - accom to its forces train does the PLA How of a cadre developed the PLA has well How to changing requirements as defined by their as defined changing requirements to the other services (PLA Navy, PLA Air Force) in Air Force) PLA Navy, (PLA the other services in represented they are How of seniority? terms are example, For headquarters? zone the war in one officers Air Force senior PLA more there in another? are than there the eastern or northern war zone? or northern war the eastern the unit’s political officers, who are responsible responsible are who political officers, the unit’s for, among other things, monitoring the welfare the welfare among other things, monitoring for, advanced weapons from the SOE system, and system, the SOE from weapons advanced and train their forces? How do they relate to to relate do they How forces? their and train all follow the same organizational approach, approach, same organizational the all follow successful have these efforts been thus far? been thus these efforts have successful cate “civil–military fusion”? How responsive are are responsive How fusion”? “civil–military cate complex military–industrial of China’s elements the PLA? customers, or are they customized to their environments? their environments? to customized they or are of the enlisted personnel? of the enlisted - to incul of efforts the impact has been what which has no maritime border, compare with compare border, which has no maritime Strategic Support Force)? How do they recruit recruit do they How Force)? Support Strategic What is the process for acquiring more more acquiring for is the process What What is the structure of the new services services of the new is the structure What What is the structure of the war zones? Do they Do they zones? of the war is the structure What Western militaries), and how do they relate to to relate they do and how militaries), Western (PLA Ground Forces, PLA Rocket Forces, PLA PLA Forces, Rocket PLA Forces, Ground (PLA

l l l l l PLA, and especially the ongoing emphasis on and especially the ongoing PLA, questions. Specifically: questions. Similarly, the steady modernization of the modernization the steady Similarly, The Organization for Economic Co-operation “informationization” of the force, raises a host of a host raises of the force, “informationization” establishes a lasting interest in and a significant interest a lasting establishes an enterprise in another over degree of influence economy.” investment defines foreignand Development direct in which an investor resident in one economy resident in one economy in which an investor Outbound Investments (FDI) as a “category of cross-border investment (FDI) as a “category of cross-border investment  (OFDI) hasbroughtnot just unfavorable economic However, whilethesestatistics aresometimes cor 14 years thatfollowed. TheBRI becamealegacy Chinese investments, particularlyinsensitive Chinese OFDIstatistics areaccurate, thereare Chinese government tomanipulate,particularly Chinese OFDIflows beginninginthemid-2000s when thecounterpartyisanadvancedeconomy, as whether atthefederal,regional,orlocallevel—to while there is often much publicity around “new” while thereisoftenmuchpublicityaround“new” filled promises, at-riskeconomies, andwhite numerous capitalsworldwidetorestrict Chinese infrastructure projectsandtelecommunica- investments, thecancellation orscalingdown of numerous casesofplannedforeigninvestments roborated by morereliablesources, Chinaisoften is partlyaresultoftheexponentialgrowth in ment oftheBRIandgrowing resources and tination oftheinvestment. However, even when generally corroborated the figuresare by thedes - through theNBSandMinistry ofCommerce. telecom giantHuawei fromassumingarolein tions networks, have repeatedlydrawn espionage the BRIisatrailofnon-performingloans, unful- there arebrightspots, thedarkunderbellyof that foravariety ofreasonsfailtomaterialize.And - to ChineseOFDIisalsoaresult ofthegeopoliti ticularly intheUnitedStatesbutalsofurther accused ofmanipulatingitseconomicstatistics— attention thattheBRIbegantocommand inthe assumed, particularlysince the2013 announce - and peakingin2016. abroad, thataredevoted totrackingChineseFDI on tradeandinvestment statistics, principally developing their5Gnetworks. concerns. Nationalsecurityconcernshave led consequences butadverse strategic ramifications. elephant projects. growth inthenumber ofChineseFDI“trackers” cal characterthattheseinvestment flows have serve theCCP’s interests. proliferation ofnewresearchinitiatives, par proposed investments unreported. oftengoes statistics andanalyzingtheirimplications. The The Chinesegovernment regularlyreports The prominentattention now beingaccorded In anumberofcases, ChineseoutboundFDI In recentyears, therehasbeenadramatic OFDI statistics canbemoredifficult forthe China Transparency Report - - Transparency from theChineseGovernment: 3outof10 Chinese OFDIflows. ing internationalbacklash. research institutes host avariety ofChineseOFDI declinein new projectsthatparallelsalarger ments wherever theymaterialize;somelookonly has alsosufferedfromadramaticdeclinein trackers, eachwithdifferentemphasesanddiffer trackers now inuse. Since then,however, theBRIhasfacedagrow Some areglobalinscope,trackingChineseinvest- are someofthemost prominentChinese OFDI are focusedonspecificregions. Thefollowing ofinvestments;at certaincategories andsome enshrined intheChineseconstitution in2017. ent sets ofdataandvariablesthattheyaretracking. project ofChinesePresidentXiJinping andwas l l l l l l

There are criticalgapsinthedata provided by AidData: “MappingChina’s GlobalInvest- American EnterpriseInstitute: ChinaGlobal Today, several prestigious thinktanksand Infrastructure Tracker Investment Tracker Investment Project. Inter-American Dialogueand Boston University Rhodium GroupandNationalCommit- Boston University GlobalDevelopment Policy Latin AmericaFinanceDatabase Center: China’s GlobalPower Database Global Development Policy Center:China– government’s defense-linked outboundflows cifically, information onthe terms onwhich are alsonottransparent. BRIprojects andChi- absence ofofficial data onChineseloans—spe- ments andInequality” these loanshave beenprovided. The Chinese the Chinesegovernment withregard to out tee onU.S.–China Relations:US–China Stimson Center:Mekong nese aidare slightly more transparent. bound investments. There isanear-complete 56 51 52 54 50 Inrecentyears, it 55 53 - - -  15 - - Given the holistic, comprehensive approach comprehensive the holistic, Given However, China’s legal code affects how the legal code affects how China’s However, In addition, because China is a rule-by-law In addition, because China is a rule-by-law To provide insight into Chinese developments, insight into Chinese developments, provide To Another consideration in assessing China is the consideration in assessing China Another both in the PRC and abroad. Support for China’s in the PRC and abroad. Support for China’s both for Western analysts. for Western from both Chinese and foreign corporate entities. and foreign corporate entities. Chinese from both pursuit of initial public offerings and listings on listings pursuit of initial public offerings and security Law—to justify accessing a variety of data accessing a variety justify security Law—to party hierarchies and their relationships to busi- society, it creates legal scaffolding to justify vari- it creates legal scaffolding to justify society, ous other politics. Thus, China has passed a range Thus, politics. ous other the Law, of laws—including the National Security global stock markets, as well as its participation in markets, global stock of legal infrastructure. cal that China’s legal situation should be a focus legal situation should cal that China’s China’s businesses. cially corporations and other country’s evolving legal situation. Because China legal situation. evolving country’s rule by of history considering its millennia-long of its domestic politics. of its domestic overlap with its economic, diplomatic, and military overlap of these laws can therefore provide indications of of these laws can therefore provide actions. Grasping China’s objectives therefore objectives Grasping China’s actions. the realm of commercial law, precisely because the realm of commercial law, time, the government can support various educa- can support various government time, the including Confucius efforts abroad, tional outreach as direct Chi- Education—as well of the Ministry the CCP and the Chinese state: the relative rank the relative the CCP and the Chinese state: that China takes toward accumulating “compre- toward that China takes Office pub- State Council Information the PRC’s hensive national power,” China’s political activities China’s national power,” hensive international supply chains, requires some degree international supply chains, is an authoritarian state ruled by the CCP and ruled by state is an authoritarian nese students abroad. This means that the range abroad. This means of nese students requires understanding the organization of both the organization of both requires understanding referencing these various laws. An understanding An understanding referencing these various laws. and the state ings of individuals in terms of both entities. and other the military, nesses, legal structure is arguably better developed in developed is arguably better legal structure - seem paradoxi it might rather than rule of law, law lishes a variety of white papers that provide the of white papers that provide lishes a variety various Chinese and foreign companies interact various Chinese and foreign companies Chinese interface with foreign entities, espe- Chinese interface with foreign entities, Chinese foreign politics is as extensive as the range as is as extensive Chinese foreign politics Chinese interests and thinking. Chinese interests National Espionage Law, and the National Cyber National Espionage Law, Institutes—which are managed by a body within a body are managed by Institutes—which The Chinese government does so not by fiat but by fiat but by does so not The Chinese government - - The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The largely on the “what” and “where” of Chinese of Chinese and “where” on the “what” largely loans, and aid. FDI gets tracked more closely closely more tracked aid. FDI gets loans, and how these investments are affecting the host the host affecting are these investments how ments on a regionwide basis, but there is room is room basis, but there on a regionwide ments projects are now evaluating Chinese invest evaluating now are projects investments. Less attention has been paid to has been paid to attention Less investments. populations. and institutions, - pro in instrumental been have efforts Private there is a need for greater focus on the impact on the impact focus greater is a need for there defense-linked outbound investments are still still are outbound investments defense-linked - a subre at and analysis collection data more for additional research in this field beyond the in this field beyond additional research such an initiative. countries and the regions at large. Specifically, Specifically, large. at and the regions countries on local governance, of Chinese investments expanding number of existing efforts. Many Many efforts. number of existing expanding on the receiving end. Even with private efforts, efforts, private with end. Even on the receiving gional level. The Stimson Mekong Infrastructure Infrastructure Mekong Stimson The gional level. viding more transparency on BRI projects, FDI, BRI projects, on transparency viding more non-transparent. very The PRC is governed by the CCP. Chinese poli- the CCP. by The PRC is governed Another aspect of Chinese politics is Bei- Another To date, ongoing research efforts have focused focused have efforts ongoing research date, To Tracker offers a great example and model for and model example a great offers Tracker There continue to be ample opportunities for for be ample opportunities to continue There students to come to Chinese universities because to come to Chinese universities students posal for the conduct of foreign policy. Chinese for the conduct of foreign policy. posal as and are not part on broader national objectives policymaking is complicated by the very differ policymaking the very is complicated by ent structures and approaches that characterize and approaches that characterize ent structures - on invest concerns about returns by constrained domestic politics, understanding Chinese foreign understanding politics, domestic domestic politics, spans a wide range of issues. politics, domestic as well as China’s “market socialist” system, the system, socialist” “market as well as China’s the state runs the educational system. At the same the same At runs the educational system. the state SOEs, for example, can make decisions based in SOEs, for example, can make the PRC. Because of the CCP’s extensive reach, extensive Because of the CCP’s the PRC. tics of the Chinese state, even when only discussing when even of the Chinese state, tics tics therefore includes both the politics of the state the politics of the state tics therefore includes both ment. The Chinese government can invite foreign can invite ment. The Chinese government international organizations. As with Chinese international organizations. Politics and Law Politics jing’s dealings with other countries, groups, and groups, countries, jing’s dealings with other Overall Transparency: 6 out of 10 6 out Transparency: Overall PRC of tools at its dis- has a much wider array (at various levels) and intraparty politics. The poli- and intraparty politics. (at various levels)  Affairs has long issued annual reviews ofChina’sAffairs haslongissuedannualreviews The overall five-year planalsosets guidelinesand PRC continuestoproducefive-yearPRC economic 16 Chinese ministries.- TheStateOceanicAdmin laws, anddrafts. Someofthesedocuments are indicators ofkey prioritiesandnationalefforts. important, theeconomicfive-year planprovides reviews, reports, andstatements fromvarious released inconjunctionwith theannualmeetings istration, forexample,anadministrative agency is thefive-year plan.Despiteshifts away fromthe maritime environment. TheMinistry ofForeign under theMinistry ofLandandResources, issues that remainsunderstate ownership atalllevels. As the PRC government.the PRC the gainsandadvancessinceprevious“two tion efforts, set forthattheNPC. Both thenational and agreementbeforepublicationtherefore ally inlinewith thefive-year plan)aswell key as medium-termandlong-termplansinaspectsof all five-year planandministry-specific five-year also typicallyprovide workreportsthatreview and provincial governments, aswellministries, associated withtheCCPParty Congressandthe activities, includingterritorialclaims, maritime an annualreportonthestate ofChinesemaritime cies onagiven subject.Thewhitepaperproduction of theNPC. Theseset economic targets(usu- example, withineachministry). Both theover glimpses intoboth successesandfailures—basedin dead handofcentralizedeconomicplanning,the directionforthenextexpected policy five years, set diplomatic activities. economic activities, andthestate ofChina’s single most authoritative positiononChinesepoli- science andtechnology. plans forthesubstantial portionofthe economy provides theconsensusviewonasubjectwithin process requiresbureaucraticreconciliation plans alsofeedintoother Chineseplanningsuch part onwhatisnotreportedordiscussed. forth atthepartycongress, andkey implementa- full sessionoftheNPC. Theseconclaves lay outthe boundaries forsubsidiaryfive-year plans(for meetings. Thesereportsprovide important big” Another sourceofinformationistheannual Another importantsourceofpoliticalinsight Providing additionalinformationarereports, Coming every five yearsorsoareworkreports China Transparency Report - “Made inChina2025”and“China Standards2035,” Transparency from theChineseGovernment: 4outof10 The following aresomeofthem. Overall Transparency: 5outof10 which furtherdetail Chineseobjectives. legislation andmajordecisionsonavariety of ing someofthevariousdatasourcesnoted above. topics. Apartfromtheplenum-relateddocuments aspects ofChinesepoliticaldevelopments, exploit- are other Chineseplansandprojects, suchas l l l l l

This hasgotten worse over time. Government The Chinesegovernment scores low on As thePRC hasbecome stronger, instead of A widevariety ofgroupsaremonitoringvarious CCP. IftheChinesegovernment doesnotpub- Lab: CCPElitePortal Paulson Institute MacroPolo: TheCommittee University of California–San Diego ChinaData Diego University ofCalifornia–San Center for Advanced ChinaResearch Center forAdvanced China LeadershipMonitor China DigitalTimes gather inthepublicdomain.This willremain the case unless Beijingimplements new regulations structure isgenerally well-reported except for to become more opaque. Inmany ways, the to improve easeofaccess. to thedata onpoliticalissues isguarded by the tive policy areas. Inrecent years, transparency the leadership isreported, except for insensi- transparency ofitspolitics.Overall party Private efforts, while beneficial, have notmade in economic policies,hasworsened. in thepublication ofgovernment decrees, even becoming more transparent, Beijinghastried politics. The issue isthat, inmost cases,access near enoughimpact ontransparency onChina’s remain secretive in somecases.The activity of membership ispublishedannually, butthere is lish data, there islittle else private effort can leaders oftheparty leading groups, which little information ofthemakeup besidesage. 57 61 58 59 60  17 67 65 64 The plan gives us a good overview us a good gives The plan overview 66 63 CCP leadership, including Chinese President Xi including Chinese CCP leadership, Like most of the official figures proffered most Like Finally, a third CCP plan, called China Stan- a third CCP plan, called Finally, The Chinese government regularly reports on The Chinese government The PRC government has also adopted a $1.6 has also adopted The PRC government All of these technologies are shaping a global All of these technologies are shaping - biotechnol big data, quantum information, and blockchain, neuroscience, quantum comput- neuroscience, quantum blockchain, for electrified vehicles, data centers, artificial data centers, vehicles, for electrified future—the authoritarians such as China and future—the authoritarians such as position globally, replacing the United States. position globally, publicly by the PRC, these statistics do not tell the do not these statistics the PRC, publicly by primarily through the NBS, Ministry of Science Ministry primarily through the NBS, show how much the central Chinese government much the central Chinese government how show ogy—are gathering strength.” Xi indicated that strength.” gathering ogy—are China could assume a dominate whereby opment,” of Industry and Information Technology, and Min- and Information Technology, of Industry dards 2035, is an ambitious 15-year blueprint is an ambitious 15-year dards 2035, of Internet eration of technologies such as the cial intelligence. communication networks, charging equipment communication networks, of the critical technologies the CCP is focusing the CCP is focusing technologies of the critical artificial intelligence,on such as biotechnology, and the Indo-Pacific. and Technology, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry Ministry and Technology, tion and industrial change—artificial intelligence,tion and industrial these “earth-shaking changes” an would provide trillion infrastructure initiative that surges initiative fund- trillion infrastructure gen for the next - to shape the global standards - that “a new round of technological revolu has said now will determine who leads into the future. Xi who leads into will determine now istry of Education. istry - national expenditures of research and develop ment (R&D) funding in science and technology, ing and focus on seven main areas, including 5G including areas, main ing and focus on seven intelligence, of an industrial development and the for connected factories. internet ing, and robotics. race for who will lead the information agerace for who will lead the information in the ministries spend (or at least as much as they are spend (or at least ministries whole story. Official government statistics merely statistics government Official whole story. willing to acknowledge). The statistics do not do not willing to acknowledge). The statistics Goals for 2035. Goals for Russia or the democracies found in the West the West Russia or the democracies found in Republic of China and the Outline of Long-Term Outline of Long-Term of China and the Republic Industrial Revolution where heated competition where heated competition Revolution Industrial Things, cloud computing, big data, 5G, and artifi- cloud Things, Jinping, sees information technology as a Fourth information technology as a Fourth sees Jinping, - leapfrog devel “important opportunity to promote - The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The 62 leadership trends could yield data that enhance enhance that data yield could trends leadership leadership studies. leadership nese politics. Similarly, a better understanding understanding a better nese politics. Similarly, of provincial and studies political leadership, nese political process. Instead, there has been there Instead, nese political process. role of party secretaries and party committees. committees. and party secretaries of party role interact to convert policy direction into actual actual into direction policy convert to interact urgent because of the greater need to under need to because of the greater urgent More recently, however, the CCP has tried to has tried to the CCP however, recently, More demand for more analysis of all aspects of Chi- of all aspects analysis more demand for the history of science) rather than political or than political rather of science) the history to an increase in academic study of the Chi- study in academic an increase to demics and institutions from analyzing sensitive sensitive analyzing from demics and institutions to of the Uyghurs, treatment such as topics, discourage analysis of Chinese politics. These of Chinese politics. These analysis discourage functioning. This need, however, has not led need, however, This functioning. a decline in “area studies,” with much more with much more studies,” a decline in “area actions, has typically been unavailable. has typically actions, sociology (for example, women’s studies and studies women’s example, sociology (for stand how the Chinese political system is is the Chinese political system how stand scholars. small groups, in which party and state officials officials and state party in which small groups, source analysis more difficult, but also more but also more difficult, more analysis source of China’s top ministries, the interplay between between the interplay ministries, top of China’s and the national of SOEs chief executives of generation of the next our understanding emphasis on the study of Chinese society and of Chinese society emphasis on the study open harassment of both domestic and foreign and foreign of both domestic open harassment efforts range from steadily reducing access to access reducing steadily range from efforts Similarly, membership in the Chinese leading in the Chinese leading membership Similarly, Chinese leaders. Chinese politics, there is a significant unmet unmet is a significant Chinese politics, there Chinese databases to discouraging foreign aca- foreign discouraging to Chinese databases CCP has never been transparent, obscuring the the obscuring been transparent, has never CCP The role of technology was highlighted in the The role of technology was Technology in this context means information in this context Technology As a result, for those who choose to study study those who choose to for As a result, This reduction in transparency makes open- makes in transparency reduction This area with critical implications for U.S. security. area with critical implications for U.S. technology and its many components. This is an components. technology and its many released the 14th Five-Year Plan for the National Five-Year released the 14th PRC’s Made in China 2025 industrial policy plans. policy Made in China 2025 industrial plans. PRC’s 2021, CCP leadership on March 5, recently, More of the People’s Economic and Social Development Technology  Transparency from theChineseGovernment: 3out of10 18 with nationalchampionssuchasHuawei, Alibaba, research, development, andcommercialization fundsthatsteermajor public/private technology include aclearbreakout investments ofPRC inthe include how muchhasbeenallocatedinthese that wouldnot befoundinpublicdata. “black” orclassified budget tifiable andlikely ina the PRC governmentthe PRC hasaccessto. those listed above) inR&Dbutwhich thatengage areas by theindividualprovinces, prefectures, or and Tencent, internationalglobalattention has as aglobaltechnologyleaderinthepast 15years ated researchprojectsdedicatedtotrackingthis districts. Further, CCP-sanctioned datadoesnot campaign toacquiretechnology—is not easilyiden- expanded beyondthePRC’s government-spon- sponsored cyber and human-enabled espionage andhuman-enabledespionage sponsored cyber sored technologyfunding.Growing attention has such asChineseGovernment GuidanceFunds. public andprivatefunding. prominent thinktanksaroundtheworldhave cre- been paidtoprivateChinesecompanies(suchas l l l l l l

There are severe gapsinthedata provided by Australian StrategicPolicy Institute Interna- As Chinahasenteredtheinternationalstage To supplementincomplete officialreporting, Emerging Technology McKinsey GlobalInstitute Brookings GlobalChinaProject Further, wellasthestate- muchoftheR&D—as Center forInternationalGov Georgetown University CenterforSecurityand the Chinesegovernment withregard to tech - tional Cyber Policy Centre Stanford-New AmericaDigiChinaProject ernance Innovation by theNational Natural Science Foundation of hosted at State Key Laboratories and supported research activities are notthat secretive. Itpub- nology. Ononehand,theChinesegovernment’s lishes information aboutmajorR&D projects 74 69 73 72 - 70 China Transparency Report 71 68 Overall Transparency: 6outof10 China (NSFC). Chinesescientific literature and Chinese government’s surveillance technology Chinese government usedto bemore transpar grams over thepast decade. Buttoday’s major government’s priorities.Transparency onthe efforts have beenable to piece together some government andCCP offices (at the provincial ogy transfer isnottransparent. The Chinese ogy-gathering operations have beenmet with opaque. Noinformation isbeingpublished eign ExpertRecruitment Plan,are still largely operations to monitor andabsorbforeign changing withtime, asChineseinternet com- considerably. The PRC issomewhat transparent ent onitstalent programs buthasregressed surviving information about majortalent pro- state leansonpredatory investment prac sector sponsors, China’s state-backed research some success inrecent years. Private efforts about award winners. Private efforts to compile any information aboutthebudgets ofcentral- annual budgets andexpense reports. Yet thisis about itsbudgeting andexpenditure. Most local technology. Through painstaking work, these deployment has alsoimproved asaresult of to compile andanalyze publicbudget docu- tices andclandestine intelligence-gathering to suchinformation. The PRC doesnotpublish Private efforts have beeninstrumental in improving overall transparency withregard to in more democratic countries. Moreover, many information abouttheiractivities asdothose institutions generally donotpublishasmuch information aboutChina’s science- andtechnol- plans, includingtheNational High-EndFor known aboutthem.Ontheotherhand,technol- not disclosedpublicly, andlittle, ifanything, is projects financed by theNSFC in2020 were because they donotneedto attract private patent information isgenerally available. But, private efforts. ments have shedmore light ontheChinese breakthroughs inscience andtechnology. The budget ofthecentral CCP committee. panies are beginningto blockforeign access level CCP offices, andlittle isknown aboutthe level andbelow) publishinformation abouttheir - - -  19 police, and intelligence applications. Resources Resources applications. and intelligence police, of the the unseen budget as part of perfected ing domestic technologies to track, surveil, and surveil, track, to technologies ing domestic Ministry of State Security. of State Ministry technologies from the PRC’s “black” budget in “black” budget the PRC’s from technologies R&D of China. The Firewall tion, and the Great are clearly being poured into developing these these developing into poured clearly being are published in its open- is being what addition to source reporting. Just how much is unclear and much is unclear how Just reporting. source such as the social population, its own suppress - on develop focus an intense clearly maintained - recogni facial surveillance, mass score, credit been have would of these technologies of most very difficult to ascertain. Further, the PRC has the Further, to ascertain. difficult very The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The lack of detailed visibility into the PRC’s defense defense the PRC’s into visibility lack of detailed broad figures released, but it is difficult if not but it is difficult released, figures broad impossible to estimate how much is spent that that much is spent how estimate to impossible - technolo advanced for R&D is unseen—namely By far the biggest challenge in understanding in understanding challenge the biggest far By technology, quantum computing, autonomous autonomous computing, quantum technology, to its military, intelligence, and vast domestic domestic and vast intelligence, its military, to and state security spending. Some U.S.-based Some U.S.-based spending. security and state job do a decent think tanks and international security services based on output and the based services security of estimating how much the CCP allocates allocates much the CCP how of estimating gies. Clearly, many AI, robotics, information information AI, robotics, many gies. Clearly, vehicles, and other technologies have military, military, have other technologies and vehicles, China’s technological development plans is the plans is the development technological China’s   21 - Understanding the strengths and weaknesses in the strengths Understanding The Heritage Foundation has created the China The Heritage Foundation An accurate assessment of the health of China’s An accurate assessment of the health of China’s publicly available resources that can help inter publicly available economy is important for a number of reasons. is important for a number of reasons. economy ested individuals and agencies to determine the individuals and agenciesested to determine consumption are decreasing (which might reflect consumption of China’s economy. But because of China’s lack But because of China’s economy. of China’s its careful managementof transparency—and of a poorer economy). and government spending can make it seem as spending can make and government true health of China’s economy. true health of China’s though GDP is increasing when components like like though GDP is increasing when components that China’s economy is the second largest in the is the second largest economy that China’s the official data it does release—there has been far not economists. Many simply rely on the fact Many economists. not This ignores parity. purchasing power measured by of the problems China faces as an increas- many economy China’s economy. socialist ingly assertive is large, but riddled with problems. world when measured in U.S. dollars or first when or first dollars world when measured in U.S. Government actions such as increasing investment actions such as increasing investment Government China’s economy will give analysts a better picture a better analysts will give economy China’s The first is that most public policy analysts are public policy analysts is that most The first Transparency Project to highlight the world-class, Transparency Project to highlight the world-class, Why Chinese Economic Chinese Economic Why Transparency Is Important Transparency Economy The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The The second problem is that GDP accounting is There are two problems with measuring China’s There are two problems with measuring China’s At its heart, the study of economics involves involves of economics the study its heart, At better assessment of the welfare of China’s econ- assessment of the welfare of China’s better per capita (or GDP per person) is one-fifth the size of those in the world’s most advanced economies. A advanced economies. most of those in the world’s GDP per Even requires more inputs than GDP. omy capita is an insufficient measure of the wealth of both officials, Chinese government corruptible. it seem as if China’s can falsify numbers to make increasing. if not is stable, economic growth domestic product (GDP). This includes the total of product (GDP). This includes the total domestic spending, government investment, consumption, country has: GDP is an imperfect model that fails collective choices of those individuals. To study study To choices of those individuals. collective to default to broad, task. It compels many colossal at the provincial level and at the national level, and at the national level, level at the provincial and net exports within China. and net analyzing the choices people make based on the based on the analyzing the choices people make the Chinese people. to fully reflect the welfare of a country. China may China may to fully reflect the welfare of a country. the economy of 1.4 billion individuals in China is a of 1.4 the economy have one of the world’s largest GDPs, but its GDP largest GDPs, one of the world’s have macro-level data and trends. One common method One common method data and trends. macro-level gross is to look at the components of China’s resources available to them. An economy is the to them. An economy resources available Defining Economy Defining GDP, however. The first problem is one that every problem is one that every The first however. GDP,  Official Data from China 22 China’s economy worksdifferentlyfromthe Government officials now hadaknack forpredict- China’s economy throughitsNationalBureau whether by attempting tobuildaself-sufficient just thateconomicchoicesinChinacanbediffer lishes asignificantamountofinformationon inequality between theeastern andwestern ing thegrowth ratefortheentire country, even more questionable. understand thatChina’s economy ismuchmore too muchfocusonitsstrengths andfartoolittle trade statistics, forexample,becausetheycanbe tries theycover like tradeorthedigitaleconomy, the NBS:informationonChina’s GDP, population ability ofChina’s official GDP statistics andtheir also publishmorein-depth informationonindus- and educationindustries; andmore.Provincial antee qualitydata. are plentifulbutnot always reliable. Perhaps to and other free-market economiesare. consequences exactedby decadesofsocialist on itsweaknesses. economies oftheU.S. orother countries. Itisnot economy inthefutureaswell. domestic economy orby trying tocreatetheillu- of China’s GDPsuspiciously becamelessvolatile. components. Sincetheearly1990s, thegrowth compared toother countries’statistics—others are data thatNBSpublishesmay bemorereliable— collected by the NBS. Government will agencies government datawillfeedintotheinformation of Statistics (NBS),butmoredatadoesnot guar create theillusionoftransparency, Beijingpub- ent fromthoseinAmerica;itisalsoimportantto sion ofstable economicgrowth, willaffectthe size, and wage andincomerates;itstravel,size, andwage retail, provinces. TheactionsthatBeijingistakingtoday, policies, whethergaporeconomic itisagender susceptible topoliticalinterferencethantheU.S. being publishedby theNBStoo. Whilesomeofthe but muchofthattoplineinformationendsup by thePeople’s RepublicofChinagovernment All sortsofeconomicdatacanbefoundthrough Beijing continuestostruggle withtheeconomic Finally, itisimportanttounderstand how For years, economists have questioned thereli- Official dataonChina’s economy asreleased China Transparency Report - - (as measuredby GDP)allows Beijingtosignal China’s nationalinterest, thereisnosignificant China. Given state enterprises’proximity to China’s economicproductivity. what wouldbeannouncedatthenationallevel. largest companiesintheworld,whether theyare Private Efforts net exports):interest rates, productivity, health measured by total assets orby total employment, mation. For example,someofChina’s state-owned investment wheninactualityareaslike household investors thatChinaisstill aprofitablemarket for investment cansendsignalstopotential foreign ing. Stronggrowth ratesinareaslike retail or incentive tomake GDPandother statistics appear ity toservicedebt, andtheoverall performanceof is unusual.For example,Beijingrevisedits2019 influenced by theglobalrecession. troublesome foramyriad ofreasons. Thereare tion, butcollectingdataonany economy can be transparency withrespecttohowtransparency theseorgani- the worldthatitseconomicmodelissucceed- times readjusted for Beijing’s benefit. Adjustmentstimes readjusted forBeijing’s benefit. the provincial governments werereportingand though gapswouldbecomeevidentbetween what and education, and working age population,among and education, andworkingage and thereforemeritsafairamountofatten - and state-invested companiesexist throughout and state-invested enterprisesareamongthe are not uncommoninmost countries, butthesize economy besidesthecomponentsofGDP(con - other indicatorstoconsiderwhenlooking atan of corrupted statistics lackofinfor isthegeneral consumption may bestagnating. questions about China’s financial stability, itsabil- of theadjustments inChina’s official statistics decline ofinvestment in2020appearedtobeless sumption, investment, government spending,and zations arefinancedandoperated.Thiscreates statistics oninvestment down by several hundred feature ofconsumption) orinvestment, aresome- but just asmany, ifnot more,smallerstate-owned better thantheyare.Astable orgrowing economy billion dollarstomake itappearasthoughthe Perhaps just asworrisomeBeijing’sreporting Beijing hasboth apoliticalandaneconomic China hasoneoftheworld’s largesteconomies Components ofGDP, like statistics onretail (a 1 -  23

5 7 Economics is just one of Economics is just 6 Based in Europe, the Mercator Based in Europe, the Mercator 8 Mercator Institute for China Studies: “Trade and “Trade Studies: China for Institute Mercator Milken Institute: “Best-Performing Cities China.” “Best-Performing Institute: Milken being the largest. Investment.” strength of China. The Lowy Institute’s Asia Institute’s of China. The Lowy strength relative ponent of its measurement of China’s in Asia. An explanation of the Lowy power or second-tier cities or third-tier cities. The or second-tier cities or third-tier cities. city tiers depends difference between generally cities on the size of the cities with first-tier ogy, social, and international image, that CSIS’s image, social, and international that CSIS’s ogy, to relative nature of Chinese power evolving global competitiveness, and the future of its global competitiveness, CSIS the renminbi, among others. currency, chains and provides a quarterly outlook on the a quarterly outlook chains and provides economic performance of “34 first- and second- economic performance of “34 first- growth; foreign direct investment (FDI) growth: (FDI) growth: foreign direct investment growth; can be a particular burden on its finances. Debt Debt on its finances. burden can be a particular which economy, of China’s the growth can slow are then ranked as to whether they are first-tier they are first-tier as to whether are then ranked an interactive map, began in 2015 and tracks the began in 2015 map, an interactive the China Transparency Project’s chapter on chapter the China Transparency Project’s Shanghai, for example, has a population of more Shanghai, for example, cities The best-performing try employment. the power of other countries. Economic issues countries. of other the power than 25 million and a local GDP of roughly than 25 million and and “228 tier cities” from Beijing to Zhengzhou indicators: two There are nine third-tier cities.” high-speed rail and value in global supply high-speed rail and economy. health of China’s include China’s infrastructure spending, its infrastructure include China’s to look at the relative the only institute is not measures each of job, wage, and GDP per capita measures each of job, is still considered a middle-income economy. economy. a middle-income considered is still five categories, along with military, technol- along with military, categories, five China Power Project uses to examine the China Power Center for Strategic and International Studies: Studies: and International Strategic for Center Project. China Power China has some of the largest cities in the world. China has some of $500 billion. The Milken Institute’s “Best- Institute’s Milken $500 billion. The Power Index also uses the economy as a com- Index also uses the economy Power FDI-to-GDP and high value–added indus- ratio; MacroPolo also has digital projects on China’s China’s digital projects on also has MacroPolo Performing Cities China” series, which includes Cities China” series, Performing Institute’s Asia Power Index can be found in Index can be found Asia Power Institute’s “Indexes and Rankings.” “Indexes

l l l -

2 Macro- 4 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The Some of the least important are Some of the least 3 MacroPolo: “China’s Debt Hangover.” “China’s MacroPolo: debt is affecting real economic output across debt ability to service that debt are important ques- ability to service that debt active map that looks at debt within China’s 31 within China’s map that looks at debt active it looks Specifically, and regions. all provinces through local government at the ratio of debt tions. A high amount of debt for any country for any A high amount of debt tions. the extent to which local government financing to which local government the extent regions and provinces. The indicator measures regions and provinces. financing vehicles to GDP (debt-to-GDPfinancing ratio). Polo is the in-house think tank of the Paulson is the in-house think tank of the Paulson Polo 2018. The level of China’s debt and China’s and China’s debt of China’s The level 2018. Institute. Its “China Debt Hangover” Debt is an inter Its “China Institute. There are prominent for-pay resources that one There are prominent for-pay The dataset currently covers the years 2009– currently covers The dataset When it comes to analyzing China’s economy, economy, analyzing China’s When it comes to

l but there is far less open-source information that but there is far less open-source information for example). Derek Scissors at the American for example). Derek Scissors at the stock prices, money supply, and trade. money supply, prices, stock quality of those data. Generally, his conclusion is quality of those data. Generally, can use to analyze China’s economy—resources economy—resources can use to analyze China’s difficulty of gathering information make analyz- information make difficulty of gathering others. For example, there is a significant overlap overlap there is a significant example, For others. assessing the health of China’s economy, and the economy, assessing the health of China’s are a few examples of the open-source resources ability of government data, China’s size, and the size, and the data, China’s ability of government that the most valuable indicators are those that are that the most thinks of the economic data that are available in available thinks of the economic data that are that are available. that are often used by companies and individuals that are often used by in China— to invest in or planning that are invested however, the lack of transparency, the unreli- lack of transparency, the however, national wealth. is as comprehensive and available. The following The following and available. is as comprehensive ing the health of the economy extremely difficult. extremely economy ing the health of the - for debat are notorious economists is available, to and how ing about which are more important for inflation, measure them correctly (adjusting ing and other government-funded operations, all of operations, government-funded ing and other investment being a component of any economy. of any being a component investment worst measured such as unemployment, debt, and debt, measured such as unemployment, worst with this chapter and the China Transparency and the China chapter with this which constitute economic activity. which constitute China, which indicators are more important in China, which indicators are more important Even when a significant amount of economic data when a significant Even about what he has written Enterprise Institute Project’s chapter on China’s outbound investments, investments, outbound on China’s chapter Project’s The same could be said for China’s defense spend- for China’s could be said The same  24 l l

2. Institute forChinaStudies(MERICS),provides 1. year over year, theydogive analysts asenseof China’s digitaleconomy, industrial policy, and Caixin Global:Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI). Caixin, partneredwithIHSMarket, releases ment. MERICSalsocovers other topicssuchas reports analyzingChina’s tradeandinvest- month. APMIscorehigherthan50pointsindi- not necessarily usefulwhencomparing data ing andservicesPMIshows whether economic not. Thiscanmake themhardtofindandthere- ing onwhether they’reaccepted by ajournalor much deeperinsightintowhattheavailable reports fromvariousthinktanksandjournals. monthly indexes theeconomic thatgauge health ofChina’s economy. The problemwith than 50pointsindicatesacontraction. the healthofChina’s economy frommonthto these reportsistheyareonlypublisheddepend- activity in these two sectors is generally activity inthesetwosectorsisgenerally and inscholarlyjournals. These canprovide activity ofChina’s manufacturingandservices outbound foreigndirectinvestments. cates anexpansionofactivity, andascorelower expanding orcontractingcomparedtothe economics professionisbuiltondataanalysis data actuallymeanwhentryingtoanalyzethe preceding month.Whilethesesurveys are provide services, Caixin’s monthlymanufactur sectors. Basedonsurveys sentto500manu- published asreports, aspeer-reviewed articles, Individual Reports andPapers. facturing companiesand400that fore keep trackof.Thefollowing arejust afew Tianlei HuangatthePeterson Institute for International Economicshasdoneworkthat Logan Wright andLaurenGloudemanof Return?” helooksatnon-performingloans, CSIS andDaniel RosenoftheRhodium firms. Inworkssuchas “As ChinaRecov loss-making state-owned enterprises, and in China,sometimes referredtoaszombie the numberofbankruptcies inChina. explores thesurvivalofnon-profitablefirms ers fromthePandemic, WillZombieFirms Muchofthe China Transparency Report 10 - 9

- 4. 3. 5.

A paper, preparedfortheSpring2019 The ChinaEconomicRiskMatrix,theylook (IMF) isnot aprivateorganization,itisan While theInternationalMonetary Fund They willalso provide helpful analysisof published These consultationsaregenerally Investment, savings, andindustrial growth Economic Researchexaminesdifferences Brookings Papers onEconomic Activity years, butthisresearchsuggests thatChi- China’s NationalBureauofStatistics has Group have doneworklookingatthepoten- China’s PurchasesofUSGoods”tracks Chad Bown, alsoatthePeterson Institute financial crisis. liberalization) toassessthelikelihood ofa rates have allbeenoverstated foryears. national levels. in China’s reportingofGDPatthelocaland numbers forthepast decade.Specifically, nese officials have alsobeen overstating GDP na’s GDPgrowth hasbeenpositive over the important resourceinanalyzingChina’s known asitsArticle IVconsultations. have afocusonfiscalandmonetary policies. unions, andcivilsociety inwhatiscommonly thereby inflatingGDPgrowth statistics. the IMF’s mission, thesereportstendto tion togovernment data,thereports include tial riskofaneconomiccrisisinChina.In the progressofPhaseOnetradedeal PhaseOneTracker: trade. His“US–China assessments by theIMFstaff. Becauseof at five indicators(property, banks, debt or and publishedby theNationalBureauof ernment, representatives ofbusiness, labor economists toChinaconsultwithgov economic andfinancepoliciesofitsmem- economy. TheIMFregularlymonitorsthe on aregularbasis, usuallyannually. In addi- credit, external pressure,andcapitalaccount on Chinesetrade,particularlyU.S.–China signed inearly2020. for InternationalEconomics, hasfocused been overestimating nationalinvestment, bers, includingChina.Thisinvolves sending 11 13 Thereisnodoubt thatChi- 12 14

-  - 25

- 16 Some local governments have have Some local governments 15 China has increasingly become a consumer Beijing has long taken credit for China’s eco- for China’s credit Beijing has long taken Decades of other socialist policies like migra- policies like socialist Decades of other between eastern and western provinces. China cur provinces. and western eastern between points since 2008. pletely abandoned its socialist ideology. External External ideology. abandoned its socialist pletely financial crisis and such as the 2009 global shocks, poverty and giving more Chinese access to a better more Chinese access to a better and giving poverty panies still want to invest in China. Rising wages to invest want panies still population growth have also led to significant have population growth still not a consumer market comparable to the U.S. comparable to the U.S. a consumer market not still government debt to GDP by over 30 percentage over to GDP by debt government quality of life and leisure. But Beijing never com- leisure. But Beijing never quality of life and to production, employment, whether disruptions, local of loans by example, the issuing For or GDP. economic model to succeed. Entry into the World Entry into the World model to succeed. economic - trade and invest to foreign market opened China’s or Europe, and there are questions as to whether as to whether or Europe, and there are questions on track to become old before it becomes rich. authoritarian capitalist economic model under the economic model authoritarian capitalist economic to keep governments and national-level activity going has increased the ratio of local automobiles, e-commerce, financial technologies, e-commerce, financial technologies, automobiles, But China is and proliferation of smartphones. ance in the ratio of men to women or in wealth ance in the ratio of men to women or to see its work China is expected 2050, By active. the late 1970s and allowed for a more capitalist more capitalist for a and allowed the late 1970s the increasing levels of debt. the increasing levels and efforts to control restrictions tory worker have allowed for more disposable income, which for more disposable allowed have of development has had huge effects on China’s now COVID-19, have shifted Beijing toward a more a more shifted Beijing toward have COVID-19, now it that way. nomic success and wishes to keep sure that not) to make resources (efficiently or ment, helping to lift millions more out of abject ment, helping to lift it ever can be. Can China changeit ever from being the market, which explains why many foreign com- many which explains why market, ing-age population to have fallen by 25 percent. ing-age fallen by population to have managed this better than others but the future of but than others managed this better it is an imbal- imbalances within China, whether billion, but only 800 rently has a population of 1.4 million (58 percent) are considered economically leadership of President Xi Jinping. leadership of President China’s economy is not susceptible to further susceptible is not economy China’s Coupled with rising debt levels, China’s economy is economy China’s levels, Coupled with rising debt China’s economic development is in question given given is in question economic development China’s This means that Beijing is more willing to invest to invest This means that Beijing is more willing Trade Organization in the early 2000s further early 2000s further in the Trade Organization “world’s manufacturer” to the “world’s consumer?” manufacturer” to the “world’s “world’s The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The be over the next few years, though this is few years, the next be over predict what it thinks China’s GDP will China’s predict what it thinks questionable given China’s already unre- already China’s given questionable the years, there has been particular interest interest been particular there has the years, in the strength of the renminbi, especially of the renminbi, in the strength The IMF will also dollar. to the U.S. relative relative strength of China’s currency. Over Over currency. of China’s strength relative liable GDP numbers. China’s foreign exchange reserves and the reserves foreign exchange China’s provide sufficient data on Chinese government government data on Chinese sufficient provide the Chinese government. by be provided must is also a severe lack of reliable data from the from data lack of reliable is also a severe Private efforts have helped filled some of the have efforts Private data on consumption, wages, and employment, and employment, wages, on consumption, data of on the nature is a lack of information there Chinese state-owned over control the CCP’s debt is more is. Local than local government that said, these efforts have not been able to not been able have efforts said, these that the nature of the CCP’s control over Chinese over control of the CCP’s the nature spending and debt, as this area of transparency of transparency spending and debt, as this area significantly improved transparency on Chinese transparency improved significantly enterprises (SOEs) and businesses. Official data Official and businesses. (SOEs) enterprises When it statistics. lack basic firm-level on SOEs the spending, debt and government to comes transparent seems more government central There and much of it is off budget. complicated, on its economy has significant gaps. While the gaps. has significant on its economy gate gross domestic product (GDP) figures. (GDP) product domestic gross gate government subsidies and China’s GDP. With With GDP. subsidies and China’s government gaps in data, especially in shedding light on especially in shedding light gaps in data, China’s economic development has been economic development China’s SOEs and businesses. Private efforts have also have efforts Private and businesses. SOEs - on subsidies and aggre Chinese government Chinese government is fairly transparency with transparency is fairly Chinese government In this section are scores assessing the trans- In this section are The data provided by the Chinese government the Chinese government by provided data The for calculating these scores can be found on p. 119. on p. for calculating these scores can be found parency of the Chinese government and overall parency and overall of the Chinese government score is rated on a 10-point scale. The methodology methodology score is rated on a 10-point scale. The transparency as a result of private efforts. Each transparency as a result of private efforts. impressive since it opened more to the world in impressive Overall Transparency: 5 out of 10 Transparency: Overall Grade and Reasoning Grade Transparency from the Chinese Government: 4 out of 10 4 out the Chinese Government: from Transparency Trends from the Data from Trends  Opportunities for FurtherResearch 26 China’s economy actuallyis. Generallyspeaking, China’s economy withthehealthofU.S. or when theeconomy isnot doingwell(forexample, labor andcapitalcomparedtomany other econo- nificant impactinanalyzingthehealthofChina’s is questionable, especiallyinviewofthefact mies, butwhether theyarebeingusedefficiently its state mediaorganizations, isunlikely toreport investment, orretail numbers, isanother areaof nity toprovide amoreobjective analysisofChina’s unreliable, andthisoffersresearchersanopportu- the efficiency ofaneconomythe efficiency isbasedonwhat to astotal factorproductivity. Chinahasalot of tance ofthosedatacanstill behigh. have tobe that manufacturedgoods atendency and technology. Measuring whatisactuallypro- duced basedontheseinputsissometimes referred economy istryingtofigureouthow efficient capital borderonuseless, but theeconomicimpor criticisms thatdataonthereturns tolaborand opment aswell.Thiswouldtieinnicelywith economy isprogressingthroughoutitsdevel- can give analysts abetter senseofhow China’s overproduced inChina. opportunity. Beijing,eitherdirectlyorthrough corrupts itsstatistics, whether by adjusting GDP, economy. Keeping trackofwhenandhow Beijing other economies, butcomparingtheChinese and being producedgiven acountry’s labor, capital, because of rising inflation or a shortage of goods). of because ofrisinginflationorashortage Measuring ofChina’s theefficiency economy Many analysts trytocomparethehealthof Chinese government dataarenotoriously One researchareathatcouldhave themost sig- 17 China Transparency Report - American economiesislike comparingapplesand American andChineseconsumption patterns are Chinese economy toEuropeanandother econo- increasingly digitalandautomated. pandemicorbecomes recovers fromtheCOVID-19 mies. TheU.S. andChineseeconomiesarelarge, relative sizeofChina’s economy. mists usemorethantheygive any senseofthe mies arenot atthesame stages ofdevelopment. history. Thestudy ofeconomicsisnot just astudy trends. For example: oped, buthow itcontinuestodevelop astheworld oranges. Thesame istrueoftryingtocomparethe economy andtheU.S. orother advancedecono- economies, suchasadjusting GDPforpurchasing different. Effortstocomparethe U.S. andChinese of peopleandresources. Itisalso thestudy of state ofChina’s economy: not just how ithasdevel- power parity, exposeflawsinthemethods econo- standing ofthehealthChina’s economy would progress—that Chinahasmadethroughoutits but similaritiesbeyondthatarenegligible.China’s benefit fromlookingattheprogress—orlackof l l l

There isalot still tobelearned aboutthetrue Those whoaretryingtogainabetter under How hasChina’s economy developed sinceit How hasChina’s economy developed since How hasChina’s economy developed sinceits joined theWorld TradeOrganization? last five-year economicplan? smartphones werefirst introduced? -  27 for cooking and heat; pesticide use, mining runoff and chemicals, and use, mining runoff and chemicals, pesticide such as commercial fishing; other contaminants that leach into the soil as a other consequence of human activities; and affected by the sources of the fuel they use affected annual output of carbon dioxide and annual output of carbon dioxide Stewardship of water resources and industries resources and industries of water Stewardship methane emissions. methane ficult measure because households are ficult measure because households China’s commitment to transparent and reli- China’s Greenhouse gas emissions trends and Land and soil pollution, which involve tracking tracking Land and soil pollution, which involve Indoor air quality, which is a more dif- which is a more Indoor air quality, Water quality and water pollution; quality and water Water

l l l l l because they are the core building blocks of well- Affordable, reliable energy being and livelihoods. people, who must live with the consequences of live people, who must Energy use policy. poor energy and environmental and Environment Is Important and Environment able data is important chiefly for the Chinese close to home strike environment and a healthy Why Transparency on China’s Energy Energy on China’s Transparency Why - The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The Energy and Environment and Energy surements of particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, sulfur dioxide, surements of particulate matter, nitrous oxides, carbon monoxide, and ozone; monoxide, carbon nitrous oxides, Categories of energy data include energy Environmental data survey a wide range data survey of Environmental This chapter offers a snapshot of China’s energy of China’s offers a snapshot This chapter Air quality, which is generally mea- which is assessed by Air quality,

l by sector, and imports and exports. They also They also and imports and exports. sector, by benchmark for evaluating human well-being. production and use by source of energy, end use end source of energy, production and use by pendent, there is interplay between energy and energy between pendent, there is interplay encompass energy infrastructure investment, investment, encompass energy infrastructure per and energy consumption energy poverty, product (GDP). Reliable dollar of gross domestic and human health stewardship environmental to which pollution including the extent categories, directly affects human health and the environment. development. Together, they provide an important an they provide Together, development. environmental issues. Energy production and use Energy production and issues. environmental impacts on and negative positive both can have policy and environmental quality, environmental and environmental data. While each area is inde- data. and environmental trend data in these areas can help evaluate how trend data in these areas can help evaluate how changing. tant) not impacts access to energy resources, and therefore, impacts access to energy resources, Defining Energy and Environment Defining Energy China’s energy mix is changing or (equally impor China’s Categories include:  Montreal Protocol, reliabledataarenecessary to 28 Clear, objective datacanidentifywhereproblems well-being. Free cleaner economiesaregenerally choicesandgovernment structureswhich policy worse, itsneighbors, more concrete anddefensibleevidenceasto decisionsonenergyuseand impact ofpolicy responsible foranumberofseriouspublichealth is anecessityforfamilies, butsotooisaclean, international arrangements andmarkets.international arrangements ments withmajoreconomicimplicationssuch number ofinternationalenvironmental agree- role ininfluencingpeacefulusesofnuclearpower its government andcompanieswillplay acritical manufacturer andexporterofnuclearpower, and more efficient—contributeto environmentally sus- negate itseffectiveness. has aglobalreach,anditsenergymarket ambitions have internationalimplications. China’s economy tion patterns, andharmtopeople’s well-being. tional commitments. For example, Chinaisarising tainable economicoutcomes. Unfreeeconomies, the globalcommons. as theParis Agreement,Kyoto Protocol, and and exportingboth safety andinternational non- and itstrustworthiness inupholdingitsinterna- accountability, incentive toinnovate andbecome and environmental practicesaffect,forbetter or environmental protection. Suchdataprovide exist andincentivizedata-driven solutions. economies, commitments. Suchdataaresimilarlyusefulin ensure thatChinaisliving uptoitsobligationsand sess greaterwealthtoimprove theirenvironments, such asChina’s, problems, declinesinworker productivity, migra- sound environment. China’s pollutionisdirectly proliferation practicesandnorms. progress asadeveloping anddeveloped nation, property rights, ruleoflaw, and transparency party authorities—where conflictsofinterests formulating U.S. responsestoChinainthese policy for discerningthehealthofChina’s economy, its for them largely inthehandsofgovernment and for themlargely best provide energyaccessandenvironmental but alsobecausethetoolsofstewardship— Accurate datawillalsohelptomeasurethe Accurate In addition,becauseChinaisapartyto Chinese energyandenvironmental dataalso 2 not onlybecausethesesocieties pos- 3 putthosetoolsandaccountability 4 6 itstradingpartners, Dataareusefulbenchmarks China Transparency Report 5 and 1

Official Data from China 15 ministerial departments. Chinareleasesthe Environmental Health tobuildaChineseEnviron- For instance, effortstoreducepollutioninurban China’s provinces. For example,ajointproject with theresultsofits“secondnationalpollution withholding ormisrepresentingdataonmultiple villages.” ranging fromprovinces andcitiestocounties mental PublicHealth Trackingsystem hasbeen ronmental reporting. ity andmagnitudeofdatacollectionacrossall ing dataonairquality. items ofbasicdata.” reputation for reporting energy and environmental nonexistent, orundisclosednationaldataand resources. treated someenergyandenvironmental data tal organizations(NGOs), than 1,800databasetables” with“over 150million the SecondNationalCensusonPollution Sources” the magnitudeofChina’s environmental problems. tal policiesinonecityorprovince affecteconomic and healthdataatvariousadministrative levels and Prevention andtheU.S. NationalInstitute of as state secrets, butinother cases, theabsence byability anddrive change thegovernment—for all ofthesedataisessentialifonetounderstand ardship, theChinesegovernment doesnot have a anecdotal evidenceofpoorenvironmental stew areas simplypushedindustrial activityoutsidethe accurate, andpubliclyavailable, thiscouldbea grating, analyzing,andinterpreting environmental complicated by thedifficultyof“collecting,inte- of consistent dataisduetothesheercomplex- example, withrespecttomonitoringandpublish- census every decade,andthedatainclude“more occasions by itsown citizens, data consistently oraccurately. Ithasbeencaught city tomoreruralareas. decisions andenvironmental outcomesinothers. source census,” athree-year effortundertaken by significant step forward forthecountry’s envi- pressure, whether fromtheChinesepeopleor from other countries, hashelpedtocreateaccount- between theChineseCenterforDiseaseControl After decadesoffraudulent,inconsistent, In thepast, theChinesegovernment has In June 2020, Chinareleasedthe“Bulletin on 10 9 Thisisimportantbecauseenvironmen- Inrecentyears, however, outside 12 Ifthesedataareobjective, 11 Theabilitytoaggregate 8 andU.S. government 7 nongovernmen- -  29

27 - there is 26 The CMA, along 23 The National Bureau of 29 28 24 Although China’s National Climate Although China’s Data on climate are reported largely by largelyclimate are reported Data on by In the past, data on energy in China have data on energy in China have In the past, 25 Energy. Climate. The lack of any official and consistent data official and consistent The lack of any The primary hub of climate research within the The primary hub of climate research between 1999 and 2000. Most importantly, the importantly, Most 1999 and 2000. between been called into question, but outside academics but outside academics been called into question, previously significant statistical difference for coal statistical previously significant sumption by sector, total imports and exports, and imports and exports, total sector, by sumption Energy Statistical Year Statistical in its Energy coal consumption emissions. dioxide on greenhouse gas emissions trends, climate-related trends both globally and specific climate-related trends both Climate commitment, pursuant to the Paris on mineral reserves, energy production and con- on mineral reserves, The International Energy GDP. energy intensity by on the supply and demand side for a number of resulting in breaks in time series energy products, on surface, upper air, meteorological, and satellite and satellite meteorological, air, on surface, upper this information The CMA opened observations. , which consequently underreports carbon book, which consequently underreports and significant revisions. any accountability. any and other government agencies, have published have agencies, government and other of those reports has not The integrity and 2015. and centers within the CMA. As China’s national national As China’s within the CMA. and centers includes data China Statistical Yearbook Statistics’ to China. tics’ “revisions showed significant changes both significant changestics’ “revisions showed both tive policymaking.tive the China Meteorological Administration (CMA) Meteorological the China to the public for free in 2015. to the public for free on Climate Change, which analyzes a number of have commented on data gaps that limit effec- have reporting is important in the context of China’s of China’s reporting is important in the context reporting on emissions make it difficult to enforce reporting on emissions make national climate assessment reports in 2007, 2011, 2011, reports in 2007, national climate assessment no official annual reporting on greenhouse gas. no official annual reporting on greenhouse lacked reliability because of frequent, unexplained, lacked was allocated to industrial consumption based on consumption allocated to industrial was with the Ministry of Science and Technology of Science and Technology with the Ministry weather service, the CMA makes near-term near-term makes service, the CMA weather data and collects land publishing weather forecasts Change Program used to publish information CMA is the National Climate Center. In August In August CMA is the National Climate Center. 2020, the Climate Center published its Blue Book the 2020, and uncertainties in data gaps, Inaccuracies, 2030. In the past, China has also underreported its In the past, Agreement, that its emissions would peak by peak by Agreement, that its emissions would Agency that the National Bureau of Statis- notes - 14 15 20 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The The Ministry of The Ministry 13 22 17 These data have These data have and and 21 16 The government’s “Black The government’s 19 - quality are notori Data on water - of Environmen The former Ministry 18 annual Report on the State of the Ecology and Report on the State of the Ecology and annual Report on the State of the Ecology and Sources of information on air pollution and air Sources of information on air pollution Sources of information on water quality in Sources of information on water Water Quality. Water Center’s Real-time National Air Quality, Center’s Compounding the difficulty, data manipulation data manipulation the difficulty, Compounding The National Bureau of Statistics of China’s of China’s The National Bureau of Statistics The Ministry of Ecology and Environment’s of Ecology and Environment’s The Ministry The National Bureau of Statistics of China’s of China’s The National Bureau of Statistics The China National Environmental Monitoring Monitoring The China National Environmental of Ecology and Environment’s The Ministry . China Statistical Yearbook . China Statistical Yearbook Air Pollution and Air Quality. Air Pollution Environment in China, Environment Environment in China, Environment

l l l l l between provincial and national departments provincial between from the former Ministry of Environmental Pro- of Environmental from the former Ministry provincial, and municipal levels of particulate and municipal levels provincial, ously difficult to capture, and “multiple ministries and “multiple ministries ously difficult to capture, quality in China include: expanded rapidly since 2013 to provide real- to provide since 2013 expanded rapidly of governments in some cases. of governments consolidate and standardize environmental data environmental consolidate and standardize and Smelly Waters” reporting program allows indi- reporting program allows and Smelly Waters” annual reports on the quality of surface water, but annual reports on the quality of surface water, to the public. available that monitor water quality creates discrepancies that monitor water time information on and monitoring of national, time information tection and six other central government bodies. central government tection and six other tal Protection published weekly, monthly, and monthly, published weekly, tal Protection have overlapping responsibilities in a system that in a system responsibilities overlapping have has occurred closer to the source at the local level level source at the local closer to the has occurred in data.” ing and management. Insufficient coordination is not conducive to effective groundwater monitor groundwater to effective conducive is not matter, sulfur dioxide, nitrous oxides, carbon nitrous oxides, sulfur dioxide, matter, and ozone. monoxide, information on the quality of drinking water is not is not information on the quality of drinking water viduals to report local water pollution. viduals to report local water China include: Ecology and Environment was created in 2018 to in 2018 created was Environment Ecology and  30 findings fromanationaleconomiccensus.” Private Efforts mineral resources. recently formedMinistry ofNaturalResources also reportsdataonlanduseandmarine catalyzed reformandimproved government trans- government dataandactualconditions. Pressure cal toexposingsignificantdiscrepanciesbetween environmental issuesinChinahave beencriti- energy inChinainclude: sources ofdataandinformationonenergy parency. Two examplesshow how thishasworked. from thebottom upandoutside inhassometimes l l l l l l

Jun foundedtheInstitute forPublicandEnvi- China StatisticalYearbook, The NationalNuclearSafety- Administra The ChinaElectricityCouncil, The Ministry ofNaturalResources The NationalBureauofStatistics ofChina’s Resources Bulletins 337 cities, aswellinformationmandatorily Citizen, NGO, andoutsidegovernment viduals andforeigncompanieslookingtodo maps arenow available asresourcesforindi- ronmental Affairs(IPE)tocollectandcompile responsibility requirements.” usable “environmental quality, emissionsand tion’s AnnualReport. tion levels. tors onsitetotrackparticulate matter (PM2.5) Sources ofinformationon and better informU.S. citizensaboutpollu- of reportingonenvironmental problems, Ma on relevantlegislationandcorporatesocial or voluntarily disclosedby enterprisesbased differed from Chinese governmentdiffered from Chinese airquality embassy inBeijinginstalled airqualitymoni- pollution sourcesupervisionrecordspublished business inChina. by thelocalgovernments of31provinces and Pressure from theoutsidein. Pressure from thebottom up. 37 Embassy data,whichrepeatedly 36 32 34 In2008, the U.S. 31 In2006, afteryears 35 33 IPEdataand and China Transparency Report 30 The (BRI) projects, estimates that“abouttwothirdsof Chinese spendingoncompleted BRIprojectswent China. Thefollowing areafewexamplesofthese in globalenergymarkets. For example,theMerca- more than50billionUSD.” into theenergysector, andalreadyamountsto in China.For example,Yale, Columbia University, in China’s baselineofficialdataweretooprevalent rate andtransparentaccesstoinformationin tor Institute forChinaStudies, whichmaintainsa to develop anenvironmental assessmentofeach the ChineseAcademyforEnvironmental Planning, to allow fortheconstruction ofaconsistent and also shedlightonChineseinvestment andpatterns and theCityUniversity ofHong Kong attempted a fullpictureofenergyandenvironment realities ate andorganizedatahave proved tobeandwill database ofspendingonBeltandRoadInitiative extremely difficultforindependentdatatocapture gaps, alackoftransparency, andinconsistencies of China’s provinces but“concludedthatdata comparable provincial ChinaEnvironmental Per open-source resources. continue tobecriticalachievingmoreaccu- formance Index(EPI).” l

Yale CenterforEnvironmental Law and Policy Yale Center for Environmental Law andPolicy: Envi- Independent datafromexternal sourceshas Index (EPI)uses“32performance indicators Information Network ofColumbiaUniversity’s NASA satellite data. Nevertheless,gener independenteffortsto Earth Institute since2006withdatagoing Given thelackofscopeandresources, itis vitality.” lution, weremadewidelyavailable through notifications thatdownplayed levels ofpol- to buildoutitsairqualitymonitoring,reporting, tries onenvironmental healthandecosystem and regulatorynetwork in2013. and independentsourcesof data,including across 11 issue categories [torank]180coun- across 11issuecategories and theCenterforInternationalEarthScience outcry forcedtheChinesegovernment tobegin social media.Internationalexposureandpublic back to1994,theEnvironmental Performance ronmental Performance Index. 40 TheEPIusesavariety ofgovernment 41 39 38 Compiledby the - - 

31 46

48 52 BP 47 It conducts It conducts 51 45 50 49 “A collaboration of two “A Global Energy Monitor Global Energy Monitor A joint project of the Global Climate Watch provides country- provides Climate Watch . Energy World of Review BP: Statistical - of govern come from a variety Data facilities. - institu with partner studies peer-reviewed publishes annual reports covering energy publishes annual reports covering and emissions by production, consumption, pollution-control policies. pollution-control plants, and public financing for coal projects. In public financing for coal projects. and plants, specific time-series data on greenhouse gas - on energy and environ trend data country-level emissions and climate targets. climate change, air quality, energy systems, systems, energy climate change, air quality, of ‘holding warming well below 2°C, and pursu- of ‘holding 2°C, well below warming country, region, and sector with data going back country, Climate Analytics and New Cli- organisations, climate action and measures it government gathers data on fossil fuel use with the intent to gathers data on fossil on all operating, planned, cancelled, and closed on all operating, planned, cancelled, articles and data in “China: Energy Country Energy articles and data in “China: and economic development.” and economic against the globally agreed Paris Agreement aim the globally agreed Paris against and independent data. and compiles field observations, emissions observations, and compiles field gas and greenhouse China’s and evaluation of tions in China of the global challenges of the global tions in China of to 1965. It uses publically available government government It uses publically available to 1965. mental topics. It also publishes China-specific mental topics. ing efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C.’” ing efforts to limit mate Institute,” Climate Action “tracks Tracker mate Institute,” inform climate and environmental decisions. environmental inform climate and inventories, atmospheric modeling of China, atmospheric modeling of inventories, infrastructure, coal mines, steel production steel coal mines, infrastructure, include information these trackers cases, many ment and independent sources. independent sources. Change Lab and the Oxford Martin Data Climate Action Tracker. Action Climate Climate Watch. Climate Global Energy Monitor. Global Energy . in Data Our World Programme on Global Development, Our Programme on Global Development, “China: CO2 Country Profile.” Profile” and Data come from a variety of government and of government Data come from a variety It maintains global trackers on coal plants, fossil coal plants, on trackers It maintains global includes extensive global and in Data includes extensive World

l l l l l -

- - The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The 43 Boston University’s University’s Boston Founded in 1993, the Har in 1993, Founded an interactive data project that tracks an interactive is an interactive data project by project by data is an interactive 44 42 Harvard–China Project on Energy, Economy Economy on Energy, Project Harvard–China and Environment. Boston University, Global Development Policy Policy Global Development University, Boston Boston University, Global Development Policy Center: Center: Policy Development Global University, Boston policy Bank banks: the China Development The billion in 2019. $3.2 including since 2000, source type (coal, gas, hydropower, etc.); energy etc.); hydropower, source type (coal, gas, trans- generation, extraction, subsector (power ship, capacity of the project, type of technology, capacity of the project, type of technology, ship, database of Chinese foreign direct investment, includ of Chinese foreign direct investment, organizes Chinese spending by region; energy organizes Chinese spending by global energy projects by China’s two global China’s by global energy projects operating status, and estimated C02 emissions. and estimated operating status, greenfield investments. As of the end of 2018, the As of the end of 2018, greenfield investments. of 777 Chinese- tracking “upwards database was countries, when possible. Every record includes record includes when possible. Every countries, cial documents” that are later “verified through through cial documents” that are later “verified generating a total of 186.5 gigawatts of power- gigawatts generating of 186.5 a total deal The database displays generation capacity. all of the power plants financed by the China plants financed all of the power and jointly financed projects). It also offers and jointly financed projects). It also the year, location, energy source, subsector, location, energy source, subsector, the year, types, the Chinese investor, percentage of owner the Chinese investor, types, have provided $251 billion in energy finance $251 provided have host country ministries, news reports, and offi- news reports, country ministries, host interactive map published on the website map published interactive ing mergers and acquisitions, debt finance, and debt ing mergers and acquisitions, interview contacts in China and other host host interview contacts in China and other mission, etc.); and lender (CDB, EX–IM Bank, EX–IM and lender (CDB, mission, etc.); for each year from 2000 to individual datasets lender, and project description.” lender, financed power plants overseas,” which were overseas,” plants financed power vard–China Project “conducts rigorous, vard–China Project “conducts rigorous, websites at the [Chinese] banks themselves or or websites at the [Chinese] banks themselves Center (GDPC) that analyzes financing for Center (GDPC) that GDPC also publishes the China’s Global Power Global Power GDPC also publishes the China’s Center: China's Global Energy Finance Database. Finance Global Energy China's Center: China’s Global Power Database. Global Power China’s Development Bank and the Export–ImportDevelopment formsBank of China worldwide as well as other Boston University’s Global Development Policy Policy Global Development University’s Boston Database, 2019. The data are collected from the “official The data are collected 2019. The project notes that these two policy banks The project notes The China’s Global Energy Finance (CGEF) Finance (CGEF) Global Energy The China’s (CDB) and the Export–Import Bank of China. (CDB) and the Export–Import

l l l  32 International Organization Efforts vately generated transparency,vately generated itisimportant in theoverall data. to note theresourcesprovided by international organizations astheyhelptofillsomeofthegaps l l l l

Although thefocusofthisreportisonpri- Energy Agency andpublishedby theOECD; Energy Agency Bureau ofStatistics. Bureau ofStatistics ofChina,secondarysources, Co-operation andDevelopment’s Nuclear Cambodia, andVietnam. TheStimsonCenter China’s network ofdamsandreservoirs along World HealthOrganization. with downstream countriesThailand,Laos, Organization hasahousehold energydatabase tive Waste Management. light, andheat theirhomes. numerous previouslyunreportedindicatorsin imagery, andGISanalysistoprovide near-real (the “Red Book”), prepared jointly and Demand(the“RedBook”),preparedjointly uses independent“remote sensing,satellite these arethePower ReactorInformationSystem tion, anddemand;nuclearwaste. Among the international governing body for nuclear the internationalgoverning bodyfornuclear that provides survey data onhow people cook, to 1971. the Mekong Basin.” time reportinganddatadownloads across the Mekong River impactswater resources, and and estimatesgoingback tofillingapsdata and emissions. Itusesdatafrom theNational database; on nuclearreactors;uraniumresources, produc- of nuclearpower databasesandissuesreports cies inenergydataprovided by theNational country-level energysupply, consumption, environmental stewardship, andagreements pices oftheUnitedNations. It housesanumber safeguards andnonproliferationundertheaus- piles dataandtrendsonglobal,regional, International Energy Agency. International Atomic Energy Agency. by theIAEAand theOrganisation forEconomic Henry L.Stimson Center: Mekong DamMonitor. Status andTrends inSpentFuel andRadioac- 54 TheIEAalsohastracked inconsisten- 56

Uranium 2020: Resources, Production 53 55 58 TheWorld Health TheIEAcom- 59 Italsoaggregates The IAEA is TheIAEAis China Transparency Report 57

