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The Rise of Populist Sovereignism THE RISE OF POPULIST SOVEREIGNISM WHAT IT IS, WHERE IT COMES FROM, AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies SECURITY HCSS helps governments, non-governmental organizations and the private sector to understand the fast-changing environment and seeks to anticipate the challenges of the future with practical policy solutions and advice. This report is from the HCSS theme SECURITY. Our other themes are RESOURCES and GLOBAL TRENDS. SECURITY HCSS identifies and analyzes the developments that shape our security environment. We show the intricate and dynamic relations between political, military, economic, social, environmental, and technological drivers that shape policy space. Our strengths are a unique methodological base, deep domain knowledge and an extensive international network of partners. HCSS assists in formulating and evaluating policy options on the basis of an integrated approach to security challenges and security solutions. THE RISE OF POPULIST SOVEREIGNISM: WHAT IT IS, WHERE IT COMES FROM, AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) ISBN/EAN: 978-94-92102-59-1 Authors: Stephan De Spiegeleire, Clarissa Skinner and Tim Sweijs Contributors: Mateus Mendonça Oliveira, Rianne Siebenga, Frank Bekkers, Nicholas Farnham Overall project team: Tim Sweijs (project leader), Stephan De Spiegeleire, Clarissa Skinner, Mateus Mendonça Oliveira, Rianne Siebenga, Frank Bekkers, Ekaterina Novak, Bastiaan van Manen, Henry Fersko, June Vasconcellos, Paula Faber, Karlijn Jans, Nicholas Farnham and Yulya Solodovnik This Report has been commissioned by the Netherlands’ Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense within the PROGRESS Program, Lot 5, 2017. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed rests solely with the authors; publication does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. © 2017 The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. All rights reserved. No part of this report may be reproduced and/or published in any form by print, photo print, microfilm or any other means without prior written permission from HCSS. All images are subject to the licenses of their respective owners Visuals: Bastiaan van Manen Desktop Publishing and Design: Ekaterina Novak, based on a design by Maartje de Sonnaville The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies Lange Voorhout 16 [email protected] 2514 EE The Hague HCSS.NL The Netherlands THE RISE OF POPULIST SOVEREIGNISM WHAT IT IS, WHERE IT COMES FROM, AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) . TABLES PB The Rise of PoPulisT soveReignism hCSS RePort 5 Table of Contents Executive Summary ii What Populist Sovereignism Is About ii What PopSov Parties Want iv Nation of ‘the People’: Popular Rule and Protection of the Nation-State vi Revising the Liberal World Order: The Nation-State in the International Arena vi Stability and Influence: International Relations and Alliances vi The Foreign and Defense Policies of Populist Sovereignist Parties vi Scenarios and Implications vii Foreign and Security Policy Starts at Home viii Do Not Ostracize PopSovism viii Give Democracy a Chance ix Defense, Foreign and Security Policy Priorities ix What Should Europe and the Netherlands Do? x PopSovism as a Challenge and an Opportunity xiii 1 Introduction 18 2 Populist Sovereignism 23 2.1 Introduction 23 2.2 What Is Populism? 26 2.3 What is Sovereignism? 32 2.4 Bringing the Two Concepts Together: Populist Sovereignism 36 3 Where Does PopSov Come from? 43 3.1 Demand-Side Explanations: Economic Insecurity and Cultural Backlash 44 3.1.1 Economic Insecurity 44 3.1.2 Cultural and Physical Insecurity 47 3.1.3 Bridging Economic Insecurity and Cultural Backlash: Globalization 48 3.2 Supply-Side Explanations: Elite Consensus and Ideological Convergence among Mainstream Parties 52 4 A Benchmark of PopSov Policy Manifestos 56 4.1 Methodology 57 4.1.1 Selection of Populist Sovereignist Parties 58 4.1.2 Coding Scheme and Process 61 4.2 Populist Sovereignism in Europe and the United States 62 4.3 Nation of ‘the People’: Popular Rule and Protection of the Nation-State 65 4.3.1 Direct Democracy 66 4.3.2 National Culture and Way of Life 69 4.3.3 Immigration and Refugees 71 4.3.4 Border Controls and Territorial Security 73 4.4 Revising the Liberal World Order: The Nation-State in the International Arena 75 4.4.1 National Sovereignty versus Liberal Internationalism 76 4.4.2 Attitudes towards the EU 79 4.4.3 Economic Nationalism versus the Liberal Economic Order 80 4.5 Stability and Influence: International Relations and Alliances 83 4.5.1 European Union Defense Cooperation 84 4.5.2 NATO and the Transatlantic Alliance 86 4.5.3 Relations with Russia 88 4.6 Focusing on Home: The Foreign and Defense Policies of Populist Sovereignist Parties 90 4.6.1 Military Capabilities 91 4.6.2 Military Intervention 93 4.6.3 Development Aid and Promoting Democracy and Human Rights Abroad 95 4.7 Findings and Key Takeaways 97 4.7.1 Support for Populist Sovereignist Parties in Europe and the US 97 4.7.2 Nation of the People: Popular Rule and the Protection of the Nation-State 98 4.7.3 Revising the Liberal World Order: The Nation-State in the International Arena 99 4.7.4 Stability and Influence: International Relations and Alliances 100 4.7.5 Focusing on Home: Foreign and Defense Policies 101 4.7.6 What Does This Mean? 102 5 Potential Implications for International Security 104 5.1 Introduction 104 5.2 Four Scenarios 106 5.2.1 Living in a PopSov World 106 5.2.2 The Clash of PopSovs 108 5.2.3 War in the European Union? 