Trends from theData Transparency from theChineseGovernment: 4outof10 Grade andReasoning Overall Transparency: 6outof10 nese policy adoptednese policy infive-year plans forenergy, transparency asaresultofprivateefforts.transparency Each and technologymarkets aswellinternational environmental agreements. quent implicationsforinternational energyfuel demand willonlycontinue togrow withconse - environment, andclimate projectthatChinese score isratedona10-pointscale.Themethodology parency oftheChinesegovernment andoverallparency producer. Independentestimates andofficialChi- for calculatingthesescorescanbefoundonp. 119. become amajorglobalenergyconsumerand The Chinesegovernment’s transparency on These indicators provided by theChinese zero transparency onwater andlandmanage- In thissectionarescoresassessingthetrans- In amatter ofseveral decades, Chinahas Monitoring Center. when itcomes to airquality data, there isnearly floated onlocalChinese, andsometimes global, government match theindicators provided by external efforts. Energy production data tend to energy andenvironment varies dependingon on energy production, climate, andwater and ency onenergy andenvironment. These efforts stock exchanges. as theChinesegovernment hasbeenreporting national airqualitydata,withChina’s data the type ofdata. Whereas itisvery transparent Private efforts have greatly improved transpar data forambientairqualitystandards and indicators for airquality for more thanadecade. by state owned enterprises that are listed and be more available becausethey are produced provided isoften notverifiable orisdisputed by ment andChina’s climate data. What little is supplied by Beijing’sNationalEnvironmental non-government efforts. not madeasmuchofanimpact onairquality have beeninstrumental infillinggapsdata land management. To note, private efforts have 60 -  33 74 As This 70 There 76 72 71 The appalling and exposed abuse China is a growing player in the player China is a growing 73 75 build as many as 30 reactors overseas in the as 30 reactors overseas build as many solar panels and its use of forced labor to make to make solar panels and its use of forced labor electricity, up from 2 percent a decade ago, and up from 2 percent a decade ago, electricity, growing. According data University growing. to Boston $52 billion for provided have direct investment supported more than 74 coal projects and have other country, and mass Chinese production country, other helped to of solar panels and components has of China’s Uyghur population could have impli- Uyghur population could have of China’s cations for Chinese solar exports. administrations of Presidents Barack Obama administrations to be and Donald Trump that appear not and producer of coal, and its consumption is and producer of coal, and its consumption those panels. trackers, Chinese government finance and Chinese government trackers, tive, particularly in developing countries. particularly in developing tive, resolved under President Joseph Biden. under President Joseph resolved megawatts of new coal power plants globally. of new coal power megawatts reduce prices drastically over the past decade. decade. the past over reduce prices drastically nuclear energy trade and has aspirations to decade as part of its Belt and Road Initia- next nonproliferation norms. is also the link between China’s production of China’s is also the link between wars between the U.S. and China under the and China under the U.S. between wars will influence both international markets and international markets will influence both 38 planned. China continues to be the largest consumer China continues to be the largest consumer China’s energy and environmental trends energy and environmental China’s China generates any more solar energy than Low component prices have triggered component prices have trade Low Nuclear energy provides 5 percent of China’s 5 percent of China’s Nuclear energy provides 17 reactors are under construction with another with another 17 reactors are under construction

l l l shape international markets. Several examples Several shape international markets. cally. Consequently, Philippe Benoit and Kevin Tu Kevin Philippe Benoit and Consequently, cally. on Global Energy Center of Columbia University’s nations. and developed developing ducer and exporter), China will continue to ducer and exporter), access to fuel, power, and heat, both standards of standards heat, both and fuel, power, access to also have international implications. As a international implications. also have the Chinese people have experienced increased experienced people have the Chinese hybrid superpower” trends akin to both displaying hybrid - pro (and, increasingly, major energy consumer related, it is clear that the two go is clear that the two related, it hand. hand in illustrate the point. illustrate living and economic growth have improved dramati- improved have economic growth living and Policy have argued that China is “the world’s only that China is “the world’s argued have Policy 66 It 65 However, However, - Approxi The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The 61 67 69 62 64 68 Electricity consumption per capita has per capita Electricity consumption 63 below the OECD average. below for OECD countries. - electricity con per capita average. However, across rural stratified is drastically sumption producer and consumer of renewable energy. producer and consumer of renewable second largest consumer of oil after the U.S. and the U.S. second largest consumer of oil after comes from fossil fuels. China is the world’s China is the world’s comes from fossil fuels. despite more concerted efforts by the cen- despite more concerted efforts for 2021–2025. on environment other country—nearly double the amount emit- country—nearly other quintupled since 2000, putting China in the China putting quintupled since 2000, cooking fuels, putting China well above levels levels China well above putting cooking fuels, and urban provinces. approximately 47 percent of the world’s coal. At coal. At 47 percent of the world’s approximately tral government to establish standards. Vice standards. to establish tral government plan five-year trends” in advance of the 14th ted by the second-place U.S. ted by tricity. than tripled since 2000, and China is now the and China is now 2000, than tripled since top third of nations and just below Europe’s Europe’s below and just top third of nations the same time, China is also the world’s largest largest time, China is also the world’s the same tion is the largest in the world, accounting for tion is the largest in the world, accounting mately 40 percent (about 560 million) of is also the third largest consumer and second is also the third largest imports more oil than any other country. other imports more oil than any largest importer of natural gas. China is the largest importer of natural gas. produc- largest consumer of coal, and its coal world’s largest energy consumer. world’s China emits more carbon dioxide than any than any China emits more carbon dioxide China is the world’s largest producer of elec- largest producer China is the world’s China’s total energy consumption has more has more consumption energy total China’s China’s people do not have access to clean have people do not China’s China’s energy consumption per capita is far energy consumption China’s More than 80 percent of China’s total energy total than 80 percent of China’s More Energy trends present a robust but varied but varied present a robust Energy trends Minister of Ecology and Environment Zhao of Ecology and Environment Minister These trends are a barometer of China’s eco- of China’s These trends are a barometer Air quality remains a persistent problem Air quality remains a persistent Yingmin recently noted “grim environmental “grim environmental Yingmin recently noted

l l l l l picture across China. picture across and economic growth is correlated or causally and economic growth nomic health. While it is unclear whether the nomic health. While it is unclear whether increased access to energyrelationship between  A 2020articleintheJournal ofEnvironmental World BankandtheU.N. Framework Convention Management foundthatincreasedthird-party Opportunities for FurtherResearch Paris ClimateAgreement.Its most recentfive-year 73 gigawatts. 34 China. 30 gigawatts ofcoalcapacity, commissioned38 well asitsenergyinvestments, appeartomain- wherewithal oftheworld’s wealthiest economies. monitoring improved thedataonairqualityin international agreements. Chinahascommitted to national climateandfinancebodiessuchasthe nation even assomeproblemsmorecharacteristic reporting have increaseddatareportingandavail- mental dataover thepast decade,both intermsof tain China’s status quoofrobust economicand to fillgapsindataandpursuefurtherresearch. tries butisalsotheworld’s greatest sourceof terms andflexibilitygrantedtodeveloping coun- tional energymarkets. that integratesboth authoritariancontrol and and tobeingCO2neutralby 2060aspart ofthe achieving maximumCO2emissionsaround2030 and Tu,thistensionisparticularlyatplay ininter ability. However, there are plentyofopportunities and non-participatory policy processtoone and non-participatorypolicy energy growth. of developing countriespersist. Asnoted by Benoit environmental issuescovered andintermsofdata greenhouse gasemissionsandwieldsthefinancial Chinaenjoyson ClimateChange. thefavorable global total), andproposedplansforanother gigawatts ofnewcoalpower plants(triplethe decades, Chinawillcontinue to grow asitlooks environmental governance fromamono-centric dence “supportsChina’s effortstoadvanceits plan andunderlyingimplementinglegislation,as should injectnecessary realismintoaspirational published. Outsidepressureaswellthird-party both toitsdomestic energyneeds andtointerna- Accordingly, energyandenvironment trends The first isincreased third-partyparticipation. China isoutgrowing itslabelasadeveloping China hasimproved itsdisclosureofenviron- 79 Theauthorsconcludedthattheevi- 78 Asithasover thepast several 77 In2020, Chinacompleted around China Transparency Report - Consequently, researchersshouldinvestigate how would shedlightontheprogress orlackthereof local level. For example,Yale’s Data-Driven Solu- market-based mechanisms.” industrial projects andenvironmental dataunder mental datainChina. ronmental progress. in environmental datareportingandenvi - in thischapter. Thisisparticularlytruewherethe uniformity inreportingthatmakes thedataacces- tions Groupfoundthat tion between localprovinces andnationalagencies the guiseof“state secrets.” Like many other public to theother environmental indicatorsmentioned accountability for and transparency of environaccountability forandtransparency - are formulated.Abetter understanding ofthis and soiltoxicity. data aswell,whether itbewithrespecttofisheries, exists inthereportingofother environmental environmental laws, regulations, andstrategies of how Chinaformulates environmental policy. data collectionattheprovincial level andmore on indoorairquality, drinkingwater, surfacewater, quality ofdataispoor, asitiswithrespecttodata sible andverifiable woulddomuchtoimprove both sible, morethird-partymonitoringshouldextend policy issues,policy thereisnoclearunderstanding forests, orother biodiversity metrics. better andmoreconsistent informationatthe be moreinvestigative innature.Chinahashidden Another opportunityforimprovement is A similarlackofstandardization andcoordina- Another potential avenue forresearchwould sources ormethodologies. and withoutinformation onoriginaldata [T]he [Ministry ofEnvironmental Protec different ministries are often untimely, quality statistics, showing that data from quality. The report summarizes key water demonstrates theneedfor improving data tion’s] annualState of Environment Report resolution imagesthat cannotbedown- presented ininaccessible formats (e.g. low loaded from theweb intabularformat), 81 80 To theextent pos- 82 83 Improved -  - 35 The CCP has responded 2 China’s vulnerabilities include both vulnerabilities include both China’s 1 There is, therefore, an abiding need to promote an abiding need to promote therefore, There is, While successive U.S. Administrations have Administrations have U.S. While successive foreign policy is motivated largely vulnerability foreign policy by is motivated particular premium on maintaining its own inter its own particular premium on maintaining sees regions like Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang as Tibet, Taiwan, sees regions like peripheral, the CCP sees their suppression as cen- - China has led to inconsisten toward strategies China. toward strategy efforts to on the CCP’s sought to pull back the veil or deprioritize human rights concerns in broader U.S. it has hamstrung policy; at worst, cies in U.S. gious freedom, freedom of association, and other gious freedom, freedom of association, and other core human rights. often viewed issues of human rights in China as aid organizations, academics, and others—have and others—have academics, aid organizations, themselves as a threat. themselves - restrict severely threats by to these perceived survival and to its own. to the country’s tral both efforts transparency with respect to the CCP’s Civil society—including to curtail human rights. to threats. internal and external threats. The CCP places a threats. internal and external nal stability and ensuring its sovereignty. The CCP and ensuring its sovereignty. nal stability It also views the Chinese people internal threats. ing the Chinese people’s fundamental freedoms ing the Chinese people’s freedom, reli- including freedom of speech, press legal organizations, nongovernmental nonprofits, At best, the U.S. government’s decision to sideline government’s the U.S. best, At Human Rights The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The Data on human rights in China are difficult if In short, these are rights that exist independently In short, these are rights that exist The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a (CCP) Party The Chinese Communist As Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell argue by government and civil society to promote trans- to promote and civil society government by parency with regard to human rights. collecting information on human rights in China, citizens. This chapter highlights the situations in highlights chapter This citizens. - record of ignoring its duty as a govern consistent even if governments fail to respect them. These if governments even of government. They are not granted by governments granted by They are not of government. as documented by the media, to supplement efforts as documented by and therefore cannot be taken away by governments— by away be taken and therefore cannot and preservation. and therefore merit protection this chapter relies on various forms of data collec- this chapter accounts from survivors tion, including firsthand to internationally recognized freedoms in general.to internationally recognized freedoms not impossible to acquire because the CCP does not much to conceal critical information on human unique to Because of the restrictions rights trends. ment to protect and preserve the rights of Chinese and preserve ment to protect , China’s for Search Security, China’s in their book China’s rights are inherent in each person as a human being Human Rights Is Important Defining Human Rights Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong, as well as threats Kong, and Hong Xinjiang, Tibet, Why Transparency on China’s on China’s Transparency Why  Although itdoesnot acknowledgethattheyrestrict Official Data from China However, whileChinesegovernment data 36 while theCCPmay not beespeciallytranspar line securityexpendituresorjobpostings inthe light onthesetrends. in secrecy thanthoserelatedtohumanrights.in secrecy rights conditionsinsideChina.Therefore,they inadvertently reveal informationabouthuman regulations doviolateinternationalstandards instituted newregulationsonreligiousaffairs. regulations thatitputsintoplace.In2018, theCCP many researchershave foundways toshed not researchersfrominvestigating discourage researchers findthatonce theywritesomething it observes, creative researcherscanusedataon undermine freedomandhumanrightsinChina, the humanrightsfield.Many Chinese-language the dataarepublishedorbecomesubjectof tions ofhumanrights. picturewithrespecttotheCCP’sthe bigger viola- a person’s abilitytopracticehisorherfaith,the government’s policiesandrightsabuses. Thus, draw inferencesaboutbroadertrendsinthe Zenzusethisinformation to ers like Adrian ostensibly unrelateddatathat,forexample,out- can beusefulingaininganunderstanding ofthe of religiousfreedom.Regulationslike these on theseissuesareoftenhardtotrackdown, of writingaboutsensitive issues, but itshould disappear. Thisisanunfortunateconsequence often take down theinformation,removing it comment by outside researchers, theCCPwill other subjects to get aclearerunderstanding of ent aboutthedataitreleasesortrendsthat securitization intheXinjiangregion.Research- security sectorthatspeaktoanincreasedlevel of provide insightintotheCCP’s policiesandoften publicly available. Thesetacticsarenot uniqueto from websitesorother venues whereithadbeen but fewaspectsofitspoliciesaremoreshrouded but muchworkhasyet tobedone. broader landscape. based onpubliclyavailable CCPdata,thedata The CCP lacks transparency inmanyThe CCPlackstransparency areas, The government ofChinapublishesother The CCPisoftenvery openaboutnewlawsor Mining CCP data is a double-edged sword.Mining CCPdataisadouble-edged Once China Transparency Report - 3

Xinjiang China. Inrecentyears, civilsociety hasdevoted CCP’s humanrightsabuses. Reportshave drawn work hasshedamuch-neededlightonthesever Private Efforts ity ofthesituation. rights, andcollectedfirsthand testimony; their uting totheseefforts. tions insideChina. this informationtogaininsightintocondi- and reportingonviolationsofhumanrightsin cutting-edge, data-driven projectsthatarecontrib- engineered technologyusedintheviolationof reverse-on Chinesegovernment data,ingeniously significant attention topullingbackthe veil onthe l l l

York ofleaked Timesacquired400pages The New York Times: The Karakax List. Xinjiang includeitsreportingontheChina The following isarepresentative sample ofthe There isagreatdealofdata-driven research List, whichdetailed speechesgiven by Chinese Database isacrowdfunded databaseoftestimo- Uyghur Autonomous Region.Thedatabase Cables, aChinesegovernment document Chinese documentsknown astheKarakax Xinjiang Victims Database. workings ofthecamps, theseverity ofcondi- leaders, includingXiJinping, justifying mass routines.” Thesebriefings“arethe first leakof instructions regulating inmates’mundanedaily resents thefirst leakofaclassifiedChinese internment camps. TheChina Cables“rep- nies fromvictimsofthemassincarcerations internment. It alsorevealed resistance within tions behindthefences, andthedehumanizing classified governmentclassified documentsonthemass- government documentrevealing theinner characterized asamanualforrunningthe ous toolswithwhichtoanalyzethedata. documents primaryevidenceandincludesvari- of ethnic minoritycitizensinChina’s Xinjiang surveillance andpredictive policingeffort.” International Consortium ofInvestigative Jour nalists. 5 TheICIJ’s many importantstories on 4 TheXinjiangVictims 7 TheNew - 6 - 

18 37

20 19 He also uncovered uncovered also He 16 Adrian Senior Zenz, The Uyghur Human Rights Project’s The Uyghur Human Rights Project’s and studied the forced labor-transfer the forced labor-transfer and studied 17 Militarized Vocational Training Comes to Tibet.” to Comes Training Vocational Militarized Document. Reports by Adrian Zenz. Adrian by Reports bers of a minority group that the CCP deems region. The out of and within the Tibetan both Uyghur Human Rights Project: The Qaraqash Qaraqash The Project: Human Rights Uyghur produced a suite of studies on the crisis in in on the crisis a suite of studies produced - been sub Uyghurs have schemes to which zation and training of approximately 543,000 543,000 zation and training of approximately problematic. The program transfers laborers discern trends in the region. documents, analyzing Uyghur testimony, and and analyzing Uyghur testimony, documents, country,” “overseas communication,” “prayed “prayed communication,” “overseas country,” and “had a beard.” grandfather,” and en masse) Uyghur women of child-bearing women of child-bearing and en masse) Uyghur age applying rigorous academic methodology to to applying rigorous academic methodology analyzed patterns to explain how the security the security to explain how analyzed patterns later was in Tibet piloted apparatus that was and exposed specific official justifications for and exposed specific official the CCP’s stated goals of sterilizing (by goals stated of sterilizing force the CCP’s training program is similar in many ways to ways training program is similar in many their internment. Among the justifications their internment. Among the justifications used: “visiting abroad,” “applied for a passport,” “applied for a passport,” used: “visiting abroad,” ing are analyzing and evaluating Chinese ing are analyzing and evaluating Chinese repurposed in Xinjiang to carry out mass col- repurposed in Xinjiang regularly,” “religious knowledge comes from regularly,” report on the Qaraqash Document confirmed report on the Qaraqash Document reeducate rural laborers to transform the mem- report draws on Chinese data and satellite imagery in reaching its conclusions. labor-transfer schemes rolled out in Xinjiang. labor-transfer lectivization of Uyghurs. local involvement in the repression of Uyghurs in the repression of Uyghurs local involvement jected in Xinjiang and throughout the region. jected in Xinjiang and throughout Communism Memorial Foundation, has has Foundation, Memorial Communism Fellow for China Studies at the Victims of of Studies at the Victims for China Fellow This report documents the CCP’s mass mobili- This report documents the CCP’s seeks to scheme in Tibet The labor-transfer Xinjiang. Zenz sourced CCP documents and CCP documents and Xinjiang. Zenz sourced Among the methods he uses in his report- Among the methods Jamestown Foundation: “Xinjiang’s System of System “Xinjiang’s Foundation: Jamestown “rural surplus laborers” in Tibet. The vocational The vocational “rural surplus laborers” in Tibet. “applied for a passport and didn’t leave the leave “applied for a passport and didn’t

l l l Tibet

15 RFA RFA 9 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The Radio Free Radio Free 8 modeled condi- and revealed the and revealed 12 13 collected firsthand accounts of collected firsthand The Open Technology Fund, Pulitzer Fund, The Open Technology 11 The project analyzed thousands of The project analyzed thousands 14 Its regular reporting has been critical to Its regular reporting has been critical 10 Human Rights Watch: “Algorithms of Repression.” “Algorithms Watch: Human Rights BuzzFeed. Radio Free Asia: Uyghur Service. Uyghur Asia: Radio Free facilities, for the Integrated Joint Operations Program, for the Integrated Joint provided additional insight into justifications justifications insight into additional provided series that estimated the total number of camp the total series that estimated satellite imagessatellite to evaluate the size and scope system that enabled the government to round that enabled the government system eight individuals with “recent, direct experi- eight individuals with “recent, direct facilities” in Xinjiang. ence in detention of Journalism funded a four-part BuzzFeed BuzzFeed funded a four-part of Journalism on the Uyghurs. In particular, the Karakax List List the Karakax particular, In on the Uyghurs. is one of internment. It for the Uyghurs’ given of the camps, providing indispensable proof of indispensable providing of the camps, existence of forced labor facilities within the existence camps. gathering firsthand information and insights gathering firsthand conditions inside the camps, engage activities in Xinji- in mass surveillance gain insight into the indicators that were used an anonymous CCP official. an anonymous an application used by Chinese authorities to an application used by the application to ang, and reverse-engineered term, more systematic reporting, including a term, more systematic the CCP to carrying out the mass crackdown mass crackdown to carrying out the the CCP docu- leaks from China; the the more detailed their existence that is corroborated by firsthand firsthand that is corroborated by their existence from camp survivors. testimony tions inside a specific camp, to justify internment. This report provides internment. This report provides to justify up and intern the Uyghurs at such a rapid pace. unprecedented insight into the surveillance unprecedented insight into the surveillance has also kept track of mosques destroyed in Xin- destroyed track of mosques has also kept reliable and consistent sources of detailed sources of detailed reliable and consistent longer- and is augmented by reporting is critical The New York Times by to The New York ments were provided into life on the ground in Xinjiang. jiang. firsthand accounts of life in Xinjiang. Its regular accounts of life in Xinjiang. Its firsthand Center, and Eye Beam Center for the Future Beam Center for the Future and Eye Center, Trapped in the System: in the System: Trapped 2021 report, February Human Rights Watch (HRW) acquired the code Human Rights Watch Experiences of Uyghur Detention in Post-2015 Detention in Post-2015 of Uyghur Experiences Asia’s Uyghur Service has been among the more Uyghur Service has been among Asia’s , based on firsthand testimony from testimony Xinjiang, based on firsthand

l l l  38 Hong Kong Religious Freedom l l l l

Jamestown Foundation: “Xinjiang’s RapidlyEvolv Tibetan Political PrisonerDatabase. Tibetan Centre for HumanRights andDemocracy: The reportdrawsonpubliclyavailable jobpost- 10,000 individualshadbeenarrested andmore Party Secretary ChenQuanguo. Specifically, it Database documentsmorethan5,000 currentor Democracy, theTibetan Political Prisoner Hong Kong Watch’s Protest ProsecutionData- Published in2017, thisreportwas written lations perpetrated by theChinese government ings (recruitments)forpolicetodemonstrate in theTibetan region.Thedatabaseprovides rity budget.” Thereportalsodrawsparallels recruitment ofnearly90,000 newpoliceofficers in protests. AsofFebruary 4,2021, morethan in protests inHong Kong. Thedatabaselinks highlights thecreationofso-calledconvenience updated informationontheirdetention status the rapidexpansionofsecuritystate. to open-source news articlestotracktherate to open-sourcenews fortheirinvolvementthan 2,300facedcharges and notes whether theyarereligious political and a356percentincreaseinthepublicsecu- and inXinjiangundertheleadershipofCCP arrested, orin detention fortheirinvolvement against thebackdrop ofXiJinping’s increasing of thedatabaseistodocumenthumanrightsvio- of Xinjiang’ssecuritystate apparatus:“the common asaconvenience store) inboth regions. of increaseinimprisonmentsandprosecutions service postings tomaptherapidexpansion prisoners orimprisonedforsomeother reason. police stations (policestations thatareas former politicalprisonersinTibet. The purpose from yeartoyear. between thesecuritystate’s growth inTibet by theTibetan CentreforHumanRightsand base keeps trackofallpersonsprosecuted, Freedom House:Thefor Battle China’s Spirit. Hong Kong Watch: Protest Prosecution Database. ing Security State.” 21 Thisreportanalyzespublic 22 Maintained Maintained China Transparency Report 24

- 23

Miscellaneous l l l

“high,” and“very high.” Thereportfindsthat June 1,2019–May 31,2020, based onascaleof Africa The methodology involves 21questions with 100 subquestions todetermine theextent of Freedom House conductsacomprehensive Doors staff inconjunctionwithpeopleonthe year, OpenDoorsUSA’s World Watch List mea- Global ResearchInstitute inWilliamsburg,Vir Open Doors USA: World Watch List: China. College ofWilliam andMary, GlobalResearch Insti- worldwide. Thelist evaluatestwodifferent 0–100, China receives ascoreof10/100 and is limits oncontent,andviolationsofuserrights. review offreedomontheInternet, evaluating including individualreportsoncountriesin most recentindex,exhibiting“very high”levels recent report,whichcovers developments from nese investment ondeveloping democracies, religion ledtoupticks inrepression.Inaddition housed at the College ofWilliamandMary’shoused attheCollege kinds ofpersecution:variousformspressure tions onchurchlife. types ofpersecution.Chinaranks17thonthe to providing abroadoverview ofreligiousper the CCP’s attempts toSinicize(secularize) that Christians faceandviolenceperpetrated a country’s Internet freedom. at least 100millionChinesearereligiousand another “low,” infourcategories: “moderate,” against Christians. Itusesaquestionnaire of persecutionandespeciallyhighrestric- ground ineachcountry, toevaluatedifferent examining andevaluatingtheimpactsofChi- ginia, AidDatahaspublishednumerousreports consisting of84questions, filledout by Opens scores in three categories: obstaclesscores inthreecategories: toaccess, sures thepersecutionofChristians incountries persecution ofvariousgroupsrelative toone secution inChina,itattempts tomeasurethe persecution ofpersonsfaith.Itdetails how facing highorvery highlevels ofpersecution. Freedom House:“Freedom ontheNet: China.” tute: AidData. 28 andSouthCentralAsia. 26 Self-describedasa“researchlab” 31 Inthemost 29 25 Every 30

27 -

-  39

41 The Congressio- 39 The U.S. Department of The U.S. 42 - The Congressional–Execu 38 The U.S. Department of State’s Department of State’s The U.S. 40 Political Prisoner Database. Political - Reli on International Report Freedom: Religious Country Reports on Reports and Labor: Country Human Rights, be detained currently or have been detained been detained or have currently be detained forth in the Universal Declaration of Human forth in the Universal freedom, political prisoners, and arbitrary freedom, political prisoners, U.S. Department of State, Office of International International of Office of State, Department U.S. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, of Democracy, Bureau of State, Department U.S. perished while in custody. previously on political or religious grounds. The grounds. previously on political or religious prehensive survey of conditions in China. survey prehensive database lends insight into the total number database lends insight into the total in China (a little of people currently detained detention. While the report cannot cover all cover While the report cannot detention. covers violations of human rights in China. The violations covers issues as religious freedom, examines functional The commission also main- concerns. ethnic and covers “internationally recognized indi- and covers annual report on human rights conditions annual report on human rights conditions on China across the globe includes a section association, academic freedom, Internet association, academic freedom, Internet . and Tibet) the release of political prisoners and those that the release of political prisoners and that also covers Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet. Macau, and Tibet. Kong, Hong that also covers to the rule of law, freedom of expression and to the rule of law, threats to human rights, it is a relatively com- it is a relatively threats to human rights, tive Commission on China, created by the China, created by Commission on tive political prisoners in China. tains a database of human trafficking, population control, and human trafficking, more than 1,500) and is also useful for tracking more than 1,500) and is also useful report includes region-specific sections on the report includes region-specific and Xinjiang, and Tibet in Taiwan, rule of law nal–Executive Commission on China’s Political Political Commission on China’s nal–Executive list of nearly 10,000 individuals believed to individuals believed of nearly 10,000 list gious Freedom: China (Includes Tibet, Xinjiang, Xinjiang, China (Includes Tibet, gious Freedom: vidual, civil, political, and worker rights, as set as set rights, vidual, civil, political, and worker . and Macau) Hong Kong, Human Rights: China (includes Hong Kong, Macau, Macau, China (includes Hong Kong, Human Rights: Congressional–Executive Commission on China: Commission Congressional–Executive China: on Commission Congressional–Executive U.S. Congress, produces an annual report that an annual report produces Congress, U.S. Rights and other international agreements.” Rights and other Prisoner Database includes a chronological Prisoner Database includes a chronological The report has been issued annually since 1999 Annual Report. Among other subjects, the report covers threats the report covers subjects, Among other

l l l l

32 35 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The ProPublica’s ProPublica’s According to 37 36 and Tibet “Not Free.” “Not and Tibet In the most recent report, In the most 34 33 ProPublica: Inside the Firewall. ProPublica: Freedom House: “Freedom in the World: China.” in the World: House: “Freedom Freedom freedom” for six consecutive years. for six consecutive freedom” sponding documents related to the purchases ofsponding documents related to the purchases central and local both technology by surveillance points for political rights and a possible total of rights and a possible total points for political of China’s surveillance build-up to date.” surveillance of China’s of Human Rights. database documents and analyzes “some 76,000 76,000 database documents and analyzes “some and corre- procurement notices government 2004 and mid- in China between governments dom—specifically, political rights and civil dom—specifically, of 40 total with a possible on a scale of 0–100, as defined under the Universal Declaration as defined under the Universal are accessible to browsers inside China. Of the are accessible to browsers homepages of international news organizations has been “the world’s worst abuser of internet of internet abuser worst “the world’s has been its web site, ChinaFile’s State of Surveillance its web site, ChinaFile’s receives a score of 10/100 (–1/40 for political (–1/40 a score of 10/100 receives and is rated for civil liberties) rights and 11/60 rated “Not Free.” According China to the report, Free.” rated “Not liberties—in 195 countries and 15 territories liberties—in 195 countries web site reflects that “[e]very day since Nov. 17, 17, since Nov. day web site reflects that “[e]very which covers developments in 2019, China in 2019, developments which covers worldwide. Countries are ranked numerically are ranked worldwide. Countries ChinaFile: State of Surveillance. ChinaFile: State U.S. government–produced reports dem- government–produced U.S. May 2020—the most comprehensive accounting comprehensive 2020—the most May Freedom House’s annual “Freedom in the annual “Freedom House’s Freedom Kong “Partly Free” “Partly Kong 2014, ProPublica has been testing whether the whether ProPublica has been testing 2014, 18 in our test, 14 are currently blocked.” 14 18 in our test, 60 for civil liberties. The report evaluates rights The report 60 for civil liberties. Tibet separately from China and rates Hong separately from China and rates Hong Tibet World” report evaluates the state of free- of evaluates the state report World” “Not Free.” The report evaluates Hong Kong and Kong The report evaluates Hong Free.” “Not

l l l onstrate the premium that the U.S. places on the premium that the U.S. onstrate reports documenting violations of comprehensive on) rather than replace the invaluable often draw tices. Many of the reports listed below are annual, below of the reports listed Many tices. understanding the CCP’s human rights prac- the CCP’s understanding human rights that the CCP is perpetrating against against human rights that the CCP is perpetrating research produced by private sources. research produced by its own people. These efforts supplement (and its own Government-Supported Efforts Government-Supported  40 l l l

“Countries ofParticular Concern,” Trafficking in Persons Reportisissuedpursuant Freedom documentsconditionsofreligious Xinjiang, Hong Kong, andMacau.Itisauseful 1, Tier2,2Watch List, andTier3. Chinahas Department producesareportassessingthe Combat Trafficking in Persons: Trafficking in Persons was treatedpriortothe1997handover. Report: China. fication astowhether Hong Kong warrants legal frameworkforrespectingreligiousfree- is consideredtobeamongthemost comprehen- in conditionsaffectingfreedomofreligionand resource fordocumentingyear-to-year changes responses tothreatsreligiousfreedomina nonpartisan, independentfederal commission recommendations onhow torespond.The mission onInternationalReligious Freedom’s in persons and ranks countries according to their in personsandrankscountriesaccordingtotheir recognized standards forcombatting trafficking report measurescompliancewithinternationally tection Act of2000 tection Act to theVictimsofTraffickingandViolencePro- treatment underU.S law inthesame mannerit to respectreligiousfreedomaredesignated threats to religious freedom and issues policy threats toreligiousfreedom andissuespolicy the inauguralreportin2000. State’s annualReportonInternationalReligious ant totheInternationalReligiousFreedom Act annual reportidentifiestopline trendsin all its various forms in countries worldwide. The all itsvariousformsincountriesworldwide.The of 1998 on ChinaalsoincludesconditionsinTibet, conditions inHong Kong, alongwithcerti- consistent withthe1992 theState Policy Act, country. Certaincountriesthatregularlyfail dom, government practices, societal respect compliance frombest toworst infourtiers:Tier sive reportsonreligiousfreedom. freedom worldwide.Thereportisissuedpursu- U.S. Commission onInternational Religious U.S. Department ofState, Office toMonitor and for religiousfreedom,andU.S. government been ranked onTier3almost every yearsince Hong Kong Policy Act Report. Freedom: AnnualReport:. China 43 andcovers religiousdemography, the 46 TheU.S. DepartmentofState’s 47 and monitors trafficking in andmonitorstrafficking 45 Every year, 48 TheU.S. Com- 44 Thereport China Transparency Report Transparency from theChineseGovernment: 1outof10 Grade andReasoning Overall Transparency: 5outof10 transparency asaresultofprivateefforts.transparency Each score isratedona10-pointscale.Themethodology parency oftheChinesegovernment andoverallparency for calculatingthesescorescanbefoundonp. 119. l

“Country ofParticular Concern”intheReport The Chinesegovernment isnottransparent Freedom by beingfocusedprimarilyonmaking In thissectionarescoresassessingthetrans- Religious Freedom maintainsadatabaseon Department’s ReportonInternationalReligious when itcomes to humanrights. To beclear, viduals includedinthedatabase,asignificant egorized aspropaganda. Data that deviate from number arefromChina.Inadditiontothe ing themasdetained, disappeared, under - religious prisonersofconscience,categoriz monitors internationalreligiousfreedom menting violationsofreligiousfreedom. house arrest, imprisoned,forcedtorenounce has recommendedthatChinabedesignateda on InternationalReligiousFreedom every year to advocate ontheirbehalf;fourofthe17 to adopt ReligiousPrisonersofConscience their faith,or“Other.” Ofthe1,008 indi- transparency onhumanrights, given the com- there isdata reported by theChinese govern- quickly removed ornotreadily available. the Chinesegovernment’s narrative are either Private efforts have significantly improved annual reportisdistinguished fromtheState currently adopted religiousprisonersofcon- database, membersofthecommissionareable conditions globally. science arefromChina. plete lack oftransparency from theChinese been widelycriticized asinaccurate andcat ment. The issue isthat thedata provided have policy recommendationsratherthanondocu- policy since itsinception in1998. Thecommission’s U.S. Commission onInternational Religious List. Freedom: Freedom ofReligion orBeliefVictims 50 TheU.S. CommissiononInternational 49 ItsannualreportonChina 51 -  41 - - His own work has focused His own 52 that document the CCP’s historical human historical the CCP’s that document the Hui in China, like tially vulnerable groups understanding of human rights challenges. challenges. of human rights understanding rights record, are integral to gaining a better to gaining a better are integral rights record, Muslims, and closely monitor emerging threats. and closely monitor Muslims, - to identify poten should do more Researchers ¸ a Heritage ¸ a Heritage In an episode of China Uncovered In conducting research for this report, we found In conducting research for this report, The methodologies applied to these reports applied to The methodologies This report can serve not only as a resource not This report can serve better understanding of the forms of forced labor understanding better for identifying information and reports that lend for identifying information and reports stated goals of violating or undermining human stated subjects seem ripe for future cultivation. resources on the significantly fewer data-driven especially as Kong, and Hong situation in Tibet ency Project, researcher Adrian Zenz suggested the CCP. carried out by on Xinjiang and Tibet, and while there may be a and while there may on Xinjiang and Tibet, other places (like be more difficult to other it may Tibet), elucidate individualized persecution; still others others still elucidate individualized persecution; use of surveillance repressive government’s a few merit additional research, above covered to have compared to Xinjiang. Some of this may and rights do with the fact that some of the events - govern evaluate the impacts of aid on individual and used Chinese data to demonstrate the CCP’s CCP’s the data to demonstrate and used Chinese access information, or there may be less political be less access information, or there may abuses are new and emerging (as in Hong Kong);abuses are new and emerging (as in Hong in also to inspire future research projects that fill in also to inspire future research projects Some of these reports, like the Human Rights like Some of these reports, investigation. they merit further theless, that additional deep research is needed to gain a the Chinese government’s nefarious intentions. nefarious intentions. the Chinese government’s technology by reverse-engineering the application reverse-engineering technology by all of the issues the gaps in current research. While used open-source news to draw conclusions about used open-source news conclusions to draw need for more research in both of these regions, of these regions, need for more research in both rights; others drew on first-person testimony to testimony drew on first-person rights; others itself, while others applied quantitative methods to methods applied quantitative itself, while others ments’ decision-making. but intentions and actions, insight into the CCP’s were incredibly varied. Many of the reports mined Many were incredibly varied. will to conduct research on these subjects. Never will to conduct research on these subjects. Program, provided new insight into the Chinese Program, provided within the China Transpar podcast Foundation Opportunities for Further Research for Opportunities Watch report on the Integrated Joint Operations Joint report on the Integrated Watch - The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The beyond human rights. mental in uncovering the Chinese government’s government’s the Chinese in uncovering mental be done for transparency on both Xinjiang and on both Xinjiang transparency be done for - (the Tibet another similar techniques against cutting-edge techniques have been pioneered cutting-edge techniques have the crisis in Xinjiang. to understanding devoted in the can and should inform future research organizations to produce timely reports. For organizations to produce timely reports. driven research that may contribute to data research that may driven in fields collection and reporting methods driven. However, it is clear that many groups it is clear that many However, driven. augmented human rights research. Many Many augmented human rights research. attention as a consequence of the significant against one group (the Uyghurs), it is only against or of time before it uses the same a matter ans). This places the onus on researchers and tal in improving transparency on rule of law, rule of law, on transparency tal in improving use of firsthand and victim-centered accounts use of firsthand human rights field. This is true for research on human rights field. This is true for freedom of speech, and religious freedom. of speech, and religious freedom in the China space are undertaking reports issues in China is vast. A common complaint issues in China is vast. data in the human rights field is that it is not actions in Xinjiang. Transparency on Tibet has on Tibet Transparency in Xinjiang. actions as much as on although not also improved, - been instru have efforts Private government. ward-looking research projects, as well as those research projects, ward-looking with complex methodologies and data- with complex methodologies Creative forms of information gathering have forms of information gathering have Creative data, and ample Chinese government-produced areas as well. China in other Much time and energy has been devoted to has been devoted Much time and energy Xinjiang. This is not to say that more should not more that say is not to This Xinjiang. The landscape of reports on human rights The use of satellite imagery analysis, mining of imageryThe use of satellite analysis, When the CCP carries out human rights abuses - instrumen also been have efforts Private Tibet.

l l l peeling back the layers on the CCP’s human rights human rights CCP’s on the peeling back the layers - done much to close the knowl have government A few key edge important issues. gap on these critical information about its violations of human critical information about its violations trends are worth noting. rights, but scholars, civil society, and the U.S. and the U.S. civil society, scholars, but rights, violations. The CCP has done much to conceal violations. Trends from the Data from Trends  42 Olivia Enosrecentlypublishedareportonlimi- reeducation-through-labor methods isalsoneeded. more informationontheCCP’s historical useof model for the creativity and ingenuity thatcanbe model forthecreativityandingenuity understanding oftheextent towhichanunder to the COVID-19 pandemic. to theCOVID-19 tations experiencedby civilsociety inresponse the many concernsraisedby isthe policymakers than any other issue.Theresearchandattention additional workshouldbedonetoimprove our activities ofcivilsociety inChinaorthefreedom applied toinvestigate ahumanrightsissue—espe- operate inChina.Heritage SeniorPolicy Analyst ground orabove-ground civilsociety hasspaceto of civilsociety tooperateinChina,webelieve that concerns inChinaarenot data-driven. Oneof conception thateffortstoaddresshuman rights cially whenthereisthepoliticalwilltodoso. directed toward Xinjiangmay thereforeserve asa overchanged timeinChina. civil society andgrassroots organizationshave should bedonetounderstand theextent towhich Although thisreportdoesnot directlycover the This reportshouldalsohelptodispelthemis- This chapter hasmorereportsonXinjiang 53 Further research China Transparency Report - China’s violationsofhumanrights. Amorethor with lessacademicrigor. Humanrightsconcerns vast majorityofissuescovered inthisreport,it job ofunpackingsomethemotivations for lack ofinformationtoinformdecision-making; reports alreadyinexistence. researchisevidencedbyrigorous thelonglist of may beconsidered“soft”issues, lessconducive to is simplynot truethattheseissuesarecovered repeatedly inhumanrightsadvocacy. Onthe it doeswilldeepentheapplicationofresearchin understanding ofthesemotivations willalmost this is true on a range ofissues,this istrueonarange butitcomesup the policy context, the policy particularlyforpolicymakers are covered every bitascomprehensively through additional analysisoftheCCP’s historical and and advancingU.S. interests. Thismay require quantitative analysisperse,butthefactthatthey edies fortheharmthattheycause. tocrafteffectivecertainly helppolicymakers rem- contemporary justifications foritsabuses. An ough understanding ofwhy theCCPdoeswhat focused onsafeguarding U.S. nationalsecurity Finally, futureresearchshoulddoabetter -  - 43 2 Until fairly recently, the Chinese Commu- Until fairly recently, Influence operations are key to China’s efforts key to China’s Influence operations are This chapter will examine influence operations This chapter fere in democratic institutions,” describes the tools fere in democratic institutions,” focused on specific targets. However, influence However, focused on specific targets. for Securing Democracy initiative that develops for Securing Democracy that develops initiative public opinion were heavy-handed and crude, and crude, public opinion were heavy-handed strategies to “deter, defend against, and raise the defend against, to “deter, strategies strategy to deal with future crises and generally strategy costs on autocratic efforts to undermine and inter costs “[i]nformation influence operations as, of China’s and economic coercion. subversion, civil society operations can also be seen as a more generaloperations can also be seen as a more global standing. enhance a country’s and ultimately compete for global leadership with and ultimately compete to control and manage its image globally, extend extend to control and manage its image globally, the United States. manipulation, cyber operations, malign finance, manipulation, cyber operations, its regional reach, dominate the narrative vis-à-vis vis-à-vis its regional reach, dominate the narrative de facto independence, in Xinjiang, and Taiwan’s global efforts to influence (CCP’s) Party’s nist represent a whole-of-government approach represent a whole-of-government in the context of China’s global ambitions. The global ambitions. of China’s in the context Influence Operations Is Important Operations Influence German Marshall Fund, which houses the Alliance which German Marshall Fund, Hong Kong’s democracy, persecution of Uyghurs democracy, Kong’s Hong Why Transparency on China’s on China’s Transparency Why 1 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The Influence Operations Influence nized application of national diplomatic, diplomatic, of national application nized and crisis, conflict bilities in peacetime, behaviors, attitudes, foster to postconflict informational, economic, and other capa- economic, informational, that further…interests and objectives. further…interests that or decisions by foreign target audiences audiences target foreign or decisions by - and synchro integrated, coordinated, The Influence operations have been used by modern been used Influence operations have Influence operations are government Influence operations are government The Rand Corporation defines influ- psychological operations (psy ops). Likewise, the Likewise, ops). operations (psy psychological truthfully dis- propaganda” (the origin of which is perceptions in order to enhance a country’s in order to enhance a country’s perceptions states for centuries in some form and are wide- states spread tools of foreign policy and military strategy. ence operations as: content of influence operations can, depending content of influence operations can, range from “white in question, on the government closed) to “black propaganda” (the origin of which operations aimed at changing foreign popular operations aimed at changing foreign tools are global influence. A range of soft power used in influence operations, from benign civil- used in influence operations, is hidden or disguised). ian exchange and cultural programs to military ian exchange Defining Influence Operations Defining Influence In their broadest application, influence operations In their broadest  Jinping, hastaken on theworkoftheseagencies Work Departmentarethetwocontrollingagencies Institutes—billed asharmlesscultural-learning In 2003, fromtheU.S. takingapage govern- Department (CPD)andtheCCP’s UnitedFront Development Road.” Ironically, Beijingadopted United StatesanditsWestern allies:“China does Under PresidentandCCPGeneralSecretary Xi 44 Chinese strategist ZhengBijian. ing state andparty. ment’s playbook onpublicdiplomacy, theCCP new importance. not seekhegemony orpredominanceinworld relic oftheColdWar. ished theU.S. in1999asa InformationAgency haranguing by Chinesediplomats, andbelliger under theleadershipofXiJinping, in isengaged through incrementalreformsanddemocratization tion was explicatedinForeign Affairsin2005by this strategy aftertheU.S. government abol- the Chinesemodeltodeveloping countriesgrew affairs. Itadvocates anewinternationalpoliti- as well,greatersophistication was necessary. able tothePeople’s RepublicofChina(PRC). a massive campaigntoinfluencemediaandnews of internationalrelations.” cal andeconomicorder, onethatcanbeachieved question thesincerityofinitialpremise, of StateHillary Clintonintestimony totheSenate tothen-Secretary worldwide.According colleges cratic chainthantheCPD, throughwhich China centers—which areapartofdifferentbureau- developed over recentyearsaretheConfucius coercive, andpotentially corrupt.” out thatmany aspectsoftheseeffortsare“covert, global ambitionsgrewandthedesiretoexport ent threatstoward Taiwan. However, asChina’s domestic andinternationalpublicopinion,favor consumers aroundtheworld.” strategy isclear, agauntlet thrown down tothe seeks to insert its agenda intohighschoolsand seeks toinsertitsagenda sions by prisonersofwar duringtheKorean War, straight-out propaganda,suchasforcedconfes- promulgated itswhitepaper“China’s Peaceful states, “theChineseparty–state, particularly for asprawling governmental system, encompass- Among the important tools that the PRC has Among theimportanttoolsthatPRC The Chinesegovernment’s CentralPropaganda The Chineseconcept ofideologicalcompeti- 6 AsaFreedom House report 5 Theirpurposeistoengineer 4 7 Thereportpoints 3 Whileonewould China Transparency Report - - The Coronavirus Pandemic Wuhan pneumonia.” Itpunishedusersfor“spread- Internet hasbeensuccessfullyintegratedby the Department requested thatChinese“reporters” Every newinformationtoolfromradiotothe Foreign RelationsCommittee, Chinahasgreatly CCP intothatmodel,inawhole-of-government working forChina’s state-run mediabeclassified which oversees theU.S. government’s interna- world. Until2017, itsstaff was abletooperate work (CGTN)hasofficesand studiosaroundthe restrictions have always beenespeciallytight numbers offoreignreportersinChina.Chinese ing rumors”and fomenting“socialunrest.” media thatemployed keywords suchas“unknown inChina, months afterthefirst casesofCOVID-19 immediately rampedupanaggressive propaganda ies. has always beeninplaceover thefarmorelimited university inChina. until the Trump Administration, whentheState until theTrumpAdministration, to openasinglesimilaroperationatschoolor tration Act of1938. tration Act tional broadcast networks. Thisasymmetry lasted the Chinesegovernment begancensoringsocial tions wereonfulldisplay withtheoutbreakof tool fortheCCPcontrolofinformationand as foreign agents undertheForeignas foreignagents Regis- Agents army andcontrolsitsown informationspace global media.TheChinaGlobalTelevision Net - campaign topintheblameforcoronavirus coronavirus pandemicinJanuary 2020. China global propaganda.Chinahasamassive cyber cover operatingexpensesthatexceed $200,000 each centerwith$1milliontolaunch,plusthey cius Centers, theChinesegovernment provides outcompeted theUnitedStates. “On theConfu- system ofcapabilities. pandemic ontheUnitedStates. Lessthanthree per year. We don’t have thatkindofmoney inthe for staff fromthe U.S. forGlobal Media, Agency freely intheUnitedStates, whereas tightcontrol found amodelthatworksinfreeandopensociet- behind theso-calledGreatFireWall ofChina. budget.” Another significantChineseinvestment isin The effectiveness ofChina’s influence opera- The Internet earlyonbecameapowerful 9 Conversely, theUnitedStateswas not allowed 8 WiththeConfuciusInstitutes, Chinahas 10 11  45 - 16 15 18 With that said, the role of the CCP With that said, 17 Chinese state media and party directives media and party directives Chinese state Chinese government and CCP’s influence and CCP’s government Chinese China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) some- state-owned China’s However, there are some relevant publicly there are some However, Also, Chinese media operating in the United Also, ber 15, 2020 when the party issued a directive for 2020 when the party issued a directive ber 15, build political influence is often covert and is usu- build political influence is often covert funded propaganda campaign. As Lowy Institute Institute campaign. As Lowy funded propaganda formal processes to mobilize its agencies for private sector. provide a glimpse into objectives and leadership a glimpse into objectives provide in influ- of the various agencies involved structures such as registrations of organizations within such as registrations ence operations. The CCP sometimes publishes The CCP sometimes ence operations. as guidance for carrying out documents that serve role in supervising the expanding the United Front operations are not easily quantified through offi- quantified through easily are not operations more is made even data. Evaluation cial Chinese of agencies structure the sprawling complicated by , “the big party The Party in his book observes personnel and the media departments controlling government and party agencies. For example, the For and party agencies. government conglomerate, China Petrochemical Corporation, conglomerate, China Petrochemical accessible data, often available only in Chinese, only in Chinese, accessible data, often available and offices within the Chinese government and the the Chinesegovernment and offices within ally denied when asked directly. ally denied when asked a database of officially registered social organiza- a database of officially registered also called the Sinopec Group, published an annual published also called the Sinopec Group, States have to disclose their ownership and to disclose their ownership States have Senior Fellow and journalist Richard McGregor Richard McGregor and journalist Senior Fellow State Council’s Ministry of Civil Affairs maintains Ministry State Council’s tions, including those registered under the United those registered including tions, tion on their efforts. at the times publish information that reveals, keep a purposely low public profile.” a purposely low keep in activities such as targeting political actors to ized the measure of United Front workshop.” ized the measure of United Front in influence operations. China’s top petroleum top petroleum China’s in influence operations. the SOE that noted the report in 2019 “promoted implementation of Guidance Opinion of Enhancing major operations, necessarily generating informa- necessarily major operations, , summarized and popular work the United Front finances through the Foreign Agent Registration finances through the very least, the party’s use of the financial sector the party’s least, very CCP that contribute to the CCP’s massive well- massive to the CCP’s CCP that contribute - the case on Septem work, as was United Front Front Work Department. The regime employs Department. The regime employs Work Front Official Data from China from Data Official Act (FARA), so at least some financial figures are so at least Act (FARA), - - Lin’s Lin’s 12 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The Social media companies are 14 Government censors punished and silenced Government 13 coronavirus and spreading it in Wuhan, the in Wuhan, and spreading it coronavirus capital of Hubei province. to tout the nation’s accomplishments through accomplishments to tout the nation’s hundreds of interviews and articles. racism for referring to the coronavirus as racism for referring to the coronavirus Charging President Donald Trump with Charging President Donald Trump Meanwhile, the Cyberspace Administration the Cyberspace Meanwhile, Directing Chinese diplomats across the world Directing Chinese In tweets, China’s ambassador to South Africa, ambassador China’s In tweets, The propaganda campaign began accelerating in began accelerating campaign The propaganda Accusing States of creating the new the United “the Chinese virus.”

l l l break. The communist regime’s highly coordinated highly regime’s communist break. The platforms started to censor any references to the to censor any platforms started - out the coronavirus for China to conceal possible seafood market” on December 31, a day after eight on December 31, a day seafood market” people, including Li, raised the alarm about the subject to strict laws requiring them to censor laws subject to strict ernment’s handling of the spreading epidemic. ernment’s of China ensured that the country’s social media of China ensured that the country’s earnest on January 20, 2020, when it no longer was 2020, 20, on January earnest content that “undermines social stability” or is So YY added critical of the central government. official line that a visit by 300 U.S. military athletes military athletes U.S. by 300 official line that a visit as December 2019. to Wuhan caused the coronavirus outbreak. caused the coronavirus to Wuhan thought had emerged from a Wuhan seafood mar thought had emerged from a Wuhan the world over. The Chinese government itself Chinese government The the world over. had identified a new, unknown illness spreading unknown had identified a new, ket. research group associated with the University of research group associated with the University new coronavirus as well as critiques of the gov new coronavirus influence operation was threefold: influence operation ing “Wuhan unknown pneumonia” and “Wuhan pneumonia” and “Wuhan ing “Wuhan unknown in Wuhan. Physicians and scientists, such as Dr. Li as Dr. such and scientists, Physicians in Wuhan. line was touted by Chinese media and diplomats touted by line was virus in a WeChat group. virus in a WeChat Li and others. Li later died from COVID-19. Li and others. Lin Songtian, repeated the Foreign Ministry’s Ministry’s Lin Songtian, repeated the Foreign Toronto, Chinese social media platforms, such as Chinese social media platforms, Toronto, Wenliang, tried to warn of the new pathogen tried to warn they Wenliang, 45 key phrases to an internal blacklist, includ- phrases to an internal blacklist, 45 key According to a report by Citizen Lab, a cyber- According Citizen Lab, to a report by YY and WeChat, began to censor content as early began YY and WeChat,  “country” supplementsareanimportantrevenue “country” Washington Post duringasix-monthperiod.These Administration inSeptemberAdministration of2018. China Dailystaff. 2017, theChinaDailyCorp. spent$4,585,000 on FARA since1983, whichprovides financialdata 46 CGTN alsoregistered (underprotest) asaforeign Chinese influenceoperations, privateefforts have Private Efforts mainstream intheUnitedStateshave newspapers marked asseparate,theylooksimilartoregular incomplete pictureofthescopeandscale ing isasample, andby nomean exhaustive, list of it easiertospot andanalyzethedata.Thefollow helped tounveil theseoperations by exploiting using technologicaltools. Translationapplications agent underFARA,agent as mandatedby theTrump and socialmediaanalyticplatformshave made advertising inTheWall Street Journal andThe applies totheCCP-owned ChinaDailyDistri- available fromofficialChinesechannels. This cutting-edge privateeffortshelpingtofilloutthe operations. on itoperationsandthenatureofsome some ofthevariousdatasourceslisted above and sections ofthenewspapers. Over 30independent, andalthoughtheyare source forthenewspapers picture ofChineseinfluenceoperations. been paidtorun“China Watch” articles, written by bution Corp., whichhasbeenregistered with l

While officialdataprovide a verylimitedand Alliance for Securing Democracy: Hamilton 2.0 The aimofthedashboardand searchtoolisto In February 2019, theChinese mediagiant Democracy, United States’(GMFUS’s) AllianceforSecuring various informationmediums. TheAlliancefor lished by theGermanMarshallFund ofthe increase understanding ofthefocusandspread Securing Democracy and InstituteSecuring Democracy forStrategic the narratives andtopicspromoted by Rus- and state-funded mediaonTwitter, YouTube, of state-backed government messaging across diplomatic statements attheUnitedNations. state-sponsored websites, news andvia official sian, Chinese,andIraniangovernment officials Dashboard. 19 ThusaccordingtoafilingofMay 17, TheHamilton2.0 Dashboard,pub- 21 provides asummary analysisof 20 China Transparency Report - l l l

Alliance for Securing Democracy: Authoritarian AidData: China’s Diplomacy. Public That Bind”and“InfluencingtheNarrative.” This includesmetrics forfive typesofpublic Through avariety ofoutputs(mediaarticles, The Tracker shinesalightonthetacticsand Dialogue’s ReplyAll:reportutilizestheHam- Data isaresearchlabatWilliam&Mary, a Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, andSlova- Czech andHungarianparliamentssince 1990. ChinfluenCE (2017 to2020),hasusedvarious Central Europe(MapInfluenCE) China Public Diplomacy isaninteractive map China PublicDiplomacy Chinese governments’ activitiestoundermine ilton 2.0 Dashboardtoconductacasestudy of interviews, researchreports, open-door aswell includes media,socialnetwork, andparliamen- in politicalparties’positions onChinaatthe manipulation, cyber operations,manipulation, cyber malignfinance, kia, andintersectionswithinfluenceof other, university intheUnitedStates. that displays quantifiabledataonChina’s public tary issues. to reveal linksbetween pro-Chinabusinesses tools, suchasmediaanalysis, touncover who the asymmetric toolkit. the interconnectivitybetween different partsof trends that define the Russian and Chinese govtrends thatdefinetheRussianandChinese tries since2000usingfive tools:information Securing Democracy’s Authoritarian Inter and English-language audiencesonline. and English-language a pro-CCPTwitter network targetingChinese authoritarian internationalactors. Analysis and localpoliticalelites, analysisofchanges diplomacy fromtwoofAidData’sdiplomacy reports:“Ties on China’s influenceinCentralEurope—the exchange, andinformationaldiplomacy. Aid- diplomacy—financial, cultural,elite-to-elite, countries, andhow, mappingofagenda-setters ernments’ interferenceefforts, andhighlights civil society subversion, andeconomiccoercion. democracy inmorethan40transatlanticdemocracy coun- shapes theChinadiscourseinVisegrád Interference Tracker. ference Tracker MapInfluenCE. 27 Theproject,known initiallyas MappingChineseInfluencein 23 cataloguestheRussianand TheGMFUSAlliancefor AidData’s 26 focuses 22 - 25

24 -



47 37 In 38 39 The IRI The Hoover Institution Institution The Hoover 36 35 International Republican Institute (IRI). Institute Republican International power activities at sub-national, national, and at sub-national, activities power “burrows into power and deceptively deeply manipulation or spreading disinformation. or spreading manipulation subvert and sway them though methods” that them though methods” and sway subvert zens build democratic societies that are open, zens build democratic societies ect’s research team has released two major research team has released two ect’s U.S.: the influence operations in of China’s case studies of the CCP’s influence tactics. of the CCP’s case studies organization, IRI works with organizations organization, IRI works with organizations conducted case studies on the CCP’s campaign on the CCP’s conducted case studies are covert, coercive, or corrupting. The proj- or corrupting. coercive, are covert, and individuals across the globe to help citi- and individuals across the globe to and Stanford Internet Observatory have also Observatory have and Stanford Internet a joint report with Graphika and Institute for a joint report with Graphika and Institute tracks, documents, and evaluates China’s sharp sharp China’s and evaluates documents, tracks, sharp states, As the project levels. transnational seeking to democracies, the soft tissues of to shape global narratives on Hong Kong, the Kong, on Hong to shape global narratives the Future’s Digital Forensics Lab, IRI has also Lab, Digital Forensics the Future’s traced Chinese disinformation in Taiwan. - influ to with regards the Chinese government data on health official by provided transparency reports that look into various mechanisms reports that look into responsible, accountable, and resilient. IRI’s IRI’s responsible, accountable, and resilient. Safe for the Party” contains 13 World report “A is a nonpartisan, nongovernmental institute. nongovernmental is a nonpartisan, and economic diplomacy, and united front work work front and united diplomacy, and economic information involve that operations and cyber ence operations. On one hand, there is some On one hand, there operations. ence on digital is no transparency other hand, there COVID-19 pandemic. 2020 Taiwan presidential elections, and the elections, presidential 2020 Taiwan In this section, you will find scores assessing (within Chinese language sources). On the On the Chinese language sources). (within American Interests.” As an international democracy-development As an international democracy-development There are severe gaps in the data provided by by provided gaps in the data severe are There “Global Engagement” and “China’s Influence & Engagement” and “China’s “Global

l be found on p. 119. be found on p. efforts. Each score is rated on a 10-point scale. efforts. and overall transparency as a result of private and overall the transparency from the Chinese government Grade and Reasoning Grade The methodology for calculating these scores can for calculating these scores can The methodology Transparency from the Chinese Government: 3 out of 10 the Chinese Government: from Transparency -

34 - 33 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The 29 Freedom House’s House’s Freedom 31 Freedom House is an inde- House Freedom The Citizen Lab is an interdisci- The Citizen Lab is focusing on research, development, focusing on research, Transnational Its annual report Transnational 28 30 The China Media Bulletin is a monthly 32 Hoover Institution: China’s Global Sharp Power. China’s Institution: Hoover Freedom House. Freedom borders to silence dissent. state agencies and other state regarding personal data The Citizen Lab produced activities. surveillance privacy, security, and information controls of security, privacy, transpar popular applications; and examining practices from political science, law, computer practices from political science, law, Its research studies. science, and specific area plinary laboratory based at the Munk School ofplinary laboratory pendent research institution dedicated to the pendent research institution censorship of the Chinese regional and centralcensorship of the Chinese regional and on social media during the initialgovernment outbreak of the Coronavirus. ency and accountability mechanisms relevant expansion of the CCP’s media influence since expansion of the CCP’s civil society; documenting Internet filter documenting Internet civil society; communication technologies, human rights, and human rights, communication technologies, The Citizen Lab uses a “mixed global security. expert as well as public debates on China’s influ- on China’s well as public debates expert as Europe. activities in Central ence and of Toronto, expansion of freedom and democracy around a highly detailed and revealing analysis of the and revealing a highly detailed and high-level strategic policy and legal engage strategic and high-level - - stake of and briefings events, as closed-door to the relationship between corporations and to the relationship between the world. holders), MapInfluenCE broadens and shapes broadens and shapes MapInfluenCE holders), ing and other technologies and practices that ing and other analyzingimpact freedom of expression online; includes investigating digital espionage against includes investigating methods” approach to research combining methods” ment at the intersection of information andment at the intersection newsletter from Freedom House that provides that provides House from Freedom newsletter media freedom, and insight on censorship, COVID-19 and timeline, based on the rhetoric Global Affairs and Public Policy at the University Public Global Affairs and China’s Global Sharp Power project from the Global Sharp Power China’s English and Chinese-language sources. Hoover Institution at Stanford University Institution Hoover 2017. Internet freedom issues related to China, using Internet The Citizen Lab. Citizen The tracks authoritarian reach across Repression Beijing Global Megaphone report examines the

l l l  “Spamouflage Breakout” reportpointsoutthata Trends from theData These platformshave spreadChina’s narrative Front Work and Departmentiscertainlylarger 48 Overall Transparency: 5outof10 lomats intentionallypromoted thesebot accounts. liberalized accesstomedia,themediumhasalso machine hascertainlybecome louder, theeffec- in thehumanrightscontext, technologyhasin its messageabroad. holds moreresponsibilitiesthanseveral decades tiveness ofthesenarratives inshapingglobal tally remainsthesame. tional concepts thatguidetheseoperationshardly than 250percent”sincetheendofMarch2019. to ananalysisby theAllianceforSecurity, “Twitter ago, thepurposeitserves fortheCCPfundamen- ang, andtheHong Kong protests. Also, Graphika’s ates, andambassadors have increasedby more accounts connectedtoChineseembassies, consul- demic, MapInfluenCE conductedamedia analysis differ fromthoseoftheCCP. WhiletheUnited does note that there isnoevidencethatthesedip- challenges toauthoritarianrule.However,challenges asseen ouflage” ouflage” by Graphika,hasfoundincreasingsuccess on theoriginsofCOVID-19, itspoliciesinXinji- ence operations. Whilethere is certainlyamore perceptions seemstobemixed. Prior tothepan- some ways enabledandamplifiedChina’s influ- pro-Chinese propagandanetwork, dubbed“Spam- propaganda networks is a case in point. According propaganda networks isacaseinpoint.According platforms by Chineseofficialsandpro-Chinese provided oftoolkitsfortheCCPtocarry arange be a force for democracy andwouldpromotebe aforcefordemocracy been amplified by Chinesediplomats. by accountsthathave, usingrealistic inturn, “bot” Although newtoolsareavailable, thefounda- While thedrumbeatofChina’s propaganda The increaseduseofWestern socialmedia It was oncepredictedthattheInternet would and cyber operations. These efforts have also transparency onunited front work. that said,there still needsto bemore overall transparency ontheChinese government’s Private efforts have greatly improved overall influence operations, particularly ondigital nomic diplomacy, andunited front work. With provided more transparency onhealthandeco- 40 Thereport China Transparency Report Opportunities for FurtherResearch Front system’s roleintechnologytransferand yielded interestingofChina resultsontheimage Graphika’s “Splamouflage”reportshows alim- within thesecountries, rangingfrommostly nega- which have conducted analysisonprofessional where China’s influenceoperationsseemtono just fake accounts. lic, Slovakia, Hungary, andPoland. longer achieve thesamelonger results. Whenitcomes ited butgrowingrealusers, abilitytoengage not increasing actionby nongovernmental organiza- more canbedone. is still insufficient understanding oftheUnited its technologyobjectives. Aspointedoutinthe influence operationmechanismstosupport manufactured, to“tellChina’s story well.” tive tohighlypositive. TheCCP’s mishandling tions incounteringChina’s mediainfluence. thanks toorganizationssuchasGeorgetown CSET, the UnitedFront system, butdo play a rolein the UnitedFront Work Department,orwithin tremendous attention recentlyfromthegeneral tainly bemoretoolsandvoices, whether realor the worlddefendedChinathanin2019. the landscapelooksmuchdifferentthanjust a to globalperceptions oftheCCP’s Xinjiangpolicy, talent recruitmentprograms. of themediaoutputspublishedfrom2010 to2017 global perceptions ofChina,butaspointedout, havediplomacy undoubtably hadanimpacton pandemicand“wolfwarrior” of theCOVID-19 organizations andtechnology transfertoChina, on agencies andmechanismsthatare noton agencies under evolve Therewillcer asnewplatformsemerge. question is, whowillbelieve it? ever, theavailable open-source researchhasonly some publiclyavailable literatureonthisrole scratched thesurface. public, media,andnationalgovernments. How by thefourVisegradcountries:Czech Repub- few yearsago. In2020, 16fewercountriesaround book China’s Foreign Questfor Technology, there There alsoneedsbemoreopen-source research The CCP’s influenceoperationshave received The Internet isnot static. Itwillcontinueto On theother hand,therearespecificareas One specificopportunityisBeijing’suseof 47 42 46 Whilethereis 41 Thisstudy 43 Thereis 45 The 44 - - 

50 49 - More broadly speaking, there needs to be more broadly speaking, there needs to be More become a target of influence, it is another thing of influence, it is another become a target for countries, such as Taiwan, in gaining represen - in gaining as Taiwan, such for countries, CCP is doing and identify focused on what the should. This has raised the alarm on the issue, so should. This has raised such as those conducted by public opinion surveys, effectiveness. This will not be an easy task, but be an easy not This will effectiveness. attention evaluation of the actual effectiveness of evaluation of the actual effectiveness attention Simply labeling everything as being influenced by as being influenced Simply labeling everything tation in these organizations. to It is one thing influence operations. the CCP’s Much of the discourse has to become influenced. picture. help to paint a clearer Institute, the Lowy tions, as these nations may have membership and membership have may as these nations tions, ing the targets of those operations, as it rightfully operations, ing the targets of those can be paid to the actual closer attention now - organiza of multilateral in the context important voting rights. Their votes can make the difference the difference can make votes Their rights. voting China gives the CCP more credit than it is due. China gives - Analyzing These sorts of The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The 49 48 While it is expected that most of the available of the available that most While it is expected shaping global perceptions. dominance of Chinese state-media in, for instance, in, for instance, dominance of Chinese state-media cal warfare component of the PLA. component of the cal warfare expanding China’s influence. The Project 2049 The Project influence. China’s expanding tions in Western and developed nations, there nations, and developed tions in Western to inter that these nations face is limited access tion Army (PLA)’s General Political Department Department General Political (PLA)’s tion Army needs to be greater study of operations in underde- of operations in study needs to be greater national media outlets. As such, there is a rising national media outlets. influence operations in these regions is incredibly influence operations in these regions mechanisms do not exactly fall within the United exactly fall within the mechanisms do not literature is focused on the CCP’s influence opera- on the CCP’s literature is focused veloped and developing nations. A prevalent issue nations. and developing veloped Central Military Commission) detailed the politi- detailed Central Military Commission) Front system, but do play an instrumental role in an instrumental but do play system, Front Kenya and other African countries. and other Kenya Institute’s 2013 report on the People’s Libera- on the People’s report 2013 Institute’s (renamed the Political Work Department of the of the Department Work the Political (renamed   51 1 The irony is that this reduction in access has The irony With the end of the Cold War, however, this however, With the end of the Cold War, broadcasts as well as social media and economic broadcasts per) was a rarity. Now there is much readier access Now a rarity. per) was proliferation of Chinese materials and data. In the sors, think tank analysts, and contractors as well as tank analysts, think sors, dozens of these articles and broadcasts five days a days five of these articles and broadcasts dozens classified networks. effort was curtailed. FBIS became the Open effort data. The opening of China to academics, includ- data. The opening of China to academics, occurred precisely when there has been a massive occurred precisely when there has been a massive analysts across a range agencies. of government analysts later renamed the Access to OSC, and broadcasts. indicate restrictions The latest agencies to employ. Source Center (OSC), which spent much more time analyzing than translating foreign articles time analyzing than translating foreign OSE became harder and to FBIS translations, only through available that OSE outputs are now to a variety of Chinese journals, newspapers, and newspapers, of Chinese journals, to a variety harder for nongovernmental organizations and harder for nongovernmental it had a substantial linguistic capacity, translating capacity, linguistic it had a substantial more restricted; where once many university university where once many more restricted; ing students, has meant the ability to explore ing students, libraries and think tanks could get subscriptions subscriptions libraries and think tanks could get Open Source Enterprise (OSE), became steadily steadily Open Source Enterprise (OSE), became week. It was commonly cited by university profes- university commonly cited by week. It was People’s run of the People’s an entire year’s to have 1960s, (the PLA’s official newspa- Army Daily (the PLA’s Liberation Military The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The For many decades of the Cold War, the Central decades of the Cold War, many For The realm of national security—including The realm of national security—including At the same time, the U.S. defense and intel- time, the U.S. the same At biggest consumer, but also one of the larger gen - biggest consumer, bound to be even more restricted. bound to be even security community has often been not only the security community has often been not security community relies primarily or even solely security community relies primarily or even security operations—is typically one of the most of the most security operations—is typically one casts from countries around the world. Moreover, from countries around the world. Moreover, casts obtain journals and articles, providing translations providing journals and articles, obtain newspaper and books, of recent papers, of a variety erators of open-source literature. consumers of Chinese open-source literature. The the national on classified information. In reality, opaque, even in open democratic societies. In in open democratic societies. opaque, even analysts and academics. It had access to hard-to- and academics. analysts as the national security community) are arguably as the national security community) an authoritarian system like that of the People’s of the People’s that like an authoritarian system the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Broadcast the Foreign the most long-standing and yet often least noticed noticed often least and yet long-standing the most magazine articles, and radio and television broad- magazine articles, military affairs, intelligence activities, and internal intelligence activities, military affairs, ligence referred to here (collectively communities Defining Military widespread misimpression is that the national FBIS was a vital resource for both government government a vital resource for both FBIS was Republic of China (PRC), access to information is Intelligence Agency maintained and supported  Army Daily,areavailable online. People’s Liberation ArmyDaily,andRadioBei- Why Transparency onChina’s Global Times,forexample,whichispublishedby Is itastatement ofChinesedoctrine,theopinion 52 Chinese strategy andmilitary. Chinese voices has emerged. HowChinese voices hasemerged. doesoneassess China totheworld,however, afargreatervariety of jing, onehadtoassumethatthesepublications like Unrestricted Warfare, acontroversial book Military IsImportant is linking“tangible”and“intangible”aspectsof read Chinesetovaryingdegreesoffluency. As sourcesrather research usingoriginal-language materials were largely limitedtoPeople’smaterials werelargely Daily, reports, andelectronicmedia.Many- Chinesenews its tangibleandintangible aspects. ing trendsintheChinesemilitary. Understanding has raisednewissuesonhow todefineauthori- than relyingontranslations. Allofthevarious tion, orrevelation? in1999,that emerged written by twoPLAcolonels? that doesnot appeartomirrorofficial government the state-run People’s Dailybutappearstopublish tativeness. WhencurrentChinese-language the Chinesemilitaryrequires considerationofboth tant becauseitprovides researcherswithabaseline access toMaoZedong’sChinawas solimited,there approval—while alsorecognizingthepotential for and broadcasts reflectedsomedegreeofofficial amount ofinformation (usuallynot fromthe examined inthisreportemploy peoplewhocan of twoChinesemilitaryofficers, disinforma- extreme opinionsandemploy incendiaryrhetoric disinformation fromthesesame sources. Because of dataforassessingthecurrent state- ofand ongo simply werefewother options. several analysts observed, however, thechallenge private institutes andresearchorganizations sources hasmadeitfareasiertoundertake positions? Andhow shouldoneassesspublications papers andjournals, includingPeople’s Liberation provincial andeven township newspapers, official As important,thegrowth inChinese-language The enormousexpansionofChinesesources Transparency aboutChina’sTransparency militaryisimpor In termsoftangibleaspects, thereisafair Beginning withDengXiaoping’s openingof China Transparency Report - Republic ofChina Official Data from China Department ofDefense(DOD)reportonMilitary People’s LiberationArmy haspublishedwhite Chinese themselves) regardingweapons, equip- was abreakdown ofthesingleaggregateChinese less amatter ofassemblingdatabasesquantita- ment processes, anditsown assessmentsofChina’s norms, processes, andinterest groups. Thisis ment, andforcestructure. China’s aircraftcarrier, major Chineseplatforms, asdoother publications rity forces, butitdoessoinanoftenincomplete including informationaboutitsmilitaryandsecu- insight intomany ofthe morebasicaspectsof military thinking. information onPLAdoctrineandChina’s evolving numbers andtypesofChineseplatformsto and SecurityDevelopments Involving thePeople’s have beenthemost authoritative sourcesof understand how thosesystems mightbestaffed, tive informationandmoreanissueofqualitative the Liaoning,hasbeencloselyobserved sinceit tials astheChinesemilitary budget. At notime the world’s largestmilitary, includingsuchessen- trained, andemployed. beyondthe the Chinesemilitaryoftentrytogo tional systems, analysts tasked withexamining the focusofmany ofthereports, papers, studies, tary strategic guidelines”ofthe“Active Defense,” Soviet threat required going beyond the “bean Soviet beyondthe“bean threatrequiredgoing Studies’ TheMilitaryBalance. assessments oftheChinesenationalsecurity arrived inChinafromUkraine.TheannualU.S. and conferencesthatthesevariousorganizations and mobilization. establishment,- itsdecision-makingandmanage count” ofnumbersSoviet nuclearandconven - concluded thataproperunderstanding ofthe security situation. support—is assessingtheintangibles:governance, such astheInstitute forInternationalStrategic such issuesasthePLA’s individualservices, “mili- papers forover twodecadesthathave discussed fashion, omitting key details andfigures. Thus, the What ismuchmoredifficult—andwhatalso But thesesame whitepapersprovide little Much astheDODOfficeof Net Assessment China publishesawidevariety ofinformation, 2 4 provides numbersofvarious Thesebiannualwhitepapers 3  53 6 - Center Center and the publishes an annual year RAND Corporation RAND Stockholm International Peace Peace International Stockholm . Each of these programs involves . Each of these programs involves International Institute for Strategic Strategic for Institute International produces the annual Military Balance, produces the annual Research Institute Research book that covers major military developments major military developments book that covers for every nation, including the PRC. For more For PRC. nation, including the for every developments, including assessments of overall of overall including assessments developments, and organization, and major additions to the and organization, and major additions an overview of the past year’s national security national year’s past of the an overview around the world. It includes assessments of around the world. It includes assessments and arms transfers. arms control agreements, Similarly, the Similarly, tanks, planes, warships, nuclear weapons, etc.) etc.) nuclear weapons, warships, planes, tanks, China section has included than a decade, the Studies which provides basic data (numbers of troops, basic data (numbers of troops, which provides Chinese strategy, changes in force structure changes in force structure Chinese strategy, Chinese and other military expenditures, recent military expenditures, Chinese and other However, these tangible elements pro- However, Much of the work on intangibles is undertaken Much of the work on intangibles is undertaken PLA’s order of battle. PLA’s In combination, these two volumes pro- In combination, these two volumes Two of the largest nongovernmental programs of the largest nongovernmental Two As noted, the As noted,

for Naval Analysis Naval for l l by various think tanks, contractors, and federally and federally contractors, various think tanks, by forms, as well as insight into Chinese military as well forms, funded research and development centers. The fol- centers. funded research and development sales and expenditures. sales such as doctrine, training, and organization several dozen analysts. However, because these However, analysts. dozen several complete understanding, intangible elements understanding, complete centers, much of their work is for U.S. government government much of their work is for U.S. centers, generally accepted data on the size of the force generally accepted dons to the skeleton. of the range of their activities. opments are at the erence volumes, for example, are produced in for example, erence volumes, are federally funded research and development are federally funded research and development and its organization and key weapons plat- and its organization and key are not American. Two of the most notable ref- notable of the most American. Two are not - that monitor Chinese military and security devel national security establishment. To gain a more To national security establishment. national security establishment, including national security establishment, be incorporated to add muscles and ten- must lowing organizations and programs are indicative organizations and programs are indicative lowing vide only the skeletal outline of the Chinese vide only the skeletal vide a baseline of data regarding the Chinese vide a baseline of data regarding the Britain and Sweden. Britain and -

5 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The Similarly, the work reports issued in conjunction the Similarly, Open-source information is vital to any any Open-source information is vital to Consequently, there is much greater reliance Consequently, There is a vast array of nongovernmental of nongovernmental array There is a vast become “fully mechanized and informationized,” but only sporadically. The announcement of the The announcement but only sporadically. being employed, much less on how mechanized and mechanized much less on how being employed, but no details were forthcoming on exactly what but no details fully understanding it. In some cases, the monitor it. In some cases, fully understanding for more in-depth examinations of issues such as for more in-depth provide the background and context essential to and context the background provide public funding to encourage research by academics public funding to encourage research by provided to indicate how much might be spent on much might how to indicate provided sources focused on aspects of China’s military sources focused on aspects of China’s on think tanks, federally funded research centers, federally funded research centers, on think tanks, of daily developments. There is much less time of daily developments. establishment, Chinese strategic thinking, and Chinese strategic establishment, conferences and publications. expected from the government. At the same time, a the same At expected from the government. data and signposts on major Chinese security initia- on major Chinese security data and signposts defense budget figure ($178 billion in 2019) ever ever billion in 2019) figure ($178 defense budget what been clear exactly It has never each service. or biological space infrastructure, development, and academia to flesh out current intelligence and and other nongovernment analysts by promoting promoting by analysts nongovernment and other and analysts is as close and detailed as might be is as close and detailed and analysts activities—for example, military research and research and example, military activities—for and national security establishment, and many and many and national security establishment, trine, and other “why”trine, and other questions. therefore likely Chinese national priorities. This Chinese national priorities. therefore likely that China’s military was accelerating its efforts to military was that China’s tives. They have provided hints, for example, as to hints, provided They have tives. of Chinese internal security spending— the extent those terms might mean and what metrics were those terms might mean and what metrics understanding of the Chinese national security understanding is especially true because the intelligence com- on “current munity is often much more focused when, and how what, where, intelligence”: the who, of military doc- the evolution national strategy, number of government-supported efforts provide efforts provide number of government-supported ing provided by nongovernmental organizations nongovernmental by ing provided research—are included in this figure and, equally research—are included are not. important, what activities informationized the PLA is now. Private Efforts Private with the National People’s Congress and Chinese Congress People’s with the National Communist Party Congresses provide important Congresses provide Party Communist 14th Five Year Plan (governing noted 2021–2025) Year Five 14th  (DGI) 54 with afocusonspecifictopicssuchasChinese views onnucleardeterrence,views civil–militaryfusion, One ofthelargestsuchgroupsis language bylanguage analysts whoarefluentin Chinese) means exhaustive orcomprehensive; rather, they ining Chinesedocuments(usuallyintheoriginal research available tothebroaderpublic. think tanks whose products are more generally think tankswhoseproductsaremoregenerally School of Advanced InternationalStudies,School ofAdvanced Leidos, about and discussed Chinese cyber securitythreats.about anddiscussedChinesecyber are intendedprimarilytoprovide asense oftheir available. Theexamplesprovided hereareby no and Booz AllenHamiltonconductresearchthat and conferencevolumes, makingsomeoftheir or counterspaceoperations. exploits available Chinese-language materials.exploits available Chinese-language organizations suchasJohns Hopkins University’s do contributeregularlytoacademicmonographs clients, althoughanalysts fromboth institutions products arenot necessarily available tothepublic, programs andthekindofanalysisthatispossible. but theheadofDGI,James Mulvenon, haswritten l l

(China’s internalsecurityorgan);and12state- Australian Strategic Policy Institute: ChinaDefence These variouseffortstypicallyfocusonexam- Tracker isadatabaseofChineseinstitutions In addition, there are larger efforts In addition,therearelarger bynonprofit Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) Maritime Transparency Policy Centre, and itsdatabaseincludesinfor Policy Institute’s ChinaDefenceUniversities Center for Strategic andInternational Studies: Asia 50 PLAinstitutions; China’s nuclearweapons is anexcellent exampleofthepower ofnew mation on100civilianChineseuniversities; the ChineseMinistry ofStateSecurity(China’s Similarly, ahost ofgovernment contracting associated withtheMinistry ofPublicSecurity created by theinstitute’s InternationalCyber ence andtechnologyresearch.Thetracker was inmilitaryorsecurity-relatedengaged sci- owned defense industry conglomerates. program; threeinstitutions associatedwith Universities Tracker. for StrategicandInternational Studies’Asia foreign intelligence organ);fouruniversities foreign intelligence Maritime Transparency Initiative. , a subsidiary of SOS InternationalLLC., asubsidiaryofSOS DGI’s 8 TheAustralian Strategic Defense Group Inc. 9 TheCenter China Transparency Report - 7 l l l

Awareness Projectfeaturesaninteractive map (NBAR) andtheSasakawa(NBAR) Peace Foundation Institute’s China Monitor tracksChineseinflu Institute onGlobal ConflictandCooperation 2016 by theNationalBureauofAsianResearch Professor Tai SanDiego’s MingCheung,UC Global Conflict and Cooperation. Warsaw Institute: ChinaMonitor. where the PRC mighttrytoincreaseitscon- where thePRC warfare,” whichspansboth politicalandmilitary was oneofthefirst recipientsofa U.S.gov work onChina’s military–industrial complex. is not simplytoimprove China’s butalso image, includes observationsatellite data,aportfolio including explicitobjectives, effortstoconcen in theAsia–Pacific region.The projectalso intended topromote socialscienceresearch ularly note, “informationwarfare” isconducted to counterandsuppressopposingviews. Thisis trate massandgainsurprise,unityofeffort. technologies in creating transparency even technologies increatingtransparency that depictsthemaritimeissuesanddisputes Sea, employingofdatasourcesthat arange Sea. Itsreportshave documentedtheexpansion South andEast ChinaSeas. thinking. ProfessorCheung hasdoneextensive activities andorganizations. As PLAwritingsreg analysts noted, thepurposeofsuchoperations as other military operationsareconducted,with and intelligence agencies.and intelligence and maintained by the NBAR, theMaritime and maintainedby theNBAR, consistent withChineseconcepts of“information ence operationsinEurope.Asoneoftheir of datathatwas oncethepreserve ofmilitaries of China’s artificialislandsintheSouthChina on Chineselandreclamationeffortsaswell cealment. TheAMTIprovides regularupdates database ofvariousreefsandislandsalongthe on broadlydefinedsecurity issues. Onemajor ernment MinervaResearch Initiative grant, USA: MaritimeAwareness Project. University ofCalifornia Diego: San Institute on features a timeline of incidents and an imagery features atimelineofincidentsandanimagery focus oftheMinervagrants isChinesesecurity broader policy initiatives intheSouthChina broader policy National Bureau ofAsianResearch andSasakawa 11 12 TheWarsaw 10 Headed by Launchedin - - - - 

18 55 This commission, established by by This commission, established 17 Established in 2006 and located within in 2006 and located within Established 16 mission. tute. - Insti China Maritime Studies College: War Naval by outside authors. outside by - Com Review and Security Economic U.S.–China sors an annual conference and also publishes sors an annual conference produces an annual report examining vari- produces an annual report examining papers examining various aspects of Chi- papers examining various aspects of security and economic policies, organiza- security and economic policies, strategic relationship. To support its work, it To relationship. strategic established in 2015 as an institute within the within as an institute 2015 in established - but also Chi (PLAAF), Air Force only the PLA ous aspects of the U.S.–China economic and ous aspects of the U.S.–China which of longercommissions a variety studies, congressional mandate in October 2000, 2000, congressional mandate in October dimensions of China’s military and economy, military and economy, dimensions of China’s a variety of research papers, including papers of research papers, a variety are usually incorporated in its annual report. are usually incorporated in its annual annual conference and publishes studies and annual conference and publishes studies Studies Institute examines the maritime Studies Institute tions, and processes. tions, the Naval War College, the China Maritime War the Naval nese army and naval aviation, the PLA Rocket Rocket the PLA aviation, and naval nese army researching not only the PLA Navy, but also only the PLA Navy, researching not maritime power. na’s roundtables that delve into aspects of China’s into aspects of China’s roundtables that delve law, and marine technologies. It sponsors an It sponsors and marine technologies. law, flight-related activities. It therefore covers not not covers It therefore activities. flight-related China’s approach to shipbuilding, maritime China’s - It spon and Chinese space capabilities. Force, The commission also holds regular hearings and The commission also holds regular While the Chinese publish more and more Air War College that focuses on all of China’s College of China’s that focuses on all Air War

l l such advocacy was outside of Hong Kong or China, Kong of Hong outside such advocacy was scholars. The arrest of Japanese professor Nobu of Japanese The arrest scholars. ers to access that material are also intensifying. not provide much reassurance. The announce- provide not under Kong, Hong governing ment of new laws material, their efforts to limit the ability of outsid- which anyone found advocating independence for found advocating which anyone whether other academics might face similar fates. other whether Hong Kong may be liable to prosecution even if be liable to prosecution even may Kong Hong Growing Challenges Growing Iwatani in 2019, for example, raised concerns about for example, raised concerns about in 2019, Iwatani This is partly reflected in crackdowns on foreign This is partly reflected in crackdowns Although he was subsequently released, this does Although he was

15 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The This center 14 for example, DOD produces for example, DOD 13 U.S. National Defense University: Center for the for Center University: Defense National U.S. shared with both academia and other parts of academia and other shared with both gic support and Chinese military diplomacy analysis on various aspects of China’s military analysis on various aspects of China’s It also produces a capabilities. and strategic the U.S. government). the U.S. Studies at the U.S. National Defense Uni- Studies at the U.S. Study of Chinese Military Affairs. Study - on PLA strate included recent studies have Other U.S. government agencies that have agencies government that have Other U.S. variety of publicly available reports, which reports, of publicly available variety versity provides senior DOD officials with provides versity within the Institute for National Strategic within the Institute Under the National Defense Authorization Act Defense Authorization Under the National In addition to these agencies, several centers several In addition to these agencies, The China Aerospace was Studies Institute Air War College: China Aerospace Studies Institute. Studies China Aerospace College: Air War (for which it also maintains a database that is Although the focus of this report is on private, report is on private, the focus of this Although

l l for Fiscal Year 2000, for Fiscal Year foster greater interaction with the academic and foster perhaps the most authoritative source on Chinese source on authoritative perhaps the most provide opportunities for various members of the provide of information is the United States government. of information is the capabilities include the U.S. Defense Intelligence capabilities include the U.S. detailed information on the Chinese military’s information on the Chinese military’s detailed as well as key (what units they have) order of battle military and observed equipment developments and activities. exercises an annual report on developments in the Chi- developments an annual report on available from the Chinese, including much more from the Chinese, including much more available the U.S. intelligence community’s assessment of assessment intelligence community’s the U.S. tary realm, it is important to note that a key source that a key to note it is important tary realm, think-tank communities. These organizations communities. think-tank key development trends in the PLA. development key host conferences and publish monographs that host have been established by the U.S. government to government the U.S. by been established have military capabilities and reflects in filtered form military capabilities nese military and security establishment. This is security establishment. nese military and - China, in the mili analyses of nongovernmental issued important reports on Chinese military issued important reports on Chinese research and findings. reports often provide vital information that is not vital information that is not reports often provide China military–watching community to share their China military–watching National Air and Space Intelligence Center. These National Air and Space Intelligence Center. Government-Supported Efforts Government-Supported Agency, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Office of the and Agency,  (CNKI) databaseisoneofseveral thatprovide The ChinaNationalKnowledgeInfrastructure Grade andReasoning 56 China whereitwas oncepossibletoobtain Chi- whether of thisis theresultofadeliberatepolicy various materialsthatwouldseemtobepublicly journals, includingtheirback issues. lier adopters ofelectronicdatabasesfor journals. laws regardingaccesstoinformation.Ineither mined thatby 2011, 13ofthe16authorshadbeen its Uighurpopulation.Ithassincebeendeter restrictions ontheabilityofforeignerstopurchase nese militarypublicationshave imposedtighter has raisedadditionalconcernsaboutpoten- restricting foreign accessortheeffectofChinese results. Ifthesereportsareaccurate,itisnot clear ang: China’s MuslimBorderland. to beamatter ofnationalsecurityconcern,and the regionanditspeopleisnow clearlyconsidered transparency asaresultofprivateefforts.transparency Each tial vulnerability. tions isalsobecomingmoredifficult.Bookstores in available. Noristhissolelyamatter ofaccessing access toChinesematerials. obtain visas toconductresearch. discussed varioussubjectsrelatedtoXinjiangand concern. In2004,M.E.SharpepublishedXinji- case, theeffecthasbeentoreduceforeignscholars’ notdata managers wanting toviolateChina’s own of nationalsecurity, leadingtoincomplete search databases isincreasinglybeingmonitoredwith ever, suggestthataccesstotheCNKIandother score isratedona10-point scale.Themethodology suing suchefforts. sensitive orproblematictopicsisofeven greater parency ofthe Chinesegovernment andoverallparency subscribers withaccesstothousands ofChinese physical copies. TheChinesewereamongtheear sensitive topics, especiallythoserelatingtoaspects for calculatingthesescores canbefoundonp. 119. foreign analystsfrompur areopenlydiscouraged foreign academicsaccessiftheyareresearching blacklisted byableto Chinaandarenolonger At thesame time,accesstoChinesepublica- The apparentlysystematic refusal togrant In thissectionarescoresassessing thetrans- Some discussionsamongChinawatchers, how 19 20 21 Thisanthology Thestudy of China Transparency Report - - - - Trends from theData Transparency from theChineseGovernment: 5outof10 Overall Transparency: 7outof10 available Chinesesourcescanprovide. some indicationsofthekindsinformationthat l l

The PLA’s Expanding Area ofOperations. Chinese government andtracking PLA activities Chinese government butisstill incomplete and While theChinesegovernment scores low on China’s Steadily Growing Military and Security without muchdetail. Details onmilitaryarma- Ongoing open-sourceresearchefforts provideOngoing land. Coverage ofthe PLANavy andPLAAF score isnotablyhigherthansomeofthescore and movement. Otherareas—such asdoctrine, activities andarmssalesby theChinesegovern- navy, andreportingonthePLAAFindicated tary size isslightly better documented by the transparency withregard to itsmilitary, the that ittendedtooperatemainly over themain- the 1990sandearly2000s, Chinesewritings the announcedincreasesinChinesedefense Private efforts have beenmost impactful in growth intheChinese economy. Thiswould economic growth. Over thepast several years, on increasesinoutlays andespeciallyincom- senseofthescalethisspending based general defense spendingfigures, there isnonetheless a downs ofitsdefensespendingandthereare economy isunderreview ifnot eclipsed. info isoften notreported. in othercategories withinthisreport. Mili- more transparent becauseoftheseefforts. reform efforts, andpolicies—have alsobecome providing transparency onarmssalesby the serious doubtsofChina’s abouttheaccuracy ment. PLA activity canbeseen,buttheofficial public. There isalackoftransparency onPLA ments outsideofimagesare limited from the spending infavor ofbuildingthedomestic thatthepastsuggest decisiontolimitdefense parison withtheprojectionsofoverall Chinese focused on“nearsea”operations by theChinese budget have beguntooutpacetheprojected Budgets. WhileChinadoesnot provide break In -  - 57 for, among other things, monitoring the welfare things, among other for, prise system, and what has been the impact of prise system, successful have these efforts been thus far? successful have efforts to inculcate “civil–military fusion”? How How efforts to inculcate “civil–military fusion”? the PLA? by their customers, defined example, how does the western war zone, which zone, which war does the western how example, zone? ern or northern war in PLA Air Force) services (PLA Navy, other of the enlisted personnel? of the enlisted advanced weapons from the state-owned enter advanced weapons from the state-owned all follow the same organizational approach, or approach, organizational the same all follow For to their environment? are they customized Similarly, the steady modernization of the the steady Similarly, tegic Support Force)? How do they recruit and do they recruit and How tegic Support Force)? relate to the do they How train their forces? are they represented terms of seniority? How in one than there more senior PLAAF officers there are in another? the unit’s political officers, who are responsible political officers, the unit’s - the east compare with has no maritime border, responsive are elements of China’s military– are elements of China’s responsive complex to changing requirements as industrial in the war zone headquarters? For example, are zone headquarters? For in the war modate all of the new technologies? How How modate all of the new technologies? of noncommissioned officers (the backbone Ground Forces, PLA Rocket Forces, PLA Stra- Forces, PLA Rocket Ground Forces, How does the PLA train its forces to accom- does How a cadre of has the PLA developed well How What is the process for acquiring more What is the structure of the war zones? Do they zones? Do of the war structure What is the (PLA of the new services What is the structure Western militaries), and how do they relate to militaries), and how Western

l l l l l questions. Specifically: questions. PLA, and especially the ongoing on emphasis “informationization” of the force, raises a host of a host “informationization” of the force, raises - - The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The deploying to the Indian Ocean and the central Indian Ocean and to the deploying during the past decade, however, indicates that indicates decade, however, past during the erately made joint? commissions, and departments that now and departments that now commissions, do these relate to comprise the new CMC? How in terms of seniority and staffing? each other, they are steadily moving farther afield. Chi- farther moving they are steadily they predominantly from the ground forces nese writings regularly discuss PLA Navy ships PLA Navy regularly discuss nese writings Given China’s translucent if not opaque nature, translucent if not China’s Given Pacific, and a variety of sources mention that and a variety Pacific, Taiwan. PLAAF units circumnavigate Chi- the declining ability to access Nevertheless, How are each of these staffed? For example, are are each of these staffed? How What are the functions of each of the 13 offices, What are the functions of each of the 13 offices, (now their own service), or are they delib- their own (now

l benefit from sustained open-source research. With benefit from sustained saw a complete overhaul of the Central Military overhaul a complete saw activity, including their ongoing As reorganization. activity, and academic exchanges more broadly, suggests suggests more broadly, and academic exchanges access to information in the coming seven years is years seven access to information in the coming the creation of several new services, each area new services, the creation of several the massive reform of the PLA in 2015, which which reform of the PLA in 2015, the massive there is an enormous range of areas that could the Chinese reporting on the PRC’s 14th Five Year Year Five 14th the Chinese reporting on the PRC’s that it may become more difficult to obtain infor more difficult to become that it may includes a wealth of topics. For example: For includes a wealth of topics. military regions into five war zones/theaters, and war zones/theaters, military regions into five mation on some key areas of Chinese military areas of mation on some key nese sources, including the restrictions on scholars on scholars restrictions including the nese sources, mechanized and fully informationized” by 2027. 2027. by mechanized and fully informationized” mation on how well the PLA accomplishes this, but well the PLA accomplishes this, mation on how likely to become more difficult. likely Commission (CMC), the transformation of seven of seven Commission (CMC), the transformation Chinese reporting will be a major source of infor Chinese reporting will be a major source Plan indicated, the PLA is pushing to become “fully Plan indicated, the PLA is pushing Opportunities for Future Research Future Opportunities for   59 - - For the first 15 years of this expansion, China the first For This chapter examines the various research This chapter When the liberal economic reforms launched by leader Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s began by foreign direct investment (OFDI) or FDI origi- foreign direct investment foreign policy think tanks or educational institutes. formed into an economic juggernaut. Between product of the dramatic growth in Chinese OFDI product of the dramatic growth sources. China also ran massive current account China also ran massive sources. largely from the increase in surpluses with the U.S., cent, inaugurating one of the greatest economic cent, inaugurating one of the greatest expansions in history. over the past 10 to15 years. 10 to15 the past over aged in the double-digits, never falling below falling below never aged in the double-digits, trade, allowing it to amass large foreign currencytrade, allowing to bear fruit in the early 1990s, China was trans- China was to bear fruit in the early 1990s, reserves. Chinese OFDI began to rise precipitously reserves. $5 billion until exceeding not in the mid-2000s, initiatives dedicated to tracking Chinese outbound initiatives of them are housed at nating from China. Many was largely a destination for FDI from foreign for FDI from largelywas a destination 7.7 percent and reaching as high as 14.2 per percent and reaching as high as 14.2 7.7 Many of them are relatively recent creations, a recent creations, of them are relatively Many 2005 and reaching $27 billion in 2007. It nearly 2005 and reaching $27 billion in 2007. 1992 and 2012, China’s annual GDP growth aver annual GDP growth China’s and 2012, 1992 Outbound Investments Is Important Outbound Investments Why Transparency on China’s on China’s Transparency Why The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The Outbound Investments Broadly defined, FDI can 1 Finally, different definitions may include or different definitions Finally, Horizontal FDI generallyHorizontal refers to funds The Organization for Economic Co-operation The Organization for Economic Co-operation branch in the U.S. or purchasing a competing or purchasing a competing branch in the U.S. subsidiaries, acquiring voting stocks, mergers and stocks, acquiring voting subsidiaries, structing new factories or power plants, expanding plants, new factories or power structing significant degree of influence over an enterprise significant degree of influence distinguishing FDI from short-term portfolio distinguishing clothing that it sells. clothing different classes of FDI. Some defini- exclude chain: for example, a retail clothing store purchas- store clothing chain: for example, a retail clothing store in the U.S. Vertical FDI generally Vertical in the U.S. store clothing existing businesses, providing loans to overseas loans to overseas providing businesses, existing economy establishes a lasting interest in and a interest a lasting establishes economy a retail clothing store in China opening a new store clothing a retail acquisitions, and joint ventures. acquisitions, assume multiple forms, including an entity con- assume multiple forms, and Development (OECD) defines foreign direct and Development tions, for example, limit FDI to investments that for example, limit FDI to investments tions, investment in stocks. investment net at least 10 percent of voting power in a firm, power 10 percent of voting at least net ing the garment manufacturer that supplies the refers to investments up and down the supply up and down refers to investments invested abroad in the same industry: for example, for example, industry: abroad in the same invested investment (FDI) as a “category of cross-border investment resident in one in which an investor investment in another economy.” in another Defining Outbound Investments  (BRI); andfinallypeaked in2016 at$196billion Xi Jinping unveiled China’s colossal economic FDI flows have proven economic adouble-edged First, Inseveral developing thegood: economies, 60 Chinese investments ininfrastructure, energy, and with examplesofprojects that have been hand- financed projectsdeemedtooeconomicallyor limited—in somecasestosmallgroupsofbusiness more traditionallenders. Whiletherearebright met internationalstandards widelyadopted by investments, infrastruc particularlylarge-scale - like theU.S. Intheprocess, Chinahasovertaken ing andconstruction. international lenders. Thedeveloping worldhas number ofcountries. nomic growth. Inanumberofhigh-riskdeveloping ture projects, have frequentlyandcrediblybeen and technicalstandards, forlackingtranspar the U.S., Japan, andtheEUasleadingtrade to CentralAmerica,fromAfricaSouthAsia,and transformative inways bad,andugly. thataregood, a compellingneedfortrillionsofdollarsininfra- and investment andgrowing partnerforalarge again to$108billionby 2013, theyearPresident ency, andforcontributingtoirresponsibledebt criticized forfailingtomeet internationalfinancial elite, leadershipnetworks, orChinesefirms them- of thisoutfluxChinesecapitalhave beenpro- economies, Chineselendersand investors have enhancing livingstandards andpropelling eco- connectivity projectshave improved economic connectivity project,theBeltandRoadInitiative doubled in2008to$56billionastheworldreeled sword, providing economicbenefitsthatareeither spots, thedarkunderbellyof BRIisatrailof picked by autocraticelitesandwouldnot have practices. TheBeltandRoadInitiative islittered selves—or outweighedby economiccosts. Chinese sources have beentheironlyoptions forfinanc- structure investments, andinsomecases, Chinese physically riskyby moretraditionalWestern and performance, infrastructure, andproductivity, from thedeveloping worldtoadvancedeconomies found andfar-reaching, fromthePacific Islands from theglobalfinancialcrisis;nearlydoubled before witnessing a sharp decline from 2017–2020. The bad:Inmorethanafewcases, Chinese The economic and geopolitical ramifications The economicandgeopolitical For many countries, ChineseOFDIhasbeen China Transparency Report - 2 With China,however, awiderarray ofeconomic Chinese investments, particularlyinsensitive when theyupset theChineseCommunist Party or with theChinesegovernment aren’t like private OFDI hasbroughtnot just unfavorable economic Only occasionallydoFDIflows intosensitive later wereshown toincludesovereignty-violating infrastructure projectsandtelecommunica- non-performing loans, unfulfilledpromises, at-risk numerous capitalsworldwidetorestrict Chinese have beenaccusedofsigningsecretive dealsthat istics andimplications. Thisistheproductoftwo national securityconsiderationsandconcerns. industries andadvancedtechnologiestrigger tions networks, have repeatedlydrawn espionage telecom giantHuawei fromassumingarolein transactions havecharacter assumedgeopolitical ages and leverage asaninstrument andleverage ofitsforeign ages consequences, butadverse strategic ramifications. economies, andwhiteelephantprojects. concerns. Nationalsecurityconcernshave led grown increasinglybrazeninusingeconomiclink cians. Inaddition,theChinese government has of illegallyfunnelingfundstopro-Chinesepoliti- developing their5Gnetworks. object toaspectsofChineseforeignpolicy. complementary trends. cies, aretreatedaspurelyeconomic transactions. provisions. Chinesefirmshave alsobeenaccused policy, punishingforeign capitalseconomically sector company relationshipswith governments particularly advancedeconomiesanddemocra- l l

And theugly:Inanumberofcases, Chinese In somecases, aswithSriLanka,Chinesefirms In theU.S. andagrowing numberoflike- In most cases, FDIflows between countries, Put simply, “Chinese company relationships China’s outboundFDIhasattracted unique litically antagonisticsourcesnaturallytendto minded capitals, Chinaisincreasinglyviewed hostile competitor. Investments- fromgeopo attract greater scrutiny. as astrategic rival oratleast apotentially and China’s uniqueways ofdoingbusiness. scrutiny becauseof the intimaterelationship between thepublicandprivatesectorsin China 3 - -  - 61 In recent 10 OFDI statistics can be more difficult for the for the be more difficult can OFDI statistics In recent years, there has been a dramatic pro- In recent years, Today, several prestigious think tanks and prestigious several Today, The prominent attention now being accorded being now The prominent attention began to command in the years that followed. The followed. began to command in the years that faced a growing international backlash. faced a growing publicity around “new” investments, the cancel- the “new”publicity around investments, stitution in 2017. Since then, however, the BRI has Since then, however, in 2017. stitution ent sets of data and variables that they are tracking. of data and variables that they are tracking. ent sets cal character that these investment flows have have flows cal character that these investment that the BRI resources and attention growing exponential growth in Chinese OFDI flows begin- in Chinese OFDI flows exponential growth often goes unreported. destination of the investment. However, even even However, of the investment. destination at certain categories of investments; and some at certain categories of investments; The following are focused on specific regions. prominent Chinese OFDI are some of the most assumed, particularly since the 2013 announce- assumed, particularly since the 2013 at the federal, regional, or local level—to serve the the serve local level—to regional, or at the federal, by the as the figures are generally corroborated - Some are global in scope, tracking Chinese invest trackers now in use. now trackers to tracking Chinese FDI statistics and analyzing to tracking Chinese FDI statistics the number of in The growth their implications. geopolitito Chinese OFDI is also a result of the - there are numerous cases of planned foreign cases of planned foreign there are numerous while there is often much to materialize. And ments wherever they materialize; some look only ments wherever in new projects that parallels a larger decline in of Chinese OFDI a variety host research institutes ment of the Belt and Road Initiative and the ment of the Belt and Road Initiative in the U.S. but also further abroad, that are devoted but also further abroad, that are devoted in the U.S. in 2016. ning in the mid-2000s and peaking investments that for a variety of reasons fail fail of reasons for a variety that investments Private Efforts Private liferation of new research initiatives, particularly liferation of new research initiatives, lation or scaling down of proposed investments of proposed investments lation or scaling down when Chinese OFDI statistics are accurate, are accurate, statistics when Chinese OFDI when the counterparty is an advanced economy, is an advanced economy, when the counterparty Chinese OFDI flows. Chinese FDI “trackers” is partly a result of the is partly a result of the Chinese FDI “trackers” Communist Party’s interests. interests. Party’s Communist particularly to manipulate, government Chinese years, it has also suffered from a dramatic decline years, BRI became a legacy President project of Chinese Xi Jinping and was enshrined in the Chinese con- and was Xi Jinping “trackers,” each with different emphases and differ “trackers,” - 7 They 5 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The 9 Even where the Chi- Even 8 6 There is an enforced nexus between between an enforced nexus There is 4 Many large a grow even Chinese firms and Many The Chinese government regularly reports The Chinese government This phenomenon has accelerated since Xi This phenomenon has accelerated According Datenna, to one analysis done by by more reliable sources, China is often accused more reliable sources, by between economics and geopolitics economics in Chinese between foreign policy to an extent not seen in other in other seen not foreign policy to an extent private, market-driven growth has given way to a way has given growth private, market-driven or citizen to support, assist, and cooperate with or citizen to support, assist, of manipulating its economic statistics—whether of manipulating its economic statistics—whether on trade and investment statistics, principally statistics, on trade and investment expert Richard McGregor. controlling shareholder is a part of the Chinese controlling shareholder is a part of of influence. or a medium level government) developed economies. developed and Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). However, However, of Commerce (MOFCOM). and Ministry analyst Ashley Feng. analyst are required to have Communist Party commit- Party Communist are required to have to share intelligence, law upon are required by Security Law, 2016 Cybersecurity Law, and 2017 and 2017 Law, Cybersecurity 2016 Security Law, through its National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) through its National Bureau of Statistics to render assistance to the Chinese government to the Chinese government to render assistance tees or “cells” embedded in their organizations tees or “cells” embedded as well as guidelines, and administrative tic laws between it quite difficult to distinguish make tees, the private and public sectors and a unique fusion and a unique and public sectors the private unspoken regulations and internal party commit- unspoken national intelligence work.” resurgence of the role of the state,” notes China notes resurgence of the role of the state,” reversal of a trend toward very gradual economic very of a trend toward reversal in China—is invoked. The National Intelligence in China—is invoked. nese government does not exert direct control, the exert does not nese government in roughly 40 percent of Chinese acquisitions in in roughly 40 percent of Chinese acquisitions of influence (ultimate ment had either a high level in the west.” ing number of joint ventures with foreign firms ventures ing number of joint - domes “Chinese Chinese state. with the request, liberalization under his predecessor. “Since 2012, 2012, “Since liberalization under his predecessor. while these statistics are sometimes corroborated are sometimes while these statistics when national security—a broadly defined concept broadly defined concept when national security—a with a formal role in business decisions. with a formal role argues what is private and what is state-owned,” Law, for example, “instructs every organization every for example, “instructs Law, - the Chinese govern Europe from 2010–2020, National Intelligence Law effectively require firms National Intelligence effectively Law Official Data from China Data Official Jinping’s rise to power in 2012, which heralded the in 2012, rise to power Jinping’s “lines have been blurred.” China’s 2015 National National 2015 China’s “lines been blurred.” have  62 l l l

AidData: “MappingChina’s GlobalInvestments and American Enterprise Institute: ChinaGlobal The CGITdatabaseincludes3,500 economic Tracker includes “a wide range ofregional Tracker includes“awiderange Tracker. It doesnot effort. appeartobeanongoing 2,500 entriesdrawn from“awideset ofChinese MERICS bills itself as the “largest European MERICS billsitselfasthe“largest 3,485 Chineseinvestment projectsworth $274 Global ResearchInstitute intheU.S. InSeptem- Global Investment Tracker (CGIT)isoneofthe China Studies(MERICS)“provides analyses vate databasethatitmaintains withmorethan lab” housed at the College ofWilliamandMary’slab” housedattheCollege research institute focusingsolelyoncontem- investments inpowerandtransmis - generation including railroad,pipeline,andportprojects, initially hosted by TheHeritage Foundation, real assets, suchasthepurchaseofacompany real estate, andother industries. TheCGITisa the AmericanEnterpriseInstitute’s China transactions acrossenergy, transportation, the planningphase.MERICS publisheshighly track projectsstill underconstruction orin and onlyinvestments thatinvolve ownership of and thematicmapstovisualizetheinitiative’s and internationalofficial sources, industry asso- of lessthan$100million. cover, forexample,portfolioinvestments, bond or theconstruction ofafactory. Itdoesnot origin transactions ofmorethan$100million global tracker thatcovers Chinese- onlylarge oldest andmost respected“trackers” intheU.S. detailed, high-resolutionmapsbasedon a pri- of BRI-relateddevelopments andtrends.” ciations, companies, andmedia.” scope andprogress—aswellasitssetbacks.” It porary Chinastudies,” anditsBeltRoad sion, anddigitalinfrastructure, butdoesnot purchases, foreignaid,ortrade orinvestments Inequality.” Investment Tracker. focuses onBRI-relatedinfrastructure projects, billion andimplementedbetween 2000and2014. ber 2018, itpublishedadataset “geolocating” by theBerlin-basedMercator Institute for Mercator Institute for ChinaStudies: BeltandRoad 13 TheBeltandRoadTracker published 12 AidData is described as a “research AidDataisdescribedasa“research 11 Inauguratedin2005and China Transparency Report l l

The China’s GlobalEnergyFinance(CGEF) Import BankofChina.Theprojectnotes that Bank oftheU.S. aswell“analysisofgovern- FDI fromChina,andexternal debt toChina.It Development Bank(CDB)andtheExport– Chinese development loanstoBeltandRoad Center: China’s GlobalEnergy Finance Database. Council onForeign Relations: BeltandRoad Track financed projects).Italsooffersindividual lion inenergyfinancesince2000, including$3.2 ment announcementsandmediareportsabout in thethreeindicatorsfrom2000–2017. Data includes theyear, location,energy source,sub- ments,” and “[t]hesesourcesarelaterverified ministries, reports, news andofficialdocu- key economicindicatorsacross67countries hydropower, etc.); by energysubsector(power host countries, when possible.Every record er. this study, includingAidData. tive mapandalsooffersseparatechartsforeach the CouncilonForeign Relations tracksthree these two policy bankshavethese twopolicy provided $251 bil- through interviewcontacts inChinaandother the [Chinese]banksthemselves orhost country and draw fromother tracker projects listed in are imports from China as a percentage ofGDP,are importsfromChinaasapercentage analyzes financingforglobalenergyprojects and by lender(CDB, EX–IM Bank,andjointly countries.” Thedatatake intoaccountFDI, databases. DataintheIndexofDebt toChinais drawn fromtheInternationalMonetary Fund on importsfromChinaandChineseFDIare country includedinthestudy, visualizingtrends conveys theinformationinashadedinterac- database isaninteractive dataprojectthat generation, extraction,generation, transmission, etc.); on thewebsiteorganizesChinesespending data arecollectedfromthe“officialwebsitesat datasets foreach yearfrom2000to2019. The portfolio investments, anddevelopment loans participating intheBRI.Thethreeindicators sector, lender, andproject description.” based ondatafromtheIMFandExport–Import by region;by energysourcetype(coal,gas, billion in2019. Theinteractive mappublished by China’s banks:theChina two globalpolicy Boston University GlobalDevelopment Policy 14 The BeltandRoadTracker publishedby 15 -  63 The Australia- The China–EU The China–EU 21 19 The Washington, DC-based- Stim The Washington, 20 Lowy Institute: Pacific Aid Map. Pacific Institute: Lowy Henry L. Stimson Center: Mekong Infrastructure Infrastructure Mekong Center: Henry L. Stimson Datenna: China–EU FDI Radar. China–EU FDI Datenna: based Lowy Institute’s Pacific Aid Map is Pacific Institute’s based Lowy by Datenna, an information services com- information services Datenna, an by factors.” A “high-level influence” grade of state factors.” pany in the Netherlands that tracks Chinese that tracks the Netherlands in pany son Center’s Mekong Infrastructure Tracker Tracker Infrastructure Mekong son Center’s to platform is a “resource for researchers sector and country. structure, shares being pledged, of state- level structure, structure assets and the social, economic, and assets structure on a quarterly basis. data are derived from open sources, including from open sources, data are derived project profiles, company websites, government orga- nongovernmental banks, development determination on the level of Chinese state of Chinese state on the level determination medium, or high, having grading projects as relevant and other investors control of any - infra water transportation, and of energy, ecological changes they bring to South East an analytical tool designed to examine the and Thailand, and also tracks several projects and Thailand, and also tracks several trackers listed in this chapter. Data are updated in this chapter. listed trackers tools,” including a Mekong Infrastructure Infrastructure including a Mekong tools,” tion, Datenna uses a “proprietary algorithm a “proprietary tion, Datenna uses track, monitor, and quantify the development and quantify the development track, monitor, Asia Program and supported Southeast ter’s holder is part of the Chinese government.” The holder is part of the Chinese government.” nizations, media reports, and other research research and other media reports, nizations, of the other including several institutions, investments in Europe. The project makes a Europe. The project makes in investments European investments, influence in various share- means that “the ultimate controlling including Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, including Myanmar, of southeastern in the bordering provinces Agency for International the U.S. in part by - determina that make To influence. state low which takes into account the entire shareholder into account the which takes China–EU Radar also organizes acquisitions by by China–EU Radar also organizes acquisitions China. The tracker is run by the Stimson Cen- is run by China. The tracker Mekong Project Impact Screener. All of the Project Impact Screener. Mekong Development (USAID). It offers three “Data Development FDI Radar is an interactive map produced map is an interactive FDI Radar Tracker. Tracker Dashboard, Suitability Mapper, and Dashboard, Suitability Mapper, Tracker Asia.” It focuses on several regional countries, regional countries, It focuses on several Asia.”

l l l - - The 18 Boston Boston 16 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The The Center for Strategic 17 Boston University Global Development Policy Policy Global Development University Boston by the China Development Bank and the China Development the by funders, and operators. Currently, the website Currently, operators. and funders, International Studies and China–Africa Research Research and China–Africa Studies International Database. Africa to Chinese Loans Initiative: plant, and transmission programs. Each listed Each listed plant, and transmission programs. informa- project is supported with detailed purpose, and year. project tracking all of the power plants financed plants financed of the power project tracking all completion dates, contractors, consultants, consultants, contractors, dates, completion owned enterprises.” For each loan, the database For enterprises.” owned sector, on dollar amount, country, offers details documents, contractor websites, fieldwork, contractor websites, documents, capacity of the project, type of technology, oper capacity of the project, type of technology, capacity. The database displays deal types, the deal types, The database displays capacity. and interactive map are down for maintenance map are down and interactive across the Eurasian landmass, including inter across the Eurasian landmass, and International Studies’ Reconnecting Asia and International Studies’ Reconnecting and 2019,” according to the website, “SAIS- and 2019,” and greenfield investments. As of early 2019, As of early 2019, and greenfield investments. ating status, and estimated C02 emissions. and estimated ating status, SAIS–CARI Chinese Loans to Africa Database tion on project status, total costs, start dates, dates, start costs, total tion on project status, tracker offers an interactive map with detailed map with detailed offers an interactive tracker tracks Chinese lending to Africa since 2000. tracks Chinese lending to Africa since 2000. total of 186.5 gigawatts of power-generation of power-generation gigawatts of 186.5 total the database had tracked some 777 Chinese- some the database had tracked modal, railway, road, seaport, pipeline, power road, seaport, pipeline, power modal, railway, information on 14,000 infrastructure projects infrastructure information on 14,000 interviews, and media sources. “Between 2000 “Between and media sources. interviews, ing mergers and acquisitions, debt finance, debt ing mergers and acquisitions, lion with African governments and their state state and their lion with African governments financed power plants across the globe with a plants across the globe financed power with a new website planned for 2021. - forms of Chinese FDI, includ well as other Center for Strategic and International Studies: Studies: and International Strategic for Center CARI estimated Chinese financiers signed estimated CARI Chinese investor, percentage of ownership, percentage of ownership, Chinese investor, Global Power Database, an interactive data data Database, an interactive Global Power Center: China’s Global Power Database. Power Global China’s Center: University’s GDPC also publishes the China’s China’s also publishes the GDPC University’s Export–Import Bank of China worldwide as Export–Import Bank 1,141 loan commitments worth US$153 bil- 1,141 The database draws from official government government The database draws from official Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced School of Advanced Johns Hopkins University “Reconnecting Asia.” “Reconnecting

l l l  64 l l

Japan, theWorld Bank,theAsianDevelopment American andCaribbeangovernments and America FinanceDatabasetracksloansfrom 40,000 projectsin14 countriesfrom64donors Venezuela worth$62.2billion.TheGDPCgath- (energy, infrastructure, mining,other); and America Finance Database. The U.S.–China Investment Projectis“amul- National Committee onU.S.–China Relations, Bank, andChinaExport–ImportBanktoLatin Bank, andother donors. year. Thewebsitealsoshows thenumberof China Relations: U.S.–China Investment Project. Global Development Policy Center: China–Latin Group, aU.S.-based economicresearchfirm, and China’s banks, policy theChinaDevelopment loan); andstatus (complete, inprogress, on lead organizations. Itisdesignedtobringmore loans accepted by eachcountry from2005–2019, map oranExcel spreadsheet. Themapoffers island nationswithinMicronesia,Polynesia, ments, reports. andnews hold, etc.). Themapalsooffersbasicpopula- host countryministries, other officialdocu- to thelevels provided by theU.S. Australia, through 2018 andallows theviewertocom- tion, demographic,andeconomicstatistics for transparency toChina–U.S.transparency capitalflows. The tiyear researchinitiative” withtheRhodium available throughthewebsite’s interactive and Melanesia. Itincludesdataoncloseto atu, andtheCookIslands. Thedataarefurther a nonprofiteducationalorganization, asits detailed dataontotal aidcommitted toand offers comprehensive datafromalldonors each country. Currently, thePacific AidMap or bycategorized donor;sector;type(grant ers its data from China policy bankwebsites,ers itsdatafromChinapolicy organized by destination; dollar amount;type spent incountrieslike Kiribati,Samoa,Vanu- state-owned enterprises. Chinese loansare provision offoreignaidamongtheSouthPacific pare thelevels offoreignaidprovided by China Inter-American DialogueandBoston University from 2010 tothepresent.Thedataarefreely from one$50millionloantoPeru to17loans Rhodium Group andNational Committee onU.S.– 22 TheChina–Latin China Transparency Report 23

Grade andReasoning transparency oftheChinese government andtransparency l

An interactive mapdisplays ChineseFDIinto (private orstate); stake (controllingorminor In thissectionarescoresassessing the MacroPolo’s ChinaFootprint beyondthe “looks $8.8 billionin2020. Thedataalsodisplay U.S. $900,000 intheU.S.); education;andtravel. The Chinese investments intheU.S. peaked in2016 CB Insights, theNationalAssociation ofRealtors, China Investment Project,PitchbookFigures, lion beforefallingto$75.9 billionin2019. research papersprovide qualitative andquanti- investments intheU.S. by state. Inaddition, investments inChinaby province andChinese ity); andentrymode(acquisitionorgreenfield). registrations, andregulatoryrecords, offeringa into six categories: FDI; venture capital; home FDI;venture capital;home into sixcategories: ing theyearsfrom2010–2019 broken down interactive mapoffersannual statistics cover highly scrutinized bilateral trade relationship highly scrutinizedbilateraltraderelationship using datadrawn fromtheRhodiumGroup’s US– tative analysisoftwo-way investment flows. the U.S. by year, industry, sector, dealtype, type (financialor strategic); investor ownership through aninteractive map, thedatacanbe to paintacompositepictureofChinesecon- total figurereachedapeakin2016 at$111.5bil- the U.S. DepartmentofState’s BureauofCon- States.” To thatend,theprojecttracksvarious at nearly$60billionbeforefallingrapidlyto and government ownership. Itestimates that and venture capitalflows usingdatadrawn and instead drawsonthebest available sources and theInstitute forInternationalEducation.An organized by industry (agriculture,energy, etc.); degree ofspecificityandgranularity. Presented data totracknewinvestments, acquisitions, grant investors arepermitted tobecomelawful project’s databaseusesproprietary transactions sumption anddirectinvestment intheUnited sular Affairs, the U.S. DepartmentofCommerce, permanent U.S. residentsby investing atleast investments (eligibleimmi- purchases; EB-5 from pressreleases, company filings, business forms ofChina–U.S. economicengagement Paulson Institute MacroPolo: The ChinaFootprint. - 24 -



65 - 28 - - 29 China’s numbers China’s 31 Similarly, the China–Latin America Similarly, 30 loans for energy projects totaling just $3.2 bil just totaling projects energy loans for lion, down 71 percent from the $11.08 billion in billion the $11.08 from 71 percent lion, down in 2018. governments foreign lending to tions—the China Development Bank (CDB) Bank (CDB) China Development tions—the [I]n 2019, overseas energy financing by financing energy overseas [I]n 2019, In 2019, China’s policy banks issued only three only three issued banks policy China’s In 2019, and the Export-Import Bank of Chinaand the Export-Import China’s two policy banks with global opera banks policy two China’s (CHEXIM)—was at its lowest level since 2008. since level its lowest at (CHEXIM)—was Derek Scissors, creator of AEI’s China Global creator of AEI’s Derek Scissors, In Africa, China offered $148 billion in loans In Africa, China offered $148 According to Boston University’s China Global China According University’s to Boston Analysis shows that in the first half of 2020, Chi- half of 2020, in the first that shows Analysis between 2000 and 2018 with over half, or $80 with over 2000 and 2018 between in the transport and invested billion, of the total from Tencent accounting for a third of the total. accounting for a third of from Tencent prising that Chinese OFDI has plummeted. Chinese OFDI prising that power sectors. The SAIS–CARI sectors. power Chinese Loans to pendent figures suggest the decline is closer to 80 policy bank finance to [Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, policy bank finance to [Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, companies say less.” Chinese sources are reporting less.” companies say data sourced from the destinations for Chinese data sourced from the destinations either wiped out Chinese investments or Chinese either wiped out Chinese investments a product of heightened investment screening for screening investment a product of heightened - but inde a 5 percent decline in OFDI in 2020, and Venezuela] and other countries in the region and other and Venezuela] the lowest total in nine years, with one investment with one investment in nine years, total the lowest to all African countries peaked in 2016 at $29.4 bil- at $29.4 in 2016 to all African countries peaked of investments.” reporting used to track at least loosely with independent used to track at least has decreased markedly in recent years.” has decreased markedly nese OFDI in the U.S. amounted to only $10 billion, amounted to in the U.S. nese OFDI investment. That, he said, is no longer That, he said, the case. investment. increasingly challenging to find documentation of lion but by 2018 had fallen by roughly 70 percent to had fallen by 2018 lion but by war, but the phenomenon is global. but the phenomenon war, Chinese projects, tariffs imposed by the Trump by the tariffs imposed Chinese projects, Chinese debt-to-GDPChinese sur it is perhaps not levels, Chinese entities investing overseas. “COVID-19 overseas. Chinese entities investing $8.9 billion. $8.9 Energy Finance Database: Finance Database website notes that “Chinese that “Chinese Finance Database website notes In the U.S., the fall in Chinese investments is partly is partly in Chinese investments the fall In the U.S., Investment Tracker, argues that in 2020, it became argues that in 2020, Tracker, Investment Administration, and other impacts from the trade Administration, and other Africa Database shows that total Chinese lending that total Africa Database shows “Whenever Chinese things become stressful, It 25 - The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The 27 and declined a further 8 26 loans, and aid. FDI gets tracked more closely more tracked loans, and aid. FDI gets nese aid are slightly more transparent. more slightly nese aid are bound investments. There is a near complete is a near complete There bound investments. - in pro been instrumental have efforts Private defense-linked outbound investments are still still are outbound investments defense-linked these loans have been provided. The Chinese The been provided. these loans have the Chinese government with regards to out to with regards the Chinese government are also not transparent. BRI projects and Chi- BRI projects also not transparent. are - loans—spe data on Chinese of official absence on the receiving end. Even with private efforts, efforts, with private end. Even on the receiving cifically, information on the terms on which terms on the information cifically, government’s defense-linked outbound flows outbound flows defense-linked government’s viding more transparency on BRI projects, FDI, on BRI projects, transparency viding more non-transparent. very In recent years, this gap has shrunk. By 2019, 2019, this gap has shrunk. By In recent years, The defining contemporary trend in Chinese The defining contemporary trend What explains this massive rise and fall? What explains this massive There are severe gaps in the data provided by by provided gaps in the data severe are There be found on p. 119. on p. be found from $12 billion to $196 billion, and the precipitous from $12 billion to $196 billion, and fell to $118 billion in 2018 percent to $111 billion in 2019. stricter capital controls from Beijing and later by a capital controls from Beijing and later by stricter Chinese OFDI fell In 2017, global economy. slowing surplus from trade with the U.S. allowed China to allowed surplus from trade with the U.S. overall transparency as a result of private efforts. transparency of private efforts. as a result overall decline in the years since then, caused in part by in part by decline in the years since then, caused a slowing global economy, caused in part by the caused in part by global economy, a slowing accumulate large currency reserves. inbound FDI reached $137 billion, but outbound billion, but outbound inbound FDI reached $137 mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, China was accumu- China was to the mid-2000s, mid-1990s methodology for calculating these scores can scores can for calculating these methodology lion surplus. When this trend is combined with lion surplus. lating $40 billion–$60 billion per year in inbound current account This and a massive lion annually. OFDI is the dramatic increase from 2005–2016, 2005–2016, OFDI is the dramatic increase from COVID-19 and rising pandemic, capital controls, Overall Transparency: 6 out of 10 Transparency: Overall FDI reached $111 billion, netting China a $26 bil- FDI reached $111 billion, netting Each score is rated on a 10-point scale. The scale. The is rated on a 10-point Each score FDI while OFDI was averaging well under $10 bil- averaging FDI while OFDI was 1990s even as OFDI remained stagnant. From the From as OFDI remained stagnant. 1990s even 19.3 percent from its 2016 peak to $158 billion. percent from its 2016 19.3 Inbound FDI into China began to surge in the early Transparency from the Chinese Government: 3 out of 10 3 out of Chinese Government: the from Transparency Trends from the Data from Trends  Opportunities for FurtherResearch 66 largely onthe“what”and“where”ofChineselargely regionwide basis, butthereisroomformoredata tion activityandpurchaseofforeignassets have Stimson Mekong Infrastructure Tracker offersa great exampleandmodelforsuchaninitiative. collection andanalysisatasubregionallevel. The ects arenow evaluatingChineseinvestments ona expanding numberofexisting efforts. Many proj- plunged considerably.plunged percent. WhileChinaismaintainingitspositionin foreign financialandbondmarkets, itsconstruc- for additionalresearchinthisfieldbeyondthe To researcheffortshave date,ongoing focused There continuetobeampleopportunities China Transparency Report Private Enterprise(CIPE),forexample,has in ordertomitigaterisk. important toolboth by identifyingthebenefits nese investment and onregionaltransparency investments onlocalgovernance, institutions, need forgreaterfocusontheimpactofChinese investments. Lessattention hasbeenpaidtohow these investments areaffectingthehost countries Southeast Asia,thatassesstheimpactofChi- and risksofChineseinvestments andby empow and populations. TheCenterforInternational Specifically,and theregionsatlarge. thereis a ering officials to develop practical policy solutionsering officialstodevelop practicalpolicy governance. Thistypeofeffortservesgood asan conducted regionalcasestudies, includingin - 

- 67 - - It is important 1 Another aspect Another Political–Economic Institutions and Policymaking. Institutions Political–Economic Ethnic and Religious Groups. and Religious Ethnic Given China’s dual governance structure, how structure, dual governance China’s Given but are a separate source of concern for the CCP. position, such as deputy minister, lieutenant gov position, such as deputy minister, policy, the position of party secretary is a vital the position of party secretary policy, ernor, or deputy mayor. ernor, ever, it is also important to identify and track the ever, the equivalent of the correspond- one, at least groups are officially recognized in China, and while of domestic governance below the level of the the level below governance of domestic chauvinism,” the PRC does not imbue the Han with the PRC does not chauvinism,” announced and may hold a relatively lower state state lower hold a relatively announced and may and associated politics. More than 50 ethnic than 50 ethnic More and associated politics. at work in China that overlap with ethnic issues with ethnic at work in China that overlap the party secretary is not necessarily officially necessarily is not the party secretary tance of the party committees that set Chinese that set tance of the party committees these groups are still only a fraction of the ethnic only a fraction of the ethnic these groups are still to note that, despite Western references to “Han that, despite Western to note to for example, attributed the Nazis, the overtones ing governor, mayor, or ministerial head. But or ministerial mayor, ing governor, national government is the issue of ethnic groups is the issue of ethnic national government ist market” system, a significant number of a significant number system, market” ist in Chinese domestic policymaking.in Chinese domestic various party secretaries. Because of the impor various party secretaries. Furthermore, because of the Chinese “social- Furthermore, Han Chinese, they nonetheless represent a factor Han Chinese, they nonetheless Aryans. Similarly, there clearly are religious issues Similarly, Aryans. - - Politics and Law Politics The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The This dual chain To understand Chinese pol- understand To Provincial and Local Governance. and Local Provincial National Governance. National The People’s Republic of China (PRC) Republic of China is gov The People’s provincial-equivalent cities such as Beijing, Tian- provincial-equivalent politics. The politics of the Chinese state, even even politics of the Chinese state, The politics. political structure. Because the CCP rules China, political structure. extends down through the provinces to cities and through the provinces down extends It is important and villages. to townships even erned by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Party the Chinese Communist erned by of the State Council, which reflects the structure of the State Council, which reflects the of the PRC but also the members of government, to identify and track the career development of to identify and track the career development tics of the state (at various levels) and intraparty (at various levels) tics of the state the CCP, their ranks in the CCP do not necessar their ranks in the CCP do not the CCP, the CCP leadership and its ranks. While the vast While the vast the CCP leadership and its ranks. majority of government officials are members of majority of government it is necessary to determine not only the members not to determine it is necessary it is state. Thus, ily reflect their positions in the to monitor the membership of the CCP necessary itics, one must recognize the dual nature of China’s nature of China’s recognize the dual one must itics, Defining Politics and Law Defining jing, Shanghai, and Chongqing. when only discussing domestic politics, spans a politics, when only discussing domestic wide range issues. of Chinese provincial governors and the mayors of and the mayors governors Chinese provincial Chinese politics therefore includes both the poli- both Chinese politics therefore includes Central Committee, especially its Political Bureau especially its Political Central Committee, (Politburo) and the Politburo Standing Committee. and the Politburo (Politburo)  “faction” and“relationship,” includesfamilialties, Technology hundreds manage Corporation(CASC) The concept ofguanxi,whichembodiesaspects 68 Corporation) or the China Aerospace Scienceand Corporation) ortheChinaAerospace Zemin was longregardedasheadofthe“Shanghai would constitute civilsociety (includingnongov was viewedasacloseassociateofXiJinping. This level; therearealsoprovincial andeven township large andextensivelarge toconstitute factionswithin important componentoftheCCP. China’s banking national tolocal,any understanding ofChinese measure ofinfluenceonChinesepolitics. Because reach of the CCP or the PRC government—politicalreach oftheCCPorPRC relationships, not just formallines ofauthority. including theMinistry ofIndustry andInforma- istries. Thereareseveral authoritiesthatmanage nebulous; formerPolitburo member Wang Qishan mation both withinandbetween bureaucracies. home province, amongother links. universities andother academicestablishments, usually associatedwithvarious government min- transparency musttransparency alsoconsideraspectsofwhat the Chineseeconomy. tion Technology andthe Ministry ofEducation. In the Chinese government manages itsownthe Chinesegovernment manages versions tained economicliberalization.Othersaremore the Chinesepoliticalsystem. For example,Jiang and village-ownedenterprises, allofwhichhave a as Sinopec(theChinaPetroleum andChemical and thebroaderChinesesociety arebuilton academic background, andsharedhometown and economic decisions, whichaffect andareaffected atalllevels,of theroleandimportanceSOEs of thegovernance structure. civil society inChina—thatis, aspherebeyondthe of thousands ofworkers andplay acentralrolein of variousorganizedreligions. Thinktanksare ernmental organizations)inother systems. Thus, overlay ofguanxinetworks affects theflow ofinfor system isalsostate-run. The headsofsuchentities part ofChina’s economy, andtheirleadersarean state-owned arestill avital enterprises(SOEs) politics must includeassessingandmonitoring faction” perceived as generally supportingsus- faction” perceived asgenerally by other politicaldecisions. In addition, not all SOEs areatthenational In addition,not allSOEs Some relationshipnetworks aresufficiently Politics andCivilSociety. Factional andGuanxi Politics. 2 Thesepeoplearealsopart Becausethereisnoreal Chinesepolitics China Transparency Report - - Affairs now more regularlyholdpressbriefings (as doestheMinistry ofNationalDefense),but Institutes, by whicharemanaged abodywithin Health Organization andtheInternationalTele- Deng Xiaopinginthelate1970s, Chinahascomple- PRC hasamuchwiderarrayPRC oftoolsatitsdis- jing’s dealingswithother countries, groups, and Foreign Policy many diplomaticoutposts andtheirstaffs regularly mented itspolitical outreachtoother countries nese views are consulted on a range ofissuesfrom areconsultedonarange nese views ment. TheChinesegovernment caninvite foreign international organizations. AswithChinese nese students abroad. higher profile, earning the sobriquet “Wolfhigher profile,earningthesobriquet Warrior keep the CCP informed of ongoing activities.keep theCCPinformedofongoing SOEs, forexample,canmake decisionsbasedin the Ministry ofEducation,aswelldirectChi- tional outreacheffortsabroadincludingConfucius time, thegovernment cansupportvariouseduca- the state runstheeducationalsystem. At thesame the PRC. BecauseoftheCCP’s extensive reach, all ofthesebodies, inadditiontotherelevantover as wellChina’s “market socialist” system, the communications Union. onsocialmedia.TheChinesehaveengage also climate change toNorthKorea.climate change growth inChinese power, other countriesarenow constrained by concernsabout returns oninvest- domestic politics, understanding Chineseforeign diplomats.” Not onlydoes theMinistry ofForeign diplomats wererelatively quiescent,butinthe domestic politics. eign politicsisasextensive ofits astherange ent structures andapproachesthatcharacterize subsidiary specialized agencies suchastheWorldsubsidiary specializedagencies seeking Chinesediplomatic participation,andChi- part onbroadernationalobjectives andarenot as posal fortheconductofforeignpolicy. Chinese students tocomeChineseuniversities because iscomplicatedbypolicymaking thevery differ past several years, anumberhave assumeda sight ministries, therearepartycommittees that become moreactive attheUnitedNationsandits Another aspectofChinesepoliticsisBei- This means that the range ofChinese for This meansthattherange Foreign Economic Activities. Diplomatic Activities. For alongtime,Chinese 3 Asimportant,given the Sincetheriseof - - -  69

by - seem paradoxi it might law, of However, because of foreign investments in because of foreign investments However, Finally, China’s doctrine on “legal (falu warfare” China’s Finally, In addition, because China is a rule by law law by In addition, because China is a rule Another consideration in assessing China is the consideration in assessing China Another - bodies such as the International Court of Jus both Chinese and foreign corporate entities. The Chinese and foreign corporate entities. both for Western analysts. for Western partners in various areas of advanced computing. partners in various society, it creates legal scaffolding to justify vari- it creates legal scaffolding to justify society, countries, ensuring that it retains access to and access that it retains ensuring countries, Beijing of those facilities. control of many even country’s evolving legal situation. Because China legal situation. evolving country’s of rule history considering its millennia-long ous other politics. Thus, China has passed a range Thus, politics. ous other including the National Security Law, of laws, of initial public offerings (IPOs) and listings on listings of initial public offerings (IPOs) and as well as its participation in markets, global stock of legal infrastructure. cal that China’s legal situation should be a focus cal that China’s creation of laws and regula- ignore China’s cannot China’s businesses. cially corporations and other elsewhere. This is especially true in the use of of these laws can therefore provide indications of of these laws can therefore provide a security component that is not fully paralleled a security component that is not ) means that its approach to the law includes includes zhan) means that its approach to the law the PRC and abroad. Support for China’s pursuit the PRC and abroad. Support for China’s tions. In the first place, the legal code affects how code affects place, the legal first In the tions. espe- entities, the Chinese interface with foreign tice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration, its tice and the Permanent has also engaged with European in joint research recently announced that it would cooperate with would cooperate announced that it recently is an authoritarian state ruled by the CCP, and the CCP, ruled by state is an authoritarian international supply chains, requires some degree international supply chains, realm of commercial law, precisely because various realm of commercial law, incorporates its approach to international legal law, of international and domestic interpretation rity Law, to justify accessing a variety of data from accessing a variety to justify rity Law, an understanding referencing these various laws; law rather than rule law legal structure is arguably better developed in the developed is arguably better legal structure legal warfare against external adversaries, which adversaries, external against legal warfare China as well as Chinese investments abroad, one China as well as Chinese investments in both Chinese and foreign companies interact Chinese government does so not by fiat, but by fiat, but by does so not Chinese government and thinking. Chinese interests Russia on a joint lunar exploration program. China program. a joint lunar exploration Russia on - and National Cybersecu National Espionage Law, China’s Evolving Legal Situation Legal Evolving China’s China The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The Another aspect of Another Educational Outreach Activities. Outreach Educational Scientific and Technological Cooperation. Technological and Scientific In the 21st century, China has developed China has developed century, In the 21st budgets. Similarly, China invites foreign students foreign students China invites Similarly, budgets. future foreign leaders. satellites to a variety of states; and has helped to of states; to a variety satellites states. In the realm of space exploration, for states. providing significant leverage. providing supply chains, China’s trade, investment, and tax trade, investment, China’s supply chains, diplo- a role in its growing played policies have construct space-related infrastructure in various space-related infrastructure construct example, China has established a regional space example, China has established Space Cooperation organization, the Asia Pacific economic zones or integrating itself into various itself into various zones or integrating economic ence other countries; it views both positions as positions countries; it views both ence other point that it has established economically to the also makes full use of its growing scientific and full use of its growing also makes attracting foreign investment to the coastal special special to the coastal investment foreign attracting able to use the large to amounts of cash available and abroad. China has used the Ministry of Educa- and abroad. China has used the Ministry an array of banks and programs that parallel and of banks and programs an array technological base to foster ties with other ties with other technological base to foster to attend Chinese universities, often at little or often at little Chinese universities, to attend them to gain real and potential leverage over host host leverage over them to gain real and potential tion’s Confucius Institutes to establish outposts outposts to establish Confucius Institutes tion’s tion of educational opportunities, both at home both tion of educational opportunities, tiative as well as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, as well as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, tiative these efforts is a matter of trade and economics, of trade and economics, these efforts is a matter there is a political component as well. no cost. This helps not only to enhance China’s only to enhance China’s This helps not no cost. with potential relations image, but also to foster institutions by becoming a significant part of their by institutions in various educational institutions around the in various educational institutions matic strength. China exploits its position as a China exploits matic strength. exporter in an effort to influ- major importer and These include the entities. rival a range of Western role in expanding China’s ties to foreign partners, ties to foreign partners, role in expanding China’s interests. integrating economic and diplomatic While part of and business standards. industrial language proficiency, these institutes have been have these institutes language proficiency, Organization, with itself at its head; has exported with overseas economic activities. Whether it is Whether economic activities. with overseas world. Originally intended to promote Chinese world. Originally intended to promote Chinese external relations has been the exploita- Chinese external China, South Africa) grouping and its associated China, South Africa) grouping and China actively seeks to play a role in the setting of a role in the setting seeks to play China actively Export–Import Bank, and the Belt and Road Ini- Export–Import Bank, and the Belt Bank. Chinese SOEsNew Development a also play Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Chinese Investment Asia Infrastructure  Tools ofGovernance Why Transparency onChina’s 70 Central PropagandaDepartmentaswellthe with onlinebehavior, Chineseauthoritieshave like Facebook andTwitter, insights intoChinese Politics andLaw IsImportant nance available totheCCP. Thisincludesthe in theChineseportionofInternet, whichisan important toexamineandmonitordevelopments nese informationenvironment. Consequently, itis in Chinaandtheexclusion ofWestern socialmedia it isessentialtounderstand how operates thePRC its domestic policy. regulations, andlegalproceedings(suchasextra- ment bodiessuchasInterpol.Legalwarfare isalso together financial,social,andeconomicdataalong State Security. Italsoincludes, however, thetools and theassociatedministries andentitieskey parts as theMinistry ofPublicSecurityandMinistry of an understanding ofthevarioustoolsgover an understanding ofChinesepoliticsrequires accumulating “comprehensive nationalpower,” at thepoliticallevel. Given theholistic, com- applied against domestic enemies, however, and and itsinteractionswithinternationallaw enforce- credit scorestomonitoritspopulation.By tying of theChinesepoliticallandscape. of theCyberspace ofChina(CAC) Administration realms.or Russiancyber Thisalsomakes thehead environment thatisdifferentfromthe Western government-run media. suchasthe CCP’sof informationmanagement, good behavior canopen upnewopportunitiesin good quently, theChinesepopulationismadeaware that enormous visibilityintopeople’s behavior. Conse- dition) areconsequentlyanimportantpartof domestic law, law enforcementagencies, courts, politics requireabetter understanding oftheChi- such areasasjobsorinternalmigration,whilepoor prehensive approachthatChinatakes toward prohibitions onrailorairtravel. blunt instruments ofthesecurityservicessuch behavior willleadtogreaterconstraints suchas In approachingthePeople’s RepublicofChina, Because oftheexplosive growth ofsocialmedia Because ofthepervasive natureoftheCCP, China haspioneeredtheestablishment ofsocial China Transparency Report - Affairs has long issued annual reviews ofChina’sAffairs haslongissuedannualreviews 两大), theCCPParty Congressandthefullsession Official Data from China NPC. Both thenationaland provincial governments, China’s objectives thereforerequiresunder China’s politicalactivitiesoverlap withitseco- Chinese ministries.- TheStateOceanicAdmin Communist Party andtheChinesestate: therela- white papers, whichwereproducedbiennially nomic, diplomatic,andmilitaryactions. Grasping maritime environment. TheMinistry ofForeign istration, forexample,anadministrative agency reviews, reports, andstatements fromvarious reconciliation andagreementbeforepublication reports. Nonetheless, thevariouswhitepapers important glimpsesintoboth successesand failures, reports thatreviewthegains andadvancessincethe under theMinistry ofLandandResources, issues the PRC’s(SCIO) StateCouncilInformationOffice the next five years, set forthattheparty congress, to businesses, themilitary, andother entities. tive rankingsofindividualsintermsboth the activities, includingterritorial claims, maritime an annualreportonthestate ofChinesemaritime and thereforeprovides theconsensusview ona and Arcticpolicy, appear tohave beenone-off are producedregularly, suchasChinesedefense as wellministries, alsotypicallyprovide work and key implementationefforts, set forthatthe associated withthe“twobig[meetings]” (liangda economic activities, andthestate ofChina’s diplomatic activities. on Chinesepoliciesagiven subject.Thewhite conclaves lay out the expected policy direction for conclaves directionfor lay outtheexpectedpolicy of theNationalPeople’s Congress (NPC).These subject within the PRC government.subject withinthePRC standing theorganizationofboth theChinese state andpartyhierarchiestheirrelationship paper productionprocessrequiresbureaucratic provide thesinglemost authoritative position papers onreligiousfreedom,poverty reduction, publishes avariety ofwhitepapers. Someofthese previous “two big” meetings. Thesereportsprovide previous “twobig” for morethantwodecades. Others, suchaswhite based inpart on whatisnotreportedordiscussed. Another sourceofinformationistheannual To provide insightintoChinesedevelopments, Coming every five yearsorsoareworkreports -