110 5.2.4 Upwards and Onwards! 113 5.3 Cross-Scenario Implications and Policy Options 115 5.3.1 Overall Implications and Policy Options 116 5.3.2 European Foreign, Security and Defense Policy 124 5.3.3 Dutch Foreign, Security and Defense Policy 137 6 Conclusion – PopSovism as a Challenge and an Opportunity 145 Bibliography 150 Annex A: Method for Coding PopSov Party Manifestos ii A.1 Selecting the parties ii A.2 Selecting the documents v A.3 The coding process vii A.3.1 Developing the coding scheme vii A.3.2 Coding scheme for policy positions viii A.3.3 Reliability of the Coding xii Annex B: Scenario Parameters – Method xvi B.1 PopSov Quotient – Europe / Global xvi B.2 The European Union: Its heft in the world x its internal decision-making efficiency xvi B.3 NATO: US interest in NATO x balance in EU-US partnership x degree of shared threat assessment xvii B.4 Economic situation: Europe/globally xviii B.5 Conflict and war xviii B.6 Regional cooperation (in Europe, Africa and Asia) xix B.7 European neighborhood (Eastern and Southern borders) xix B.8 Relations with Russia / China xx B.9 Overviews – by scenario and by parameter xx Bibliography for Annexes xxiii Table of Figures Figure 1.1 Populist sovereignist parties in national legislatures of selected countries iv Figure 1.2 Results of the Benchmark: Positions of PopSov Parties v Table 2.1 Frameworks for understanding populism 27 Textbox 2.1 Why sovereignism and not nationalism? 37 Table 2.2 Characteristics of Populist Sovereignism 41 Figure 3.1 Unemployment rate among low, medium, and high skilled workers in selected European OECD countries and US (1990-2015) 45 Figure 3.2 Share of temporary contracts in selected European OECD countries and US (1980- 2015) 46 Figure 3.3 Labor income share as a percentage of GDP in selected EU OECD countries and US (1958-2015) 46 Figure 3.4 Share of immigrants in the total population (1983 – 2014) 50 Figure 3.5 Confidence in the EU in selected EU countries (1995-2014) 51 Figure 3.6 Confidence in the UN in selected EU countries and the US (1995-2014) 51 Figure 3.7 Confidence in political parties in the European and North American countries (1995-2015) 53 Table 4.1 Final list of populist sovereignist parties 60 Figure 4.1 Populist sovereignist parties in national legislatures of selected countries 64 Figure 4.2 Percent of seats country’s European Parliament seats held by populist sovereignist parties 65 Figure 4.3 Coding results for ‘Direct Democracy’ 67 Figure 4.4 Coding results for ‘National Culture and Way of Life’ 69 Figure 4.5 Coding results for ‘Immigration and Refugees’ 72 Figure 4.6 Coding results for ‘Border Controls and Territorial Security’ 74 Figure 4.7 Coding results for ‘National Sovereignty versus Liberal Internationalism’ 76 Figure 4.8 Coding results for ‘Taking back control’ 78 Figure 4.9 Coding results for ‘Attitudes towards the EU’ 80 Figure 4.10 Coding results for ‘Economic Nationalism versus the Liberal Economic Order’ 81 Figure 4.11 Coding results for ‘European Defense Cooperation’ 84 Figure 4.12 Coding results for ‘NATO and the Transatlantic Alliance’ 86 Figure 4.13 Coding results for ‘Relations with Russia’ 88 Figure 4.14 Coding results for ‘Military Capabilities’ 91 Figure 4.15 Coding results for ‘Military Intervention’ 94 Figure 4.16 Coding results for ‘Development Aid and Promoting Democracy and Human Rights Abroad’ 96 Figure 5.1 Scenario 1: Living in a PopSov world 106 Figure 5.2 Scenario 2: The clash of PopSovs 109 Figure 5.3 Scenario 3: War in the European Union? 111 Figure 5.4 Scenario 4: Upwards and onwards! 113 Figure 5.5 EU’s (possible) countervailing role in strengthening the European market 129 Texbox 5.1 EU initiatives to deal with the impact of globalization 129 Texbox 5.2 What is a ‘cooperation portfolio’? 134 Texbox 5.3 Box on Dutch PopSovism 137 Table A.1 Final list of populist sovereignist parties iv Figure A.1 Year of document publication vii Figure A.2 Percent of total excerpts for a party taken from an official document versus a speech or op-ed vii Table A.2 Inter-rater reliability for coding of manifestos and policy documents xiv Figure B.1 Parameter values by scenario xx Figure B.2 Parameter values by parameter xxi ‘In the name of the people’ will be my slogan.
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