 - 71 - This 7 Based in 9 The Center 6 The University of California The University 10 The NPC Observer is a blog that The NPC Observer 8 NPC Observer. Affairs. of International Institute Polish Paulson Institute MacroPolo: The Committee. The MacroPolo: Institute Paulson base of biographic data on all members of the base of biographic data on all members focuses on the activities of China’s national leg- focuses on the activities of China’s University of California San Diego China Data Lab: Lab: San Diego China Data of California University from Chinese-language sources. for Advanced China Research (CACR) conducts conducts for Advanced Research (CACR) China potential guanxi or relationship networks. potential ernment officials at the time of the 18th (2012) ernment officials at the time of the 18th (2012) overlapping careers—a key part of identifying careers—a key overlapping carefully selected questions on trends within on trends within questions carefully selected and 19th (2017) CCP Central Committees. and the NPC Standing Committee. alization of key characteristics of some 1,700 characteristics alization of key and local levels to the national level. to the levels and local San Diego’s China Data Lab maintains the CCP San Diego’s tic politics, foreign affairs, and security policy. and security policy. affairs, foreign tic politics, the Chinese Communist Party regime. Party the Chinese Communist identify where various CCP Central Committee Committee identify where various CCP Central identify periods of and served members have islative bodies: the National People’s Congress Congress bodies: the National People’s islative members of the CCP’s elite who were active gov elite who were active members of the CCP’s national Affairs (PISM) publishes research on national Affairs (PISM) publishes nese leadership structure, from the provincial the provincial from structure, nese leadership its Party Watch Initiative that seeks to answer to answer that seeks Initiative Watch its Party leadership developments throughout the Chi- throughout developments leadership CCP Central Committee. This allows analysts to analysts This allows CCP Central Committee. Center for Advanced China Research. Advanced for Center CCP Elite Portal. Elite CCP Chinese political discourse on various issues Chinese political discourse on various Chinese-language research on China’s domes- Chinese-language China’s research on MacroPolo digital project is an interactive data- digital project is an interactive MacroPolo Elite Portal, which provides users with a visu- which provides Elite Portal, In this section are scores assessing the trans- The CACR publishes an annual report under publishes an annual report under The CACR Warsaw, Poland, the Polish Institute of Inter Institute the Polish Poland, Warsaw,

l l l l l for calculating these scores can be found on p. 119. for calculating these scores can be found on p. parency of the Chinese government and overall parency and overall of the Chinese government score is rated on a 10-point scale. The methodology score is rated on a 10-point scale. The methodology transparency as a result of private efforts. Each transparency as a result of private efforts. Grade and Reasoning Grade - The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The Originally housed at 5 China Digital Times began 4 ship directives, and providing translations and providing ship directives, organization that attempts to break through organization that attempts of various Chinese websites and electronic highlighting Chinese censor discussions, electronic journal provides in-depth analyses of in-depth electronic journal provides and analysis of symbols and metaphor used in and metaphor and analysis of symbols as a blog tracking China’s censorship of its as a blog tracking China’s the censorship to report on developments in the censorship to report on developments translations This includes providing the PRC. the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Revolution, on War, Institution the Hoover media, but it has become a broader media Chinese discourse. China Digital Times. Providing additional information are reports, additional information are reports, Providing Peace at Stanford University and now edited by edited by and now at Stanford University Peace College, this of Claremont McKenna Minxin Pei . Monitor China Leadership A wide variety of groups are monitoring various A wide variety Another important source of political insight source of political important Another

l l boundaries for subsidiary five-year plans (for plans five-year boundaries for subsidiary such as “Made in China 2025” and “China Standards such as “Made in China 2025” and “China science and technology. plans for the substantial portion of the economy of the economy portion plans for the substantial documents are other Chinese plans and projects, Chinese plans and projects, documents are other example, within each ministry). Both the overall the overall Both ministry). example, within each dead hand of centralized economic planning, the planning, of centralized economic dead hand aspects of Chinese political developments, exploit- aspects of Chinese political developments, also feed into other Chinese planning such as Chinese planning such also feed into other the National People’s Congress. These set economic These set Congress. the National People’s as plan) (usually in line with the five-year targets that remains under state ownership at all levels. As at all levels. ownership state that remains under released in conjunction with the annual meetings of meetings released in conjunction with the annual ing some of the various data sources noted above. above. noted ing some of the various data sources medium-term and long-term plans in aspects of medium-term and long-term plans is the five-year plan. Despite shifts away from the away Despite shifts plan. is the five-year important, the economic five-year plans provides plans provides five-year important, the economic national efforts. priorities and indicators of key laws, and drafts. Some of these documents are and drafts. laws, Private Efforts Private variety of topics. Apart from the plenum-related of topics. variety five year plan and ministry-specific five-year plans five-year year plan and ministry-specific five well as key legislation and major decisions on awell as key PRC continues to produce five-year economic economic PRC to produce five-year continues 2035,” which further detail Chinese objectives. which further detail 2035,” The following is only some of them. The following The overall five-year plan also sets guidelines and plan also sets five-year The overall  Trends from theData Transparency from theChineseGovernment: 4outof10 72 Overall Transparency: 5outof10 evidence ofsomepotential trendsisemerging. l l

This hasgotten worse over time. Government The Chinesegovernment scores low on China’s politics.The issue isthat, inmost cases, From thecurrentusesofopen-sourceresearch, Ongoing Centralization ofPower intheHandsof Growing Concern AboutUrban–Rural Divides. China’s efforttoannounce theendofextreme which would thanenablethoseoutsideChina Xi Jinping. when hewouldhave beenexpectedtostep down other entities from reaching thesource-data economic policies,hasworsened. structure isgenerally well reported except for least acquiescence. access to thedata onpoliticalissues isguarded meeting oftheNationalPeople’s Congresssaw military leadershipnow shows Xi’s imprint to produce more precise publications. This will the publicwithaccurate data italsoprevents the publication ofgovernment decrees, even in the leadership isreported, except insensitive transparency ofitspolitics. Overall party therefore presumablywith hisapproval or at to theirpositionsunderhisadministration and the consolidationofpower by XIJinping. Xiwas Private efforts, while still beneficial, have not and influence,asmost ofthetopleadersrose as headoftheChinesestate. Similarly, China’s allowing himto remaininpower beyond2022 able topersuadetheNPCremove termlimits regulations to improve easeofaccess. remain thecaseunless Beijingimplements new by theCCP. So, whenCCP isnotproviding made nearenoughimpact ontransparency on policy areas. Inrecent years, transparency in remain secretive insomecases.The activity of membership ispublishedannually, butthere is poverty, announced inthe2021sessionof the from theChinesestate constitution, effectively leaders oftheparty leadinggroups, which little information ofthemakeup besidesage. The19thParty Congressand 2017 China Transparency Report

Opportunities for FurtherResearch Chinese politicalsystem isfunctioning.Thisneed, which partyandstate officialsinteracttoconvert ment ofboth domestic andforeignscholars. more opaque.Inmany ways, theCCPhasnever nese databases, todiscouragingforeignacademics has beenadeclinein“area studies,” withmuchmore however, hasnot ledtoanincreaseinacademic and institutions fromanalyzingsensitive topics efforts range from efforts range steadilyreducingaccesstoChi- analysisofChinesepolitics.discourage These cally beenunavailable. ogy (forexample,women’s studies and thehistory of emphasis onthestudy ofChinesesociety andsociol- secretaries andpartycommittees. Similarly, mem- such astreatmentoftheUyghurs, toopenharass- science) rather thanpoliticalorleadership studies. study oftheChinesepoliticalprocess. Instead, there source analysismoredifficult,butalsourgent policy directionintoactualactions,policy hastypi- bership intheChineseleadingsmallgroups, in been transparent,obscuringtheroleofparty becoming moretransparent,Beijinghasbecome because ofthegreaterneedtounderstand how the l

As the PRC hasbecomestronger,As thePRC instead of This reduction in transparency makes open- This reductionintransparency More recently, however, theCCPhastriedto National People’s Congress, may betiedtothe lawyers, andother observers both insideand mation aboutChineseinternaldisagreements, reporting by theChinesestate-run media,infor na’s ruralpopulation. is higher-level interest inandconcernabout in countingruleswouldsuggest thatthere the level ofrepressionaimedattheUyghurs terms, arealmost whollyreliantonunofficial tant declineinthenumberofpeoplewhat at least appearingtoimprove thelot ofChi- asruraldistricts.are categorized Theseshifts efforts toprovide transparency. Awareness of especially whenrooted inreligiousorethnic ever lesstolerantofdissent.Given thelackof outside ofChinamake clearthatXihasbeen growth oftheurbanpopulationandconcomi- should becreditedtosuchefforts. Increasingly Severe Internal Crackdowns. from Uyghurdissidentgroups, humanrights Reports 11 -  73 - standing of the next generation of Chinese leaders. next of the standing of state-owned enterprises and the national politi- and the national enterprises of state-owned leadership provincial of and studies cal leadership, trends could yield data that enhance our under yield data that trends could The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The As a result, for those who choose to study Chi- to study for those who choose As a result, for more analysis of all aspects of Chinese politics. of Chinese politics. analysis of all aspects for more Similarly, a better understanding of China’s top of China’s understanding better a Similarly, nese politics, there is a significant unmet demand is a significant unmet there nese politics, chief executives between the interplay ministries,   75 7 6 Finally, when considering how the CCP thinks when considering how Finally, If the economy of the future is a data-centric, If the economy This chapter will examine various research This chapter All of these technologies are shaping a global raceAll of these technologies are shaping As leading global economies become increas- big data, 5G, and AI. for who will lead the information age in the future— plan called China Standards 2035, which is an plan called China Standards 2035, standards for the next-generation of technologies standards computing, cloud of Things, such as the Internet of technology, one should look to a third CCP one should look of technology, democracies found in the West and the Indo-Pacific. democracies found in the West espionage sabotage. or even ambitious 15-year blueprint to shape the global ambitious 15-year and technology transfer. the authoritarians such as China and Russia or thethe authoritarians such as China and (R&D), research and development talent programs, - invest dedicated to tracking Chinese initiatives PRC ment in the aforementioned technology areas, based, the ingly information and innovation importance of technology increases exponentially. it with mastered have nations whose industries for increased influence, leverage, and potential the economy, information-based innovation The very reliance on technology provides those reliance on technology provides The very Why Transparency on China’s on China’s Transparency Why Technology Is Important Technology Technology The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The 5 1 2 4 The plan gives us a good overview of us a good The plan gives overview 3 On March 5, 2021, CCP leadership released the On March 5, In recent congressional testimony, Central Central In recent congressional testimony, - Republic of China (PRC) govern The People’s Technology in this context means informa- in this context Technology blockchain, neuroscience, quantum comput- blockchain, for 2035. such as artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, such as artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, our rivalry with an increasingly adversarial Chi- our rivalry with an increasingly adversarial charging equipment for electrified vehicles, data vehicles, charging equipment for electrified of an industrial AI, and the development centers, and Social Development of the People’s Repub- of the People’s and Social Development the coming years.” tion technology and its many components. This components. tion technology and its many the critical technologies the CCP is focusing on, nese Communist Party and Chinese leadership in Party nese Communist internet for connected factories. internet ment has also adopted a $1.6 trillion infrastructure a $1.6 trillion infrastructure ment has also adopted that surges initiative funding and focus on seven including 5G communication networks, main areas, is a key area, which the Chinese Communist area, which the Chinese Communist is a key in China 2025 plan. ing, and robotics. Defining Technology Defining lic of China and the Outline of Long-Term Goals lic of China and the Outline of Long-Term Party (CCP) has highlighted in its strategic Made has highlighted in its strategic (CCP) Party 14th Five-Year Plan for the National Economic Plan Five-Year 14th IntelligenceAgency that Director Bill Burns noted “competition and technology is right at the core of “competition  “important opportunitytopromote leapfrogdevel- Jinping, seesinformationtechnologyasaFourth Initiative, thegeotech strategy—to condition Industrial Revolution, whereheatedcompetition Official Data from China Ministry ofEducation. Bureau ofStatistics (NBS),Ministry ofScience 76 written thesoftware codeperformingcriticalfunc- later inthischapter, official government statistics now willdetermine wholeadsintothefuture.Xi microelectronics thatmake itallworkwillholda nations whoseindustries have builttheinfrastruc- national andeconomicsecurityrisks, unlike reli- national expendituresofR&Dfundinginscience merely show how muchthecentralChinesegov has said that“anewroundoftechnologicalrevolu- not includehow muchhasbeenallocatedinthese untrustworthy providers createsmajorglobal these “earth-shaking changes” wouldprovidethese “earth-shakingchanges” an tion andindustrialintelligence, change—artificial tions (software andfirmware), anddesignedthe ture controllingthedataflows (5Gandbeyond), toe theCCPline—hasensnaredalliesandfoes technology exchanges tothosenationswhoclosely tainly donot tell thewholestory. Asexplained they arewillingtoacknowledge). Thestatistics do ance inother areas. away fromBeijing. alike whilealienatingothers andpushingthem and Technology, Ministry ofCommerce,Ministry and technology, primarilythroughits National areas by theindividualprovinces, prefectures, or opment” whereby Chinacouldassume adominate ogy—are gatheringstrength.” Xiindicatedthat compel compliance.AswiththeBeltandRoad oil andnaturalgas—asabluntinstrument to similarlytohowence geopolitics Russiauses of Industry andInformationTechnology and its ernment ministries spend(oratleast asmuch position globally, replacingtheUnitedStates. powerful perchintheinternationalorder. publicly by the PRC, thesestatistics almost cer big data,quantuminformation,andbiotechnol- As withmost of theofficialfiguresproffered The Chinesegovernment regularlyreportson Reliance oncriticaltechnologiesfrom CCP leadership, includingChinesePresidentXi CCP leadershipisusingtechnologytoinflu- 9 China Transparency Report 8 - - Chinese State Council 26 departments, 21ministries, threenational People’s BankofChina. research, development, andcommercialization fundsthatsteermajor public/private technology include aclearbreakout investments ofPRC inthe that wouldnot befoundinpublicdata. “black” orclassified budget tifiable andlikely ina cially releaseddata: commissions, theNationalAudit Office,andthe campaign toacquiretechnology—is not easilyiden- districts. Further, CCP-sanctioned datadoesnot showed thefollowing budget figures fromoffi- andhuman-enabledespionage sponsored cyber primary administrative authority. Itincludes such asChineseGovernment GuidanceFunds. l l l

The ChineseStateCouncilisthecountry’s Information Technology includesfunding for Ministry ofScienceandTechnology includes Education isthelargestbudget itemunderthe For the2019 budget,theministries below Further, wellasthestate- muchoftheR&D—as Ministry ofScience andTechnology. Ministry ofIndustry andInformation Tech- Ministry ofEducation. 2019 Budget: $8.3 billion 2019 Budget: $19.4 billion 2019 Budget: $66billion Chinese StateCouncil.Itincludesevery aspect national scientists toreturn toChina. ministry alsotracksinternationaltechnology nology. ment andprivatesector. military–civilgovern fusioneffortsacrossthe - tions overseas andbringthembacktoChina talent andscholarsprograms, whichexperts advance thenationalprioritiesofCCP. acquire sensitive technologiesandinnova- cation. Further, itincludesfundingfortheCCP of earlychildhoodeducationandallhigheredu- coordinates and funds the vast array of PRC-led coordinates andfundsthevast array ofPRC-led progress andtriestopersuade overseas Chinese science, technology, andindustrialization. It funding for260state researchlaboratories. The believe includerobust effortstoillegitimately 13 TheMinistry of Industry and 11 12 TheMinistry of 14 The 10  77 The 22 CSET researchers have identi- researchers have CSET 21 The PRC has set up over 1,700 guid- up over The PRC has set 23 billion in public and private money. Though billion in public and private money. funds”. fraught with their own troubles, guidance funds troubles, fraught with their own project is dedicated to providing a much-more a much-more to providing project is dedicated sanctioned PRC data. sanctioned civilian and pool in support of China's strategic cil Budget Tracker, a repository of financial a Tracker, cil Budget of advanced technology R&D in much greater of advanced technology in officially than is provided and detail depth dozens of official government entities, often entities, of officialgovernment dozens and the numbers continue to trend upward. and the numbers continue to trend area of tracking Chinese government “guidance area of tracking Chinese government also looks at how AI is used in national security also looks at how and biotechnology. a team of data scientists within the Walsh the Walsh within data scientists a team of ance funds with the stated purpose to “catch ance funds with the stated advanced technologies through advanced R&D and commercialization. These guidance funds policyare further industrial tools the CCP uses grand are a critical component of the CCP’s State Council is directly controls the country’s country’s State Council is directly controls the School of Foreign Service tracking PRC Service tracking - fund Foreign School of than 200 talent programs at sub-national levels, levels, than 200 talent programs at sub-national tries) and dozens of smaller offices, including of smaller offices, tries) and dozens and those critical to science, technology, talent recruitment. through publicly available budget data from budget available through publicly to further its geotech strategy. According to strategy. to further its geotech up with and surpass” the United States in holistic picture of the state-sponsored funding picture of the state-sponsored holistic - the Chinese govern information published by budget. 2019 ment on the State Council’s ing people, data, and computational power. It power. ing people, data, and computational in original language source documents. This in original language source documents. ing in science and technology. The scholars sift The scholars sift and technology. ing in science initiatives to cultivate China’s domestic talent talent domestic to cultivate China’s initiatives military goals. fied 43 national-level talent programs and more fied 43 national-level CSET has done groundbreaking research in the has CSET CSET focuses on the foundations of AI, includ- focuses on the foundations CSET Program also maintains a Chinese Talent CSET CSET, the funds have currently raised over $672 currently raised over the funds have CSET, 26 cabinet-level departments (and minis- 26 cabinet-level They also maintain the Chinese State Coun- They also maintain the Chinese State Tracker, which is a catalogue of CCP-sponsored which is a catalogue of CCP-sponsored Tracker, 19 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The CSET hosts hosts CSET 20 The Ministry of Com- The Ministry 15 16 17 18 Emerging Technology (CSET). Technology Emerging property, innovation, and technology through and technology innovation, property, merce is responsible for trade and investment. and investment. responsible for trade merce is intellectual obtain to lawfully nese investment joint ventures, acquisition, and investment. investment. acquisition, and joint ventures, Georgetown University Center for Security and Security for Center University Georgetown 2019 Budget: $3.7 billion $3.7 Budget: 2019 Ministry of Commerce. Ministry It coordinates the CCP strategy to push out Chi- the CCP strategy It coordinates The most recent numbers issued by the NBS numbers issued by recent The most The NBS issues an annual “Communique on annual “Communique The NBS issues an To supplement incomplete official reporting, supplement incomplete To As China has entered the international stage A desire to improve the domestic capacity for the domestic A desire to improve

l l been paid to private Chinese companies (such as funding, a 12.5% increase over the previous year funding, a 12.5% increase over sector accounted (The American private for 2019. for $394 billion.) prominent think tanks around the world have cre- prominent think tanks around the world have public and private funding. show a record figure of $378 billion for broad R&D billion a record figure of $378 show sored technology funding. Growing attention has attention sored technology funding. Growing ogy.” It breaks out the type of R&D that was funded, that was It breaks out the type of R&D ogy.” it compared occurred, the dollar amount, and how - government-spon expanded beyond the PRC’s ated research projects dedicated to tracking this as a global technology leader in the past 15 years as a global technology leader in the past has international global attention and Tencent, added in 1996. Though the program concluded in Though the program added in 1996. advanced technologies is not a new one. In 1986, a new one. In 1986, advanced technologies is not - govern and more than the United States federal the province or location where the research or location where the research the province those listed above) that engage in R&D but that the above) those listed the PRC launched the 863 Program, which infused laser technology, space, information technology, and new materials. automation, energy, technology, ment, which was $123 billion in federal dollars $123 billion in federal dollars ment, which was Private Transparency Efforts Transparency Private National Bureau of Statistics Bureau National with recent years. with national champions such as Huawei, Alibaba, with national champions such as Huawei, $200 billion in spending over 30 years in bio- $200 billion in spending over - on Science and Technol National Expenditures PRC government has access to. has access PRC government 2016, its legacy on in PRC planning. lives 2016, Telecommunications and marine technology were and marine Telecommunications  78 l l

The DigiChinaProjecthasrecentlyfocusedon The CCP believes that access to high-skilled The CCPbelieves thataccesstohigh-skilled It focusesondatagovernance, AI,internet law, Institute’s Cyber Policy CenteratStanfordUni- Institution’s GlobalChinaProjectistracking DigiChina extensively tracksChina’s pursuitof DigiChina Projectisacollaborative effort Chinese technologygiants suchHuawei and Chinese expertstoreturn toassist tothePRC ZTE has increased the urgency ofthe CCP’sZTE hasincreasedtheurgency where Chinaislookingtobuildcloserrelations, versity. Itseekstounderstand China’s digital lating and analyzing Chinese-language sources.lating andanalyzingChinese-language listed above. Since2012, Brookingsfoundthat labor isanimpedimenttoachievingthegoals legitimate exchange oftalentandknowledge na’s BeltandRoadInitiative. Since2008, thePRC ing futuretradeforitstechnologyimportson has increaseditsinternationalscholarshipsavail how U.S. government effortstogloballyrestrict Stanford–New America DigiChinaProject. technology buttobecomeself-sufficient. the China Scholarship Council has more than the ChinaScholarshipCouncilhasmorethan talent tosupplement,teach,andtraindomestic the PRC’s talentdevelopment programs. These able tostudy inChinafrom225,000 to492,000. also worked toattract foreignstudents innations advanced technologies, particularlyAI. and technologyingeopolitics. acquiescence totheCCPglobalpoliticalagenda. doubled thenumberofstudy abroadscholar efforts tobecometechnologically independent. other globalleadersincurrenttechnologywhile on futuretechnologiesasitseekstoleapfrog experts. CCPleadershipputsastrong emphasis domestic advancements. Third,itseeksforeign globally. Second,itseekstopersuadeoverseas efforts aremulti-faceted. First, seeks thePRC such asthosenationswhohave signedontoChi ships thatrequireareturn toChina.Chinahas plans to no longer haveplans tonolonger torelyontheWest for policy developments,policy primarilythroughtrans- between NewAmerica andtheFreeman Spogli better controllingitspopulation andcondition- Brookings GlobalChinaProject. 24 TheBrookings China Transparency Report 25 The - - - l l l

Among other insights, theprojectfoundaclear- (IISS), aLondon-basedthink tank,maintainsa Technology Policy Institute (STPI). International Institute forStrategicStudies McKinsey’s Asia/Pacific researchincludes $138 millioninChinesenon-defenseAIR&D Chinese supercomputingefforts. China Global SecurityTracker incollaboration with thefactsandinsightsonwhichtobase which isanonprofitcorporation.STPI was cre- workforce, technologyandcapitalflows inand Other publiclyavailable spendingshedslight management and policy decisions.” andpolicy management think tankestablished in1990todevelop a the importofdomestic AIadvancementasatop tion ofadvancedtechnologies. technology. McKinsey takes adata-focused STPI provides in-depth trackingofChinese as AI.OnereportonChina’s AIspendingfound ated andisfundedby Congresstoinformpolicy areas suchasbasicR&Dandalackofdomestic analysis onChina’s existing andfuturetech ers inthecommercial,public,andsocialsectors economy. Itsstated missionis“toprovide lead- deeper understanding oftheevolving global on theChinesecommercialspacesectorand expenditures from2018. Thatnumberiscom- government spendingonsuchtechnologyareas ogy Policy intheWhiteHouse. decisions oftheOfficeScienceand Technol- operating systems oradvancedsemiconductor development, includingwhereitisdeficientin isinitsAI eyed assessmentofwherethePRC critical areassuchasR&Dandcommercializa- of globalization—which ishighlytargetedto out ofChina,andChina’s roleinthenext phase parable toU.S. spendinginthesame category. priority ofCCPleadership. production. Theprojectleaves nodoubt asto Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) Science and IISS–MERICS ChinaGlobalSecurity Tracker. federally fundedR&Dcenteroperatedby IDA, business approach to tracking PRC spendingin business approachtotrackingPRC McKinsey GlobalInstitute (MGI). 27 MGIisaprivate 26 STPIisa 28 The  79 lish information about their annual budgets and about their annual budgets lish information by the Chinese government with regard to to with regard the Chinese government by secretive. not that are activities research ment's Laboratories Key State at hosted projects China's sponsors, sector private attract need to about their not publish as much information leans on Chinese state The not transparent. and clandestine practices investment predatory is PRC The considerably. but has regressed safeguarding Americans’ intellectual property. safeguarding intelligence-gathering operations to monitor monitor to operations intelligence-gathering decades and continue largely unabated. Even if largelydecades and continue Even unabated. able and highly concerning for global trade and able and highly concerning acknowledge industrial subsidies, talent poach- subsidies, industrial acknowledge that is favorable to the PRC, major systemic major systemic to the PRC, that is favorable place in recent taken have technology transfers - the trend is unquestion a strategy, this were not - On one hand, the Chinese govern technology. by financed projects many Moreover, tries do. not disclosed publicly, were in 2020 the NSFC programs on its talent transparent be more to It publishes information about major R&D major R&D about It publishes information ing, and some level of trade secret theft. trade secret of level ing, and some and supported by the National Natural Sci- Natural the National by and supported - coun democratic as those in more activities them. about is known if anything, and little, in science breakthroughs and absorb foreign used Chinese government The and technology. scientific literature and patent information is information and patent literature scientific do generally institutions research state-backed and budgeting about its transparent somewhat ence Foundation of China (NSFC). Chinese of China (NSFC). Foundation ence and CCP local government Most expenditure. pub- and below) level provincial (at the offices this is changing with time, Yet reports. expense generally available. But, because they do not But, because they available. generally Malkin’s writings prove that even in a framing in a framing that even prove writings Malkin’s On the other hand, technology transfer is transfer On the other hand, technology In this section are scores assessing the trans- In this section are There are severe gaps in the data provided provided gaps in the data severe are There for calculating these scores can be found on p. 119. on p. for calculating these scores can be found parency of the Chinese government and overall parency and overall Chinese government of the score is rated on a 10-point scale. The methodology methodology score is rated on a 10-point scale. The transparency as a result of private efforts. Each transparency as a result of private efforts. Grade and Reasoning Grade Transparency from the Chinese Government: 3 out of 10 3 out the Chinese Government: from Transparency - The data- The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The 30 ASPI is an Australian ASPI is an Australian 29 One CIGI scholar, Anton Anton One CIGI scholar, 32 CIGI’s China program, based in Ottawa, China program, based in Ottawa, CIGI’s 31 tional Cyber Policy Centre. Policy tional Cyber base that tracks the global expansion of 27 key of 27 key base that tracks the global expansion base covers major points of overseas presence of overseas major points base covers foreign investments. partnerships, submarine cables, significant tele- submarine cables, partnerships, spending in the region. security issues in the Indo-Pacific theater. security issues in the Indo-Pacific curity and emerging and critical technologies, curity and emerging and critical technologies, ernment of Canada. ogy transfers from the private sector to the competing with the Chinese on technology. competing communications and technology projects, and communications and technology projects, among other topics. among other military-related and training examine China’s and legal framework. Malkin nonetheless does and legal framework. Malkin nonetheless Studies (MERICS). The focus of the tracker is is of the tracker The focus Studies (MERICS). tank that has received support from the gov tank that has received transfer from European firms and highlighted transfer from European universities; provides an extensive mapping of an extensive provides universities; including 5G initiatives, smart cities, research smart cities, including 5G initiatives, research institution focusing on defense and focusing on defense research institution ing a deliberate strategy of technology transfer. of technology transfer. ing a deliberate strategy loose, uncoordinated web of local corruption, loose, uncoordinated web of local corruption, and a poor regulatory legitimate transactions, vides updates on the cyber, defense, and space defense, vides updates on the cyber, with the German Mercatur Institute for China Institute German Mercatur with the China’s domestic technology giants; and pro- domestic China’s Chinese technology companies. Cyber Policy Centre, which focuses on cyberse Centre, which focuses - Policy Cyber Canada, closely tracks China’s forced technol- Canada, closely tracks China’s China’s defense and security policies. defense and security China’s Center for International Governance Innovation Innovation Governance International for Center (CIGI). PRC. CIGI is an independent, nonpartisan think CIGI is an independent, nonpartisan PRC. European policy and structural weaknesses in European policy and structural Malkin, takes the tack that Beijing is not pursu- the tack that Beijing is not Malkin, takes In biannual reports, the China Global Security the China In biannual reports, Instead, he suggests that it is the result of a Instead, The center’s data-driven, collaborative research collaborative data-driven, The center’s Tracker has examined PRC forced technology Tracker - Interna (ASPI) Institute Policy Strategic Australian ASPI’s Mapping China’s Tech Giants is a data- Tech Mapping China’s ASPI’s ASPI maintains a world-class International ASPI maintains a world-class International

l l  Trends from theData PRC couldunknowinglyPRC beintroducingsoftware 80 Overall Transparency: 6outof10 looks tobecomeanexporteroftechnologyand independence fromtheWest ontechnologyand in thecomingdecades, suchastheUnitedStates. nations withwhichitwillincreasinglybeatodds trending over thepast twodecades, but it isalso this desirebeenmanifested inChina’s actions technological development areclear:Beijingseeks Second, itseekstoreduce the opportunitythat and hardware intotheirown systems andsupply gies onthetopic. outlined initsnumerousstate-issued grandstrate- dependency onwhatitcorrectlyrealizesare dependency espionage. Third,CCPleadership canuseadvances espionage. orconduct communications orcollect intelligence chains thatadversaries couldusetodisrupt their several reasons. standards governing itsdeployment. Not onlyhas The trends in the area of PRC state-backedThe trendsintheareaofPRC CCP committee. Chinese government’s surveillance technology CCP leadershipseeksthisindependencefor grams over thepast decade. Buttoday's major government's priorities.Transparency onthe efforts have beenable to piece together some ogy-gathering operation have beenmet with opaque. Noinformation isbeingpublished eign ExpertRecruitment Plan,are still largely surviving information aboutmajortalent pro- some success inrecent years. Private efforts as Chineseinternet companies are beginningto about award winners. Private efforts to compile technology. Through painstaking work, these the budgets ofcentral-level CCP offices, and deployment hasalsoimproved asaresult of to compile andanalyze publicbudget docu- Private efforts have beeninstrumental in PRC doesnotpublishany information about improving overall transparency withregard to information aboutChina’s science- andtechnol- plans, includingtheNational High-EndFor block foreign access to suchinformation. The private efforts. ments have shedmore light onthe Chinese little isknown aboutthebudget ofthecentral 34 33 First, itseeksto reduceits China Transparency Report - Opportunities for Further Research 2025 andinthe14th Five-Year isin Plan—thePRC PRC agenda, trackoverseas agenda, PRC Chinesedissidents, CCP allocatestoitsmilitary, andvast intelligence China’s technologicaldevelopment plansisthe whole-of-society As approachtoachieve thegoal. lack ofdetailed visibilityintothePRC’s largest legitimate foreigntechnologyacquisitionvia in domestic technologiesformassdomestic national champions’competitors, andflooding ing. WhilesomeU.S.-based andinternationalthink investment andjointventures, forcedtechnol- identified intheofficialandunofficialdata—aswell ity populationsofconcerntotheregime,such model. Andfifth,asitperfectsits own domestic information onbillionsofpeople. the globalmarket tobankrupt nationalchampion the nationaltechnologystrategies, endlesslines targeted educationandtalentprogramstosupport tanks doadecentjobofestimating how muchthe tion throughhumanandcyber-enabledespionage, the processofattempting- toleapfrogitsgeopoliti track orlimitdissent,andtarget internalminor and illegalsubsidiesforthosenationalchampi- as thestated CCPstrategies suchasMadeinChina as theUighursorFalun Gong.Fourth, asChina attacks, andtraffickingofpersonallyidentifiable and effectively formasssurveillance toconduct adversaries andpotential alliesalike morebroadly ons, quotas and difficultmarket entryrulesforthe domestic securityservicesbased onoutputandthe global market share. competitors and toincreasenationalchampions’ of credittoChinese-based“nationalchampions” ogy transfers, massive influxof state R&Ddollars, efforts includetheftoftradesecrets andinnova- cal competitors technologically. or exporttheChineseauthoritariangovernance export technologytocompelacquiescencethe espionage, potentialespionage, disruption operations, cyber such asHuawei andHikvision,captured markets surveillance tofurthercontrolitsown population, surveillance, itcanusethosetoolstotargetforeign budget items:itsdefenseandstate securityspend- becomes itsown technologicalpowerhouse, itcan As withmost ofthePRC’s industrial policies, the The trendherenodoubt istocreateafocused, By inunderstanding farthebiggest challenge 36 35 - -  - 81 Finally, there is a growing body of private there is a growing Finally, for national champions? How do “private” com- How for national champions? panies in China deconflict this stolen IP into their stolen IP into their this panies in China deconflict period of forced technology transfers for foreign period of forced technology sector R&D occurring in China that is more dif- sector R&D occurring in China that successful are PRC-led commercialization efforts? ship has cast a vast net and no region of the world no region of the and net vast a ship has cast guidance funds, but what about the myriad of but what about the myriad guidance funds, or startups private R&D taking place by other What more do not. while so many questionable), or directed? Is it leading to backed government How commercial success in the global market? its competitors? over own legitimate R&D efforts? Exactly how much of R&D efforts? Exactly how legitimate own companies to access the Chinese market, and the the Chinese market, companies to access a leg up has this given them? a leg up has this given and explaining the use of Chinese government technology giants themselves? Some “private” Some “private” technology giants themselves? their R&D spending (though the accuracy is those institutions in place, however, the scope of in place, however, those institutions CCP leader The as well known. is not the problem has been spared. Couple this with the same time with the same spared. Couple this has been industries are leading private R&D efforts? Is it industries impact of the PRC’s domestic technical know-how know-how technical domestic impact of the PRC’s with does this interplay How is surely substantial. ficult to measure. The aforementioned CSET at CSET ficult to measure. The aforementioned Georgetown has done a masterful job of tracking job has done a masterful Georgetown do declare Chinese companies such as Huawei Beijing’s plans to guarantee domestic market share market plans to guarantee domestic Beijing’s And what advantages the PRC has this given The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The - data or research avail Second, there is little been perfected as part of the unseen budget of the been perfected as part of the unseen broad figures released, it is difficult if not impos- difficult if released, it is broad figures press its own population, such as the social credit press its own facial recognition, and score, mass surveillance, police, and intelligence applications. Resources Resources police, and intelligence applications. sible for an open-source estimate of how much is of how open-source estimate sible for an R&D for advanced is unseen—namely spent that much is unclear and how Just source reporting. clearly maintained an intense focus on developing an intense focus on developing clearly maintained and sup- technologies to track, surveil, domestic actions, there is some sense of what technologies actions, have In nations that do not advanced nations. and cyber-enabled espionage advanced to acquire able on the holistic domestic impact for the PRC’s for the PRC’s impact domestic able on the holistic addition to what is being published in its open- addition to what is are clearly being poured into developing these into developing are clearly being poured technologies. Due to media reports, congressio- Due to media reports, technologies. technologies, sophisticated R&D, or even the or even R&D, sophisticated technologies, two-decades-long master plan to conduct human two-decades-long master the Great Firewall of China, among other tools. tools. of China, among other the Great Firewall - informa robotics, AI, many Clearly, technologies. autonomous quantum computing, tion technology, “black” in budget the PRC’s technologies from have been stolen from the United States and other from the United States and other been stolen have nal investigations, prosecutions, and other legal and other prosecutions, nal investigations, intellectual property of commercially available available intellectual property of commercially vehicles, and other technologies have military, military, have technologies and other vehicles, the PRC has Further, difficult to ascertain. very Ministry of State Security. Ministry The R&D of most of these technologies would have of these technologies would have The R&D of most   83

5 - 4 No similar efforts seem to have been under No similar efforts seem to have As of this writing, the United Nations Report bottom up by, for example, pricing tanks and mis- for example, by, up bottom burden and government the overall estimating by shaping our strategies in the context of great- in the context shaping our strategies the U.S. During the Cold War, competition. power - competi great-power security apparatus toward siles and adding up the cost and from the top down and from the top down siles and adding up the cost great is the impact of those instruments on their great is the impact of those instruments resources. governments’ on Military Expenditures, which used to include on Military Expenditures, for 2010–2017, defense budget data on China’s government devoted considerable resources and devoted government of the an accurate estimate effort to determining from the ods used included building estimates of these methods led to important methodological led to important methodological of these methods discussions inside our government. - The different meth defense burden. Union’s Soviet taken by the U.S. government with respect to with respect government the U.S. by taken that we gain a better it is imperative tion, however, - govern the size of the military within the Soviet understanding of how our adversaries, including our adversaries, of how understanding includes data for only three years: 2008–2010. ment. Substantive differences and pitfalls in each differences and pitfalls in each ment. Substantive China. As the United States reorients its national and how China, build their military instruments Available Data Available

1 3 FREDERICO BARTELS FREDERICO The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The Comparing military 2 Creating Some Clarity on the PLA Budget Some Creating of China (PRC), how much money is dedi- of China (PRC), how ike many other things in the People’s Republic things in the People’s other many ike Regardless of the difficulties, understanding understanding Regardless of the difficulties, It therefore becomes necessary for the individu- It therefore becomes necessary our adversaries’ military burdens is essential to our adversaries’ cated to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of Army Liberation cated to the People’s expenditures is a tricky endeavor even when one even expenditures is a tricky endeavor even more challenging. even other sources, including selective disclosures by disclosures by including selective sources, other - the avail data treatments that will approximate allocated to China’s different cabinet-level depart- different cabinet-level allocated to China’s als and institutions that are trying to understand that are trying to understand als and institutions close to the truth. at something able data to arrive the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is quite hard (CCP) Party the Chinese Communist According from to determine. to a recent study the PRC government. and methods the PRC burden to develop military ments, “The Ministry of National Defense (国防部; “The Ministry ments, is comparing transparent democratic allies within in a different manner and counts different things. Georgetown University’s Center for Security and University’s Georgetown MND) and the Ministry of State Security (国家安全 MND) and the Ministry NATO: Each country defines military expenditures Each country NATO: Emerging Technology, which tracked how much is how tracked which Emerging Technology, Developing meaningful comparisons becomes Developing Ministry of National Defense must be derived from be derived of National Defense must Ministry ; MSS) do not publish their budget documents.” publish their budget 部; MSS) do not Any information on how much is allocated to the information on how Any L  War sourceforthese maintainsagood College Defense intheNewEraDefense , andcreditedtheU.N. The StockholmInternationalPeace Research Institute (SIPRI)maintainsadatabaseof global However, thewebsitehasbeenintermit- However, theChinesedonot filloutallofthecat- U.S. defense budget issplitintosixsubcategories: 84 China’s whitepaperaresplitintothreedifferent just theannounced totals allocatedforChina’s reporting mechanismasthesource. nese submitted aversion ofthesimplifiedreporting military personnel;operationsandmaintenance; ment. (SeeTable 1.)As abaselinecomparison,the research anddevelopment [R&D])ineachdomain. resources (personnel,operations, procurement, military expendituresbased inpubliclyavail- independent databasesthatcompiletoplines. ments donot have thesame granularityasis reported inaspreadsheet of11by 35cells. ized formthatrequiresmultiplelayers ofdetail report zeromilitaryexpenditures)tothestandard- topline announcements. the reportingcountry. Additionally, differentlevels of thus dependentonthecooperationandaccuracy tently accessibleinthelast fewyears. Strategic Studies(IISS)also hasanindependent appendix toits2019 whitepaper, China’s National air, other) andthetotal of spentinfourcategories and familyhousing. and evaluation(RDT&E); military construction; able sourcesthatstarts in1949. able. ProfessorAndrewEricksonoftheU.S. Naval announced by theChinesegovernment areavail- government reproduceddatafor2010–2017 inthe estimate oftheChinesedefense budget andstarted data start in1989. TheInternationalInstitute for defense expenditures. offered forthe2010–2017 dataset. Theyare of reporting can be used, from nil (countries that of reportingcanbeused,fromnil(countriesthat egories requestedegories by theU.N. forms. spaces for each of the major domains (land, naval, naval, spaces foreachofthemajordomains(land, procurement; research,development, testing, personnel, trainingandsustainment, andequip- thatcomposethedefense budget: subcategories form. The U.N. reportingmechanismisvoluntary and The eightyears’worthofdataprovided in For databefore2010, thebest sourcesare For theyearssince2017, onlythetoplinedata 9 Thesimplifiedformisa5-by-5 matrixwith 10 11 Theseannounce- 12 For China,the 7 6 TheChinese 8 China Transparency Report TheChi- January 2021. (DOD) includesashortdiscussionoftheChinese New Methodologies” inMarch2020, andSIPRI People’s ArmedPolice (PAP) underthecontrolof PLA Rocket Force of“civil–military tothe policy vice breakdown onboth itsstandardized reporting Unavailable andUnknown Data is countedandhow itiscountedinthedefense methodology theCCPhasmadein arethechanges nese defensebudget inthepast decade. methodological compositionoftheirindependent incompleteness oftheofficiallypublicized budget is noinformationofthisnature inthedisclosed ments areimmediatelyevident:abreakdown of has developed itsown assessmentoftheChinese understanding ofChinesemilitaryexpenditures. to assessthisareawiththe2006editionofits the organizationofitsmilitary. the changes inWesternthe changes understanding oftheChi- the CentralMilitaryCommissiontocreating ary implications, especiallywith respecttowhat annual MilitaryBalanceseries. assessments ofthebudget,especiallyconsidering and even acknowledgesR&Dandforeignweapons any assessmentofhow theChinesemilitaryis granularity thatisneededtoachieve abetter gestions astohow thosegapsmightbeclosed. cipal question tackledby both institutions isthe defense budgetfortheprecedingyear. Theprin- defense budget. data. Further, the UnitedNationsrequiresaser equipment, andtrainingsustainment—are evolving andchanging. cated toR&D. Both areextremely importantto expenditures by serviceandtheresourcesdedi- data wouldbe very valuable forobservers ofthe published apaperupdatingitsmethodology on produced by theU.S. DepartmentofDefense procurement asgaps. services ofthePeople’s LiberationArmy, butthere presumably distributed throughthedifferent fusion,” have thesechanges substantial budget- form anditssimplifiedreporting form. budget. Both studies aregreatexamplesofthe The annualreportonChinesemilitarypower IISS publishedadiscussionof“Proposals for Each ofthethreesubaccounts—personnel, From theavailable data,twomissingele- 14 Themajorthrusts forrevisingthe 16 Thereportacknowledgesthe 17 However, therearenosug- 13 15 Eachinstitution From placingthe 18 Such -  85           Renminbi TOTAL Billions of heritage.org A

        Total 21 Share of Share EQUIPMENT           Renminbi Billions of budget, most notably those allocated to the to notably those allocated most budget, Funding for defense-related research and research defense-related for Funding development, for example, comes primarily comes example, for development, from other areas of the central government government of the central other areas from ogy, and Industry for National Defense Defense National for and Industry ogy, budget. official defense - Technol Science, for Administration State (SASTIND), which is not included in the (SASTIND),            Total Further, in its recent review of Chinese defense in its Further, Share of Share service breakdown, the U.N. form requests the dis- requests form the U.N. service breakdown, closure of resources spent on R&D, but the Chinese closure of resources spent on R&D, publication of those even However, comply. do not expenditures, SIPRI concluded that “[t]here is still SIPRI concluded that “[t]here is still expenditures, the whole story. As University of California, San As University the whole story. technologies in great-power competition. As with competition. technologies in great-power to the reporting of budgets and actual spending to the reporting of budgets resources within the defense budget would not tell would not resources within the defense budget no transparency in budgeting and spending for changes Unless substantial are made military R&D. Diego, Professor Tai Ming Cheung explains: Professor Tai Diego, - -         SUSTAINMENT TRAINING AND TRAINING Renminbi Billions of The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The         Total Share of Share This transfer makes it This transfer makes 20 PERSONNEL          Renminbi Billions of The Coast Guard was transferred to PAP transferred to PAP Guard was The Coast 19 Included in the service breakdown category are Included in the service breakdown The other huge data is mili- The other gap in the available Year         budget. paramilitary force that is counted under many defi- paramilitary force that is counted under many ent military forces. defense budget, but without any clarity on the ser defense budget, but without any SIPRI estimates of the Chinese defense budget SIPRI estimates the other services that could be counted within the other Armed the People’s the Chinese defense budget: the distribution of resources among the differ the distribution tary research and development, which is especially tary research and development, how the 2015 military reforms have affected military reforms have the 2015 how military control in 2018. necessary to account for the PAP budget within the budget to account for the PAP necessary nitions of military expenditures. Both old and new Both nitions of military expenditures. budget as one of the largest of the identify the PAP included in the official defense items that are not important in view of the role played by advanced by important in view of the role played it was included in the numbers report for 2019. it was vice breakdown, it is not possible to judge whether possible to judge whether it is not vice breakdown, Chinese military in their efforts to understand understand Chinese military in their efforts to (Beijing: Foreign Languages (Beijing: Foreign Era in the New Defense National of China, China’s Republic of the People’s ce O Information Council State SOURCE: Bartels, in Frederico Also available 2021). April 9, (accessed http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm 39, p. July 2019), Press, Special Heritage Foundation the Picture,” Distort and Economies ering Standards and Di Under-Reporting How in Context: Budget Defense “China’s ering-stan- https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/chinas-defense-budget-context-how-under-reporting-and-di 9, p. 2020, 25, March 225, No. Report dards-and-economies. T T Spending on Military Figures cial Chinese O Police and the Chinese Coast Guard. The PAP is a Guard. The PAP and the Chinese Coast Police  Further, many andservicesthatare ofthegoods 86 yuan intodollarsorany othertoallow currency Chinese militaryburdenhasonlyincreased. well-developed senseofhow youradversaries are Unanswered Questions rate fullyreflectsthecosts experiencedinChina. ment’s and prices, controlofcurrency neither military expenditures. Because ofthegovern- muddles thepossibleestimates ofChinesemili- resources available tothePLAwithoutnecessarily in anopenmarket andthusaremoresubjectto ment resources. importance ofhaving aclearunderstanding ofthe remain anestimate.” has succinctlycaptured theimportanceofaccurate using themilitary’s R&Dresources. Thisfurther understanding how thedifferent militaryservices tary R&Dexpenditures. answers forcross-countrycomparisons—market assessments ofmilitaryexpenditures: any competition withamilitarycomponent, exchange rateandpurchasingpower parity—have comparisons withother countries. Thetraditional conversion ofChinesedefensebudgetdatafrom government determinations. classified asmilitaryexpendituresarenot tradable calculating themilitary’s researchanddevelop- questions, fromdetermining whatitemsshould defense budgetstill presentsmany unanswered divide theoverall budget. At thesame time,the developing theirarmedforcesisimperative. SIPRI on R&D, militaryrelatedRDT&E spendingwill substantial drawbacks whenappliedtoChinese sidering thepushforcivil–militaryfusionin states that“China isastrategic competitor.” be includedtothecompositionoftheseitemsand Achieving abetterAchieving estimate oftheChinese Additionally, ofcon- thereisthechallenge The 2018 U.S. NationalDefenseStrategyclearly One major challenge stillOne majorchallenge unaddressedis The usesofmilitaryexpenditure data by on itseconomy; viadetermining how a the burden ofacountry’s militaryforces interested partiescanrange from assessing 23 ThispushhasmademoreR&D 22 24 China Transparency Report 25 In Xi Jinping certainlyknows how muchtheCCP Conclusion 2021, shouldserve toadvancethediscussionand 2021, National Defense Authorization Act forFiscalYearNational DefenseAuthorization Act Congress’s stated isamoreprecisecompari- goal lenges. However, recentprogressshows thatan nity couldbegintopublishmorecomprehensive commu- importance, DODandtheintelligence nation reportsandclassifiesthedifferentportions military expendituresandactedaccordinglyinthe ing abetter understanding ofourcompetitors’ how market exchange rateandpurchasing power knowledge andilluminatingtheproblemareasso understanding ofthiscrucialsubjectandencour the Chinesedefensebudget accurately. Chairman to produceaclearerpicture. that individualsandinstitutions cancometogether the PRC fundsthePLAstillthe PRC presentsmany chal- the Americanpublicindark. to those of the PRC andtheRussianFederation.to thoseofthePRC assessments anddiscussionsofhow toestimate othersinthedebate.Of particular age toengage accurate assessmentofthePRC’s military expen- and development centerproduceastudy that of itsbudget. Itexplicitlyasksforassessmentsof ditures ispossible.Theeffortwillinvolve sharing compares thedefensebudgets oftheUnitedStates spends ondefense;by continuingtotreatthePLA parity affectcross-countrycomparisons. son thataccountsforthedifferencesinhow each budget asasecret, theU.S. government onlykeeps Achievement ofaclearunderstandingAchievement ofhow The study, whichisdue inlateSeptember Congress understood theimportanceofgain- 27 government prioritizes themilitaryrelative conflict. of thisspendingonsecurity andarmed cation; to understanding thefactors that determine militaryspendingandtheimpact to othersectors suchashealthandedu- requesting thatafederallyfundedresearch 26 -  87 5 4 It is implausible that Beijing is not taking It is implausible that Beijing is not - glimpsed the Chinese govern The world first be used to tailor political influence campaigns faithful supporters of the Chinese government’s faithful supporters of the Chinese government’s data Beijing can also use purloined foreign policy. similar advantage sensi- of some of the other does in a uniquely intensive and aggressive way. and aggressive does in a uniquely intensive of foreign affairs, and military installations. The and military installations. of foreign affairs, gies that are critical to Beijing achieving its most its most gies that are critical to Beijing achieving those that including priorities, cherished strategic challenge interests. American closed-circuit television (CCTV) from one footage compound. of the buildings on the AU of listening devices. The building’s servers were were servers The building’s devices. of listening allegedly uploading their data to Shanghai every targeted at African leaders who have emergedtargeted at African leaders who have as that it to benefit Chinese companies—something tive, Chinese-built African government buildings buildings Chinese-built African government tive, ministries that include presidential residences, reported in 2018 newspaper Le Monde reported in 2018 the French of the Chinese-built African Union that the walls from China were accessing the likely that hackers unique, difficult-to-obtain data to fuel technolo- unique, difficult-to-obtain information gleaned in such eavesdropping could information gleaned in such eavesdropping ment’s surreptitious data mining in Africa when data mining surreptitious ment’s report revealed another year, morning as well. Last likely gives its companies the ability to harvest its companies the ability to harvest gives likely (AU) headquarters building in Ethiopia were full (AU)

1 -

2 JOSHUA MESERVEY JOSHUA The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The All of this is in addi- 3 Offer an Especially Valuable Trove Valuable an Especially Offer Strategic Resource, and Africa May May and Africa Resource, Strategic China Considers Big Data a Fundamental a Fundamental Big Data China Considers n the outskirts of the Zimbabwean capital of n the outskirts of the Zimbabwean Harare, a massive new parliament building Harare, a massive Such solicitousness for Earth’s poorest conti- poorest Such solicitousness for Earth’s The new luxury facility for Zimbabwe’s political The new luxury facility for Zimbabwe’s petition with the U.S., the continent’s value to the the continent’s with the U.S., petition projects have been partially or fully subsidized by been partially or fully subsidized by projects have ernment and built by the state-owned Shanghai the state-owned ernment and built by on China–Africa Cooperation extravaganza, and Cooperation extravaganza, on China–Africa or renovated across the continent since 1966. or renovated capita GDP of just over $1,400. over capita GDP of just build- elites is one of nearly 200 government an extraordinary sum in a country with a 2019 per with a 2019 sum in a country an extraordinary to the center of Beijing’s increasingly overt com- overt increasingly to the center of Beijing’s tion to the parade of senior Chinese leadership that frequents the continent, the triennial Forum and diplomatic support for to important minerals, the Chinese government. is nearing completion. A gift of the Chinese gov is nearing completion. nent may seem disproportionate to any benefit the seem disproportionate to any nent may its international agenda. As technology has moved ings that Chinese companies have constructed constructed ings that Chinese companies have jing’s attentiveness reaps economic gains, access reaps economic gains, jing’s attentiveness Construction Group, it costs around $140 million, $140 around it costs Group, Construction Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has only grown. (CCP) has only grown. Party Chinese Communist China’s heavy lending and investment in Africa. lending and investment heavy China’s Bei- can earn, but it is not. Chinese government Moreover, the construction costs of many of these of many costs the construction Moreover, Now the Chinese government’s position in Africa the Chinese government’s Now O  “national champion”telecommunicationscom- Nigeria, Somalia,andSouthAfrica—are served Nigeria, Having physical accesstothese cablesmakes it 88 widespread ontheAfricancontinent—though with apreinstalled e-wallet (complete withsecu- financial and other data. first stand-alone commercial5Gnetwork. networks. more than70percentofAfrica’s commercial4G it recentlyunveiled inSouthAfricathecontinent’s rity backdoors) fortheBankofChina’s digital intelligence officersandwhoseequipmentoften intelligence nity inAfrica.Huawei, China’s heavily subsidized, highways foralmost allofEarth’s transmitted tion fordeploying 5Gnetworks onthecontinent; the parkinglots.) there is a burgeoning Africa–Chinacryptothere isaburgeoning trade— tries. Five ofthosecountries—Cameroon,Libya, ascendance access togovernment buildingsisprobablynot ates theneedtopenetrate atarget’s network and cables aredatasuperhighways, datacenters are currency. UseofChina’s cryptocurrency isnot data centerindustry aswell. even itsmost productive data-miningopportu- data-heavy industries thatBeijing’ssurveillance data—that collectively touch21Africancoun- defeat itsprotections. easy toexploitthemfordatacollectionandobvi- sectors suggeststhelikelihood ofthedigitalyuan’s pany whoseranksaresprinkledwithChinese features securityvulnerabilities, but Chinesecompanies’dominanceofrelevant built orupgraded11underseacables—thesuper by morethanoneHuawei Marine-builtcable. l l

Yet Chinesecompaniessodominatecertain A Huawei subsidiary, Huawei Marine, In SenegalandZambia,Huawei con- In conjunctionwithanother Chinesecompany Huawei hasenteredthecloudservicesand Late in2020, Huawei rolledoutasmartphone largest datacenterinCameroon, whichwill host datafrom,amongothers, the government and financialinstitutions. and withfinancingfromtheExport–Import structed datacentersthatcurrently hold, bank ofChina,itrecentlybuiltCentralAfrica’s 7 This4Gdominancegives itpoleposi- 9 andalongwithitaccesstotroves of 12 13 14 (Ifsubmarine 6 hasconstructed 10 China Transparency Report 8 has 11

- “broad cameralayouts”). “broad 46 sub-Saharan Africaports. 46 sub-Saharan Tecno, toclaimthedominant market shareon Transsion, throughitsaffordablesmartand CloudWalk struck anagreementin2018 with (AI)companyChinese artificialintelligence ZTE hasrolledoutitsown version incountries Zimbabwe. Like isoftencompro- Huawei, itsgear like Ethiopia, Nigeria, andSudan. like Ethiopia,Nigeria, mised withbackdoors. its safe/smart citycustomers isdatamining. theircities,manage gathersimmenseamounts of mobile moneyplatformwithnearly42million ments between AfricaandChina.WeChat is messaging platform tofacilitatemobilepay technology infrastructure tohelpgovernments the continent. the government ofZimbabwe tobuildafacial company thatsellsCCTV cameras, Hikvi- data. OneoftheservicesthatHuawei provides to customers, of StateSecurity. owned by Chinesetechgiant Tencent, whichwas countries toimplementitssafe cityplatform, excellent accesstosensitive data inAfrica.The database ofZimbabweans (whichwould require sion, isactive acrossthecontinent,includingin sits ontheBab el-MandebStraitchokepoint platform, whichintegratesandcentralizesICT and feature phonebrandssuchasInfinix,Itel,and funded initsearlystagesby China’s Ministry l l

“ICT [informationandcommunicationstech- In 2008and2009, ZTE was reportedly It tookonly10yearsforShenzhen-based Huawei alsohasagreementswith16African More recently, Huawei proclaimeditselfthe Kenyan ser government atitsintelligence Chinese companiesalsohave stakes inatleast vice’s headquarters. Other privateChinesecompaniesalsohave in both countries. nology] architectoftheKenyan government” ther digitizeitsfiles. and signedanagreementwithNairobitofur or willholdsoonhold,allgovernment data constructing something similarforthe 24 was linked tothe massive WeChat 23 In2018, M-Pesa, Africa’s largest 25 15 22 16 17 21 Themassive Chinese 26 InDjibouti,which 19 Thesmartcity - 20 - 18 and -  89 - - The CCP is 39 Authoritar 37 which would certainly 36 41 43 42 Beijing signaled its preoccupa- 40 and the government is deploying elements elements is deploying and the government 38 barely exploited, so it could be lucrative for the it could be lucrative barely exploited, so fewer fees, giving Chinese shipping an edge shipping an giving Chinese fewer fees, sensitive networks. sensitive gained unauthorized access to Dutch telecom- against its competition. against their conversations, including those of the their conversations, then-prime minister. tech firm that can deliver affordable services. affordable deliver tech firm that can munications company KPN’s network of over of over network KPN’s munications company restricted, or banned Huawei from their or banned Huawei restricted, nies prioritize Chinese cargo and extract Chinese cargonies prioritize and extract world’s fastest growing population, has been population, growing fastest world’s Fourteen countries have warned about, warned countries have Fourteen Evidence that Chinese companies siphon Evidence 6 million subscribers and could eavesdrop on 6 million subscribers and could eavesdrop Information is also critical to developing theInformation is also critical to developing The ports controlled by Chinese compa- Chinese controlled by The ports in Africa, home of the for data The market A recent report alleged personnel that Huawei Yet it defies belief that the fabulous oppor it defies belief that Yet

l l l l because it facilitates control of their popula- because it facilitates control of their burgeoning Credit System. Social partially motivate some of Beijing’s labors some of Beijing’s labors partially motivate so acquisitive that it sucks up mountains of data, as that it sucks up mountains of data, so acquisitive deployed in Xinjiang and Tibet regions runs off regions runs off in Xinjiang and Tibet deployed data, on the continent. The CCP views big data as a on the continent. The CCP views big data as a off data to send back to China has been of that machine to the rest of China through its of China through its of that machine to the rest a plan for its use. accumulating steadily. tions. The surveillance machine that Beijing has machine that Beijing has surveillance The tions. tion with data collection through its 2017 national 2017 tion with data collection through its - and cooperate” with the govern to “support, assist, tunity to mine African data does not at least least at data does not tunity to mine African ian governments like China’s covet information information covet China’s like ian governments intelligence law that requires any Chinese company Chinese company intelligence any that requires law ment on intelligence work, include handing over data if requested. include handing over it did, for example, with the 2013 Office of Personnel Office of it did, for example, with the 2013 nation as an unassailable global power. nation as an unassailable world-beating technologies, such as AI, that the world-beating technologies, CCP believes are vital to rejuvenating the Chinese are vital to rejuvenating CCP believes Management hack, against the day when it will have Management the day hack, against “fundamental strategic resource.” “fundamental strategic 30 - 35 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The Huawei and China Huawei 29 33 34 The Chinese government also has The Chinese government Exacerbating the problem is the Exacerbating the This will likely enable Beijing to This will likely 32 28 31 Increasingly wired ports collect a huge wired ports collect Increasingly 27 of the Chinese construction sector’s sector’s of the Chinese construction earnings. overseas ocratic Republic of the Congo supplies most of ocratic Republic of the Congo supplies most the world’s cobalt, which is critical to certain the world’s high-tech products, and Chinese entities domi- high-tech products, nate the supply chain for the mineral. wei’s global revenue. wei’s In 2017, Africa provided 5 percent of Hua- Africa provided In 2017, In late 2020, following a rushed approval a rushed approval following In late 2020, The continent may supply nearly a third supply nearly a third The continent may The Chinese government may not exploit not may The Chinese government Africa is home to important minerals: The Dem-

l l l ping transits, state-owned China Merchants Port Port Merchants China state-owned ping transits, process that circumvented normal procedures, procedures, normal process that circumvented profit-seeking doubtless explains some of its profit-seeking doubtless pledged CDC hub to fund and build a $75 million possibility that Chinese companies operating these possibility that Chinese information technology ports replace existing gear with Huawei as Chinese Navy–linked systems officials broke ground for the construction of an ground for the construction officials broke government. exploitation. every data-mining opportunity in Africa, and every gain access both to the eventual stock of genomic stock to the eventual gain access both data that the headquarters will undoubtedly regional gather and to data collected in the five amount of data on shipping from all over the world the world shipping from all over amount of data on activities. For example: For activities. terminals. through which about 12 percent of the world’s ship- of the world’s about 12 percent through which ters in Ethiopia that will be built by the Chinese ters in Ethiopia that will be built by that may be vulnerable to Chinese government to Chinese government be vulnerable that may tious Disease Prevention Center in Sierra Leone, Center in Sierra Leone, tious Disease Prevention has already constructed hospitals in Cabo Verde, hospitals in Cabo Verde, has already constructed is building the Ministry of Health in Liberia, and of Health is building the Ministry in Kenya, built a Bio-Safetyin Kenya, Lab and an Infec- Zambia, and Zimbabwe. COSCO Shipping often does. Cameroon, Liberia, Namibia, Somalia, Uganda, Cameroon, Liberia, Namibia, Somalia, CDC centers. Holdings owns or operates three of the port’s five five three of the port’s or operates owns Holdings Mobile have developed a “smart port” solution. a “smart port” developed have Mobile African Centers for Disease Control headquar African Centers for Disease Control The CCP Perspective on Data Perspective CCP The  “private” intheChinesecontext, itismoreplau- Africa may beofoutsizedimportancetothe Why Africa? 90 Chinese Communist Party becauseofthe unique nese companiesandtheChinesegovernment, services.intelligence Given thevalueChinese its intelligence services.its intelligence that iscollectedby aChinesecompany willeventu- ally make itsway totheChinesegovernment and and thevirtualmeaninglessofacompany being government placesondata,thelong-established company must by law cooperate withChina’s gain acompetitive butevery Chinese advantage, contribution itcanmake torefiningtheCCP’s practice ofreciprocaldatasharingbetween Chi- sent sharppracticesusedby Chinesecompaniesto systems ofcontrol.Beijing hasusedartificial sible thannot that any informationBeijingvalues l l l l l

The informationthatBeijing cancollectin The Chinesecompany Lenovo soldlaptops to The University ofToronto’s CitizenLabdiscov European Unionwatchdog organizationand Lithuania recentlybannedanother large Hong Kong andChina. Users ofthepopularChinese-owned TikTok U.S. warned government that agencies China’s market-dominating DajiangInnova- Chinese company, Nuctech,fromits would sendharvested datatotheChinese lected inputted datatowhiskoffChina. intelligence services.intelligence market becauseoffearsthatthecompany user informationsurreptitiously toBeijing.A tions (DJI) likely sharesdatathatitsdrones the U.S. col- militarywithachipthatallegedly Some oftheillicitdataharvesting may repre- a cybersecurity firmrecently voiced similar a cybersecurity app suedthecompany forpurportedlysending collect withBeijing—something thecom- concerns aswell. content ofuserseven outsideChina’s borders. ered thattheWeChat messaging appsurveils pany admitted itdidwithdatacollectedin 47 48 45 China Transparency Report 46 49

44 - (although itisworthnoting thattwoofthosecoun- including CloudWalk, Huawei, andHikvision,to andfacialrecognitiontechnology intelligence in Africa:Asof2020, 12ofAfrica’s 54countries industry. Onemarket fortheseproductsiscontrol- in AI-enabledtechnology, apotentially massive might usetotrackethnic minoritiesinChina. in successive five-year plansandonethatBeijing markedly differentfromthedataitcangather had ChinesebigdatatechnologyandAIproducts hungry regimesthroughouttheworld,including tage inthisfield. tage those systems todistinguish dark-complexioned tries, Botswana andNamibia, areamongAfrica’s also facilitateintrusionsintosecurelocations. aggressively Chinaispursuingcompetitive advan- companies maintainorstrengthen theirlead could befeedingdatafromAfricanfacesintotheir considers a“strategic emergingindustry.” develop valuablebiotechnologies, afieldfeatured domestically. Thesedifferentdatacanbeusedto can accessinAfricaare,like Africanfacialdata, systems, andthosedatacouldmake iteasierfor surveil itsUighurpopulation. prominent, stealingandfacialdatacould genomic poses ofrepression). procure Chinesesurveillance technologyforpur from Chinesecompaniesthatareactive inAfrica, faces freest, suggestingthatgovernments donot always biometric identificationbecomesincreasingly l l l

At the beginningofthecoronavirus pandemic, The genomic datatheChinesegovernment The genomic In 2020, theU.S. several scientists charged In 2019, prompted by theFBI, scoresofAmeri- Recent events demonstrate how lieutenant intheChinesearmy). ing anaffiliationwithChinaor stealingtrade involved in biomedicalresearchwithconceal- research, nearlyallonChina’s behalf. nearly 200casesofpotential theftofbiomedical trying tosteal informationrelated tovaccine the U.S. warned thatChinesehackers were Such refinementscanalsohelpChinese can academiccentersbegantoinvestigate secrets (oneofthebiomedicalresearchers was a 51 —a useful refinement that the government—a usefulrefinementthatthe 50 Thesecompanies 56 55 53 As 54 - 52

 91 should be a 61 The fact that the Chinese Communist regime regime Communist The fact that the Chinese fact that the Chinese Communist Party is almost is almost Party fact that the Chinese Communist factors that will help to determine the outcome the outcome to determine factors that will help strategy that they formulate to protect American that they formulate to protect strategy prominent among them. prominent among and is already far ahead scant one or two years on facial recognition technology certainly taking advantage of its access to African it thinks will data to refine the technologies that - in which Wash system creating an international will be technology competition, of the U.S.–China existential—goals: the rejuvenation of the Chi- of the rejuvenation existential—goals: a key to overcoming the U.S.’s advantages and to the U.S.’s to overcoming a key help it to dictate terms both to the U.S. and to the and to the to the U.S. help it to dictate terms both has probably already narrowed the artificial the artificial narrowed has probably already matter of deep concern to U.S. policymakers. Any Any policymakers. of deep concern to U.S. matter for the account in this vital area must interests rest of the world. rest ington cannot gainsay Beijing. Although other other Beijing. Although gainsay ington cannot to a intelligence gap with the U.S. technology nese nation. Under President Xi Jinping, the Xi Jinping, Under President nese nation. Chinese government is prioritizing technology as is prioritizing technology government Chinese 58 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The the stage is set for is set the stage 60 just under a year later, reports later, under a year just 57 When that is coupled with the relative When that is coupled with the relative 59 products, in the latter case to gain access to, to, to gain access case in the latter products, development; emerged groups hacker Chinese of separate among others, infectious disease researchers. among others, targeting Indian vaccine makers and Microsoft and Microsoft Indian vaccine makers targeting Finally, the CCP likely mines African data CCP likely the Finally, The Chinese Communist Party believes believes Party The Chinese Communist because it is relatively easy to do so. Its blitz of to do so. easy because it is relatively critical systems from intrusion, critical systems elites. on the continent. An economic relationship with on the continent. to achieving one of its primary—even obstacle engagement during the past 20 years especially has 20 years especially engagement past during the that Washington is the single biggest foreign is the single that Washington inability of many African countries to defend their inability of many made China the most consequential foreign actor consequential made China the most with a range of blandishments for the continent’s with a rangeof blandishments for the continent’s China is critical to many African countries, and African countries, many China is critical to Beijing further cements access and cooperation Beijing further cements Beijing to pluck data almost at will. Beijing to pluck data almost Conclusion   3 93

7 - Overwhelmingly, Overwhelmingly, 4 and in the years that 6 The CCP abruptly ended all public The CCP abruptly 5 In 2015, as tensions over global competition competition global as tensions over In 2015, These talent programs are managed and imple- from China escalated, the Thousand Talents Talents from China escalated, the Thousand intention- the Chinese government followed, programs and grants focus on hard science, engineers, and managers from foreign countries.” engineers, - contracts with Chinese such entities as universi discussions of the program, - insti come directly from the Chinese research or the humanities. age of 40, and a Foreign Thousand Talents Program Talents Thousand Foreign a and age40, of available in English. available are overseen by the Chinese government and the government the Chinese by are overseen ally deleted online references to the program. ally deleted ticipants are required to sign legally binding ties and research institutions. tutions that manage individual programs. Both Both tutions that manage individual programs. mented by several institutions that report to and, institutions several mented by institutions and individual recipients receive and individual recipients receive institutions research, and engineering, not on social science research, and engineering, not Bureau of Federal the U.S. by ing investigations like all Chinese government-backed programs, programs, all Chinese government-backed like financial compensation for participating. Par for participating. financial compensation was added to attract “high-end foreign scientists, “high-end added to attract was foreign scientists, CCP. Invitations and advertisements to participate and advertisements Invitations CCP. Program received increased scrutiny includ- increased scrutiny Program received Investigation. There is little information on the program There is little - The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The CHAD WOLF AND JAMES JAY CARAFANO, PHD CARAFANO, JAY AND JAMES CHAD WOLF The party also intended to 2 of U.S. Colleges and Universities Colleges of U.S. Chinese Influence on and Exploitation on and Exploitation Chinese Influence In 2008, the Chinese Communist Party Party the Chinese Communist In 2008, 1 survey of available data on the Chinese gov of available survey ernment’s influence on American colleges ernment’s Since 1996, China has had formal programs Since 1996, - Tal the Thousand During the ensuing years, been renamed. In 2010, it was reshaped to allow reshaped to allow it was been renamed. In 2010, publicly known programs directed by the Chinese programs directed by publicly known particularly in the U.S. current research, open-source data, and gaps in current research, open-source data, open-source information. concerns. This assessment describes the major concerns. of Chinese government actions and the efforts of actions and the efforts of Chinese government ents Program has expanded, changed focus, and ents Program has expanded, changed focus, ers who were being educated and working abroad, and universities demonstrates that there is insuf- demonstrates and universities attract “foreign” talent. attract and a program, the Thousand Talents Program, to Talents and a program, the Thousand and research- top-tier Chinese students attract to encourage to foreign-trained talent to return regime; the concerns that have been raised; and regime; the concerns that have researchers to hold appointments simultaneously Talents Thousand A Young in China and overseas. ficient transparency with respect to the impact China. U.S. universities to address relevant issues and universities U.S. Program was established to attract those below the those below to attract established Program was (CCP) first established a management framework established (CCP) first Thousand Talents Programs Talents Thousand A  The Trump Administration subsequently issued The TrumpAdministration National Thousand Talents Plan,whichalsofocuses Foreign ExpertsRecruitmentPlan,whichfocuses 94 Chinese Ministry ofScienceandTechnology. recruitments asparticipants werenot transparent in indictmentsby theDepartmentofJustice, ministry launchedtwonewprograms, theHigh-end nization Department and the State Administration nization DepartmentandtheStateAdministration national power thanacooperative economicdevel- nese government andtheCCPnow oversee more include (amongothers) theJiaxing Talents Program highlight theproblematicnatureofthesetalent universities includingrecruitmentprograms. the U.S. DepartmentofStatedistributed warnings the Chinesemilitaryin2016of includedagoal than 200talentrecruitmentprograms. about ChineseCommunist Party activitiesatU.S. about theirfundingandaffiliation. That sameyear, and technologyprofessionals.” attention ontheseprograms. already workinginChina.By oneestimate, theChi- and programsaimedatattracting foreignexperts overseas trainingfor“defense-affiliatedscience of Foreign ExpertsAffairs was absorbed by the opment andscientificexchange. on recruiting foreign talent. Additional programs programs on recruitingforeigntalent.Additional on high-level expertsinkey strategic fields, andthe strategy. prioritized “civil–militaryfusion”asanational program was becomingmoreaninstrument of l l

The government-directed reorganizationof In 2020, twohigh-profile casesfocusednational In 2019, by theprogrammanaged CCPOrga- Both cases, amongmany others thatresulted Emory University ProfessorXiojiangLiandhis Lieber, arecipientofsubstantial researchgrants Harvard ProfessorofChemistry CharlesM. with crimesrelatedtonondisclosureoffunds wife, who managed theuniversity’swife, whomanaged neurosci- received fromaChineserecruitmentprogram. ing hundredsofthousands ofdollarsingrants the U.S. DepartmentofDefense,was charged came underfederalinvestigation fornot report- ence lab, wereabruptly terminatedwhenthey from theNationalInstitutes ofHealth and from theChineseAcademyofScience. 9 Thisraisedadditionalconcernsthatthe 8 Thegovernment 11 China Transparency Report 13 10 The The 14

12 researchers linked totheChinesemilitaryfrom have beenmadetoevaluatetheimpactofthese an executive orderbarringgraduatestudents and entering theUnitedStates. programs. For instance: l l l

A study in2020by tworesearchers attheCenter A study by theCenterforSecurityandEmerg- The vast majority werepostdoctoral students, Thousand Talents Programfrom2011 to2018. In 2019, theU.S. SenatePermanent Subcommit- Enterprise: China’s Talent RecruitmentPlans, Program. Theauthorsestimated thatin2013, Using open-sourceresearch,several efforts were abuses, principallyfailures toreportpartic- which detailed theorigins, structure, and was making significant contributions to leading was makingsignificantcontributionstoleading whom theywereabletoidentify. Theyassessed lications andconcludedthat“thebest Chinese relationships between Chineseinstitutions and institutions affiliatedwiththeChinese military, research institutions. Two-thirds oftheaward- most ofthemat top-tieruniversities and ipation intheprogramandundisclosedincome. ing Technology atGeorgetown University management oftheinitiative; U.S.management measures roles inscientificdevelopment.” ures ingovernment oversight offederalgrants. the PLA. that about8percentwere offered workwith transfer of technology to China and that there transfer oftechnologytoChinaandthatthere tee onInvestigations issueditshighlycritical to monitortheprogramandaddressconcerns; talent hadnot lefttheUnitedStatesand,infact, the qualityofparticipantsby thenumber, the programincluded1,723participants, 733of although itacknowledged difficulty indefining acknowledged that the program facilitated the acknowledged thattheprogramfacilitated available recordswhoparticipatedintheYouth assessed 3,586 individualsidentifiedinpublicly abuses oftherecruitmentprograms;andfail- ees worked intheU.S. Thereportconcluded staff reportonThreatstothe U.S. Research part-time participantsintheThousand Talents publicly available informationonfull-timeand prestige, andcitationsoftheir professionalpub- prestige, for Strategic and International Studies analyzed for StrategicandInternationalStudiesanalyzed 19 Thereportfurther concludedthat 15 17 Thestudy also 18 16  - 95 In 24 27 26 - 25 The Hanban is clearly an instrument of is clearly an instrument The Hanban 23 regularly provide information to the State the State to information provide regularly in the funding, and operations recruiting, informed choices about the influence being about the influence choices informed District of Columbia as of January 2019. as of Columbia District Department about PRC citizen personnel, personnel, citizen about PRC Department Most Confucius Institutes in the United in the United Institutes Confucius Most ties. However, there are several Confucius Confucius several are there ties. However, transparency by requiring the CIUS to the CIUS to requiring by transparency fucius Institutes established independently established fucius Institutes United States. With greater transparency, transparency, greater With States. United Institutes established directly in partnership directly established Institutes Instead, designating the CIUS as a for the CIUS as designating Instead, and how these Beijing-backed programs programs these Beijing-backed and how should continue to teach their students. teach to should continue - Con two least and at education) secondary educational institutions can make more more can make institutions educational on their campuses and whether exerted of any educational institution. We identified We institution. educational of any and the in 44 states and universities colleges eign mission will ensure much needed will ensure eign mission with U.S. public school districts (primary and public school districts with U.S. 96 Confucius Institutes in operation at U.S. U.S. at in operation Institutes 96 Confucius - and universi colleges based at are States - Department of State desig the U.S. In 2020, According to a 2019 U.S. Government Account Government - According U.S. to a 2019 “Since 2006,” according to the previously refer to the previously according 2006,” “Since fucius Institutes.” Schools, center directors, and center directors, Schools, fucius Institutes.” staff must also sign contracts with the Hanban that also sign must staff staff study, “China over [has] directly provided study, staff enced Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on Investigations Subcommittee enced Permanent of the institutes and their growing footprint. The footprint. and their growing of the institutes role and responsibility exact nature of the center’s commissions that comprise the Hanban governing the Hanban governing that comprise commissions council. ability Office (GAO) report: tute U.S. Center (CIUS) to coordinate U.S. activities to coordinate U.S. Center (CIUS) tute U.S. the Chinese state and Chinese Communist Party. and Chinese Communist state the Chinese ing the terms of hosting a Confucius Institute.” ing the terms of hosting nated the CIUS as a foreign mission. “This action - of the contracts “establish limit public disclosure leges to close individual Confucius or universities was a subject of debate and uncertainty. was will not close the CIUS, nor will it require U.S. col- nor will it require U.S. close the CIUS, will not - schools for Con to U.S. $158 million in funding - Insti the Confucius established the Hanban 2013, Institutes,” the department announced. Institutes,” 20 21 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The 22 aid in China’s military modernization,” noting noting military modernization,” aid in China’s Similar concerns have been raised in other been raised in other have Similar concerns that “at least 13” individuals were offered posi- individuals were 13” that “at least weapons lab. leading nuclear tions in China’s Research that minimizes the threats points Research that minimizes the threats In the U.S., institutes are established in part- are established institutes In the U.S., In addition to concerns about the exploitation In addition to concerns about the exploitation The Chinese government has established has established The Chinese government “[t]here is merit to concerns that plans awardees that plans awardees merit to concerns “[t]here is from Civitas alleges “up to 15 UK universities that students and researchers. students suppliers or other military-linked companies.” military-linked suppliers or other sharing sensitive defense research. The report defense research. sharing sensitive cacious countermeasures. - competitive from U.S. emerging research, detract of sensitive and advanced U.S. technology and and advanced U.S. of sensitive countries. In 2021, research in the United In 2021, research countries. guage and cultural teaching resources worldwide. and extent of the threats and risks and devise effi- of and extent activities and direct connections to the Chinese activities and direct connections to damagea few serious cases can do significant to are concerns that countermeasures will inhibit are concerns that countermeasures transparency it difficult to access the scope makes to the limited number of actually proven illegal to the limited number of actually proven South Korea in 2004. South Korea teaching Chinese language and culture worldwide. military. On the other hand, others argue that even argue that even hand, others On the other military. have [established] relationships with 22 Chinese relationships [established] have ing for China-related research. Overseen by the by ing for China-related research. Overseen and ministries members of the 12 state reviewed by nerships between Chinese institutions and Chinese institutions nerships between ness, or disadvantage the U.S. in attracting top in attracting the U.S. or disadvantage ness, research for military use and other purposes, there purposes, research for military use and other is affiliated with the Ministry of Education. The is affiliated with the Ministry military-linked universities as well as weapons universities military-linked inadvertently assisted the Chinese military by Chinese military by the assisted inadvertently language instruction, cultural events, and fund- language cultural events, instruction, Confucius institutes for the stated purpose of for the stated Confucius institutes U.S. interests. Moreover, the significant lack of Moreover, interests. U.S. Hanban, Confucius Institute activities are also Hanban, Confucius Institute Language Council International (Hanban), which lan- in 1987 to provide established Hanban was Kingdom universities concluded that British Confucius Institutes Confucius The first Confucius institute was established in was established Confucius institute The first This program is overseen by the Office of Chinese by This program is overseen American schools for the stated purpose of offering American schools for the stated  96 https://www.nas.org/storage/app/media/New%20Documents/confucius-institutes-in-the-us-updated-april-13-2021.pdf (accessed April14, 2021). SOURCE: RachellePeterson, National Association ofScholars, “Confucius Institutes intheUnited States,” April2021, * Confucius Institute scheduledto closein2021. Confucius Centers inSchoolsAcross theU.S. MAP 1 Webster University  Valparaiso University  Schools ChicagoPublic  University ofWisconsin -  St„ CloudState University  Colorado State University*  University ofUtah  Davis SchoolDisrict  Southern UtahUniversity  DiegoGlobalKnowledge San  University ofCalifornia Santa  Stanford University  Northwest Nazarene University  Portland State University*  Pacific Lutheran University  School withConfucius Center 2 Platteville while university conducts review) (Confucius Institute “paused” University)  ­€ from DiegoState San University (transferred inJune Barbara 1 4 5 6 3 7 8 9 10 SUNYat Bu™alo  College ofWilliam &Mary*  George Washington University   West Virginia University  East Central OhioEducational  University ofAkron  Cleveland State University  University ofToledo  MichiganState University  Presbyterian College  Wesleyan College  EmoryUniversity*  Troy University   AlabamaA&MUniversity  SimpsonCounty Schools  Xavier University ofLouisiana  Houston Independent School  University ofCentral Arkansas  Service Center District China Transparency Report 17 11 16 15 12 18 13 19 14 20 21 25 University ofSouthernMaine*  University ofNew Hampshire*  Tufts University*  Bryant University (will notreapply  Central Connecticut State  Stony Brook University*  ChinaInstitute  University Baruch  Columbia University  SUNYGlobalCenter   State College ofOptometry  MedgarEvers College  New Jersey City University  Temple University  State University ofNew York  Binghamton University  Alfred University  22 26 23 for fundingpossibly willclose) University* SUNY (SUNY) -Albany 24 27 28 29 30 33 34 31 32 35 37

36 A 45 38-44 heritage.org 46 47 48 49 50  - 97 36 37 34 33 With respect to this last concern, With respect to this last 35 ing events at the Confucius Institute and Institute the Confucius at ing events that hosting a Confucius Institute could limit could Institute a Confucius hosting that events hosting avoid choose to could tute - Insti a school with a Confucius that stated or the of Tibet, governance such as Taiwan, others we interviewed expressed concerns concerns expressed interviewed we others - critical of China—includ or activities events researchers on campus. Several elsewhere on campus, elsewhere topics on certain consid- or out of its Chinese partners offend of the agreement…. the terms for eration Several school officials, researchers, and researchers, school officials, Several Tiananmen Square protests, so as to not so as to protests, Square Tiananmen Many assessments of U.S. operations are anec- operations of U.S. assessments Many These concerns about political censorship The controversies surrounding Confucius The controversies freedom—including interference in academic and freedom—including interference in pedagogy and the operations or controversies sur pedagogyor controversies the operations and public statements or holding events on topics or holding events public statements state policies, and concerns that the institutes are concerns that the institutes and policies, state dom, transparency, entanglement with Chinese dom, transparency, cius Institute program in 2021. cius Institute guage teachers who are hired by the program are guage teachers who are hired by cally sensitive.” dotal. A study published in 2017 by the NAS based by 2017 published in A study dotal. where at 12 Confucius Institutes on case studies that they there are concerns cultural structures, teacher hiring, ence on curriculum development, activities and pressure “to avoid extracurricular are not unfounded, as Tufts University’s public unfounded, as Tufts University’s are not and instruction that would undermine academic and instruction according to the GAO: that the Chinese government considers politi- that the Chinese government the NAS surveyed hiring policies, funding arrange- hiring policies, the NAS surveyed valuable language and that these centers provide hearings on its Confucius Institute program hearings on its Confucius Institute that Chinese-lan- highlight. The hearings revealed rounding the institutes. rounding required to sign an agreement not to participate required to sign an agreement not may exert significant and inappropriate influ- significant and inappropriate exert may ments, contracts, and pressure on affiliated faculty and pressure on affiliated contracts, ments, of propaganda. instruments flagged intellectual free- four issues of concern: United Kingdom. For the most part, they focus on part, they focus the most United Kingdom. For Institutes are significant. Although some argue Institutes Tufts announced that it will be closing its Confu- “in activities that harm China’s national interest.” national interest.” “in activities that harm China’s The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The 31 32 Nevertheless, the increased Nevertheless, 29 However, this could simply be an However, 30 - required universi That rule would have 28 In addition to the data provided by the NAS, the NAS, by In addition to the data provided In December 2020, the U.S. Department of Department the U.S. 2020, In December As of March 2021, the National Association of As of March 2021, the National Association According to media reports, in response to According to media reports, been conducted in other countries, such as the countries, been conducted in other schools…have rebranded as the Asia Society Chi- Society rebranded as the Asia schools…have scrutiny seemed to have prompted Beijing to prompted seemed to have scrutiny exercise in renaming and rebranding, with little in renaming and rebranding, with little exercise or mission. According to one account, for example, days of taking office. days closed or are in the process of closing, along with cius Institute at a private educational organization, cius Institute of institutes in the U.S., the Chinese government the Chinese government in the U.S., of institutes authoritative studies of Confucius Institutes and of Confucius Institutes studies authoritative at K–12 public school districts” in addition to “74 in addition to “74 public school districts” at K–12 Scholars (NAS) “count[ed] a total of 50 Confucius Scholars (NAS) “count[ed] a total to no actual change in organizational membership ties and K–12 schools to disclose their financial ties schools to disclose their financial ties and K–12 The Biden Administra- to Confucius Institutes. rule within withdrew the proposed tion, however, their operations and influence. Some studies have studies have their operations and influence. Some - on Investiga Subcommittee the Permanent there are limited open-source and the GAO, tions, the stated reason for the closure.” the stated the China Institute,” and “5 Confucius Institutes and “5 Confucius Institutes the China Institute,” tutes at Central Connecticut State University and tutes at Central Connecticut State University - Founda the Chinese International Education oversee Confucius tion, “will fund and officially tutes. The Hanban was renamed the Ministry of renamed the Ministry The Hanban was tutes. rooms,” with the Office of Management with and rooms,” nese Language Partner Network.” nese Language Partner - of the Confucius Insti reorganized its oversight restructure the program. restructure and negative increased international scrutiny the closing responses to the program, including lishing Requirement for Student and Exchange and Exchange for Student lishing Requirement Confucius Institutes in the United States that have in the United States that have Confucius Institutes Cooperation, and a separate spinoff organization, Cooperation, and a separate spinoff Budget. - rule, “Estab filed a proposed Security Homeland Emory that are scheduled to close this year. The Emory that are scheduled to close this year. at NAS also identified “44 Confucius Institutes Education Center for Language and Exchange - including insti in the United States,” Institutes Institutes.” Visitor Program Certified Schools to Disclose Schools to Disclose Certified Visitor Program Agreements with Confucius Institutes and Class- and Confucius Institutes Agreements with American colleges and universities,” “one Confu- American colleges and universities,” “[m]ore than 100 Confucius Institutes serving K-12 serving K-12 “[m]ore than 100 Confucius Institutes  “[n]early 70 percent of colleges receivingChinese- “[n]early 70percentofcolleges American side.For example,accordingtoRachelle Investigations] reportfound—contrafederallaw.” Institute activities, theirfinancialandoperational Chinese Students and Peterson oftheNationalAssociationScholars, But whileCSSAsmay provide usefulservicesfor United Statesinpromoting, allowing, orgoverning U.S. civil society. Thisincludesdemandinggreater 98 Confucius Institute money. with Chinese government activitiesthatengage Chinese students overseas, anditsactivitiesare CSSAs wereestablished inthe1970stosupport Chinese StudentsandScholarsAssociation(CSSA) Chinese citizensabroad. Scholars Associations never reportedthosedonationstotheDepartment impact. Part isonthe ofthislacktransparency relationships withother institutions, andtheir need abetter understanding oftheseorganizations’ ment. Infact,theChinesegovernment supports ing increasinglydependentonfundingdirectedby transparency fromtheAmericanrecipients of transparency that they are also tools for espionage andhelpto that theyarealsotoolsfor espionage tries, fromfindinghousingandroommatesto to lifeandacademicactivitiesinforeigncoun- the Chinesegovernment. Security Review Commissioncitesawebsite that and oversees CSSAactivitiesworldwide. of Education,the[Permanent Subcommittee on government fundingforConfuciusInstitutes educational programs. government doesnot practicereciprocitywiththe overseen by theCCP’s UnitedFront Work Depart- events onAmericanuniversity campuses. The of U.S. researchandeducationinstitutions becom- sionally mandatedU.S.–China Economicand strengthen theparty’s controlof theactivitiesof students, theirtiestotheCCPhave ledtoconcerns studying andgroup andcommunityactivities. parency withrespecttothescopeofConfucius parency functions inordertoassessrisksandaddressother A 2018 reportpreparedby staff ofthecongres- There isnoquestion thatthereisalackoftrans- The Chinesegovernment sponsorsandfunds There also are concerns about the consequences U.S. andeducationalinstitutions policymakers CSSAs provide servicestohelpstudents adjust 38 Moreover, theChinese China Transparency Report 39 Foreign Policy article. In particular, thereisalackofauthoritative open- Gifts, Contracts, andPartnerships Economic andSecurityReviewCommissionstaff Many oftheseconcernswerearticulatedina2018 Party. Themost significantconcernwithCSSA with U.S. Universities websites—the onestypicallyreviewedby univer with” theChinesegovernment, others describe variety ofChineseentitiesand individualsources lists “142 individualU.S. CSSAchapters.” report notes that “CSSAs oftenattempt toconceal intimidation andadvocacy, andother illicit,illegal, report assertsthatCSSAchapters appeartobe rity operative spiedonCaliforniapoliticianswhile revealed thatasuspectedMinistry ofStateSecu- into theregime’s strategy tostrengthen state party themselves as“independent.” Ontheirface,these try ofStateSecurity—China’s maincivilianspy the connectionbetween CSSAsandtheMinis- and ChineseconsulatesintheU.S. Thereportalso agency. AnAxiosinvestigative report,forexample, among criticsinassessingCSSAactivities. While analysis ofCSSAoperationsintheUnitedStates. activities isthattheyhave beenfullyintegrated as Christine Fang, usedpoliticalgatheringsand or obscuretheirtiestotheChinesegovernment, claims aredifficulttoevaluate.The U.S.–China or inappropriateactivities. other political countriesthatincludeespionage, directly subordinateto, inadditiontoreceiving control oftheactivitiesChinesecitizensabroad. campus events totargetelectedofficials. sity administrators.” ported by,” “recognizedby,” or“closelyconnected some associationsareself-describedas“sup- source informationdetailing therelationship provides examplesofactivitiesintheU.S. and political directionfrom,theChineseEmbassy sity East Bay’s CSSAchapter. Fang, alsoknown serving aspresidentofCaliforniaStateUniver from the English-language versions oftheir from theEnglish-language frequently omitting incriminatinglanguage between theCSSAandChineseCommunist There have beenseveral casespointingto Transparency hasbeenachroniccomplaint Transparency There isalackofsystematic open-source U.S. universities enterintocontractswitha 43 41 42 40 The - -  99 The council also funds 50 49 51 Chen, accused of failing to disclose financial There are no systematic open-source data There are no systematic - The major concern is that the Chinese govern - universi U.S. influence on This area of Chinese nonprofit The China Scholarship Council is a While there currently are no direct cases of As of July 2020, Georgetown University’s University’s Georgetown 2020, As of July 52 plexity of the task. primary sources.” such manipulation, the January 2021 arrest of MIT 2021 arrest such manipulation, the January professor Gang Chen does point to this possibili- ommended students for scholarship awards. This for scholarship awards. ommended students implicate the council, but it necessarily does not that there are grounds for concern. does show dents. The council can serve as an avenue for the for as an avenue council can serve The dents. dents in the United States. difficult to assess whether adequate means for the adequate whether difficult to assess available. ence are currently of organization within the Chinese Ministry engagements concerns raised with respect to other of the Chinese government. ers. The CSET study describes the characteristics describes the characteristics study The CSET ers. Chinese by grams beyond what is explicitly stated and Chinese government entities, including entities, government and Chinese advisor to the China Scholarship Council and rec- assessing the risks and concerns raised. - stu abroad for Chinese graduate and postgraduate activities is among the least understood. It is also understood. the least activities is among and features of the council’s programs but “does and features of the council’s the relationship between Chinese universities Chinese universities between the relationship An clear. always is not military, the Chinese but acknowledges the com- these relationships ties and affiliation with Chinese entities, was an ties and affiliation with Chinese entities, the largest program administering scholarships the largest program administering ties and the potential risks associated with these risks associated with ties and the potential ty. mitigation of direct and indirect malicious influ- mitigation of direct ment could manipulate these programs to exert illicit, and students for malicious, influence on with anecdotal This is consistent illegal purposes. not attempt to assess the intent of these pro- to assess the intent attempt not - stu and 65,000” supporting “betweenwas 26,000 Chinese government to exert influence. to exert Chinese government Center for Security and Emerging Technology Chinese scholars, professors, and other research- and other professors, Chinese scholars, Education that funds academic exchanges and is and Education that funds academic exchanges (CSET) estimated that the government of China that the government estimated (CSET) Australian-based data tracker attempts to list to list attempts tracker data Australian-based The China Scholarship Council The - - 47 This does not This does not Although the The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The 45 46 Another concern Another 48 China was the third largest the third China was 44 Chinese companies play a prominent role in a prominent play Chinese companies Chinese companies have also sought to pur Chinese companies have The Washington, DC-based Woodrow Wilson DC-based Woodrow The Washington, The U.S. Department of State maintains the Department of State The U.S. The most significant concern raised is that The most by the Chinese government and the CCP have not not and the CCP have the Chinese government by analyzed. been systematically billion per year in tuition paid by Chinese students. Chinese students. billion per year in tuition paid by funding and gifts to U.S. universities. It is troubling universities. funding and gifts to U.S. publicly disclosed funds from China amounted publicly disclosed - assessing Chinese influences on universi study chase campuses and other educational properties. educational properties. chase campuses and other cerns are warranted, even if they are sometimes if they are sometimes even cerns are warranted, for mischar and fraught with potential overblown company eventually backed out of the purchase, backed eventually company collected by the U.S. Department of Education, Department U.S. the by collected of Education has found significant underreporting of foreign gifts and contracts. gifts or contracts from 2014 to 2019. gifts or contracts from 2014 contributor during this period, behind Qatar and contributor during universities. with U.S. example, has contracted and operations or how these funds are directed and operations or how acterization, or worse, racial profiling.” - with Chinese compa include contracts activities at least nine U.S. colleges that and universities nine U.S. at least Steel Structure Company attempted to purchase a to purchase attempted Steel Structure Company than 100 professors, concluded “that these con- than 100 professors, ties. The study, which was based on approximately based on approximately which was The study, ties. that how this spending affects university activities this spending affects university that how the arrangement raises concerns about the impact that such purchases could have. to almost $1 billion in gifts and contracts dis- $1 billion in gifts and to almost tributed to 115 colleges a half years in six and 2020. through June to foster collaborative partnerships. Some of these partnerships. collaborative to foster these funds are in addition to the estimated $12 these funds are in addition to the estimated the United Kingdom. for telecom Huawei, The Chinese these activities. nonprofit American music college. most comprehensive available data on Chinese available comprehensive most nies. According analysis of data to a Bloomberg nies. received more than $10.5 million from Huawei as million from Huawei more than $10.5 received is that it might be difficult to assess risks because include funds that go unreported. Data from the U.S. Department of Education list of Education list Department Data from the U.S. 180 interviews that included interviews with more In 2018, for example, the Jiangsu Zhongtai Bridge example, the Jiangsu for In 2018, International Center for Scholars sponsored a Added to this is the fact that the U.S. Department Added to this is the fact that the U.S.  This assessmentconcludesthattherearesignifi- Conclusion U.S. universities andresearchinstitutions. The 100 level of transparency ofChinesegovernmentlevel and oftransparency government-directed activitiesisextremely low. cant gaps inopen-sourceliteraturemake it difficult programs involving with Chineseengagement This survey hasassessedthemajorpublic China Transparency Report increasingly tensecompetition between theU.S. rity andprosperityofallAmericans, andgiven the mitigation measures. Given theimportanceofU.S. university andresearchinstitutions tothesecu- to evaluaterisksandassesstheeffectiveness of and China,itisvitallyimportantthatthisknowl- edge gapbeclosed. edge  101 4 3 external environment. external domestic social, political, and economic audi- domestic they of being fixed, instead Moreover, ences. argue, China’s policy priorities change over argue, China’s time in response to domestic politics and time in response to domestic instead of being a “unitary actor”instead as commonly China is composed of multiple misperceived, Interesting foreseeable trends, however, do however, foreseeable trends, Interesting This commentary does not seek to rehash the This commentary does not Altogether, these materials promote better better these materials promote Altogether, be the future of China’s fishery focus, and how will and how fishery focus, be the future of China’s batant are blurred. scrutiny of Beijing’s maritime activities, not least least not activities, of Beijing’s maritime scrutiny - literature, which is easily accessed. More existing of Chinese-language there is a rich trove over, that affect the role of its maritime militia? Equally that affect the role of its maritime militia? the use of coercion against rivals in such disputes. rivals in such disputes. the use of coercion against tia—for instance the People’s Liberation Army–run Liberation Army–run the People’s tia—for instance helps navies that grapple with how best to cope best that grapple with how helps navies raise questions regarding the future trajectory of raise questions materials that deal with China’s maritime mili- maritime materials that deal with China’s Militia. magazines National Defense and China’s responses to gray zone activities. In particular, it In particular, zone activities. responses to gray with adversarial techniques short of war, especially techniques short of war, with adversarial a fisherman and a com- when the lines between China’s gray zone activities. In particular, what will what In particular, zone activities. gray China’s This allows concerned policymakers to craft better concerned policymakers to craft better This allows COLLIN KOH COLLIN The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The 2 in the maritime domain. 1 in the “New Situation”: A Primer Situation”: in the “New The Future of China’s Maritime Militia of China’s Future The zone” techniques uch has been written about Beijing’s “gray “gray about Beijing’s uch has been written pillars of China’s military doctrine, has evolved military doctrine, has evolved pillars of China’s guerrilla warfare to the logistics and transporta- to the logistics guerrilla warfare Shuxian Luo and Jonathan G. Panter argue that G. Panter Shuxian Luo and Jonathan through time from the traditional “people’s war” through time from the traditional “people’s war” under modern conditions to to “people’s war” century, in the 21st the current “people’s the focal role of the militia has shifted from forces. tion for conventional war” long considered one of the key concept, Hongzhou Zhang argues that as the “people’s Zhang argues that as the “people’s Hongzhou In their analysis of China’s maritime militia, In their analysis of China’s The cottage industry of articles examining industry The cottage

l l focused on China’s maritime law enforcement maritime law focused on China’s shed light on China’s maritime militia, hitherto shed light on China’s works Notable shrouded in public obscurity. porary understanding of Beijing’s strategies short of Beijing’s strategies porary understanding expanded to include more nuanced perspec- of war in such regional maritime flashpoints as the in such regional maritime flashpoints of war agencies by other scholars like Lyle Morris and Lyle Morris scholars like agencies other by tives. For instance: For tives. China’s gray zone maritime activities has gradually gray China’s Ryan Martinson have also broadened our contem- Ryan Martinson have East and South China Seas. East Andrew Erickson’s scholarly enterprise has Andrew Erickson’s M  Transforming China’s Fisheries China FisheryProduction CHART 1 MILLIONS OFTONS OFFISH Ocean University , Vol. 30, No. 2(March 2021). Forecast inthe14thFive-Year Plan,” pp. 339–347, Journalof Shanghai Industry in the Past 40Years ofReform andOpeningUp, Production SOURCE: LuQuanandChenXinjun, “Development ofChineseFishery 102        fisheries (marinecapture) important, isthisfutureunderminedby therapid marine economy andcontributetoBeijing’squest immensely tothecountry’s total fisheryproduc- near seas—theEast andSouthChinaSeas, Yellow tion ofanewCoast GuardLaw? to becomeamaritimegreatpower. Traditional tion. However, thesefishinggroundshave been tion in1985, marine capture constituted about 4.2 Sea, andBohaiGulf—fordecades, contributing and by recentdevelopments suchasthepromulga- are nearthebrinkofpotential futurecollapse. expansion ofthePLANavy andChinaCoast Guard suffering inrecentyearsfrom overexploitation and farming Freshwater Fisheries constitute amajorfacet ofChina’s Of the7.05 milliontonsoftotal fisheryproduc -  0.71 Mariculture 2.95  5 have focusedon China’s capture Marine 4.42  

A heritage.org capture Freshwater China Transparency Report 6.45   July 12,2016, Arbitration handeddown itsarbitration award on (2011–2015), whichpromulgatedseveral new 12.55 milliontonsoftotal production. By 2005, fisheryproductionhadballoonedto44.2 Five-Year Plan(2016–2020) focusedonimple- By 2025, underthe new14th Five-Year Plan, China’s total fisheryproduction isprojectedto fisheries industry andadministration, theMinistry fishery policies. Inits2020workreportonthe fishery policies. million tons, withmarinecapture accountingfor industries, buildingonthe12thFive-Year Plan menting structural reformsandpromoting the rights-based fisheriesmanagement. million tons. Inthecourseofafulldecade,fishery near seas, causedby overfishing andmarine refurbished over 16,000 existing vessels tomeet near-seas fishingfleet bymorethan 45,000 ves- key challenges facedbykey challenges China’s fisheries, chiefly transformation andupgradingofthefisheries the depletion ofcoastal fisheryresourcesinthe the 13thFive-Year Planperiod,ithadreducedthe tally harmfulfishing. to theirlawsoradopting newmethods andstricter Sea, whereoverexploitation offish stocks has a seriesofreformactionshave beentaken to aging pooloffishermen. and mostly antiquatedfishingfleet manned byan aquaculture andmariculture,aswellthedevel- growth toimprovements inqualityandefficiency, environmental pollution,andanexcessively large capture accountingfor11.4 milliontonsofthetotal. overfishing topromote sustainable development. opment ofdistant fishingoperationsasoneofthe of AgricultureandRuralAffairs stated thatwithin eight provincial laws afterthePermanent Courtof enforcement mechanismstoprevent environmen- of “marineenvironment” established intheaward strategic emergingindustries, andcontrolson shift toward greatergovernment investments in push theinstitutional tobetter change defined production roseto29.53 milliontons, withmarine sels—not just thetargeted20,000 vessels—and better safety andenvironmental requirements. been aconcern,theHainanauthoritiesrevised With aneyetoshiftingfromquantitative Beijing hadlatelyclaimedsomesuccessforits Chinese scholarshiprecognizessomeofthe 10 eitheraddingthenewcomponents 9 WithrespecttotheSouthChina 11 6 Therehasbeenagradual 8 The13th 12

7  103 19 - The Hainan 20 21 23 18 Recent publications by senior Recent publications by 22 It is clear that, as Beijing continues to build up In line with fishery industry reforms and In line with fishery industry These advocacies build on calls made in recentThese advocacies There have long been calls to revamp the mari- long been calls to revamp the There have fare, anti-submarine, deception, and small-scale and small-scale deception, fare, anti-submarine, provincial government’s 2021 work report also government’s provincial the deepening of civil–military fusion in a stressed sovereignty at sea by improving their technical improving at sea by sovereignty education; and elevating realistic sovereignty sibilities. However, there are longer-term concerns there are longer-term However, sibilities. such missions as reconnaissance, mine war as reconnaissance, such missions capabilities; raising their awareness; enhancing capabilities; raising their awareness; combat training and joint training with the PLA other livelihood opportunities that might prevent prevent opportunities that might livelihood other ditional fisheries activities are in their 40s–60s. ditional fisheries activities are in their combat operations. and control, fishing and fishery production, and about the aging manpower pool, since most pool, since most about the aging manpower at the PLA Army Command College, Command maritime Army at the PLA to improve prospects for joint operations, coordina- prospects for joint operations, to improve tion, command, and control and prepare them for the maritime militia’s ability to safeguard national ability to safeguard the maritime militia’s territorialtheir quality through more intensive transformation, the maritime militia is expected transformation, the maritime militia pace as to undergo to keep parallel evolution a in involved using militia members the main body, time militia fleet capable of both fishing and fighting capable of both time militia fleet command protection, that integrates sovereignty time militia for various reasons, such as long-term reasons, time militia for various them from fulfilling their maritime militia respon- them from fulfilling their maritime under “informatized conditions,” undertaking undertaking conditions,” under “informatized its blue-water naval capabilities and commission naval its blue-water reflected in the push to constitute a new type of reflected in the push to constitute “using fishing militia as maritime militia system as backbone.” maritime industries manning challenges. There are full-time maritime There are manning challenges. partly alleviate the problem of militia units that during fishery especially availability, manpower to seek when fishermen have moratorium periods nod to the maritime militia’s role. nod to the maritime militia’s militia still has a useful role in modern warfare warfare a useful role in modern has militia still logistical support. logistical Chinese citizens engaged in coastal provinces’ tra- provinces’ Chinese citizens engaged in coastal years by senior PLA officials for a new type of mari- years by Navy and other maritime law enforcement agencies maritime law and other Navy PLA servicemembers stress the need to strengthen PLA servicemembers stress Conclusion “military struggle at sea.” “military struggle

14 16 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The 13 17 Fishing, an economic activity, has political has political activity, Fishing, an economic 15 Even if there could be a gradual reduction of Even - about the long-term sustain Despite concerns Publicly available Chinese literature and official Publicly available With near-seas Chinese fishery activities—a With near-seas being present in disputed space and showing the showing being present in disputed space and from marine capture. from marine publications in recent years have pointed toward a pointed toward publications in recent years have processes, it is clear that Beijing would still have have it is clear that Beijing would still processes, do so. disputed Spratly waters is based on the belief that is based disputed Spratly waters campaign to safeguard its maritime sovereignty its maritime sovereignty campaign to safeguard and of uniformed services such as the PLA Navy shrinking, future role for the mari- not growing, even under current transformation and reform even environmental conditions for mariculture, and environmental cally contentious areas. So far, Mischief Reef, Subi So far, cally contentious areas. and that it is in China’s national interest that they national interest and that it is in China’s and demonstrate Chinese ownership. and demonstrate ability of the fisheries stock in China’s near seas, near seas, stock in China’s ability of the fisheries and rights, notwithstanding the rapid buildup notwithstanding and rights, the South China Sea in particular is seen to possess the South China Sea fishery development. for its potential the greatest tons of freshwater farmed products, 23.64 million million 23.64 farmed products, tons of freshwater million tons 10.04 just mariculture, and tons from time militia. According to Pan Jinkuan, a professor Jinkuan, time militia. According to Pan tial tests in Mischief Reef since 2007 with some tial tests has transformed into artificial island outposts, outposts, has transformed into artificial island been identified as possessing the basic have national flag, Chinese fishermen represent China national flag, Chinese fishermen reach 70.95 million tons, including 32.54 million 32.54 million including tons, million reach 70.95 immense stakes in contested maritime areas, not not maritime areas, in contested immense stakes mixture of wild catch or mariculture—persisting of wild catch or mariculture—persisting mixture notable successes. notable ranching or mariculture in the near seas merely ranching or mariculture in the near by methods represents a transformation of the Reinvigorating for Relevance for Reinvigorating least the South China Sea. The maritime militia least fishery activities would not be irrelevant. Marine fishery activities would not value. As Ryan Martinson has pointed out, just by by out, just value. As Ryan Martinson has pointed wild catch fishing in the South China Sea, China’s Sea, China’s wild catch fishing in the South China will continue to be an important part of China’s will continue to be an important part of China’s which fishery resources in the area are harvested. are harvested. which fishery resources in the area Chinese fishermen have a right to operate there a right to operate have Chinese fishermen China Coast Guard. China Coast Chinese authorities have been conducting ini- Chinese authorities have Beijing’s policyBeijing’s fishery operations in the governing Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef, all of which Beijing Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef, all of which These activities would still take place in politi- take These activities would still  Philippine authoritiestobemannedby maritime 104 within thePhilippineexclusive economiczone, waters. Themost recentinstance, believed by militia off Julian Felipe Reef (Whitsun Reef) well militia off Julian (Whitsun Reef) Felipe Reef militia continuestoroamthenear-seas disputed new classesofCoast Guardvessels, themaritime China Transparency Report fishery reformsandtransformation,themari- the contested waters. tools initseffortstoexpanddominationof time militiawillremainoneofBeijing’sprimary serves asareminderthatnotwithstanding China’s  105 and its 3 Beijing’s Made in China 2 China exploits this attention deficit. Beijing China exploits this attention state tools to promote Chinese construction of Chinese construction tools to promote state state-backed champion Huawei Marine Networks Marine Networks champion Huawei state-backed - has paid much justi leverage.coercive Washington clearly considers undersea cables central to its One Belt, One Road China’s global economy. and ZTE) or trusted non-Chinese vendors (such as non-Chinese vendors or trusted and ZTE) ambitions to capture the commanding heights (or ambitions to capture to build fifth-generation (5G) wireless networks to build fifth-generation (5G) wireless networks telecom networks, stopping at the water’s edge. Far edge. Far at the water’s stopping telecom networks, though even undersea cable networks, to develop economic and national security they pose the same undersea cables globally. has been selective, confined largely has been selective, to terrestrial market for fiber-optic communications, for fiber-optic market intelligence and collection, commercial influence, risks as terrestrial networks. risks as terrestrial of the future in this case, commanding depths) includes a Digital Silk Road strategy infrastructure and other diplomacy, that uses subsidies, initiative into the top tier of global undersea cable vendors. less attention has been paid to the competition has been paid to the competition less attention fied attention to whether other countries choose to whether fied attention with untrusted Chinese vendors (such as Huawei (such as Huawei Chinese vendors with untrusted China’s ambitions to build and exploit it for global China’s Nokia, Ericsson, and Samsung). But this attention 2025 plan seeks to capture 60 percent of the global 2025 plan seeks to capture (recently rebranded HMN Tech) is bidding to break (recently rebranded HMN Tech) That is 1 DAVID FEITH AND LARA D. CROUCH FEITH AND LARA D. DAVID The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The Commanding Depths: China’s Bid to Bid to China’s Depths: Commanding Dominate the Cloud—Under the Sea the Cloud—Under Dominate Undersea cables are a particularly acute exam- Most people have never seen a photograph of seen a photograph never people have Most The United States and its allies have in recent The United States and its allies have A challenging reality of the Internet age is that A challenging reality of the Internet ple of this challenge. systems that are invisible or, at best, obscured from best, at or, that are invisible systems site. Images in space loom large of satellites in the public imagination, but undersea cables are typi- flows. data now percent of global internet government and military communications. government communications infrastructure—cell towers, data towers, communications infrastructure—cell cloud—that we seldom see, and even the centers, cally out of sight and out of mind. Yet it is through cally out of sight and out of mind. Yet along with personal messages, video chats, busi- video chats, along with personal messages, an undersea cable, let alone encountered one on an undersea cable, let trillions of dollars daily in financial transactions, trillions of dollars daily in financial transactions, by prompted telecommunications infrastructure, the ocean floor or at some obscure coastal landing the ocean floor or at some obscure coastal human life depends so heavily on technologies and on technologies human life depends so heavily undersea cables, not satellites, that more than 95 satellites, not undersea cables, ness records, scientific information, and almost all scientific information, and almost ness records, more seldom understand. national security, Americans and others rely on Americans and others national security, through tele- transmitted data packets invisible view. It is hard to understand what we cannot see. what we cannot It is hard to understand view. years recognized the strategic importance of years recognized the strategic Yet to talk to family, conduct business, and protect protect and conduct business, talk to family, to Yet America’s Undersea Blind Spot America’s  “Although underseacablelaying isabusiness, itcan First, theU.S. government haspaidsignificantly U.S. officialshadfocusedmostly onprotecting 106 Strategic Transparency world thatisnot online—will requiremany more invade divert dataflows; privacy; harvest commer in thisportionofthetelecommunicationscom- recognized concerns. natural disasters (earthquakes andtsunamis) and notice thatChina’s underseacablemoves poseda ing theInternet totheroughly40percent ofthe undersea cablenetworks sinceearly2020. Second, undersea cables, andfurtherincrease U.S. and two decadesinterrestrial 5Ghardware. Thetrick those thattheUnitedStatesforfeitedover thepast the UnitedStatesanditsalliesretain significant tion canbeobtained.” to cutthemortapthem.Other concernsincluded to QueenVictoria,in1858).Butrecentdecades ter them.Future plansforautomatedvehicles, achievable throughmodest sharpeningofstrategy, also bedescribedasabattlefield whereinforma- accidents (suchascollisions withfishingtrawl- a moretransparentunderstanding ofundersea advanced robotics, and5Gnetworks—plus bring- allied relianceonthisoverlooked technology. commercial advantages inunderseacables,commercial advantages unlike greater attention tothestrategic importanceof otherwise make mischief.AsoneChineseindustry data; install subseasurveillance equipment;or cut offcommunicationsinacrisis;manipulate cially andstrategically significantbig-datapools; competition fromarivalstate was not amongthe ers orcontainerships).Mercantilist commercial cables fromadversary militaries, whichmighttry on underseacables(PresidentJames Buchanan TheU.S.challenge. government haslongworked cables, China’s ambitions, andhow tocoun- state sponsors—opportunitiestosteal information; sensitive workthatcangive companies—andtheir sent America’s first transatlantic cablemessage, policy, anddiplomacy. petition istomaintainthatlead,whichshouldbe publication describedinespeciallycandidterms, There is good news onatleast news twofronts: There isgood It isvital,therefore,thatU.S. gain policymakers Until early2020, Washington was slow even to Constructing andoperatingunderseacablesis 4 China Transparency Report - Alcatel SubmarineNetworks, and(3)Japanese Administration, wheninterestAdministration, inunderseacables Indeed therewas nomentionatallofwhobuilds 200-some cablescriss-crossingasmallnumber 2015 that“Russiansubmarinesandspy shipsare Malacca, andtheLuzonStrait. Policy Exchange similarlyfocusedontheRussian Russia. TheNewYork TimesreportedinOctober China. Across manyChina. Across market sectorsandtechnology was nomentionofBeijing’s world-spanningplans firm NEC. Suchprivatecompetition amongfirms fields—and fordecades—the West overestimated ness ofaglobalInternet thatreliesonasfew precarious- military threat,alongwiththegeneral intensely ontheRussianmilitarythreattounder its strengths while underestimating China’s. nist Party (CCP)intoglobaldigitalinfrastructure. retired U.S. James Admiral Stavridis, offeredmany might beplanningtoattack thoselinesintimes officialsthattheRussians military andintelligence nications, raisingconcernsamongsomeAmerican the EnglishChannel,Suez Canal,the Straitof to buildcablesandinsinuatetheChineseCommu- thoughtful insights, butitcitedChinaonlyonce,as Submarine Systems), (2)French–Finnish firm Subcom (onceknown asTESubcomand AT&T tic ofthedemocraticWest’s formerapproachto threat ofChina’s commercialunderseacable the world’s cables, oroftherisktheirbeingbuilt a possiblemilitarythreat,alongsideIran.There aggressively operatingnearthevitalundersea ambitions reflected a complacency characteris- ambitions reflectedacomplacency of well-known chokepoints, geographic suchas came todominatetheglobal market: (1)U.S. firm cables becauseChinawas historically outofthe of theExchequer) RishiSunak,withaforewordby of tensionorconflict.” cables thatcarryalmost allglobalInternet commu- commercial competition fromChina. spiked inthecontext ofmilitarytensionswith sea cables—butnot onthethreatofstate-backed picture, whilethreefirmsfromdemocraticnations from friendly, rule-of-law countries ishighly by Britishparliamentarian(andnow Chancellor by competitors oradversaries. A 2017 reportfromtheBritishthinktank This dynamicwas seeninthelateObama The U.S. andalliedfailuretorecognizethe It was especiallyeasy todothisinundersea 5 Americanofficialsfocused 7 Thereport,written 6 -  107 Like Like 13 11 12 PEACE is set to connect to a companion to connect to a companion PEACE is set 10 Chinese state telecom giants China Mobile, telecom giants China Mobile, Chinese state Huawei Marine also benefits from branding Huawei Huawei Marine’s new parent, Hengtong Group, Group, new parent, Hengtong Marine’s Huawei Yet there are limits to how much China can how there are limits to Yet been rebranded as “HMN Tech” in late 2020. That in late 2020. been rebranded as “HMN Tech” business from the ostensibly private commercial business from the ostensibly espe- long-haul cables, of the world’s build many backers have signaled plans to extend the undersea the plans to extend signaled have backers for lack of experience in building advanced long- for lack of experience in building advanced Technologies its spin-off from Huawei followed sanctions and diplomatic pressure about its status and diplomatic pressure about its status sanctions policy interests, making it harder for these cables policy interests, portion of the project via further connections into portion of the project project power beyond China toward Europe and Europe beyond China toward project power sleight of hand. Indeed, the company no longer sleight of hand. Indeed, the company sell bandwidth to certain would-be buyers. So Bei- buyers. sell bandwidth to certain would-be of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (NATO) Treaty Organization Atlantic of the North encouraging more flexible standards and insisting standards and insisting encouraging more flexible consortiums of international telecom firms that consortiums of international telecom and Africa. cially those that run across Eurasia overland cable from Pakistan to China, and its to China, Pakistan cable from overland global market share for these products. global market awarding construction contracts. And whereas contracts. construction awarding as a proxy for the CCP. as a proxy and Western Europe, and in partnership with in partnership with Europe, and and Western are not state-backed. are not accomplish with purely state-financed projects, projects, accomplish with purely state-financed Southeast and Northeast Asia. and Northeast Southeast that Huawei Marine be invited to compete. Once to compete. Marine be invited that Huawei which rivals, prices than its Western tially lower having Marine,” “Huawei technically goes by to earn landing rights in certain countries and to to earn landing rights in certain countries haul cables, China’s telecom companies have begun begun companies have telecom China’s haul cables, investors in many such consortiums, giving these such consortiums, in many investors - Marine can offer substan in the mix, Huawei became subject to U.S. soon after Huawei in 2019, is China’s largest optical fiber and power cable cable fiber and power largest optical is China’s manufacturer and claims to hold a 15 percent least some stigma of advancing Chinese foreign some stigma least jing increasingly wants to help Huawei Marine get to help Huawei jing increasingly wants which are more expensive for Beijing and carry at for Beijing and carry which are more expensive China Telecom, and China Unicom are significant and China Unicom China Telecom, Beijing-owned firms significant voting power in power voting firms significant Beijing-owned from these bids long excluded Marine was Huawei Europe (PEACE)” cable from Pakistan to East East to Pakistan cable from Europe (PEACE)” giant Orange. telecom As Orange executive French Africa and onward to France—landing in the heart to France—landing onward Africa and Africa.” Jean-Luc Vuillemin explained, “This is a plan to explained, “This Vuillemin Jean-Luc - The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The 8 Beijing financed a more significant long- 9 Huawei Marine’s ultimate purpose was not not ultimate purpose was Marine’s Huawei Huawei Marine Networks was formed in 2008 was Marine Networks Huawei In its earlier years, Huawei Marine focused Huawei In its earlier years, Thus Beijing financed Huawei Marine’s first first Marine’s Thus Beijing financed Huawei below 10 percent, according to industry estimates, estimates, 10 percent, according to industry below its tech- to develop the company but it allowed footprint, especially in Southeast Asia, Africa, the especially in Southeast footprint, percent, and used the tie-up to elevate its under percent, and used the tie-up to elevate equipment on installing from mostly sea strategy, simply to rack up short-haul contracts, however, but however, simply to rack up short-haul contracts, cally more than 4,000 kilometers in length). This kilometers cally more than 4,000 around the world. In companies and governments cable in New York for finance industry clients for finance industry cable in New York cables built globally. cables built by others, to winning contracts to build others, cables built by Marine had a global Soon Huawei cables of its own. desirable. Yet, it also seems to have caused poli- have it also seems to Yet, desirable. if unconsciously—that cymakers to assume—even ambitions of a and that the a given, is construction ern players in this strategically critical industry. in this strategically ern players - Tech Huawei China’s between as a joint venture unable to compete with Subcom, Alcatel, and unable to compete this free-world dominance in undersea cable in undersea dominance this free-world - displace the dominant West to rival and eventually completed tic from Cameroon to Brazil, which was kept Huawei Marine’s commercial market share commercial market Marine’s Huawei kept - Tech cable in 1850). Huawei undersea telegraph nology and establish relationships with telecom nology and establish mostly on “short-haul” cables that were modest on “short-haul” cables that were modest mostly as it was in technical and commercial terms, in the five years to 2020, nearly 25 percent of all years to 2020, in the five haul contract in 2017, for Huawei Marine to build for Huawei haul contract in 2017, nologies was the controlling shareholder, with 51 the controlling shareholder, nologies was not warrant concern. This was a mistake. This was concern. warrant not in 2018. lion contract in 2011 to land the “Project Express” lion contract in 2011 nologies and Britain’s Global Marine Systems Systems Global Marine nologies and Britain’s its flagship “Pakistan and East Africa Connecting and East its flagship “Pakistan Know Thy Competitor Thy Know long-haul contract in 2015, to build the “South to build the “South long-haul contract in 2015, Chinese upstart like Huawei Marine Networks do Marine Networks Huawei like Chinese upstart Huawei Marine was on pace to complete 28 cables on pace to complete Marine was Huawei NEC for long-haul, higher-value projects (typi- NEC for long-haul, higher-value Middle East, and Europe. It even won a $250 mil- and Europe. It even Middle East, 2019, research firm TeleGeography assessed that TeleGeography research firm 2019, (more on this later). (successor to the British firm that laid the first British firm that laid the first (successor to the - Inter Link (SAIL)” cable across the Atlan Atlantic  (PLA) veteran andNationalPeople’s Congress This iswhy Beijing’s ambitionsintheinternational The PLA,whichfirstproduced laidindigenously Internet serviceprovider 21vianet, amajorpartner Hong Kong-based telecomservicesfirmLightHash, Huawei, Hengtong isclosetotheChinesegovern- University ofEngineeringtoformanUnder 108 China’s advancedtechnologyecosystem, inwhich Chinese-language websitetrumpetsChinese-language thecompany’s way ofdoingbusinessunderminesfaiththat which willoperatethePEACEcableandmanage water Optical Network Joint Laboratory. last year, Fiberhome isalsoontheU.S. export-con- market alone.Another Chineseplayer being ment. ItsfounderisaPeople’s LiberationArmy its dataflows. LightHashadvertises linkstocable modernization of our country’s nationaldefense.” undersea cablemarket posesuchseriousrisksto undersea networks, suchasthoseconnectingtoits undersea cablesin2002,hassignificantinterest in trol EntityList forlinkstotheCCP’s surveillance tegic endsandtomaximizeglobalmarket share. the CCPpushescompaniesboth toserve itsstra - and repressionofUyghurMuslimsinXinjiang. and is affiliated with NASDAQ-listed Chinese and isaffiliatedwithNASDAQ-listed of cableproductsales aroundtheworld. groomed by BeijingisFiberHome, whichboasts dor. cable solutionstomajorlocaloperatorsinEcua- cables toDeutscheTelekom inGermany andsold company hassupplied30,000 kilometers ofoptical desire tosurveil, steal, andcoerce. of U.S. firmsoperatinginChina. of trust, transparency, andruleoflaw. Beijing’s aresignificantlyamatterdata integrityandprivacy other countries. Intelecommunicationssystems, connections tointernationalmarkets istypicalof ownership, deepconnectionstothestate, and deep deputy, andin2016, itworked withthePLANaval commitment to“offerpowerful supportforthe state-backed butnot allowed todominateits stay independentofBeijing’s widelydemonstrated systems builtandoperatedby Chinesefirmscan projects worldwide,includingintheUnitedStates, be inthreeyears,” oneindustry sourcesays. bases intheSouthChinaSea. This webofrelatedfirmswithnominallyprivate Hengtong isalsoajoint-venture partnerof Consistent withChina’s style, Hengtong is 19 “What HMNTech “What istoday, FiberHome could 16 17 22 18 14 China Transparency Report The Its 20 - Asof 21 15

Transparency inU.S. Policy Marine cablefromconnectingtoSydneythe Huawei Marineisassociatedchieflywith Australia, Huawei MarinefromlandingcablesonU.S. shores, London. Huawei Marinefromimplementingitscontractto China Mobile, China Telecom, andChinaUnicom, Committee raisingsharpnational-securitycon- whether toallow cablestoconnect directlyfrom where thegovernment in2018 blocked aHuawei landing siteinOregon. land the“ProjectExpress”cableinNewYork from lenge athome andabroad. lenge in 2013, whenU.S. officialsreportedlyblocked input fromthe DepartmentsofJustice, Defense, implications oftelecomlicensing decisions, with might alsobethelast. munications Commission(FCC) gave alicense reckoning withtheChineseunderseacablechal- has never earnedanother contracttoconnecta that advisestheFCC onthenational-security the roleofTeam Telecom, group aninteragency the UnitedStatestoChina,regardlessofwho Solomon Islands. Australia’s move broughtwel- and builtby Subcom—becamethefourthcableto awakening tothreatsfromChina,butitfollowed a connect theUnitedStatesandChinadirectly. cable—owned by aconsortiumincludingMicrosoft, concerns, setting avisiblestandard forcountriesto come U.S. andglobalattention tounderseacable cable totheUnitedStates. cerns aboutHuawei. so publicly. Instead, positionofbanning the policy partial answer quietly emerged fromWashington sort ofcablestoallow toconnectU.S. shores. A policy considerablyinrecentyears.policy protect theirdomestic systems fromcompromise prescient 2012 reportfromtheHouse Intelligence for acabletoconnectdirectlyShanghaifrom builds them.Onthis, Washington hastightened by untrusted Beijing-backed vendors. but itisnot clearthatU.S. officials have ever said As recentlyasJanuary 2017, theFederal Com- A relatedbutseparateU.S. question policy is A first basicquestion of U.S. iswhat policy This suggests thatU.S. effectively bars policy In 2018, formalized theTrumpAdministration Hence theneedtoestablish better policiesfor 23 Thiswas beforeWashington’s general 24 Sincethen,Huawei Marine 25 This“NewCross-Pacific” 26 It  109 - ) 36 Such 34 Today, Today, 33 As policymakers recognize the 35 U.S. policy will also be strengthened to the policy will also be strengthened U.S. These various U.S. policy concerns are impor These various U.S. As with 5G and telecommunications issues Academic partnerships can also pose concerns. Academic can also pose concerns. partnerships be prudent to examine how advanced academic advanced academic how be prudent to examine familiar with the players in undersea cables. These in undersea cables. familiar with the players fund a growing share of new cable projects world- fund a growing programs manage export-control compliance and strategic significance of undersea cables, it would it would significance of undersea cables, strategic shell games undermine U.S. technology controls. U.S. shell games undermine semiconductors, advanced robotics, and the like, and the like, advanced robotics, semiconductors, more become government so too should the U.S. paired importance strategic so much enjoyed pany players in strategic areas such as the Indian Ocean in strategic players equipment and other fiber-optic technology. fiber-optic equipment and other - net and U.S. interests securing U.S. generally, conduits for illicit or otherwise unwelcome tech- unwelcome or otherwise conduits for illicit degree that U.S. officials are well connected to degree that U.S. - to these compa exports that U.S. due to concerns data-center operators, and cable developers, from and cable developers, data-center operators, Islands. or Pacific able to access U.S. exports because its new parent, its new parent, exports because U.S. able to access ally beneficial, but many others have proven to be to be proven have others many ally beneficial, but as the foundation for important diplomatic work. global challenge.and abuse is a necessarily the case in the past. Just as Washington has in as Washington Just the case in the past. Securing data flows from adversary compromise from adversary Securing data flows the tech giants that produce so much data and but also networks, domestic tant for securing U.S. however, it appears that Huawei Marine may be may Marine it appears that Huawei however, related risks. (Virginia Tech’s Center for Power Center for Power (Virginiarelated risks. Tech’s Huawei, rated with Chinese tech firms including nology transfers. relevant private-sector actors, which has not been which has not relevant private-sector actors, in engaging with recent years deepened its interest nies would harm U.S. national security. harm U.S. nies would important are producers of fiber-optic technology, technology, important are producers of fiber-optic works will depend in large part on coordination Marine and Huawei with allies and partners. would include not just Subcom (rarely has a com- Subcom (rarely just would include not and Alcatel. Also with so much obscurity), NEC, wide (Facebook, Google, Amazon) to smaller, local Google, Amazon) to smaller, wide (Facebook, ZTE, Powerland, and others on cable power-feed power-feed on cable and others Powerland, ZTE, U.S. and allied firms that specialize in 5G hardware, and allied firms that specialize in 5G hardware, U.S. Electronics Systems, for example, has long collabo- for example, Electronics Systems, Hengtong Group, is not on the Entity List. is not Group, Hengtong Many such partnerships are positive and mutu- are positive such partnerships Many Transparency in U.S. Diplomacy in U.S. Transparency

31 28 32 In June In June 27 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The Starks added 30 29 The FCC may soon go a step further and re- further soon go may a step The FCC As Washington adopts a more restrictive pos- a more restrictive adopts As Washington An additional policy question is whether the is whether An additional policy question both sides of the Pacific. both four existing submarine cables connecting the US four existing services. But China is not disconnecting from the disconnecting from is not But China services. support for U.S. policy from Congress, the private policy from Congress, support for U.S. and others. allies and partners, U.S. sector, entities in China cooperate with its intelligence examine existing cable links to China. As FCC cable links to China. As FCC examine existing control Entity List in August 2019, along with other along with other 2019, in August control Entity List directly connecting the United States and China. the United directly connecting organizing the executive branch around a shared organizing the executive global Internet, so which risks are acceptable? so which risks are acceptable? global Internet, other consortiums seeking to build U.S.-to-Hong consortiums seeking to build U.S.-to-Hong other and Homeland Security, among others. among Security, and Homeland and China, most of which are partially owned by by of which are partially owned and China, most affiliates of parent company Huawei Technologies, Technologies, Huawei affiliates of parent company ate” so long as U.S. communications are “secure.” communications ate” so long as U.S. touches China or Chinese firms, given Beijing’s given touches China or Chinese firms, ture, it should provide greater transparency into ture, it should provide to U.S. satisfaction given current law and policy current law given on satisfaction to U.S. tive technologies related to undersea cables. An technologies related to undersea cables. tive that U.S.–China cable connections are “appropri- cable connections that U.S.–China tion that the FCC block a landing license for a cable for a cable license landing block a that the FCC tion terminate instead in Taiwan and the Philippines. and the Philippines. in Taiwan terminate instead their applications from the FCC. understanding of the challenge and to securing understanding how the U.S. government defines a “secure” system. system. “secure” defines a government the U.S. how important starting point is Huawei Marine, which point is Huawei important starting necting Los Angeles to Hong Kong, forcing it to Kong, necting Los Angelesto Hong neither project using Huawei Marine) withdrew Marine) withdrew neither project using Huawei locations in adversary countries. This includes the This includes countries. locations in adversary firm Dr. Peng, and built by Subcom) from con- Peng, and built firm Dr. was added to the Commerce Department’s export- added to the Commerce Department’s was Chinese state-owned companies.” Chinese state-owned Commissioner Geoffrey Starks testified last year, year, last Commissioner Geoffrey Starks testified Clarifying this question will be crucial both to will be crucial both Clarifying this question United States is sufficiently protecting sensi- United States is sufficiently protecting But it is unclear how security can be established security can be established But it is unclear how Kong cables (including Facebook, Amazon, China Amazon, cables (including Facebook, Kong Unicom, with and China China Telecom, Mobile, 2017 National Intelligence that all requiring Law 2017 - recommenda its first made Telecom Team 2020, There is reason for concern about any data that There is reason for concern about any This prevented the “Pacific Light Cable Network” Network” Light Cable the “Pacific This prevented Within months, seeing the writing on the wall, two on the wall, seeing the writing Within months, (owned by Facebook, Google, and Chinese telecom Google, and Chinese telecom Facebook, by (owned “We must take a closer look at cables with landing take must “We  July 2020decisiontobuildatrans-Pacific cable Australian restrictions. Chilemadethisdecision This was partofabroadersuiteCleanNetwork Island nationsofMicronesia,Kirabati,andNauru; In one,U.S. officialsraisedconcernsabouta World In another case,U.S. Chile’s officialsencouraged Bank plantohave Huawei Marinebuildacable(at Pacific, Africa,andEuropeusing Chinese state- Marine significantlyunderbids other companies 110 was theAugust 2020announcementby Secretary [CCP] cannot compromiseinformationcarriedby nership withHuawei, thatrecommendedbuilding ing Huawei Marinefromthecompetition given matic campaignsby U.S. officials, someofwhich mobile-phone apps. Thepurpose ofCleanCable,as rating withuntrusted Beijing-backed firmsacross recognize theneedtoelevateunderseacablesinits had quietly gotten started intheprioryearortwo. undermine Western rivalsandabuseaccesstovast the cabletoShanghai. to Australia andNewZealand,effectively exclud- the World Bankformallyunwound thisplanin that tocontinue.” the underseacablesthatconnectourcountryand the digitaleconomy, from5Gtocloudservices that provide afoundationforimportantdiplomatic Secretary Pompeo putit,was “toensurethatthe a reported20percentdiscount)amongthePacific and other transmissionstoalliedandpartner amounts ofdata,includingsensitive U.S. military all aroundtheworld,withsignificantpotential to despite conductinganinitial2017 study, inpart- early 2021by seekingnewbidsfromallplayers. officials triedtodiscourage PapuaNew Guinea diplomats. Suchwas thecasein2018, whenU.S. officials played asignificantrolealongside U.S. on multipleprocurementstoconnectAsia,the others totheglobalInternet.” He added,“Huawei alliesfromcollabo- efforts designedtodiscourage of StateMike Pompeo oftheCleanCableinitiative. going forward. efforts in2020,diplomacy setting ofinitiatives outarange countries. cameto TheTrumpAdministration other Chineseplayers areseekingmarket share from usingHuawei Marine tobuilditsdomestic backed underseastechnology. We can’t allow The most move visibleTrumpAdministration In many suchcases, Australian andJapanese Clean Cablegave anametoseriesofdiplo- 37 39 China Transparency Report 38

Australia andJapan, whichin2019 alsoco-founded Trilateral Partnership forInfrastructure Invest- The Palau spurfundingwas thefirst fruitofthe Export-Import Bank.Thisorganizationalchal- Development FinanceCorporation,andtheU.S. National SecurityCouncil,theDefenseDepart- NEC, boosts U.S. connectivity withfast-growing Marine backin2015, andby 2018 construction Papua NewGuineahadcontractedwithHuawei United Statesannounced$190millionindevelop- Commercial Service,theU.S. International Global Infrastructure CoordinatingCommittee, which was established, withmodest effectiveness, waters, whereBeijingseekstointerferewithand was alreadyunderway. lenge extendslenge tostrategic infrastructure issues issues itdoesnotice. Thiscouldbeimproved by ment, theCommerceDepartmentanditsForeign its secondundersealinktotheglobalInternet. infrastructure development. ment intheIndo-Pacific among theUnitedStates, ment hasleddiplomaticinitiatives relatedto ment financingfortheconstruction andoperation undersea cablesinrecentyears, thereisnorec- undersea-cable offerings. InNovember 2019, the undersea cableissues. undersea network. Butthoseeffortscametoolate. the Pacific Islandnationof Palau, providing Palau the BlueDot Network toadvance high-standard the government, wherekey players includethe tion onproviding countriesalternatives toChina’s to anOctober2020announcementoffinancial thwart economicactivityby itsneighbors. Thanks Singapore. Southeast Asia,whileavoiding SouthChinaSea challenges and opportunitiesthanitneedsto challenges generally. TheU.S. government islessaware of governments, thecablewillalsoincludeaspurto ognized leadofficeorofficial,norarethereclear of anewcablefromCaliforniatoIndonesiaand encourage U.S.encourage officialsto get better organized on government canmove quicklyinthreeareas: strengthening interagency bodiessuch asthe strengthening interagency structures ofcoordination withother partsof support fromtheU.S., Japanese, andAustralian be, andoftennot wellpostured toaddressthose To buildonthisdiplomaticfoundation,theU.S. U.S. andalliedofficialsalsoimproved coordina- 1. Who IsinCharge? 41 Thecable,tobebuiltby Japan’s ThoughtheStateDepart- 40 Thisexperiencehelpedto 43 42

 111 As the Biden Administration organizes the favor of the traditional threat of undersea military favor sabotage or espionage, important as those are. The sabotage possible, U.S. engagement foreign can inform possible, U.S. protections, and highlight high-quality alterna- and highlight high-quality protections, government and with the private sector, and pri- and with the private sector, government Quad partners, allies, oritize diplomacy with NATO data-producing populations (India and Indonesia). (India and Indonesia). populations data-producing concerted attention from policymakers- and diplo concerted attention in can no longer overlooked cable competition be dence on Beijing for undersea access to the global dence on Beijing for governments of the risks they face, help to develop face, help to develop of the risks they governments and other important players. and other authoritarians,” undersea cables clearly deserve clearly deserve undersea cables authoritarians,” a common threat assessment, discouragea common threat depen- tives from trusted vendors. from trusted tives undersea cable networks given their strategic geog- strategic their given cable networks undersea keys to U.S. success are to sharpen U.S. policy at success are to sharpen U.S. to U.S. keys hands of technology out of the U.S. home, keep - central Indonesia’s of become more aware have raphy (Brazil, Egypt, and South Africa) and large and South Egypt, (Brazil, raphy mats. Beijing’s ambitions in commercial undersea Beijing’s mats. ment with these countries, much as U.S. officials much as U.S. ment with these countries, to cobalt. Congo’s or supplies, ity to global nickel world’s “techno-democracies” against the “techno- “techno-democracies” against world’s Chinese firms, improve coordination across the U.S. U.S. the coordination across improve Chinese firms, Conclusion Internet, expose systems with insufficient data with expose systems Internet, This fact should inform U.S. diplomatic engage- should inform U.S. This fact be Chinese deal will not every Though stopping - 44 45 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The Thanks to the back Outside of continen- 3. Developing-World Hubs. 3. Developing-World 2. Europe’s Soft Underbelly. 2. Europe’s but apparently not regarding undersea cables. As regarding undersea cables. but apparently not providing allies with more information about U.S. allies with more information about U.S. providing sharing to identify vulnerabilities and test NATO NATO test sharing to identify vulnerabilities and - net preparedness for compromises of undersea play an outsized role in the future development of an outsized role in the future development play support the Blue Dot Network executive consulta- executive Network Blue Dot support the count on access—across the Indo-Pacific, Africa, count on access—across the Indo-Pacific, or impossible to land cables in the United States, cables in the United States, or impossible to land during the Trump Administration.during the so would Doing attention by U.S. officials and NATO allies, starting NATO allies, officials and U.S. by attention also boost the Biden Administration’s efforts to efforts the Biden Administration’s also boost Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Relations Senate Foreign the Middle East, and Europe. Latin America is a the Middle East, particular The European risk warrants target, too. tries. This will limit Beijing’s global undersea This will limit Beijing’s tries. tion group (launchedtion group to focus on 2021) and in June tal Europe, a handful of developing countries will tal Europe, a handful of developing risk assessments and the challenges of mitigation. mentioned above, Washington would benefit by would benefit Washington mentioned above, market share and data access, but only to a point. data access, share and market infrastructure at the next Quad summit meeting summit meeting Quad at the next infrastructure lash from Beijing’s aggressive policies of recent aggressive lash from Beijing’s with France, which has signaled shared concern which has signaled with France, in 5G networks about Huawei with Washington works, as recommended in a 2020 report of the U.S. in a 2020 report of the U.S. as recommended works, with Japan, Australia, and India (late Australia, 2021). with Japan, years, Huawei Marine will likely find it difficult Marine will likely Huawei years, The PEACE cable shows where Beijing can still where Beijing can still The PEACE cable shows Also beneficial would be greater intelligence- Australia, Japan, Britain, India, and other coun- Britain, India, and other Japan, Australia,   113 - the ideological and military competi unlike Not Today, with the acceleration of great- Today, This was reflected in the planning for the This was for major war today would be an attempt by Beijing by would be an attempt today for major war power competition with China, where is competition power spans a spectrum of conflict ranging from peace- defense of the Fulda Gap in West Germany, which Germany, Gap in West defense of the Fulda military East–West the broader came to symbolize the Germany, confrontation. Located in southern and even made the case for effective sea control of made the case for effective and even the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. of Western invasion of a Soviet the event to ensure that critical reinforce- the North Atlantic Gap? Fulda today’s tion with the Soviets, the competition with China with the competition tion with the Soviets, high-intensity through potential time competition to reintegrate Taiwan into the mainland by force. into the mainland by to reintegrate Taiwan ning, as well as investments in future capability, in future capability, ning, as well as investments in time. ments would arrive it is their modern Berlin, and the most likely trigger likely it is their modern Berlin, and the most vibrant democracy and successful capitalist market. vibrant democracy market. and successful capitalist was never certain. never was warfare. Taiwan, protected by 90 miles of ocean, is a by protected Taiwan, warfare. Fulda Gap would be the site of the “first battle” in battle” the “first Gap would be the site of Fulda 1989—but the peaceful conclusion of the Cold War the peaceful conclusion of the Cold War 1989—but To the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), however, (CCP), however, Party the Chinese Communist To As such, it played an immense role in military plan- an immense role in military As such, it played The Spectrum of Conflict: Taiwan Spectrum of Conflict: The BRENT D. SADLER BRENT D. The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The Fulda Gap for Major War in Asia War Major Fulda Gap for The South China Sea: 21st-Century South China Sea: 21st-Century The has struggled to identify a compelling and has struggled ince the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy Navy the U.S. ince the end of the Cold War, At the end of the Second World War, Stalin War, the end of the Second World At blinkered approach must end if the Navy is to end if the Navy approach must blinkered bly China, yet there has been little focus on the there has been little bly China, yet so far as to instigate a crisis that resulted in the so far as to instigate projection ashore against threats that could not threats that could not projection ashore against demonstrated by the fall of the Berlin Wall in fall of the Berlin Wall the by demonstrated competitions and war. competitions Germany. East into Soviet-controlled entirety success of freedom and an example of capitalist contest its presence. This era has ended with the contest - nota most of competitors, a host capabilities by - challengegalvanizing naval to inform invest and subsequent Soviet leaders failed in their aspi- and subsequent Soviet advent of modern anti-access and area denial advent the Navy pursued a decades-long focus on power pursued a decades-long focus on power the Navy traditional region. Instead, the Indo-Pacific rations for global Communism—a failure vividly nestled deep behind the Iron Curtain. Stalin went nestled naval generalist approaches have held sway. This held sway. approaches have generalist naval ments in building its future fleet. In the interim, ments in building its future fleet. maritime theater, decisive and most likely most lamented that Berlin was not incorporated in its not lamented that Berlin was field the forces needed for today’s great-power great-power field the forces needed for today’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Stalin Treaty Organization (NATO). North Atlantic 1948 Berlin Airlift and 1949 establishment of the 1948 Berlin Airlift and 1949 establishment In time, West Berlin would grow into a bastion into a bastion Berlin would grow In time, West S  The SouthChinaSea The SpectrumofConflict: This relatively fixed tactical and strategic dynamic Islands mitigatetheopportunityvalueofEast 114 China Seainanincrementalpeacetime contest, wide-ranging militaryreforms. various allegiances. Suchakey strategic theater in thiskey strategic maritime theater. Themost ing thefateofTaiwan. ThePLANavy (PLAN) needed tosecurethelandingsandwinsub- military planners. Withoutlogistical support,PLA the danger of conflict has taken on added urgency ofconflicthastaken onadded urgency the danger there. Infact, both ofthe last twoPLANavy ticed there,andPLANsenior leadershave served jointoperations areprac- there, leading-edge time andwartime operationsconductedonthe South ChinaSeawithitswide-openmaritime South ChinaSeawillbeakey factorindetermin - the East andSouthChinaSeascriticaltoChinese Sea plays akey strategic roleinthisapproach. that such a geopolitical settingthat suchageopolitical affordstheCCP. as thePeoples LiberationArmy (PLA)hasout- advanced Chinesenaval platformsarebased and CCPhave invested tremendous resources ally Japan’s militaryforcesinthenearby Ryukyu deterrence. However, successinsuchaconflictis direction. Itwas alsoamajorinspirationfor2015’s core nationalinterest andprincipalstrategic of thesurroundingwaters andairspacewouldbe given thelimitedmilitaryanddiplomaticavenues cumb. Theshallow waters andproximity ofkey U.S. space anddeepwaters surroundedby nationswith survival oftheCCP. strategy isbeingperusedatminimumrisktothe paced thecapacityofU.S. andalliedconventional ships andcredibilitywhilebeingafavorable setting peacetime successes inunderminingU.S. partner provides thepotential forincrementalChinese sequent landcampaign.Thismakes controlling presents astraightforward setting forforce-on- far fromcertain,andanapparentlyincremental for amajornaval showdown. force calculationandattrition warfare. forces fightingin Taiwan wouldeventually suc- In a prolonged battleIn aprolonged over Taiwan, PLAcontrol More interesting totheCCP, however, isthe Regaining controlofTaiwan isastated CCP Like theFulda GapintheColdWar era,peace- 2 ControloftheSouthChina 1 Inrecentyears, China Transparency Report - At the sameleadover time, the CCGhasahuge (PLAN) commanders, stretching back15years, Major GeneralZhangZhaozhong ofthePLAonce CCG hassomeofthelargest cutters intheworld. China SeaalsocompelsthePLAtoassumeavery within thePhilippines’EEZ.However, instead writing, analltoofamiliarscenariowas playing with theChineseCoast Guard(CCG)andmaritime land’s southerncoast. its economicexclusive zone(EEZ). maritime features, thePLAhasestablished an most notable example,Beijing attempted touse massed atWhitsun Reeftothesouth,two PLAN in Southeast Asia. maritime militiaandCCG,amoreforcefulPLAN maritime militia,andfishermenhadmassed militia, hashadgreatsuccessinedgingoutregional has madesubstantial investments inpocketbook using one’s shiptophysically move another’s. In used by theCCGisshouldering,whichrequires to lureManilaintorelinquishingitslegalrightsin the CCP’s best interest. Consequently, Beijing the SouthChinaSea. to sustain apersistent maritime presenceacross the PLANhasbacked morecoercive approaches to the uncertaingeostrategic landscapeoftheSouth Southeast Asiainordertobuyacquiescence.Inthe Seas Fleet basedinZhanjiangontheChinamain- archipelago ofmanmadeislandmilitary garrisons archipelago approach inwhichthemaritimemilitiabacked any other coast guardormaritimepoliceforce added expenseofU.S. regionalcredibility. Asofthis active militaryanddiplomaticrolethere.Inwhat co-development andinfrastructure investments andinfluencepeddlingthroughout diplomacy of typical “cabbage” strategiesof typical“cabbage” leveraging the out atWhitsunReef,whereChineseCoast Guard, expanding itsmilitaryfootprint intheregionat claimants. strategy,called a“cabbage” thePLAN, inconcert such cases, thesizeofshipmatters, andthe securing thewaters aroundTaiwan inaconflict, served previouslyascommandersoftheSouth presence was ondisplay. by the CCG and PLAN “peacefully” seizevarious by theCCGandPLAN“peacefully” Avoiding theuncertaintyofwar isclearlyin While thePLANwouldberesponsiblefor In anunusualmove, as maritimemilitia In peacetime confrontations, atacticoften 3 To bolster thisechelonmaritime 5 4 Failing this,  115 It 7 Sea Philippine Line” China’s heritage.org “Nine-Dash A

PHILIPPINES TAIWAN 5 4 Islands Spratly Islands INDONESIA Paracel 3 MALAYSIA Sea The bottom line: To compete in peace- compete line: To The bottom 1 South China 8 Hainan 2 Construction of 10,252-foot runway and runway of 10,252-foot Construction Fiery Cross. support logistic pier space; port with 4,350-foot positions. added with fixed-weapon facilities and runway of 9,800-foot Construction Subi Reef. support logistic pier space; port with 3,650-foot positions. added with fixed-weapon facilities runway of 8,900-foot Construction Mischief Reef. support logistic pier space; and port with 6,370-foot positions. added with fixed-weapon facilities The growth of the CCG and maritime militia has The growth CHINA 3 5 4 3 4 5 been remarkable. Andrew Erickson has exposed in Malaysia’s EEZ. in Malaysia’s Capella chartered ship West on Woody Island 175 miles southeast of Hainan Island 175 miles southeast on Woody time, it is necessary for the U.S. and its allies to for the U.S. time, it is necessary the extent to which the Chinese maritime militia the extent has matured operationally and grown in size, with has matured operationally and grown is important to note that tactics evolve constantly. that tactics evolve is important to note 84 of the most modern ships based at Sansha City 84 of the most Island.

6 VIETNAM CAMBODIA LAOS Gulf of Gulf MALAYSIA Thailand The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The THAILAND INDONESIA Pier expansion to accommodate a accommodate to Pier expansion Base. Naval Yulin accommodate and dry dock to group carrier battle super carriers. Chinese next-generation and shore Pier expansion Submarine Base. Yulin additional submarines and accommodate to facilities groups. ships of additional carrier battle Significant pier Significant HQ. Zhanjiang South Sea Fleet support ships and shore additional for expansion facilities. 1 2 2 2 1 completion of survey operations conducted by the operations conducted by of survey completion as they drove off a commercial vessel carrying off a commercial as they drove Such a change the increased could be caused by unremarkable. However, if it represents a change if it represents unremarkable. However, reporters in waters off Palawan in the Philippines. Palawan off reporters in waters in Chinese tactics, it could be more of a concern. in Chinese tactics, the successful 2020 ner nations emboldened by U.S. maritime presence in the region and part- maritime presence in the region U.S. The use of PLAN vessels in this way could be in this way The use of PLAN vessels -class missile boats relieved CCG cutters CCG cutters Houbei-class missile boats relieved Author’s research. Author’s SOURCE: China has been and expanding its naval reinforcing to bases, both close into home and deep the South China Sea. MAP 2 Major Developments in Chinese Naval Expansion  Island. ThomasShugart,an adjunctseniorfellow April 21,2021); and Commander oftheU.S. 7thFleet, https://www.c7f.navy.mil/ (accessed May 10, 2021). Capabilities—Background andIssues for Congress,” CRSReport RL33153, p. 32, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33153/248 (accessed TRISERVICESTRATEGY.PDF (accessed April22,2021); Congressional Research Service, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy SOURCES: U.S. Department ofDefense, “Advantage at Sea,” December 2020, p. 4, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Dec/16/2002553074/-1/-1/0/ in theSouthChinaSearegion. compared to the70 shipsintheU.S. 7thFleet anddeployed warships that operate China’s navy isprojected to grow to more than760 shipsby 2030, adaunting force China’s RapidlyGrowing Naval Fleet CHART 2 China’s Steadily Growing Most notable has beenthegrowth ofcommercial 116 CCG, andmaritimemilitiaoperations. Maritime Capacity neutralize theeffectiveness ofcoordinatedPLAN, ries thatcanbeactivatedby thePLANformilitary fer roll-on/roll-off” noted thebuildupof“large unfolded inChina’s south,toincludecommercial at theCenterforaNewAmerican Security, has a remarkable expansionofportfacilities and piers andincreasednumbersofferriesonHainan shipping aswellmilitaryinfrastructure ashore. sealift. A substantial buildup ofmaritimecapacityhas 9 Open-sourcesatellite clearlyshow images NUMBER OFSHIPS              China Transparency Report -   Island. Force toundertake coordinatedstrikes onallied PLAN’s annualnaval andmaritimejointwarfare warships. were alsoattempted by theSoviets inthe1980s, ing outofHainanIslandandother southernports ferriesoperat- roll-on/roll-off” numbers of“large ing inAugust 2020ofanti-ship ballistic missiles have thepotential tooverwhelm aship oreven a the PLAAirForce (PLAAF)andthePLARocket tions onTaiwan ifcalledintoservice. that couldjust aseasilysupportmilitaryopera- against amoving naval targetsouthof Hainan cises, thePLANhasincreasinglyworked with exercises intheSouthChinaSea.Intheseexer Most troubling,however, have beenthe   11 Suchcoordinatedoperations, which 10 Thisincludestheoperational test-     battle force Chinese coast guard Chinese maritime militia Chinese Appx. 50–70 deployed warships: U.S. 7thFleet and

A heritage.org -  117 - In In 18 17 Overall, the speed of development and opera- the speed of development Overall, However, winning in war is not enough; suc- is not winning in war However, Although the PLAN has demonstrably improved improved the PLAN has demonstrably Although from PLAN headquarters in Beijing. While this Beijing. While this headquarters in from PLAN support units can be problematic in a crisis. support units can point toward conflict “in the next six years.” the next conflict “in point toward pal southern Taiwan port of Kaohsiung. pal southern Taiwan seas and trade. Success on both fronts in the seas and trade. Success on both such a command structure performs in multiple such a command structure enables coordination with the Ministry of For with the Ministry enables coordination shipping company state-owned eign Affairs and - Com Indo-Pacific for U.S. notably concerns, ceeding in the peacetime competition is a strategic is a strategic competition ceeding in the peacetime that are intended complicating Chinese strategies of China. One possibility would be a new theater of China. One possibility would be a on the command in the Indian Ocean centered - PLA reforms that approxi concert with recent in 2008 with that began in earnest deployments crises or in a conflict remains to be seen, overseas actions would most likely be fought in the South likely actions would most and it could evolve into theater commands outside and it could evolve Senate hearing on March 9, 2021, that PLA actions Senate hearing on March 9, South China Sea is needed to ensure deterrence by by South China Sea is needed to ensure deterrence tional learning by the PLAN has caused serious tional learning by the U.S. as a security partner at risk and would the U.S. the event of war over Taiwan, the largest fleet the largest fleet Taiwan, over of war the event in the not to present a fait accompli or major war future. too distant unravel the rules-based order of freedom of the unravel it continues to manage all such deployments to manageit continues all such deployments their from the operational units and is so distant mander Admiral Philip Davidson, who testified at a mander Admiral testified who Philip Davidson, imperative as well. Failure puts the credibility of as well. Failure imperative naval base at Djibouti. naval mate U.S. combatant commands, the PLAN has combatant commands, mate U.S. sea operations or out-of-area refined its distant logistics, readiness, and command and control, and command readiness, logistics, COSCO, among others, command and control that command among others, COSCO, China Sea for control of approaches to the princi- China Sea for control of approaches Horn of Africa counter-piracy operations. How How of Africa counter-piracy operations. Horn The Growing Danger Growing The

- 12 The size- The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The 14 From such a bastion, the such a bastion, From 15 Assuming that the PLAN 16 13 In addition, the completion of massive dredging of massive In addition, the completion The South Sea Fleet has seen appreciable mod- has seen appreciable The South Sea Fleet There is a strong likelihood that the PLAN likelihood There is a strong base on Hainan Island that will be capable of base on Hainan Island that will be capable battlegroup’s defenses and greatly increase the defenses and greatly battlegroup’s facilities at Fiery Cross, Mischief Reef, and Subi facilities at Fiery Cross, for securing its strategic missile submarines while for securing its strategic so-called nine-dash line demarking CCP claims to so-called nine-dash line demarking servicing the next-generation PLAN aircraft car servicing the next-generation PLAN submarines, its two most modern nuclear attack attack modern nuclear its two most submarines, capable and most its four largest submarines, chance of a kill. They also have the advantage of a kill. They also have chance of Chinese of shore-based the lethality enhancing August As of in numbers. ernization and growth operations and construction of port and airfield operations and construction continues to advance the range of its submarine- could be reached from a South China Sea bastion could develop the South China Sea into a bastion the South China Sea into a bastion could develop to what the on patrol there. This would be similar an anticipated new dry dock at the Yulin naval naval Yulin an anticipated new dry dock at the and the U.S. west coast. west and the U.S. amphibious transport warships, and some of the and some warships, amphibious transport assets in a naval battle. in a naval assets able nuclear submarine presence at Yulin also Yulin able nuclear submarine presence at to sustain a greatly enlarged a greatly presence along the to sustain of the South China Sea. the entirety Soviets did to defend their strategic missile subma- to defend their strategic did Soviets tional aircraft carrier, its only four nuclear ballistic ballistic its only four nuclear tional aircraft carrier, to this theater of operations, as it would allow the as it would allow to this theater of operations, tions in the region. rier, the Type 003. the Type rier, most modern escorts for a total of 118 warships. modern escorts for a total most in the next few years. in the next nuclear deterrent forces. nuclear deterrent rines in the Arctic and adds strategic importance rines in the Arctic and adds strategic indicates a strong emphasis on undersea opera- indicates a strong launched ballistic missiles, the entirety of the U.S. of the U.S. the entirety missiles, launched ballistic with the newest JL-3 missiles could reach Alaska with the newest Chinese to secure their second strike capacity and Chinese to secure their second strike Reef in early 2018, enables the PLAN and CCG enables the PLAN Reef in early 2018, PLAN’s Type 96 ballistic missile submarines armed 96 ballistic Type PLAN’s 2020, this fleet included the PLAN’s first opera- first included the PLAN’s this fleet 2020, This force is likely to grow with the addition of to grow This force is likely   - 119 Heritage Foundation experts developed a experts developed Foundation Heritage sector consultants. For each categorical survey, each categorical survey, For sector consultants. and compiling the soning are a result of averaging survey that was submitted to more than 30 U.S. than 30 U.S. to more submitted that was survey of how far the private efforts have raised transpar far the private efforts have of how ency in the gaps in official data. and filled the eight cat- collecting and tracking data across defense analysts, These experts comprised egories. academics, think-tank researchers, and private- researchers, think-tank academics, and international experts who have experience in and international experts who have they were asked to break down scores, using the scores, to break down they were asked The final score and rea- they assigned those scores. received scores and responses, respectively. scores and responses, received Chinese government and private data collection. and private data collection. Chinese government 10-point scale, by subcategory and to explain why subcategory and to explain why 10-point scale, by This second score should provide an assessment This second score should provide Methodology The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The f the eight categories in this report—(1) the economy, (2) energy and the environment, and the environment, (2) energy economy, The second score is for overall transparency, transparency, The second score is for overall The first score is for transparencyby the The first backed institutions. backed of data that are reported officially through the of scores for each category. Each score is rated of scores for each category. representing on a 10-point scale, with a score of 1 and law, and (8) technology—there are two sets sets are two and (8) technology—there and law, meaning the availability of data from both the of data from both meaning the availability military, (6) outbound investment, (7) politics outbound investment, (6) military, various Chinese government or government- various Chinese government Chinese government, meaning the availability meaning the availability Chinese government, (3) human rights, (4) influence operations, (5) the (4) influence operations, (3) human rights, O “no transparency” and a score of 10 representing transparency.” “complete   121 ENDNOTES The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The https://epi.yale.edu/about-epi (accessed April 25, 2021). April 25, (accessed https://epi.yale.edu/about-epi https://www.heritage.org/index/country/china. https://2019.best-cities-china.org/pdf/Milken%20Institute%20-%20Best%20Performing%20Cities%20China%202019%20-%20English.pdf (accessed April 16, 2021). 16, 2021). April (accessed https://2019.best-cities-china.org/pdf/Milken%20Institute%20-%20Best%20Performing%20Cities%20China%202019%20-%20English.pdf in_china_a_new_transparency_on_government_pollution_data (accessed April 26, 2021). April 26, (accessed in_china_a_new_transparency_on_government_pollution_data Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 2015, pp. 57–67, https://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2015/book/chapter5.pdf. 57–67, pp. Inc., 2015, Jones & Company, and Dow Foundation No. 24036, November 2017, https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w24036/w24036.pdf (accessed April 26, 2021); Gaurav Gaurav 26, 2021); April (accessed https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w24036/w24036.pdf 2017, November 24036, No. Paper Working Research https://economics.ucr.edu/ 2020, October of California–Riverside, University in China,” Migration of Pollution-Induced Consequences Productivity al., “The Khanna et , Vol. 4, No. 9 (September 1, 2020), pp. E386–E398, https://www.thelancet.com/article/S2542-5196(20)30161-3/fulltext https://www.thelancet.com/article/S2542-5196(20)30161-3/fulltext E386–E398, pp. 1, 2020), 9 (September No. 4, , Vol. Lancet The 2017,” of Disease Study Burden For the interactive map with rankings for 2020, see Milken Institute, “Best-Performing Cities China: Interactive Map,” https://best-cities-china.org/map (accessed (accessed https://best-cities-china.org/map Map,” Cities China: Interactive “Best-Performing Institute, see Milken 2020, for map with rankings the interactive For policies/latest_releases/2017/09/07/content_281475842719170.htm (accessed April 22, 2019). (accessed policies/latest_releases/2017/09/07/content_281475842719170.htm April 22, 2021). (accessed report/2019/05/01/chinas-algorithms-repression/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-police-mass April 22, 2021). (accessed program/jamestown-early-warning-brief-xinjiangs-system-of-militarized-vocational-training-comes-to-tibet/ and-road (accessed April 26, 2021). April 26, (accessed and-road with-the-toxic-aftermath-of-rare-earth-mining (accessed April 26, 2021). April 26, (accessed with-the-toxic-aftermath-of-rare-earth-mining , MIT News and Air Quality,” Happiness “In China, a Link Between and Helen Knight, 2021); April 26, (accessed wp-content/uploads/2020/10/19-10-20-Khanna.pdf environmental-crisis (accessed April 26, 2021). April 26, (accessed environmental-crisis datadrivenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/ThirdWave_Data_Gap_Analysis_Final.pdf (accessed April 26, 2021), and Natasha Vizcarra, “Crazy Bad Air,” National National Bad Air,” “Crazy Vizcarra, and Natasha 2021), April 26, (accessed datadrivenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/ThirdWave_Data_Gap_Analysis_Final.pdf State Air Quality Monitoring Program,” http://www.stateair.net/ (April 26, 2021). 26, (April http://www.stateair.net/ Program,” Monitoring Air Quality State 2021). April 26, (accessed https://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/doi/10.1289/EHP4319 2019), 4 (April No. 127, (accessed April 26, 2021). April 26, (accessed (accessed April 26, 2021); @BeijingAir, Twitter, https://twitter.com/BeijingAir (accessed April 26, 2021); and U.S. Department of State, “StateAir: U.S. Department of Department U.S. “StateAir: of State, Department and U.S. 2021); April 26, (accessed https://twitter.com/BeijingAir Twitter, @BeijingAir, 2021); April 26, (accessed (accessed April 26 2021); Shuai Chen, Paulina Oliva, and Peng Zhang, “The Effect of Air Pollution on Migration: Evidence from China,” National Bureau of Economic Economic of Bureau National China,” from Evidence Pollution on Migration: of Air Effect Zhang, “The and Peng Oliva, Shuai Chen, Paulina 2021); April 26 (accessed Vol. 253 (January 1, 2020), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337168172_Has_third-party_monitoring_improved_environmental_data_quality_An_analysis_ 1, 2020), (January 253 Vol. of_air_pollution_data_in_China (accessed April 28, 2021). (accessed of_air_pollution_data_in_China Boston University, Global Development Policy Center, “China’s Global Energy Finance,” https://www.bu.edu/cgef/ (accessed April 26, 2021). April 26, (accessed https://www.bu.edu/cgef/ Finance,” Global Energy “China’s Center, Policy Global Development University, Boston 2021). April 26, (accessed https://globalenergymonitor.org/projects/ “Projects,” Monitor, Global Energy https://github.com/owid/co2-data 8, 2021, February updated dataset ,” in Data Our World by Gas Emissions and Greenhouse on CO2 , “Data in Data Our World 2021). April 26, (accessed https://www.climatewatchdata.org/countries/CHN “China,” Watch, Climate 2021). April 27, (accessed https://climateactiontracker.org/about “About,” Tracker, Action Climate 2021). April 27, (accessed https://www.stimson.org/project/mekong-dam-monitor/ Dam Monitor,” “Mekong Center, Henry L. Stimson , Management Environmental Journal of in China,” Data of Air Pollution An Analysis Quality? Environmental Improved Monitoring al., “Has Third-Party Niu et Xuejiao Landscape.” Existing The Data: Environmental Gaps in China’s al., “Addressing Hsu et http://english.gov.cn/ 7, 2017, September Republic of China, updated People’s Council of the State Affairs,” on Religious Regulation Revises “China release, News April 22, 2021). (accessed https://shahit.biz/eng/ “Victims,” Database, Victims Xinjiang https://www.hrw.org/ 1, 2019, May App,” Surveillance Mass Police Engineering a Xinjiang Reverse Algorithms of Repression: “China’s Watch, Human Rights https://jamestown.org/ 22, 2020), 17 (September Issue 20, China Brief, Vol. Tibet,” to Comes Training Vocational of Militarized System “Xinjiang’s Zenz, Adrian , July 2, 2019, https://e360.yale.edu/features/china-wrestles- , July 2, 2019, 360 Environment Yale Earth Mining,” of Rare Aftermath Toxic with the Wrestles “China Michael Standaert, https://china.usembassy-china.org.cn/embassy-consulates/shanghai/air-quality-monitor-stateair/ Monitor,” Quality in China, “Air and Consulates Embassy U.S. , Vol. Health Perspectives Environmental Public Health Tracking,” Chinese Environmental for Resources China: Data for Health Indicators Jie Ban al., “Environmental et https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas- January 18, 2016, updated last Relations, on Foreign Council Crisis,” Environmental “China’s Eleanor Albert and Beina Xu, https://merics.org/en/analysis/powering-belt- 2019, June 27, China Studies, for Institute Mercator the Belt and Road,” “Powering Mardell, and Jacob S. Eder Thomas https:// January 2017, Data-Driven, Yale Landscape,” Existing The Data: Environmental Gaps in China’s Cheng, “Addressing and Yaping Angel Hsu, Chendan Yan, the EPI,” “About Network, Information Earth Science International for Center Earth Institute, University, and Columbia and Policy, Law Environmental for Center Yale , December 20, 2010, https://e360.yale.edu/features/ 2010, 20, , December 360 Environment Yale Data,” Pollution on Government Transparency “In China, a New Larson, Christina , ed. Terry Miller, Anthony B. Kim, and James M. Roberts (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2021), pp. 144–145, 144–145, pp. 2021), Heritage Foundation, The (Washington: Kim, and James M. Roberts B. Anthony Miller, , ed. Terry Freedom Economic of Index in 2021 “China,” , ed. Terry Miller and Anthony B. Kim (Washington: The Heritage The Kim (Washington: B. Miller and Anthony , ed. Terry Freedom Economic of Index in 2015 and Development,” Energy, Freedom, “Economic Loris, D. Nicolas Center for Strategic and International Studies, “China Power Project,” https://chinapower.csis.org (accessed April 16, 2021). (accessed https://chinapower.csis.org Project,” Power “China Studies, and International Strategic for Center April 16, 2021). (accessed https://merics.org/en/trade-and-investment and Investment,” “Trade Studies, China for Institute Mercator for the Global An Analysis 1990–2017: China and Its Provinces, Across Expectancy and Life Disease Burden, on Deaths, Pollution of Air Effect al., “The et Yin Peng MacroPolo, “China’s Debt Hangover,” https://macropolo.org/digital-projects/china-local-debt-hangover-map/ (accessed April 16, 2021). (accessed https://macropolo.org/digital-projects/china-local-debt-hangover-map/ Debt Hangover,” “China’s MacroPolo, 2019, Institute, , Milken Economies Successful Most Nation’s Cities: The Best-Performing China 2019: Jackson, Lin, and Jessica Michael C. Y. Wong, See Perry Aeronautics and Space Administration, October 11, 2013, https://earthdata.nasa.gov/learn/sensing-our-planet/crazy-bad-air (accessed April 26, 2021). April 26, (accessed https://earthdata.nasa.gov/learn/sensing-our-planet/crazy-bad-air 11, 2013, October Administration, and Space Aeronautics April 16, 2021). January 21, 2019, https://news.mit.edu/2019/china-link-happiness-air-quality-0121 (accessed April 26, 2021). April 26, (accessed https://news.mit.edu/2019/china-link-happiness-air-quality-0121 January 21, 2019, 8. 6. 9. Executive Summary Executive 5. 3. 20. 21. 22. 23. Ibid. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 2. 16. 17. 18. 19. 10. 11. 12. 13. 15. 14. 1. 4. 7.  42. 41. 40. 49. 48. 47. 46. 45. 44. 43. 122 29. 33. 32. 31. Open Doors USA, “China,” https://www.opendoorsusa.org/christian-persecution/world-watch-list/china/ (accessed April23,2021). 30. 39. 38. 37. 36. 35. 34. 59. 58. 57. 56. 55. 54. 53. 52. 51. 50. 62. 61. 60. 68. 67. 66. 65. 64. 63. Japanese Professor on SuspicionofSpying,” The Guardian, October 21,2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/21/china-arrests-japanese-professor-on- April 21,2021). April 21,2021). For themost recent edition,seeStockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRIYearbook 2020: Armaments, Disarmament andInternational Jessica Batke andMareike Ohlberg, “State ofSurveillance: Government Documents Reveal New Evidence onChina’s Efforts to Monitor Its People,” ChinaFile,October Freedom House, “Freedom intheWorld 2020: China,” https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2020 (accessed April24, 2021). Hong Kong Watch, “Protest Prosecution Database,” last updated April16,2021, https://www.hongkongwatch.org/protest-prosecution (accessed April22,2021). Tibetan Centre for HumanRights andDemocracy, “Tibetan Political PrisonerDatabase,” https://tchrd.uwazi.io/ (accessed April22,2021). PRC, State Council Information Office, China’s Military Strategy, May 2015, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/ (accessed April21,2021); andAndrew S. Ryan Fedasiuk andEmilyWeinstein, “Overseas Professionals andTechnology Transfer to China,” Center for Security andEmerging Technology, July21,2020, https:// William C.HannasandDidiKirsten Tatlow, China’s Quest for Foreign Technology (New York: Routledge, 2020), p. 259, https://www.routledge.com/Chinas-Quest-for- MapInfluenCE, https://mapinfluence.eu/en/ (accessed April22, 2021). AidData, “China’s Diplomacy: Public OfficialFinance withDiplomatic Intent (2000-2017),” http://china-dashboard.aiddata.org/ (accessed April22, 2021). Alliance for Securing Democracy, “Authoritarian Interference Tracker,” GermanMarshall Fund oftheUnited States, https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/toolbox/ Alliance for Securing Democracy, “Hamilton 2.0 Dashboard,” GermanMarshall Fund oftheUnited States, https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/hamilton-dashboard/ Richard McGregor, The Party (New York: HarperCollins, 2010), p. 21. The HeritageFoundation, “Crisis inXinjiang featuring Dr. Adrian Zenz,” ChinaUncovered podcast, https://shows.acast.com/china-uncovered/episodes/the-crisis-in- Daniel deVise, “U.S. Scholars Say Their BookonChinaLed to Travel Ban,” Washington Post, August 20, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/ University ofCalifornia–San Diego, ChinaData Lab, “CCP Elites Data Catalog,” https://chinadatalab.ucsd.edu/resources/ccp-elites-database/ (accessed April 20, 2021). MacroPolo, “The Committee,” https://macropolo.org/digital-projects/the-committee/ (accessed April20, 2021). Center for Advanced ChinaResearch, https://www.ccpwatch.org/ (accessed April20, 2021). China Leadership Monitor, https://www.prcleader.org/ (accessed April15, 2021). China DigitalTimes, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/ (accessed April20, 2021). US–China Investment Project, “FDIData,” https://www.us-china-investment.org/fdi-data (accessed April19, 2021). Inter-American Dialogue, “China–Latin AmericaFinance Database,” https://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/ (accessed April19, 2021). Henry L.Stimson Center, “Mekong Infrastructure Tracker,” https://www.stimson.org/project/mekong-infrastructure/ (accessed April19, 2021). Boston University, GlobalDevelopment Policy Center, “China’s GlobalPower Database,” https://www.bu.edu/cgp/ (accessed April19, 2021). AidData, “MappingChina’s GlobalInvestments andInequality,” https://www.aiddata.org/mapping-china-global-investments-and-inequality (accessed April19, 2021). American Enterprise Institute, “China GlobalInvestment Tracker,” https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/ (accessed April19, 2021). Jeff M.Smith, “China’s Beltand Road Initiative: Strategic Implications andInternational Opposition,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3331,August 9, 2018, Organisation for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment, “Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),” https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/foreign-direct- See Sasakawa USA, “MaritimeAwareness Project (MAP),” https://spfusa.org/programs/maritime-awareness-project-map/ (accessed April22,2021); andNational Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, “Asia MaritimeTransparency Initiative,” https://amti.csis.org/ (accessed April21,2021). Alex Joske, “The ChinaDefence Universities Tracker: ExploringtheMilitaryandSecurity Links ofChina’s Universities,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRIYearbook: Armaments, Disarmament andInternational Security,” https://www.sipri.org/yearbook (accessed For themost recent edition,seeInternational Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021: The AnnualAssessment of Global Military Capabilities and Dean Cheng,“Chinese Party Sets BoldMilitaryGoal:‘Mechanized andInformationized’ by 2027,” Breaking Defense, November 23,2020, https://breakingdefense. 30, 2020, https://www.chinafile.com/state-surveillance-china (accessed April 24, 2021). Center for Security andEmerging Technology, “Chinese State Council Budget Tracker,” https://statecouncil.cset.tech/ (accessed April20, 2021). People’s Daily, “Xi Jinping:Follow theTrend oftheTimes andAchieve Common Development,” July26, 2018, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0726/c64094- Emily deLaBruyére andNathan Picarsic, “China Standards 2035,” Horizon Advisory, April8,2020, https://www.horizonadvisory.org/china-standards-2035-first-report Takashi Kawakami, “China to $1.6tn Pump into Tech Infrastructure through 2025,” Nikkei Asia , January21,2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/China-tech/China-to- Net Politics andDigitalCyberspace Policy Program, “China’s Quest for Self-Reliance intheFourteenth Five-Year Plan,” Council onForeign Relations, March 8,2021, Xinhuanet, “The Development ofEnvironment GuidelinesandMainGoalsofthe14thFive-Year Planand2035 Vision,” March 5, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/ 30170246.html (accessed April20, 2021). Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020). 24, 2019, https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2019-11/The%20China%20Defence%20Universities%20Tracker_0.pdf (accessed April21,2021). For the cset.georgetown.edu/research/overseas-professionals-and-technology-transfer-to-china/ (accessed April22,2021). com/2020/11/chinese-party-sets-bold-military-goal-mechanized-informationized-by-2027/ (accessed April22,2021). china-defense-white-papers-1995-2019-download-complete-set-read-highlights-here/ (accessed April21,2021). (accessed April22,2021). (accessed April20, 2021). suspicion-of-spying (accessed April20, 2021). authoritarian-interference-tracker/ (accessed April22,2021). Defence Economics (London: Routledge, 2021). xinjiang (accessed April23,2021). pump-1.6tn-into-tech-infrastructure-through-2025 (accessed April20, 2021). politics/2021lh/2021-03/05/c_1127172897.htm (accessed April20, 2021). us-scholars-say-their-book-on-china-led-to-travel-ban/2011/08/17/gIQAN3C9SJ_story.html (accessed April20, 2021); andAgence France-Presse, “China Arrests tracker, seeAustralian Strategic Policy Institute, “China Defence Universities Tracker,” https://www.aspi.org.au/report/china-defence-universities-tracker (accessed Erickson, “China Defense White Papers—1995–2019—Download Complete Set +Read Highlights Here,” July23,2019, https://www.andrewerickson.com/2019/07/ Foreign-Technology-Beyond-Espionage/Hannas-Tatlow/p/book/9780367473570 (access date). Bureau ofAsianResearch, “MaritimeAwareness Project,” https://map.nbr.org/ (accessed April22,2021). investment-fdi/indicator-group/english_9a523b18-en (accessed April19, 2021). https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-strategic-implications-and-international-opposition. https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-quest-self-reliance-fourteenth-five-year-plan (accessed April20, 2021). China Transparency Report  123 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The https://www.heritage.org/index/country/china . https://www.heritage.org/index/country/china https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/us-china-phase-one-tracker-chinas-purchases-us-goods (accessed April 17, 2021). April 17, (accessed https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/us-china-phase-one-tracker-chinas-purchases-us-goods https://2019.best-cities-china.org/pdf/Milken%20Institute%20-%20Best%20Performing%20Cities%20China%202019%20-%20English.pdf (accessed April 16, 2021). April 16, 2021). (accessed https://2019.best-cities-china.org/pdf/Milken%20Institute%20-%20Best%20Performing%20Cities%20China%202019%20-%20English.pdf investments (accessed April 19, 2021). April 19, (accessed investments Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for the People's Republic of China,” January 8, 2021, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/ January 8, 2021, Republic of China,” People's for the Director by the Executive Statement Report; and Staff Release; No. 25754, revised December 2019, https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w25754/w25754.pdf (accessed April 17, 2021). April 17, (accessed https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w25754/w25754.pdf 2019, December revised 25754, No. Mekong region nations cannot effectively manage water resources or prepare for and mitigate the impacts of floods and droughts.” U.S. Department of State, “China’s “China’s State, of U.S. Department droughts.” of floods and the impacts for and mitigate or prepare resources water manage cannot effectively nations region Mekong 2021). April 26, (accessed https://2017-2021.state.gov/chinas-environmental-abuses-fact-sheet/index.html 2020, 25, September Sheet,” Abuses Fact Environmental For the interactive map with rankings for 2020, see Milken Institute, “Best-Performing Cities China: Interactive Map,” https://best-cities-china.org/map (accessed (accessed https://best-cities-china.org/map Map,” Cities China: Interactive “Best-Performing Institute, see Milken 2020, for map with rankings the interactive For Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 2015, pp. 57–67, https://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2015/book/chapter5.pdf. 57–67, pp. Inc., 2015, Jones & Company, Dow and Heritage Foundation Frostad, Ashley Marks, Lijun Wang, Maigeng Zhou, and Christopher J. L. Murray, “The Effect of Air Pollution on Deaths, Disease Burden, and Life Expectancy Across Across Expectancy and Life Disease Burden, Pollution on Deaths, of Air Effect “The L. Murray, J. and Christopher Maigeng Zhou, Lijun Wang, Marks, Ashley Frostad, No. 24036, November 2017, https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_ 2017, November 24036, No. Paper Working Research of Economic Bureau National China,” from Evidence Migration: and 2021); April 26, (accessed https://economics.ucr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/19-10-20-Khanna.pdf 2020, October in China,” Migration Pollution-Induced https://news.mit.edu/2019/china-link-happiness-air-quality-0121 , January 21, 2019, MIT News and Air Quality,” Happiness “In China, a Link Between Helen Knight, Issues/2021/01/06/Peoples-Republic-of-China-2020-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-49992 (accessed April 17, 2021). April 17, (accessed Issues/2021/01/06/Peoples-Republic-of-China-2020-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-49992 pdf?x91208 (accessed April 16, 2021). pdf?x91208 (accessed policy/chinas-economy-probably-shrank-in-2020/ (accessed April 16, 2021). (accessed policy/chinas-economy-probably-shrank-in-2020/ papers/w24036/w24036.pdf (accessed April 26, 2021); Gaurav Khanna, Wenquan Liang, A. Mushfiq Mobarak, and Ran Song, “The Productivity Consequences of Consequences Productivity and Ran Song, “The Mobarak, Liang, A. Mushfiq Khanna, Wenquan Gaurav 2021); April 26, (accessed papers/w24036/w24036.pdf , Vol. 4, No. 9 (September 1, 2020), pp. E386–E398, https:// E386–E398, pp. 1, 2020), 9 (September No. 4, , Vol. Lancet The 2017,” of Disease Study the Global Burden for An Analysis 1990–2017: China and Its Provinces, website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200921_RiskMatrix_FullReport_0.pdf (accessed April 17, 2021). April 17, (accessed website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200921_RiskMatrix_FullReport_0.pdf www.thelancet.com/article/S2542-5196(20)30161-3/fulltext (accessed April 26 2021); Shuai Chen, Paulina Oliva, and Peng Zhang, “The Effect of Air Pollution on of Air Effect Zhang, “The and Peng Oliva, Shuai Chen, Paulina 2021); April 26 (accessed www.thelancet.com/article/S2542-5196(20)30161-3/fulltext (accessed April 16, 2021). (accessed (accessed April 26, 2021). April 26, (accessed csis.org/analysis/greening-or-greenwashing-belt-and-road-initiative (accessed April 26, 2021). April 26, (accessed csis.org/analysis/greening-or-greenwashing-belt-and-road-initiative com/blogs/china-economic-watch/china-recovers-pandemic-will-zombie-firms-return (accessed April 17, 2021). April 17, (accessed com/blogs/china-economic-watch/china-recovers-pandemic-will-zombie-firms-return MacroPolo, “China’s Debt Hangover.” “China’s MacroPolo, 2021). April 17, (accessed https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/07/china-working-ageing-population/ 2016, July 25, Forum, Economic World Economy.” China’s Evaluate to “How Scissors, See International Monetary Fund, Asia and Pacific Department, “IMF Staff Country Reports: People’s Republic of China: 2020 Article IV Consultation-Press Consultation-Press 2020 Article IV Republic of China: People’s Reports: Country Staff “IMF Department, Asia and Pacific Fund, Monetary See International , May 1, 2019, https://www. 1, 2019, & Opinion, May Fact Energy Studies and International Strategic for Center Initiative?” the Belt and Road or Greenwashing “Greening Jane Nakano, Paper Working Research of Economic Bureau National Accounts,” National of China’s Examination Forensic and Zheng Song, “A Hsieh, Chen, Chang-Tai Chen, Xilu Wei For example, China’s network of dam construction projects: “These problems are compounded by the PRC’s failure to share critical water flow data, without which data, flow critical water share to failure PRC’s the by compounded are problems “These projects: of dam construction network China’s example, For , ed. Terry Miller, Anthony B. Kim, and James M. Roberts (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2021), pp. 144–145, 144–145, pp. 2021), Heritage Foundation, The (Washington: Kim, and James M. Roberts B. Anthony Miller, , ed. Terry Freedom Economic of Index in 2021 “China,” Tianlei Huang, “As China Recovers from the Pandemic, Will Zombie Firms Return?” Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 21, 2020, https://www.piie. 21, 2020, October Economics, International for Institute Peterson Firms Return?” Zombie Will the Pandemic, from Recovers China Huang, “As Tianlei https://csis- 2020, September Studies, and International Strategic for , Center Risk Matrix China Economic The and Daniel H. Rosen, Gloudeman, Lauren Wright, Logan 2021, 25, March Economics, International for Institute Peterson 2021,” of US Goods as of February Purchases China’s “US–China Phase One Tracker: Bown, Chad P. Center for Strategic and International Studies, “China Power Project,” https://chinapower.csis.org (accessed April 16, 2021). (accessed https://chinapower.csis.org Project,” Power “China Studies, and International Strategic for Center https://www.heritage.org/china-transparency-project/indexes-rankings 2021, 30, March & Rankings,” “Indexes Project, China Transparency Heritage Foundation, The April 16, 2021). (accessed https://merics.org/en/trade-and-investment and Investment,” “Trade China Studies, for Institute Mercator 2021). April 17, (accessed https://www.caixinglobal.com/index/ PMI,” Caixin Manufacturing PMI and Caixin Services Caixin Global, “Indexes: Derek Scissors, “How to Evaluate China’s Economy,” American Enterprise Institute, January 2019, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Chinas-economy. 2019, January Institute, American Enterprise Economy,” China’s Evaluate to “How Scissors, Derek April 16, 2021). (accessed https://macropolo.org/digital-projects/china-local-debt-hangover-map/ Debt Hangover,” “China’s MacroPolo, 2019, Institute, , Milken Economies Successful Most Nation’s Cities: The Best-Performing China 2019: Jackson, Lin, and Jessica C. Y. Michael Wong, See Perry , ed. Terry Miller and Anthony B. Kim (Washington: The The Kim (Washington: B. Miller and Anthony , ed. Terry Freedom Economic of Index 5 in 2015 Chapter and Development,” Energy, Freedom, “Economic Loris, D. Nicolas Peng Yin, Michael Brauer, Aaron J. Cohen, Haidong Wang, Jie Li, Richard T. Burnett, Jeffrey D. Stanaway, Kate Causey, Samantha Larson, William Godwin, Joseph Larson, Samantha Causey, Kate Stanaway, D. Jeffrey Burnett, T. Jie Li, Richard Haidong Wang, Cohen, J. Aaron Michael Brauer, Yin, Peng blog, January 18, 2021, https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense- AEIdeas blog, January 18, 2021, Institute, Enterprise American in 2020,” Shrank Probably Economy “China’s Scissors, Derek https://www.heritage.org/china-transparency-project/outbound- 2021, 30, March Investments,” “Outbound Project, China Transparency Heritage Foundation, The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, “International Cyber Policy Center,” https://www.aspi.org.au/program/international-cyber-policy-centre (accessed April 20, 2021). April 20, (accessed https://www.aspi.org.au/program/international-cyber-policy-centre Center,” Policy Cyber “International Institute, Policy Strategic Australian 2021). April 20, (accessed https://www.cigionline.org/subject/china “China,” Innovation, Governance International for Center McKinsey Global Institute, “About MGI,” https://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/overview/about-us (accessed April 20, 2021). April 20, (accessed https://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/overview/about-us MGI,” “About Global Institute, McKinsey Brookings Institution, “Global China: Technology,” https://www.brookings.edu/product/global-china-technology/ (accessed April 20, 2021). 20, April (accessed https://www.brookings.edu/product/global-china-technology/ China: Technology,” “Global Institution, Brookings (accessed https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/content/gtg-digichina Center,” Policy Cyber Studies, International for Institute Spogli “Freeman University, Stanford Georgetown University, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, https://cset.georgetown.edu/ (accessed April 20, 2021). April 20, (accessed https://cset.georgetown.edu/ Technology, and Emerging Security for Center University, Georgetown April 16, 2021). April 20, 2021). April 20, 8. 6. 69. Energy and Environment Energy Economy 5. 9. 5. 3. 3. 2. 2. 15. 16. 17. 14. 13. 11. 12. 10. 1. 1. 4. 4. 7. 73. 74. 72. 70. 71.  7. 10. 11. 12. 124 13. 14. 16. 15. 19. 18. 17. 29. 28. 30. 20. 33. 32. 31. 21. 27. 26. 25. 24. 23. 22. 9. 6. 8. April 26, 2021). April 26, 2021). Air Pollution Data?” Journalof Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 68,No. 2(September 2014), pp. 203–225, http://junjiezhang.org/files/2014_JEEM_ Jie Ban, ZonghauJie Ban, Du,QingWang, RunmeiMa,Ying Zhou,andTiantian Li,“Environmental HealthIndicators for China:Data Resources for ChineseEnvironmental U.S. Embassy andConsulates inChina,“Air Quality Monitor,” https://china.usembassy-china.org.cn/embassy-consulates/shanghai/air-quality-monitor-stateair/ Michael Standaert, “China Wrestles withtheToxic Aftermath ofRare EarthMining,” Yale Environment 360, July2,2019, https://e360.yale.edu/features/china-wrestles- Christina Larson, “InChina,aNew Transparency onGovernment Pollution Data,” Yale Environment 360, December 20, 2010, https://e360.yale.edu/features/ For example, China’s sizableillegal,unreported, andunregulated fishingininternational waters. U.S. Department of State, “Telephonic Press BriefingwithJon International Energy Agency, World Energy Balances: Database Documentation, 2020 Edition, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/4f314df4-8c60-4e48-9f36- Hsu et al.,“Addressing inChina’s Gaps Environmental Data: The Existing Landscape.” Chris Buckley, “China BurnsMuchMore Coal thanReported, Complicating Climate Talks,” The New York Times, November 3,2015, https://www.nytimes. Eleanor AlbertandBeinaXu, “China’s Environmental Crisis,” Council onForeign Relations Backgrounder, last updated January18,2016, https://www.cfr.org/ China Electricity Council, “Data & Publications,” https://english.cec.org.cn/menu/index.html?251 (accessed April26, 2021). People’s Republic ofChina,Ministry ofNatural Resources, “Natural Resources Bulletin,” http://www.mnr.gov.cn/sj/tjgb/ (accessed April29, 2021). National Bureau ofStatistics ofChina, “Annual Data,” andNational Bureau ofStatistics ofChina,ChinaStatistical Yearbook 2020, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ Zheng Yibing, “China Releases Once-a-Decade National Census onPollution Sources,” ChinaGlobalTelevision Network, June10, 2020, https://news.cgtn.com/ In astudy publishedintheJournalof Environmental Economics and Management, theauthors found “that about50%ofcitiesreported dubiousPM10pollutionlevels US–China Business Council, “Ministry ofEcology andEnvironment (MEE),” information accurate asofSeptember 2019, https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/ Reports covering theyears from 1996–2019 are available at People’s Republic ofChina,Ministry ofEcology andEnvironment, “Report ontheState oftheEcology and China National Environmental Monitoring Centre, “Real-time National AirQuality Data,” http://www.cnemc.cn/en/ (accessed April29, 2021). Angel Hsu,Amy Weinfurter, Jeffrey Tong, and Yihao Xie, “BlackandSmelly Waters: How Citizen-Generated Transparency Is AddressingGaps inChina’s Environmental et al.,“EnvironmentalJie Ban HealthIndicators for China.” Angel Hsu,ChendanYan, andYaping Cheng,“Addressing inChina’s Gaps Environmental Data: The Existing Landscape,” Yale Data-Driven, January2017, https:// National Bureau ofStatistics ofChina,“Annual Data,” http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/AnnualData/ (accessed April26, 2021). The database covers the People’s Republic ofChina,Ministry ofEcology andEnvironment, “Report ontheState oftheEcology andEnvironment inChina,” andPeople’s Republic ofChina, Yuli Shan,DaboGuan,Heran Zheng,JiaminOu,Yuan Li,JingMeng,ZhifuMi,ZhuLiu,andQiangZhang,“China CO China.org.cn, “National Climate ChangeProgram,” June4, 2007, http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/213624.htm (accessed April26, 2021). China Meteorological Administration, National Climate Center, “China’s BlueBookonClimate Change(2020) Release: Climate System Warming Accelerates,” August Bing Wang, GeHong,Chao-QunCui,HaoYu, andTad Murty, “Comprehensive Analysis onChina’s National Climate ChangeAssessment Reports: Action andEmphasis,” China Meteorological News Press, “CMA Meteorological OpensBasic Data andProducts to for thePublic Free,” September 30, 2015, http://www.cma.gov.cn/en2014/ National Bureau ofStatistics ofChina,“Annual Data,” andNational Bureau ofStatistics ofChina,2020 ChinaStatistical Yearbook . 2020), http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2020/indexeh.htm (accessed April27, 2021). 24, 2020, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/imZOsVOtDxLkQtUQQstlXw (accessed April26, 2021). com/2015/11/04/world/asia/china-burns-much-more-coal-than-reported-complicating-climate-talks.html (accessed April26, 2021). of Statistics, andMinistry ofAgriculture andRural Affairs ofthe People’s Republic ofChina, “AnnouncementPublication onthe oftheBulletin oftheSecond National of theSecond National Survey ofPollution Sources,” June8,2020, attached to Ministry ofEcological Environment ofthePeople’s Republic ofChina,National Bureau (accessed April26, 2021); @BeijingAir, Twitter, https://twitter.com/BeijingAir (accessed April26, 2021); andU.S. Department ofState, “StateAir: “U.S. Department of years from 1999–2019. For themost recently issued report, seeNational Bureau ofStatistics ofChina,2020 ChinaStatistical Yearbook (Beijing:ChinaStatistics Press, State AirQuality Monitoring Program,” http://www.stateair.net/ (April 26, 2021). Survey ofPollution Sources,” Announcement 2020 No. 33,June8,2020, https://www.mee.gov.cn/xxgk2018/xxgk/xxgk01/202006/t20200610_783547.html (accessed deputy-assistant-secretary-in-the-bureau-of-western-hemisphere-affairs-and-david-hogan-acting-director-in-the-office-of-marine-conservation-at-the-burea/index. 5 (2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/sdata2017201 (accessed April26, 2021). with-the-toxic-aftermath-of-rare-earth-mining (accessed April26, 2021). datadrivenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/ThirdWave_Data_Gap_Analysis_Final.pdf (accessed April26, 2021). ndsj/2020/indexeh.htm (accessed April26, 2021). Frontiers of EngineeringManagement, Vol. 6,No. 1(March 2019), pp. 52–61. news/2020-06-10/China-releases-once-a-decade-national-census-on-pollution-sources-RdqS1ZCxQA/index.html (accessed April26, 2021), andMinistry ofEcological mee_-_ministry_of_ecology_and_environment_2018.10.pdf (accessed April26, 2021), andChinaNews Network, “Ministry ofEcological Environment: ANational nature.com/articles/d41586-019-01661-1 (accessed April26, 2021). news/News/201509/t20150930_294222.html (accessed April26, 2021). that ledto adiscontinuity at thecut-off [during the years from 2001–2010].” DaliaGhanemandJunjieZhang,“‘Effortless Perfection:’ DoChineseCitiesManipulate Public HealthTracking,”Public Environmental HealthPerspectives, Vol. 127, No. 4(April 2019), https://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/doi/10.1289/EHP4319 (accessed April26, 2021). Bureau ofOceans andInternational Environmental andScientific Affairs,” October 9, 2020, https://2017-2021.state.gov/telephonic-press-briefing-with-jon-piechowski- Piechowski, Deputy Assistant Secretary inthe Bureau ofWestern Hemisphere Affairs andDavid Hogan, Acting Director intheOffice ofMarine Conservation at the Development ofthePeople’s Republic ofChina,National Bureau ofStatistics, andMinistry ofAgriculture andRural Affairs ofthe People’s Republic ofChina,“Bulletin Ecological Monitoring Network Will BeInitiallyEstablished by 2025,” January4, 2021, https://www.chinanews.com/gn/2021/01-04/9378210.shtml (accessed Manipulation_Zhang.pdf (accessed April26, 2021). SeealsoDavid Cyranoski, “Pollution Cover-ups ExposedinChineseProvinces,” Nature, May 28,2019, https://www. Reports/soe/SOEE2019/202012/P020201215587453898053.pdf (accessed April26, 2021). Republic ofChina,Ministry ofEcology andEnvironment, 2019 Report ontheState of theEcology andEnvironment inChina,http://english.mee.gov.cn/Resources/ Environment inChina,” http://english.mee.gov.cn/Resources/Reports/soe/index.shtml (accessed April26, 2021). For themost recently available report, seePeople’s Management,” Journalof Environmental Policy andPlanning,Vol. 22,No. 1(August 15, 2016), pp. 138–153, August 15, 2016. in_china_a_new_transparency_on_government_pollution_data (accessed April26, 2021). Ministry ofEcology andEnvironment, 2019 Report ontheState of theEcology andEnvironment inChina. html (accessed April26, 2021). bfea3d2b7fd5/WorldBAL_2020_Documentation.pdf (accessed April26, 2021). backgrounder/chinas-environmental-crisis (accessed April26, 2021). China Transparency Report 2 Emission Accounts 1997–2005,” Scientific Data, Vol.  125 , 2020, https://ourworldindata.org/co2/country/ , 2020, in Data Our World Profile,” Country 2 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The https://epi.yale.edu/about-epi (accessed April 25, 2021). April 25, (accessed https://epi.yale.edu/about-epi , 69th ed., https://www.bp.com/content/ , 69th 2020 Energy World of Review Statistical see BP, review, statistical the complete For 2021). April 27, (accessed insights.html Resources/Reports/Annual_Report_for_Nuclear_Safety/ (accessed April 26, 2021), which lists National Nuclear Safety Administration annual reports for 2009–2019. for annual reports Administration Nuclear Safety National which lists 2021), April 26, (accessed Resources/Reports/Annual_Report_for_Nuclear_Safety/ Is China Still a Developing Country, and Why and Why Country, a Developing Is China Still Jianjun Tu, and Kevin and Philippe Benoit April 28, 2021), (accessed the,access%20to%20electricity%20in%202016. , July 2018, https://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2018/08/Coding-Manual-.pdf (accessed (accessed https://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2018/08/Coding-Manual-.pdf , July 2018, Manual Coding Database Center Policy Global Development University, production-consumption (accessed April 28, 2021). (accessed production-consumption plant-tracker/methodology/ (accessed April 26, 2021). April 26, (accessed plant-tracker/methodology/ China Project,” https://chinaproject.harvard.edu/about (accessed April 26, 2021). April 26, (accessed https://chinaproject.harvard.edu/about China Project,” , p. 162. , p. Edition 2020 Documentation, Database and-road (accessed April 26, 2021). April 26, (accessed and-road www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/P1799_web.pdf (accessed April 27, 2021). April 27, (accessed www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/P1799_web.pdf energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/file-uploads/ChinaDevelopingCountry_CGEP-Report_072220.pdf (accessed April 28, 2021). 28, April (accessed energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/file-uploads/ChinaDevelopingCountry_CGEP-Report_072220.pdf April 28, 2021). (accessed environment-still-grim-despite-five-years-of-progress-idUSKBN2760EF energy/uranium-2020_d82388ab-en#page190 (accessed April 27, 2021). April 27, (accessed energy/uranium-2020_d82388ab-en#page190 , Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs, Center on Global Energy Policy, July 2020, p. 13, https://www. p. 13, July 2020, Policy, on Global Energy Center and Public Affairs, School of International University, , Columbia and Climate Energy for It Matters dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2020-full-report.pdf (accessed April 27, 2021). April 27, (accessed dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2020-full-report.pdf (accessed April 27, 2021). April 27, (accessed (accessed April 26, 2021). April 26, (accessed (accessed April 26, 2021), and Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser, “China: CO “China: Roser, and Max and Hannah Ritchie 2021), April 26, (accessed (accessed April 26, 2021), and People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Ecology and Environment, “Annual Report for Nuclear Safety,” http://english.mee.gov.cn/ Safety,” Nuclear for Report “Annual and Environment, of Ecology of China, Ministry Republic and People’s 2021), April 26, (accessed china?country=~CHN (accessed April 26, 2021). April 26, (accessed china?country=~CHN 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-08/IB4754.pdf. 2017, 27, 2021), and BP, “Country Insight—China,” https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/energy-outlook/country-and-regional-insights/china- Insight—China,” “Country and BP, 2021), 27, BP, “Statistical Review of World Energy,” 2020. Energy,” of World Review “Statistical BP, https://www.reuters.com/article/china-environment/china-says- 21, 2020, October of Progress,” Years Five Grim Despite Still Environment Says “China Reuters, Energy.” to “Access and Roser, Ritchie 2020. Energy,” of World Review “Statistical BP, and Development.” Energy, Freedom, “Economic Loris, 27. , p. and Climate Energy for It Matters and Why Country, a Developing Is China Still Benoit and Tu, 15, August 4754, Brief No. Issue Heritage Foundation Jack Up Prices,” to Proposal Government by Threatened Sector Solar Energy “U.S. K. Whiting, and Tori Tubb Katie World Health Organization, “Ambient Air Quality Database Application,” https://whoairquality.shinyapps.io/AmbientAirQualityDatabase/ (accessed April 27, 2021). April 27, (accessed https://whoairquality.shinyapps.io/AmbientAirQualityDatabase/ Application,” Database Air Quality “Ambient Health Organization, World , https://ourworldindata.org/energy- in Data Our World Consumption,” and Production “Energy and Hannah Ritchie, Profile,” Country Energy “China: and Roser, Ritchie 2020. Energy,” of World Review “Statistical BP, and Consumption.” Production “Energy Ritchie, https://ourworldindata.org/energy-access#:~:text=At%20a%20global%20level%2C%20 , 2019, in Data Our World Energy,” to “Access Roser, and Max Hannah Ritchie , IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NW-T-1.14, 2018, https:// 2018, NW-T-1.14, Series No. , IAEA Nuclear Energy Management Waste and Radioactive Fuel in Spent and Trends Status Agency, Energy Atomic International (accessed https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/topics/topic-details/GHO/household-air-pollution “Household Air Pollution,” Health Organization, World Climate Watch, “China,” https://www.climatewatchdata.org/countries/CHN (accessed April 26, 2021). April 26, (accessed https://www.climatewatchdata.org/countries/CHN “China,” Watch, Climate 2021). April 27, (accessed https://climateactiontracker.org/about “About,” Tracker, Action Climate 2021). April 27, (accessed https://www.stimson.org/project/mekong-dam-monitor/ Dam Monitor,” “Mekong Center, Henry L. Stimson Balances: Energy World Agency, Energy International See also, 2021). April 27, (accessed https://www.iea.org/countries/china “China,” Agency, Energy nternational 168–169. , pp. Edition 2020 Documentation, Database Balances: Energy World Agency, Energy International example, for See, https://www.iaea.org/resources/databases/power-reactor-information-system-pris (PRIS),” System Information Reactor “Power Agency, Energy Atomic International https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/nuclear- and Demand , 2020, Production Resources, 2020: Uranium Agency, Energy Atomic and International Agency Nuclear Energy ,” dataset updated February 8, 2021, https://github.com/owid/co2-data https://github.com/owid/co2-data 8, 2021, February updated dataset ,” in Data Our World by Gas Emissions [sic] and Greenhouse on CO2 , “Data in Data Our World April (accessed https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html 2020, Energy,” of World Review “Statistical BP, Vizcarra, “Crazy Bad Air.” “Crazy Vizcarra, 2021). April 26, (accessed https://www.bu.edu/cgef/ Finance,” Global Energy “China’s Center, Policy Global Development University, Boston Boston Databases,” Center Policy Global Development for Note A Guidance Finance: Global Development “China’s Gallagher, P. Ma, and Kevin Junda Jin, Xinyue 2021). April 26, (accessed https://www.bu.edu/cgp/ Database,” Power Global “China’s Center, Policy Global Development University, Boston the Harvard– “About and Environment, Economy on Energy, Project Harvard–China School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, John A. Paulson University, Harvard 2021). April 26, (accessed https://globalenergymonitor.org/projects/ “Projects,” Monitor, Global Energy https://globalenergymonitor.org/projects/global-coal- “Methodology,” Tracker, Plant Global Coal Monitor, in Global Energy listed sources see the data example, For https://ourworldindata.org/energy/country/china?country=~CHN , 2020, in Data Our World Profile,” Country Energy “China: Roser, and Max Hannah Ritchie Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs, “About: Our Data,” http://wwwen.ipe.org.cn/about/about.html (accessed April 26, 2021). 26, April (accessed http://wwwen.ipe.org.cn/about/about.html Our Data,” “About: Affairs, of Public and Environmental Institute Data.” Pollution on Government Transparency “In China, a New Larson, Monitor.” Quality “Air in China, and Consulates Embassy U.S. https://merics.org/en/analysis/powering-belt- 2019, June 27, China Studies, for Institute Mercator Road,” the Belt and “Powering Mardell, and Jacob S. Eder Thomas and Space Aeronautics National Bad Air,” “Crazy Vizcarra, Natasha and Landscape,” Existing The Data: Environmental Gaps in China’s al., “Addressing Hsu et the EPI,” “About Network, Information Earth Science International for Center Earth Institute, University, and Columbia and Policy, Law Environmental for Center Yale The People’s Republic of China National Nuclear Safety Safety Nuclear China National of Republic People’s The Administration, Nuclear Safety National Environment, and of Ecology of China, Ministry Republic People’s April 27, 2021). April 27, April 26, 2021). April 26, Administration, Earthdata, October 11, 2013, https://earthdata.nasa.gov/learn/sensing-our-planet/crazy-bad-air (accessed April 26, 2021). April 26, (accessed https://earthdata.nasa.gov/learn/sensing-our-planet/crazy-bad-air 11, 2013, October Earthdata, Administration, , http://english.mee.gov.cn/Resources/Reports/Annual_Report_for_Nuclear_Safety/202012/P020201215534298767323.pdf , http://english.mee.gov.cn/Resources/Reports/Annual_Report_for_Nuclear_Safety/202012/P020201215534298767323.pdf Annual Report 2019 Administration 65. 66. Ibid. 67. 68. 69. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 58. 59. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 50. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 34. 49. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 40. 70. 71. 72.  79. 76. 75. 74. 78. 77. 73. 7. 4. 10. 1. 11. 126 12. 13. 14. 19. 18. 17. 16. 15. 2. 3. 23. 22. 21. 20. 5. 9. Human Rights 6. 83. Ibid. 82. Ibid. 81. 80. Ibid. 8. Journal of Environmental Management, Vol. 253 (January 1,2020), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337168172_Has_third-party_monitoring_improved_ April 22,2021). April 22,2021). Hsu et al.,“Addressing inChina’s Gaps Environmental Data: The Existing Landscape.” Xuejiao Niu,Xiaohu Wang, JieGao, andXueJun Wang, “HasThird-Party Monitoring Improved Environmental Quality? AnAnalysis ofAirPollution Data inChina,” World NuclearAssociation, “NuclearPower inChina,” updated April2021, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/china-nuclear- Ritchie andRoser, “China: Energy Country Profile,” and World NuclearAssociation, “World Nuclear Power Reactors &Uranium Requirements,” April2021, https:// Boston University, GlobalDevelopment Policy Center, “China’s GlobalEnergy Finance,” andBoston University, GlobalDevelopment Policy Center, “China’s Global Global Energy Monitor andCentre for Research onEnergy andCleanAir, “China Dominates 2020 Coal Plant Development,” GlobalEnergy Monitor Briefing,February Lauri Myllyvirta, “China’s Five-Year Plan:Baby Steps Towards CarbonNeutrality,” Centre for Research onEnergy andCleanAir, March 5, 2021, (accessed April28,2021). Ana Swanson andChrisBuckley, “Chinese SolarCompanies Tied to UseofForced Labor,” The New York Times, January28,2021, https://www.nytimes. Radio Free Asia,“MajorUyghur MosquesandShrinesDestroyed Since 2016,” May 15, 2019, https://www.rfa.org/english/multimedia/mosques-destroyed- Radio Free Asia,Department ofResearch, Training, andEvaluation, Trapped intheSystem: Experiences of Uyghur Detention inPost-2015 Xinjiang, Interviews from Radio Free Asia,“Uyghur,” https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur (accessed April22,2021). Austin RamzyandChrisBuckley, “‘Absolutely NoMercy’: Leaked FilesExposeHow ChinaOrganized Mass Detentions ofMuslims,” The New York Times , November 16, Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Exposed:China’s Operating Manualsfor Mass Internment andArrest by Algorithm,” International Consortium ofInvestigative Journalists, International Consortium ofInvestigative Journalists, “About,” https://www.icij.org/about/ (accessed April23, 2021). Xinjiang Victims Database, “Victims,” https://shahit.biz/eng/ (accessed April22,2021). News release, “China Revises Regulation onReligious Affairs,” State Council ofthe People’s Republic ofChina,updated September 7, 2017, http://english.gov.cn/ Ibid, p. 3. Andrew J. Nathan andAndrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). Megha Rajagopalan,AlisonKilling,andChristo Buschek,“China Secretly BuiltaVast New Infrastructure to ImprisonMuslims,” BuzzFeed News, August 27, 2020, Alison KillingandMeghaRajagopalan,“What They Saw: Ex-Prisoners Detail theHorrors ofChina’s Detention Camps,” BuzzFeed News, August 27, 2020, https://www. Megha RajagopalanandAlisonKilling,“InsideaXinjiang Detention Camp,” BuzzFeed News, December 3,2020, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/meghara/ Alison KillingandMeghaRajagopalan,“We Found theFactories InsideChina’s Mass Internment Camps,” BuzzFeed News, last updated January4, 2021, https://www. Hong Kong Watch, “Protest Prosecution Database,” last updated April16,2021, https://www.hongkongwatch.org/protest-prosecution (accessed April22,2021). Tibetan Centre for HumanRights andDemocracy, “Tibetan Political PrisonerDatabase,” https://tchrd.uwazi.io/ (accessed April22,2021). Adrian Zenz andJamesLeibold, “Xinjiang’s RapidlyEvolving Security State,” Jamestown Foundation ChinaBrief , Vol. 17, Issue 4(March 14, 2017), https://jamestown. Adrian Zenz, “Xinjiang’s System ofMilitarized Vocational Training Comes to Tibet,” Jamestown Foundation ChinaBrief,Vol. 20, Issue 17(September 22,2020), https:// Uyghur HumanRights Project, “Ideological Transformation”: Records of Mass Detention from Qaraqash, Hotan , February 2020, https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/UHRP_ Adrian Zenz, “Coercive LaborinXinjiang: LaborTransfer andtheMobilization ofEthnic Minoritiesto PickCotton,” Newlines Institute for Strategy andPolicy Adrian Zenz, Sterilizations, andMandatory IUDs, BirthControl: The CCP’s Campaign to Suppress Uyghur Birthrates inXinjiang , Jamestown Foundation, updated March Adrian Zenz andJamesLeibold, “Chen Quanguo: The Strongman BehindBeijing’s Securitization Strategy inTibet andKinjiang,” Jamestown Foundation ChinaBrief, Human Rights Watch, “China’s AlgorithmsofRepression: Reverse EngineeringaXinjiang Police Mass Surveillance App,” May 1,2019, https://www.hrw.org/ 2021, https://globalenergymonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/China-Dominates-2020-Coal-Development.pdf (accessed April28,2021). 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html (accessed April22,2021). com/2021/01/08/business/economy/china-solar-companies-forced-labor-xinjiang.html (accessed April28,2021). org/program/xinjiangs-rapidly-evolving-security-state/ (accessed April22,2021). Vol. 17, Issue 12(September 21,2017), https://jamestown.org/program/chen-quanguo-the-strongman-behind-beijings-securitization-strategy-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/ (accessed April22, 2021). environmental_data_quality_An_analysis_of_air_pollution_data_in_China (accessed April28,2021). world-nuclear.org/information-library/facts-and-figures/world-nuclear-power-reactors-and-uranium-requireme.aspx (accessed April28,2021)). 17, 2021, https://jamestown.org/product/sterilizations-iuds-and-mandatory-birth-control-the-ccps-campaign-to-suppress-uyghur-birthrates-in-xinjiang/ (accessed Intelligence Briefing,December 14, 2020, https://newlinesinstitute.org/china/coercive-labor-in-xinjiang-labor-transfer-and-the-mobilization-of-ethnic-minorities-to- November 2019 to May 2020 , https://www.rfa.org/about/releases/trapped-in-the-system-experiences-of-uyghur-detention-in-post-2015-xinjiang-02022021061642. power.aspx (accessed April28,2021). policies/latest_releases/2017/09/07/content_281475842719170.htm (accessed April22,2019). QaraqashDocument.pdf (accessed April22,2021). pick-cotton/ (accessed April22,2021). report/2019/05/01/chinas-algorithms-repression/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-police-mass (accessed April22,2021). Power Database.” November 24, 2019, https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/exposed-chinas-operating-manuals-for-mass-internment-and-arrest-by-algorithm/ (accessed infographic-05152019155228.html (accessed April22,2021). html/experiences_of_uyghur_detention_in_post-2015_xinjiang.pdf (accessed April22,2021). inside-xinjiang-detention-camp (accessed April22,2021). https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/meghara/china-new-internment-camps-xinjiang-uighurs-muslims (accessed April22,2021). buzzfeednews.com/article/alison_killing/china-ex-prisoners-horrors-xinjiang-camps-uighurs (accessed April22,2021). jamestown.org/program/jamestown-early-warning-brief-xinjiangs-system-of-militarized-vocational-training-comes-to-tibet/ (accessed April22,2021). buzzfeednews.com/article/alison_killing/xinjiang-camps-china-factories-forced-labor (accessed April22,2021). China Transparency Report  127 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The bill/106th-congress/house-bill/3244 (accessed April 23, 2021). (accessed bill/106th-congress/house-bill/3244 house-bill/2431 (accessed April 25, 2021). April 25, (accessed house-bill/2431 , April 2020, https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/USCIRF%202020%20Annual%20Report_42720_new_0.pdf (accessed (accessed https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/USCIRF%202020%20Annual%20Report_42720_new_0.pdf , April 2020, 2020 Annual Report Freedom, Religious Freedom%20on%20the%20Net,a%20set%20of%20methodology%20questions.&text=The%20index%20rates%20the%20real,by%20individuals%20within%20 freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2017/battle-chinas-spirit (accessed April 22, 2021). (accessed freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2017/battle-chinas-spirit April 22, 2021). (accessed to_Chinese_Aid_Effectiveness__A_Subnational_Analysis_of_Chinese_Development_Projects.pdf uploads/2020/06/2020-TIP-Report-Complete-062420-FINAL.pdf (accessed April 23, 2021). (accessed uploads/2020/06/2020-TIP-Report-Complete-062420-FINAL.pdf reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/china/ (accessed April 23, 2021). (accessed reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/china/ , AidData, December 2019, https://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/Silk_Road_Diplomacy_Report.pdf https://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/Silk_Road_Diplomacy_Report.pdf 2019, December Asia, AidData, Central South and Influence to Toolkit Beijing’s Deconstructing each%20country (accessed April 22, 2021). (accessed each%20country 14–16, https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/China_0.pdf (accessed April 23, 2021). For the complete report, see United States Commission on International on International Commission States report, see United complete For the 2021). April 23, (accessed https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/China_0.pdf 14–16, No. 83, July 2019, http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/WPS83_Is_Favoritism_a_Threat_ 83, July 2019, No. Paper Working AidData Projects,” of Chinese Development Analysis Subnational (accessed April 23, 2021). (accessed (accessed April 23, 2021). (accessed (accessed April 22, 2021). (accessed , June 2020, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/ Edition, June 2020, 20th Report, in Persons Persons, Trafficking in Trafficking Combat and to Monitor Office of State, cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/2020%20ANNUAL%20REPORT%20FINAL%201223.pdf (accessed April 23, 2021). (accessed cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/2020%20ANNUAL%20REPORT%20FINAL%201223.pdf April 23, 2021). (accessed https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/CECC%20Pris%20List%2020191010.pdf cases),” conscience#:~:text=USCIRF%20defines%20Religious%20Prisoners%20of,not%20used%20or%20advocated%20violence (accessed April 23, 2021). (accessed conscience#:~:text=USCIRF%20defines%20Religious%20Prisoners%20of,not%20used%20or%20advocated%20violence , March 30, 2021, https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/china/ (accessed (accessed https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/china/ 2021, 30, , March and Tibet) Macau, China (Includes Hong Kong, gov/frequently-asked-questions-irf-report-and-countries-of-particular-concern/ (accessed April 23, 2021). (accessed gov/frequently-asked-questions-irf-report-and-countries-of-particular-concern/ , AidData, June 2018, http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/Ties_That_Bind--Full_Report.pdf (accessed (accessed http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/Ties_That_Bind--Full_Report.pdf 2018, June , AidData, Neighbor” Effect “Good and Its Public Diplomacy China’s , June 10, 2020, https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china/ (accessed (accessed https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china/ 2020, , June 10, and Macau) Hong Kong, Xinjiang, (Includes Tibet, 3483, April 6, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/how-the-chinese-government-undermined-the-chinese-peoples-attempts-prevent-and-respond. 3483, April 6, 2020, 30, 2020, https://www.chinafile.com/state-surveillance-china (accessed April 24, 2021). 24, April (accessed https://www.chinafile.com/state-surveillance-china 2020, 30, , April 2020, pp. pp. , April 2020, 2020 Annual Report Freedom, Religious on International Commission States on China, see United section report’s issued recently the most For H.R. 3244, Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Public Law 106-386, October 28, 2000, Sec. 110(a)(1) and (2), https://www.congress.gov/ Sec. 110(a)(1) and (2), 28, 2000, October Law 106-386, Public Act of 2000, Protection Violence and of Trafficking Victims H.R. 3244, Sisi Wei, “Inside the Firewall: Tracking the News That China Blocks,” ProPublica, December 17, 2014, https://projects.propublica.org/firewall/ (accessed April 24, 2021). 24, April (accessed https://projects.propublica.org/firewall/ 2014, 17, December ProPublica, China Blocks,” That the News Tracking “Inside the Firewall: Sisi Wei, https://www. 2020, December 2nd Sess., , 116th Cong., 2020 on China, Annual Report Commission see Congressional–Executive report, issued recently the most For (1,598 2019 10, or Imprisoned as of October Detained Prisoners of Political List “China: Prisoner Database, on China, Political Commission Congressional–Executive Practices: on Human Rights Reports Country 2020 and Labor, Human Rights, of Democracy, Bureau of State, Department see U.S. report, issued recently the most For United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, “Frequently Asked Questions,” https://www.uscirf.gov/about-uscirf/frequently-asked-questions https://www.uscirf.gov/about-uscirf/frequently-asked-questions Questions,” Asked “Frequently Freedom, Religious on International Commission States United (accessed https://www.uscirf.gov/victims-list/ List,” or Belief Victims Religion of “Freedom Freedom, Religious on International Commission States United https://www.uscirf.gov/religious-prisoners- of Conscience,” Prisoners “Religious Freedom, Religious on International Commission States United April 23, 2021). (accessed https://shows.acast.com/china-uncovered/episodes/the-crisis-in-xinjiang , podcast, China Uncovered Heritage Foundation, The No. Backgrounder Heritage Foundation COVID-19,” to and Respond Prevent to Attempts Undermines the Chinese People’s the Chinese Government Olivia Enos, “How U.S. Department of State, Office of International Religious Freedom, “Frequently Asked Questions: IRF Report and Countries of Particular Concern,” https://www.state. Concern,” Particular of Countries Report and IRF Questions: Asked “Frequently Freedom, Religious International of Office of State, Department U.S. https://www.state.gov/2021-hong-kong-policy-act-report/ Report,” Act Policy Kong Hong “2021 Affairs, Asian and Pacific of East Bureau of State, Department U.S. , Report: China in Persons Trafficking Persons, 2020 in Trafficking Combat and to Monitor Office of State, Department see U.S. report, issued recently the most For H.R. 2431, International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Public Law 105-292, 105th Cong., October 27, 1998, Sec. 102, https://www.congress.gov/bill/105th-congress/ 1998, Sec. 102, 27, October 105th Cong., 105-292, of 1998, Public Law Act Freedom Religious International H.R. 2431, , March 30, 2021, https://www.state.gov/ 2021, 30, , March Practices on Human Rights Report Country 2020 and Labor, Human Rights, of Democracy, Bureau of State, Department U.S. China Freedom: Religious on International Report Freedom, 2019 Religious International of Office of State, Department see U.S. report, issued recently the most For Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2020: Hong Kong,” https://freedomhouse.org/country/hong-kong/freedom-world/2020 (accessed April 24, 2021). April 24, (accessed https://freedomhouse.org/country/hong-kong/freedom-world/2020 Hong Kong,” 2020: in the World “Freedom House, Freedom 2021). April 24, (accessed https://freedomhouse.org/country/tibet/freedom-world/2020 Tibet,” 2020: in the World “Freedom House, Freedom October ChinaFile, People,” Its to Monitor Efforts on China’s Evidence New Reveal Documents Government of Surveillance: “State Ohlberg, and Mareike Batke Jessica , February 2017, https:// 2017, , February House Special Report , Freedom Jinping Under Xi and Resistance Repression, Revival, Spirit: Religious China’s Battle for The Cook, Sarah April 23, 2021). (accessed https://www.opendoorsusa.org/christian-persecution/world-watch-list/china/ “China,” Open Doors, April 22, 2021). (accessed https://www.aiddata.org/about AidData,” “About AidData, Institute, Global Research and Mary, William of College A Chinese Aid Effectiveness? to Threat a “Is Favoritism Tierney, and Michael J. A. Raschky, Paul C. Parks, Bradley Hodler, Roland Fuchs, Andreas Dreher, Axel Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2020: China,” https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2020 (accessed April 24, 2021). April 24, (accessed https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2020 China,” 2020: in the World “Freedom House, Freedom (accessed https://freedomhouse.org/reports/freedom-world/freedom-world-research-methodology Methodology,” Research in the World “Freedom House, Freedom Ties That Bind: Quantifying Bind: Quantifying That Ties Turner, Sims, and Jennifer Desai, Jacob Harsh Ghose, Cheng, Siddhartha Mengfan DiLorenzo, Matthew Russell, Brooke Samantha Custer, Silk Road Diplomacy: Diplomacy: Silk Road Baehr, and Austin Knight, Rodney Gupta, Anubhav Lin, Siddhartha Ghose, Jiahui A. Solis, Joyce Jonathan Sethi, Tanya Samantha Custer, 2021). April 24, (accessed https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-net/2020 China,” 2020: on the Net “Freedom House, Freedom https://freedomhouse.org/reports/freedom-net/freedom-net-research-methodology#:~:text=The%20 Methodology,” Research on the Net “Freedom House, Freedom April 23, 2021). April 23, 2021). April 23, 2021). April 23, 2021). April 22, 2021). April 22, 2021). June 2020, https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-trafficking-in-persons-report/china/ (accessed April 23, 2021). For the complete report, see U.S. Department U.S. Department report, see complete For the 2021). April 23, (accessed https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-trafficking-in-persons-report/china/ June 2020, 50. 51. 52. 53. 37. 38. 39. 34. 35. 36. 32. 33. 30. 31. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 48. 47. 40. 49. 44. 45. 46. 43. 41. 42.  7. 4. 10. 1. 19. 18. 17. 16. 15. 14. 13. 12. 11. 128 2. 29. 28. 27. 26. 25. 24. 23. 22. 21. 20. 3. 31. 30. 35. 34. 33. 32. Influence Operations 5. 9. 6. 8. Analysis,” March 3,2019, https://mapinfluence.eu/en/czech-parliamentary-discourse-analysis/ (accessed April22,2021). Analysis,” June13,2019, https://mapinfluence.eu/en/polish-social-network-analysis/ (accessed April22,2021); andMapInfluenCE, “Czech Parliamentary Discourse April 22,2021). U.S. Department ofJustice, National Security Division,“Obligation ofCGTN Americato Register undertheForeign Agents Registration Act,” December 20, 2018, Dale, “China’s Investment Diplomacy.” inPublic “Foreign Policy PrioritiesintheFY11International Affairs Budget,” hearingbefore the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 111th Cong., 2ndSess., February 24, Sarah Cook, “Beijing’s GlobalMegaphone:The ExpansionofChineseCommunist Party Media Influence Since 2017,” Freedom House, January2020, https:// Renée Diresta et al.,“Telling China’s Story: The ChineseCommunist Party’s Campaignto ShapeGlobalNarratives,” Stanford Internet Observatory, 2020, https://fsi-live. Officially, theChinese government refers tothe Central Propaganda Department asthe Central Publicity Department. Thisisa resultofchangeintheEnglish Helle Dale, “China’s Investment Diplomacy,” inPublic Explaining America: ATrack-II Engagement Public Project, April9, 2010, https://explainingamerica.wordpress. Zheng Bijian,“China’s ‘Peaceful Riseto Great Power,” Foreign Affairs , September/October, 2005. Alliance for Securing Democracy, “Authoritarian Interference Tracker,” The GermanMarshall Fund oftheUnited States, https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/toolbox/ Eric V. Larson et al.,“Foundations ofEffective Influence Operations: A Framework forEnhancingArmy Capabilities,” RAND Corporation, 2009, https://www.rand.org/ U.S. Department ofJustice, National Security Division/Foreign Agents Registration Act Unit,“China DailyDistribution Corp Registration Supplemental Statement,” Alex Joske, “The Party Speaks for You,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June9, 2020, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/party-speaks-you (accessed April22,2021). John Dotson,“The CCP’s New Directives for United Front Work inPrivate Enterprises,” The Jamestown Foundation, September 28,2020, https://jamestown.org/ Sinopec, “China Petrochemical Corporation AnnualReport 2019,” 2019, http://www.sinopecgroup.com/group/en/Resource/Pdf/GroupAnnualReport2019en.pdf Richard McGregor, The Party (New York: HarperCollins, 2010), p. 21. Lotus Ruan,Jeffrey Knockel, andMasashiCrete-Nishihata, “Censored Contagion: How Information onthe Coronavirus IsManagedonChineseSocialMedia,” The “Report: ChinaInternet FirmsCensored Coronavirus Terms, CriticismEarlyinOutbreak,” Voice ofAmerica,March 3,2020, https://www.voanews.com/press-freedom/ Helle Dale, “Chinese Coronavirus Disinformation CampaignTargets United States,” The DailySignal,March 18,2020, https://www.dailysignal.com/2020/03/18/chinese- Diresta et al.,“Telling China’s Story: The ChineseCommunist Party’s Campaignto ShapeGlobalNarratives.” Masashi Crete-Nishihata et al.,“Censored Contagion II:ATimeline ofInformation Control onChineseSocialMediaDuringCOVID-19,” The Citizen Lab, August 25, 2020, The Citizen Lab, University ofToronto MunkSchoolofGlobal AffairsPublic and Policy, https://citizenlab.ca/ (accessed April22,2021). MapInfluenCE, “Czech MediaAnalysis,” September 17, 2017, https://mapinfluence.eu/en/media-analysis/ (accessed April22, 2021); MapInfluenCE, “PolishSocial Media MapInfluenCE, https://mapinfluence.eu/en/ (accessed April22, 2021). CusterSamantha et al.,“Ties That Bind:Quantifying China’s Diplomacy Public Effect,” andIts‘Good Neighbor’ AidData, June 27, 2018, https://www.aiddata.org/ AidData, “China’s Diplomacy: Public OfficialFinance withDiplomatic Intent (2000–2017),” http://china-dashboard.aiddata.org/ (accessed April22, 2021). Alliance for Securing Democracy, “Authoritarian Interference Tracker,” The GermanMarshall Fund oftheUnited States, https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/toolbox/ Raymond Serrato andBret Schafer, “Reply All:Inauthenticity andCoordinated Replying inPro-Chinese Communist Party Twitter Networks,” ISD, July22,2020, https:// Alliance for Securing Democracy, “Hamilton 2.0 Dashboard,” The GermanMarshall Fund oftheUnited States, https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/hamilton- Kate O’Keeffe andAruna Viswanatha, “Chinese State MediaGiant CGTN Registers as Foreign Agent in U.S.,” The Wall Street Journal,February 5, 2019, https://www.wsj. Freedom House, “Out ofSight, NotOut ofReach: Understanding Transnational Repression,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/transnational-repression (accessed Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/ (accessed April22,2021). Glenn Tiffert, “Global Engagement: Rethinking Riskinthe Research Enterprise,” Hoover Institution, July30, 2020, https://www.hoover.org/global-engagement-rethinking- Hoover Institution, “China’s GlobalSharpPower,” https://www.hoover.org/research-teams/chinas-global-sharp-power-project (accessed April22,2021). Freedom House, “Chinese Media Bulletin,” https://freedomhouse.org/reports/china-media-bulletin (accessed April22,2021). Sarah Cook, “Beijing’s GlobalMegaphone: The ExpansionofChineseCommunist Party MediaInfluence Since 2017,” Freedom House, 2020, https://freedomhouse.org/ 2010, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/022410_Transcript_Foreign%20Policy%20Priorities%20in%20the%20FY11%20Intl%20Affairs%20Budget.pdf com/2010/04/09/confucius-to-their-enemies-china%E2%80%99s-investment-in-public-diplomacy/ (accessed April22,2021). on-the-coronavirus-is-managed-on-chinese-social-media/ (accessed April22,2021). corona-disinformation-campaign-targets-united-states/. com/articles/chinese-state-media-giant-cgtn-registers-as-foreign-agent-in-u-s-11549387532 (accessed April22,2021). (accessed April22,2021). (accessed April22,2021). s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/sio-china_story_white_paper-final.pdf (accessed April22,2021). dashboard/ (accessed April22,2021). www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ISDG-proCCP.pdf (accessed April22,2021). authoritarian-interference-tracker/ (accessed April22,2021). authoritarian-interference-tracker/ (accessed April22,2021). Citizen Lab, University ofToronto MunkSchoolofGlobalAffairsPublic and Policy, March 3,2020, https://citizenlab.ca/2020/03/censored-contagion-how-information- pubs/monographs/MG654.html (accessed April22,2021). program/the-ccps-new-directives-for-united-front-work-in-private-enterprises/ (accessed April22,2021). report-china-internet-firms-censored-coronavirus-terms-criticism-early-outbreak (accessed April22,2021). publications/ties-that-bind (accessed June18,2021), Custer andSamantha et al.,“Influencing theNarrative: How Chinese Government Mobilizes Students andMedia risk-research-enterprise (accessed April22,2021), andLarryDiamondOrvilleSchell,“China’s Influence &AmericanInterests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance,” report/special-report/2020/beijings-global-megaphone (accessed April22,2021). freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/beijings-global-megaphone (accessed April22,2021). translation oftheword xuanchuan (宣传),butnottheactual Chinesename. to BurnishItsImage,” AidData, December 9, 2019, https://www.aiddata.org/publications/influencing-the-narrative (accessed June18,2021). May 17, 2017, https://efile.fara.gov/docs/3457-Supplemental-Statement-20170517-24.pdf (accessed April22,2021). Hoover Institution, November 29, 2018, https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-promoting-constructive-vigilance (accessed April22,2021). https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/page/file/1282146/download (accessed April22,2021). https://citizenlab.ca/2020/08/censored-contagion-ii-a-timeline-of-information-control-on-chinese-social-media-during-covid-19/ (accessed April22,2021). China Transparency Report  129 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The boost-global-influence-idUSKCN0VS1IF (accessed April 22, 2021). (accessed boost-global-influence-idUSKCN0VS1IF Foreign-Technology-Beyond-Espionage/Hannas-Tatlow/p/book/9780367473570 (accessed June 18, 2021). (accessed Foreign-Technology-Beyond-Espionage/Hannas-Tatlow/p/book/9780367473570 Bureau of Asian Research, “Maritime Awareness Project,” https://map.nbr.org/ (accessed April 22, 2021). (accessed https://map.nbr.org/ Project,” “Maritime Awareness of Asian Research, Bureau Lab, Graphika, and International Republican Institute, August 2020, https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/detecting_digital_fingerprints-tracing_chinese_ 2020, August Institute, Republican and International Graphika, Lab, MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF (accessed April 21, 2021). April (accessed MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF International Cyber Policy Centre, “China Defence Universities Tracker,” https://www.aspi.org.au/report/china-defence-universities-tracker (accessed April 21, 2021). (accessed https://www.aspi.org.au/report/china-defence-universities-tracker Tracker,” Universities Defence “China Centre, Policy Cyber International Universities%20Tracker_0.pdf?ozIi2cWm.kXpe7XsEZ44vUMMQBNfnR_x (accessed April 21, 2021). For the tracker, see Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Institute, Policy Strategic see Australian the tracker, For April 21, 2021). (accessed Universities%20Tracker_0.pdf?ozIi2cWm.kXpe7XsEZ44vUMMQBNfnR_x files/bridge-ii_fullreport-r7-021221.pdf (accessed April 22, 2021). (accessed files/bridge-ii_fullreport-r7-021221.pdf public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika_report_spamouflage_breakout.pdf (accessed April 22, 2021). (accessed public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika_report_spamouflage_breakout.pdf April 22, 2021). (accessed xinjiang-6b29dbf5-b93c-4c70-bd4c-333e1c23471f.html Global-Media-Footprint-Democratic-Responses-to-Expanding-Authoritarian-Influence-Cook-Feb-2021.pdf?utm_source=forum&utm_medium=site&utm_ Cyber Policy Center, 2020, https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/sio-china_story_white_paper-final.pdf (accessed April 22, 2021). (accessed https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/sio-china_story_white_paper-final.pdf 2020, Center, Policy Cyber , Report No. 23/2019, November 24, 2019, https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2019-11/The%20China%20Defence%20 2019, 24, November 23/2019, No. , Report Brief Policy Centre Policy Cyber andrewerickson.com/2019/07/china-defense-white-papers-1995-2019-download-complete-set-read-highlights-here/ (accessed April 21, 2021). (accessed andrewerickson.com/2019/07/china-defense-white-papers-1995-2019-download-complete-set-read-highlights-here/ , generated August 21, 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA- 21, 2020, August , generated Congress to Report 2020: China of Republic People’s 2021). Routledge, (London: Economics Defence disinformation_in_taiwan.pdf (accessed April 22, 2021). (accessed disinformation_in_taiwan.pdf Study-of-Chinese-Military-Affairs/ (accessed April 21, 2021). (accessed Study-of-Chinese-Military-Affairs/ secrecy/2015/10/osc-ose/ (accessed April 21, 2021). (accessed secrecy/2015/10/osc-ose/ congress/senate-bill/1059 (accessed April 22, 2021). (accessed congress/senate-bill/1059 campaign=media%20cook (accessed April 22, 2021). April (accessed campaign=media%20cook April 22, 2021). (accessed cset.georgetown.edu/research/overseas-professionals-and-technology-transfer-to-china/ com/2020/11/chinese-party-sets-bold-military-goal-mechanized-informationized-by-2027/ (accessed April 22, 2021). (accessed com/2020/11/chinese-party-sets-bold-military-goal-mechanized-informationized-by-2027/ growing-media-influence-in-africa/a-56385420 (accessed April 22, 2021). (accessed growing-media-influence-in-africa/a-56385420 2013, https://project2049.net/2013/10/14/the-peoples-liberation-army-general-political-department-political-warfare-with-chinese-characteristics/ (accessed (accessed https://project2049.net/2013/10/14/the-peoples-liberation-army-general-political-department-political-warfare-with-chinese-characteristics/ 2013, 21, 2021), and Andrew S. Erickson, “China Defense White Papers—1995–2019—Download Complete Set + Read Highlights Here,” July 23, 2019, https://www. July 23, 2019, Here,” Highlights + Read Set Complete Papers—1995–2019—Download White Defense “China S. Erickson, and Andrew 21, 2021), 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/a-world-divided-the-conflict-with-chinese-techno-nationalism-isnt-coming-its-already-here/ (accessed April 22, 2021). (accessed https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/a-world-divided-the-conflict-with-chinese-techno-nationalism-isnt-coming-its-already-here/ 2021, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020). Press, University Oxford (Oxford: Security Warsaw Institute, “Programs: China Monitor,” https://warsawinstitute.org/programs/china-monitor/ (accessed April 21, 2021). April (accessed https://warsawinstitute.org/programs/china-monitor/ China Monitor,” “Programs: Institute, Warsaw April 21, 2021). (accessed https://igcc.ucsd.edu/ Cooperation,” and on Global Conflict “Institute San Diego, of California University https://www.congress.gov/bill/106th- Sec. 1202, 1999, 5, October 106th Cong., 106-85, Public Law 2020, Fiscal Year for Act Authorization Defense National S. 1059, https://inss.ndu.edu/About/Center-for-the- Affairs,” of Chinese Military the Study for “Center Studies, Strategic National for Institute University, Defense National April 21, 2021). (accessed https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/ Institute,” Studies Aerospace “China Air University, Air Force, U.S. Ben Nimmo, Ira Hubert, and Yang Cheng, “Spamouflage Breakout: Chinese Span Network Finally Starts to Gain Some Traction,” Graphika, February 2021, https:// February 2021, Graphika, Traction,” to Gain Some Starts Finally Chinese Span Network Cheng, “Spamouflage Breakout: Hubert, and Yang Ira Ben Nimmo, 2021). April 22, (accessed https://mapinfluence.eu/en/media-analysis/ 2017, 17, September Media Analysis,” “Czech MapInfluenCE, Breakout.” Hubert, and Cheng, “Spamouflage Nimmo, https://www.axios.com/un-statement-china-uighurs- 8, 2020, October Axios, Abuses,” Xinjiang of China over Join Condemnation Countries Zachary Basu, “More https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Chinas- 2021, February Democracy, for Endowment National Global Media Footprint,” “China’s Cook, Sarah https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-media/chinas-xi-urges-state-media-to- 2016, February 19, Reuters, Global Influence,” Boost Media to State Urges Xi “China’s https://www.routledge.com/Chinas-Quest-for- 259, p. 2020), Routledge, York: (New Technology Foreign for Quest China’s Tatlow, Didi Kirsten C. Hannas and William https:// July 21, 2020, Technology, and Emerging Security for Center China,” to Transfer and Technology Professionals “Overseas and Emily Weinstein, Fedasiuk Ryan 14, October Institute, 2049 Project with Chinese Characteristics,” Warfare Political Department: Political General Army Liberation People’s “The Mark Stokes, See Sasakawa USA, “Maritime Awareness Project (MAP),” https://spfusa.org/programs/maritime-awareness-project-map/ (accessed April 22, 2021), and National and National April 22, 2021), (accessed https://spfusa.org/programs/maritime-awareness-project-map/ (MAP),” Project “Maritime Awareness USA, See Sasakawa Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative,” https://amti.csis.org/ (accessed April 21, 2021). (accessed https://amti.csis.org/ Initiative,” Maritime Transparency “Asia Studies, and International Strategic for Center , November 23, 2020, https://breakingdefense. 23, 2020, , November Defense Breaking 2027,” by & Informationized’ Bold Military Goal: ‘Mechanized Sets Party Dean Cheng, “Chinese Steven Aftergood, “Open Source Center (OSC) Becomes Open Source Enterprise (OSE),” Federation of American Scientists, October 28, 2015, https://fas.org/blogs/ 28, 2015, October of American Scientists, Federation (OSE),” Enterprise Open Source Becomes (OSC) Center Source “Open Aftergood, Steven the Involving Developments and Security Military of Defense, of the Secretary Office of Defense, Department as of this writing, see U.S. report recent the most For and Capabilities Global Military of Annual Assessment The 2021: Balance Military The Studies, Strategic for Institute edition, see International recent the most For April (accessed http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/ 2015, , May Strategy Military China’s Office, Information Council of China, State Republic People’s Lowy Institute Poll 2020, “China,” https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/themes/china/ (accessed April 22, 2021). (accessed https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/themes/china/ “China,” 2020, Poll Institute Lowy Chrispin Mwakideu, “Experts warn of China’s growing media influence in Africa,” Deutsche Welle, January 29, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/experts-warn-of-chinas- 2021, January 29, Welle, Deutsche Africa,” in media influence growing of China’s “Experts warn Chrispin Mwakideu, Nick Monaco, Melanie Smith, and Amy Studdart, “Detecting Digital Fingerprints: Tracing Chinese Disinformation Taiwan,” Institute for the Future’s Digital Intelligence Digital Intelligence the Future’s for Institute Taiwan,” Disinformation Chinese Tracing Digital Fingerprints: “Detecting Studdart, Smith, and Amy Melanie Nick Monaco, Cary Miller et al., “Telling China’s Story: The Chinese Communist Party’s Campaign to Shape Global Narratives,” Hoover Institution and Stanford Internet Observatory Observatory Internet Stanford and Institution Hoover Global Narratives,” Shape to Campaign Party’s Chinese Communist The Story: China’s al., “Telling Cary Miller et April 22, 2021). (accessed https://www.iri.org/ Institute, Republican International https://www.iri.org/sites/default/ 2021, Response,” Democratic and the Influence Authoritarian China’s the Party: for Safe World “A Institute, Republican International Alex Joske, “The China Defence Universities Tracker: Exploring the Military and Security Links of China’s Universities,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, International International Institute, Policy Strategic Australian Universities,” of China’s Links Military and Security Exploring the Tracker: Universities China Defence “The Joske, Alex See, for example, James Mulvenon, “A World Divided: The Conflict with Chinese Techno-Nationalism Isn’t Coming—It’s Already Here,” War on the Rocks, January 28, Rocks, War on the Here,” Already Coming—It’s Isn’t Techno-Nationalism with Chinese Conflict Divided: The World “A James Mulvenon, example, for See, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security,” https://www.sipri.org/yearbook (accessed (accessed https://www.sipri.org/yearbook Security,” and International Disarmament Armaments, “SIPRI Yearbook: Institute, Research Peace International Stockholm April 22, 2021). SIPRI Yearbook 2020: Armaments, Disarmament and International and International Disarmament Armaments, 2020: SIPRI Yearbook Institute, Research Peace International edition, see Stockholm recent the most For April 21, 2021). 8. 6. Military 9. 5. 50. 3. 39. 36. 37. 38. 2. 12. 13. 14. 15. 11. 10. 1. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 4. 49. 7.  7. 4. Outbound Investments 19. 10. 1. 18. 17. 16. 14. 13. 12. 11. 130 15. 19. 18. 17. 16. 21. 20. See 2. 26. 25. 24. 23. 22. 21. 20. 27. 28. 3. 29. 5. 9. 6. 8. April 19, 2021). Daniel deVise, “U.S. Scholars Say Their BookonChinaLed to Travel Ban,” The Washington Post, August 20, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/ William Yang, “HongKong: National Security Law Targets Overseas Activists,” DeutscheWelle, August 18,2020, https://www.dw.com/en/hong-kong-national- Jeff M.Smith, “China’s Beltand Road Initiative: Strategic Implications andInternational Opposition,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3331,August 9, 2018, Feng, “We Can’t Tell IfChineseFirmsWork for theParty.” McGregor, “How theState RunsBusiness inChina.” Datenna, “China-EU FDIRadar,” https://www.datenna.com/china-eu-fdi-radar/ (accessed June23,2021). Ashley Feng, “We Can’t Tell IfChineseFirmsWork for theParty,” Foreign Policy, February 7, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/07/we-cant-tell-if-chinese-firms- Federica Russo, “Politics intheBoardroom: The Role ofChineseCommunist Party Committees,” The Diplomat, December 24, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/ Richard McGregor, “How theState RunsBusiness inChina,” The Guardian , July25, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/25/china-business-xi-jinping- Hong Fang, BoPeng, Xu Wang, andSiran Fang, “The Effect ofIntellectual Property Rights Protection inHost Economies ontheSustainable Development ofChina’s Organisation for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment, “Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),” OECD iLibrary, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/ Agence France-Presse, “China Arrests JapaneseProfessor onSuspicionofSpying,” The Guardian, October 21,2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/21/ U.S.–China Economic andSecurity Review Commission, “About Us,” https://www.uscc.gov/ (accessed April21,2021). U.S. Naval War College, “China MaritimeStudies Institute,” https://usnwc.edu/Research-and-Wargaming/Research-Centers/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute Council onForeign Relations, Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies, “BeltandRoad Tracker,” interactive by BennSteil andBenjaminDellaRocca, last updated Mercator Institute for ChinaStudies, “MERICS BeltandRoad Tracker,” https://merics.org/en/bri-tracker (accessed April8,2021). College ofWilliam andMary, GlobalResearch Institute, AidData, “MappingChina’s GlobalInvestments andInequality,” https://www.aiddata.org/mapping-china- American Enterprise Institute, “China GlobalInvestment Tracker,” https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/ (accessed April19, 2021). Jeff M.Smith, “China’s Beltand Road Initiative: Context and Response,” paperpresented at Quad-PlusDialogue, Tokyo, Japan,March 4–6,2018, http://thf_media. Junda Jin,Xinyue Ma,andKevin P. Gallagher, “China’s GlobalDevelopment Finance: AGuidance Note for GlobalDevelopment Policy Center Databases,” Boston Reuters, “China’s 2019 Foreign Direct Investment Grew Most inTwo Years, butOutboundInvestment Fell 6Percent,” South ChinaMorningPost, January21,2020, Evelyn Cheng,“China’s Overseas Investment Drops in2017 for theFirst Time onRecord,” CNBC,September 28,2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/28/chinas- Paulson Institute, MacroPolo, “The ChinaFootprint,” https://macropolo.org/digital-projects/china-footprint/ (accessed April19, 2021). US–China Investment Project, “FDIData,” https://www.us-china-investment.org/fdi-data (accessed April19, 2021). Inter-American Dialogue, “China–Latin America Finance Database,” https://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/ (accessed April19, 2021). Lowy Institute, “Pacific AidMap,” https://pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute.org/ (accessed April 19, 2021). Henry L.Stimson Center, “Mekong Infrastructure Tracker,” https://www.stimson.org/project/mekong-infrastructure/ (accessed April19, 2021). Datenna, “China–EU FDIRadar.” Johns HopkinsUniversity, SchoolofAdvanced International Studies, China–Africa Research Initiative, “Loan Data,” http://www.sais-cari.org/data (accessed April19, Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, “Reconnecting Asia,” December 21,2020, https://reconasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/new-website-coming-2021/ Boston University, GlobalDevelopment Policy Center, “China’s GlobalPower Database,” https://www.bu.edu/cgp/ (accessed April19, 2021). Reuters, “China Says ItsForeign Direct Investments Increased 5.8% in2019,” CNBC,January21,2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/21/china-says-its-foreign-direct- Olivia EnosandRiley Walters, “Chinese Foreign Direct Investments Featuring Dr. Derek Scissors,” Heritage Foundation ChinaUncovered podcast, October 19, 2020, Xinyue Ma, Kevin P. Gallagher, andYannan Guo, “China’s GlobalEnergy Finance 2019,” Boston University, GlobalDevelopment Policy Center, GlobalChinaInitiative 2021, theChineseLoans to Africa Database ismanagedby theBoston University GlobalDevelopment Policy Center.” 2021). The site reflects that “[t]heChinese Loans to Africa (CLA) Database isaninteractive data project started by SAIS-CARI in2020” andthat “[a]s ofMarch 29, global-investments-and-inequality (accessed April19, 2021). communist-party-state-private-enterprise-huawei (accessed April19, 2021). china-arrests-japanese-professor-on-suspicion-of-spying (accessed April21,2021). overseas-investment-drops-for-the-first-time-on-record.html (accessed April19, 2021). over 14,000 infrastructure projects. The MapandDatabase are offlinewhilethesite isunder construction.” (accessed April21,2021). security-law-targets-overseas-activists/a-54608853 (accessed April21,2021). (accessed April19, 2021). AsofDecember 21,2020, thesite reflected that “Reconnecting Asiaisupdating our website to enhance publicaccess to ourdatabase of s3.amazonaws.com/Quad%20Plus/2018%20Conference%20Papers/Smith,%20Jeff%20-%20China's%20Belt%20and%20Road%20Initiative%20Context%20and%20 work-for-the-party/ (accessed April19, 2021). Outward Foreign Direct Investment—Evidence from aCross-Country Sample,” Sustainability, Vol. 11,No. 7(April-1, 2019), https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/11/7/2100/ politics-in-the-boardroom-the-role-of-chinese-communist-party-committees/ (accessed April19, 2021). Policy BriefNo. 002, February 2020, http://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2020/02/CGEF-2019-GCI-Policy-Brief-4-Ma-Gallagher-Guo-.pdf (accessed April19, 2021). us-scholars-say-their-book-on-china-led-to-travel-ban/2011/08/17/gIQAN3C9SJ_story.html (accessed April21,2021). University, GlobalDevelopment Policy Center, Database Coding Manual,July2018, https://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2018/07/Coding-Manual-.pdf (accessed foreign-direct-investment-fdi/indicator-group/english_9a523b18-en (accessed April19, 2021). Response_JLedit.pdf (accessed April19, 2021). May 8,2019, https://www.cfr.org/article/belt-and-road-tracker (accessed April19, 2021). https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-strategic-implications-and-international-opposition. htm (accessed April19, 2021). investments-increased-5point8percent-in-2019.html (accessed April19, 2021). https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3046958/chinas-2019-foreign-direct-investment-58-cent-outbound (accessed April19, 2021). https://shows.acast.com/china-uncovered/episodes/cu_101920 (accessed April19, 2021). XinJiang: China’s MuslimBorderland, ed.S.Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY: M.E.Sharpe, 2004). China Transparency Report  131 Five-Year Plan and 2035 Vision,” March 5, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/ 2021, 5, March Vision,” Plan and 2035 Five-Year th The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/how-the-us-should-address-rising-chinese-influence-the-united-nations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-quest-self-reliance-fourteenth-five-year-plan (accessed April 20, 2021). April 20, (accessed https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-quest-self-reliance-fourteenth-five-year-plan https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/FP_20201030_huawei_tiktok_williams.pdf (accessed April 20, 2021). April 20, (accessed https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/FP_20201030_huawei_tiktok_williams.pdf Enterprise Institute, May 11, 2020, https://www.aei.org/economics/us-federal-research-spending-is-at-a-60-year-low-should-we-be-concerned/ (access date). (access https://www.aei.org/economics/us-federal-research-spending-is-at-a-60-year-low-should-we-be-concerned/ 11, 2020, May Institute, Enterprise us-scholars-say-their-book-on-china-led-to-travel-ban/2011/08/17/gIQAN3C9SJ_story.html (accessed April 20, 2021), and Agence France-Presse, “China Arrests Arrests “China France-Presse, and Agence 2021), April 20, (accessed us-scholars-say-their-book-on-china-led-to-travel-ban/2011/08/17/gIQAN3C9SJ_story.html rd-hits-a-record-378-billion.html (accessed April 20, 2021); James Pethokoukis, “US Federal Research Spending Is at a 60-Year Low. Should We Be Concerned?,” American Be Concerned?,” Should We Low. a 60-Year Spending Is at Research “US Federal James Pethokoukis, 2021); April 20, (accessed rd-hits-a-record-378-billion.html manufacturing (accessed April 20, 2021). April 20, (accessed manufacturing 2021). April 20, (accessed news/2021/04/14/intel-chiefs-china-global-threats-481485 pump-1.6tn-into-tech-infrastructure-through-2025 (accessed April 20, 2021). April 20, (accessed pump-1.6tn-into-tech-infrastructure-through-2025 politics/2021lh/2021-03/05/c_1127172897.htm (accessed April 20, 2021). April 20, (accessed politics/2021lh/2021-03/05/c_1127172897.htm Global 500, “China Aerospace Science & Technology,” data as of August 10, 2020, https://fortune.com/company/china-aerospace-science-technology/ 2020, 10, as of August data & Technology,” Science Aerospace “China Global 500, and Fortune suspicion-of-spying (accessed April 20, 2021). April 20, (accessed suspicion-of-spying Strategic_Plan_of_Made_in_China_2025_and_Its_Implementation (accessed April 20, 2021). April 20, (accessed Strategic_Plan_of_Made_in_China_2025_and_Its_Implementation sources/MOST2019.pdf (accessed April 20, 2021). April 20, (accessed sources/MOST2019.pdf (accessed April 20, 2021). April 20, (accessed of China, August 27, 2020, http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/202008/t20200828_1786511.html (accessed April 20, 2021). April 20, (accessed http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/202008/t20200828_1786511.html 2020, 27, of China, August china_ethnic/statistics (accessed April 20, 2021). April 20, (accessed china_ethnic/statistics global500/ (accessed April 20, 2021). April 20, (accessed global500/ googleapis.com/public-budget-sources/MIIT2019.pdf (accessed April 20, 2021). April 20, (accessed googleapis.com/public-budget-sources/MIIT2019.pdf c64094-30170246.html (accessed April 20, 2021). April 20, (accessed c64094-30170246.html , August 20, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/ 2011, 20, , August Post Washington The Ban,” Travel to Book on China Led Their Say Scholars “U.S. Daniel de Vise, Ryan Fedasiuk et al., “Chinese State Council Budge Tracker,” https://statecouncil.cset.tech/cset_china_state_council_budget.pdf (accessed April 20, 2021). April 20, (accessed https://statecouncil.cset.tech/cset_china_state_council_budget.pdf Budge Tracker,” Council State al., “Chinese et Fedasiuk Ryan of Statistics Bureau National in 2019,” and Technology on Science Expenditures on National “Communiqué of Finance, and Ministry and Technology of Science Ministry https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/01/chinas-spending-on- 1, 2021, CNBC, March Billion,” $378 Hits a Record and Development Spending on Research Sam Shead, “China’s Xinhuanet, “The Development of Environment Guidelines and Main Goals of the 14 of Environment Development “The Xinhuanet, University of Southern California San Diego, China Data Lab, “CCP Elites Data Catalog,” https://chinadatalab.ucsd.edu/resources/ccp-elites-database/ (accessed (accessed https://chinadatalab.ucsd.edu/resources/ccp-elites-database/ Catalog,” Data Elites “CCP Lab, China Data San Diego, of Southern California University https://findchina.info/made-china-2025-plan-unveiled-boost- 2015, 20, May Manufacturing,” Boost to Unveil Plan to “Made in China 2025 FindChinaInfo, https://www.politico.com/ 2021, , April 14, Politico Hearing,” Chiefs Sound Alarm on China in Global Threats “Intel Desiderio, and Andrew Martin Matishak Polish Institute of International Affairs, “Publications,” https://www.pism.pl/publications (accessed April 20, 2021). April 20, (accessed https://www.pism.pl/publications “Publications,” Affairs, of International Institute Polish NPC Observer, https://npcobserver.com/ (accessed April 20, 2021). April 20, (accessed https://npcobserver.com/ NPC Observer, MacroPolo, “The Committee,” https://macropolo.org/digital-projects/the-committee/ (accessed April 20, 2021). April 20, (accessed https://macropolo.org/digital-projects/the-committee/ Committee,” “The MacroPolo, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, University Libraries, “Chinese Ethnic Groups: Overview Statistics,” last updated April 12, 2021, https://guides.lib.unc.edu/ 12, 2021, April updated last Statistics,” Overview Groups: Ethnic “Chinese Libraries, Chapel Hill, University at North Carolina of University 2021), April 15, (accessed https://fortune.com/company/sinopec-group/global500/ 2020, 10, as of August data Group,” “Sinopec Global 500, Fortune example, for See, 2019, 20, August 3431, No. Backgrounder Foundation Heritage Nations,” at the United Rising Chinese Influence Should Address the U.S. “How Schaefer, D. Brett 2021). April 20, (accessed https://chinadigitaltimes.net/ China Digital Times, 2021). April 15, (accessed , https://www.prcleader.org/ Monitor China Leadership 2021). 20, April (accessed https://www.ccpwatch.org/ China Research, Advanced for Center Enos and Walters, “Chinese Foreign Direct Investments featuring Dr. Derek Scissors.” Derek Dr. featuring Investments Direct Foreign “Chinese Enos and Walters, Boston University, Global Development Policy Center, and Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, China–Africa Research Initiative, Initiative, Research China–Africa Studies, International of Advanced School University, and Johns Hopkins Center, Policy Global Development University, Boston Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, “Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 2019 Departmental Budget,” April 2, 2019, https://storage. April 2, 2019, Budget,” Departmental 2019 Technology and Information of Industry “Ministry Technology, and Information of Industry Ministry https://storage.googleapis.com/public-budget- April 2019, Forecast,” Departmental 2019 and Technology of Science “Ministry and Technology, of Science Ministry (accessed https://storage.googleapis.com/public-budget-sources/MOFCOM2019.pdf 2019,” Budget Departmental of Commerce “Ministry of Commerce, Ministry Emily de La Bruyére and Nathan Picarsic, “China Standards 2035,” Horizon Advisory, April 8, 2020 https://www.horizonadvisory.org/china-standards-2035-first-report https://www.horizonadvisory.org/china-standards-2035-first-report April 8, 2020 Advisory, Horizon 2035,” Standards “China Picarsic, and Nathan Emily de La Bruyére , January 21, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/China-tech/China-to- Asia, January 21, 2021, Nikkei 2025,” through Infrastructure Tech into Pump $1.6tn to “China Kawakami, Takashi Net Politics and Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program, “China’s Quest for Self-Reliance in the Fourteenth Five-Year Plan,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 8, 2021, 8, 2021, March Relations, on Foreign Council Plan,” Five-Year in the Fourteenth Self-Reliance for Quest “China’s Program, Policy and Digital and Cyberspace Politics Net Xiang Wu et al., “Strategic Plan of ‘Made in China 2025’ and Its Implementation,” ResearchGate, May 2018, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326392969_ 2018, May ResearchGate, and Its Implementation,” Plan of ‘Made in China 2025’ al., “Strategic et Wu Xiang 2021). 20, April (accessed https://statecouncil.cset.tech/ Tracker,” Budget Council State “Chinese (CSET), Technology and Emerging Security for Center Ibid. (accessed https://storage.googleapis.com/public-budget-sources/MOE2019.pdf April 2019, 2019,” Budget Departmental of Education “Ministry of Education, Ministry , July 26, 2018, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0726/ 2018, , July 26, CPCNews Development,” Common and Achieve of the Times the Trend Jinping: Follow “Xi Daily, People’s 6, 2020, October Institution, Brookings and Digital Security, Companies Chinese Tech over Concerns U.S. Untangling and TikTok: Huawei “Beyond Williams, D. Robert April 20, 2021). April 20, April 20, 2021). April 20, April 20, 2021). April 20, , October 21, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/21/china-arrests-japanese-professor-on- 21, 2019, , October Guardian The on Suspicion of Spying,” Japanese Professor . 18, supra See also note 2021). April 19, (accessed https://chinaafricaloandata.org/ Database,” Africa to Loans “Chinese 8. 8. 6. 6. Politics & Law Politics 9. 5. 5. 9. 3. 3. 31. 30. 2. 2. 11. 17. 18. 16. 10. 1. 1. 14. 15. 13. 10. 11. 12. 4. 4. 7. 7. Technology  7. 4. Creating SomeClarityonthePLABudget 1. 19. 132 11. 10. 13. 12. 2. 29. 28. 27. 26. 25. 24. 23. 22. 21. 20. 36. 35. 34. 33. 32. 31. 30. 3. 5. 9. 6. 8. FREDERICO BARTELS “Instrument for Standardized International Reporting ofMilitaryExpenditures,” https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/MilEx-2017-China. Journal of Policy, Administration, andInstitutions, Vol. 30, No. 3(July 2017), pp. 407–424, https://gvpt.umd.edu/sites/gvpt.umd.edu/files/pubs/zhi_pearson-2016- Ryan Fedasiuk, EmilyWeinstein, BenMurphy, andAlanOmarLoera Martinez, “Chinese State Council Budget Tracker,” Georgetown University, Center for Security and Qiang ZhiandMargaret M.Pearson, “China’s HybridAdaptive Bureaucracy: The Caseofthe863 Program for Science andTechnology,” Governance: AnInternational Martijn Rasser, Elizabeth Rosenberg, andPaul Scharre, “The ChinaChallenge,” Center for aNew AmericanSecurity, December 12,2019, https://www.cnas.org/ Grady McGregor, “The World’s Largest Surveillance System IsGrowing—and SoIstheBacklash,” Fortune , November 3,2020, https://fortune.com/2020/11/03/china- The challengesofcomparison are furtherexplored inRichard Connolly, “Russian MilitaryExpenditure inComparative Perspective: APurchasing Power Parity Estimate,” Jeremy Mark,“China’s Fourteenth Five-Year Plan:The Technologies That ShallNotBeNamed,” Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/ Center for Strategic International Studies, “MadeinChina2025,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025 (accessed April20, 2021). CIGI, “About CIGI,” https://www.cigionline.org/about (access date). CIGI, “China,” https://www.cigionline.org/subject/china (accessed April20, 2021). ASPI, “MappingChina’s Tech Giants,” https://chinatechmap.aspi.org.au/#/map/ (accessed June8,2021). ASPI, “International Cyber Policy Centre,” https://www.aspi.org.au/program/international-cyber-policy-centre (accessed April20, 2021). International Institute for Strategic Studies, “China GlobalSecurity Tracker,” https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2019/02/china-global-security-tracker McKinsey GlobalInstitute, “About MGI,” https://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/overview/about-us (accessed April20, 2021). IDA, “Science andTechnology Policy Institute,” https://www.ida.org/ida-ffrdcs/science-and-technology-policy-institute (accessed April20, 2021). Stanford, “Freeman SpogliInstitute for International Studies, Cyber Policy Center,” https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/content/gtg-digichina (accessed April20, 2021). Brookings, “Global China:Technology,” https://www.brookings.edu/product/global-china-technology/ (accessed April20, 2021). Ngor Luong,ZacharyArnold,andBenMurphy, “Chinese Government Guidance Funds,” CSET, March 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET- CSET, “Chinese State Council Budget Tracker,” https://statecouncil.cset.tech/ (accessed April20, 2021). CSET, “Chinese Talent Program Tracker,” https://chinatalenttracker.cset.tech/ (accessed April20, 2021). CSET, https://cset.georgetown.edu/ (accessed April20, 2021). Because ofincorrect assumptions aboutthebroader Soviet economy, neither oftheseapproaches delivered theproper scaleoftheSoviet militaryburden, butthe Kumar,Ganesh “Countries MilitaryExpenditures: Definitionsand Determinants,” Economic Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 4(December 2017), pp. 647–654, http://ndpublisher.in/ As ofApril19, 2021, thewebsite hasthree years’ worth ofdata. United Nations, Office forDisarmament Affairs, “MilitaryExpenditures: Country ProfileChina,” https:// United Nations, Office forDisarmament Affairs, “MilitaryExpenditures,” https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/milex (accessed April 19, 2021). For the2018, 2019, and2020 announcements, seeAndrew Erickson, “Xi’s Strong MilitaryDream: China’s Defense Budget to Grow 8.1% to ~$175 billionThis Year, Rate U.S. Department ofDefense, Office oftheUnderSecretary ofDefense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2021, April2020, https://comptroller. United Nations Report onMilitaryExpenditures, “Simplified Reporting Form,” https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/ United Nations, Office forDisarmament Affairs, “UN ReportonMilitaryExpenditures—Reporting Forms: Reporting Forms (forOfficialUse Only),” https://www.un.org/ Table 2,“Breakdown ofChina’s Defense Expenditure (2010–2017),” inState Council Information Office ofthe People’s RepublicofChina,China’s National Defense in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2006 (London: Routledge, 2006). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRIMilitaryExpenditure Database,” https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex (accessed April9, 2021). 2020, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/chinas-defense-budget-context-how-under-reporting-and-differing-standards-and-economies. governance.pdf (access date). chinas-fourteenth-five-year-plan-the-technologies-that-shall-not-be-named/ (access date). convarms/Milex/Forms/en/MilEx_simplified_reporting_form_web.doc (accessed April 9, 2021). For theChinesefiscal year 2017 report, see People’s RepublicofChina, (accessed April20, 2021). surveillance-system-backlash-worlds-largest/ (accessed April20, 2021). (College Station: Texas A&MUniversity Press, 1998). 178-billion-1-27-trillion-yuan-lowest-growth-rate-since-1988-exceeds-all-other-major-nations/ (accessed April9, 2021). Since 1988 Exceeds AllOtherMajorNations’,” May 22,2020, https://www.andrewerickson.com/2020/05/chinas-official-2020-defense-budget-to-rise-6-6-percent-to- 1.19 Trillion Yuan (~177.61 BillionU.S. Dollars),” March 4, 2019, https://www.andrewerickson.com/2019/03/china-set-for-yet-another-big-defense-spending-increase- defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/FY21_Green_Book.pdf (accessed April9, 2021). disarmament/convarms/milex/forms/ (accessed April9, 2021). admin/issues/EAv62n4j.pdf (accessed April9, 2021). CNA Occasional Paper, October 2019, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IOP-2019-U-021955-Final.pdf (accessed April 9, 2021), and FredericoBartels, “China’s Chinese-Government-Guidance-Funds.pdf (accessed April20, 2021). publications/commentary/the-china-challenge-1 (accessed April20, 2021). milex.un-arm.org/country-profile/CHN (accessed April19, 2021). pdf (accessed April 9, 2021). the New Era (Beijing:Foreign LanguagesPress, July2019), p. 39, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm (accessed April9, 2021). 8-1-to-175-billion-this-year-rate-exceeds-6-5-economic-growth-target/ (accessed April9, 2021); Andrew Erickson, “China’s 2019 Defense Spendingto Rise7.5% to Emerging Technology, https://statecouncil.cset.tech/ (accessed April9, 2021). Defense Budget inContext: How Under-Reporting andDiffering Standards and Economies Distort thePicture,” Heritage Foundation SpecialReport No. 225, March 25, Exceeds ~6.5%Economic Growth Target,” March 5, 2018, https://www.andrewerickson.com/2018/03/xis-strong-military-dream-chinas-defense-budget-to-grow- in-2019/ (accessed April9, 2021); andAndrew Erickson, “China’s Official 2020 Defense Budget toRise6.6% to $178 Billion(1.27 Trillion Yuan): Lowest Growth Rate building blocks ofthemethodology still offer valuable insights. SeeNoelE.FirthandJamesH.Noren, Soviet Defense Spending:AHistory of CIAEstimates, 1950–1990 China Transparency Report  133 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/6395/text/enr (accessed April 9, 2021). April 9, (accessed https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/6395/text/enr https://jamestown.org/program/civil-military-fusion-and-the-plas-pursuit-of-dominance-in-emerging-technologies/ (accessed April 9, 2021). April 9, (accessed https://jamestown.org/program/civil-military-fusion-and-the-plas-pursuit-of-dominance-in-emerging-technologies/ heritage.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/BG3476.pdf. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3044402/how-zimbabwes-new-parliament-symbolises-chinas-chequebook (accessed April 9, 2021). April 9, (accessed https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3044402/how-zimbabwes-new-parliament-symbolises-chinas-chequebook is-being-sold-thats-unlikely-change-threat-it-poses/ (accessed April 9, 2021). April 9, (accessed is-being-sold-thats-unlikely-change-threat-it-poses/ Hengtong is Cui Genliang, a deputy in the National People’s Congress. Fibre Systems, “Hengtong Optic-Electric to Acquire Huawei Marine Networks,” November 5, 5, November Marine Networks,” Huawei Acquire to Optic-Electric “Hengtong Systems, Fibre Congress. People’s in the National is Cui Genliang, a deputy Hengtong https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/05/huawei-marine- 2019, , June 5, Post Washington The It Poses,” Change the Threat to Unlikely Being Sold. That’s Daniele Lepido, “Vodafone Found Hidden Backdoors in Huawei Equipment,” Bloomberg, April 30, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-30/vodafone- 2019, April 30, Bloomberg, Equipment,” in Huawei Hidden Backdoors Found “Vodafone Daniele Lepido, March 2020, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2020/03/assessing-chinese-defence-spending (accessed April 9, 2021), and Nan Tian and Fei Su, “A New New Su, “A and Fei and Nan Tian 2021), 9, April (accessed https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2020/03/assessing-chinese-defence-spending 2020, March https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/2101_sipri_ January 2021, Institute, Research Peace International Stockholm Expenditure,” Military of China’s Estimate to-cut-network-deals/ (accessed April 9, 2021). April 9, (accessed to-cut-network-deals/ found-hidden-backdoors-in-huawei-equipment (accessed April 9, 2021); Alexander Martin, “GCHQ Discovered ‘Nationally Significant’ Vulnerability in Huawei Equipment,” Equipment,” in Huawei Vulnerability Significant’ ‘Nationally Discovered Martin, “GCHQ Alexander 2021); April 9, (accessed found-hidden-backdoors-in-huawei-equipment newest-armed-force-the-coast-guard/ (accessed April 9, 2021). April 9, (accessed newest-armed-force-the-coast-guard/ report_a_new_estimate_of_chinas_military_expenditure.pdf (accessed February 17, 2021). 17, February (accessed report_a_new_estimate_of_chinas_military_expenditure.pdf Chairman-Xi.pdf (accessed April 9, 2021). April 9, (accessed Chairman-Xi.pdf , U.S. Department of Defense, p. 1, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed April 9, 2021). April 9, (accessed 1, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf p. of Defense, Department , U.S. Edge , August 11, 2020, https://www. 11, 2020, , August Computing Warns,” Report Spying, to Data Secret Guinea Exposes Government's New in Papua Centre Data “Huawei Kundaliya, and Dev article/us-ethiopia-african-union-cyber-exclusiv/exclusive-suspected-chinese-hackers-stole-camera-footage-from-african-union-memo-idUSKBN28Q1DB (accessed (accessed article/us-ethiopia-african-union-cyber-exclusiv/exclusive-suspected-chinese-hackers-stole-camera-footage-from-african-union-memo-idUSKBN28Q1DB , p. 586. , p. Reforms Military Chinese Assessing PLA: e60c-458d-b9dc-053a6152f9fd.html (accessed April 9, 2021). April 9, (accessed e60c-458d-b9dc-053a6152f9fd.html 13 and 19–20. Sky News, October 1, 2020, https://news.sky.com/story/gchq-discovered-nationally-significant-vulnerability-in-huawei-equipment-12086688 (accessed April 19, 2021); April 19, (accessed https://news.sky.com/story/gchq-discovered-nationally-significant-vulnerability-in-huawei-equipment-12086688 1, 2020, October News, Sky (accessed April 15, 2021). April 15, (accessed (accessed April 9, 2021). April 9, (accessed optics-security-vulnerabilities-1648 (accessed April 9, 2021). April 9, (accessed optics-security-vulnerabilities-1648 computing.co.uk/news/4018843/huawei-centre-papua-guinea-exposes-government-secret-spying-report-warns (accessed April 9, 2021). April 9, (accessed computing.co.uk/news/4018843/huawei-centre-papua-guinea-exposes-government-secret-spying-report-warns convarms/Milex/Forms/en/Standardized_reporting_form_web.doc (accessed April 9, 2021), and United Nations Report on Military Expenditures – Reporting Forms, Forms, – Reporting Expenditures on Military Report Nations and United 2021), April 9, (accessed convarms/Milex/Forms/en/Standardized_reporting_form_web.doc , https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF (accessed April 9, 2021). April 9, (accessed , https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF Congress 2019, https://www.fibre-systems.com/news/hengtong-optic-electric-acquire-huawei-marine-networks (accessed April 9, 2021), and Jack Hasler, “Huawei Marine Is “Huawei and Jack Hasler, 9, 2021), April (accessed https://www.fibre-systems.com/news/hengtong-optic-electric-acquire-huawei-marine-networks 2019, 2, 2020, https://chinaafricaproject.com/2020/11/02/chinas-cryptocurrency-now-has-a-foothold-in-places-like-africa-with-the-introduction-of-huaweis-latest-phone/ https://chinaafricaproject.com/2020/11/02/chinas-cryptocurrency-now-has-a-foothold-in-places-like-africa-with-the-introduction-of-huaweis-latest-phone/ 2, 2020, For a more detailed discussion, see Bartels, “China’s Defense Budget in Context: How Under-Reporting and Differing Standards and Economies Distort the Picture,” pp. pp. the Picture,” Distort Economies and Standards and Differing Under-Reporting How in Context: Budget Defense “China’s Bartels, see discussion, detailed a more For competitive Military’s Sharpening the American America: of States the United of Strategy Defense National the 2018 Summary of of Defense, Secretary James Mattis, 2. p. Expenditure,” Military of China’s Estimate New and Su, “A Tian Sec. 1299H, January 1, 2021, 116th Cong., No 116–283, Public Law 2021, Fiscal Year for Act Authorization Defense National Thornberry M. (Mac) William H.R. 6395, HMN Tech, “Experience,” https://www.hmntechnologies.com/enExperience.jhtml (accessed April 9, 2021). April 9, (accessed https://www.hmntechnologies.com/enExperience.jhtml “Experience,” HMN Tech, https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/physical/fiber- 2005, 17, February Institute, SANS Vulnerabilities,” “Fiber Optics and Its Security Kimberlie Witcher, Joshua Meservey, “China’s Palace Diplomacy in Africa,” War on the Rocks, June 25, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/chinas-palace-diplomacy-in-africa/ https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/chinas-palace-diplomacy-in-africa/ 2020, June 25, the Rocks, on War in Africa,” Diplomacy Palace “China’s Joshua Meservey, https://www.reuters.com/ 16, 2020, December Reuters, Union—Memo,” African from Footage Camera Stole Chinese Hackers “Exclusive—Suspected Raphael Satter, Tian and Su, “A New Estimate of China’s Military Expenditure,” p. 22. p. Military Expenditure,” China’s of Estimate New and Su, “A Tian https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/china-welcomes-its- 2018, April 4, on the Rocks, War Guard,” Coast The Armed Force: Its Newest Welcomes Morris, “China Lyle the Remakes 15 in Chairman Xi Chapter System,” and Industrial Technology, Acquisition, Chinese Defense Jundui: Reforming Up with the “Keeping Ming Cheung, Tai 21. p. Expenditure,” Military of China’s Estimate New and Su, “A Tian 2018), 9, 6 (April 18, No. China Brief, Vol. Foundation Jamestown Technologies,” in Emerging of Dominance Pursuit and the PLA’s Fusion “Civil–Military Laskai, Lorand Another Chinese company, Hengtong Optic-Electric Ltd., agreed in late 2019 to acquire both owners’ stakes in Huawei Marine, a joint venture. One of the owners of One of the owners venture. a joint Marine, in Huawei stakes both owners’ acquire to 2019 in late agreed Ltd., Optic-Electric Hengtong Another Chinese company, ZTE, another major government-linked firm, soon followed with its own 5G network in Uganda. own 5G network with its followed firm, soon ZTE, another major government-linked November Project, China Africa The Phone,” Latest of Huawei’s with the Introduction Africa Like in Places Has a Foothold Now Cryptocurrency “China’s Eric Olander, , March 25, 2016, https://www.africanbusinesscentral.com/2016/03/25/huawei-looks-to-africa- 2016, 25, , March Central Business African Deals,” Cut Network to Africa to Looks “Huawei Christopher Balding, “Huawei Technologies’ Links to Chinese State Security Services,” July 5, 2019, https://issuu.com/avs_ind/docs/ssrn-id3415726 (accessed April 9, 2021); 2021); April 9, (accessed https://issuu.com/avs_ind/docs/ssrn-id3415726 2019, July 5, Services,” Security Chinese State to Links Technologies’ Balding, “Huawei Christopher No. 3476, May 20, 2020, https://www. 2020, 20, May 3476, No. Backgrounder Heritage Foundation Chinese Spying,” for Vector a Likely Are Buildings in Africa “Government Joshua Meservey, https://www.axios.com/china-spy-agencies-66e43830- 2020, 5, February Axios, Agencies,” Spy Formidable China’s Book Unveils “New Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020: Annual Report to to Report Annual China 2020: of Republic the People’s Involving Developments and Security Military of Defense, of the Secretary Office of Defense, Department U.S. 140. Ibid., p. https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/ Form,” Reporting “Standardized on Military Expenditures, Report Nations United , January 5, 2020, 2020, , January 5, Post China Morning South Africa,” to Approach Chequebook Diplomacy China’s Symbolises Parliament New Zimbabwe’s “How Nyabiage, Jevans Meia Nouwens and Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, “Assessing Chinese Defence Spending: Proposals for New Methodologies,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, Studies, Strategic for Institute International Methodologies,” New for Spending: Proposals Chinese Defence “Assessing Béraud-Sudreau, and Lucie Meia Nouwens Scobell, Andrew Arthur S. Ding, , ed. Phillip C. Saunders, Reforms Military Chinese Assessing the PLA: Remakes in Chairman Xi discussed of these changes are Many April 15, 2021). April 15, Andrew N. D. Yang, and Joel Wuthnow (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2019), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/Chairman-Xi/ 2019), Press, University Defense National (Washington: and Joel Wuthnow Yang, N. D. Andrew “Simplified Reporting Form.” Reporting “Simplified

8. 6. 9. 5. 3. 24. 25. 26. 27. 20. 21. 22. 23. 2. 12. 11. 19. 10. 16. 17. 18. 1. 15. 14. China Considers Big Data a Fundamental Strategic Resource, and Resource, Fundamental Strategic a Big Data China Considers 4. 7. JOSHUA MESERVEY JOSHUA Africa May Offer an Especially Valuable Trove Valuable an Especially Offer May Africa  13. 15. 14. 134 18. 17. 16. 19. 24. 23. 22. 21. 20. 26. 25. 29. 28. 27. 38. 37. 36. 35. 34. 33. 32. 31. 30. 39. “Jostling for Djibouti,” FinancialTimes, April1,2016, https://www.ft.com/content/8c33eefc-f6c1-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132 (accessed April9, 2021). April 9, 2021). The fact that thesafe city planfor tiny Mauritiuscallsfor 4,000 HDsurveillance cameras at 2,000 locations gives asenseofhow data-greedy thesafe city programs are. Vodafone Group, “M-Pesa,” https://www.vodafone.com/what-we-do/services/m-pesa (accessed April9, 2021), andJake Bright, “SimbaPay LaunchesKenya to China In thelast quarter of2020, Transsion’s three brands comprised nearly50percent ofsmartphonesshippedto Africa, whichwas three timesthevolume ofthesecond- Heidi Swart, “Visual Surveillance andWeak Cyber Security, Part One:When Cameras Get Dangerous,” Business Maverick, June13,2019, https://www.dailymaverick. Zhang Hongpei,“Chinese Facial IDTech to LandinAfrica,” GlobalTimes, May 17, 2018, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1102797.shtml (accessed April9, 2021). Huawei, “Leading New ICT, Building aBetter SmartCity,” 2016, https://e.huawei.com/en/material/industry/smartcity/fa01438ad7df46419a37edafaba1a788 (accessed Chinese companies currently have stakes inten data centers onthecontinent, withmore likely forthcoming. Economist Intelligence Unit,“Africa-China Relations. Taming Judd Devermont, AmeliaCheatham, andCatherine Chiang,“Assessing theRisks ofChineseInvestments inSub-Saharan African Ports,” Center for Strategic and Zach Dorfman,“Tech Giants Are GivingChinaaVital Edge inEspionage,” Foreign Policy, December 23,2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/23/china-tech-giants- Sheridan Prasso, “China’s DigitalSilkRoad IsLooking More Like anIron Curtain,” Bloomberg Businessweek, January10, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ Andrew Christian, “A Troubled ChineseTech FirmBuiltaMultimillion-DollarData Center for Cameroon,” WeeTracker, July22,2020, https://weetracker. Christopher R.O’Dea, “How ChinaWeaponized theGlobalSupplyChain,” National Review, June20, 2019, https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2019/07/08/ Caroline Dumortier, “The RiseofBigData inPorts andTerminals,” opendatasoft blog,May 16,2018, https://www.opendatasoft.com/blog/2018/05/16/the-rise-of-big- Costas Paris, “China Tightens GriponEast African Port,” The Wall Street Journal,February 21,2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-tightens-grip-on-east-african- Huawei alsohasarelated “smart city” platform. For the16African countries, seeJonathan E.HillmanandMaeseaMcCalpin,“Watching Huawei’s ‘Safe Cities’,” Center Huawei, “Kenya,” https://www.huawei.com/us/about-huawei/sustainability/win-win-development/social-contribution/seeds-for-the-future/kenya (accessed April9, Ambassador MichaelRanneberger, “Chinese Engagement inKenya,” telegram, February 17, 2010, https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10NAIROBI181_a.html News release, “China: BigData Fuels Crackdown inMinority Region,” HumanRights Watch, February 26, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/26/china-big-data- The 13thFive-Year Planfor Economic andSocial Development of thePeople’s Republic of China (2016–2020), translated by Compilation andTranslation Bureau, Paris, “China Tightens GriponEast African Port.” Scott Patterson andRussell Gold,“There’s aGlobalRace to Control Batteries—and ChinaIsWinning,” The Wall Street Journal,February 11,2018, https://www.wsj.com/ Howard W. French, China'sSecond Continent: How aMillionMigrants Are BuildingaNew Empire inAfrica (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 2014). Leanne deBassompierre, “Huawei Targets Ethiopia asTelecoms Industry OpensUp,” Bloomberg Quint, last updated January12,2021, https://www.bloombergquint. Katrina MansonandDavid Pilling,“USWarns over Chinese‘Spying’ onAfrican DiseaseControl Centre,” FinancialTimes, February 6,2020, https://www.ft.com/content/ Peter Fabricius, “SA Urged to Stop ChinaBuildingAfrica DiseaseControl Centre HQinAddis Ababa,” DailyMaverick, June9, 2020, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ Huawei, ZPMC,ChinaMobile, andVodafone, “5GSmart Port White Paper,” 2019, https://www-file.huawei.com/-/media/corporate/pdf/x-lab/2019/5g_smart_port_ Beijing’s most recent five-year planelevated technological progress from amatter ofeconomic development, asit was perceived inthepreceding five-year plan, to Working Paper No. 01/2019, https://www.sciencespo.fr/ecole-urbaine/sites/sciencespo.fr.ecole-urbaine/files/2019_01%20-%20Artigas.pdf (accessed April 9, 2021). 2021), andXinhua, “Huawei to Partner withKenya to BridgeDigitalDivide,” February 6,2021, http://www.china.org.cn/business/2021-02/06/content_77194391.htm global/2018/201807241004 (accessed April9, 2021), andAlvaro Artigas,“Beneath theSurface oftheSafe City: Surveillance intheTimes ofChineseSupremacy?” SciencesPo co.za/article/2019-06-13-visual-surveillance-and-weak-cyber-security-part-one-when-cameras-get-dangerous/ (accessed April9, 2021). com/2020/07/22/a-troubled-chinese-tech-firm-built-a-multimillion-dollar-data-center-for-cameroon/ (accessed April 9, 2021). com/onweb/huawei-eyes-ethiopia-growth-as-telecoms-industry-opens-up (accessed April9, 2021). A2017 articleplaced Africa’s share ofHuawei’s globalrevenue cef96328-475a-11ea-aeb3-955839e06441 (accessed April9, 2021). one ofnational security. Paul Mozur andSteven Lee Myers, “Xi’s ChinaPlansfor Gambit: aWorld Without AmericanTechnology,” The New York Times, March 10, 2021, (accessed April9, 2021). (accessed April9, 2021). data-in-ports-and-terminals-how-the-shipping-industry-is-transforming-port-technology (accessed April9, 2021). wechat/ (accessed April9, 22021). whitepaper_en.pdf?la=en (accessed April9, 2021). articles/theres-a-global-race-to-control-batteriesand-china-is-winning-1518374815 (accessed April9, 2021). at 15percent. David Pilling,“Chinese Investment inAfrica: Beijing’s Testing Ground,” FinancialTimes, June13,2017, https://www.ft.com/content/0f534aa4-4549-11e7- article/2020-06-09-sa-urged-to-stop-china-building-africa-disease-control-centre-hq-in-addis-ababa/#gsc.tab=0 (accessed April9, 2021). China-backed Data Centre,” Reuters, June22,2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/senegal-datacenter/senegal-aims-for-digital-sovereignty-with-new-china- mobile phonemarket, seeAndrew Deck,“Africa’s PhonePhenom:Your Guideto Transsion,” Rest ofWorld, June23,2020, https://restofworld.org/2020/transsion- place brand, International Samsung. Data Corporation, “Africa's MobilePhoneMarket Performs Well inQ42020, withLonger-Term Recovery ontheCards for H22021,” CHINA%29%20The%2013th%20Five-Year%20Plan%20%282016-2020%29.pdf (accessed April9, 2021). Central Committee oftheCommunist Party ofChina,Beijing,https://www.greengrowthknowledge.org/sites/default/files/downloads/policy-database/ process-stolen-data-spy-agencies/ (accessed April9, 2021). port-11550746800 (accessed April9, 2021). Someestimates ofhow muchoftheworld’s shippingtransits el-MandebStrait theBab are higher. SeeKatrina Manson, 8519-9f94ee97d996 (accessed April9, 2021). International Studies Commentary, June2019, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/190604_AfricaPorts.pdf (accessed April9, 2021). from-china-to-africa/ (accessed April9, 2021). features/2019-01-10/china-s-digital-silk-road-is-looking-more-like-an-iron-curtain (accessed April9, 2021), and“SenegalAimsfor DigitalSovereignty withNew the Dragon: New Frontiers ofCooperation?” 2021, https://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/taming-the-dragon-africa-china-relations.pdf (accessed April19, 2021). for Strategic andInternational Studies Brief,November 2019, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/191030_HillmanMcCalpin_ fuels-crackdown-minority-region (accessed April9, 2021). Huawei, “Einsicheres MauritiusGestalten, dieInspiration fürdenHimmel[A Safe MauritiusDesign,theInspiration for theSky],” https://e.huawei.com/at/case-studies/ Payment Service over WeChat,” TechCrunch , November 28,2018, https://techcrunch.com/2018/11/28/simbapay-launches-kenya-to-china-payment-service-via- March 9, 2021, https://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prMETA47514721 (accessed April9, 2021). For anaccount ofTranssion’s rapid riseto thetop oftheAfrican HuaweiSafeCity_layout_v4.pdf (accessed April9, 2021). backed-data-centre-idUSL5N2O44D3 (accessed June28,2021). how-china-weaponized-the-global-supply-chain/ (accessed April9, 2021). https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/10/business/china-us-tech-rivalry.html (accessed April19, 2021). China Transparency Report  135 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The be-sending-eu-data-to-china-its-data-watchdog-says (accessed April 19, 2021); and Richie Koch, “TikTok and the Privacy Perils of China’s First International Social International First of China’s Perils and the Privacy “TikTok and Richie Koch, 2021); April 19, (accessed be-sending-eu-data-to-china-its-data-watchdog-says mobile devices. on Android and firmware app, the WeChat software, tax including a popular router, Chinese-made products in numerous been discovered have is based on sufficient data. ¶ The company is currently waiting for a database to be provided by the Zimbabwean government, so in the meantime, it is studying studying it is so in the meantime, government, by the Zimbabwean provided to be database for a waiting currently is company The data. ¶ is based on sufficient lithuania-set-block-chinese-airport-scanner-firm-nuctech-75561672 (accessed April 9, 2021). Backdoors, which likely facilitate Chinese government access, access, Chinese government facilitate which likely Backdoors, 9, 2021). April (accessed lithuania-set-block-chinese-airport-scanner-firm-nuctech-75561672 , January 28, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/28/us/charles-lieber-harvard.html (accessed April 10, 2021). April 10, (accessed https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/28/us/charles-lieber-harvard.html , January 28, 2020, Times York New The Funding,” Down on Protecting University Research from China,” Reuters, February 28, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-universities/u-s-doubles-down- 28, 2021, February Reuters, China,” from Research University on Protecting Down Media Platform,” ProtonMail blog, July 23, 2020, https://protonmail.com/blog/tiktok-privacy/ (accessed April 19, 2021). April 19, (accessed https://protonmail.com/blog/tiktok-privacy/ blog, July 23, 2020, ProtonMail Media Platform,” No. 127, May 7, 7, May 127, No. Report Lab Research Citizen Policy, and Public School of Global Affairs Munk of Toronto, University Apparatus,” Chinese Censorship Build up WeChat’s technology/china-surveillance-artificial-intelligence-racial-profiling.html (accessed April 9, 2021), and Chris Buckley and Paul Mozur, “How China Uses High-Tech China Uses High-Tech “How Mozur, Paul and Buckley 2021), and Chris 9, April (accessed technology/china-surveillance-artificial-intelligence-racial-profiling.html technology/dji-china-data-drones.html (accessed April 9, 2021). For more on the DJI threat, see John Venable and Lora Ries, “Chinese-Made Drones: A Direct Threat Threat A Direct Drones: Ries, “Chinese-Made and Lora see John Venable threat, on the DJI more For 2021). April 9, (accessed technology/dji-china-data-drones.html features’, [CloudWalk official] Yao [Zhiqiang] said, noting that in order to make a breakthrough with such technology, deep learning needs to be exploited, as it exploited, to be deep learning needs technology, with such breakthrough a to make order in Yao [Zhiqiang] said, noting that official] [CloudWalk features’, the U.S. Based on a variety of sources consulted by the author. by consulted of sources Based on a variety the U.S. and Others Router “Walmart-Exclusive Meyer, Bernard do so. if it wishes to insert a backdoor to the state allows can be sold. This they before the government files/Research/US-China%20Biotech%20Report.pdf (accessed April 10, 2021). April 10, (accessed files/Research/US-China%20Biotech%20Report.pdf recognition-technology-in-africa (accessed April 9, 2021). April 9, (accessed recognition-technology-in-africa Than Marlo Safi, institutions. “More or Chinese research the Chinese government to or links hiding funding from for other researchers has arrested U.S. The military. r9dKMMM0Gi5I/v0 (accessed April 10, 2021). April 10, (accessed r9dKMMM0Gi5I/v0 of and the Emergence Department Golden Tax “The Brian Hussey, 2021); April 10, (accessed routers-others-made-in-china-contain-backdoors-to-control-devices/ Counterintelligence and Security Center, February 2021, p. 1, https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/SafeguardingOurFuture/NCSC_China_Genomics_Fact_ p. 2021, February Center, Security and Counterintelligence network-kpn-report (accessed April 21, 2021). (accessed network-kpn-report nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-america-needs-clear-policy-deal-chinese-cyber-security-concerns-178434 (accessed April 9, 2021). April 9, (accessed nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-america-needs-clear-policy-deal-chinese-cyber-security-concerns-178434 GoldenSpy Malware,” SpiderLabs Blog, June 25, 2020, https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/the-golden-tax-department-and-the- 2020, SpiderLabs Blog, June 25, Malware,” GoldenSpy Complaint, November 27, 2019, passim, https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Tiktok.pdf (accessed April 10, 2021); Stephanie Bodoni, Stephanie 2021); April 10, (accessed https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Tiktok.pdf passim, 2019, 27, November Complaint, companies requires law The it deems necessary. data any to access demand for of the government’s is also a good demonstration encryption law 2019 China’s , September 3, 2020, https://dailycaller. 3, 2020, , September Daily Caller the Chinese Government,” to Ties for Been Arrested Have US Universities at and Professors Researchers a Dozen , February 14, 2019, pp. 3 and 12, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/ pp. 2019, 14, , February Commission Review and Security Economic the U.S.–China for prepared A report Engagement: and Security Review Commission Hearing on China’s Strategic Aims in Africa,” May 8, 2020, p. 11, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Feldstein_Testimony.pdf 11, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Feldstein_Testimony.pdf p. 8, 2020, May Aims in Africa,” Strategic Hearing on China’s Commission Review and Security , November 11, 2019, https://www.cpomagazine.com/data-protection/chinas-new-encryption-law-highlights-cryptography- 11, 2019, CPO Magazine, November Priority,” as a Strategic 2021). April 10, (accessed as-a-strategic-priority/ without Consent,” https://www.kryptowire.com/kryptowire-discovers-mobile-phone-firmware-transmitted-personally-identifiable-information-pii-without-user- without Consent,” No. 3521, August 19, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/BG3521.pdf. 2020, 19, August 3521, No. Backgrounder Heritage Foundation Use Should Be Curtailed,” Whose emergence-of-goldenspy-malware/ (accessed April 10, 2021); Knockel et al., “We Chat, They Watch”; and Kryptowire, “Android Firmware Sharing Private Data Data Sharing Private Firmware “Android Kryptowire, and Watch”; They Chat, al., “We et Knockel 2021); April 10, (accessed emergence-of-goldenspy-malware/ China’s Biotechnology Development: The Role of US and Other Foreign US and Other Foreign of Role The Development: Biotechnology China’s and Rhodium Group, and Gryphon Scientific 2021), April 10, (accessed Sheet_2021.pdf , May 22, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/world/asia/china-surveillance-xinjiang.html (accessed (accessed https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/world/asia/china-surveillance-xinjiang.html 22, 2019, , May Times York New The Minorities,” Subdue to Surveillance , November 23, 2020, https://cybernews.com/security/walmart-exclusive- 23, 2020, , November cybernews Devices,” Control to Backdoors Hidden Contain & eBay Sold on Amazon , May 17, 2018, https://www.globaltimes.cn/ 2018, 17, , May Global Times Land in Africa,” to ID Tech Facial Zhang Hongpei, “Chinese as part of the pre-phase.” data self-collected (accessed April 10, 2021). April 10, (accessed (accessed April 9, 2021). April 9, (accessed on-protecting-university-research-from-china-idUSKCN2AT0WB (accessed April 10, 2021); and Ellen Barry, “U.S. Accuses Harvard Scientist of Concealing Chinese of Concealing Scientist Harvard Accuses “U.S. and Ellen Barry, 2021); April 10, (accessed on-protecting-university-research-from-china-idUSKCN2AT0WB com/2020/09/03/list-professors-researchers-us-universities-arrested-china-ties/ (accessed April 10, 2021); Jane Lanhee Lee and Daphne Psaledakis, “U.S. Doubles and Daphne Psaledakis, “U.S. Jane Lanhee Lee 2021); April 10, (accessed com/2020/09/03/list-professors-researchers-us-universities-arrested-china-ties/ china-nih-scientists.html (accessed April 9, 2021). April 9, (accessed china-nih-scientists.html content/1102797.shtml (accessed April 10, 2021). April 10, (accessed content/1102797.shtml consent-disclosure/ (accessed April 10, 2021). For a discussion of the cryptography law, see Nicole Lindsey, “China’s New Encryption Law Highlights Cryptography Cryptography Highlights Encryption Law New “China’s Lindsey, see Nicole law, of the cryptography a discussion For 2021). April 10, (accessed consent-disclosure/ of Texas, Houston Division, Criminal Action No. H-09-CR-307, Houston, Texas, January 11, 2010, p. 71, https://assets.bwbx.io/documents/users/iqjWHBFdfxIU/ p. January 11, 2010, Texas, Houston, H-09-CR-307, No. Division, Criminal Action Houston of Texas, by and authenticated” be “examined systems all cryptographic that but it also requires spying, them from protect to secrets encrypt trade in China to operating 2020, https://citizenlab.ca/2020/05/we-chat-they-watch/ (accessed April 9, 2021). April 9, (accessed https://citizenlab.ca/2020/05/we-chat-they-watch/ 2020, , July 6, 2020, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/future-of-facial- , July 6, 2020, Today ISS Studies, Security for Institute in Africa,” Technology Recognition of Facial Allen, “Future Karen https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/health/ 2019, 4, , November Times York New The China,” for of Biomedical Secrets Theft Targets Dragnet “Vast Gina Kolata, to the Chinese their links concealing for to biomedics, related was of interest some of whose area researchers, other five least at prosecuting is currently U.S. The Figure 1, “African Countries with AI and Big Data Surveillance Technology Provided by Chinese Firms,” in Steven Feldstein, “Testimony Before the U.S.–China Economic Economic the U.S.–China Before “Testimony Feldstein, in Steven Chinese Firms,” by Provided Technology Surveillance with AI and Big Data Countries 1, “African Figure National Security,” and National Economic and U.S. Privacy to America: Risks from [sic] Data of Genomic and Other Heathcare Collection “China’s Sheet, Fact “‘The differences between technologies tailored to an Asian face and those to a black one are relatively large, not only in terms of color, but also facial bones and but also color, terms of not only in large, relatively to a black one are and those face to an Asian technologies tailored between differences “‘The Dorfman, “Tech Giants Are Giving China a Vital Edge in Espionage.” Edge Giving China a Vital Are Giants Dorfman, “Tech https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/ 2019, , April 14, Times York New The a Minority,” Profile China Is Using A.I. to Scans: How Face 500,000 Month, “One Mozur, Paul , November 29, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/ 2017, 29, , November Times York New The Say,” Officials China, U.S. to Be Sending Data May D.J.I. Maker “Drone Mozur, Paul Southern District Court, District States Ehab Ashoor, United versus America of States United proceedings, of transcript of excerpt in Chieffalo of Lee Testimony ByteDance Beijing Corporation; Inc., a TikTok, Corporation, Inc., a ByteDance, vs. Plaintiff, All Others Similarly Situated, and on Behalf of Hong, Individually Misty https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/ 2021, 29, January ABC News, Scanner Firm Nuctech,” Block Chinese Airport to “Lithuania Set Press, Associated , April 17, 2021, https://nltimes.nl/2021/04/17/huawei-able-eavesdrop-dutch-mobile- 2021, , April 17, NL Times KPN: Report,” network mobile on Dutch eavesdrop able to was “Huawei Unwittingly Users International How Watch: They Chat, Ron Deibert, “We and Xiong, Jedidiah Crandall, Ruohan Lotus Ruan, Parsons, Christopher Knockel, Jeffrey , The Buzz blog, February 18, 2021, https:// 18, 2021, blog, February Buzz , The Interest National The Concerns,” Security Deal with Chinese Cyber to America Needs a Clear Policy “Why Klon Kitchen, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/national-intelligence-law-of-the-p-r-c-2017/ 2017, June 27, (2017),” P.R.C. of the Law Intelligence “National Translate, China Law Kingdom, and Uganda, the United Norway, Zealand, India, Japan, Lithuania, New Germany, Denmark, France, Republic, the Czech Canada, Australia, are countries The April 9, 2021). April 9, , United States District Court, Northern District of California, Class Action Action Class of California, Northern District Court, District States , United Defendant a Corporation. and Musical.ly, Company; a Privately-Held Ltd, Co. Technology , March 10, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-10/tiktok-may- 2021, 10, , March China, Bloomberg to Being Sent on Data Warning EU Watchdog’s Prompts “TikTok 54. 55. 56. 52. 53. 51. 50. 49. 45. 46. 47. 48. 43. 44. 40. 41. 42.  7. 4. Chinese Influence onandExploitation of U.S. Colleges andUniversities 12. 11. 10. 13. 14. 1. 19. 18. 17. 16. 15. 136 2. 21. 20. 26. 25. 24. 23. 22. 27. 3. CHAD WOLF andJAMES JAY CARAFANO, PHD 59. 9. 58. 57. 5. 61. 60. 6. 8. April 10, 2021). August 8,2018, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/chinese-corruption-africa-undermines-beijings-rhetoric-about-friendship-the. April 10, 2021). U.S. Department ofState, “The ChineseCommunist Party onCampus:Opportunities&Risks,” https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/CCP-on-campus- Ibid., p. 2. Ibid. Staff Report, Threats to theU.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruitment, p. Plans 7. Testimony ofEricE.Schmidt,Co-Founder, SchmidtFutures, instenographic transcript, Hearingto Receive Testimony onEmerging Technologies andtheirImpact on Serianu, “Demystifying Africa’s Cyber Security Poverty Line,” Africa Cyber Security Report 2017, https://www.serianu.com/downloads/AfricaCyberSecurityReport2017. Joshua Meservey, “Chinese Corruption inAfrica UnderminesBeijing’s Rhetoric AboutFriendship withtheContinent,” HeritageFoundation Issue BriefNo. 4895, News release, “Former EmoryUniversity Professor andChinese‘Thousand Talents’ Participant Convicted andSentenced for FilingaFalse Tax Return,” U.S. Ryan Fedasiuk andJacob Felgoise, “The Youth Thousand Talents PlanandChina’s Military,” Georgetown University, Center for Security andEmerging Technology Staff Report, Threats to theU.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruitment, p. Plans 3. Tom Burt,“New Nation-State Cyberattacks,” Microsoft OntheIssues blog,March 2,2021, https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2021/03/02/new-nation-state- David andNicole E.Sanger Perlroth, “U.S. to Accuse ChinaofTrying to HackVaccine Data, asVirus Redirects Cyberattacks,” The New York Times, updated May 13, U.S. Department ofState, “The ChineseCommunist Party onCampus:Opportunities&Risks,” https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/CCP-on-campus- Smriti Mallapaty, “China HidesIdentities ofTop Scientific Recruits Amidst Growing USScrutiny,” Nature, October 22,2018, https://www.natureindex.com/news-blog/ See, for example, Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, “Chinese Talent Programs,” Counterintelligence Strategic Partnership Intelligence Note No. 15-007, September 2015, Staff Report, Threats to theU.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruitment, p. Plans 2. David Zweig andSiqinKang, “America ChallengesChina’s National Talent Programs,” Center for Strategic andInternational Studies Occasional Paper No. 4, May 2020, Staff Report, Threats to theU.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruitment, Permanent Plans Subcommittee onInvestigations, Committee onHomelandSecurity David Zweig, “Learning to Compete: China’s Efforts to Encourage a Reverse Brain Drain,” International Labour Review, Vol. 145, Nos.1–2 (2006),pp. 65–90. Radomir Tylecote andRobert Clark,Inadvertently ArmingChina? The Chinese Military Complex andIts Potential Exploitation of Scientific Research at UKUniversities, Ibid., p. 10. Fedasiuk andFelgoise, “The Youth Thousand Talents PlanandChina’s Military,” p. 7. See, for example, ibid.,pp. 1and13. Zweig andKang, “America ChallengesChina’s National Talents Program,” p. 8. Staff Report, “Threats to theU.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruitment Plans ,” 2019, p. 2. Proclamation No. 10043, May 29, 2020, “SuspensionofEntry asNonimmigrants ofCertain Students andResearchers from thePeople’s Republic ofChina,” Federal U.S. Government Accountability Office, China:Agreements Establishing Confucius Institutes at U.S. Universities Are Similar, butInstitute Operations Vary , GAO-19-278, Ibid., pp. 14–15. Ibid., p. 2. Staff Report, “China’s Impact ontheU.S. Education System, Permanent Subcommittee onInvestigations, Committee onHomelandSecurity andGovernmental Affairs, Pratik Jakhar, “Confucius Institutes: The Growth ofChina’s Controversial Cultural Branch” BBCNews, September 7, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia- Talent%20Recruitment%20Plans.pdf (accessed April10, 2021). Fact Sheet, “‘Confucius Institute U.S. Center’ Designation asaForeign Mission,” U.S. Department ofState, August 13,2020, https://2017-2021.state.gov/confucius- 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/10/us/politics/coronavirus-china-cyber-hacking.html (accessed April9, 2021). cyberattacks/ (accessed April9, 2021), andKrishna N.Das,“Chinese Hackers Target IndianVaccine Makers SII,Bharat Biotech, Says Security Firm,” Reuters, March china-hides-identities-of-top-scientific-recruits-amidst-growing-us-scrutiny (accessed April10, 2021). china-49511231 (accessed April10, 2021). (accessed April14, 2021). (accessed April15, 2021). 1, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-india-china/chinese-hackers-target-indian-vaccine-makers-sii-bharat-biotech-says-security-firm- Issue Brief,August 2020, p. 2,https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-Youth-Thousand-Talents-Plan-and-Chinas-Military-1.pdf (accessed National Security, Committee onArmedServices, U.S. Senate, February 23,2021, p. 49, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/21-05_02-23-2021. and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, 2019, pp. 20–21, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2019-11-18%20PSI%20Staff%20Report%20-%20China's%20 Register, Vol. 85, No. 108(June 4, 2020), pp. 34353–34355, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-06-04/pdf/2020-12217.pdf (accessed April14, 2021). pdf (accessed April10, 2021). pdf (accessed April10, 2021). Civitas: Institute for theStudy ofCivilSociety, revised edition, updated February 24, 2021, p. 2,https://www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/ChinaReport.pdf (accessed p. 4, https://www.drdavidzweig.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Zweig-Kang-TTP.pdf (accessed April10, 2021). U.S. Senate, 2019, p. 13,https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/PSI%20Report%20China's%20Impact%20on%20the%20US%20Education%20System.pdf FINAL.pdf (accessed April14, 2021). Department ofJustice, May 8,2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-emory-university-professor-and-chinese-thousand-talents-participant-convicted-and FINAL.pdf (accessed April10, 2021). February 2019, pp. 3–4, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-278.pdf (accessed April15, 2021). idUSKCN2AT20P (accessed April9, 2021). institute-u-s-center-designation-as-a-foreign-mission/index.html (accessed April10, 2021). https://ippiblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/FBI-ChineseTalentPrograms-1.pdf (accessed April10, 2021). China Transparency Report  137 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-China-Scholarship-Council.pdf (accessed April 11, 2021). (accessed https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-China-Scholarship-Council.pdf halt-work-huawei-federal-charges-62175936 (accessed April 11, 2021). (accessed halt-work-huawei-federal-charges-62175936 in the United States,” January 2021, and “Confucius Institutes That Are Closing,” March 2021. March Closing,” Are That Institutes and “Confucius January 2021, States,” in the United Education, October 20, 2020, https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-uncovers-vast-underreporting-foreign-gifts-and-contracts-higher- 2020, 20, October Education, Background%20and%20Implications%20for%20US_final_0.pdf (accessed April 10, 2021). April 10, (accessed Background%20and%20Implications%20for%20US_final_0.pdf Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, February 28, 2018, p. 4, https://www.hsgac. 4, p. February 28, 2018, U.S. Senate, Affairs, and Governmental on Homeland Security Committee on Investigations, Subcommittee Permanent New%20Documents/confucius-institutes-in-the-us-updated-january-19-2021.pdf (accessed April 10, 2021). Included in this source are two tables: “Confucius Institutes Institutes tables: “Confucius two are Included in this source 2021). April 10, (accessed New%20Documents/confucius-institutes-in-the-us-updated-january-19-2021.pdf International Cyber Policy Centre, “China Defence Universities Tracker,” https://www.aspi.org.au/report/china-defence-universities-tracker (accessed April 11, 2021). (accessed https://www.aspi.org.au/report/china-defence-universities-tracker Tracker,” Universities Defence “China Centre, Policy Cyber International to The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, February 11, 2021, https://www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2021-02- 11, 2021, February Security, of Homeland Department Secretary, Mayorkas, Alejandro Honorable The to Universities%20Tracker_0.pdf?ozIi2cWm.kXpe7XsEZ44vUMMQBNfnR_x (accessed April 11, 2021). For the tracker, see Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Institute, Policy Strategic see Australian the tracker, For April 11, 2021). (accessed Universities%20Tracker_0.pdf?ozIi2cWm.kXpe7XsEZ44vUMMQBNfnR_x [of the Higher Education Act]. For the 2017–2018 school year, institutions reported receiving from China a total of about $222 million, or 17% of the $1.3 billion, in of about $222 million, or 17% of the $1.3 China a total from receiving reported institutions school year, the 2017–2018 For Act]. the Higher Education [of prc_political_influence_full_report.pdf (accessed April 11, 2021). (accessed prc_political_influence_full_report.pdf news/articles/2020-02-06/harvard-leads-u-s-colleges-that-received-1-billion-from-china (accessed April 10, 2021). 10, April (accessed news/articles/2020-02-06/harvard-leads-u-s-colleges-that-received-1-billion-from-china , Report No. 23/2019, November 24, 2019, https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2019-11/The%20China%20Defence%20 2019, 24, November 23/2019, No. , Report Brief Policy Centre Policy Cyber Center for Scholars, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, 2018, p. 1, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/ p. 2018, States, on China and the United Institute Kissinger Scholars, for Center propaganda-program-in-us-schools-changes-headquarters-name/ (accessed April 10, 2021). April 10, (accessed propaganda-program-in-us-schools-changes-headquarters-name/ academic-freedom/ (accessed April 10, 2021). April 10, (accessed academic-freedom/ 2021). April 10, (accessed axios.com/china-spy-california-politicians-9d2dfb99-f839-4e00-8bd8-59dec0daf589.html 2021). April 10, (accessed arm-reaches-into-american-campuses-chinese-students-scholars-association-university-communist-party/ , Vol. 21, No. 6 (2018), pp. 843–857. pp. 6 (2018), 21, No. , Vol. Education education-institutions (accessed April 11, 2021). (accessed education-institutions sources in 105 countries. Among these 105 countries, China ranked first in terms of the total amount of gifts and contracts reported by institutions under section 117 under section by institutions reported contracts of gifts and total amount terms of the in first China ranked Among these 105 countries, in 105 countries. sources 2021). April 10, (accessed senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2019-02-28%20Zais%20Testimony%20-%20PSI.pdf 11%20CEG%20to%20DHS%20(Confucius%20Rule).pdf (accessed April 15, 2021). April 15, (accessed 11%20CEG%20to%20DHS%20(Confucius%20Rule).pdf companies-seek-buy-american-campuses (accessed April 11, 2021). (accessed companies-seek-buy-american-campuses confucius-institute-at-tufts-university-is-set-to-close-amid-protests_3737888.html (accessed April 10, 2021). April 10, (accessed confucius-institute-at-tufts-university-is-set-to-close-amid-protests_3737888.html governmental and nongovernmental gifts and contracts.” General Mitchell M. “Mick” Zais, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Education, statement before the before statement of Education, Department U.S. Secretary, M. “Mick” Zais, Deputy Mitchell General gifts and contracts.” and nongovernmental governmental china_is_rebranding_its_confucius_institutes_110445.html (accessed April 10, 2021). April 10, (accessed china_is_rebranding_its_confucius_institutes_110445.html 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-weighs-amnesty-for-academics-to-disclose-foreign-funding-11611345451 (accessed April 9, 2021). April 9, (accessed https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-weighs-amnesty-for-academics-to-disclose-foreign-funding-11611345451 2021, , August 24, 2018, p. 10, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China's%20Overseas%20United%20Front%20Work%20-%20 10, p. 2018, 24, Report, August Research Staff 2021, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF11180.pdf (accessed April 15, 2021), and letter from Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Senate, U.S. on the Judiciary, Committee Ranking Member, E. Grassley, Charles from and letter 2021), April 15, (accessed https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF11180.pdf 2021, Ibid., p. 2. Ibid., p. January 22, Journal, updated Street Wall The Funding,” Disclose Foreign to Academics for Amnesty Weighs Department “Justice and Aruna Viswanatha, Korn Melissa , July 2020, p. 4, 4, p. Brief, July 2020, Issue Technology and Emerging Security for Center University, Georgetown An Overview,” Council: China Scholarship “The Fedasiuk, Ryan Alex Joske, “The China Defence Universities Tracker: Exploring the Military and Security Links of China’s Universities,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, International International Institute, Policy Strategic Australian Universities,” of China’s Links Military and Security Exploring the Tracker: Universities China Defence “The Joske, Alex , October 15, 2018, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/10/15/chinese- 2018, 15, , October Inside Higher Ed Campuses,” Buy U.S. Seek to Companies “Chinese Redden, Elizabeth International Wilson , Woodrow Education Higher in American Activities and Interference Influence Political PRC of Study A Preliminary Lloyd-Damnjanovic, Anastasya of Department U.S. Institutions,” Higher Education by Gifts and Contracts of Foreign Underreporting Vast Uncovers of Education Department “U.S. release, News See, for example, Lum and Fischer, “Confucius Institutes in the United States: Selected Issues.” Selected States: in the United Institutes “Confucius Fischer, Lum and example, for See, 23. , p. Vary Operations but Institute Similar, Are Universities U.S. at Institutes Confucius Establishing China: Agreements Office, Accountability Government U.S. https://www.theepochtimes.com/mkt_app/ 2021, 19, , March Epoch Times The Close amid Protests,” to Set University Tufts at Institute Liu, “Confucius Learner and non-governmental governmental foreign from billion in gifts and contracts $1.3 over receiving reported 91 institutions school year, 2017–2018 “During the recent https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/03/confucius-institutes-chinese-government- 2019, 15, , March Review National Insidious Institutes,” “China’s Rachelle Peterson, Commission Review and Security Economic U.S.–China States,” the United for and Implications Background Work: Front United Overseas “China’s Bowe, Alexander 10–11. Ibid., pp. https://www. 8, 2020, December updated Axios, Politicians,” California Targeted Chinese Spy Suspected and Zach Dorfman, “Exclusive: Allen-Ebrahimian Bethany https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/07/chinas-long- 2018, 7, , March Policy Foreign American Campuses,” into Arm Reaches Long “China’s Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany https://www.bloomberg.com/ 6, 2020, February Bloomberg, China,” Billion from $1 Received That Colleges U.S. Leads “Harvard Kochkodin, and Brandon Lorin Janet https://abcnews.go.com/Lifestyle/wireStory/us-colleges- 2019, April 4, ABC News, Charges,” Federal Following with Huawei Halt Work “US Colleges Binkley, Collin Race Ethnicity and Ethnicity Race Learning,” and Transformative Challenges, Motivation, in the UK: Teachers Institute “Confucius Edwards, and Viv Yea Wei example, for See, amended April 2017, of Scholars, Association , National Education Higher American in Power and Soft Institutes China: Confucius to Outsourced Rachelle Peterson, Rachelle Peterson, “China Is Rebranding Its Confucius Institutes,” Real Clear Education, July 22, 2020, https://www.realcleareducation.com/articles/2020/07/22/ July 22, 2020, Clear Education, Real Institutes,” Confucius Its Is Rebranding “China Rachelle Peterson, https://nypost.com/2021/03/18/chinese- 18, 2021, , March Post York New Name,” in US Schools Changes Headquarters Program Propaganda “Chinese Conklin, Audrey https://www.nas.org/storage/app/media/ 2021, 25, March updated States?” in the United Are Institutes Confucius Many “How of Scholars, Association See National Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, “OIRA Conclusion of EO 12866 Regulatory Review,” Regulatory 12866 of EO “OIRA Conclusion Affairs, Regulatory and of Information Office and Budget, of Management Office President, of the Office Executive No. 11180, updated March 18, March updated 11180, No. In Focus Service Research Congressional Issues,” Selected States: United in the Institutes “Confucius Lum, and Hannah Fischer, Thomas June 2017, pp. 9–10, https://www.nas.org/storage/app/media/Reports/Outsourced%20to%20China/NAS_confuciusInstitutes.pdf (accessed April 15, 2021). April 15, (accessed https://www.nas.org/storage/app/media/Reports/Outsourced%20to%20China/NAS_confuciusInstitutes.pdf 9–10, pp. June 2017, January 26, 2021, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoDetails?rrid=131811 (accessed April 10, 2021). April 10, (accessed https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoDetails?rrid=131811 2021, January 26, 51. 52. 50. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 33. 34. 30. 31. 32. 29. 28. 49. 46. 47. 48. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45.  The Future ofChina’s MaritimeMilitiainthe“New Situation”: APrimer 7. 4. 12. 11. 10. 14. 13. 1. 19. 18. 17. 16. 15. 138 22. 21. 23. 20. 2. 3. COLLIN KOH 5. 9. 6. 8. 五产量预测,” [Development ofChinese FisheryIndustry inthePast 40Years ofReform andOpeningUp, Production Forecast inthe14thFive-Year Plan],上海海 代化 [FisheryModernization], Vol. 46,No. 3(June 2019), pp. 1-6;鲁泉[LuQuan]and陈新军[Chen Xinjun], “改革开放40年来中国渔业产业发展及十四 岛礁及附近海域的建设与开发,” [Construction andDevelopment ofIslandsandReefs andAdjacent Seas], 中国南海网[China Nanhai],July21,2016, http:// 析,” [Analysis oftheProblems ofCoastal MaritimeMilitiainProtection ofMaritimeSovereignty], 铁军[Tiejun Magazine], Issue 11(2019), pp. 15–16. April 12,2021). 次会议上 [Government Work Report—First Meeting ofthe 6thPeople’s Congress oftheHainanProvince on26 January2018], February 5, 2018, http://www.hainan. Ministry ofAgriculture andRural Affairs ofthe People’s Republic ofChina,“2020年渔业渔政工作十大亮点 [Ten MajorHighlights of2020 Work onFisheries Jianping Guo, “The Developments ofMarineEnvironmental Protection Obligation inArticle192 ofUNCLOS andtheOperational Impact onChina’s MarinePolicy—A Permanent Court ofArbitration, “The SouthChinaSeaArbitration (The Republic ofPhilippinesv. The People's Republic ofChina),” https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/ Su, et al,“Adjustment Trend ofChina’s MarineFisheryPolicy Since 2011,” p. 3. Lijun Liu,JingjieChu,JamesL.Anderson, andJintao Xu, “Sustainability Comparisons intheTriple Bottom Linefor ChineseFisheries,” MarinePolicy, Vol. 125(March 张践 [ZhangJian],“围绕六化”抓建 推动海上民兵转型,” [Propelling theTransformation ofMaritimeMilitia,Revolving Around ‘SixChanges’],国防 海南省代省长 冯飞[HainanProvincial Governor Feng Fei], “2021年海南省政府工作报告,” [2021 HainanProvincial Government Work Report], February 1, 刘巍 [LiuWei] and侯瑞剑[HouRuijian],“南海渔业船作业环境分析,” [Analysis oftheOperational Environment for FishingVessels intheSouthChinaSea], Lu andChen,“Development ofChineseFisheryIndustry inthePast 40Years ofReform andOpeningUp, Production Forecast inthe14thFive-Year Plan,” p. 344. Ministry ofAgriculture andRural Affairs ofthe People’s Republic ofChina,“农业部关于加快推进渔业转方式调结构的指导意见[Ministry ofAgriculture Meng Su,LinglingWang, JiahaoXiang, andYuxia Ma,“Adjustment Trend ofChina’s MarineFisheryPolicy Since 2011,” MarinePolicy, Vol. 124 (February 2021), pp. 1–11. This refers to allkindsofharvesting ofnaturally occurring livingresources inthemarineenvironment: inthiscase, thecoastal regions andseas. See: “中国民兵,” [China’s Militia],中国军网[ChinaMilitary Online ], http://www.81.cn/zgmb/index.htm (accessed June23,2021). “Given thesignificant costs ofengagingtheUnited States in combat, andthegrowing range ofindirect andnon-military tools at theirdisposal,rivals are seeking ways 徐海峰 [Xu Haifeng], “适应新形势 全面规范海上民兵建设 ,” [Coping withtheNew Situation, Comprehensively Planningfor theConstruction ofMaritime 海南省省长 沈晓明[HainanProvincial Governor ShenXiaoming], “ 政府工作报告 -二○一八年一月二十六日在海南省第六届人民代表大会第一 王振宇 [Wang Zhenyu], 吴俊辰[Wu Junchen],and朱丁一[ZhuDingyi],“中国海上民兵支援维权的能力提升途径,” [EnhancingChina’s MaritimeMilitia 潘金宽 [Pan Jinkuan], “现代条件下人民战争依法动员,” [Legalized Mobilization of Personnel DuringPeople’s War UnderModernConditions], 中国军转民 Su, et al,“Adjustment Trend ofChina’s MarineFisheryPolicy Since 2011”; Central People’s Government ofthe People’s Republic ofChina,“千吨级渔船首航助力南 Ibid., p. 6. Ryan Martinson,“Catching Sovereignty Fish:ChineseFishers intheSouthernSpratlys,” MarinePolicy, Vol. 125(March 2021), pp. 1–11. Shuxian LuoandJonathan G.Panter, “China’s MaritimeMilitiaandFishingFleets: APrimerfor Operational Staffs and Tactical Leaders,” Military Review, Vol. 101, No. Hongzhou Zhang,“Chinese FishermeninDisputed Waters: NotQuite a‘People’s War’,” MarinePolicy, Vol. 68(June 2016), pp. 65–73, https://www.researchgate.net/ Trends andEnhancement ofMeasures oftheFisheryIndustry inChina’s Three SouthChinaSeaProvinces], 海洋经济[MarineEconomy], January2021, nopage 2021), pp. 1–8. 2021, http://www.hinews.cn/news/system/2021/02/01/032502224.shtml (accessed June23,2021). 要”,” [Strengthening the‘Four Must’ intheConstruction ofMaritimeMilitia],国防[National Defense ], No. 5(2016), pp. 41–42;赵经义 [ZhaoJingyi],“面向形势 沙群岛“热带渔业养殖”,” [1000-Ton Class FishingVessel Makes Maiden Voyage inSupportofNanshaIslands’‘Tropical MarineRanching’],September 10, 2011; “对 gov.cn/data/news/2018/02/180827/ (accessed June23,2021).; 刘自利[LiuZhili],丁胜[DingSheng],and刘帅Shuai],“沿海地区海上民兵维权问题浅 洋大学学报 [Journal of ShanghaiOcean University], Vol. 30, No. 2(March 2021), pp. 339–347. 唐立达 [Tang Lida]and汪治强[Wang Zhiqiang],“适应海防形势要求 加强海上民兵工作,” [Adapting to MaritimeDefense Situational Requirements, often lieinthecontested arena somewhere between routine statecraft andopenwarfare—the “gray zone.” Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, “Gray Zone on Strengthening andImproving China’s MaritimeMilitiaQuickReaction Detachments], 国防[National Defense ], No. 12(2014), pp. 35–36;何志祥 [HeZhixiang],“ 建设“四要”,” [Strengthening the“Four Must” ofSeaandBorder Defense Personnel Mobilization undertheNew Situation], 国防 [National Defense], No. 2(2015), (accessed April16,2021). [China Military–Civil Conversion ], Issue 10(2019), pp. 79–82. South ChinaSeaFisheriesPerspective,” MarinePolicy, Vol. 120(October 2020), pp. 1–7. Support andRights Protection Ability], 海洋开发与管理[Ocean Development andManagement], Vol. 1(2017), pp. 42–46 and57. 1 (January–February 2021), pp. 7–21, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/JF-21/Panter-Maritime-Militia-1.pdf (accessed Strengthening MaritimeMilitiaWork], 国防[National Defense ], No. 4(2016), pp. 42–43; 寇振云[Kou Zhenyun] and冯时[Feng加强海上民兵建设 Shi],“四 适应海防安全形势 建强海上民兵组织,” [Adapting to MaritimeDefense andSecurity Situation, Strengthening Maritime Militia Units], 国防[National www.thesouthchinasea.org.cn/2016-07/21/c_53514.htm (accessed June 23, 2021). and Rural Affairs’ GuidingOpinions Regarding the Acceleration ofImplementing FisheryIndustry Transformation and Restructuring], November 27, 2017; 丁琪[Ding Defense], No. 1(2015), pp. 48–50; 陈明 [Chen Ming],张容胜[ZhangRongsheng], and梁林生[LiangLinsheng],“加强新形势下边海防地区国防动员 Qi], 单秀娟[Shan Xiujuan] and李忠炉[LiZhonglu],“南海三省 (区)渔业产业结构演变趋势及升级对策研究,” [Research ontheStructural Evolution Chinese-fishermen-in-disputed-waters-Not-quite-a-peoples-war.pdf (accessed April12,2021). numbers; 徐琰斐[Xu Yanfei] and刘晃[LiuHuang],“深蓝渔业发展策略研究,” [Research ontheDevelopmental Strategy ofDeep-ocean Fisheries], 渔业现 profile/Hongzhou-Zhang-3/publication/299422058_Chinese_fishermen_in_disputed_waters_Not_quite_a_people%27s_war/links/59d5fc0a0f7e9b7a7e49babe/ pp. 23–24; 周洪福[ZhouHongfu],“适应海洋强国要求 加强海上民兵建设,” [Adapting to theRequirements ofMaritimeGreat Power, Strengthening 船舶 [Ship &Boat], Vol. 6,No. 189 (2020), pp. 18–23. [National Defense], No. 10(2015), pp. 21–23. [Using War Readiness Posture to Properly Grasp Enhanced Realistic Combat Training for theMaritimeMilitia],国防[National Defense], No. 11(2015), pp. 25–27; Industry andAdministration], March 9, 2021. to achieve relative gainswithouttriggeringescalation. From fake news andonlinetroll farms to terrorist financingandparamilitary provocations, theseapproaches the Construction ofMaritimeMilitia],国防[National Defense], No. 6(2015), pp. 47–48; 张利明 [ZhangLiming],“ 以临战姿态抓好海上民兵实战化训练,” Project,” https://www.csis.org/grayzone (accessed April16,2021). Militia], 国防[National Defense], No. 2(2014), pp. 65–66; 陈青松 [Chen Qingsong],“加强和改进海上民兵应急分队建设之我见,” [A Personal Opinion China Transparency Report  139 (accessed June 21, 2021), and June 21, 2021), (accessed The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The Nikkei Nikkei and Europe,” Africa to in Pakistan Builds Digital Silk Road Haq, “China Mifrah 21, 2021), (June http://www.peacecable.net/news/Detail/16628 https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-takes-on-chinas-huawei-in-undersea-battle-over-the-global-internet-grid-11552407466 (accessed June 12, 2021). (accessed https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-takes-on-chinas-huawei-in-undersea-battle-over-the-global-internet-grid-11552407466 (accessed June 21, 2021). (accessed https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-takes-on-chinas-huawei-in-undersea-battle-over-the-global-internet-grid-11552407466 FetchPN?report_key=1161502 (accessed June 12, 2021). (accessed FetchPN?report_key=1161502 (accessed June 21, 2021). (accessed https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SFRC%20Majority%20China-Europe%20Report%20FINAL%20(P&G).pdf National Security And Foreign Policy Implications, Sept. 11, 2019,” speech at the State Department, September 16, 2019, https://china.usc.edu/christopher-ford- 16, 2019, September Department, the State speech at Sept. 11, 2019,” Implications, Policy And Foreign Security National 12, 2021). June (accessed ELECTRIC-C-9059405/news/EU-launches-investigation-into-Chinese-optical-fibre-cable-imports-31352732/ Fiber & Cable,” https://en.fiberhome.com/industry/product/232.aspx (accessed June 21, 2021). (accessed https://en.fiberhome.com/industry/product/232.aspx Fiber & Cable,” 2021, 5, February Hengtong Marine Group, “Cases: Peace,” July 16, 2019, http://www.hengtongmarine.com/index.php/cases/casesInfo/37.html (accessed June 21, 2021). (accessed http://www.hengtongmarine.com/index.php/cases/casesInfo/37.html July 16, 2019, Peace,” “Cases: Marine Group, Hengtong November 10, 2014, http://news.cableabc.com/commentary/20141110025344.html (accessed June 21, 2021). (accessed http://news.cableabc.com/commentary/20141110025344.html 2014, 10, November March 2021, p. 18, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210309_Hillman_Subsea_Network_1.pdf?1c7RFgLM3w3apMi0eAPl2rPmqrNN p. 2021, March Investigation into Chinese Optical Fibre Cable Imports,” Market Screener, September 24, 2020, https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/HENGTONG-OPTIC- 2020, 24, September Screener, Market Cable Imports,” Chinese Optical Fibre into Investigation usa-cable/chinas-huawei-to-sell-undersea-cable-business-buyers-exchange-filing-shows-idUSKCN1T40BS (accessed June 21, 2021). (accessed usa-cable/chinas-huawei-to-sell-undersea-cable-business-buyers-exchange-filing-shows-idUSKCN1T40BS Cable and Satellite Communications,” Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University, 2020, https://www.jhuapl.edu/Content/documents/UnderseaFiber- 2020, University, Johns Hopkins Laboratory, Applied Physics Communications,” Cable and Satellite June 21, 2021). (accessed OpticCableandSATCOM.pdf pdf (accessed June 21, 2021). pdf (accessed (accessed (accessed https://www.huawei.com/en/news/2015/10/huawei%20marine%20is%20contracted 22, 2015, October America,” Latin to Africa Connect Cable to articles/2021-03-05/china-s-peace-cable-in-europe-raises-tensions-with-the-u-s (accessed June 21, 2021). (accessed articles/2021-03-05/china-s-peace-cable-in-europe-raises-tensions-with-the-u-s entity-list (June 21, 2021). (June entity-list ] Issue 10 (2019), pp. 197 and 199. 197 pp. 10 (2019), ] Issue [Motherland 祖国 Regions,” Coastal 陈 and 2019; of Maritime Sovereignty,” Militia in Protection Maritime of Coastal the Problems of al, “Analysis Liu, et 51–52; pp. 1 (2018), ], No. Defense 防 [National state-department-huawei-and-its-siblings-chinese-tech-giants-national-security-and (accessed June 12, 2021). For anti-competitive behavior, see “EU Launches behavior, anti-competitive For June 12, 2021). (accessed state-department-huawei-and-its-siblings-chinese-tech-giants-national-security-and (accessed June 21, 2021). (accessed end-the-dominance-of-submarine-cables zvwJ (accessed June 21, 2021). (accessed zvwJ c90000-9277569.html (accessed June 21, 2021), and Huawei Technologies Co., “Huawei Marine Is Contracted to Build Cameroon-Brazil Trans-Atlantic Submarine Trans-Atlantic Build Cameroon-Brazil to Marine Is Contracted “Huawei Co., Technologies and Huawei June 21, 2021), (accessed c90000-9277569.html com/2015/10/26/world/europe/russian-presence-near-undersea-cables-concerns-us.html (accessed June 21, 2021). (accessed com/2015/10/26/world/europe/russian-presence-near-undersea-cables-concerns-us.html 2020, pp. 90-91. For PRC security state risks, see Christopher Ford, “Christopher Ford, State Department, Huawei and Its Siblings, The Chinese Tech Giants: Giants: Chinese Tech and Its Siblings, The Huawei Department, State Ford, “Christopher Ford, see Christopher risks, state security PRC 90-91. For pp. 2020, 34508, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/06/05/2020-10868/addition-of-certain-entities-to-the-entity-list-revision-of-existing-entries-on-the- 34508, , 112th Cong., 2nd sess., October 8, 2012. October 2nd sess., ZTE, 112th Cong., and Huawei Companies Telecommunications Chinese by Posed Issues Security National on the U.S. Report Investigative http://licensing.fcc.gov/ibfsweb/ib.page. January 13, 2017, SCL-00193, No. Report Act, License Under Cable take Actions Commission, Communications Federal Interview with author, February 2021. February with author, Interview 34503- pp. 2020), 5, (June 200407-0099 No. Docket List, on the Entity Entries of Existing Revision List; the Entity to Entities of Certain Addition Register, Federal November Relations, on Foreign Committee Senate on China. U.S. Cooperation Transatlantic for Agenda A Concrete and Europe: States United see The cited, risks For 12, 2019, Journal, March Street Wall The Grid,” of the Global Internet Control for with China Battle Undersea “America’s Taylor, Rob and O’Keeffe, Kate Page, Jeremy ,” [A Few Problems to be Grappled During National Defense Political Mobilization in Mobilization Political Defense During National be Grappled to Problems Few [A ,” “沿海地区战时国防政治动员需要把握的几个问题 Xiao], 啸 [Chen FiberHome, “Deutsche Telekom Optical Fiber Cable Project,” https://en.fiberhome.com/operator/soluation/case/386.aspx (accessed June 21, 2021), and FiberHome, and FiberHome, June 21, 2021), (accessed https://en.fiberhome.com/operator/soluation/case/386.aspx Optical Fiber Cable Project,” Telekom “Deutsche FiberHome, Hengtong LightHash International Communication Co., “Products,” 2020, http://www.light-hash.com/productcenter/list.aspx (accessed June 21, 2021). (accessed http://www.light-hash.com/productcenter/list.aspx 2020, “Products,” Co., Communication International LightHash Hengtong “Optic and FiberHome, June 21, 2021), (accessed https://en.fiberhome.com/industry/product/232/363.aspx the World,” Around Presence Product “Cable FiberHome, , June 2, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-tech- , June 2, 2019, Reuters Filing Shows,” Exchange Buyer’s Cable Business, Sell Undersea to Huawei Sijia Jiang, “China’s June 21, 2021). (accessed http://www.hengtonggroup.com/en/about/Our-Company.htm Company,” “Our Group, Hengtong 91. p. Relations, on Foreign Committee Senate on China. U.S. Cooperation Transatlantic for Agenda A Concrete 18. p. Policymakers,” A Primer for the Subsea Network: E. Hillman, “Securing Jonathan Fiber-Optic “Undersea Michael Dahm, 91, and J. p. Relations, on Foreign Committee Senate on China. U.S. Cooperation Transatlantic for Agenda A Concrete https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 2021, 5, , March Businessweek Bloomberg Feud,” Internet Fuels Europe Cable to Undersea 7,500-Mile “China’s Helene Fouquet, Equipment,” and Interconnection of Termination the Location at on Cooperation a Consensus Reach Global and Interxion PCCW “Peace, Network, Cable International Peace , October 9, 2017, http://en.people.cn/n3/2017/1009/ 2017, 9, Daily, October People’s Project,” Optical Fibre Cameroon-Brazil Evaluate Partners Unicom, “China Ndukong, Kimeng Hilton , October 25, 2015, https://www.nytimes. 2015, 25, , October Times York New The Comfort,” U.S. Close for Too Cables Are Ships Near Data E. Sanger “Russian and Eric Schmitt, David , March 12, 2019, 12, 2019, Journal, March Street Wall The Grid,” of the Global Internet Control with China for Battle Undersea “America’s Taylor, and Rob O’Keefe, Kate Page, Jeremy , 2017, https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Undersea-Cables. , 2017, Report Exchange Policy Insecure,” Cables: Indispensable, Rishi Sunak, “Undersea , Network Cable Strategy), of National the Height Cables Should Rise to Shangsheng Dao Guojia Zhanlue Gaodu” (Submarine “Haidi Dianlan Ying Xinxin, Wu , Report Asia Project Reconnecting Studies and International Strategic for Center Policymakers,” A Primer for the Subsea Network: “Securing E. Hillman, Jonathan , July 1, 2019, https://blog.telegeography.com/will-new-satellites- , July 1, 2019, TeleGeography of Submarine Cables?” Dominance End the Satellites New Op-ed, Alan Mauldin, “Will 87-88, pp. 2020, November Relations, on Foreign Committee Senate , U.S. on China Cooperation Transatlantic for Agenda A Concrete and Europe: States United The 国 Soldiers’], ‘Elite Maritime Militia Reconnaissance Chinese New-Era Create to Hard [Work “尖兵”,” “努力打造新时代海上民兵侦察 诚 [Liu Zhongcheng], ], No. 2 (2017), pp. 41–42; 刘忠 41–42; pp. 2 (2017), ], No. Defense [National the Maritime Militia],国防 Strengthening Situation, under the New Missions [Towards ,” 任务 建强海上民兵 https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/China-builds-Digital-Silk-Road-in-Pakistan-to-Africa-and-Europe 2021, Asia, January 29, June 21, 2021). June 21, 2021). “Ecuador National Telecommunications (CNT) Optical Cable Group Purchase Project,” https://en.fiberhome.com/industry/soluation/case/429.aspx (accessed (accessed https://en.fiberhome.com/industry/soluation/case/429.aspx Project,” Purchase Optical Cable Group (CNT) Telecommunications National “Ecuador LARA D. CROUCH and LARA D. FEITH DAVID 8. 6. Ibid. 9. 5. 24. 25. 20. 21. 22. 23. 3. 19. 18. 17. 2. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 10. 11. 1. Commanding Depths: China’s Bid to Dominate the Cloud—Under the Sea Dominate Bid to China’s Depths: Commanding 4. 7.  The SouthChinaSea:21st-Century for FuldaGap MajorWar inAsia 44. 43. 42. 41. 40. 45. 1. 140 29. 27. 26. 2. 28. 35. 34. 33. 32. 31. Ibid. 30. 37. 36. 39. 38. BRENT D. SADLER Journal, March 10, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-drops-plan-to-run-fiber-cable-to-hong-kong-amid-u-s-pressure-11615400710?mod=pls_whats_news_ Journal, updated August 28,2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trans-pacific-tensions-threaten-u-s-data-link-to-china-11566991801 (accessed June12,2021). June 12,2021). Alex Joske, “PickingFlowers, MakingMoney: The ChineseMilitary’s Collaboration withForeign Universities,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, October 30, 2018, Jonathan Barret andYew LunTian, “EXCLUSIVE Pacific Undersea CableProject Sinks after U.S. Warns against ChineseBid,” Reuters, June17, 2021, https://www.reuters. Federal Register, Vol 84, No. 162 (August 21,2019), pp. 43493-43501. Alsoavailable at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/08/21/2019-17921/addition-of- Jonathan E.Hillman,“Securing theSubseaNetwork: APrimerfor Policymakers,” Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, p. 20. Geoffrey Starks, “Re: Process Reform for Executive Branch Review of Certain FCC Applications and Petitions Involving Foreign Ownership,” https://docs.fcc.gov/public/ Intelligence Online, “Facebook Drops Francisco-Hong San Kong SubmarineCableAmidGrowing National Security Concerns,” https://www.intelligenceonline.com/ Richard C.Sofield,Nova J. Daly, MeganL.Brown, Wayne D. Johnsen, Eve Klindera Reed, andDaniel P. Brooks, “FCC UnanimouslyApproves InitialPhaseof Team Geoffrey Starks, “Re: Process Reform for Executive Branch Review of Certain FCC Applications and Petitions Involving Foreign Ownership,” https://docs.fcc.gov/public/ U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, ChinaMilitary Power: ModernizingaForce to Fight andWin , 2019, pp. 28–29 and33,https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/ David M.Finkelstein, “Breaking theParadigm: Drivers BehindthePLA’s Current Period ofReform,” Chapter 1inChairmanXi Remakes thePLA: Assessing Chinese Mike Pompeo, “Secretary MichaelR.Pompeo at aPress Availability,” Remarks to thePress at U.S. Department ofState Press Briefing Room, August 5, 2020, Virginia Tech Center for Power andElectronics Systems, “About theCenter for Power andElectronics Systems,” https://cpes.vt.edu/about (accessed June12,2021), and Press Release, “Team Telecom Recommends that theFCC Deny Pacific Light CableNetwork System’s Hong Kong Undersea Cable Connection to theUnited States,” Media Note: Welcoming theInaugural Meeting oftheBlueDotNetwork Executive Consultation Group, June7, 2021, https://www.state.gov/welcoming-the-inaugural- “Fact Sheet: The United States Partners withAustralia andJapanto ExpandReliable andSecure DigitalConnectivity inPalau,” The U.S. Department ofState, and“The “Fact Sheet: The United States Partners withAustralia andJapanto ExpandReliable andSecure DigitalConnectivity in Palau,” U.S. Department ofState, October Press Release, “OPIC to SupportWorld’s Longest SubseaTelecommunications Cable,” U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, November 5, 2019, “PNG Resists Pressure, Sticks withHuawei,” RadioNew Zealand, November 28,2018, https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/376997/png-resists-pressure- “How GeopoliticsShapedChile’s Trans-Pacific Cable Route,” Bnamericas,July31,2020, https://www.bnamericas.com/en/analysis/how-geopolitics-shaped-chiles- Jonathan Barrett, “Exclusive: U.S. Warns Pacific islandsaboutChineseBid for Undersea Cable Project—Sources,” Reuters, December 16,2020, https://www.reuters.com/ Telecom Modernization,” Wiley, October 1,2020, https://www.wiley.law/alert-FCC-Unanimously-Approves-Initial-Phase-of-Team-Telecom-Modernization (accessed The United States andEurope: AConcrete Agenda for Transatlantic Cooperation onChina,U.S. Senate Committee onForeign Relations, p. 118. (PLCN), June17, 2020, https://www.ntia.doc.gov/fcc-filing/2020/executive-branch-recommendation-partial-denial-and-partial-grant-application (accessed June12, 2019), pp. 45 and77, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/Chairman-Xi/Chairman-Xi.pdf (accessed April23,2021). 2021), andKate O’Keeffe, Drew FitzGerald, andJeremy Page, “National Security Concerns Threaten UnderseaBacked Data Link by Google, Facebook,” The Wall Street 29, 2020, https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-partners-with-australia-and-japan-to-expand-reliable-and-secure-digital-connectivity-in-palau/index.html com/world/asia-pacific/exclusive-pacific-undersea-cable-project-sinks-after-us-warns-against-chinese-2021-06-18/ (accessed June21, 2021). certain-entities-to-the-entity-list-and-revision-of-entries-on-the-entity-list. Virginia Tech Center for Power Electronics Systems, CPESAnnualReport 2020 , 2020, https://cpes.vt.edu/library/download/30933 (accessed June12,2021). (accessed June21,2021), andDrew FitzGerald andNewley “Facebook Purnell, Drops Planto RunFiberCableto HongKong AmidU.S. Pressure,” The Wall Street (accessed June12, 2021). (accessed June12,2021), Reuters Staff, “Australia, Japan, U.S. to Fund Cable for Pacific Islandof Palau,” Reuters, October 27, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/ (accessed June21, 2021). sticks-with-huawei (accessed June21,2021). attachments/FCC-20-133A6.pdf (accessed June12,2021). attachments/FCC-20-133A6.pdf (accessed June12,2021). Military Reforms, ed.PhillipP. Saunders, ArthurS.Ding,Andrew Scobell, Andrew N.D. Yang, andJoelWuthnow (Washington: National Defense University Press, Executive Branch Recommendation for aPartial DenialandPartial Grant of theApplication for aSubmarineCable Landing License for thePacific Light Cable Network article/us-china-pacific-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-warns-pacific-islands-about-chinese-bid-for-undersea-cable-project-sources-idUSKBN28R0L2 (accessed June21, 2021). Contract to SupplythePalau Cable2(PC2)OpticalSubmarineCable,” NEC, January14, 2021, https://www.nec.com/en/press/202101/global_20210114_02.html network-system-s-hong-kong-undersea (accessed June12,2021), U.S. Department ofCommerce, National Telecommunications andInformation Administration, meeting-of-the-blue-dot-network-executive-consultation-group (accessed June21,2021), andDavid Brunnstrom andMichael Martina,“U.S. SaysL at QuadMeeting releases/launch-multi-stakeholder-blue-dot-network (accessed June21,2021). palau-cable-australia-int/australia-japan-u-s-to-fund-cable-for-pacific-island-of-palau-idUSKBN27D0FK (accessed June12,2021), andPress Release, “NEC Concludes pdf (accessed June21,2021). us_business_f (accessed June12,2021). United States Department ofJustice Office Public of Affairs, June 17, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/team-telecom-recommends-fcc-deny-pacific-light-cable- trans-pacific-cable-route (accessed June12,2021). News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf (accessed April23,2021). Launch ofMulti-Stakeholder BlueDotNetwork,” U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, November 4, 2019, https://www.dfc.gov/media/opic-press- Development Finance Corporation, Information “Public Summary: Trans Pacific Networks,” https://www.dfc.gov/sites/default/files/media/documents/9000093543. internationaldealmaking/2020/09/14/facebook-drops-san-francisco-hong-kong-submarine-cable-amid-growing-national-securityconcerns,109606444-art; in Fall Focused onInfrastructure,” Reuters, May 26, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-says-looking-quad-meeting-fall-focused-infrastructure-2021-05-26/ https://www.aspi.org.au/report/picking-flowers-making-honey (accessed June12,2021) https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-at-a-press-availability-10/index.html (accessed June12,2021). https://www.dfc.gov/media/opic-press-releases/opic-support-worlds-longest-subsea-telecommunications-cable (accessed June21,2021), andU.S. International China Transparency Report  141 The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org Heritage Foundation The html (accessed April 24, 2021). April 24, (accessed html hearings/advancing-effective-us-policy-for-strategic-competition-with-china-in-the-twenty-first-century-031721 (accessed April 24, 2021). 24, April (accessed hearings/advancing-effective-us-policy-for-strategic-competition-with-china-in-the-twenty-first-century-031721 POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF (accessed April 25, 2021). April 25, (accessed POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF 2021). April 25, (accessed https://amti.csis.org/still-on-the-beat-china-coast-guard-patrols-in-2020/ 2020, 4, December U.S. Senate, March 9, 2021, pp. 47–48, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/21-10_03-09-2021.pdf (accessed April 25, 2021). April 25, (accessed https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/21-10_03-09-2021.pdf 47–48, pp. 2021, 9, March Senate, U.S. filipino-reporters-chased-by-armed-chinese-ships-in-disputed-sea (accessed April 24, 2021). 24, April (accessed filipino-reporters-chased-by-armed-chinese-ships-in-disputed-sea andrewerickson.com/2020/12/the-china-maritime-militia-bookshelf-latest-data-official-statements-wikipedia-entry-now-force-size/ (accessed April 24, 2021). 24, April (accessed andrewerickson.com/2020/12/the-china-maritime-militia-bookshelf-latest-data-official-statements-wikipedia-entry-now-force-size/ https://www.foreign.senate.gov/ 2021, 17, March Senate, U.S. Relations, on Foreign , Committee Century with China in the Twenty-First Competition Strategic for Policy expanding-bases-near-south-china-sea (accessed April 25, 2021). April 25, (accessed expanding-bases-near-south-china-sea , Committee on Armed Services, on Armed Services, , Committee Program Years Defense Future and the 2022 Year for Fiscal Request Authorization of the Defense Review Command in Indo-Pacific sub-launched-strategic-missile/ (accessed April 25, 2021). April 25, (accessed sub-launched-strategic-missile/ security-age-chinese-mega-cutter/ (accessed April 24, 2021). April 24, (accessed security-age-chinese-mega-cutter/ org/sites/default/files/2021-02/SR242.pdf. content/1195595.shtml (accessed April 25, 2021). April 25, (accessed content/1195595.shtml , Generated August 21, 2020, p. 49, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY- 49, p. 21, 2020, August , Generated Congress to Annual Report China 2020: in 2020,” Patrols Guard China Coast on the Beat: “Still Initiative, Maritime Security Asia Studies, and International Strategic for and Center 80 and 101–102, , pp. Congress No. 15, pp. 3–4, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=cmsi-red-books (accessed April 23, 2021). April 23, (accessed https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=cmsi-red-books 3–4, pp. 15, No. Study , June 13, 2019, https://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-tests-new- , June 13, 2019, Beacon Free Washington The Missile,” Sub-Launched Strategic New Tests Bill Gertz, “China 27–40. pp. 2020), Press, Institute MD: Naval (Annapolis, Power Naval Century First China as a Twenty Michael A. McDevitt, States on United Testimony Receive of Hearing to transcript stenographic Command, in Pacific States United Commander, Philip S. Davidson, of Admiral Testimony Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of of Republic the People’s Involving Developments and Security Military of Defense, of the Secretary Office of Defense, Department in U.S. Units,” “Major Naval Table, https://news.usni.org/2020/12/29/chinese-navy- 2020, 29, December News, Institute Naval U.S. Expanding Bases Sea,” Near South China Navy “Chinese H. I. Sutton, to Annual Report China 2020: of Republic the People’s Involving Developments and Security Military of Defense, of the Secretary Office of Defense, Department U.S. Lyle S. Erickson, , ed. Andrew Nuclear Submarine Force Future in China’s Submarine Fleet,” Ballistic-Missile New China’s into Insights War “Cold G. Loewenthal, Robert No. 242, February 18, 2021, p.19, https://www.heritage. p.19, 18, 2021, February 242, No. Special Report Heritage Foundation Navy,” States United The Military: America’s “Rebuilding Sadler, D. Brent https://www. 2020, 19, December Size!” Now—Force & Entry… Wikipedia Statements, Official Data, Latest China Maritime Militia Bookshelf: “The S. Erickson, Andrew U.S. Effective in hearing, Advancing in the Indo-Pacific” of the Military Balance An Assessment and Uncertainty: Timelines on “Trends, A. Shugart III, statement Thomas Ryan D. Martinson, “East Asian Security in the Age of the Chinese Mega-Cutter,” Center for International Maritime Security, July 3, 2015, https://cimsec.org/east-asian- 2015, July 3, Security, Maritime International for Center of the Chinese Mega-Cutter,” in the Age Asian Security “East Martinson, D. Ryan https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-09/ 2021, April 9, Bloomberg, Sea,” in Disputed Crew News Chases Philippines’ Navy Philip Heijmans, “Chinese https://www.globaltimes.cn/ 2020, , July 25, Global Times of S. China Sea,” on Doorstep Ammunition’ ‘Powerful Maritime Drills Featuring Starts “PLA Liu Xuanzun, , China Morning Post South States,’” the United to South China Sea in ‘Warning Killer’ into Missile ‘Aircraft-Carrier Chinese Military Fires Huang, “Exclusive: Kristin China Maritime China Maritime Maritime Institute, China College, War Naval , U.S. Strategy Maritime Dispute in Chinese Power Sea of Role The Defense: Echelon Martinson, D. Ryan https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/07/china-refuses-to-quit-on-the-philippines. July 22, 2020, Blog, RAND Philippines,” Quit on the to Refuses “China Grossman, Derek August 26, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3098972/chinese-military-launches-two-missiles-south-china-sea-warning (accessed (accessed https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3098972/chinese-military-launches-two-missiles-south-china-sea-warning 2020, 26, August 2021). April 25, J. Goldstein, William S. Murray, and Andrew R. Wilson (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), pp. 300–301. pp. 2007), Press, Institute MD: Naval (Annapolis, R. Wilson and Andrew S. Murray, William Goldstein, J. 8. 6. 9. 5. 3. 16. 17. 18. 13. 14. 15. 12. 10. 11. 4. 7.

Founded in 1973, The Heritage Foundation is a research and educational institution—a think tank—whose mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense.

We believe the principles and ideas of the American Founding are worth conserving and renewing. As policy entrepreneurs, we believe the most effective solutions are consistent with those ideas and principles. Our vision is to build an America where freedom, opportunity, prosperity, and civil society flourish.

Heritage’s staff pursues this mission by performing timely, accurate research on key policy issues and effectively marketing these findings to our primary audiences: members of Congress, key congressional staff members, policymakers in the executive branch, the nation’s news media, and the academic and policy communities.

Governed by an independent Board of Trustees, The Heritage Foundation is an independent, tax-exempt institution. Heritage relies on the private financial support of the general public—individuals, foundations, and corporations—for its income, and accepts no government funds and performs no contract work. Heritage is one of the nation’s largest public policy research organizations. Hundreds of thousands of individual members make it one of the most broadly supported think tanks in America.

For more information, or to support our work, please contact The Heritage Foundation at (800) 544-4843 or visit heritage.org.

ISBN 978-0-89195-304-3

9 780891 953043